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
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

DR. AUGUSTUS NEANDER.

"Wir sehen jetzt durch einen Spiegel in einem dunkeln Worte, dann aber von Angesicht zu Angesicht."



GENERAL HISTORY

OF THE

CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND CHURCH:

FROM THE GERMAN OF

DR. AUGUSTUS NEANDER.

TRANSLATED ACCORDING TO THE LATEST EDITION.

BY

JOSEPH TORREY,

PROFESSOR OF MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT.

"My kingdom is not of this world." "The kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven." — *Words of our Lord.*
"The Lord is that Spirit; and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." — *Words of the Apostle Paul.*
"En Jésus-Christ toutes les contradictions sont accordées." — *Pascal*

VOLUME FIRST:

COMPRISING THE FIRST GREAT DIVISION OF THE HISTORY

ELEVENTH AMERICAN EDITION,

REVISED, CORRECTED, AND ENLARGED.

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PUBLISHED BY HURD AND HOUGHTON.
BOSTON: H. O. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY.
Cambridge: The Riverside Press.

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PREFACE.

The present new and improved edition of Neander's Church History is offered to the public in accordance with the last wishes of the translator. It embodies the results of his final labors in the revision of the second volume, — a revision which was, to a great extent, a retranslation. This volume now conforms to the author's latest edition, and contains many important alterations, together with much matter that is entirely new. Some of the more noticeable of these changes will be found in the account of the Emperor Julian; in the section, generally, relating to Christian life; and in the first part of the section relating to Christian doctrine. The English version of the interesting introduction by Ullmann, which will be found at the beginning of the first volume, is also due to the translator of the whole work. It will be welcomed by those in whom gratitude for the labors to which Neander devoted his life may have excited the desire to form a nearer acquaintance with the man himself. Each volume has undergone careful correction, and the improved and enlarged indexes will render the whole work more useful for purposes of consultation and reference.

Thanks are due to Dr. Schneider, of Schleswig, long intimately associated with Neander, and editor of Vol. V., for some important corrections in the original text.

It is hoped that, by the favor of God, the work, in this its more perfect shape, will now enter upon a yet more extended career of usefulness.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST VOLUME.

The translator deems it proper to state that his labors on Neander began, and were prosecuted to the completion of several successive volumes or parts of the present work, many years ago, though not before a partial translation of the same work had already appeared in England.

He has certainly no reason to regret, but rather much reason to congratulate himself, that his first translation did not find its way to the press. In 1843 Dr. Neander sent forth a second edition of the first volume of his work, embracing the history of the church in the first three centuries. In this new edition the alterations are numerous and important. The great features of the original work, its method and spirit, are, indeed, faithfully preserved; but in other respects there are very decided improvements.

These important changes, occurring not here and there, but through entire pages and paragraphs, have made it necessary to translate nearly the whole of the first volume anew. The translator has submitted to this labor with the more cheerfulness, as it enables him to present the work to the English reader in the form in which Dr. Neander has been pleased to express his wish that it should appear.

It has been, throughout, the translator's aim and effort to render a faithful version of the original. He has never felt himself at liberty, on any pretense whatever, to add anything to the text or to omit anything from it. He has never resorted to notes for the purpose of explaining anything which could be made sufficiently clear in the place where it stands. On the extreme difficulty of giving an exact rendering in English of an author's language, so exceedingly idiomatic, so thoroughly German in all his habits of thought and modes of expression as the author of this History, he need not enlarge. If allowance be made for the slight but necessary modifications which for this reason have sometimes been resorted to, the translator believes it will be found, that, as he has clearly conceived his author's meaning, so he has faithfully expressed it in some form of English that can be understood.

In conclusion, he would take this occasion to express his grateful acknowledgments to all those friends who have encouraged and assisted him in the execution of his task; and in a very particular manner to the Rev. Joseph Tracy, whose consent to overlook the proof-sheets before they came under the translator's final revision was an act of real kindness, which will not by him be very easily forgotten.

PREFACE BY DR. C. ULLMANN.

When the friendly publisher of this work proposed intrusting me with the responsible office of introducing this new edition of Neander's Church History by a preface, I felt, as was but natural, much hesitation about accepting it; although if the simple question had been, whether I deemed myself competent to write anything proportionate to the character and importance of so great a work, I must certainly have declined, with grateful acknowledgments, the honorable task required of me. But the wish to contribute, though it might be but slightly, towards the promotion of so noble an enterprise, finally prevailed over my scruples; and with a heart full of reverential regard for the beloved teacher and friend who has left us, I venture to place before the solid contents of these richly furnished volumes a few pages designed to set forth, in general outline at least, the peculiar merits of Neander in the province of Church History. In so doing I shall honestly endeavor to speak the truth in love, and, concerning a man who himself held everything like false show and pretense in utter abhorrence, to be careful not to say anything which I could not answer for with a good conscience.

The immediate outward occasion of Neander's undertaking to write his General History of the Christian Religion and Church was given by a very dearly beloved and intimate friend of his, the long-to-be-remembered Friedrich Perthes, father of the present publisher. Perthes wished to see Neander's work "on the Emperor Julian and his Times" republished in a larger form, so as to embrace a connected view of Christianity under Constantine and Julian. Neander commenced the work; but soon finding himself carried beyond the prescribed limits, he was led to conceive the plan — welcomed with still greater delight by Perthes — of writing a complete Church History.

Thus it appears that the first impulse to this great undertaking came undoubtedly from another; and Neander informed Perthes, on completing the First Part in the summer of 1825, that he embarked on the serious enterprise "with fear and trembling," pain-

fully sensible how very far short his execution of such a work must fall of the ideal ever present before his mind. If any person should conclude from all this, however, that he did not at the same time feel in the very depths of his being the impulse of a higher call, or that he did not apply himself to the work with that full, divine, and cheerful alacrity which nothing short of such a call can inspire, such a person would be very far from having a correct understanding of the case as it really was; for that this highest of influences, which impels and elevates the man from within, was also present with him in the fullest measure, Neander's whole being and mode of working assure us; whilst this very work itself, carried forward with inflexible perseverance through manifold difficulties and hinderances, gives incontestible evidence of the same thing.

If it is commonly the case that in all higher mental productions of the genuine stamp the whole man reflects himself, and that remarkable works can be produced only by remarkable individuals, this holds eminently true of Neander's productions, and especially of the work in which the collected harvest of his life has been deposited, — his General History of the Church. It is a life-like expression throughout of the author's personality, presupposing in all its parts a peculiarity of gifts as well as a development of life, outward and inward, such as among all who lived in the same period was to be found only in Neander. But with no less truth may it be said on the other hand, that precisely this personality, so peculiarly his own, was in all respects suited also for the fulfillment of an altogether special mission amongst his contemporaries; and this mission, intrusted to him by a higher Hand, and which, while it penetrated to the inmost depths of his own life, was at the same time of world-wide significance, Neander fulfilled, not so much as a theologian in general, but rather and more particularly as a *Church historian*, yet to be sure, also, as *that* Church historian whom a special experience of life and of heart (the *pectus*) had made a theologian and a writer of the history of Christianity.

To appreciate in this sense the significance of Neander's character, we must go back to his times, that is to say, to the time when he first became known to the public, as well as to the times of his later activity.

When he first came upon the stage of active life, although creative beginnings, auspicious of a new and better future, had already begun to manifest themselves, yet in the widest circles there still prevailed an indifferent, not to say a hostile, feeling towards Christianity. The humanitarian doctrines of that philosophical age had

left behind them, especially among the educated, a great religious desolation and prostration; and the minds of the majority in that age were in a great measure estranged not only from the clearly defined religion of the church, but also from everything positive and vital in Christianity. The fundamental positions of faith whereby the evangelical church had maintained her existence, and whereby alone she still continues to exist as evangelical, were in part openly attacked, in part evaporated away to commonplace formulas, or tacitly set aside; and Christianity itself was treated after a fashion very little in accordance with its true original character, its lofty, all-commanding historical position, and with the creative products to which it had given birth in the course of ages. The dominant schools of theology went on the principle of divesting it entirely of its positive and divine character, and, by separating away from it those integrant parts which are the most deeply religious, of shaping it altogether into conformity with those points of view which have regard only to morals and to practical utility. But even those schools which, by express recognition of the supernatural element in Christianity, preserved more fully its substantial contents, still treated them, however, in a very abstract way, merely as a summary of doctrinal determinations, and were very far from truly doing justice to the whole historical and ideal fullness of those contents, particularly to the central significancy of the personal being of Christ, and whatever is therewith connected.

All this, to be sure, was changed even during Neander's lifetime, and with his own very effective coöperation. Through the goodness of God, and in consequence of mighty interpositions of his providence, a new spirit of faith was awakened, and theology experienced from its very foundation a most salutary revival and reformation. But another eventful and unavoidable phenomenon now presented itself. This very revival, which impressed on the church and on theology a more decided stamp of the Christ-like spirit, excited the negative and lax tendency, on the other hand, to develop more fully whatever consequences were contained in it; nay, to push them to the extreme of a downright breach with the purely Christian element; and so accordingly, while the older rationalism continued still to pursue in certain quarters its wonted course, there arose a livelier struggle between old and new, a deep-reaching schism among thinking minds, a conflict of direct oppositions within the domains of the church and of science, whereby, no doubt, a mightier impulse was given to life; but, at the same time, the healthy development of the church was hindered and prevented by manifold causes of diversion and of confusion.

Now *Church History* — and under this name we would include all historical theology — has at all times and for each several time a vocation of *decisive importance.* It is, not less than the other principal theological disciplines, a fundamentally important factor towards the true and full understanding of Christianity. For Christianity itself is, in fact, when considered according to its most proper essence, *a history.* It is not merely something in thought, but something actual, a real carrying into effect of God's plan of salvation; and it is this as a sum of divine facts of salvation, which, unfolding themselves under the divine guidance in a connected series of preparatory events, and finally gathered up for completion in the divine and human person and work of the Saviour of the world, were placed in the centre of history in order that they might ever afterwards serve as the central impelling force for the collective development of humanity, and for bringing about an altogether new condition, not only of individuals, but of the entire race. No otherwise, therefore, can it be fully comprehended than *historically;* and precisely from its history must be gathered the strongest, but especially the most direct and popularly effective *proofs*, of its invincible divine power to save and to create anew; for if it is to be made out anywhere, objectively and practically, that this religion is of God, surely it must be first of all from the consideration of its historical effects; and if we have good cause to believe in the governing, training, and perfecting agency of our exalted Redeemer, the reasons for so believing must be deducible, first of all, from the fortunes of his church, as a whole, and in all its parts.

But if Church History has, in general and for all times alike, so great a function to fulfill, the importance of its office becomes in no inconsiderable degree enhanced in an age like that which we have just described. Then is *it* especially called upon to establish beyond controversy the historical ground-character of Christianity, and its true documentary foundation, to demonstrate its supreme position as a ruling force in the world, to prove the creative energy dwelling within it by the exuberant fullness of life displayed in its effects, and to make these effects speak, with convincing evidence, of the controlling agency of the eternal King and Head of the Church. Then will it be preëminently the part of *Church History* to animate faith by high examples, to overcome doubts by facts, to dispel the shadowy dreams of abstraction by vigorous realities, to bring out the significance of whatsoever is personal, concrete, and strongly marked in character, and to revive in the hearts of men a *home-bred love*, so to express it, for all the great, beautiful, and soul-

elevating traits, in conduct or character, which the church has to exhibit in different periods of time. Then is it this, above all other kinds of discipline, which must again and again refer contending parties to the immovable personal centre of all that is Christ-like, to the *one thing* needful; which must preserve the just mean between all extremes; assist in curing and restoring the sickly and the morbid, and exercise a severe judicial function over everything that is out of the way, and which has already been judged and condemned in the by-gone ages.

If Church History is really to satisfy these demands, the first thing, indeed, which is requisite to this end is the *truth* of *facts*, — the investigation and verification of facts by all the means which science has to apply for this purpose. But here, with historical truth Christian truth perfectly coincides. In the case of the History of the Church, however, we are concerned not merely with the outward verification of single events as matters of fact, we need at the same time also the deeper knowledge and profound appreciation of the whole subject; and as in the case of all great historical phenomena, so, too, in relation to the facts of Christianity, this is not otherwise to be obtained than from an understanding of the spirit or principle which is working beneath them. Nor is it sufficient here that the principle be understood theoretically; it must rather have passed over and entered into the personal life and consciousness of the historian; for what has been justly said of the theologian, that in his case faith only leads to experience, and experience only to knowledge, applies in an especial manner to the church historian. It is only from the central standing-point of an actually experienced Christian faith that he will be enabled rightly to understand and fully to exhibit, in all the freshness of life, the whole development of Christianity; it is only when he applies himself to his work in this spirit that his contributions can have in their turn the profound influence which is needful on the life of his times, and that he will really be in a condition to operate with awakening and searching power on an unchristian age, to act as moderator, rebuker, and healer on a generation full of confusion, and torn asunder by party divisions.

These reflections naturally bring us back again to Neander. Among the friends and upholders of the newly awakened Christian life, and of the theology that grew out of it, beginning from the second *decennium* of the present century, it cannot be denied that he took a leading part and held a most influential position; and to *him* above all others was allotted the special vocation of working in the manner above described as a *church historian*. His contribu-

tions in this department created an epoch in the science, and had a powerful influence on the life of the times. Of these then, and more particularly of the work presented in this new edition to the public, we shall have to speak more fully. Since, however, all Neander's productions were, as already remarked, wholly the offspring of his own individuality, and conditioned by the course and shaping of his life, both internal and external, we must say a few words, in the first place, on this subject. We shall speak from our own personal recollections and with the interest of affection; but at the same time with the consciousness that, as in *all* individual life, so in the uncommon especially, there will always be something which cannot be described; and, moreover, we may refer here, since we can give nothing more of our own than a mere outline, to the fuller notices of Neander's characteristics which were furnished by other friends immediately after his death.

Whoever beheld Neander for the first time was immediately struck with something uncommon in his whole appearance. Before him stood one visibly presenting a marked contrast with other children of men, — especially with those educated for the world; but one who, through all his outside ungainliness, gave tokens of something strikingly significant. He appeared like a stranger in this world, hardly knowing how to help himself in the most ordinary concerns, and constantly needing help from others. But any one possessing the least degree of discernment into mental excellence could not fail very soon to discover that behind this outer veil lay a hidden glory of the inner man; and that, insufficient and unserviceable as his organs might be for the things that are seen, so much the stronger and keener were those of the inner man for the things of the higher and invisible world. But the first traits which manifested themselves to an intelligent observer in Neander's inner being were his incomparable integrity, purity of spirit, and child-like simplicity, — the pure and loyal seriousness of truth which unmistakably shone forth in whatever he said or did, constituting the atmosphere in which he lived and breathed. He was an Israelite indeed in whom there was no guile, — an *anima candida*, incapable of crafty concealment, and who would not practice the least deception even in sport. This thoroughly pure, this plain, child-like, and simple temper was not expressive, however, as a superficial observer might be inclined to suspect, of any sort of intellectual narrowness; but was based on a mind possessed of great depth of feeling, great power to bring things into living shape, generous and tender affections, and an uncommonly energetic, firm, and persevering will.

There was in Neander's nature an innate tendency to the ideal; and a strong vein of idealism runs through his whole being and manner of working. From earliest youth his thoughts strove upward to the Highest; his soul mounted steadily like a flame towards its source, and nowhere found repose but in the true and eternal Being; his proper innermost life refused to acknowledge this world as the true home of his soul. As a man of a kindred spirit remarked, "There was opened for him an internal eye, which in the darkness saw nothing but the light which broke in upon it." This ideal characteristic manifested itself, however, in different ways at different periods of his life, — in a way more strongly marked in his youth, and accompanied with a certain one-sided spirituality; more subduedly later in life, and in close union with a very serious and practical Christian realism.

During the impulsive period of his youth Neander applied himself with passionate devotion to the study of the ancient philosophy, and was especially inclined to Plato. He lived and moved in Platonic intuitions, at the same time engaging with his whole soul in the lively discussions of a friendly circle, in which *Romanticism*, then first rising into notice, and an intellectual *aristocraticism*, which was its twin sister, were fully domesticated. Yet this *speculative* and *poetic* enthusiasm, though it was of a pure and noble character, could not for any great length of time satisfy Neander. In heart he always clung fast to the friends of his youth; but his own intellectual life struck independently into other paths. A world of *thoughts* and *images*, however lofty and lovely, could not wholly fill his soul; for this soul was already too deeply penetrated with the sense of its moral needs, and too firmly held by the earlier experienced seriousness of life, — nothing could do *that* but a divine, and in the fullest sense, *real* life-salvation, which along with the revelation of *eternal truth* and *beauty*, should bring with it redemption from sin and all the powers of sanctification; and this real, redeeming, and sanctifying salvation unto life he found only in Christ and his gospel.

Neander, as it is well known, was of Jewish parentage, and first embraced Christianity in his seventeenth year. It was, therefore, the free choice of conviction which brought him into the Christian, particularly into the Evangelical Church. This conviction, nevertheless, genuine and serious as it certainly was, seems at first to have borne also itself the character of that intellectual bent by which Neander was, in the earlier period of his youth, generally governed. Christianity was, for him, the included total sum of the highest ideas, — the last and crowning apex as yet reached in the

progressive development of humanity. He prized it as the final result of a genuinely speculative and historical construction, rather than as a religion which he had already fully experienced and felt to be the power of God, — as a religion which had reached him practically, and whose influence had penetrated to the depths of his innermost being. But in correspondence with the high integrity and good faith of his surrender, Christianity gradually exercised upon him more and more of its regenerating, all-renovating power; and under the influence of Christian brethren of high standing in the church, but more especially by his own diligent and earnest study of holy Scripture, and soon also of the great ancient church teachers, that christianity of the intellect and of scientific speculation, with which Neander had begun, was gradually converted into a christianity of the heart and the life. He became the simply believing, child-like, evangelical Christian, standing wholly on the foundation of God's word, to which he humbly submitted himself. Such he showed himself to be in his later writings, and as such his friends learned to revere him.

Henceforth it was no longer some peculiar prize of highly gifted minds, or some lofty and remarkable form of the religious life, that Neander strove after. He found full satisfaction in the simple faith which he shared in common with all Christians. By this he stood personally united in the living fellowship of love with his Lord and Redeemer; and in the strength of it he loyally and humbly placed himself under the inward discipline of the Divine Spirit. Thus had he — to use a favorite expression of his own — learned to apprehend "the divine in the servant-form," and to take it up into his own life. He gave himself unreservedly to his Master's service as one "bound in spirit:" and no person could fall into serious intercourse with him without receiving the decided impression, that he was talking with a sincerely religious man, one sanctified and consecrated by a higher than earthly love.

Yet, even in the later period, that characteristic ideal tendency which seemed to be ingrained in his nature still continued to adhere to him. But this *idealism* was now entirely penetrated with the *reality* of Christianity, and thus, of itself, had taken an entirely new shape. It now manifested itself chiefly in the depth and heartiness of spirit with which Neander seized hold of Christianity, the sadly-serious view he took of earthly things, joined with an unwavering confidence in the triumph of the divine; but also, and at the same time, — since with depth and elevation of thought he united the full energy of the moral element, — in the unceasing activity with which he labored to promote the ends of God's king-

dom here on the earth, as the sum-in-brief of man's highest ideal interests; and in the undaunted spirit with which he kept up the contest against everything shallow and vulgar in thought and moral sentiment, against all Philistine-like, low-minded dogmatism, and against everything that betrayed the slightest tendency to materialism.

From what has now been said of Neander's prominent intellectual qualities and of his natural temperament, it may be seen that he was eminently fitted for the vocation of a *church historian*. It is true that he was by no means a stranger in practice, nor averse by natural disposition, to abstract speculation. But he was far more strongly attracted by concrete realities, by matters of fact, and things possessed of an actual fullness of life. He valued speculation only when — as he expressed it in speaking of Schelling's later philosophy — it took history for its point of departure, and kept constantly in view, as its main object, the understanding and interpretation of that which constitutes the inner essence of a history. But his Christian realism and the love with which it inspired him for all the manifold shapings of Christian life would incline him to lean more strongly to the side of *their* historical contemplation; and so much the more, as it was precisely by this means of historical contemplation and representation he might hope to satisfy the irresistible longing he felt within him to exert himself in behalf of practical religion and morality. But besides these there were other spiritual qualities which had special influence in leading him to choose for himself the historical path: an open and delicate sense for the peculiar and characteristic in individuals, in races of men, and in periods; a power of quick intuitive discernment; a strongly impelling spirit of inquiry, — a gift by which he was distinguished from his earliest youth; such a retentive memory for things and names as seemed to border on the miraculous; a sound and sober judgment, and a love which might be called innate, not only of truth itself, but of its simple, natural, and unsophisticated utterance.

To the development and profitable employment of all the gifts thus belonging to Neander's nature, or which were prepared by rich influences of divine grace within his heart, the fortunes of his life contributed in the most favorable manner. The Hamburg *Johanneum* secured to him a thoroughly learned, and, in Philology especially, a complete course of instruction; and in the preceptor Gurlitt, spite of his essentially different way of thinking, which soon showed itself, he met with a paternal counselor and practically helpful friend. His companionship with nobly emulous fel-

low-students, among whom stood prominent Sieveking, Chamisso, and Neumann, called forth, just as he was passing from the years of boyhood to those of the young man, the higher aspirations of his soul; and while it in a measure satisfied the deep feeling, in him early awakened, of the need of that close and intimate fellowship of minds which fructifies the life, it at the same time gave him a foretaste and a preparatory training for that social interchange of thoughts in which he was to be so bountiful a giver and receiver through the whole of his life. The University of Halle brought him under the powerfully stimulating, creative influence of Schleirmacher, then in his prime; and it was through his influence, more especially, that he was led to renounce his original purpose of studying jurisprudence as a profession, and to devote himself to theology; that he was fired with an ardent zeal in the prosecution of this study; in fact, that he was led to devote himself to the particular province of Church History, and to pursue his inquiries in the peculiar spirit which characterized his later labors in it. With the same fresh and stimulating food for thought he was not supplied, indeed, at Göttingen, whither, much against his will, he was compelled to go after the shutting up of the University of Halle; but it brought him, when he had now chosen Church History for his specialty, in contact with the first German church historian of the time, the venerble Planck, and in this man set before him a pattern of thorough learning united with the most excellent spirit. In Heidelberg, on the other hand, where Neander, after having passed a short candidateship at Hamburg, made his first experiment as a Docent, he found on all sides a glorious nature, refreshing to the spirits, and enjoyed a richer supply of intellectual stimulus, from such men as Daub, Creuzer, Schwarz, and others; and when, by his Essay on the Emperor Julian, — a production of great promise, — he suddenly became known in wider circles, and, like Melancthon when transferred to Wittenberg, received, while he was yet scarcely past the age of youth, a call to the first learned institution of Protestant Germany, the place was found where, under wider relations, for his whole life he was in a condition to form himself for working on a larger scale; to introduce, in companionship with the first theologians of the time, a new era of theological life; and, in the centre of this distinguished circle, to become by his spoken word and his writings a teacher of Germany.

On the mission thus plainly marked out for him by inward qualities and outward position, Neander entered with so single a purpose that his whole life went into it. He was one of the happy few who are never obliged to stand hesitating at the cross-ways of

different callings. His good angel distinctly pointed out to him the one right path, and into it he struck with the prompt decision of a most cheerful obedience. All the energy and all the time which God allotted to him were consecrated to the fulfillment of the great purpose of his life. Even the few hours of relaxation which he allowed himself, and that oftentimes only by constraint, meant nothing more for him than simply to get recruited for his work. From the outward world he had little need of secluding himself; his own nature had made him a recluse: and, bating the society of his most intimate friends, but especially of the young men his pupils, who always were so dear to him, he led, in the crowded throng of a city checkered with all the interests of the nineteenth century, the life of an ancient Benedictine. He would hardly allow himself to be broken off from his exercises by vacation excursions, into which, however, he was now and then beguiled by some artifice of affection; and even then he would not consent to lay wholly aside the folios or manuscripts, which he either took with him or hunted up by the way. It was with difficulty that even in his last sickness he could be restrained from going on with the continuation of his History of the Church.

Neander's labors were, of course, divided between his office as a teacher and his occupation as an author. In both of these spheres his efforts were directed to the same great object, as they proceeded from the same living principle; and this was nothing other than to awaken, or to strengthen and confirm in others, by all the means and methods of a faithfully applied science, the life of Christian faith in which he himself stood firmly grounded. In laboring as a teacher he did this most directly and personally; but in his labors also as an author, which, as regarded by Neander, were but a supplementary representative of the living, spoken word, he never for a moment lost out of view the great object to which his life was devoted.

The first thing, and nearest of all to his heart, was his office of Teacher. He was not of the class of teachers who neglect their immediate calling to secure success to themselves as authors. On the contrary, he devoted himself to it with the same conscientious diligence and care as if it were the sole business of his life. Though constantly laboring under an unsettled state of health, he could never satisfy himself with a mere perfunctory observance of the prescribed or customary hours of instruction, but did in them the utmost which his strength would allow him to do. He moreover subjected himself in all cases to a most careful preparation for his lectures, which were always a free reproduction of the fresh and

living truth, just as it lay in his mind, and not the mere repetition of lectures written and delivered before, — a circumstance which, connected with the rich and solid matter which was constantly presented to view, caused them to make the deeper impression, as bearing constant testimony to the triumphant power of the inner life over all the accidents of bodily infirmity and the hinderances thence resulting. But of still greater weight, by far, than all this was the noble temper in which Neander performed the office of a teacher, shown not by what he *did* merely, but by what he *was* for his pupils, even beyond the walls of the lecture-room. It was here that he exemplified, in its perfection and glory, that which Plato asks for in the heavenly, wing-producing Erōs, united with that seeking, helping, and saving love, of which the perfect type is to be found only in the gospel.

Neander was the kindest of friends, nay rather a father, to the young men who were recommended to his care; his whole, full heart was theirs; his care extended to their whole life. His supreme solicitude, indeed, was to guard them against everything low and vulgar, profane and immoral; to enkindle in them a desire for the ideal, the eternal, good, as the true end of life; to lead them first of all to Christ as the sole foundation of peace, and from this centre into the way of a healthy and vital theology. But, at the same time, he interested himself in inquiring, with the most delicate sympathy, into their outward condition and circumstances in life; and, wherever he could be of any use, proved to them a faithful helper and adviser. There was nothing which gave him greater pleasure than to come in contact with young men of frank and open dispositions, and who were susceptible of higher impressions; and into what close ties of friendship and affection he could enter with such persons we have a signal proof, in the tribute which he paid to the memory of that youthful friend of his, so early removed, the highly gifted Hermann Rossel. It might easily happen that Neander, who, as some one has justly remarked, had a better knowledge of *man* than of *men*, and was always inclined to believe and hope the best of every one, would sometimes be deceived in relations of this kind, and led to expend his sympathies on unworthy objects; but there was, again, precisely in this artless simplicity of affection a peculiar and moving power of attraction, whereby, without specially intending it, nay, without saying much, but simply letting the fullness of love in his heart flow quietly through his silent looks and deeds, he won for himself the confiding attachment of many a young man. Wherever he appeared, he was invariably greeted on all sides with marks of the sincerest respect and affec-

tion; and Rossel might justly salute him, as he did, as the "most beloved of teachers." His birthday was celebrated as a set annual festival by the young theologians of Berlin. At his death, no effort was spared by them to show, in a manner the most becoming, the last tokens of their respect; and the *Neander-foundation* still stands as a memorial of that lovely disposition which so endeared him to the youth. Neander's coming was to light up a fire in the souls of the young men; and hardly any other theological teacher of our age has succeeded in doing it so effectually.

But faithfully and lovingly as Neander pursued the duties of his calling in the academical circle, his eager desire to be useful would naturally prompt him to look beyond it. He felt that he was called upon to act as the teacher of a much wider community, not in the theological world merely, but in the great field of the Church at large and among all its members, but the educated especially. It was to this end, for the most part, that his *labors as an author* were directed; and, here, the thought ever uppermost with him was, to minister, though without neglecting in the least the claims of science, to the *truly* edifying instruction of all Christians who were capable of receiving it. And in this, too, he met with unprecedented success. Other contemporary theologians have, in the field of stricter science, exercised a deeper and more creative influence; but in respect to compass and extent of animating, warmth imparting, edifying efficiency beyond the pale of the school; in respect to abundance of living fruits as the result of such efficiency, surely no man is to be compared with Neander.

His activity as an author exhibits a progressive advancement from the *more particular* to the *more general;* from a narrower to a wider range of observation. First, the need of thorough inquiries in detail, as well as his own natural bent and inclination, which was to the concrete, the individual, and personal, led him to compose monographical essays; and it is generally known how much he accomplished in this narrower field, and on divers sides of it, by his works on Julian, and on the Gnostic systems; on St. Bernard, Chrysostom, and Tertullian; how by these writings he exhibited a model of, and furnished a stimulus to, historical composition, and excited an interest in the thorough study of Church History which was attended with the most fruitful effects. Still, a mind so fitted by nature to work on a grand scale could not be fully satisfied with writing the histories of individual lives and of single events; accordingly, he proceeded finally, after having first prepared the way by his work "On Memorable Things in the History of Christianity," to the representation of the development of the life of the

church as a whole. But in proportion as he advanced from the individual to the universal, in the same proportion did his field of vision enlarge from the narrow circle of the school to the wider field of the church. His style also gradually changed from the erudite style of the scholar to that of a father of the church; and pertinently was it said of him at his burial, that with him the last of the church fathers was consigned to the grave.

The maturest fruit of Neander's labors as an author is acknowledged, on all hands, to be his *General History of the Church;* and of this work, especially, it is our business in this preface to speak more at large. This we shall do with special reference to two particular points: first, to the learning displayed in this work; secondly, to the spirit, and method of treating the subject, both as to matter and as to form.

It must be owned that, as a product of learned investigation, Neander's Church History possesses a strongly marked significancy; and it may be well, in touching on this point, to say a word here respecting Neander considered as a man of learning generally.

He was a man *genuinely learned*, in the largest acceptation of the word. For the most part he kept himself wholly aloof from the traffic and chaffer of the theological and ecclesiastical market-place, — stepping forth from his solitude only now and then, on weighty occasions, particularly when questions came up which concerned the preservation of the free and healthy development of science and of the church from all outward hinderances, for the purpose of giving a mild and earnest expression of his own convictions, which, on this very account, generally, indeed, produced an effect so much the more decisive and prophet-like. So, too, he held in contempt that excessive indulgence of a merely literary taste, about which even gifted minds often waste a great deal of their time and energies. On the contrary, he kept steadily in view his main purpose and problem, and, without turning to the right hand or to the left, strove with the unwearying concentration of all his mental powers to reach its solution. Within the domain of Church History, nothing lay too far remote for him; he looked upon the whole of the immeasurable field as belonging to his province; but he knew also that a complete and reliable superstructure could only be erected on the foundation of particular facts, established by careful investigation; and hence, without ever losing sight of the fabric as a whole, he was, at the same time, faithfully attentive to the minutest parts. In him was to be found that severe self-restriction to a single object, that healthful *one-*

sidedness, that quiet, untiring perseverance, whereby, alone, decided success in any science is to be won; and he proved also, by his own example, that moral, no less than intellectual, qualities go to form a truly great man of learning.

One special characteristic, which proves that Neander was a genuinely learned man, was his habit of resorting directly to the right sources for his facts. He trusted to no other man's eyes, but used his own. He would not suffer his sight to be dimmed or confused by looking through the colored medium of this or that particular system; but was determined to see things just as they were actually presented by their own nature. His spoken word produced on those who heard him, as his writings do to this day on readers, this prevailing impression: here speaks one who has seen on the spot the things which he reports to us, — one who does not offer us stagnant water, taken from secondary side-channels, and mixed with foreign matter, but pure draughts from the fountain-head itself. This character of originality and freshness, indicating a man who speaks not from hearsay, but from sight and experience, is stamped upon everything that proceeded from Neander, and was the natural result of that full and thoroughly independent study of the sources, to which, with unflagging diligence, he devoted himself. Neander was no great reader of modern productions; but to the study of the original authorities, particularly of the old church fathers and of the mediæval writers, — a study more often recommended than pursued, — he applied himself with an earnestness and fidelity, such as had not been known for a long time before, and which could not fail to be followed with the happiest influence on the modern style generally of writing Church History. From these original authorities, which he examined critically in general and in detail, and with an unbiased love of truth, Neander brought many new things to light, giving the highest value to his labors, simply as bestowed on the materials. But the work especially in which, more than in any other, the results of his investigations have been brought together and embodied must, on this account, prove to the students of Church History, for generations to come, a mine of wealth, to which this progressive science will often have occasion to go back, whether for the purpose of refuting or of confirming.

But great and highly valuable as the learning of Neander undoubtedly was, yet, in estimating the qualities which constitute the essential and truly epoch-making superiority of his Church History, it was of minor account in comparison with the *new spirit*, which was once more introduced by him, and made to rule supreme in

this field of inquiry, — a spirit as decidedly and thoroughly Christian, as it was in its honest faithfulness large-hearted and liberal, — a spirit equally opposed to the rationalistic and worldly way of thinking, and to that tendency which would measure all the phenomena of Christianity merely by the standard of some particular ecclesiastical or philosophical formula, such as might happen to be in vogue for the time being.

In Neander's method of treating Church History, everything proceeds from one and the same centre as the point of departure; and this is none other than the central point of Christianity itself, — the living Christ as the son of God and the son of man, the Redeemer of a sinful world, and the eternal kingly head of the church. From this vital centre of the whole, appropriated by himself with a believing heart, Neander judges and appreciates all the historical phenomena. With him, Christianity is that divine principle of life, in the fullest sense divine, personally and actually brought down and implanted in humanity, for the redemption, regeneration, and renovation of individual men, of nations, and of the entire race, in the new and alone soul-saving way of faith, and of a faith laying hold on Christ and his righteousness; but the church is God's appointed organ for conveying these powers of redemption and sanctification, building itself on the same foundation of an inward faith which is the basis of Christianity itself. Regarding all events from this central position, Neander is thoroughly penetrated with an unshaken confidence in the triumph of the cause of Christ, as the cause of God himself in humanity; yet he is none the less persuaded that Christianity must at all times be represented under a regular and orderly church organization. Nor does he lose sight of the fact, that the kingdom of God founded by Christ realizes itself after a human and historical manner; that, in the process of this realization, that which is naturally and historically given is not to be destroyed, but only to be renewed and sanctified; nay, that with the human, the limited and the sinful also unavoidably find entrance into the Christian communion. He distinguishes therefore between Christianity itself, and its temporal, churchly, humanly individual features; appreciating the whole of the rich manifoldness in the shapings of Christian life, as modified by the standard of different times, races, and individuals; but keeping a watchful eye also upon the disorderly movements and corruptions of the church; maintaining his stand everywhere, firmly and securely, in the *one* needful thing, so as to measure and estimate all appearances from thence, with a truly just, because a Christian, measure.

From this as the ground position, it is very easy to form a judgment of the peculiarities and of the advantages of Neander's Church History in particular respects.

The great object of the work is explained by the author himself, in his preface to the first volume. It is to exhibit the history of the Church of Christ, "as a living witness to the divine power of Christianity; as a school of Christian experience, — a voice sounding through all the ages, of instruction, of doctrine, and of warning, for all who will give heed to it." In these words he directs attention to the *Christian*, and, indeed, *practically Christian*, *spirit*, as the most characteristic feature of his labors in this field; and also gives us plainly enough to understand the sense in which he means this.

Christianity, as regarded by him, is the power of God, not at its miraculous beginning merely, but in the whole sum and series of its effects; Christ is the kingly head of God's kingdom, not merely by virtue of its historical foundation at a particular point of time, but by virtue of the continued manifestations of his governing, protecting, training, and correcting agency, through the entire progress of the development of the church. The church accordingly, as to its essence, presented itself to him as the theatre of a continuous manifestation of divine powers; as the peculiar province of the divine guidance and sifting of humanity; and hence he also saw in its history a means of Christian instruction, edification, and warning, of inestimable value. But at the same time, and for the same reason, he saw that it could only just so far prove to be a means for such ends, as the spirit of Christian faith furnished the key for its interpretation, and the right standard of judgment; and this qualification was one which Neander himself, by virtue of his whole personal character, unmistakably possessed in an eminent degree. In him, the scholar and the man were never separated. As a church historian he never, for a moment, ceased to be a believing Christian. Wholly a stranger to that cold objectivity, which, under the pretense of rising above all oppositions and party strifes, knows nothing of hatred and of love, but places just as little value upon thorough conviction, he showed that, even as a historian, he was full of the most hearty love of Christ's cause, and of decided dislike and abhorrence of all the mighty agencies that fought against it; and his only standard for judging of characters and events was the Christian one, which he needed not to take up and apply as a measure furnished him from without, but which he carried within himself as a truly spiritual man, and therefore knew how to apply with no less inward certainty than seriousness of motive and considerate moderation.

The fact is well known, that just because Neander stood up firmly for the right of such a spirit of Christian faith, the right of a heartfelt experience and of the feelings, to have something to do with questions belonging to the province of theology in general, and of Church History in particular, he was assailed with certain opprobious epithets, such as the pious, the *pectoral* theologian; and it was for the same reason, perhaps, that he was classed with the *Pietists* or *Mystics*. But it is also well known that, for himself, he felt not the slightest disturbance on that account. He was perfectly well aware, it is true, as was also Spener in *his* day, that a right temper of heart, and a life given up to the religious feelings, do not of themselves, and at once, make one a theologian; and his views, at the farthest, never went so far as to allow the claims of science and learning, so sedulously cultivated by himself, to suffer the least abatement, — these being, in fact, the very qualifications by which the theologian is distinguished from the pious layman. But in allowing all this, it was still the firm conviction of his own mind, that a sound and vigorous theology is only born and nurtured on the lap of Christian piety; that the latter is the indispensable and prime condition of the former. In maintaining this, he fought on the same side and for the same good cause with the great theologians of every age; and, confident of the goodness of the cause, he manfully and cheerfully bid defiance to all the reproaches which assailed him. "Never need we be ashamed," said he in one of his dedications, — "never need we be ashamed of the motto, Pectus est quod facit theologum. The shame falls back rather on those who ventured to ridicule it. They are judged by themselves. It was the watchword of those men who called Theology forth from the dead formulas of scholasticism to the living spirit of God's word. So let this be our motto still, in despite of all the starveling or overcrammed Philistines, of all the foolish men, who wrap themselves up in the conceit of their own supereminent science, or who allow themselves to be dazzled by such vain and empty pretensions."

With this decidedly Christian standing-point, which was taken by Neander in his handling of the matter of Church History, another thing was inseparably connected.

"The essence of Christianity," he says in another dedication, "consists not so much in the revealing of a new speculative theory, or system of morals, as in the bestowment of a new divine life, adapted to penetrate, and to refine from its inmost centre, man's entire nature, with all its powers and capacities; and also to give a new direction to all human thought and action."

In thus apprehending Christianity as the creative force of a new

life, its significancy is recognized, not only for men as individuals, but in relation to the masses of the nations, and to the whole human race. It is the purpose and end of Christianity, as expressed in the parable of the "leaven," gradually to penetrate, with reanimating power, the life of mankind; and to each several period and each several nationality is assigned its own special part in this world-renovating process. But the purpose which is thus aimed at as a whole would fail to have a real basis of support, if individual souls were not first renewed by the redeeming and sanctifying efficacy of the faith in Christ, and did not form central points and domestic hearths for the cherishing of the common life. Thus, in Christianity, the individual and the community of individuals, the personal agent and the masses, go hand in hand; no Christian community and no Christian state of the world without actually redeemed and regenerated Christians; but again, no truly Christian persons separated from all organic connection with the whole, and having no significancy whatever in relation to this whole. But Church History must everywhere direct attention to both, to the individual and personal, as well as to the connected development of the whole, carried on and accomplished by causes lying within itself; and only when, in the right way, in a spirit combining thoughtfulness with comprehension, it takes into view both these sides together, will it succeed in bringing the actual concrete life of the church into full exhibition, and avoid the danger of representing it either as a mere web-work of human subjectivities and arbitrary notions, or as a mere unwinding of a thread of general, abstract thoughts, disconnected from the individual life which alone gives them the fullness of their meaning.

The comprehensive scope of Neander's vision did in fact take in both these sides together; his eye never lost sight of either; and the rights of the two factors in their reciprocal action and reaction upon each other were by him sacredly regarded.

In the first place, he possessed by nature a fine and delicate sense of the *individual in character*. He fully appreciated the significancy of personality in the great field of Christian life. He adhered tenaciously to the correct point of view, that Christianity aims not to obliterate, but only to sanctify, natural peculiarities of character; and in precisely this fact he found the most convincing evidence of its superiority and power; that, receiving into itself the whole divinely appointed diversity of minds, so unlike and unequal in intelligence and capacity, it unites them together in one organic whole of the body of Christ, into a *cosmos* in the highest spiritual sense of the word. This not only made him

tolerant to the diversities of individual stamp in the Christian life, but filled him with delight in contemplating them; and hence it was, that, with an eye ever intent on the essential thing of the Christian temper at bottom, he could with the same large-hearted love portray a Chrysostom and an Augustin, a Tertullian and a St. Bernard. It is in the same spirit that he appreciates peculiarities of different races and nations, and treats of the historical condition of the popular life with which Christianity has, at different periods, blended itself, forming the most heterogeneously modified combinations. In all these cases, Neander makes it plainly to appear, that he has not confined himself to the form of one particular period or race of men, but that, as becomes the genuine historian, he is able to distinguish and separate from each other the problems of different times and nations, and to appreciate everything in its place, in its special form, and according to its intrinsic worth.

But, in so doing, he does not forget that everything personal and individual, everything belonging to a particular age or description of people, also stands in a *grand, collective order of connection;* and that he only can comprehend in its full truth the history of the church, who has learned to view it as at the same time a *progressive development*, which, under the guidance of a higher hand, moves onward, impelled by one central force at the starting-point, according to certain internal laws and causes. This mode of contemplating the subject was what he called the *genetic;* and to this, in opposition as well to bare outward facts, as to purely intellectual construction, he attributed a peculiarly high value.

Such a thing, of course, could never have occurred to a man of Neander's intelligence and good sense, as to regard the history of the church as nothing better than a rude, chaotic mass of facts, and to content himself with a mere outward arrangement and classification of such facts. His thoughtful and shaping mind would necessarily look after the connecting links, would inquire into the *why* and the *wherefore;* and whoever examines his Church History but cursorily will see at once that he not only did so, but did it in the most earnest spirit. He seized Christianity on its external side, in its connection with universal history, in its fundamental relations to Paganism and to Judaism, in its central significancy in the middle place of the development of humanity. And on the internal side, he seeks in like manner to present clearly to view the unfolding of the Christian life itself, in its gradually progressive steps. But the important point here is not so much *that* he did so, as *how* he did it.

It is well known that, even before the time of Neander, there

was such a thing as treating Church History in the light, and according to the method, of cause and effect; but it was, for the most part, a matter-of-fact sort of proceeding, a quite outward and mechanical method. Authors felt quite satisfied with explaining phenomena of the most important kind by attributing them to motives derived in reality from nothing but local and temporary relations, from the tempers or passions of the immediate agents, without the least perception of those inwardly impelling causes which dwell in the nature of Christianity and of the church itself. The whole course of church development resolved itself into what this or that individual chose to do or not to do, into accidents of time and place; while the deeper and more substantial grounds of the facts failed of obtaining the slightest notice. To this superficial, or at the best, skillful psychological treatment of the facts, there came to be opposed, about the time when Neander had already entered upon the active period of his life, a totally different way of looking at the whole subject, namely, that way which, regarding the individual and the personal agent as but the substratum, as that which in itself was wholly without importance, considered *all* historical development — hence, too, that of the church — as the *movement, necessary in itself*, of *the conception through its several moments*, as *a logical process* carried onward with necessity, and in which the objective side barely and alone, — that is to say, whatever conceptual moment, whatever determination of thought, might happen to be contained in it, — was the thing of actual importance.

Neither the former, that outward matter-of-fact method, nor the latter, this purely conceptual construction of history, based on pantheistic notions, could satisfy Neander. His profound sense and judgment shrunk in disgust from the one; his quick sense for the living, the concrete, and real — his thoroughly Christian, theistic spirit — revolted against the other. He rejects most decidedly those "who look upon all history as the mere chance-play of man's arbitrary will, and who would explain the greatest things by the most trivial causes;" but then again, "the fanaticism of the philosophical conception," and the tendency of those "who thought themselves able to measure the development of the divine life in humanity, and the deepest things in the human mind and heart, with certain pitiful forms of conception to which everything must be made to adjust itself," — who "aimed at science and spirit by referring everything to the head," — constantly found in him a sturdy, and, as he himself expresses it, "unfashionable" opponent.

Christianity is undoubtedly, according to his own view, of the

nature of an *objective power*, which enters indeed into the conscious subject, the individual, as it also does into all kinds of historical relations; but which at the same time reaches much farther, and amidst all outward influences still continues to unfold itself according to its own laws and by virtue of its own indwelling energy. *He too* would recognize the history of the church as a process of development from within outwards, as the exhibition of an *internal* history; and he would, *in this sense*, be necessarily led to attempt a *construction* of the same. But this construction, as attempted by him, could not be a purely *conceptual* construction; and that for a reason quite independent of his respect for the personal and individual element; namely, for this reason, that Christianity itself was, to him, not a bare conception, but a new divine creation of life, — therefore a fact, which, precisely on account of its own peculiar nature, can be understood, indeed, by the human mind, whenever it has become a vital force within that mind, but which cannot be constructed *à priori* out of thought itself. Neander could not, consistently with the fundamental intuition which had its ground in his inmost being, start from "the pure conception," which in this case could be to him nothing but an empty and dead letter, and proceed to construct history as a fabric of thought, to which actual events must be adjusted, neatly or awkwardly, as the case might happen to be. He could start only from actual facts; and, having ascertained and established these facts by thorough investigation, endeavor to comprehend them by reference to their internal grounds and their connection with each other; or, in other words, modestly to follow out the steps of the problem, which He who hath put the times and the seasons into his own power had previously laid down in history by facts, and so proposed for solution.

With such a method of constructing history, thus proceeding from and calculated upon facts, Neander not only allowed to persons and individual agents — whom he regarded as the free, independent, and, in themselves, worthy organs and supporters of the higher general life — their just claims to respectful regard, but also recognized most fully the ethical character lying at the basis of Christianity. He knew that Christianity was a power constantly efficient in the work of man's redemption and sanctification; but he knew also the mighty power of sin: nor did he forget that the saving powers of Christianity were marshaled in battle array against a kingdom of evil; that they find their way to man's heart only through conflicts and struggles which are unceasing; and that, therefore, not only corruptions and relapses enter in at the same

time, but also mixtures are formed in which Christian elements become strangely fused and blended with others which are foreign and anti-Christian. It was just here, then, that Neander gave practical proof of that perfect justice, that magnanimous equity, with which he was inspired by his no less serious than gentle Christian spirit. Nothing that bore the image of Christ, no matter in what shape it might happen to appear, was ignored by him. Nor did he permit himself to be so smitten by any particular form as to believe that into that form alone, to the exclusion of all others, had been poured the Christian spirit. Wherever he observed in a tendency of thinking or a direction of life any departure from the line of revealed truth, he did not withhold the severity of his judgment; but he, at the same time, took great pains to search out, even in false and perverse tendencies, whatever germs of truth might lie hidden in them, and especially to bring out to notice the better starting-points, whether in the circumstances of the times or in the sense of internal needs, out of which they had sprung. By pursuing this method, he did excellent service for the department of the history of doctrines, and particularly for the history of heresies; in the latter, in fact, pointing out for the first time the proper way of proceeding, — a way equally removed from a narrow-minded condemnation, and an extravagant glorification, of the heretical spirit; and which first begins with a thorough explanation of these phenomena, and a careful separation of the Christian from the unchristian elements in their composition.

Through all this, however, Neander brings into active service his *practical* spirit in Church History. "That there is any opposition," he says, "between an edifying and an instructive church history is what I shall never acknowledge." History, according to his view of it, should not only satisfy the thirst for knowledge, but at the same time supply a stable foundation and a sure guide for the conduct of life. But *Church* History should especially perform these offices within the Christian pale. It should confirm and cheer; enkindle and moderate; admonish and warn; in a word, perform in the right and the full sense, the work of edification. And this work, Neander's Church History *does* perform, as no other one had done before it. But it does so, not by interspersing among the narrative parts practical reflections, and laying down rules of right living; but by the simple exhibition of the facts themselves, presented however in a Christian spirit: for these facts truly exhibited with the force and reality of life, have, in themselves even, an edifying power, — directly, when they announce the spirit of Christ in his church; indirectly, when they proceed

from the opposite spirit; because, in the latter case, they at least stand before us as earnest monitors, to reprove or to warn us. But, next to the profoundly Christian mode of seizing the whole subject, that which above all secures to Neander's Church History an influence promotive of true faith and piety, is his entering so carefully into minute details, describing with such hearty love the prominent Christian personages, and giving so many and such well chosen traits of character and words of life: for it is these personal and individual characteristics which will always prove to be the most quickening in their influence. But viewed on this particular side, the Church History of Neander has never, by any means, as yet been applied to the practical uses it is capable of. The field of Church History should be resorted to a great deal more than it commonly is by our practical clergy, for the striking examples with which it abounds of God's method of guiding the church, for sketches drawn from the life of great Christian characters, and for memorable acts and words which once explained with all the circumstances can never be forgotten. But it would be difficult to find a work more serviceable in all these respects than Neander's.

If we have thus far spoken only of the merits of this great work, we would not have it therefore to be understood that we hold it to be perfectly satisfactory and faultless. Everything human has its limits. Powers which work with the greatest force and efficiency are generally of that kind in which something partial and one-sided is very apt to manifest itself. Accordingly it is not to be denied that, owing to the fact of Neander's strongly marked individuality of character, several things have found admittance into his work which may justly be put down as faults, either in respect to form or to matter.

As regards the *formal* matter of authorship, Neander possessed no slight gifts in that way; and among them were some which, judging from his habits in other things, one would hardly have expected to find in him. When he had once thought through the plan of a work, he was able, as I have been credibly informed, to state, nearly to a day and an hour, the space of time within which the printing of the proposed volume could be executed, and tell beforehand the number of sheets which the work would require. This he could do, because it was his constant practice to begin from a point of view which comprehended the whole matter, and the work to be produced stood displayed before his mind as an organic structure in which no minutest part was wanting. But while he possessed this exceedingly rare gift of being able to shape

and arrange beforehand the necessary parts of a whole work, we should be hardly warranted to say that everything in the execution corresponded strictly with the highest claims of the historical art. This applies especially to his language, taken in the largest sense. As it was with his oral, so we find it to be also with his written discourses: they possess the unmistakably good qualities of heartiness, fervor, and simplicity, and, in certain places, of a very peculiar and penetrative energy of soul. But the style, with all the agreeable breadth and expansion which naturally belongs to it, still labors under a certain heaviness and monotony, and we might often desire to see in it more compression, more movement, sharpness of expression, and liveliness of coloring.

But closely herewith connected was another thing which, though it belongs more especially to the *material* side of historical description, should not here be passed without notice. If we sometimes miss sharpness and lively coloring in the style, this arises from the fact that the objects themselves had not been looked at and seized in the complete sharpness and distinctive features of their proper being. Neander was profoundly sensible to the individual and the personal in itself considered; also to the differences of intellectual types generally and on the great scale; but he possessed in a less degree a discriminating sense for the characteristic traits in individuals, and for all those fine shades which exhibit themselves in men and things as they actually exist. As he had, moreover, a strongly marked character of his own, and as everything of importance in life called forth either love or repugnance in his own feelings, and thus influenced his judgment, so in his contemplation of history, something of his own life was transferred, with or without his will, over to the objects which he contemplated: he saw them in his own light, and, if they attracted him, brought them into a certain relationship with his own being. This gave inward truth and glow to his style; but at the same time caused many of the sharp and rough points in the men and things he describes to be smoothed over, so that those things and persons, though well described as to their fundamental type, were not always so distinctly and fully characterized in the smaller details as would have been desirable. To this, we may add the *idealism*, which we have several times alluded to already as forming an element of his constitutional nature. This feature betrays itself also in his way of treating history. He is inclined predominantly to the ideal side of the historical subject-matter. Hence it is the development especially of the internal life; it is Christian piety in its diversified forms and shapings; it is the shining points of this piety in great

personages,— which engage the full sympathy of his heart. On the other hand, he appears to have possessed a peculiarity which was strongly marked also in his life,— much less tact for secular things; for politics in its conflicts and implications with church matters; for the church as an external institution, in the manifold shapings of its forms of constitution, government, and worship; and for many other things pertaining to the outward life and to the secular influences, even in the best sense, of the church upon the world,— for example, Christian art, with its great creations, which are altogether too slightly noticed by him.

These defects we would neither seek to deny nor to conceal; but we would take the liberty to suggest the following considerations in extenuation of them. Neander was a thoroughly plain, honest, unpretending man, who would never consent to appear to be anything other than he was. Hence also in the exhibition of his matter, in style and language, he avoided whatever was far-fetched and merely ornamental, preferring rather to be awkward than over-refined, to dispense with art altogether than to be artificial. And in just this uprightness and frankness he left his soul at full liberty — in subjection only to the spirit and word of God — to range at large in the selection and in the treatment of the matters presented before it. Had he preferences or repugnancies? He expressed them most decidedly. Were there many things for which he had no special vocation or apitude? He would never assume to appear as if he had it; nor would he speak of such things on the authority of others, where he had no experience or insight of his own. Now if the case was, that, being so constituted, he sometimes permitted himself, particularly in consequence of his strong leaning to the internal side of the life of the church, to become partial and one-sided, he is so far deserving of censure: but it is impossible to deny that this very thing gives a peculiar value to his work for the times we now live in. Faith, and the inner life which flows from it, is, and must ever continue to be, the principal thing in Christianity; and to this, we evangelical Christians, of all others, should immovably hold fast. The life of faith ought, indeed, to find at once its corresponding churchly form and order, and no intelligent theologian would be disposed to deny, that the outward shaping of the church, in all its relations, is an object deserving of the most constant and watchful care. But when we hear, in these our own days, from so many different quarters nothing but the cry: The church! The church! it is a comfort, certainly, to know that there is one work of Church History, the fruit of a mind richly furnished with fresh and living evangelical

knowledge, which expends the whole of its power in directing us — though it may be with a certain bias on one side — to the eternal, immutable foundation of all healthy church life, which must be found in the soul itself. And while it is true, that this work does, at the same time, bring against the separative, schismatic spirit, which also prevails to so ruinous an extent through the church in these times, the testimony of a great fact to the honor of the evangelical spirit of *love*, everywhere insisting with force upon *this*, which has preserved union among true Christians at all times, we need not, against all this, make too much ado about a want of sharpness in drawing the lines of distinction between things that differ or things that stand opposed to each other; at any rate, not *so* much as to take away or greatly diminish the thankful pleasure of reading a church history which, beyond what any other one has ever yet done, proclaims the *one* thing which is alike needful for all.

Being thus the offspring of a heart deeply penetrated with the spirit of evangelical faith and love, Neander's Church History carries within itself the pledge of imperishable youth. It will outlast the temporary currents which seem to be setting against it. Neander predicted and hailed the dawn of a new Christian era. May his work contribute evermore to hasten the coming of that day; and may the blessing of the Lord accompany it, as it now goes forth to the world.

CARLSRUHE, *May*, 1856.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

First of all, I would thankfully acknowledge the Divine goodness which has enabled me,—beyond any expectations I could have formed when, seventeen years ago, I commenced the publication of my Church History,—to prosecute the work so far, and also to recast the first volume of it in a better shape. The first edition having been disposed of within a year, a reïmpression of the text and doubling the number of copies made it possible to defer the preparation of a new edition for so long a period. For this I am indebted to the prudent arrangement of my respected publisher; for had I undertaken to prepare a new edition at any earlier period, it would hardly have been in my power to carry forward the work so far as I have. Besides, owing to the long interval which has elapsed, I had become almost a stranger to this portion of it, in its original form; and hence the defects which demanded correction could not fail to appear to me the more glaring. Many of the corrections have been suggested by the remarks of friends and of enemies; and I trust I shall ever be glad to listen also to the latter, when the truth speaks through them.

I must still hold fast to the same fundamental position in theology, and in the contemplation of history, which I held at the outset of my undertaking. I must strenuously defend it, over against, and in opposition to, the same main tendencies which I then had to combat. On many points, history, in the mean time, has already decided. Nothing will remain hidden: principles must unfold themselves, and bring out to the light the results which lie within them. When this has been done, all the shifts are in vain by which men would seek to reverse the decision of history, and repeat over again the old trick of deception.

When, at the commencement of my labors, seventeen years ago, I dedicated my work to the friend who was about to leave me, Wilhelm Böhmer,—a young man whom I looked upon as the representative of a whole class inspired with the same disposition; who has since, as a man, maintained his standing among the learned theologians and teachers of the church, and with whom I have ever remained bound by the same fellowship of spirit,—I affixed to it the motto of our common theology, and of this exhibition of history: "Pectus est, quod theologum facit." We need not be ashamed of this maxim; shame rather to those who were bold enough to ridicule it. They have pronounced sentence on themselves. It was the watchword of those men who called forth theology from the dead forms of scholasticism to the living spirit of God's word. So let this be our motto still, in despite of all starveling or over-crammed *Philisters*,—of all the foolish men who wrap themselves in the conceit of their own superior science, or who allow themselves to be dazzled by such vain pretensions.

The first division of this work, in its present altered shape, will occupy two volumes. The second volume, with the Divine permission, will soon follow the present;* and I hope, also, the continuation of the whole work will no longer be delayed.

A. NEANDER.

Berlin, July 11, 1842.

* The two volumes are embraced in the first volume of the present translation.

DEDICATION OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

TO MY BELOVED AND MUCH-HONORED FRIEND, DR. HEUBNER,

SUPERINTENDENT-GENERAL AT WITTENBERG,

THE THEOLOGUS NON GLORIÆ SED CRUCIS.

When, last year, the noble festival was held in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of your Theological Seminary, from which, during that space of time, so rich a blessing has flowed to the churches of this country, gladly would I have borne some part or other in honor of this occasion so interesting to my heart. It was not my happiness to enjoy that privilege. I now come after the feast, with a small offering, which assures you of my sincere love and respect. There is also a jubilee-festival in commemoration of our ancient friendship. It is now *more* than five and twenty years since it was my happiness to make your acquaintance, in the society of that man of God, who but a short time ago was called home from the midst of us, Baron von Kottwitz, a man whose memory thousands bless, — and from that time I have looked towards you as to a point of light amid the darkness of this worldly age. You will receive this tribute of my sincere esteem with indulgent good-will. If you find a good deal here, as in other writings of mine, which does not accord with your own views of doctrine, this, I am confident, cannot disturb your kind feelings. You understand how to make subordinate differences recede and give place to the higher fellowship grounded on that one foundation, which is Christ. You are a disciple of the true spirit of love and freedom, which, so far from insisting that everything shall be cast in the same mould, maketh free.

God grant that you may be spared yet many years, as a blessing to his church, which, in these times of encroaching darkness, needs such witnesses above all things else.

With all my heart, yours,

Berlin, June 28, 1843. A. NEANDER.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND VOLUME.

The following is that part of the first book of my Church History which contains the history of doctrines. The active investigations which have been going on, during the few years past, in this department, gave occasion, here especially, for the correction or more ample proof of many things which I had advanced; and I am rejoiced that the opportunity has been given me for making these improvements. A tendency which aims at science and spirit by referring everything to the head, could, most assuredly, never find in me any thing but an unfashionable opponent.

In conclusion, I present my hearty thanks to my friend, Hermann Rossel, for the patient and skilful care which he has bestowed on the correction of this volume, and in preparing the running-titles, and the indexes at the end.

The two prefaces to the second and third volumes of the first edition, I leave out for want of room. The third volume was dedicated to the beloved man with whom, as a colleague, I have since had the pleasure of being permanently connected, and was meant as a salutation of hearty love on the occasion of his then recent arrival on a visit to this city, in July 19th, 1827.

The guide to Church History, which I promised some time ago, will now beyond all doubt be prepared by a very dear young friend of mine, Hr. Lic. Jacobi, who has already made himself favorably known by his essay on Pelagius, and from whom the best which could be done may be expected.

A. NEANDER.

Berlin, June 23, 1843.

DEDICATION OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

TO F. VON SCHELLING, THE PHILOSOPHER.

As the first volume of my Church History is about to make its appearance in a better shape, I feel constrained to take this opportunity of presenting you a testimony of my sincere respect and love, and my hearty thanks for all the instruction and excitement to thought derived from what you have said, both publicly and in the intercourse of private life, and for all you have done, during your residence here, in the service of our common holy cause. When I dedicate a work of this character to a philosopher like you, I know that it is nothing foreign from *your* philosophy; for that takes history for its point of departure, and would teach us to understand it according to its inward essence. In striving to apprehend the history of the church, not as a mere juxtaposition of outward facts, but as a development proceeding from within, and presenting an image and reflex of internal history, I trust that I am serving a spirit which may claim some relationship to your philosophy, however feeble the powers with which it may be done. In what you publicly expressed respecting the *stadia* in the development of the Christian church, how much there was which struck in harmony with my own views! I might feel some hesitation in laying before a man of your classical attainments, such a master of form as well as of matter, a work of whose defects, when compared with the idea at its foundation, no one can be more conscious than its author. But I know, too, that fellowship of spirit and feeling will be accounted of more worth by you, than all else besides.

Trusting, then, that you will accept this offering in the same spirit with which it is presented, I conclude with the sincerest wishes that a gracious God may long preserve you in health, and the full enjoyment of your powers; that he would make you wholly our own, and long keep you in the midst of us, to awaken the ἔρως πτεροφύτωρ in the minds of our beloved German youth; to exert your powerful influence against all debasement and crippling of the intellect; to lead back those who are astray, from the unnatural and the distorted to a healthful simplicity; to exhibit a pattern of right method and of true freedom in science; to testify of that which constitutes the goal and central point of all history; and — so far as it comes within the province of science — to prepare the way for that new, *Christian* age of the world, whose dawn already greets us from afar; that, for such ends as these, He would prolong the evening of your life, and make it even more glorious than was its morning.

These are the sincere and fervent wishes of him who calls himself, with his whole heart,

Yours, A. NEANDER.

BERLIN, JULY 11, 1842.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

To exhibit the history of the Church of Christ, as a living witness of the divine power of Christianity; as a school of Christian experience; a voice, sounding through the ages, of instruction, of doctrine, and of reproof, for all who are disposed to listen; this, from the earliest period, has been the leading aim of my life and studies. At the same time, I was always impressed with the magnitude of the undertaking, and with the great difficulties which must attend it, if so conducted as to answer the demands of science and of the great practical want which I have mentioned; for both of these are, in the present case, closely connected. Nothing but what can stand as truth before the scrutiny of genuine, unprejudiced science, — of a science which does not see through the glass of a particular philosophical or dogmatic school, — can be profitable for instruction, doctrine, and reproof; and wherever a science relating to the things of God and their revelation and evolution among mankind has not become, by mismanagement of human perversity, an insignificant caricature, or a lifeless skeleton, it must necessarily bear these fruits. Science and life are here designed to inter-penetrate each other, if life is not to be exposed to the manifold contradictions of error, and science to death and inanity.

Although I certainly felt the inward call to such an undertaking, yet the sense of its weight and its responsibleness, — especially at the present time, which so much needs the *historiam vitæ magistram*, as a sure compass in the storm and tumult of events, — has continually deterred me from attempting to realize the favorite idea which so long floated before my mind. After several preliminary essays, on works connected with church history, I was led by various motives, personal and outward, to engage in a task which, if too long delayed, might never be accomplished.

The immediate outward occasion was, that my respected publisher invited me to prepare for the press a new edition of my work on the Emperor Julian; and, at the same time, a more full and ample treatment of the subject, which in that work had been only a fragment. But, in setting about this task, I found that the book, according to the views which I then entertained, would have to take an entirely new shape, and, if it came to any thing, to be wrought into a far more comprehensive whole. Thus was suggested to me the thought of publishing, in the first place, the history of the church in the three first centuries, as the starting point of a general Church History; and the encouragement received from my publisher confirmed me in the plan.

I here enter, then, upon the execution of this work, and present to the public the first great division of the history of the church during the three first centuries. The second division, if it please God, shall follow by the next Easter fair. The history of the Apostolic church as a whole, is, to my own mind, of so much importance, that I could not prevail on myself to incorporate it immediately with the present history. Hence, in this work, I have simply presupposed it; and I reserve for a future opportunity the publication of it, as a separate work by itself.

May He who is the fountain of all goodness and truth, attend the commencement of this work with His blessing, and grant me both the ability and the right disposition to prosecute it to the end.

To conclude, I offer my hearty thanks to all the friends who have attended this work, in its transition through the press, with their kind assistance; and especially to my excellent friend, one of our promising young theologians, (soon afterwards removed to a better world), the theological student, SINGER. To his assiduity and care, accompanied with no small labor in correcting the proofs, the appearance of this volume is greatly indebted. The indexes referring to the matter of the work, which, it is hoped, will contribute much to the reader's convenience, are also due to the industry of this valued and beloved friend.

A. NEANDER.

BERLIN, OCTOBER 18, 1825.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

VOLUME FIRST.

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND CHURCH IN THE THREE FIRST CENTURIES.

INTRODUCTION.

GENERAL RELIGIOUS CONDITION OF THE WORLD, ROMAN, GREEK AND JEWISH, AT THE TIME WHEN CHRISTIANITY FIRST APPEARED, AND BEGAN TO MAKE PROGRESS, p. 1—68.

PAGE

Christianity, a power transcending man's nature; but adapted to the wants, and called for by the history, of the human race; as this period of its first appearance most especially shows ..... 1—5

Religious Condition of the Roman, Greek, and Pagan World, 5—35.

Religion of the Greeks and Romans, of transient significance, and supplanted by the progress of culture. Not a religion for mankind, but only a popular and state religion. Antithesis of esoteric and exoteric. Superstition regarded by Polybius the strongest pillar of the Roman state: so also by Strabo. Varro's distinction of a threefold theology .. 5—7

Total decline of religion. Epicurianism, skepticism: Lucretius, Lucian. Isolated attempts to rescue the fundamental truths of religion: Varro, Strabo. Doubt as to all religion: the elder Pliny ..... 8—11

The craving awakened after the religion of the earlier times. Dissatisfaction with the present, and with the results of a negative philosophy: Pausanias, Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Artificial faith. Fanaticism. Superstition ..... 11—14

Superstition. Infidelity. Plutarch on the relation between the two ..... 14—15

The more earnest tendencies of the period: Stoicism, Platonism. Relation of the two to each other, and to the religious want ..... 15—20

Eclecticism growing out of Platonism. Plutarch, its representative ..... 20—24

The speculative mode of apprehending religion as preparing the way for Monotheism. Idea of a simple Original Essence, of the Neo-Platonic ὄν ..... 25—27

Representation of worship as sensuous imagery and accommodation. Defence, on this ground, of image-worship: Dio Chrysostom. Apologetic doctrines concerning demons: Plutarch, Porphyry. These artificial helps of no use to the people. The aristocratic spirit ..... 27—29

Religious cravings excited by the attempts to defend and uphold the declining religion. Enthusiasm. Goetæ: Alexander of Abonoteichus, Apollonius of Tyana ..... 29—32

The Clementines ..... 32—33

Favorable or hostile relation of the state of religion as above described to Christianity ..... 33—35

Religious Condition of the Jews, 35—68.

Judaism as a divine revelation. Want of accordance between the divine subject-matter and its form of manifestation. Hence Judaism only a preparatory step. Prophecy. Its end and aim, and the ultimate end of the Jewish religion. The idea of the Messiah ..... 35—37
Conception of the Theocracy, and expectations of the Messiah become sensuous. Judas of Gamala. The Zealots. False prophets ..... 37—39
Three main directions of the Jewish theology. a dead and formal orthodoxy, a superficial religion of the understanding, and Mysticism, represented in the three sects of the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes ... 39—49

Alexandrian Judaism, 49—62.

Influence of pagan culture on the Jews of Alexandria. Dogmas of a foreign philosophy combined with faith in a revelation. Universal historical import of Judaism set forth by Philo ..... 49—52
Twofold purpose of the Alexandrian philosophy of religion; to ward off pagan infidelity, and pharisaical bondage to the letter. In opposition to the latter, the allegorical method of interpretation. Two different stages in the understanding of revelation; faith in the letter and history, intuition of the enveloped idea. Sons of the Logos, sons of the ὄν. Distinction between esoteric and exoteric religion ..... 53—58
Ascetic tendency growing out of this Idealism. The Therapeutæ ..... 59—62
Relation of the different religious tendencies among the Jews — of Sadduceeism, Phariseeism, of Jewish Mysticism, of the Alexandrian theology — to Christianity ..... 62—66
Spread of Judaism among Greeks and Romans. Proselytes of justice. Proselytes of the gate ..... 67—68

SECTION FIRST.

RELATION OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH TO THE UNCHRISTIAN WORLD, 69—178.

Spread of Christianity, 69—86.

Spread of Christianity generally. Obstacles which hindered it. Causes and means by which it was advanced ..... 68—79
Christianity, by readily uniting with every thing purely human, and as readily attacking every form of ungodliness, destined and suited, from the smallest beginnings, to reform entire humanity ..... 68—71
Superstition of the lower classes of the people among the pagans. Sorcerers hinder the entrance of Christianity. Supernatural effects of Christianity, contrasted with the arts of these men ..... 71—75
The devout, enthusiastic life of its confessors, a witness for Christianity, and means of its spread ..... 75—79

Diffusion of Christianity in particular Districts, 79—86.

Asia. The accounts in the New Testament. Legend about the correspondence of Uchomo, Abgar of Edessa, with Christ. More certain evidence of the spread of Christianity there, in the years 160—170. The gospel preached in the Parthian empire, by Peter. In Arabia, perhaps by Paul and Bartholomew. Later, by Pantænus and Origen. In India, according to an old tradition, by Thomas ..... 79—83
Africa. Mark, according to the tradition, founder of the church at Alexandria. Diffusion of the gospel from thence to Cyrene. To Carthage and proconsular Africa, from Rome ..... 83—84

Europe. First of all, Rome. Lugdunum, Vienna in Gaul. From thence to Germany. In Spain, probably by Paul. In Britain, through the connections with Asia Minor ..... 84—86

Persecutions of the Christian Church, 86—178.

Their Causes, 86—93.

Limits of Roman toleration. Grounded on a principle exclusively political. Christianity a *religio nova, illicita.* Suspicion of political designs, favored by the position taken by the majority of Christians in relation to the state and its institutions ..... 86—92
Public opinion. Popular hatred ..... 92—93

Situation of the Christian Church under the several Emperors, 93—156.

Under *Tiberius.* Tertullian's story of a proposal of the emperor to the senate in relation to Christ ..... 93—94
Under *Claudius.* Christians confounded with the Jews; and, in consequence, banishment of the Christians in the year 53. Report of Suetonius 94
Nero. Persecution of the Christians occasioned by the burning of Rome 94—96
Domitian. Encouragement of informers. Confiscation of goods. Banishment. Trial of the kinsmen of Jesus 96
Nerva. Prohibition of informers. *Trajan.* His law against close associations. Report of Pliny, governor of Bithynia and Pontus, in the year 110. Less favorable situation of the Christians ..... 96—101
Hadrian. Forbids riotous attacks. Complaints against them by the Proconsul Serennius Granianus. Rescript of Hadrian to the latter's successor Fundanus. Religious views of Hadrian. Persecution of the Christians under Barcochba ..... 101—103
Antoninus Pius. Disapprobation of popular attacks. Pretended rescript πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῆς Ἀσίας ..... 103—104
Marcus Aurelius. His religious tendency. Sharper measures against the Christians. Persecution at Smyrna in 167. Martyrdom of Polycarp. Persecution in Gaul, — Lugdunum, Vienna, Autun. Martyrdom of Pothinus. Examples of Christian heroism. The legio fulminea 104—117
Commodus. Reason of his milder behavior towards the Christians .... 117—119
Situation of the Christians during the political disturbances after the death of Commodus. *Septimius Severus.* Law forbidding Romans to embrace Christianity ..... 119—122
Caracalla. Examples to show how the persecution was conducted .... 122—124
Tranquillity under Heliogabalus and Alexander Severus. The *lararium* of the latter. Collection of imperial rescripts against the Christians by Domitius Ulpianus ..... 125—126
Popular attacks under Maximin the Thracian. Tranquillity under Philip the Arabian. Story of the conversion of this Emperor to Christianity ..... 126—127
Remarks of Origen concerning the situation, thus far, of the Christian church, and its prospects in the future ..... 127—130
Decius Trajan. Design of the Emperor to supplant Christianity entirely. Edict of persecution. Different conduct of the Christians. Cyprian's removal from Carthage. Continuation of the persecution under Gallus and Volusianus. Martyrdom of the Roman bishops Cornelius and Lucius ..... 130—136
Persecution under Valerian. Martyrdom of the bishops Sixtus of Rome and Cyprian of Carthage ..... 136—140
The Christians under Gallienus and Macrianus. Decree of toleration by the former. Christianity a *religio licita.* Consequences of this even in the time of Aurelian. Forty years' repose of the church .... 140—142
Diocletian. From 284 and onward, alone; then from 286 with Maximian Herculius. At first favorable to the Christians. His edict against

the Manichæans. Alarm of the Pagans at the increasing spread of the Christian religion. Caius Galerius Maximian. His command, — that all the soldiers should take part in the sacrifices, in the year 298. Martyrdom of the centurion Marcellus ..... 142—147
Meeting of Diocletian with Galerius at Nicomedia. Destruction of the Christian church there. Attempt to destroy the copies of the holy scriptures. Examples illustrative of this persecution ..... 147—154
Constantius Chlorus. Cæsar in Spain, Gaul, Britain. His mildness towards the Christians. Maximin, elevated to the rank of a Cæsar, continues the persecution. In the year 308, a new command to offer sacrifice. Three years later, the edict of toleration by Galerius ..... 154—156

Written Attacks on Christianity, and the Defence of it against such Attacks, 157—178.

Erroneous judgments concerning Christianity, arising out of the form of its development, and the singularity of its whole appearance. Lucian. Confusion of Christianity with various kinds of superstition. His Peregrinus ..... 157—159
Judgment of the stoic Arrian, like that of Marcus Aurelius. The most eminent antagonists from the school of Neo-Platonism. Celsus. Inquiry relative to his person. His Platonic Eclecticism. Importance of his attack entitled, — λόγος ἀληθής. Its contents ..... 159—170
Porphyry the Phœnician, towards the close of the third century: likewise a Platonician. His "system of Theology derived from the responses of Oracles," περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας. Oracular responses concerning Christ ..... 170—173
Hierocles, governor of Bithynia, the last writer against Christianity of this age. His book: λόγοι φιλαλήθεις πρὸς τοὺς Χριστιανούς. Repetition of objections already made. Calumnies. Inclination of declining Paganism to oppose to the founder of the Christian religion, the heros of their own. Account of the life of Apollonius by the rhetorician Philostratus ..... 173—174
Christian Apologists after the time of Hadrian. Twofold purpose of the Apologies. Relation of the Roman state to them. Appeal of the Apologists to the life of the Christians. Reference to prophetic elements in Paganism. The Sibyllines. Tertullian's appeal to testimony of the soul, as Christian by nature ..... 174—178

SECTION SECOND.

HISTORY OF THE CHURCH CONSTITUTION, CHURCH DISCIPLINE, AND SCHISMS, 179—248.

History of the Church Constitution, 179—217.

History of the Constitution of the Communities generally, 179—201.

Two periods to be distinguished: the first shaping of the church constitution in the Apostolic age, proceeding immediately from the essence of Christianity, and the further development of it under the foreign influences of the succeeding times.

First Ground-work of the Constitution of the Christian Communities in the Apostolic Age, 179—190.

Christ the one and only High Priest — the end of the whole priesthood. All Christians a priestly race. Common participation of all in one Spirit. Manifestation of one Spirit in the several spiritual gifts. Different position of individuals according to these charismata ..... 179—182

The charisma of government, *χάρισμα κυβερνήσεως*. Unsuitableness of the monarchical form of government. Shaping of the constitution of the Christian communities after the pattern of the Jewish. Council of elders, *πρεσβύτεροι* = זְקֵנִים, also called *ἡγούμενοι*, *ποιμένες*, *ἐπίσκοποι*. The names of bishops and presbyters equivalent ..... 182—186
The charisma of teaching, *χάρισμα διδασκαλίας*. Relation of the office of teaching to the administration of government ..... 186—188
Office of the deacons 188
Form of election to these church offices ..... 189—190

Changes in the Constitution of the Christian Church after the Apostolic Age, 190—217.

Change more especially in three points: — *a*. Distinction introduced between bishops and presbyters, and development of the monarchico-episcopal government of the church. *b*. Distinction between the clergy and the laity, and formation of a sacerdotal caste. *c*. Multiplication of church offices.
a. The president of the college of presbyters receives distinctively and afterwards exclusively the title of *ἐπίσκοπος*: continues nevertheless to be *primus inter pares*. Development of the episcopal system favored by the circumstances of the times. Influence of the Apostle John in this respect. Traces of the earlier equality of rank. Contest between the presbyters and episcopi. Cyprian's activity in this contest. Advantages and disadvantages of the episcopal system ..... 190—193
b. Furtherance of the idea of a distinct sacerdotal caste by this system. Development of this idea. The denominations Ordo, *κλῆρος*, originally without reference to the Levitical priesthood ..... 193—196
Revolt of the Christian consciousness against the pretensions of the sacerdotal order ..... 196—198
Change of the original relation between communities and presbyters. Separation of the latter from the world. Form of church elections .. 198—200
c. Multiplication of church offices. Sub-deacons. Readers, lectores, *ἀνάγνωσται*. Acolytes. Exorcists. Door-keepers, *πυλωροί*, ostiarii .. 200—201

Forms of Union between the several individual Communities, 201—207.

In place of the gospel equality, subordination of some of the communities to others. The country bishop under the city bishop. The provincial city under the bishop of the capital. Mother churches. Sedes Apostolicæ: Rome, Antioch, Alexandria, Ephesus, Corinth ..... 201—203
Rome the centre of the world, the mother church of almost the entire West, — distinguished by the preaching and the martyrdom of Peter and Paul ..... 203—204
Union between the communities by means of travellers. Ecclesiastical correspondence. Epistolæ formatæ, *γράμματα τετυπωμένα*. Origin of synods. Advantages and disadvantages of them ..... 205—207

Union of the entire Church in one body, closely connected in all its parts; the Outward Unity of the Catholic Church, and its Representation, 207—217.

Unity of the church. Conception of the unity of the church as an outward thing. Irenæus, Cyprian. Resistance to it. Representation of this outward unity. Germ of the medieval domination of the priesthood ..... 207—211
Preëminent rank of Peter. Gradual origin of the view that Rome was the cathedra Petri ..... 211—214
Arrogant claims of the Roman bishops, as *episcopi episcoporum*. Resistance to it. Irenæus, Cyprian ..... 214—217

Church Discipline. Exclusion from the Fellowship of the Visible Church, and Terms of Re-admission, 217—221.

The Christian church in its not unalloyed manifestation. Necessity of church discipline, and of the exclusion of the unworthy. Views of St. Paul ..... 217—218
The church as an institution for education. Church penance. Re-admission of the reformed. Church discipline becomes outward and formal ..... 218—220
Controversy concerning the re-admission of those who had fallen into *mortal sins* ..... 220—221

History of Church Divisions or Schisms, 221—248.

Distinction between church divisions and heresies. Furtherance of the system of church unity by the two principal schisms ..... 221—222

The Schism of Felicissimus at Carthage, 222—237.

Cyprian. His conversion and nomination to the episcopate. His position with respect to the Carthaginian communities ..... 222—224
Novatus. His appointment of Felicissimus to the office of deacon ..... 224—225
Cyprian's flight from Carthage. Question about the re-admission of the lapsed. Cyprian's decision. Hostility to this by Cyprian's adversaries, confirmed by the voice of the confessors ..... 225—229
Cyprian opposed to the excessive veneration of the confessors. His undecided conduct on this point. Influence of the Roman church on his way of proceeding ..... 229—232
Church visitation. Resistance of Felicissimus. New outbreak of the controversy ..... 232—234
Synod of Carthage, A. D. 251. Removal of the schism. Last attempts of the party. Cyprian's letter to Florentius Pupianus ..... 234—236

Schism of Novatian in Rome, 237—248.

Novatian — his life and character ..... 237—241
Intermeddling of Novatus in the Roman controversy. Novatian anti-bishop to Cornelius. Judgment of Dionysius of Alexandria on the schism. Cyprian's position with relation to it ..... 241—243
The two points of dispute: — the nature of penance and the conception of the church.
a. Novatian's principles on penance. Cyprian's arguments on the other side. Their weakness ..... 243—246
b. Novatian's conception of the purity of the church. Contaminated by toleration of the lapsed. Cyprian's refutation. Fundamental error of both parties: — the confounding together of the visible and the invisible church. Victory of the catholic church system as the fruit of the schisms ..... 246—248

SECTION THIRD.

CHRISTIAN LIFE AND CHRISTIAN WORSHIP, 249—335.

Christian Life, 249—288.

Christianity a power for sanctification. Testimonies of the church fathers 249—250
Contrast of pagan and Christian life. Circumstances that furthered and hindered the cultivation of the Christian temper. Outward apprehension of Christianity — particularly of baptism ..... 250—253
Entrance of Christianity even into the sensuous representations of men.

Defects of the visible church. Point of view to be taken, in contemplating this primitive period ..... 253—254
Prominent virtues of the Christians. Christian brotherly love and benevolence ..... 255—258
Position of Christianity in respect to the existing forms and relations of society. Collision between civil and religious matters. Different views of the Christians on this point ..... 259—262
Occupations and trades which were forbidden. Penalty for visiting any kind of public show ..... 262—267
Christianity in its relation to slavery ..... 267—269
Different views respecting the propriety of taking any civil or military office. Arguments for and against Christians enlisting in the military service ..... 270—273
Christian life as judged of by the Pagans. Christian asceticism. Resistance against extreme asceticism. The shepherd of Hermas. Τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος of Clement of Alexandria ..... 273—279
Christian life in the family. Marriage. Dress. Mixed marriages. Church consecration of marriage ..... 280—284
Prayer, the soul of the whole Christian life. Effects. Mode of prayer. Times of prayer. Common prayer. Position and gestures of the suppliant ..... 284—288

Of the Common Worship of God, 288—335.

Character of Christian Worship generally, 288—290.

Spiritual worship of God in contradistinction to Judaism and Paganism.

Places of Assembling for Worship, 290—293.

First, private houses; later, buildings erected for the purpose. Churches. Originally no images. Hatred of art. Causes of it. Images in domestic life. Symbolic figures. Church images. Sign of the cross 290—293

Times of Assembling for Divine Worship and Festivals, 293—302.

Times consecrated to God. New view of Christianity on this point. Origin of festivals. Confounding together of the Old and New Testament points of view ..... 293—294
Weekly and annual festivals. Sunday. Dies stationum. Sabbath. Fasts. Annual festivals. Feast of the passover. Difference with regard to the celebration of the passover between Jewish and pagan Christians ..... 294—298
Disputes concerning the passover. Anicetus and Polycarp. Renewal of the dispute. Victor and Polycrates ..... 299—300
Quadragesimal fasts. Festival of Pentecost. Origin of the Christmas festival. Feast of Epiphany ..... 300—302

Particular Acts of Christian Worship, 302—335.

Edification by common hearing of the word, and prayer. Reading of the holy scriptures. Translations. Addresses. Preaching. Church psalmody. Sacraments. Baptism and the Lord's supper ..... 302—305

Of Baptism.

Catechumens. Catechists. Confession of faith. Apostolic confession of faith. Its signification. Oral tradition. Formula of renunciation. Exorcism. Form of baptism. Formula of baptism. Infant baptism. Its signification. Tertullian's rejection of infant baptism. Doctrine of its necessity. Cyprian. Origen on this point. Baptismal sponsors. Unction. Imposition of hands. Confirmation. Fraternal kiss ..... 305—317
Controversies about baptism ..... 317—323

Sacrament of the Supper.

Foundation. Signification of the Lord's supper. Original celebration of it. Love feasts. Degeneration of them. Severance of the Agapæ from the celebration of the Lord's supper. Comparison of the supper with the pagan mysteries. Prayer of praise and thanksgiving, *εὐχαριστία*. Original idea of the thankoffering. False notion of sacrifice. Elements of the Lord's supper. Domestic participation and use of it. Communion of infants ..... 323—333

Union of the celebration of the Lord's supper with the covenant of marriage and the celebrations in memory of the dead. Feasts of the martyrs. Degeneration of honor paid to the martyrs ..... 333—335

SECTION FOURTH.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY APPREHENDED AND DEVELOPED AS A SYSTEM OF DOCTRINES.

General Introductory Remarks.

Christianity considered as to its effects on thought and knowledge. Different forms of the apprehension of Christianity. The four fundamental forms. Origin and signification of the heresies ..... 336—339

Heretical Tendencies.

The two fundamental heresies ..... 339—340

Judaizing Sects.

Origin of the Judaizing sects. The compromise or *henoticon* of Jerusalem. Apostolic and heretical Jewish Christians. Influence of the Jewish war. Gentile-Christian community at Ælia Capitolina ..... 341—344

Ebionites. Their name. Epiphanius. Origen on its meaning. Their doctrine. Different kinds. Nazaræans. Gospel of the Nazaræans. Transition of Ebionitism to other tendencies ..... 344—353

The Clementines. Supposition of a primeval religion. Doctrine of inspiration. Relation to Judaism and Christianity. Relation to the apostle Paul. Position of Judaism and Christianity with regard to each other. Justin. Chiliasm ..... 353—365

Sects growing out of the Fusion of Christianity with Ancient Religious Theories of the East, 365—506.

The Gnostic Sects.

General Remarks on the Origin and Character of these Sects, on that which they possessed in common, and that in which they differed, 366—396.

Aristocratic spirit of the ancient world. Opposition between those who knew and those who believed, favored by outward faith. Eclectic character of Gnosticism. Influence of Parsism and Buddhaism. Principle of redemption. Peculiarity of the Gnostic mode of inquiry. Its objects. Relation to simple faith. Doctrine of emanation. Doctrine of moral evil. Of the Hyle. Diversity in the mode of apprehending this ..... 366—374

Prevailing inclination to Monoism or to Dualism, as distinguishing the Alexandrian and Syrian Gnosis. Influence of these different forms on the system of morals. Expression in the two different modes of considering the Demiurge, the basis of a classification of the systems. Common tenets of the two classes ..... 374—380

Judaizing Gnostics: sensual and spiritual Theocracy. Transitive character of Judaism. Anti-Jewish Gnostics. Judaism as opposed to Christianity ..... 380—384
Influence of this difference on the shaping of the system of morals. On the doctrine concerning Christ. Distinction of a heavenly and an earthly Christ. Docetism. Biblical interpretation of the Gnostics. Secret doctrines. Their position with respect to the principle of the Christian church ..... 384—390
Gnosticism attacked on one side by the church, on another by Neo-Platonism. Plotinus ..... 390—394
Judaizing and anti-Jewish Gnostics. Points of transition between Judaism and Gnosticism. The Clementines as opposed to the doctrine of Marcion. Two-fold shaping of anti-Jewish Gnosticism ..... 394—396

Particular Sects.

Gnostic Sects connected with Judaism.

Cerinth.

Contradictory accounts. Chasm between God and the world. Angels, as creators of the world, and givers of the law. Ebionite doctrine concerning Christ. Union of the heavenly with the earthly Christ at the baptism. Uncertainty with regard to his views concerning the resurrection. Continued obligation of the law. Doctrine of the millenium ..... 396—400

Basilides.

His field of activity. Fundamental view of his system. Evolution of the divine powers. The Ogdoad-Dualism. Formation of the world. Purification of fallen life. Transmigration of souls through nature and humanity. Doctrine of the Archon and of providence. Ministering spirits. Theodicee. Typical representation of Judaism. Sources of the doctrine taught by Basilides. On the Grecian philosophy. National gods. Doctrine of redemption. Union of Jesus with the Nus at the baptism. Effect of this union on the Archon. On the sufferings of Jesus. Doctrine of justification ..... 400—413
Individual religious-moral ideas of the Basilidean school. Doctrine concerning faith as the most intimate union with the godlike. System of morals. Rejection of excessive asceticism. Recognition of the authority of the apostle Paul ..... 413—417

Valentine and his School.

Birth and residence of Valentine. Relation to Basilides. Self-limitation of the Bythus, the ground of the Æons, of the Pleroma. Idea of the Horus. Immersion of the divine germs in the Hyle. The heavenly wisdom, Achamoth. Three stages of existence: pneumatic, psychical, and hylic natures. The Demiurge. The devil. Place of the redemption. The Soter, former and redeemer of the lower world. His union with the Achamoth. Place of man in the mundane system. His elevation above the Demiurge. His exaltation into the syzygies of the Pleroma. Ante-Christian revelation. Incompleteness of the redemption. Union of the Soter with the psychical Messiah at the baptism. Nature of the redemption. Significance of Christ's sufferings. Separation of the psychical from the pneumatic Messiah in death. Psychical and pneumatic Christianity. The last things ..... 417—434
Distinguished men belonging to Valentine's school. Heracleon. His commentary on John. Interpretation of the discourse with the Samaritan woman. Opposed to the wrong notion of martyrdom ..... 434—437
Ptolemæus. Letter to Flora. Esoteric tradition. Striving towards Monoism. Threefold origin of the law ..... 437—440
Marcus. Bardesanes. Cabalistic symbolism of Marcus. Native country of Bardesanes. Different reports concerning his relation to the church. Prominent place attributed to freedom ..... 440—442

Gnostic Sects in Conflict with Judaism.

Sects which, in opposing Judaism, inclined towards Paganism.

The Ophites.

Pantheistic character of the system. Soul of the world. Ialdabaoth. Ophiomorphus. Formation of man. Signification of the fall of man. Migration of Christ through the heavens. Pantheistic system of morals. Probable transition to antichristian tendency ..... 442—447

Pseudo-Basilideans.

Antinomianism. Crucifixion of Simon of Cyrene. Ridicule of martyrdom ..... 447—448

Cainites.

Inversion of the history of revelation. Cain and Judas Iscariot considered as the true men of the spirit ..... 448—449

Carpocrates and Epiphanes, Prodicians, Antitactes, Nicolaitans, Simonians.

Carpocrates and his son Epiphanes. Employment of Platonic ideas. A supreme primal essence. Limitation of the revelation of him, by the several national gods. Equalization of Christ with the wise men of all nations. Undisturbed repose of the pneumatic nature. Perfect fellowship, as the moral ideal. Carpocratians at Samos. Antitactes, Prodicians. Contempt for the moral law. Nicolaitans. Report of Irenæus. His mistake with regard to the deacon Nicolaus. Report of Clement. Licentiousness of the sect. Simonians; honor paid to Simon Magus. Unsettled character of his adherents ..... 449—454

Anti-Jewish Gnostics who strove to apprehend Christianity in its Purity and Self-Subsistence.

Saturnin.

Formation of the world by the seven star-spirits. Man as the bearer of a higher life. Redemption by the Nus ..... 454—456

Tatian and the Encratites.

Conversion of Tatian by means of Justin Martyr. His apology. Doctrine of the Hyle. Destruction of God's image in man by the fall. Asceticism. Rejection of marriage ..... 456—458

Marcion and his School.

Predominant tendency of Marcion to the practical element in Christianity. Protestant rejection of tradition. Literal interpretation. Pauline conception of faith. Historical significance of Marcion. Circumstances of his life and history Separation of the God of nature from that of the gospel. Christianity a sudden intervention. His residence at Rome. Exclusion from the fellowship of the church. Intercourse with Cerdo. Meeting with Polycarp. Rumor of his conversion ..... 458—466

Marcion's system. Separation of the God of the Jews from that of the Christians. Demiurge. The Redeemer. Docetism. Relation of the Demiurge to the redemption. Moral tendency of his doctrines. Criticism of the New Testament ..... 466—473

Marcion's Sects.

Marcus. Lucan. Apelles ..... 473—476

APPENDIX.

On the Worship of the Gnostics.

Entire rejection and pompous excess of worship. Marcosians. Twofold baptism. Formula of baptism. Resistance of Marcion to the separation of the catechumens and the faithful. Charge brought against Marcion of holding to a representative baptism ..... 476—478

Mani and the Manichæans, 478—506.

Character of Manichæism. History of its founder. Western and Eastern sources. Acts of Archelaus of Cascar. Scythian and Buddas, as predecessors. Mani's education. Purposed reformation of Christianity by fusing it with Parsism. His appearance on the stage of action. His death ..... 478—488
Mani's doctrines. Connection with the sect of Magusians. Light and darkness. The mother of life. The primal man. His immersion in the darkness. Origin of the soul of the world. The living spirit. Transfer of the Mithras doctrine to Christianity. Crucifixion of Christ in nature. Man a microcosm. Humanity the theatre of the great conflict. Enfeebling of the evil principle, the end of the course of the world. Sources of information respecting religion. Church constitution. Sacraments. Moral character of the sect ..... 488—506

The Doctrine of the Catholic Church, as it unfolded itself in opposition to the sects.

Genetic Development of the Church Theology in general; and Character of the several different Religious and Dogmatic Tendencies of Spirit, which had a particular Influence upon it, 506—557.

Determination of the church theology by the above oppositions. Judaizing, Gnosticising tendencies. Supernatural, rational elements. Greek, Roman individualities of character. Mediation betwixt the Eastern and Western church: Irenæus. Representation of the West by Tertullian ..... 506—509

Montanism.

Importance of Montanus as the founder of the sect. Character of Montanism. Tenacity to a rigid supernaturalism, as opposed to the mediation of the supernatural and natural. Graduated progress of the church by means of outward revelations. Notion of inspiration. The Paraclete. Tendency to outward morality ..... 509—513
Montanus. History of his development. His prophetesses ..... 513—514
Exhibition of the Montanistic system. Undue prominence given to God's omnipotence. Nearness of the millennium. Tertullian concerning the church of the Spirit, as opposed to the church of the bishops. Assertion of the priestly dignity of all Christians; a falling back, at the same time, to the Old Testament point of view ..... 514—519
Attack on the Montanistic notion of inspiration. The new Montanistic propositions. Contempt of life among the Montanists. Over-valuation of celibacy. Concerning second marriages. Strictness of penance. Chiliasm. External fate of the sect ..... 519—525
Relation of the church tendency to Montanism ..... 525—527

The Alexandrian School.

Appropriation of the existing culture in behalf of Christianity. Origin of the school. Catechists ..... 527—529
Relation of the Alexandrian school to the Greeks, to the Gnostics, to Realists 529

Conception of Gnosis and Pistis. Clement concerning both, in opposition to Pagans and Gnostics. Sources of information respecting the Gnosis. Necessity of Grecian culture. Its defence by Clement. View of the Christian development of history. Disparagement of simple faith. Agreement with the Gnostics. Difference from them. Gnostic pride ..... 529—544

Prosecution of Clement's ideas by Origen. Fundamental position of Origen. The Gnosis in its relation to the facts of Christianity. Faith as the lowest stage. Reality of the Redeemer in the system of Origen. Imperfection of all human Gnosis. Pistis and Gnosis, as sensual and spiritual Christianity. Different forms of the revelation of Christ. Opposition to the Pauline preaching of Christ crucified. Tolerance and gentleness of Origen ..... 544—551

Twofold principle of scriptural exposition. All scripture a revelation of God. Gnostic definition of the end of this revelation. Moral sense of scripture, between the literal and the spiritual. Dangerous application of these principles of interpretation to the gospel history. Counterpoise in the Realism of the West ..... 552—557

Development of the several main Doctrines of Christianity.

The fact of redemption, the central point of Christianity. Reformation of the entire religious consciousness commencing from this point.

Theology.

Doctrine concerning God. God as omnipresent, as undeniable. Reference of Clement, Origen, Theophilus, to this undeniable sense of God. Tertullian's appeal to the testimony of the uncultivated soul. Spiritual nature of God. The Alexandrians. Irenæus, Novatian. Anthropomorphism, Anthropopathism. Marcion's denial of the divine justice. Tertullian opposed to him. His view of God's condescension to man. Subjective apprehension of the divine attributes by the Alexandrians. Origen on the Divine wrath. Midway between the other church teachers and the Gnostics ..... 557—564

Doctrine of the creation. Connection of the doctrine of the creation with other Christian doctrines. Creation from nothing. Hermogenes. Opposition to the Gnostic as well as to the Christian doctrine of the the creation. God conceived as eternally giving form to the Hyle. Inconsistency of his doctrine ..... 564—568

Origen on the creation. Inconceivableness of a beginning of creation. Objection of Methodius. Concerning God's omnipotence. Its connection with the other attributes. Limited number of the creatures 568—571

Doctrine of the Trinity. Fundamental marks of it in the New Testament. Dangerous nature of analogies drawn from other religions. Progressive development of the practical into the ontological Trinity. Son of God in the Old and New Testament. Idea of the Logos .... 571—575

The Monarchians. Two classes of them ..... 575—579

First Class. Said to be dominant in the most ancient Roman church. Theodotus. Development of Christ under the influence of the Holy Spirit. Supernatural birth. The confessor Natalis. Artemon. Appeal to the Roman bishop Victor. Novatian in opposition to the Artemonites. Pretended prevalence of the Artemonite tendency until the time of Zephyrinus. Intellectual bent of the sect. Their criticism of the New Testament. The Alogi ..... 579—583

Second Class. Patripassians. Praxeas. Residence in Rome. Journey to Carthage. Tertullian opposed to him. Two ways of understanding his doctrine: — denial of any distinction whatever in God, — distinction of God hidden and revealed. Noetus. Distinction of God as ὄν and as λόγος ..... 583—585

Doctrine of the church. Oriental subordination-system, as opposed to the Monarchians. Western striving after the unity of essence. The

doctrine of the Logos. Justin Martyr, Athenagoras. The Alexandrian doctrine of the Logos. Clement. Transfer of the predicates of the Nus to the Logos. Origen. The Logos, as the collective revelation of God. Different forms of the revelation of one and the same Logos. Eternal generation of the Logos grounded in the divine will. Difference of essence. Subordination ..... 585—591

Mediatory monarchian tendency. Indwelling of the deity in Christ, constituting his personality. Preëxistence in the divine idea. Beryll. Disputation with Origen. Sabellius. Discordant views of his doctrine. The Father evolved in the Son and the Spirit. Creation of humanity in the Logos. Hypostasizing of the Logos in Christ. As such, the Son of God. Transient continuance of this hypostasis. Ultimate end. On the continued duration of creaturely existence. Gospel of the Egyptians. Paul of Samosata. Deistical tendency. Impersonality of the Logos. Indwelling in Christ. Christ as a mere man. Use of the name, "Son of God." Character and external history of Paul. Disputation with Malchion ..... 591—605

Difference between the Western and Eastern mode of apprehending the doctrine of the Trinity. Tertullian. Unity of essence. Graduated series of persons. Diversity not in number but in measure. Retrocession of the doctrine of subordination. Condemnation of the Homoousion in the East ..... 605—606

Dionysius of Alexandria. Prominence given to the doctrine of subordination. Opposed to him, Dionysius of Rome. Yielding disposition of the former ..... 606—608

Doctrine of the Holy Spirit. His personality. Its denial by the Monarchians and Lactantius. Diversities of doctrine. Justin. Clement of Alexandria opposed to the Montanistic doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit ..... 608—610

Doctrine concerning human nature. Its connection with the doctrine concerning God. Both determined by the doctrine of the Redeemer. Necessity of redemption; recipiency for the redemption. Opposition between the Christian and the pagan doctrine of human nature. Conception of moral freedom. Doctrine of spirits ..... 610—612

Opposition between the church and the Gnostic doctrine of human nature ..... 612—614

Difference of the North-African from the Alexandrian Tendency.

Tertullian's doctrine. Traduction of souls. Corruption of man's nature; relationship to God. Against Hermogenes' view of the hylic soul. Against the Platonic λογικόν and ἄλογον. On the power of divine grace 614—620

The Alexandrian church. Clement on the fall of man. Connection between grace and free-will. Origen. Derivation of all diversity from moral freedom. Moral evil as a fall from true being. The corporeal world as the place for purification. Higher intelligences. Doctrine of the preëxistence of souls. Natural corruption. The three principles of fallen human nature. Separation of fore-knowledge and predestination. Grace and free-will ..... 620—630

Doctrine concerning Christ.

Assumption of human nature by the Redeemer. Opposed to Docetism; Ignatius, Tertullian. Tertullian on the servant-form of Christ. Clement on the absence of all need in Christ. Clement; Origen concerning the servant-form. The soul of Christ. Passage in Irenæus. Trichotomy in Justin. Tertullian. Twofold division of the human nature. The human soul of the Redeemer. Origen on the soul of Christ. Distinction of Psyche and Pneuma. On the sinlessness of the soul of Christ. On Christ's body. Origen accused of separating Jesus and the Christ ..... 630—640

Doctrine of the redemption. Negative and positive moment in it. In reference to the first: victory over Satan by Christ. To the last: Christ as the archetype of humanity, in Irenæus. Justin on the sufferings of Christ. The letter to Diognetus on satisfaction. Origen on the passion. His view of the sacrifice ..... 640—644
Doctrine concerning faith. Connection of redemption with sanctification. Clemens Romanus. Letter to Diognet. Irenæus. Distortion of the Pauline conception of faith ..... 644—645
Doctrine of the church (see above, sect. I.)
Doctrine of the sacraments. Confusion of the sign with the thing signified. 646
a. Baptism. Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement. Confounding of the outward symbol with the inward grace; of baptism with regeneration ..... 646—647
b. Lord's supper. Ignatius, Justin, Irenæus. Union of the Logos with the wine and bread. Tertullian, Cyprian. Symbolical mode of apprehension. Communion of infants. Origen. Distinction of the inward substance from its outward sign ..... 647—649

Eschatology.

Doctrine of the last things. Millenium. Papias. Irenæus. Anti-Chiliast tendency. Opposition to Montanism. Alexandrian theology. Caius against Proclus. Nepos. Coracion and Dionysius. Of the intermediate state ..... 649—654
Doctrine of the resurrection. Controversy between the church fathers and the Gnostics. Mediation of Origen. Continued development after death. Origen on the restoration of all things ..... 654—656

History of the more eminent Teachers of the Church.

The Apostolic Fathers.

Barnabas. Letter of Barnabas ..... 656—658
Clement of Rome. Epistle to the Corinthians. Fragment of a second. Two letters to the Syrian church. The Clementines. The apostolic constitutions ..... 658—660
Hermas, his shepherd 660
Ignatius. Seven letters to churches of Asia Minor. Polycarp ..... 660—661

The Apologists

Quadratus. Aristides 661
Justin Martyr. His education. His two Apologies. Determination of the time of the first. The παραινετικὸς πρὸς Ἕλληνας. The λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας. The dialogue with Trypho the Jew. Lost writings. The letter to Diognet. Justin's death ..... 661—671
Tatian. Conversion by means of Justin. Discourse to the Gentiles ... 672, 673
Athenagoras: Πρεσβεία περὶ Χριστιανῶν. Hermias: Διασυρμὸς τῶν ἔξω φιλοσόφων ..... 673—674
Theophilus of Antioch against the Pagan Autolycus 674

Church Teachers of Asia Minor.

Hegesippus. His πέντε ὑπομνήματα ἐκκλησιαστικῶν πράξεων. His relation to the Roman church ..... 674—676
Subjects written upon by these church teachers. Melito of Sardis. Claudius of Apollinaris ..... 676—677
Irenæus. His relation to Polycarp. Position with regard to Montanism. Refutation of the Gnostic systems. Treatise on the style of St. Paul. The two letters to Blastus and to Florinus ..... 677—680
Hippolytus. His place of residence. Commentary on the scriptures. Defence of the Gospel of John and of the Apocalypse. His work against thirty-two heresies. Tract on Antichrist. Exhortation to Severina ..... 681—683

Church Teachers of North Africa.

Tertullian. Characteristics. Circumstances of life. His Montanism. Tertullianists ..... 683—685
Cyprian. Relation to Tertullian. His books of testimonies ..... 685—686
Commodian. His instructions ..... 686—687
Arnobius. His conversion. His Apology ..... 687—689

Church Teachers of Rome.

Caius. Novatian. Minucius Felix ..... 689—691

Church Teachers of Alexandria.

Pantænus. Clement. His writings ..... 691—693
Origen. History of his life. Theological education. Catechetical office. His activity as a theological teacher. Relation to Ambrose. His commentaries. Περὶ ἀρχῶν. Persecution by Demetrius. Residence in Palestine. The Hexapla. Correspondence with Julius Africanus. His other writings. Death ..... 693—711
The school of Origen. Heraclas. Dionysius of Alexandria. Pierius and Theognostos. Origenistic and Anti-Origenistic party ..... 711—713
Hieracas. His exegesis and ascetic tendency. On marriage. Approach to rationalism ..... 713—716
Gregory Thaumaturgus. Conversion by means of Origen. His labors and writings ..... 716—720
Methodius. Controversy with Origen. His writings ..... 720—721
Pamphilus. His services rendered to exegesis. Defence of Origen ... 721—722
Theological school at Antioch. Doritheus. Lucian. Conclusion ..... 722—723

Index to Names and Subjects ..... 725—732
Citations ..... 733—740

INTRODUCTION.

CONDITION OF THE WORLD, ROMAN, GREEK AND JEWISH, AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST APPEARANCE AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SPREAD OF CHRISTIANITY.

It shall be our purpose to trace, from the small mustard-grain, through the course of the past centuries, lying open for our inspection, the growth of that mighty tree, which is destined to overshadow the earth, and under the branches of which all its people are to find a safe habitation. The history will show how a little leaven, cast into the mass of humanity, has been gradually penetrating it. Looking back on the period of eighteen centuries, we would survey a process of development in which we ourselves are included; a process moving steadily onward, though not in a direct line, but through various windings, yet in the end furthered by whatever has attempted to arrest its course; a process having its issue in eternity, but constantly following the same laws, so that in the past, as it unfolds itself to our view, we may see the germ of the future, which is coming to meet us. But although the contemplation of history enables us to perceive the powers as they are prepared in their secret laboratories, and as they are exhibited in actual operation, yet in order to a right understanding of all this, it is pre-supposed that we have formed some just conception of that in its inward essence, which we would study in its manifestation and process of development. Our knowledge here falls into a necessary circle. To understand history, it is supposed that we have some understanding of that which constitutes its working principle; but it is also history which furnishes us the proper test, by which to ascertain whether its principle has been rightly apprehended. Certainly, then, our understanding of the history of Christianity will depend on the conception we have formed to ourselves of Christianity itself.

Now Christianity we regard not as a power that has sprung up out of the hidden depths of man's nature, but as one which descended from above, because heaven opened itself for the rescue of revolted humanity; a power which, as it is exalted above all that human nature can create out of its own resources, must impart to that nature a new life, and change it from its inmost centre. The great source of this power is the person whose life its appearance exhibits to us,— Jesus of Nazareth,— the Redeemer of mankind when alienated from God by sin. In the submission of faith to him, and the appropriation of the truth which he revealed, consists the essence of Christianity, and of

that fellowship of the divine life resulting from it, which we designate under the name of the church. Out of this springs the common consciousness, which unites all its members in one, however separated from one another by space or time. The continuance of all those agencies, whereby Christianity has given a new turn to the life of our race, depends on our holding fast to this, its peculiar essence, to the same that has been the spring of these agencies from the beginning. To the Kingdom of God, which derived its origin from these influences in humanity, and which must ever continue to spring up afresh from the same, may be applied the remark of an ancient historian respecting the kingdoms of the world, that they will be preserved by the same means to which they were indebted for their foundation. [1]

But although Christianity can be understood only as something which is above nature and reason, something communicated to them from a higher source, yet it stands in necessary connection with the essence of these powers and with their mode of development, — otherwise, indeed, it could not be fitted to elevate them to any higher stage; otherwise, it would not operate on them at all. And such a connection, considered by itself, we must presume to exist in the works of God, in the mutual and harmonious agreement of which is manifested the divine order of the universe. The connection of which we now speak consists in this; that what has by their Creator been implanted in the essence of human nature and reason, what has its ground in their idea and their destination, can attain to its full realization only by means of that higher principle, as we see it actually realized in Him who is its Source, and in whom is expressed the original type and model, after which humanity has to strive. And accordingly, we see the evidence of this connection, whenever we observe how human nature and reason do, by virtue of this, their original capacity, actually strive, in their historical development, towards this higher principle, which needs to be communicated to them in order to their own completion; and how, by the same capacity they are made receptive of this principle and conducted onward till they yield to it, and become moulded by its influence. It is simply because such a connection exists, because in all cases where, through the historic preparation, the soil has been rendered suitable for its reception, Christianity enters readily into all that is human, striving to assimilate it to its own nature, and to inter-penetrate it with its own power, that on a superficial view, it appears as if Christianity itself were only a product resulting from the combination of the different spiritual elements it had drawn together; and the *opinion* has found advocates, that it could *thus* be explained. So may it also become blended for a while with the impure elements, attracted by its influence, and in its manifestation assume a shape which wholly resembles them; — till at length, by its own intrinsic power, it begins a process of purification, from which it issues forth refined and ennobled, even in its outward form. But this circumstance, again, might seem to furnish some hold for the *opinion*, *as if* all those impure elements,

[1] Imperium facile his artibus retinetur, quibus initio partum est.

which only attached themselves to Christianity in its outward manifestation, sprang from its essence; while on the contrary, the real operation of its essence, as the process of development went on, was to separate and reject them. In the contemplation of history, as of nature, it is always in truth a very difficult thing to avoid confounding accidental symptoms with more deep-seated agencies, — to distinguish clearly the true cause from what merely works on the surface.[1]

If this holds good, so far as it concerns the relation of Christianity to the development of human nature generally, it will be found to apply with peculiar force to that great period which was chosen for the appearance of the Saviour of the world; and for the diffusion among mankind, from him, as the source, of those powers from above, which formed the commencement of that new creation, whose progressive work became thenceforth the final problem and the goal of history. It is, therefore, only from its historical connection with the previous development of that portion of mankind, among whom Christianity first appeared, that its effects can be rightly understood; and such a connected view of the subject is necessary, in order to clear the way of false explanations.

This connection is hinted at by the Apostle Paul, where he says that Christ appeared *when the fulness of the time was come.* For herein, certainly, it is implied, that the precise time when he appeared had some particular relation to his appearance; — that the preparatory steps, through the previous development in the history of the nations, had been directed precisely to this point, and were destined to proceed just so far, in order to admit of this appearance — the goal and central point of all. It is true, this appearance stands in an altogether peculiar relation to the religion of the Hebrews, which was designed to prepare the way for it in an altogether peculiar sense. It is connected with this religion by the common element of a divine revelation, — the super-natural and supra-rational element; by the common interest of Theism and the Theocracy; as all revealed religion, the entire development of Theism and the Theocracy, points from the beginning towards one end; which being reached, every thing must be recognized as belonging to one organic whole, — a whole wherein all the principal *momenta* served to announce beforehand, and to prepare the way for, the end towards which they were tending as their last fulfilment and consummation. It is in this reference, Christ says of his relation to *this* religion, what he could not say after the same manner, of his relation to any other; — that he was not come to destroy the law and the prophets, but to fulfil; although it remains none the less true, that Christ stands in the relation of one, who came not to destroy but to fulfil, to all the truth at bottom in all religions, to the purely human element wherever it may be found. But still we must not confine ourselves here to the connection of the appearance of Christianity with Judaism alone. Judaism itself, as the revealed religion of Theism, can be understood in its true significance, only as

[1] We might apply here what the great historian Polybius says on another, though kindred subject: Ἀρχὴ τί διαφέρει καὶ πόσον διέστηκεν αἰτίας καὶ προφάσεως. III. VI.

contrasted with the Nature-religion of Paganism. Whilst on the one hand, the seed of divine truth out of which Christianity sprang, was communicated to reason by divine revelation; so on the other hand, reason unfolding itself from beneath, must seek, especially among that great historical people, the Greeks, how far it could singly, and by its own power, advance in the knowledge of divine things. To this, the Apostle Paul alludes, when he says, "God hath determined for all nations the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation, — how long they should continue, and how far they should extend their sway, — that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him." And so, too, when he says of the times immediately preceding the revelation of the gospel, that the world, by its own wisdom, sought to know God in his wisdom, but could not know him. As it had been intrusted to the Hebrews to preserve and transmit the heaven-derived element of the Theistic religion, so it was ordained that among the Greeks, all seeds of *human culture* should unfold themselves in beautiful harmony, to a complete and perfect whole; and then Christianity, taking up the opposition between the divine and the human, was to unite both in one, and show how it was necessary that both should co-operate to prepare for the appearance of itself and for the unfolding of what it contains. Origen had no hesitation in admitting, what Celsus the great antagonist of Christianity maintained, when he ascribed to the Greeks a peculiar adaptation of talents and fitness of position, which qualified them for applying human culture to the development and elaboration of those elements of divine knowledge they had received from other quarters, namely from the East.[1]

Besides, among Pagans, the transient flashes of a deeply-seated consciousness of God, — the sporadic revelations of Him in whom we live and move and have our being, and who has not left himself without witness among any people, — are too clear to be mistaken; the testimonia animæ naturaliter christianæ, as it is expressed by an ancient father, which pointed to Christianity. And while it was necessary that the influence of Judaism should penetrate into the heathen world, in order to prepare the way and open a point of communication for Christianity, so was it needful also, that the stern and repulsive stiffness of Judaism should be softened and expanded by the elements of Hellenic culture, in order to become recipient for what was new in the presentations of the Gospel. The three great historical nations had to contribute, each in its own peculiar way, to prepare the soil for the planting of Christianity, — the Jews on the side of the religious element; the Greeks on the side of science and art; the Romans, as masters of the world, on the side of the political element. When the fulness of the time was arrived, and Christ appeared, — when the goal of history had thus been reached, — then it was, that through him, and by the power of the spirit that proceeded from him, — the might of Christianity, — all the threads, hitherto separated, of human development, were to be brought together and interwoven in one web.

[1] Ὅτι κρῖναι βεβαιώσασθαι καὶ ἀσκῆσαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὰ ὑπο βαρβάρων εὑρεθέντα ἀμείνονές εἰσιν Ἕλληνες. Origen, acquiescing in this opinion, says it serves precisely for the vindication of Christianity c. Cels. I. 2.

Now, how it was, that the different courses of development under revealed, and in natural religion, — under Judaism on the one hand, and Greek or Roman institutions on the other, — co-operated to prepare the way for Christianity, it is our present purpose more particularly to consider; and we will first cast a glance at the religious state of the pagan world among the Greeks and Romans.

State of the Pagan World among the Greeks and Romans.

If, in the ancient world, a dark fatality *seemed to reveal itself* in the rise and fall of nations, an irresistible cycle to which all human greatness was forced to submit, in this impression we may recognize the consciousness of a necessary law of development at that stage of the world. All national greatness depends on the tone of public feeling and manners; and this again on the power of religion in the life of the people. But the popular religions of antiquity answered only for a *certain stage* of culture. When the nations, in the course of their progress, had passed beyond this, the necessary consequence was a dissevering of the spirit from the religious traditions. In the case of the more quiet and equable development of the Oriental mind, — so tenacious of the old, — the opposition between the mythic religion of the people, and the secret, *theosophic* doctrines of a priestly cast, who gave direction to the popular conscience, might exist for centuries without change. But among the more excitable nations of the West, intellectual culture, as soon as it attained to a certain degree of independence, must necessarily fall into collision with the mythic religion, handed down from the infancy of the people. The more widely diffused cultivation became, the more extensive grew this schism. Religion was deprived of its power, and the defection from this led at the same time to the depravation of morals. Thus the culture which had no religious and moral ground of support, capable of withstanding every shock, and indestructible under all changes, — as soon as it was rent from its connection with the inner life that alone gives the vigor of health to all human concerns, — could only degenerate into false civilization and corruption. There was as yet *no salt*, to preserve the life of humanity from decomposing, or to restore it back again when passing to decomposition.

As it was the Grecian mind, — freed in its development from the influence of tradition, — to which philosophy and every independent science under its form, owe their existence; so too it was among the Greeks, that the mighty schism first presented itself, between the human mind striving after its freedom, and the popular religion. As early as the fifth and fourth conturies before Christ, the arbitrary and heartless dialectic of the Sophists was directed against the might of holy tradition and morals. Plato already represents Socrates discoursing against this rage for enlightenment, which he characterises as a "boorish wisdom," [1] that put itself to the thankless task of tracing back

1 Ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, is what he says of one of those enlighteners who were for explaining every thing into the natural and trivial. Phædrus, p. 285, Plat ed. Bipont, Vol. X.

all mythical tales to some natural fact, neglecting meanwhile, what is most important and nearest to man, the knowledge of himself. And in the times immediately succeeding, appeared a certain Euemerus, from the school of Cyrene, who fancied that he had compassed the long sought object, and resolved the whole doctrine concerning the gods, into a history of nature.

Among the Romans, religion was more closely interwoven than in the other ancient states, with politics. One gave life to the other. Here, more than elsewhere, the whole civil and domestic life was based on religious customs, which, by their connection with modesty of manners, presented a striking contrast with the more æsthetic than moral element of the Grecian mythology, — a system which did not shrink from even entering into union with immorality.[1] The great historian Polybius has given a picture of Roman life, as it was a century and a half before Christ, while it yet retained its ancient simplicity. Judging by those maxims of the understanding, which, as a statesman, he was in the habit of applying to the affairs of the world, he believed that the trait of character, for which the Roman people had been commonly reproached, — the excessive superstition inwrought with their public and private life, — was, in truth, the firmest pillar of the Roman state.[2] Contemplating religion in this outward way, he saw in it only a means, employed by the wisdom of law-givers, for training and leading the multitude. It was his opinion, that were it even possible to form a state of wise men, such a procedure would, perhaps, be found unnecessary. But as a counterpoise to the power, which unruly passions and desires exercised over the excitable multitude, there was need of such means, in order to hold them in check by the dread of the invisible, and by terrifying fictions.[3] From this power of religious faith, he accounted for the integrity and trustworthiness of the Roman magistrates, with whom an oath was a pledge of fidelity, to be relied on with far more confidence than any number of other securities in the Grecian states. But while he praised the ancients, who, not without good reasons, had introduced among the multitude these opinions concerning the gods and the things of the lower world, he felt constrained to censure those of his own contemporaries, who were most unreasonably and inconsiderately seeking to destroy these convictions.[4]

It would necessarily be the case, at the point occupied by the ancient world, that in proportion as scientific culture came to be more generally diffused among the people, this opposition noticed by Polybius between the subjective conviction of individuals and the public state-religion, would become more strongly marked. There were no means of creating a fellowship of religious interest on truthful grounds,

[1] A difference between the Roman and Grecian religions, particularly noticed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a Greek writer of the Augustan age. See the well-known and remarkable passage in Archæol. Roman. l. II. c. 18.

[2] Καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ὀνειδιζόμενον, τοῦτο συνέχειν τὰ ῥωμαίων πράγματα, λέγω δὲ τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν. L. VI. c. 56.

[3] Λείπεται, τοῖς ἀδήλοις φόβοις καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τραγῳδίᾳ τὰ πλήθη συνέχειν.

[4] Διόπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ δοκοῦσι μοι τὰς περὶ θεῶν ἐννοίας καὶ τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου διαλήψεις οὐκ εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν εἰς τὰ πλήθη παρεισαγαγεῖν· πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ νῦν εἰκῇ καὶ ἀλόγως ἐκβάλλειν αὐτά.

between the cultivated class and the people. The wiser sort endeavored to sustain the popular religion; either because, like Polybius, they merely recognized in it a necessary means to political ends; or because, like philosophers of more depth, they regarded it as not barely the work of human caprice, but as belonging to a higher necessity; as resting on a basis of truth, which could be brought near the consciousness of the multitude only under this human form; as the fragments of a tradition, transmitting the knowledge of divine things possessed in the earliest times, wherein all that was true and that claimed to be acknowledged as such also by the wise, ought to be distinguished from the imperfect form.[1] With Polybius agrees Strabo the geographer, who wrote in the age of Augustus Cæsar. "The multitude of women, he observes, and the entire mass of the common people cannot be led to piety by the doctrines of philosophy; for this purpose superstition also is necessary, which must call in the aid of myths and tales of wonder." Having adduced some examples from the Grecian mythology, he adds, "such things the founders of states employed as bug-bears to awe childish people." These myths, as it seemed to him, were required not only for children, but no less for the ignorant and uneducated, who are no better than children; and so too for those whose education is imperfect, for in their case too, reason has not as yet acquired strength enough to throw off the habits they have brought with them from the years of childhood.[2]

In the latter times of the Roman republic, when the ancient simplicity of manners was fast disappearing before the advance of culture, this opposition, which had for a long time existed among the Greeks, between the religion of thinking men and the state-religion, or the popular faith, began to prevail more generally in proportion to the influence of the Grecian philosophy. Thus the learned Roman antiquarian, Varro, who lived about the time of our Saviour's birth, distinguished three kinds of theology; the poetic or mythical, the civil, and the natural; the last being the one which belongs to the whole world, and in which the wise are agreed. The *theologia civilis*, in its relation to truth, seemed to him to lie half way between mythology and philosophical religion.[3] Seneca said in his tract "against superstition," "the whole of that vulgar crowd of gods, which for ages past a Protean superstition has been accumulating, we shall worship in

[1] So Aristotle; who says, "It has been handed down, in a mythical form, from the earliest times to posterity, that there are gods, and that the divine (the Deity) compasses entire nature. All besides this, has been added, after the mythical style, for the purpose of persuading the multitude, and for the interest of the laws and the advantage of the state. Thus men have given to the gods human forms, and have even represented them under the figure of other beings, in the train of which fictions followed many more of the like sort. But if we separate from all this the original principle, and consider it alone, namely, that the first essences are gods, we shall find, that this has been divinely said; and since it is probable that philosophy and the arts have been several times, — so far as that is possible, — found and lost, such doctrines may have been preserved to our times, as the remains of ancient wisdom." Metaphys. x. 8.

[2] In Strabo Geograph. l. I. c. 2.

[3] His words are: Prima theologia maxime accommodata est ad theatrum, secunda ad mundum, tertia ad urbem. Ea, quæ scribunt poetæ, minus esse, quam ut populi sequi debeant, quæ autem philosophi, *plus* quam ut ea vulgum scrutari expediat Ea quæ facilius intra parietes in schola, quam extra in foro ferre possunt aures. Augustin. De civitate Dei. l. VI. c. 5, et seq

this sense, viz. that we ever remember the worship we pay them is due rather to good manners, than to their own worth. All such rites the sage will observe, because they are commanded by the laws, not because they are pleasing to the gods." So Cotta, whom Cicero introduces as the Academician, in the third book of his work, "De natura Deorum," knows how to distinguish, in his own person, the two different positions of the pontifex and the philosopher. But not every one had the wisdom, which could hold these two positions distinctly apart, and keep them from destroying, where they had nothing better to substitute in place of what they destroyed. The inner disunion was at length no longer to be concealed even from those who were *no philosophers*. When with the increase of luxury, a superficial cultivation came to be more widely spread among the Romans, and the ancient simplicity of manners gradually disappeared; when the old civic virtue, and the old constitution and freedom sank away, and were succeeded by every species of moral depravation, and by servitude; then was the tie also broken, whereby the old religion of the state had been thus far preserved in the life of the people. Those among the philosophical systems of the Greeks, which most completely harmonized with a worldly, thoughtless spirit, destitute of all susceptibility for the godlike; those which made pleasure man's highest end, or which led to doubt of all objective truth, — Epicureanism, as represented, for example, by a Lucretius, and scepticism, — found currency on all sides; and although the systems themselves were seldom studied, yet the great mass of half-educated men, became familiar with their results. Individuals appeared, who, like Lucian, pointed the shafts of their wit against the existing religions, and the superstitions of the people. In the religious systems of the several nations that had been brought in contact with one another by the Roman empire, as well as in the doctrines of the philosophical schools, men saw nothing but the strife of opinions, without any criterion of truth. Pilate's question, "what is truth?" conveying a sneer at all enthusiasm about such a matter, represented the prevailing tone of mind of many a noble Roman.

They, who without any deep sense of religious need, were yet unable to make up their minds to a total denial of religion, endeavored to content themselves with that dead abstraction, which is usually left behind, as something to retire to from the living forms of religion, when these are on the point of expiring, — a certain species of Deism, — a way of thinking that does not indeed absolutely deny the existence of a Deity, but yet places him at the utmost possible distance, in the back-ground of his works. An idle deity is all that is wanted; not one everywhere active — whose agency pervades the whole life of things. He who to satisfy his religious wants requires anything beyond this meagre abstraction, he who would know anything more respecting man's relation to a higher world appears already, to men of this way of thinking, a fanatic or a fool. The inquiries that suggest themselves under the feeling of a more profound religious need, are to such minds unintelligible; for they are strangers to the feeling itself. In the notions entertained by the many, concerning the

anger of the gods, and the punishments of the lower world, they see nothing but superstition, without recognizing in them a fundamental truth, namely, the undeniable need, which leads men into various delusions, only when misunderstood. But, by minds of this stamp, the whole is ridiculed alike, as mere dreams and fancies of limited man, who transfers all his own passions over to his gods. As a representative of this class, we may take that satirical castigator of manners in the age of the Antonines, Lucian, who characterizes himself as the hater of lies, cheats and charlatanry.[1] And Justin Martyr observes of the philosophers in his time, "that the greater part of them bestow no thought on the questions, whether there is one God, or whether there are many gods, whether there is a providence, or no providence; as if knowledge of these matters were of no importance to our well-being." "They rather seek," says he, "to convince us also, that the divinity extends his care to the great whole, and to the several kinds, but not to me and to you, not to men as individuals. Hence it is useless to pray to him; for everything occurs according to the unchangeable laws of an endless cycle."[2]

From the wreck of religion, many sought to rescue the faith in one divine primal essence, which they found it difficult, however, to distinguish from the world; and the simple spiritual worship of this, appeared to them the original truth, lying at the foundation of the whole fabric of superstition in the popular religions. It was Varro's opinion, that the only thing true in religion was the idea of a rational soul of the world, by which all things are moved and governed.[3] He traces the origin of superstition and unbelief to the introduction of idols, which he contends were unknown to the earliest religion of the Romans.[4] "If images had not been introduced," says he, "the gods would have been worshipped in a more chaste and simple manner;"[5] and he appeals, furthermore, to the example of the Jews. So Strabo informs us what he himself considered to be the original truth in religion, where he describes Moses as a religious reformer, who established the simple spiritual worship of a Supreme Being, in opposition to the idol and image worship of all other nations; "and this one Supreme Essence," says he, "is what embraces us all, water and land, — what we call the heavens, the world, the nature of things. This Highest Being should be worshipped without any visible image, in sacred groves. In such retreats, the devout should lay themselves down to sleep, and expect signs from God in dreams." But this simple nature-worship, Strabo supposes, became afterwards, as well among the Jews as everywhere else, corrupted by superstition and thirst for power.[6] We should mention here, also, that eclectic philosopher of the Cynic

[1] Μισαλαζών εἰμι καὶ μισογόης καὶ μισο-ψευδὴς καὶ μισότυφος καὶ μισῶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτῶδες εἶδος τῶν μιαρῶν ἀνθρώπων· πάνυ δὲ πολλοί εἰσιν. Which, to be sure, he could say, with perfect justice, of his own time. See the dialogue entitled ἁλιεύς.

[2] Dial. c. Tryph. Jud. at the beginning f. 218, Ed. Colon. 1686.

[3] Anima motu ac ratione mundum gubernans.

[4] Qui primi simulacra deorum populis posuerunt, eos civitatibus suis et metum demsisse et errorem addidisse.

[5] Castius Dii observarentur; see Augustin. de civ. Dei, l. V. c. 31.

[6] Strabo l. XVI. c. 2.

tribe, Demonax of the isle of Cyprus, who, at the beginning of the second century, resided in Athens, where he lived near to the age of a hundred years, universally respected for his simple life, full of kindness and charity to all. He was the representative of a sober, practical bent of mind, striving after nothing beyond the purely human, which, while it discarded whatever savored of superstition and fanaticism, checked all inquiry also about super-terrestrial things. He made no offerings, because the gods needed none. He had no desire to be initiated into the mysteries, for he thought, "if they were bad, they ought to be divulged, to keep men away from them, and if they were good, they should be communicated to all, from love to mankind." When a show of gladiators was about to be exhibited in Athens, he presented himself before the assembled people, and told them they should pass no such decree, until they had first removed away the altar of pity (ελεος). That equanimity which renders man independent of outward things and truly free, which makes him fear nothing and hope for nothing, he considered the loftiest attainment. When asked whether he thought the soul to be immortal, his answer was, "Yes, but in the sense in which all things are immortal."[1]

The elder Pliny, while absorbed in the contemplation of nature, is lost in admiration of an immeasurable creative spirit, beyond all human comprehension, manifesting himself in his works. But his admiration of this exalted spirit of the universe, serves only to awaken, in tenfold strength, the depressing sense of the narrowness and vanity of man's existence. He saw nothing to fill up the chasm betwixt feeble man and that unknown, all-transcending spirit. Polytheism appeared to him an invention of human weakness. Since men were incapable of grasping and retaining the whole conception of perfect being, they separated it into many parts. They formed for themselves divers ideals as objects of worship; each making himself a god, suited to his own peculiar wants. "All religion is the offspring of necessity, weakness and fear. *What* God is,—if in truth he be anything distinct from the world,—it is beyond the compass of man's understanding to know. But it is a foolish delusion, which has sprung from human weakness and human pride, to imagine that such an infinite spirit would concern himself with the petty affairs of men.[2] It is difficult to say, whether it might not be better for men to be wholly without religion, than to have one of this kind, which is a reproach to its object.

[1] See the account of his life, by Lucian. This remarkable bent of Demonax, so exclusively practical, moral and *rationalistic*, so decided in its renunciation of all higher knowledge, so ready to spurn, as fanaticism, all speculative or religious interest about any other world besides or above the present, is illustrated by several other of his sentences, preserved in the collection of Johannes Stobaeus. Thus, when asked if the world was animated, or of a spherical shape, he replied, "You busy yourselves impertinently about the nature of the world, but of the disorder in your own nature you do not think." The play on the words is not translatable into English. Ὑμεῖς περὶ μὲν τοῦ κόσμου πολυπραγμονεῖτε, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀκοσμίας οὐ φροντίζετε. Stobaei Eclogæ l. II. c. I. 11, ed. Heeren, P. II. p. 10. Two other sentences are contained in the Anthology of Stobaeus on the γνῶθι σεαυτόν and on ὑπεροψία, and in Orelli's Collection of the Gnomographi graeci.

[2] Plin. hist. nat. l. II. c. 4, et seq.; l. VII. c. 1. Irridendum vero, agere curam rerum humanarum illud, quidquid est summum. Anne tam tristi atque multiplici ministerio non pollui credamus dubitemusve?

The vanity of man, and his insatiable longing after existence, have led him also to dream of a life after death. A being full of contradictions, he is the most wretched of creatures; since the other creatures have no wants transcending the bounds of their nature. Man is full of desires and wants, that reach to infinity, and can never be satisfied. His nature is a lie, — uniting the greatest poverty with the greatest pride. ("Among these so great evils, the best thing God has bestowed on man, is the power to take his own life.") Sadness, mixed with a cold resignation, is the prevailing tone that runs through Pliny's remarkable work. It was in the same temper, he proceeded to encounter the flames of Vesuvius, for the purpose of exploring their effects.

But as the history of this and of every age witnesses, there is a religious need clinging to man's nature, and not to be denied; a need of recognizing something above nature, and of fellowship with the same, — which only asserts itself with the more force, the longer it is repressed. The predominance of that worldly bent of mind, which will acknowledge nothing above nature, does but call forth, in the end, a stronger reaction of the longing after the supernatural; the dominion of an all-denying unbelief excites a more intense desire to be able to believe. And the experience itself, which follows in the train of unbelief, contributes to bring about this result. The times in which unbelief has prevailed, are, as history teaches, uniformly times of earthly calamity; for the moral depravation which accompanies unbelief, necessarily destroys, also, the foundation of all earthly prosperity. Thus the time of the diffusion of unbelief in the Roman state, was also the time which saw the destruction of civil liberty, and the time of public suffering, under the rule of merciless despots. And the outward distress awakened a sense of the inward; men were led to regard their estrangement from the gods and from heaven, as a principal cause of the public decay and misery. Many felt themselves constrained to compare these times of public misfortune with the flourishing period of the Roman republic, and believed this melancholy change ought to be ascribed particularly to the decline of the *religio Romana*, once so scrupulously observed. In the gods, now cast off or neglected, they saw the authors and protectors of the Roman empire. They observed the mutual strife of the philosophical systems, which, promising truth, did but multiply uncertainty and doubt. All this excited in them the longing after some external authority, which might serve as a stay for religious conviction; and they resorted back to the religion of their more fortunate ancestors, who, under the influence of that religion, found themselves so happy in the freedom from all doubt. That old religion appeared to them, like the days of the past, in a transfigured light. Such was the tone of feeling which set in to oppose, first the prevailing infidelity, afterwards, Christianity.

Thus the pagan Cæcilius, in the *apologetic* dialogue of Minucius Felix, first describes the strife and uncertainty in the systems of human philosophy; shows what small reliance can be placed on human things generally; and points to the doubts in a providence, which suggest themselves when we observe the misfortunes of the virtuous, and

the prosperity of the wicked. He then goes on to say, "How much nobler and better is it, then, to receive just what our fathers have taught us, as a sufficient guide to truth? To worship the gods which we have been instructed by our fathers to reverence, even before we *could* have any true knowledge of them? To allow ourselves, in regard to the divinities, no license of private judgment, — but to believe our ancestors, who, in the infancy of mankind, near the birth of the world, were even considered worthy of having the gods for their friends or for their kings?"

The need of some union with heaven, from which men felt they were estranged, the dissatisfaction with a cold, melancholy present, procured a more ready belief for those accounts, in the mythical legends, of a golden age, wherein gods and men lived in intimate fellowship together. Ardent spirits looked back to those times, with a sort of earnest craving, — a craving after the past, that pointed to the future. Thus Pausanias[1] endeavors to defend old mythical traditions against the infidelity of his contemporaries; accounting for the latter, partly from the fact, that the true had been rendered suspicious by being mixed in with the false, and in part from the fact, that men had grown accustomed to apply a standard, suiting the present times only, to that more glorious period of wonders. Of those former days he says, "The men who lived then, were, on account of their uprightness and piety, admitted as guests and even table companions of the gods; for their good actions, the gods openly bestowed honors on them, and for their bad, openly manifested displeasure. It was then, also, that men themselves became gods, and continue to enjoy this honor." But of his own time, he says, "At the present day, when wickedness has reached its highest pitch, and extended itself through all the country and in every town, such an incident no longer occurs, as that of a man becoming a god, except merely in name, and through flattery to power (the apotheosis of the emperors;) and the anger of the gods awaits transgressors at a remote period, and after they are gone from this world." Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who, a few years before the birth of Christ, wrote on the old Roman history, relates the story of a vestal virgin, whose innocence, after she had been falsely accused, was miraculously brought to light. Upon this, he remarks, "The followers of atheistic philosophies, — if philosophies they may be called, which scoff at all appearances of the gods, that are said to have occurred among the Greeks or Barbarians, — would make themselves quite merry with these accounts, attributing them to human exaggeration; as if no one of the gods ever concerned himself about a man, whoever he might be; but he who is not disposed to deny altogether the care of the gods for men, but believes they regard the good with complacency and the bad with displeasure, will look upon these appearances as not incredible."[2]

The *artificial* faith in an old religion that had outlived itself, must, on this very account, become fanatical, be united with passion, in place of natural conviction. Hence, the violence by which the continually

[1] In his Description of Greece. See Arcadica, or l. VII. c. II. § 2.

[2] Antiq. Roman. II. 68

waning course of Paganism was sought to be maintained against the onward advance of Christianity. Although the Romans, accustomed to hold firm to their old traditional forms, and national peculiarities, were singularly averse to foreign modes of worship, yet this fundamental trait in the old Roman character had, with many, already become obliterated. The ancient religion of Rome had lost its power over their minds, and they were inclined, therefore, to seek a prop for their religious faith in foreign modes of worship. Ceremonies that wore an air of enigma and mystery; strange-sounding magical formulas in some barbarous tongue; whereby, as Plutarch remarks, the national dignity of devoutness was put to the blush,[1] found readiest admittance. Men were looking, as usual, for some peculiar supernatural power in that which they did not understand, and which was incapable of being understood.

Hence, the *artificial* faith was pressed more closely to assume the shape of superstition. Unbelief, against which an undeniable need of man's nature asserted its force, called forth superstition, — since these two distempered conditions of the spiritual life are but opposite symptoms of the same fundamental evil, and one of them, therefore, passes easily over to the other. It is the worldly tone of the inner life, which either suppresses religious feeling entirely, and then turns to unbelief; or, mixing itself up with that feeling, gives to it an interpretation of its own, and thus turns to superstition. The desperation of unbelief surrenders the troubled conscience a prey to superstition; and the irrationality of superstition makes religion suspected by the thoughtful mind. Such an opposition we find presenting itself, whenever we contemplate this period, under various forms. A man who was not in the habit, like Lucian, of ridiculing the absurd extravagances of superstition, but who was made sad in contemplating such cases of the denial or misapprehension of the Godlike, — the wise and devout Plutarch, — in a beautiful work of his, where he describes this opposition, as it existed in his own time,[2] presents us a picture from the life, of such caricatures of religion. "Every little evil is magnified to the superstitious man, by the scaring spectres of his anxiety.[3] He looks on himself as a man whom the gods hate and pursue with their anger. A far worse lot is before him; he dares employ no means for averting or curing the evil, lest he be found fighting against the gods. The physician, the consoling friend, are driven away. Leave me, — says the wretched man, — me, the impious, the accursed, hated of the gods, to suffer my punishment. He sits out of doors, wrapped in sackcloth or in filthy rags; ever and anon he rolls himself, naked, in the dirt, confessing aloud this and that sin," — and the nature of these sins is truly characteristic! — "he has eaten or drunk something wrong,[4] — he has gone some way or other, which was not allowed him by the divinity. The festivals in honor of the gods give no pleasure to the

[1] Ἀτόποις ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασι βαρβαρικοῖς καταισχύνειν καὶ παρανομεῖν τὸ θεῖον καὶ πάτριον ἀξίωμα τῆς εὐσεβείας. De superst. c. 33.

[2] The tract Περὶ δεισιδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθεότητος.

[3] Cap. 7.

[4] Comp. Coloss. 2, 16.

superstitious,[1] but fill him rather with fear and affright. He proves the saying of Pythagoras false in his own case, — that we are happiest when we approach the gods, — for it is just then he is most wretched. Temples and altars are places of refuge for the persecuted ; but where all others find deliverance from their fears, there the superstitious man fears and trembles most. Asleep[2] or awake, he is haunted alike by the spectres of his anxiety. Awake, he makes no use of his reason ; and asleep, he finds no deliverance from what disturbs him. His reason always slumbers ; his fears are always awake. Nowhere can he find an escape from his imaginary terrors." The contradictions involved in superstition are thus described : " These men fear the gods, and fly to them for succor. They flatter them, and insult them. They pray to them, and complain of them."[3] The offensive phrases and gesticulations, the forms of self-abasement, — so repulsive to the antique feeling of freedom, — into which the slavish spirit of superstition fell, were peculiarly revolting to the Greek and Roman sense of propriety.

In the work above cited, Plutarch thus judges respecting the mutual relation of superstition and unbelief:[4] " The infidel has no belief in the gods ; the superstitious man would fain disbelieve, but believes against his will, for he fears to do otherwise. Yet as Tantalus wearies himself to escape the stone that hangs over him, so the superstitious man would gladly rid himself of the fear which is no trifling burden to him ; and he is inclined to praise the unbeliever's state of mind, as freedom. But now the unbeliever has nothing of superstition in him ; while, on the other hand, the superstitious man is an unbeliever by inclination, but only too weak to think of the gods as he would be glad to do.[5] The unbeliever contributes nothing at all towards producing superstition ; but the superstitious have, from the beginning, given existence to unbelief, and furnish it, when it exists already, an apparent ground of justification." [6]

Manifestly, Plutarch has taken here but a very partial view of the religious phenomena of his times, — a natural mistake for one living in the midst of those phenomena, and who is biased in his judgment by immediate impressions. It seems evident, from what has been already said, that the same cause which produces superstition, lies also at the root of unbelief ; and that unbelief, therefore, may easily change into superstition, as well as superstition into unbelief. Indeed, it was precisely the latter, which, in this period of history, had called forth the former. Plutarch, moreover, has looked at these opposite tendencies, in a way too general and abstract ; he did not observe and take into his account, those manifold gradations and transitions, which he might have discerned in his own times, in the mutual relation of unbelief and superstition to each other. If there was a superstition, at

[1] Cap. 9. [2] Cap. 3.
[3] Cap. 5. [4] Cap. 11.
[5] In like manner, Plutarch says, in another place, that by the prevailing false notions of the gods, the weaker and more simple natures were led into a superstition without bounds ; the more acute and bolder spirits, into unbelief ; — the different turn which is taken in the natural course of their development by the *ἀσθενέσι καὶ ἀκάκοις* on the one hand, and the *δεινοτέροις καὶ ῥᾳσυτέροις*, on the other. De Iside et Osiride, c. 71
[6] Cap. 12.

that time, leagued with immorality, having its root in unbelief, — but an unbelief restrained by fear, — yet we find, too, in the case of some who were really striving after moral worth, various modifications of superstition, grounded at bottom in the need, — though not understood, and even misunderstood, — of believing; the need of atonement, from the deep-felt disunion in their nature. It was only necessary that, to such need, the satisfaction, unconsciously sought, should be furnished, in order to lead it from superstition to faith. This was the point of religious development, through which many were brought to embrace Christianity, as the remedy for their evil.

And while Plutarch, in the work above cited, biased, as he manifestly was, by the impression received from the revolting exhibitions of superstition, was really inclined to prefer unbelief to superstition; yet where he has occasion to attack an unbelief that denies every thing, he owns there is one kind of superstition which he would prefer to unbelief. He says, for example, of Epicureanism, which boasted of having delivered men from the shadowy fears of superstition, "It is better to have a feeling of reverence mixed with fear, together with faith in the gods, than for the purpose of avoiding that feeling, to leave one's self neither hope nor joy, neither confidence in prosperity, nor recourse to a divine being in adversity."[1]

That profound sense of disunion, of disruption, which gave birth to manifold kinds of superstition, revealed itself in those forms of mental disease, which so widely prevailed, where the sufferers believed themselves to consist of two or more hostile natures, — to be possessed or persecuted by evil spirits. It was through this ground-tone of the spiritual life, that the system of Dualism, which came from the East, found means of introducing itself; and hence its extraordinary influence in this age.

If we now glance at those philosophical tendencies among the Greeks, which, in this period, found most general acceptance with men of earnest minds, two systems of philosophy will offer themselves particularly to our notice, the *Stoic* and the *Platonic*.

To begin with the *Stoic:* the old Roman character felt itself peculiarly attracted by the moral heroism flowing from the principles of this philosophy. To the noble pride of the Roman, who would not survive his country's liberty, and in the self-sufficing consciousness of his disposition, bade defiance to the corruption of the times, the doctrines of the stoic school were peculiarly welcome. In the freedom and independence of the sage, placing himself above the power of fate, by his self-feeling of an unconquerable mind, he found a compensation for the loss of civil liberty. Between a disposition like Cato's and Stoicism, there existed a natural relationship. The wise man felt conscious of an entire equality, in moral loftiness, with Jupiter himself; and of

[1] Βέλτιον γὰρ, ἐνυπάρχειν τι καὶ συγκεκρᾶσθαι τῇ περὶ θεῶν δόξῃ κοινὸν αἰδοῦς καὶ φόβου πάθος, ἢ που τοῦτο φεύγοντας μήτ' ἐλπίδα, μήτε χάραν ἑαυτοῖς, μήτε θάρσος ἀγαθῶν παρόντων, μήτε τινὰ δυστυχοῦσιν ἀποστροφὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀπολείπεσθαι. In the tract: Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 20.

standing below him in no respect.[1] He was master of his own life, and might take it, whenever he found he could live no longer in a manner worthy of himself. On this principle, many noble Romans acted; not only when they wished to withdraw themselves from the ignominy of despotism, but also when disease cramped their powers and rendered existence no longer supportable.[2] Thus many a strong soul found, in this philosophy, the expression for that which he carried in his own bosom; and to many it imparted a moral enthusiasm, which enabled them to rise superior to the degeneracy of their contemporaries. But there were many who did nothing more than make an idle parade of the lofty maxims of the ancient philosophers, with whose statues or busts they embellished their halls, while their lives, abandoned to every vice, presented the strongest contrast with these examples.[3]

In respect to the relation of Stoicism to the religious interest, its aim was to bring the popular religion, allegorically explained, into union with a thoroughly pantheistic view of the world.[4] The Jupiter of Stoicism was not a being who governs all things with paternal love, and for whom each individual has a distinct end to fulfil. He was not one who can reconcile the good of the whole with the good of the individual; but he was a being who devours his own children; the All-Spirit from which all individual existence has flowed, and into which, after certain periods, it is again resolved. The gods themselves were subject to the universal law of this eternal cycle, to which *every* individual existence must finally be sacrificed.[5] The law, or word of Zeus, providence, fate,[6] all signify in this system the same thing; — that unchangeable law of the universe, of an immanent necessity of reason, which all must obey. Evil itself is necessary, according to this law, to exhibit the harmony of the world, since without it there could be no good.[7] The wise man calmly looks on the game, and surrenders with cheerfulness his individual existence to the claims of the whole,—to which every individual, as a part, ought to be subservient. The wise man has precisely the same divine life with Zeus, from whom his own has

[1] See the words of Chrysippus: Ὥσπερ τῷ Διὶ προσήκει σεμνύνεσθαι ἐπ' αὐτῷ τε καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν καὶ εἰ δεῖ οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὑψαυχεῖν καὶ κομᾶν καὶ μεγαληγορεῖν, ἀξίως βιοῦντι μεγαληγορίας· οὕτω τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πᾶσι ταῦτα προσήκει, κατ' οὐδὲν προεχομένοις ὑπὸ Διός. Plutarch. de Stoicorum repugnantiis, c. 13.

[2] For examples, cons. Pliny's Letters, I. 12, 22. III. 7. VI. 24. The old man of sixty-seven, lying under an incurable disease, dismissed his physician, who was for compelling him to take nourishment against his will, with the word κέκρικα. Whereupon Pliny remarks, — Quæ vox, quantum admirationis in animo meo, tantum desiderii reliquit. The following words of Pliny serve to give distinct form and expression to the principle of the age, that left the decision of life and death to the *autonomy* of reason. Deliberare et causas mortis expendere utque suaserit ratio, vitæ mortisque consilium suscipere vel ponere, ingentis est animi.

[3] Qui Curios simulant et Bacchanalia vivunt,
Indocti primum: quanquam plena omnia gypso
Chrysippi invenies. — Juvenal. Satira II.

[4] Lucian quotes, in the way of banter, the motto of the stoic pantheism: Ὡς καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ διά πάντων πεφοίτηκεν, οἷον ξύλων, καὶ λίθων καὶ ζώων, ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων. Hermotim. § 81.

[5] As Chrysippus says in his work, Περὶ προνοίας, — Τὸν Δία αὔξεσθαι, μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ἅπαντα καταναλώσῃ. Plutarch. de Stoicorum repugnantiis, c. 39.

[6] Διός λόγος, προνοία, εἱμαρμένη.

[7] Thus Chrysippus says, Γίνεται καὶ αὐτὴ (ἡ κακία) πως κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καὶ ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, οὐκ ἀχρήστως γίνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα, οὔτε γὰρ τ' ἀγαθὰ ἦν. Plutarch. de Stoicor. repugnantiis, c. 35

flowed. Calmly submissive, he restores it back, when the fated hour arrives, to its original source.

A cold resignation, — wholly at variance with man's natural feelings, and altogether different from the childlike submission of the Christian, which leaves every purely human feeling inviolate, submission, not to an iron necessity, that decrees annihilation, but to eternal love, which restores back what has been offered to it, transfigured and glorified. The emperor Marcus Aurelius says of this Stoic principle, "The man of disciplined mind reverently bids Nature, who bestows all things and resumes them again to herself, 'Give what thou wilt, and take what thou wilt.'" He says this, not in a haughty spirit and in defiance of Nature, but in the spirit of cheerful obedience to her.[1] His Stoicism, moreover, was tempered and refined by a certain childlike devoutness, a certain gentleness, and unpretending simplicity of character. But with what grounds of comfort, does he strive to still the craving, implanted in man's nature, after an imperishable personal existence? We will hear what he says himself. "Two things, we should consider; first, that from all eternity, things are repeated over after the same manner, and that it matters not whether one beholds the same thing again in one hundred or two hundred years, or in infinite time; next, that he who lives longest, and he who dies soonest, lose just alike, for each loses only that which he has, the present moment." (II. 14.) "Ever keep in mind, that whatever happens and shall happen, has already been, — it is merely the same show repeated!" (10, 27.) "An action terminating at the allotted moment, suffers no evil, in that it has terminated; and he that did it, suffers no evil, in that he has done acting. So, also, the whole, consisting of the aggregate sum of actions, which is life, suffers no evil, when it terminates at the allotted time, in that it has terminated; and he, who, at the allotted time, has brought up the whole chain to the end, has lost nothing." (12, 23.) He asks, (12, 5,) "How happens it, that the gods, who have ordered all things well and with love to men, seem to overlook this one thing alone, that many very good men, who, by pious works and offerings, have stood on terms of intimate communion with the deity, having once died, return no more to existence, but perish entirely?" He answers thus, "Although this is so, yet be assured, that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would have so ordered it. For had it been right, it would also have been possible; and had it been in harmony with nature, then nature would have allowed it. That it is not so, if it is not so, should satisfy us that it ought not to be so."

As Stoicism, by repressing a want inseparable from the essence of man's nature, tended, on the one hand, to awaken the longing after a revelation, capable of satisfying this want; so, on the other hand, by unfolding in man the consciousness of his relationship to the divine, — the truth lying at the bottom of pantheism,[2] — by the idea — although

[1] Monolog. 10, 14.

[2] Thus, for instance, Paul, in his discourse at Athens, appeals to that testimony of such a consciousness in the verse of Aratus; and much of a similar import is to be found in the hymn of Cleanthes, and

pantheistically apprehended — of one original divine Being, and of the spirituality of his worship, as confined to no particular place, which idea it opposed to the polytheistic religion of the people,[1] — it prepared the way for Christianity.

Yet a far greater, more deep reaching and more universal influence on the religious life of man's spirit than it was ever in the power of Stoicism to exert, was destined to proceed from the *Platonic* philosophy. It dates its beginning from that man, who appears to us as the forerunner of a higher development of humanity, as the greatest man of the ancient world, — one in whom the spirit of that world, going beyond itself, strove after a more glorious future, — from *Socrates*, whose whole appearance seems invested in a mystery and riddle, corresponding to his prophetic character. As it was his great calling, when the first strong reaction of reason, become altogether worldly, was turned against religious and moral belief, to witness, in the struggle with this worldly tendency and heartless dialectic caprice, which suppressed all higher interests; to witness of the reality of that in which alone the spirit can find its true life, and to awaken in men wholly immersed in earthly things, that aspiration after the godlike, which might lead them to Christ; so through his great disciple, Plato, — who, in his philosophy, produced, with a truly original and creative mind, the image of Socrates, although not in the whole loftiness and simplicity of the man himself, — the influence of Socrates has been often experienced, after the same manner, in those great crises of man's history, destined by the dissolution of the old, to prepare the way for a new creation; and as one who lived in a crisis of this sort, has said,[2] the Platonic Socrates came like a John the Baptist before the revelation of Christ. This was preëminently true, so far as it relates to the first appearance of Christ, the great epoch in the history of the world.

The Platonic philosophy did not merely lead men, like the Stoic, to the conscious sense of a divine indwelling life, and of an immanent reason in the world, answering to the idea of the Stoic Zeus; but it led men to regard the divine as supra-mundane, as an unchangeable existence, transcending that which merely *becomes;* a supreme Spirit, exalted above the world, if not as an unconditionally *free Creator*, yet as the *architect* of the universe. It awakened, also, the consciousness of the supernatural and divine, which in man is the efflux from this supreme Spirit, and of a kindred nature; so that man is thus enabled to rise and have fellowship with it, and cognition of it. It did not, like the Stoic philosophy, followed out to its legitimate consequences, repre-

in other outpourings of the Stoic muse. Compare the well-known passage in Seneca, Non sunt ad cœlum elevandæ manus nec exorandus ædituus, ut nos ad aures simulacri, quasi magis exaudiri possimus, admittat, prope est a te Deus, tecum est, intus est. Ita dico sacer intra nos spiritus sedet. Ep. 41 ad Lucil.

[1] Compare the passage from Seneca and the words of Zeno: "We should build no temple to the gods; for a temple is of little worth, and nothing holy, — a work of architects and common laborers is not worth much." Ἱερὰ θεῶν μὴ οἰκοδομεῖν· ἱερὸν γὰρ μὴ πολλοῦ ἄξιον καὶ ἅγιον οὐκ ἔστιν· οἰκοδόμων δ' ἔργον καὶ βαναύσων οὐδέν ἐστι πολλοῦ ἄξιον. Hence Plutarch reproaches the Stoics with self-contradiction, in participating in the religious rites of the temple Plut. de Stoicorum repugnantiis, c. 6.

[2] Marsiglio Ficino.

sent the divine in man, as a self-subsistent element, an efflux from the divine source, which, as long as the form of personal appearance lasted, could maintain an existence by itself; so that Zeus appeared to the wise man simply as the ideal of wisdom he was to strive after; — but it contemplated the divine in man as a ray which conducted back to the primal light itself; merely as something to receive — a capacity — which, separated from communion with the original source, from which alone it *can* receive, is powerless.

Compared with the principle of ethical *self*-sufficiency — with that elevation of the feeling of self, peculiar to the ancient world, and which appears to have reached its highest point in Stoicism — the Platonic system, in perfect harmony with the connection of ideas above expressed, was distinguished by a striving towards what is most directly opposed to that principle, namely, towards the Christian idea of humility. The word ταπεινος which, at the point of view generally taken by the ancient world, was employed, for the most part, in a bad sense, as indicating a slavish self-debasement,[1] is to be met with in Plato and the Platonists, as the designation of a pious, virtuous temper.[2]

This philosophy would have us recognize in man's personality, not a mere transitory appearance, but something destined to higher unfoldings. The life of the individual it regarded, not as an aimless sport in the periodical changes of the universe, but as a stage of purifying discipline and preparation for a higher state of existence. It did not require *the suppression* of any purely human want, but taught that the satisfaction of it was to be sought after and waited for. It pointed to a higher stage of being, where the soul, disencumbered of its dross, would attain to the unclouded vision of truth.

It was in no sense, certainly, the general drift and purpose of Plato, to set up an abstract religion of reason, in opposition to the existing forms of worship; but he took his stand rather in opposition to that exclusive enlightenment of the understanding, which merely analyzes and destroys, and which was peculiar to the Sophists. His religious speculations rested on a basis altogether historical. He connected himself with the actual phenomena of the religious life, and with the traditions lying before him; as we see in his remarks on the doctrine of the gods and on divination. He sought to embody in his speculations the truth which lay at the bottom here, and to separate it from all admixture of superstition. And, in like manner, this general drift of a positive philosophy that sought to understand history,[3] passed over, from the original Platonism, to the derivative Platonism of this age; and in

[1] Even in Aristotle we find the ταπεινὸν united with the ἀνδραποδῶδες. Ethic. Eudem. III. 3.

[2] To denote the disposition of submissiveness to the divine law of order in the universe, the word ταπεινὸν is used in connection with κεκοσμημένον, and opposed to the impious spirit of self-exaltation. De legibus, IV. vol. VIII. ed. Bipont. p. 185; and Plutarch (de sera numinis vindicta, c. III.) says of the humiliation of the wicked brought about by punishment: ἡ κακία μόλις ἂν γένοιτο σύννους καὶ ταπεινὴ καὶ κατάφοβος πρὸς τὸν θεόν.

[3] To avail myself of an expression, which Schelling, in the new shaping of his philosophy, has made classical, — *positive* philosophy, as opposed to the mere logical science of reason, *negative* philosophy.

this latter form, to speak generally, in spite of all the foreign additions, the tendency of the *original* Platonism may be clearly traced. It still continues to be its aim, under every new modification, to explore in all directions the marks of a connection between the visible and invisible worlds, between the divine and the human in history, and to discover, in the great variety of religious traditions[1] and modes of worship, different forms of one revelation of the divine.

In opposition to unbelief which appealed to the strife between different religions as evidence against the truth of any, an apologetic tendency, which flowed from Platonism, pointed out the higher unity lying at the root of this manifoldness; and the coincidence of ideas, in the different forms of revelation, was made available here, as *evidence for* the truth. Thus the effort to arrive at an understanding of history, to come at some comprehensive view, reconciling the oppositions of historical development, gave birth to a peculiar religious and philosophical eclecticism — as such phenomena are usually found marking the conclusion of any great series of historical evolutions. Arrived at the limits of such a series, we feel constrained to look over once more the whole, which now lies unfolded as one in all its parts; just as the traveller, near the end of his journey, gladly pauses to survey the road he has left behind him.

By distinguishing form from essence, the spiritual from the sensual, the idea from the symbol which served for its representation, it was deemed possible to find the just medium between the extremes of superstition and unbelief, and to arrive at a right understanding of the different forms of religion. The devout and profoundly meditative Plutarch, who wrote near the close of the first century, may be considered the representative of this direction of mind to religious speculation, which was now fully developed. In regard to the relation of different religions to one another, he thus expresses himself:[2] "As sun and moon, sky, earth and sea, are common to all, while they have different names among different nations; so, likewise, though there is but *one* system of the world which is supreme, and one governing providence, whose ministering powers are set over *all* men, yet there have been given to these, by the laws of different nations, different names and modes of worship; and the holy symbols which these nations used, were, in some cases, more obscure, in others, clearer; but in all cases, alike failed of being perfectly safe guides in the contemplation of the divine. For some, wholly mistaking their import, fell into superstition; while others, in avoiding the quagmire of superstition, plunged unawares into the opposite gulf of infidelity." The reverential regard for a higher necessity in the religious institutions of mankind, the recognition of a province elevated above human caprice, is shown by Plutarch, in the following remark, where he confronts the stoics with the phrase from an Orphic hymn, which was often on their lips, as a motto of their pantheism.[3] "As Zeus is the beginning and centre

[1] Συνάγειν ἱστορίαν, οἷον ὕλην φιλοσοφίας θεολογίαν τέλος ἐχούσης. De defectu oraculorum, c. 2.

[2] See de Iside et Osiride, c. 37.

[3] Ζεὺς ἀρχή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται. Adv. Stoic. c. 31.

of all, — every thing has sprung from Zeus, men should first correct and improve their ideas of the gods, if any thing impure or wrong has found its way into them. But, if this is beyond their power, they should then leave every one to that mode in which he finds himself placed by the laws and religious traditions of his country." He cites here, in evidence of a higher necessity, lying at the foundation of these institutions, the words of Socrates, witnessing of an innate and eternal law in the heart of humanity: (Antig. 467.) "The divine — religion — is something imperishable; but its forms are subject to decay. God bestows many good things on men; but nothing imperishable; for, as Socrates says, even what has reference to the gods, is subject to death." [1]

Plutarch is filled with sadness, in thinking of those who take part in the public worship only from respect to the multitude, while they look upon the whole thing as a mere farce. "They hypocritically mimic the forms of prayer and adoration, out of fear of the many; — repeat words that contradict their philosophical convictions; and, when they offer, see in the priest only the slaughtering cook." [2] He rebukes those, who, following the fashion of Euemerus, in attempting to explain everything in the doctrine of the gods after a natural way, wage war with the religious convictions of so many nations and races of men, in that they are seeking to draw down the names of heaven to earth, and to banish nearly all the religious belief that had been implanted in men from their birth. [3] He sees men wandering between these two extremes; — either confounding the symbol with what it was designed to represent, and thus giving rise to superstition — as, for instance, when the names of the gods were transferred to their images, and thus led the multitude to believe that these images were the gods themselves, and when, in Egypt, the animals consecrated to the gods became confounded with the latter; [4] — or else running into the opposite views, which were occasioned by these errors, and resulted in infidelity.

If the manner in which Plutarch explains and contemplates the opposition between superstition and unbelief, shows, when applied to the phenomena of his time, an inadequate and partial view of the subject, this must be attributed to that fundamental view, belonging to the essence of the Platonic philosophy, according to which, everything is referred back to the intellectual element, — to knowledge in religion, — and the deeper practical ground of religious conviction, and of the religious life, — their connection with the moral bent of the affections, — is overlooked. Hence, he considers the main source of both superstition and unbelief to be intellectual error — in the former of a positive, in the latter of a negative kind; only, in the case of superstition, there is, moreover, a movement of feeling, which arises out of those erroneous notions of the gods, whence they become only objects of fear. [5] But he

[1] Πολλὰ καλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ διδόντος ἀνθρώποις, ἀθάνατον δὲ μηδέν· ὥστε θνήσκειν καὶ τὰ θεῶν, θεοὺς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὸν Σοφοκλέα. De defectu oraculorum, c. 9.

[2] See Plutarch's tract: Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 22.

[3] De Iside et Osiride, c. 23.

[4] L. c. c. 71.

[5] Ἡ μὲν ἀθεότης λόγος ἐστὶ διεψευσμένος· ἡ δὲ δεισιδαιμονία πάθος ἐκλόγου φευδοῦς ἐγγεγενημένον. c. 2.

does not seem to have found that a παθος lies at the ground of many shapes of unbelief, as well as of superstition; and both disorders of the spiritual life have their proper seat in the direction of the moral affections, in the disposition; that the παθος is, therefore, usually the original, the intellectual error the derivative and symptomatic cause, of the evil. Thus Plutarch ascribes it merely to a false notion of the gods, that they are represented by the superstitious as angry, and threatening punishment; but he is not prepared to understand such a stage of religious development well enough to perceive, that there is a bottom truth, by virtue of which the gods can be represented *only in this relation* to the religious consciousness of one who feels himself estranged from God. Hence he erred also, in supposing that nothing more was necessary for the recovery of the superstitious man, than to lead him, simply by the intellectual operation, *to the knowledge* of the gods, and of the fact that good only, and nothing that is evil, proceeds from them; — not perceiving, that the representation of the gods, above alluded to, might itself be nothing else than a reflex of the superstitious man's own state of mind, and therefore to be got rid of only by an immediate operation on the nature of the man himself. This error, again, stood in some connection with another circumstance; namely, that although he defended, against the stoics, the Platonic doctrine of punishments,[1] as a necessary means of reformation, and of purifying and deterring men from evil, and wrote a treatise expressly to vindicate the divine justice in punishing the wicked,[2] yet to that conception of God's holiness and to that apprehension of sin, grounded in and intimately connected with it, which belong to the Theism of the Old Testament, he was too much a stranger. Hence, the Old Testament idea of God, as the Holy one, considered from his own Platonic position, must be unintelligible to him; and he might easily seem to himself to miss in Judaism the right notion of God's goodness.[3]

It was the purpose, then, of this apologetic and reforming philosophy of religion, to counteract unbelief, as well as superstition, by setting forth the ideal matter contained in the old religions. From this position and with this object in view, Plutarch says, in his exhortatory discourse to a priestess of Isis:[4] "As it is not his long beard and mantle that makes the philosopher, so is it neither linen robe nor shorn head that makes the priest of Isis. But the true priest of Isis is he who first receives the rites and customs pertaining to these gods from the laws, and then examines into their grounds, and philosophizes on

[1] Against Chrysippus, for instance, who puts this doctrine on a level with the stories with which old women frighten the children; Τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ θεοῦ κολάσεων λόγον, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ακκοῦς καὶ τῆς Αλφιτοῦς, δι' ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργουσιν. De Stoicorum repugnantiis, c. 15.

[2] His work on the Delay of Divine Punishments.

[3] De Stoicorum repugnantiis, c. 38, where he refers to the example of the Jews, to prove that the conception of the gods as χρηστοί was by no means to be found everywhere. And here we may remark, that we would not deny the Jews themselves were partly in fault for the diffusion of such representations of their religion.

[4] Ὁ τὰ δεικνύμενα καὶ δρώμενα περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τούτους, ὅταν νόμῳ παραλάβῃ, λόγῳ ζητῶν καὶ φιλοσοφῶν περὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας. c. 3.

the truth they contain." With some profoundness of meaning, Plutarch compares the old myths, — considered as representations of ideas, arising from a refraction of the divine light in a foreign substance, a re-appearance of it, broken by the intervention of some heterogeneous medium, — to the rainbow in relation to the sun's light.[1]

We find here the first beginnings of an attempt to reconcile the natural and supernatural in religion; to reconcile the position of the rationalist with that of the supranaturalist, the scientific interest with the religious; — tendencies and ideas, which, outstepping already the position maintained by the old Nature-religion, came forward to meet the Theism of revelation; and it was by the latter, first, that any such reconciliation could be brought about, and a true understanding of the religious development of humanity made possible.

Plutarch distinguishes two different stages or positions of knowledge; that which goes immediately to the *divine* causality, and that which dwells on the natural causes, serving as instruments to the former. "The ancients," he says, "directed their attention simply to the divine in phenomena, as God is the beginning and centre of all, and from him all things proceed; and they overlooked natural causes. The moderns turned themselves wholly away from that divine ground of things, and supposed every thing could be explained from natural causes. Both these views are, however, partial and defective; and the right understanding of the matter requires that both should be combined."[2] In attempting to show how a natural phenomenon may be a sign of the future, he says, "Divination and Physics may both be right; one serving to point out the causes which have brought about the phenomenon; the other, the higher end it is intended to subserve."[3] "They who suppose the significancy of signs is made naught by the discovery of natural causes, forget that their argument against the signs of the gods would also apply to those invented by human art; since in the latter case too, one thing is made by human contrivance to serve as the sign of something else; as for example, lights to serve as beacons, sun-dials to indicate time, and the like."

This distinction of the natural from the divine, in the coöperation of both, was employed, in a noticeable manner, by Plutarch, for the purpose of so defending the divinity of the oracles, as to avoid, at the same time, superstitious representations. While some were of the opinion, that the god himself dwelt in the prophetess at the Delphic shrine, employed her as his blind instrument, speaking through her mouth and suggesting every word she uttered; by others, these representations were seized upon for the purpose of turning the whole into jest, and

[1] Καθάπερ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τὴν ἶριν ἔμφασιν εἶναι τοῦ ἡλίου λέγουσι ποικιλλομένην τῇ πρὸς τὸ νέφος ἀναχωρήσει τῆς ὄψεως, οὕτως ὁ μῦθος λόγου τινὸς ἔμφασίς ἐστιν ἀνακλῶντος ἐπ' ἄλλα τὴν διάνοιαν. De Iside et Osiride, c. 20.

[2] Ὅθεν ἀμφοτέροις ὁ λόγος ἐνδεὴς τοῦ προσήκοντός ἐστι, τοῖς μὲν τὸ δι' οὗ καὶ ὑφ' οὗ, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὧν καὶ δι' ὧν ἀγνοοῦσιν ἡ παραλείπουσιν. De defectu oraculorum, c. 47.

[3] Ἐκώλυε δ' οὐδὲν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν ἐπιτυγχάνειν καὶ τὸν μάντιν, τοῦ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος καλῶς ἐκλαμβάνοντος· ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἐκ τίνων γέγονε καὶ πῶς πέφυκε, θεωρῆσαι, τῷ δὲ πρὸς τί γέγονε καὶ τί σημαίνει προειπεῖν. Pericles, c 6.

making the doctrine of such a divine influence on the human soul, and every idea of inspiration, ridiculous.[1] They laughed at the bad verses of the Pythoness, and inquired why it was, that the oracles, once given in poetry, should now be uttered in the form of prose. But Plutarch sought to unite the recognition of the divine causality with that of the human individuality which served it as an organ; and by distinguishing in the oracles the divine and the human, to find in this case, also, the just medium between superstition and unbelief. "We are not to believe," says he, "that the god made the verses; but, after he has communicated the moving impulse, each of the prophetesses is moved in a way that corresponds to her own peculiar nature.[2] For let us suppose the oracles were not to be spoken, but recorded in writing, we should not, I imagine, ascribe to the god the strokes of the letters, and find fault with him because the writing was not so beautiful as that of the imperial edicts. Not the language, nor the tone, nor the expression, nor the measure of the verse, proceeds from the god; — all this comes from the woman. He simply communicates the intuitions, and kindles up a light in the soul with regard to the future."[3] "As the body uses many organs, and the soul uses both the body and its parts as organs, so the soul has now become the organ of the god. But the adaptation of an organ consists in its answering, with its own natural activity, the purpose of him that employs it as a means to represent the work of his ideas. This, however, it cannot represent pure and unadulterated, as the work exists in its author; but much foreign matter becomes necessarily mixed up with it."[4] "If it is impossible," he says afterwards, "to force lifeless things, which remain constant to themselves, so as to be used in a way that contradicts their natural character — so that a lyre, for instance, can be played as a flute, or a trumpet as a harp; if the artistic use of each particular instrument consists precisely in this, that it be used conformably with its peculiar character — then it is really impossible to say how a being, possessed of a soul endowed with free will and reason, could be used otherwise than according to the character, power or nature which dwelt in him before." So, according to this view, the difference of the several individualities of character, and of the several modes of culture, will continue to appear in the manner in which the inspiring agency of the divine causality exhibits itself through each. The peculiar appearances in such states of enthusiasm, (*ἐνθουσιασμός*) he explains as arising from the conflict of the two tendencies, — the movement imparted from without, and that belonging to the proper nature of the individual; just as when to a body falling by the law of gravitation to the earth, a curvilinear motion is communicated at the same time.

[1] The sarcasm in Lucian's dialogue, *Ζεὺς ἐλεγχόμενος*, may serve as an example. "What the poets say, when possessed by the Muses, is true. But when forsaken by the goddesses, and left to sing for themselves, they are out, and contradict what they had said before; and one must excuse them if they perceive not the truth as men, when the agency has vanished which hitherto dwelt in them, and by which they invented."

[2] *Ἐκείνου τὴν ἀχὴν τῆς κινήσεως ἐνδιδόντος, ὡς ἑκάστη πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι τῶν προφητίδων.* De Pythiæ oraculis, c. 7

[3] *Ἐκεῖνος μόνας τὰς φαντασίας παρίστησι καὶ ὥς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον.*

[4] De Pythiæ oraculis, c. 21

By this speculative mode of apprehending the popular religion, men would be led, moreover, to reduce Polytheism to some higher unity, lying at its root. The recognition of an original unity being a thing absolutely necessary for reason, Polytheism either proceeded out of that unity, or must be reduced back to it; it continually felt itself impelled to derive the multitude of gods from one original essence. Now, by the speculative mode of apprehension, the consciousness of this unity could not fail to be developed and rendered still more distinct, and the relation of the manifold to unity clearly presented. Thus Plato had already sought to bring back Polytheism to some such higher unity, had derived all existence "from the Creator and Father of the Universe, who is hard to find, and whom, when found, it is impossible to make known to all."[1] So now, too, this new philosophy of religion rose to the idea of one simple original essence, exalted above all plurality and all becoming; the only true *Being;* unchangeable, eternal;[2] from whom all existence, and first of all, at the summit of existence, the world of gods, nearest related to himself, in its manifold gradations, has emanated. In these gods, that unfolded perfection, which in the Supreme essence was more included and hidden, becomes known; they exhibit in different forms, the image of that Supreme essence, to which no one can rise, except by the loftiest flight of contemplation, after it has rid itself from all that pertains to sense — from all manifoldness. They are the mediators between man, scattered and dissipated by manifoldness, and the Supreme Unity. A distinction was next made of the *purely* spiritual, invisible deities, and those in nearer contact with the world of sense, by whom the life radiating from the Supreme essence is diffused down to the world of sense, and the divine ideas, so far as that is possible, *actualized* in it — the manifest gods;[3] the gods in the process of becoming; the θεοὶ γενητοί in contradistinction from the ὤν; the spirits that, according to Plato, animate the worlds. Thus it was contrived to hold fast the position of the old Nature-religion, which lived and moved in the intuition of nature, and to bring it into union with the recognition of a supreme original essence, and of an invisible spiritual world, to which man's spirit strove to rise from the sensuous things that had hitherto chained it. Accordingly, two different stages in religion now presented themselves; that of the multitude, with minds dissipated and scattered in the manifold, who can have intercourse only with those mediatorial deities approaching nearest to them; and that of the spiritual men, living in contemplation, who rise above all that is sensuous, and soar upwards to the supreme original essence. Hence, again, arose two different stages, or positions, in respect to the divine worship; the purely spiritual position, which corresponds to the relation with the original essence, exalted above all contact with the sensible world; and that of sensuous worship, which is adapted to the relation with those gods who are connected more nearly with the world of sense. From

[1] In Timæus.

[2] Εἰς ὢν ἐνὶ τῷ νῦν τὸ ἀεὶ πεπλήρωκε καὶ μόνον ἐστι τὸ κατὰ τοῦτον ὄντως ὄν. Plutarch. de εἰ apud Delphos, c. 20.

[3] Θεοὶ φανεροί as contradistinguished from the ἀφανεῖς.

this point of view, it is said, in the work on "Offerings," cited under the name of Apollonius of Tyana: "We shall render the most appropriate worship to the deity, when to that God whom we called the first, who is one, and separated from all, after whom we must recognize the others, — when to him we present no offerings whatever; kindle to him no fire, dedicate to him no sensible thing; for he needs nothing, even of what could be given him by natures more exalted than ours. There is no plant the earth produces, no animal the air nourishes, no thing that in relation to him would not be impure. In relation to him, we must use only the higher Word, — that, I mean, which is not expressed by the mouth, — the silent, inner word of the spirit." Even prayer, expressed in words, he would say, is beneath the dignity of that original essence, so exalted above all that is of sense; "and from the most glorious of all beings, we must seek for blessings by that which is most glorious in ourselves. But this is the spirit, which needs no organ."[1] This highest position of spiritual worship in reference to the Supreme essence, was set up as a rival of Christianity, and as a means of dispensing with it.

We must not, however, transfer over to this Supreme essence of the new Platonic philosophy of religion, the Christian conception of God, as Creator and Governor of the world. The fundamental position of the ancient world — deification of nature in life, separation of the divine and human in science — appears, also, in this final shaping of philosophic thought, — with which that position ended, — again prominent and distinct. It belonged, no doubt, to the lofty dignity of that Supreme essence, that, wrapt in its transcendent perfection, it could enter into no contact with the sensible world; whence also it followed, that the only worship worthy of it, is the contemplation of the spirit raised above all that is sensible; and this is, therefore, set over against practical life, as a subordinate position. This conception of spiritual worship is, accordingly, quite as distinct from the Christian, as the conception of the Supreme essence itself is. At the extreme point and summit of its speculation, this philosophy of religion proceeded still further in refining on the conception of the Supreme essence. In Plato is to be distinguished what he says concerning the idea of the absolute, — the good in itself, exalted above all being,[2] — and what he says of the Supreme Spirit, the Father of the Universe.[3] But the new Platonists substituted that idea of the absolute, in place of the Supreme essence itself, — as the first simple, which precedes all existence; of which nothing determinate can be predicated; to which no consciousness, no self-contemplation can be ascribed; inasmuch as this would immediately imply a duality, a distinction of subject and object. This highest of all can be known only by the intellectual intuition of the spirit, transcending itself, declaring itself free from its own limits.[4]

[1] In Eusebius Præparat. evangel. l. IV. c. 13, and Porphyry de abstinentia carnis, l. II. § 34, who cites these words of Apollonius of Tyana, and busies himself with explaining and applying them.

[2] In the Republic.

[3] In the Timæus and Philebus.

[4] As Plotinus says: Τῆς γνώσεως διὰ νοῦ τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένης καὶ τῷ νῷ νοῦν γιγνώσκειν δυναμένων, ὑπερβεβηκὸς τοῦτο

With this barely logical direction, whereby it was possible to arrive at the conception of such an absolute, the ὄν, there united itself a certain mysticism, which, by a certain transcendent state of feeling, could communicate to this abstraction a reality for the soul. Such an absorption of the spirit in that super-existence, (τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας,) even to entire union with it, or such a revelation of the same to the spirit raised above itself, was considered as the highest end to be reached by the spiritual life. Porphyry relates that this was experienced by him once, in his sixty-eighth year; and by his teacher, Plotinus, four times.[1]

By virtue of the gradations in the evolution of the chain of existence, from that transcendent original ground down to the world of sense, and by virtue of a symbolic interpretation connected with this doctrine, it was made possible to appropriate everything that belonged to the existing *cultus*, spiritualized after this manner. Thus, e. g. the rhetorician Dio Chrysostom, who wrote in the time of Trajan, makes Phidias speak in defense of images of the gods, in the following language: "It cannot be said, that it would be better for men simply to lift their eyes to the heavenly bodies, and that there were no images at all. All these, the man of reason worships, and believes that he beholds from afar the blessed gods. But love to the gods makes every one wish to be able to honor them near at hand, so that he may approach and touch them, offer to them with implicit faith, and crown them." Thus, he says, "it lies in the essence of human nature, to endeavor to make present before our senses the absent objects of our love. Hence the Barbarians, who had no art, were obliged to transfer their worship to other, certainly far less appropriate objects; — to mountains, trees and stones."[2] Similar arguments are employed by Porphyry, in justification of image-worship.[3] "By images addressed to sense, the ancients represented God and his powers — by the visible they typified the invisible for those that learned to read in these figures, as in books, a writing that treated of the gods. We are not to wonder, if the ignorant consider the images only as wood or stone; for just so, they who are ignorant of writing, see nothing in monuments but stone, nothing in tablets but wood, and in books but a tissue of papyrus."

We see that this spiritualizing apprehension of the old polytheistic religion had gone on to form itself — independent of the influence of Christianity, as a mean of conciliation between superstition and unbelief — out of the spirit of the Platonic philosophy, so far as this extended its influence into the religious consciousness. For when Plutarch wrote, in whom we find this direction of mind already fully developed, Chris-

-ἦν τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν, τίνι ἂν ἁλίσκοιτο ἢ ἐπιβολῇ ἀθρόᾳ. Anecdota græca ed. Villoison. Venet. 1781. T. II. p. 237.

[1] Thus Porphyry relates of him in the account of his life: Ἐφάνη ἐκεῖνος ὁ θεὸς ὁ μήτε μορφὴν μήτε τινα ἰδέαν ἔχων, ὑπὲρ δὲ νοῦν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἱδρυμένος· ᾧ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ ἅπαξ λέγω πλησιάσαι καὶ ἑνωθῆναι, and of Plotinus he says, it was his highest aim ἑνωθῆναι καὶ πελάσαι τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ, and four times, during his abode with Porphyry, he had attained to this, ἐνεργείᾳ ἀῤῥήτῳ καὶ οὐ δυνάμει.

[2] See Dio Chrysostom's remarkable discourse on the knowledge of the gods. Orat. XII. ed. Reiske. II. Vol. I. p. 405, et seq.

[3] In Eusebius Præparat. evangel. l. III c. 7.

tianity, certainly, had as yet produced no influence on the spiritual atmosphere at large. But a new zeal in behalf of the old religion, in which men were striving, with all their might, to keep the breath of life, was to be awakened by this philosophy of religion, now that the ancient rites were threatened with destruction by Christianity, from a new positive religious interest; and so there arose, out of those already existing ideas, a new polemical and apologetic direction, having for its end to preserve erect the rotten fabric of Paganism. Yet artificial and violent expedients cannot help any cause long; and by this effort, often too artificial, the untenable character of the religion men were laboring to uphold, was badly concealed. These philosophical refiners of religion were themselves preparing for after times, by this means, many a weapon against the popular religion, of which the Christians well knew how to avail themselves. Already Plutarch employed the doctrine concerning demons, as intermediate beings between gods and men, for the purpose of defending the traditions of the popular religion, and rescuing the dignity of the gods — transferring from the latter many things to these middle beings, who, he maintained, had been confounded with the others.[1] According to Plutarch's doctrine, these demons, half related to the gods, half to men, serve as the means of intercourse between both.[2] But he supposed that also among these demons, there was a graduated subordination, according as the divine or the sensuous element[3] predominated in them. Where the latter was the case, it gave rise to malicious demons, with violent desires and passions; and to conciliate these, and avert their destructive influences, was the design of many of the noisy and rude forms of cultus. Such were the ones which had given occasion to human sacrifices. With this idea, Porphyry fell in, representing these demons as impure beings, related to matter, from which these Platonists derived all evil. These take delight in bloody offerings, by which their sensuous desires are gratified; they prompt to all evil impulses; they seek to draw men from the worship of the gods by pretending to be such themselves, and to spread abroad unworthy opinions concerning the gods, and concerning the Supreme God himself. Their delusive arts have been successful from of old. Hence those unworthy and indecent notions and stories of the gods, which are diffused among the multitude, and have received countenance even from poets and philosophers.[4] It is easy to see, how well such explanations would serve the purpose of the Christians, in their attacks on the popular religion; and we can perceive, how the same representations, passing from one side to the other, and modified in different forms, might be seized upon, sometimes for the defense, sometimes for the assault of Paganism.

It was impossible, however, that religious knowledge and religious

[1] Plutarch. de defectu oraculorum c. 12 et seq.

[2] What seemed incompatible with the exalted dignity of the gods, was transferred to them, *ταῦτα λειτουργοῖς θεῶν ἀνατιθέντες, ὥσπερ ὑπηρέταις καὶ γραμματεῦσι.*

[3] The *παθητικόν* and *ἀλόγον*.

[4] In Eusebius Præparat. evangel. l. IV. c. 21, 22.

life should make progress among the people by these explanations, to them so unintelligible. The people remained fixed to the externals of their worship; they clung firmly to that old superstition which it was attempted to reanimate, without troubling themselves about these more spiritual views. Hence Dionysius of Halicarnassus could say,[1] "that but few take any part in this philosophical view of religion. But the many, who are destitute of philosophical culture, are accustomed to understand those mythical stories in the worst possible way; and one of two things is the case: either the gods are despised for taking an interest in such pitiable affairs, or else men abandon themselves to the worst abuses, because they find the same among the gods."

Again, inseparable from that stage of progress at which the ancient world stood, there was, together with a lingering zeal — not freed however from the shackles of egoism — for civil liberty, a certain aristocratic spirit. This, as we have seen already, made itself felt in religion. The higher religious position, which necessarily supposed philosophical culture, could not be transferred to the multitude; *they* seemed as if excluded from the higher life, capable of religion only in the form of superstition. The great body of tradesmen and mechanics were considered as unsusceptible of the higher life, which alone answered to man's true dignity,[2] — as abandoned to common life.[3] Platonism itself was entangled in this aristocratic spirit of Antiquity, and opposed the stage of science, whence alone it was possible to soar to pure truth in religion, to that of opinion (*δόξα*) among the multitude (*οἱ πολλοί*,) where the true must ever be mixed up with the false. And, in like manner, it was remote also from the aim of this new philosophy of religion, to elevate the people to any higher stage of religious development; — for which, indeed, it was destitute of the means. Plotinus distinguishes two different stages, that of the noble-minded (the *σπουδαῖοι*) and that of the gross multitude (the *πολλοί*.) None but the former attain to the Highest; the others remain behind, conversant with the merely human (the opposite to the Divine.) And at this stage of common life, again, are to be distinguished, those who, in some sort, take an interest and part in virtue, and the wretched mass, as the day-laborers, — the better class of whom, however, must busy themselves with providing for the daily wants of life; the rest abandon themselves to all that is vile.[4] It was not till the word that went forth from the carpenter's shop had been published abroad by fishermen and tent-makers, that these aristocratic notions of the ancient world could be overthrown.

As it is usually found to happen with particular intellectual tendencies at epochs of transition, that while aiming to hold fast the old, they have been already forced to pass beyond it, and so must themselves

[1] Archæol. l. II. c. 20, near the end.

[2] Βίος βάναυσος.

[3] Οὐ γὰρ οἷοντ' ἐπιτηδεῦσαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βάναυσον ἢ ϑητικόν. Aristoteles Polit. l. III. c. 5.

[4] Ὡς διττὸς ὁ ἐνθάδε βίος, ὁ μὲν τοῖς σπουδαίοις, ὁ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τοῖς μὲν σπουδαίοις πρὸς τὸ ἀκρότατον καὶ τὸ ἄνω, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρωπικωτέροις, διττὸς αὖ ὤν, ὁ μὲν μεμνημένος ἀρετῆς μετίσχει ἀγαθοῦ τινος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος ὄχλος οἷον χειροτέχνες τῶν πρὸς ἀνάγκην τοῖς ἐπιεικεστέροις. Ennead. II. l. X. c. 9.

lead over to the new, which they would hinder in its development; so it happened with this philosophy of religion, in its relation to the position of the old world on the one hand, and to Christianity on the other. While the new Platonism was for holding and defending the former of these, it yet contributed itself to excite deeper religious wants, which sought satisfaction in something better; to set afloat religious ideas, in which there dwelt a power unknown to those who expressed them, and which must serve to prepare for Christianity a way of introducing itself into the culture of the times. There was called forth, by the influence of this particular direction of mind on religious life, a longing which tended to a different end. But by this undefined longing, accompanied with no clear conciousness of its import, ardent spirits were also exposed to many dangerous delusions, before they could find the satisfying object. This state of feeling drew out fanatics, and procured for them a hearing.

There were roving about at that time in the Roman empire, which united together the East and the West, numbers who boasted of divine revelations and supernatural powers, men in whom, as usually happens in such times of religious ferment, the *self*-deception of fanaticism was mixed with more or less of *intentional* fraud. For an example, we may mention that Alexander of Abonoteichus, in Pontus, whose life Lucian has written in his usual satiric manner, and who, all the way from Pontus to Rome, found believers in his pretended arts of magician and soothsayer, and was reverenced and consulted as a prophet, even by men of the first standing. Doubtless, to the better class belonged Apollonius of Tyana, famous in the age of the apostles. It is impossible, however, to form any certain judgment of his character, so imperfect are our means of information. Those who, like Philostratus, (at the close of the second century,) attempted, with their marvellous stories, to represent him as a hero of the old popular religion, have done most to injure his reputation with posterity. He travelled about, seeking to reanimate religious faith; but by giving nourishment to a prurient curiosity about matters that should remain hidden from man, he also promoted fanaticism. He spoke against a superstition, which, in leading men to suppose that offerings and sacrifices could purchase impunity for crime, served as a prop for superstition: he explained that, without a good moral disposition, no kind of outward worship can be pleasing to the gods. He spoke against the cruel gladiatorial shows; for when the Athenians, who were celebrating such games, invited him to their public assembly, he replied, that he could not tread on a spot stained by the shedding of so much human blood, and wondered the gods did not forsake their Acropolis. When the person who presided over the Eleusinian mysteries declined to allow the privilege of initiation to Apollonius of Tyana, it is difficult to tell whether the Hierophant meant honestly, and regarded Apollonius as a magician, who dealt in unlawful arts, or whether he was not, rather, jealous of the great influence, unfavorable to the priesthood, which Apollonius exercised over the people; for this is said to have been so great, that already many thought it a greater privilege to have the society of Apollonius than to

be initiated into the mysteries. The words with which he is said to have concluded all his prayers, and in which he summed up every particular request, are characteristic of the man: "give me, ye gods, what I deserve."[1] These words do not imply directly a spirit of self-exaltation; he intended simply to express by them the conviction, that prayer can avail nothing, unless in connection with a virtuous life; that the good man only can expect blessings from the gods. At the same time, he is said to have remarked himself, that if he belonged to the good, God would give him more than he asked, therefore more than he deserved. Still we cannot fail to perceive, in this language, a position in the judgment of one's self, quite opposed to that of Christianity.

If a letter consoling a father for the death of his son, which has been ascribed to Apollonius, is genuine, it gives an insight into his pantheistic tendency. At all events, we may recognize here, as we may in so many other appearances of this age, the pantheistic element, into which, as the unity lying at its root, the dissolving system of Polytheism was now passing.[2] In this letter, the doctrine is advanced, that birth and death are such only in appearance; that which separates itself from the *one* substance, the *one* divine essence, and is caught up by matter, seems to be born; that which delivers itself again from the bonds of matter, and reunites with the one divine essence, seems to die. There is an interchange between becoming visible and invisible.[3] In all, there is, properly speaking, but the One essence, which alone does and suffers, by becoming all things to all; the eternal God, to whom men do wrong, when they deprive him of what should be attributed to him, by transferring it upon other names and persons.[4] "How can we grieve for one, when by change of form, not of essence, instead of a man he becomes a god?"[5] So Plotinus, when dying, is said to have remarked, that he should endeavor to convey back the divine in man to the divine in the universe.[6]

On every side was evinced the need of a revelation from heaven, such as would give inquiring minds that assurance of peace which they were unable to find in the jarring systems of the old philosophy, and in the artificial life of the reawakened old religion. That zealous champion of the latter, Porphyry, alludes himself to the deep-felt necessity; which he proposed to supply, leaning on the authority of divine responses, by his Collection of Ancient Oracles. On this point he says,[7] "The utility of such a collection will best be understood by those who have felt the painful craving after truth, and have some-

[1] Δοίητέ μοι τὰ ὀφειλόμενα. Philostrat. l. IV. f. 200, ed. Morell. Paris, 1608.—c. 40. f. 181, ed. Olear.

[2] Ep. 58 among those published by Olearius in the Works of Philostratus.

[3] Θάνατος οὐδεὶς οὐδενὸς ἢ μόνον ἐμφάσει, καθάπερ οὐδὲ γένεσις οὐδενὸς ἢ μόνον ἐμφάσει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οὐσίας τραπὲν εἰς φύσιν ἔδοξε γένεσις· τὸ δὲ ἐκ φύσεως εἰς οὐσίαν κατὰ ταῦτα θάνατος.

[4] Τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν, ἣ δὴ μόνη ποιεῖται καὶ πάσχει, πᾶσι γινομένη πάντα, θεὸς ἀΐδιος, ὀνόμασι δὲ καὶ προσώποις ἀφαιρουμένη τὸ ἰδίον, ἀδικουμένη τε.

[5] Τρόπου μεταβάσει καὶ οὐχὶ φύσεως.

[6] Πειρᾶσθαι τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον ἀνάγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον. Porphyr. vit. Plotin. c. 2.

[7] Περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας in Euseb Præparat. l. IV. c. 7, near the end: Ἦν δ' ἔχει ὠφέλειαν ἡ συναγωγὴ μάλιστα εἴσονται ὅσοι περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὠδίναντες ηὔξαντό ποτε τῆς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιφανείας τυχόντες ἀνάπαυσιν λαβεῖν, τῆς ἀπορείας διὰ τὴν τῶν λεγόντων ἀξιόπιστον διδασκαλίαν.

times wished it might be their lot to witness some appearance of the gods, so as to be relieved from their doubts by information not to be disputed."

The life of such a person, from his youth up, harrassed with doubts, unsettled by the strife of opposite opinions, ardently longing after the truth, and conducted at length, through this protracted period of unsatisfied craving, to Christianity, is delineated by the author of a sort of romance, (partly philosophical and in part religious,) who belonged to the second or third century. This work is called *The Clementines*, and though a fiction, is clearly a fiction drawn from real life; and we may safely avail ourselves of it, as presenting a true and characteristic sketch, which might doubtless apply to many an inquiring spirit belonging to those times.

Clemens, a noble Roman, who lived about the time of the first diffusion of the gospel, gives the following account of himself. "I was, from my early youth, exercised with doubts, which had found entrance into my soul, I hardly know how. Will my existence terminate with death; and will no one hereafter be mindful of me, when infinite time sinks all human things in forgetfulness? It will be as well as if I had not been born! When was the world created, and what existed before the world was? If it has existed always, it will continue to exist always. If it had a beginning, it will likewise have an end. And after the end of the world, what will there be then? if not perhaps the silence of death! or, it may be, something of which no conception at present can be formed. Incessantly haunted," he goes on to say, "by such thoughts as these, which came, I know not whence, I was sorely troubled, so that I grew pale and emaciated — and, what was most terrible, whenever I strove to banish away this anxiety as foolish, I only experienced the renewal of my sufferings in an aggravated degree; which occasioned me great distress. I was not aware that I had in these thoughts a friendly companion, guiding me on towards eternal life, as I afterwards learned by experience, and thanked the great Disposer of all for granting me such guidance, since it was by these thoughts, so distressing at first, that I was impelled to seek till I found that which I needed. And when I had attained to this, then I pitied, as miserable men, those whom in my former ignorance I was in danger of considering most happy. As such thoughts, then, dwelt in me from my childhood, I resorted to the schools of the philosophers, hoping to find some certain foundation, on which I could repose; and I saw nothing but building up and tearing down of theories — nothing but endless dispute and contradiction: sometimes, for example, the demonstration triumphed of the soul's immortality, then again that of its mortality. When the former prevailed, I rejoiced; when the latter, I was depressed. Thus was I driven to and fro by the different representations; and forced to conclude, that things appear not as they are in themselves, but as they happen to be presented on this or that side. I was made dizzier than ever, and from the bottom of my heart, sighed for deliverance." As he could come to no fixed and certain conviction by means of reason, Clemens now resolved to seek relief in another

way,—to visit Egypt, the land of mysteries and apparitions, and hunt up a magician, who could summon a spirit for him from the other world. The appearance of such a spirit would give him intuitive evidence of the soul's immortality. No arguments would afterwards be able to shake his belief in what had been thus made certain to him by the evidence of his senses. But the advice of a sensible philoso pher dissuaded him from this project, and from seeking the truth by forbidden arts, to which he could not resort and ever hope again to obtain peace of conscience. In this state of mind, full of doubts, unsettled, inquiring, distressed and agitated, he came in contact with the gospel, preached in demonstration of the Spirit and of power—and his case may illustrate that of many others.

If, now, we take a general survey of the religious state of the pagan world, as it has thus been exhibited, we cannot fail to observe many and various oppositions to, and points of possible union with, Christianity; oppositions capable also of becoming points of union, and points of union capable also of becoming oppositions. Opposed at one and the same time against Christianity, stood the powers of infidelity and of superstition. *The force of infidelity*—the sole supremacy of the understanding, denying everything above nature, the wisdom of the *nil admirari*—set itself to oppose Christianity, as it did everything else that called in requisition man's religious nature. By such as had taken this direction, Christianity was put in the same category with all appearances of fanaticism and superstition; but *there was also an infidelity*, at the root of which lay that need of believing, which could no longer be satisfied by anything that the present state of the ancient world, in religion and philosophy, could afford; just as we have seen it represented in the case of the above-mentioned Clemens: and such unbelief could be overcome by the force of divine truth in the gospel; the unbelief itself became here a preparatory *momentum* to the reception of Christianity. On the other hand, the dominion of a superstition clinging to sense opposed the entrance of a religion which proclaimed the worship of God in spirit and in truth; and this superstition was in close alliance with the old religion, which had now been elevated to a new sway over the spirit. But that sway was something unnatural,—it was a last effort of expiring life: and at the root of a great proportion of the superstition lay, as we have seen, a need, seeking for its satisfaction, which could be found only in Christianity;—the need of redemption,—of a healing of the deep-felt schism within,—of reconciliation with the unknown God, after whom the conscious or unconscious need was seeking. By means of an unconscious, undefined craving of this sort, many no doubt fell victims to various deceptive arts; and it was necessary that the power exercised by such arts over the minds of men, should be overcome by Christianity, before it could pave its way to their hearts: but there also dwelt in the gospel a power to lay bare and expose all deceptive arts, and to penetrate through every delusive show, to the inmost recesses of man's being.

Platonism prepared the way for Christianity, by spiritualizing the religious modes of thinking; by bringing back polytheism to a certain

unity of the consciousness of God; by awakening many ideas closely allied to Christianity, as, for example, the idea of a redemption, in the sense of deliverance from the ὕλη,— the blind power of nature opposed to the divine;[1] of elevation to a stage of divine life removed beyond the influence of natural powers.[2] But that which is best suited to form a preparatory position, is capable also of being most easily turned into one of fierce hostility, where an interest is felt in maintaining the old position against the higher one which has presented itself; and in this Platonism, we still discern the spirit of the old world, though pregnant already with foreign elements. The new Platonism could not bring itself to acquiesce, particularly, in that *humility of knowledge* and that *renunciation of self* which Christianity required. It could not be induced to sacrifice its philosophical, aristocratic notions, to a religion which would make the higher life a common possession for all mankind. The religious eclecticism of this direction of the spirit could do no otherwise than resist the exclusive and sole supremacy of the religion that suffered no other at its side, but would subject all to itself. Yet this philosophy of religion found it impossible to prevent the ideas and wants it had awakened, from leading beyond itself, and to Christianity. Platonism, it is true, revived the faith in a superterrestrial nature and destination of the spirit; but the manner in which the doctrine of the soul's immortality, reduced to the ideas of an eternity of the spirit, and of the soul's preëxistence, became united here with the transmigration of souls, failed to satisfy the universal religious wants of mankind. If, according to this doctrine, even those souls — which applied, however, in the end, only to such as had attained by philosophy to the intuition of truth — if even those souls which, when freed from the bonds of their earthly existence, could rise to a life wholly above sense, wholly divine, must yet, after a certain time, yield again to the force of destiny, and plunge once more into the circle of an earthly life; this was not an expectation answering to the desires of the human spirit. And it may be conceived what power the proclamation of eternal life, in the Christian sense, must have exercised over a want thus excited, and yet left unsatisfied.[3]

There could not fail to arise, then, out of this school itself, an opposition of views: on the one side, were those who held this position in hostility to Christianity; on the other, those to whom it proved a point of transition to Christianity. But then these latter, again, were exposed to a peculiar danger. Their earlier prejudices might react in such a way as to pervert their mode of apprehending and of shaping

[1] Of attraction and repulsion, of every description of *γοητεία*, the *ἀγοητεύτον*.

[2] We may mention here also the idea of an *αἰώνιος ζωή*, which God possesses. Plutarch. de Iside et Osiride c. 1. The idea of a kingdom of God, depending on the condition that the divine element in man gains the supremacy; — in the language of Psammon, an Egyptian priest in the time of Alexander the Great: *Ὅτι πάντες ἄνθρωποι βασιλεύονται ὑπὸ θεοῦ· τὸ γὰρ ἄρχον ἐν ἑκάστῳ καὶ κρατοῦν, θεῖον ἐστιν.* In the Life of Alexander, c. 27, near the end.

[3] We have an illustration of it in Justin Martyr's account of his own religious history, at the beginning of his dialogue with Trypho, where he relates how he was led from Platonism to embrace Christianity

Christian truth. In this way, much foreign matter, drawn from their previous opinions, might unconsciously be conveyed over with them to Christianity.

Religious Condition of the Jewish People.

In the midst of the nations addicted to the deification of nature in the form of Polytheism or of Pantheism, we see a people among whom the faith in one Almighty and holy God, the absolutely free Creator and Governor of the world, was propagated, not as an esoteric doctrine of the priests, but as a common possession for all, as the central point of life for a whole people and state. And necessarily connected with the faith in a holy God, was the recognition of a holy law as the rule of life, was the consciousness of the opposition between holiness and sin, — a consciousness, which, at the esthetic position held by Nature-religion, though it occasionally flashed out in single gleams, yet could not be evolved with the same strength, clearness and constancy. This relation of the Hebrew people to other nations suffices of itself to defeat every attempt which might be made to explain the origin of the religion of this people in the same manner as that of other religions. It is a fact bearing witness of the revelation of a living God, to whom the religion owed its existence and its progressive development; and of the peculiar course of training, whereby this nation was formed to be the organ for preserving and propagating this revelation. A Philo might, with good reason, say of this people, that to them was entrusted the prophetic office for all mankind; for it was *their* destination, in opposition to the nations sunk in the worship of nature, to bear witness of the living God. The revelations and leadings of the Divine hand vouchsafed to them, were designed for the whole human race, over which, from the foundation here laid, the kingdom of God was to be extended. Theism and the Theocracy must be embodied in an outward shape, as pertaining exclusively to a distinct people, in order that from the envelope of this national form might issue forth the kingdom of God, embracing all mankind. Yet as the idea of the Theocracy cannot, by forms and rules from without, be realized in the life of a single people, and generally not in the rude stock of human nature, unennobled and persisting in its estrangement from God, there could not fail to exist here a disproportion between the revealed idea and its outward manifestation; and in this very circumstance was grounded the prophecy of a future conciliation. The idea must strive, beyond the form of appearance, which as yet does not answer to it, towards a development more conformable to its essence and fulness; and it contains in itself the prophecy of such a development. If history in general partakes, by its own nature, more nearly of the prophetic character in proportion as there dwells in it a pervading reference to the great moments of history, to that which has significancy as bearing on the progress of mankind as a race; then the religion and history of this people must be filled, in a preëminent degree, with prophetic elements. The destinies of this nation were so guided as ever to call forth more strongly the consciousness of that breach, that inward disunion, of

which we have spoken above, and the longing after deliverance from it. This deliverance is one and the same with the restoration of the fallen Theocracy; with which belongs also the participation of all nations in the worship of the living God. The appearance of him by whom this was to be accomplished, of him who is the true theocratic King, forms therefore the central point of the prophetic element, which, although unfolded by particular prophecies with special clearness and distinctness of vision, yet here, is not merely some accessory individual thing added from without, but had been grounded by an inherent necessity in the whole organism of this religion and national history. The idea of the Messiah is the culminating point of this religion, to which all the diffused rays of the divine in it converge.

While the religious belief of the Greeks and Romans suffered a violent shock in the revolutions which these nations experienced, the indwelling power in the theistic faith is clearly manifested, when we see it preserving itself unshaken amid all the political storms that agitated the Hebrew people. Nay, the oppressions suffered under the dominion of foreign nations served but to render this faith more firm; although the right understanding of its import did not keep up at an equal pace. But as everything that develops itself in human nature is exposed to the corruptions lying within it, revealed religion could not escape the same. Even Christianity, the absolute religion of mankind, could not be exempted from this necessity; only it possessed the power of coming forth ennobled from the conflict with these corruptions, taking advantage of them to free itself from the admixture of foreign elements. This power did not reside in Judaism; as it was not designed to endure for all times, as a religion in this form, but to give place, by the dissolution of this form, for that higher creation which was foretold by it. If this form, instead of making way for that higher development, would maintain its own existence for a still longer term, it must, in surviving itself, merely drag itself along, as a thing effete. And here too it will be seen again, that what is designed as a preparatory stage, when it attempts to assert its own independence, not understanding itself according to its spirit and idea in relation to the historical development, may turn round into opposition with that higher stage, for which it was its very purpose to prepare.

What has just been said is to be applied to the direction of the religious spirit which governed the great mass of the Jewish people. With them, the theocratic consciousness, misapprehended according to the notions of their fleshly minds, served but to foster a national pride, of which it had become the foundation. Men fastened on the letter — the letter, understood according to the contracted views of minds turned only on the world; and clung by the sensible form and envelop, without being able to perceive the spirit they revealed and the ideas they contained, because there was no congenial, recipient spirit to meet the divine truth as it was offered. The sentence was here verified, pronounced by our Lord himself, "He who hath, to him shall be given; and he who hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he hath."

By the consciousness of the declining condition of the Theocracy, it is true, that the yearning after the promised epoch of its glorious restoration, and by the feeling of distress under the yoke of foreign and domestic tyrants, the longing after the Deliverer, after the appearance of Him from whom that glorious restoration was to come, the Messiah, had been aroused to greater activity. But the same groveling sense which led to a misapprehension of the nature of the Theocracy generally, could not fail to lead also to a misapprehension of this idea, which forms the central point and mark towards which the whole Theocracy was aiming. (From that worldly sense which was attached to the idea of the Theocracy, and that worldly turn of the religious spirit generally, could only result a secularizing also of the idea of the Messiah.) As the great mass of the people were bowed down by the sense of outward much more than of inward wretchedness, disgrace and bondage, it was chiefly a deliverer from the former whom they expected and yearned after, in the Messiah. The inclination to the supernatural took here an altogether worldly shape; the supernatural, as it pictured itself to the imagination of the worldly heart, was but a fantastic imitation of the natural magnified to the monstrous. Thus the deluded Jews, destitute of a sense for the spiritual apprehension of divine things, expected a Messiah who would employ the miraculous power, with which he was divinely armed, in the service of their earthly lusts; who would free them from civil bondage, execute a severe retribution on the enemies of the Theocratic people, and make them masters of the world in a universal empire, whose glory it was their special delight to set forth in the fantastic images suggested by their sensuous desires.

There was a great want of such leaders and teachers of the people as could have instructed them respecting the nature of their religion and of the Theocracy, and undeceived them of their erroneous fancies. Most of their guides were blind leaders of the blind, men who only confirmed the people in their perverse inclinations and in the errors thence resulting. Great mischief had been occasioned particularly by a fanatical zealot, Judas of Gamala, or the Galilæan, who, about the year 14 after the birth of Christ, took upon himself to oppose the census or registration decreed by Augustus Cæsar. A people that had incurred the forfeiture of their liberty, as a just punishment for their sins, and would continually incur it more and more; — such a people he called upon to throw off, at once, the yoke of Roman bondage. He stimulated those, who, in disposition, were widely removed from serving God as their Lord, to recognize Him as their only Lord, by suffering no vestige to remain of the dominion of a stranger over the people that belonged to God alone. While others were for awaiting the deliverance to be wrought by the power of God, through the Messiah, he, on the contrary, required, that they should first lay hands to the work themselves. God — said he — will help those only, who do their own; but by this he meant nothing else than the resistance of mere arbitrary will to a power placed by God's appointment over a people that had not understood their calling, that had been unfaithful to it, and who, by

virtue of their disposition, were no longer capable of freedom.[1] From this exciting cause proceeded that wild fanaticism of the Zealots, formed out of an impure combination of political and worldly-religious elements; a combination which in all times has introduced the most fatal mischiefs among nations; as was illustrated, indeed, by the history of this people down to the period of their total extinction as a State. When John the Baptist, after his call from God to become a preacher of repentance, caused a divine voice to be heard in the wilderness of the degenerate people, sought to bring them to the consciousness that it was by the disposition of the heart the way must be prepared for the regeneration of the Theocracy, and directed the longing wishes of his contemporaries away from the earthly to the divine, yet notwithstanding the great effect which he produced by the commanding power of his words, he found little sympathy with that which was the true aim and spirit of his preaching, and at last fell the victim of a league struck between worldly and spiritual tyranny — a martyr to that truth, which, with a denunciatory zeal that regarded no consequences, he held up against all the wickedness of his age. The death of John foreshadowed the fate which was to terminate the earthly course of one greater than himself, to bear witness of, and prepare the way for whom, was his divine vocation.

Incomprehensible, therefore, to men given up to such blindness, was what the Son of God told them of the *true* freedom, which he had been sent from heaven to bestow on those who sighed under the bondage of sin. As with their earthly sense they knew not the Father, so also they could not discern in Jesus, the Son; because they had no ear for the voice of the Father, witnessing of him, in the wants of the human heart. The same temper which made them disregard the warning prophetic words of John the Baptist, rendered them deaf also to the warning call of the greatest among all the prophets; and as he had foretold them, they became, even to their ruin, through the influence of the same disposition, a prey to the artful designs of every *false* prophet who knew how to flatter the wishes which such a disposition inspired. When the temple of Jerusalem was already in flames, one of those false prophets could persuade crowds of the people, that God was about to show them the way of deliverance by a miraculous sign, — such a sign as they had often demanded of him who would have shown them the *true* way to *true* deliverance, and who did refer them to the *true* signs of God in history, — and thousands of deluded men fell victims to the flames or to the Roman sword. Josephus, who was no Christian, but who contemplated with less prejudice than others the fate of his nation, of which he was an eye-witness, closes his recital of this event with the following remarkable words: "The unhappy people would suffer themselves, at that time, only to be cheated by impostors who were bold enough to lie in the name of God. But to the manifest prodigies that portended the approaching destruction they paid no regard; they had no faith in them: — like men wholly infatuated, and

[1] Joseph. Archæol. l. XVIII. c. 1, de B. J. l. II. c. 8, § 1.

as if they had neither eyes nor soul, they heeded not what God was announcing."

Among the Jewish theologians in Palestine, we find the three different main directions, which are commonly observed to make their appearance in opposition to each other, on the decay of the forms of a positive religion. First, the traditional tendency, which mixes up with the original religion many foreign elements, aiming to combine all these into an artificially constituted whole; which holds tenaciously to form and letter, without the living spirit; and substitutes, in the place of the real essence of the religion, an effete orthodoxy and a dead ceremonial. Thus is there called forth, in the next place, the reaction of a reforming tendency; but a reaction which, if it has proceeded rather from the intelligential than from the religious element, if the sense of negation rather than the positive religious interest predominates, easily swerves from the just moderation in polemics, and runs into the extreme of expunging, together with the foreign elements, much that is genuine and good. But the unsatisfied want which both these tendencies leave in men of more profound and warmer feelings, usually impels the latter to another reaction, — the reaction of a predominantly subjective tendency, of predominant feeling and intuition by the feelings, which, as opposed to the tendencies above described, is designated by the name of mysticism. These three main directions of the religious spirit, which often recur under different forms, we recognize, in the present case, in the three classes called the Pharisees, the Sadducees and the Essenes.

The Pharisees[1] stood at the summit of legal Judaism. They fenced round the Mosaic law with a multitude of so-called "hedges," whereby its precepts were to be guarded against every possible infringement. Thus it came about, that, under this pretext, many new statutes were added by them, particularly to the ritual portion of the law. These they contrived, by an arbitrary method of interpretation, — a method which in part tortured the letter and in part was allegorical, — to find in the Pentateuch; appealing at the same time to an oral tradition, as furnishing both the key to right exposition, and the authority for their doctrines. They were venerated by the people as the holy men, and stood at the head of the hierarchy. An asceticism, alien to the original Hebrew spirit, but easily capable of entering into union with the legal sectarianism at its most extravagant pitch, was wrought by them into a system. We find among them a great deal that is similar to the *consiliis evangelicis*, and to the rules of Monachism in the later church. On painful ceremonial observances they often laid greater stress than on good morals. To a rigid austerity in the avoidance of every even seeming transgression of ritual precepts, they united an easy sophistical casuistry which knew how to excuse many a violation

[1] The name is derived from "parash," פָּרַשׁ; either in the sense "to expound," whence "poresh," פֹּרֵשׁ, the ἐξηγητὴς τοῦ νομοῦ κατ' ἐξοχήν, a title claimed by the Pharisees, according to Josephus; or in the sense, "to set apart," parush, פָּרוּשׁ, which indeed sounds nearer like the Greek φαρισαῖος, one separated from the profane multitude, the עַם הָאָרֶץ, one who would be regarded as holy.

of the moral law. Besides those who made it their particular business to interpret the law and its supplemental traditions, there were among them those, also, who knew how to introduce into the Old Testament, by allegorical interpretation, a peculiar Theosophy; and this they propagated in their schools; — a system which, starting from the development of certain ideas really contained in the Old Testament in the germ, had grown out of the fusion of these with elements derived from the Zoroastrian or Parsic system of religion; and at a later period, after the time of Gamaliel, with such also as had been derived from Platonism. Thus to a ritual and legal tradition came to be added a speculative and theosophic one.[1]

It would be as wrong, certainly, to confound these Pharisees together in one class, as to pursue the same course with the later monks. We must distinguish among them the several gradations of honestly meant though misguided zeal, till it diverges to mock-holiness and hypocrisy thirsting for power. Although the egoistic interest of an hierarchial caste was the governing principle with many, yet there were some for whom the legal way, with all its efforts and conflicts, possessed perfect truth; some who had been led, by their course of life, to pass through the same painful experiences of which Paul, the former Pharisee, bears witness in the seventh of his epistle to the Romans. But one thing was wanting to them; the humility with which those who feel the poverty of their own spirit, go forth to meet the divine grace.

The Sadducees were for restoring the original Mosaic religion in its purity, and expunging every thing that had been added by Pharisaic traditions. But as they did not follow out the thread of *historical progress which marked the development* of the divine revelations, but arbitrarily cut it short, so they could not understand the *original Theism* in the Jewish religion. That direction of mind which shows hostility to the progressive development of the religious consciousness, required by what was already contained or implied in the original, cannot fail to misunderstand the original itself, — cannot fail to seize it on a single side and to mutilate it. The Sadducees were too deficient in the more profound sense of religion and of the religious need, to be able to distinguish the genuine from the spurious in the Pharisaic theology.

Directly at variance as were the two systems of Phariseeism and Sadduceeism, still they had something in common. This was the one-sided legal principle which they both maintained. And indeed by the Sadducees this principle was seized and held after a manner still more exclusively one-sided than by the other sect; since with them *all* religious interest was confined *to this point;* and since they misinterpreted or denied every thing else that belonged to the more fully developed faith of the Old Testament. Moreover, the essential character of the law in its spirit, as distinguished from its national and

[1] In what is here said, I have taken into view the well-grounded objections which Dr. Schneckenburger, in the seventh Dissertation of his Introduction to the New Testament, has made against the manner in which the subject was presented by me before.

temporal form, in its strictness and dignity, was recognized by them still less than by the Pharisees. While the Pharisees attributed the highest value to ritual and ascetic works of holiness, with the Sadducees — as, perhaps, the name they gave themselves may denote — uprightness in the relations of civil society passed for the whole. Starting from this principle, there was nothing in their view of morality which presented a point of contact for the feeling of *religious* need, which most readily emerges from *the depth* of the moral life. Add to this, that they ascribed divine authority, an authority binding on religious conviction, only to the Pentateuch.[1] The observance of the law, understood after *their own* way, was for them the only thing fixed and certain; in respect to all other things, they were inclined to doubt and disputation.[2]

As the belief in the spirit's destination for an eternal existence beyond this earth found no recipiency in this, their one-sided intelligential direction of mind, holding converse only with the worldly, they expressly denied the doctrines of the resurrection and of the immortality of the spirit, because no such doctrines could be proved from the letter of the Pentateuch alone. These doctrines they reckoned

[1] Ready as I am to acknowledge the weight of the arguments brought by Winer (in his Biblische Realwörterbuch) against the statement here made, yet I cannot be induced to abandon it. Very true, it does not admit of being proved from the passages of Josephus, that the Sadducees denied the authority of all other books of the canon. It is only evident from those passages, that they were opponents of tradition; and were for deriving the substance of the legal precepts to be observed from the letter of the law alone, without allowing validity, in this regard, to any other source of knowledge. But neither can it by any means be proved from them, that they judged respecting the canon precisely as did the Pharisees. Although Josephus, (c. Apion. c. 8.) taking his position on the ground of Jewish orthodoxy, might thus describe the canon as of universal validity, yet it by no means follows, that that heterodox sect, which departed in so many other things from what was elsewhere considered as important for the religious interest, — that this sect might not also differ from the same in their judgment concerning the canon. If the Sadducees, notwithstanding their denial of doctrines so important to the general religious interest as those of personal immortality and of the resurrection, could yet attain to the most considerable offices of the state, how was an opinion concerning the canon, which certainly had no such vital connection with practical life, to offer any obstacle to this promotion? Josephus says of them, that when they were called to administer public affairs, they did not venture to act according to their own principles, but were constrained to yield to what was required by the Pharisees; since otherwise they must fall by the popular rage, which would be excited against them. Ὁπότε γὰρ ἐπ' ἀρχὰς παρέλθοιεν, ἀκουσίως μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκην, προσχωροῦσι δ' οὖν οἷς ὁ φαρισαῖος λεγει, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄλλως ἀνεκτοὺς γενέσθαι τοῖς πλήθεσιν. Archæol. l. XVIII. c. 1, § 4. These words refer immediately, without doubt, to church principles of administration; yet I cannot avoid the inference from analogy, that the Sadducees would have acted in precisely the same way, in regard to other things, not less important in their relation to the common religious interest; such, for instance, as their denial of immortality; that is, would have made no public demonstration of their real convictions, although it must necessarily have been the case, that, with such difference of opinions, violent contentions would sometimes arise in the Sanhedrim. See Acts, 23: 9. So now, there may have been a distinction of an exoteric and esoteric position in their judgment concerning the canon; and while manifesting a certain respect for the whole canon, they may have, notwithstanding this, ascribed a decisive authority, in matters of faith, to the Pentateuch alone. Indeed, it cannot well be conceived, how they could reconcile the acknowledgement of an equal authority belonging to all the books of the Old Testament, with their denial of immortality and of the resurrection.

[2] Josephus describes the skeptical tendency of the Sadducees in Archæol. l. XVIII. c. 1, § 4: Φυλακῆς δὲ οὐδαμῶν τιμῶν μεταποίησις αὐτοῖς ἢ τῶν νόμων. Πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς διδασκάλους σοφίας ἣν μετίασιν, ἀμφιλογεῖν ἀρετὴν ἀριθμοῦσιν.

also among the foreign additions that had been made to the original doctrines of Moses, from which additions they were wishing to purify Judaism. To such a direction of mind, it is *ever* peculiar to declare all doctrines surreptitious, which do not lie, expressed in so many words, in the religious records still recognized as authoritative, although these doctrines may be contained there in the spirit, including within itself the germ of a future development. But it is more difficult to conceive how the Sadducees found it possible to reconcile their denial of a world of spirits and of the existence of angels[1] — to which denial they were impelled by the same direction of mind — with their principle of recognizing everything as religious doctrine which could be shown to lie, in so many words, in the Pentateuch. It is easy to see here, how they were seeking for their own opinions, which had originated and were grounded in a state of mind wholly peculiar to themselves, a point of union and support in the authority which they recognized only just so far as the case admitted. Most probably, in explaining the angelic appearances, (the Angelophaniai,) they departed from their principle of literal interpretation, and considered them merely as visions by which God revealed himself to the Fathers.[2]

Although it cannot be proved, from the notices of Josephus, that they denied a special Providence, yet it is clear, that in strict conformity with their tendency to negation, they made God, as far as possible, an idle spectator of the affairs of the world, taking much less share in the concerns of men than the Theocratic principle required. Their direction of mind must have impelled them ever nearer to a Deism which abolished all revelation, and consequently, also, the essence of the Jewish religion itself, though at the outset they had simply in view the restoration of that religion to its primitive simplicity. The principle of their spiritual bent must have led them further than they intended themselves to go. In perfect harmony with this mode of thinking was also the severe, cold, heartless disposition which Josephus ascribes to the Sadducees. According to his account, they were for the most part persons of wealth, who led a life of ease, and, satisfied with earthly enjoyments, would open their minds to no higher aspirations.[3]

[1] Acts, 23, 8.

[2] As we are to infer from Origen's words, if we compare them with a passage in Justin Martyr, (Dialog. c. Tryph. Jud. f. 358, ed. Colon,) where he speaks of a party among the Jewish theologians, that denied the personal existence of angels, and explained all appearances of them as merely transient forms of the manifestation of a divine power, which God caused to go out from himself and then withdrew. Origen, in the words alluded to, ascribes to the Sadducees, *δόξας περὶ ἀγγέλων, ὡς οὐχ ὑπαρχόντων, ἀλλὰ τροπολογουμένων τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν ἀναγεγραμένων καὶ μηδὲν ὡς πρὸς τὴν ἱστορίαν ἀληθὲς ἐχόντων.* It may admit of some question, whether Origen was following here some historical accounts, or merely allowing himself to conclude, from the necessary connection of ideas in his own mode of thinking, that if they did not ascribe literal truth to the narratives of the angelic appearances, they must then have explained them allegorically. The comparison of his statement, however, with that of Justin Martyr, renders the former the more probable.

[3] Although Josephus was himself a Pharisee, yet we have no reason to suspect what he says of the Sadducees, for he constantly shows himself impartial in his judgments he moreover frequently exposes, without reserve, the bad traits of the Pharisees, and we have no cause, therefore, to charge him here with malicious feelings, injurious to the truth. Certainly we cannot infer from

It remains, that we should speak of the Essenes or Essæans, whose relation to the two parties just described has already been exhibited in a general manner. About two centuries before the birth of Christ, there arose, in the quiet country lying on the west side of the Dead Sea, a society of piously disposed men, who, in these solitudes, sought a refuge from reigning corruptions, from the storms and conflicts of the world and the strifes of parties; precisely as the monastic system sprung up at a later period. Thus they are described by the elder Pliny, who felt constrained to express a sort of respect for their independence and their contentment within themselves. "On the western border of that lake," says he, "dwell the Essenes, at a sufficient distance from the shore to avoid its pestilent effluvia — a race entirely by themselves, and, beyond every other in the world, deserving of wonder; men living in communion with nature; without wives, without money. Every day, their number is replenished by a new troop of settlers, since they are much visited by those whom the reverses of fortune have driven, tired of the world, to their modes of living. Thus happens, what might seem incredible, that a community in which no one is born, yet continues to subsist through the lapse of centuries. So fruitful for them is disgust of life in others."[1] From this first seat of the Essenes, colonies of them had been formed in other parts of Palestine; in remote and solitary districts of the country, which must have answered best to their original design, but also in the midst of villages and towns. A transplantation of this sort would naturally lead to many deviations from the original strictness of their principles, to many alterations of their discipline. If there was also one class of Essenes who, as we may gather from the accounts of Josephus, were willing to act as magistrates, it is evident that these, residing amidst civil society, could not observe all those rules which bound, with the force of law, such as lived secluded from human intercourse. As is wont to happen in similar communities, there must, in this case, have naturally sprung up many orders of the sect, various forms of relation to, and modes of connection with, the original society. Indeed, the historian Josephus expressly distinguishes four different orders, of which the Essenes were composed.[2] Many contradictory statements, which occur in the several accounts of this sect, admit thus of being most easily reconciled.[3]

the character of the doctrines of the later Careans, who were temperate opponents of the Pharisaic traditions, what must have been the character of the Sadducean doctrines. The general question still remains unsettled, whether the latter doctrines had any outward connection whatever with the former, although the heresy-hunting spirit of their adversaries would naturally be glad of the chance to confound them with these.

[1] Ab occidente litora Esseni fugiunt, usque qua nocent. Gens sola et in toto orbe præter cæteras mira, sine ulla femina, omni venere abdicata, sine pecunia, socia palmarum. In diem ex æquo convenarum turba renascitur, large frequentantibus, quos vitâ fessos ad mores eorum fortunæ fluctus agitat. Natur. hist. l. V. c. 15.

[2] Josephus cites μοίρας τέσσαρας of Essenes, B. J. l. II. c. 8, § 10, which several grades, it is true, would, according to his testimony, have reference simply to the length of time spent in this community; but from the marks which are given, we may doubtless infer, that there were other modes of classification among them besides that which bore reference to the circumstance just mentioned.

[3] As, for instance, while Pliny makes them reside only on the border of the Dead

If we may always distinguish, among mystic sects, the more practical and the more speculatively inclined, we must reckon the Essenes with the former class, without overlooking in them, however, at the same time, a certain speculative and Theosophic element. This, their peculiar mystic turn, might have sprung, in the first place, independently of external influences, out of the deeper religious sense of the Old Testament, a spiritualization of the letter, proceeding from the temper of mind which gave birth to the allegoric interpretation. Such mysticism has made its appearance, after much the same manner, among people of the most diverse character, — among the Hindoos, the Persians, and Christian nations. It would lead, certainly, to the greatest mistakes, if from the resemblance of such religious phenomena, whose relationship can be traced to their common ground of origin in the essence of the human mind itself, we should be ready to infer their outward derivation one from the other. How much that is alike may not be found in comparing the phenomena of Brahmaism and of Buddhism with those of the sect of Beghards in the middle ages, where the impossibility of any such derivation is apparent to every body? We are ready to admit, however, that the Essenean mysticism, although it did not spring originally from any outward cause of excitement, yet, having once made its appearance, received into itself many foreign elements. But should the question now arise — whence did these elements come? — we find our thoughts reverting far more naturally to old Oriental, to Parsic, Chaldaic elements — many ideas from that source having been propagated, since the time of the exile, among the Jews — than to elements of Alexandrian Platonism, according to the usual supposition at the present time; for it is difficult to conceive how the latter could already have exerted so powerful and wide-extended an influence in Palestine, at the period when this sect arose. The peculiar asceticism of the Essenes by no means warrants us to infer that they must have been acquainted with the Platonic doctrine of the ὕλη, since that asceticism may be explained as well from the influence of the Oriental spirit; while this doctrine itself, without the addition of the Oriental spirit, would have led to no such peculiar bent. We should also duly weigh, that Josephus and Philo, writers to whom we are indebted for our most important information respecting this sect, have both, though the latter still more than the former, clothed the opinions of the Essenes in a garb peculiarly Grecian, which we may rightly consider as not originally belonging to them. We must therefore be cautious of attributing too much importance to many things they advance, which have been derived *simply from that source;* especially as, in modern times, the Essenean doctrines have given occasion to very arbitrary combinations and modes of representing historical facts.

Besides the diversities above mentioned, which must have been

Sea, Josephus (de B. J. l. II. c. 8, § 4,) says that there were many of them dwelling in every town; Philo, (quod omnis probus liber § 12,) that they lived κωμηδὸν, τὰς πόλεις ἐκτρεπόμενοι, and the same writer, in a fragment of his defence of the Jews, preserved by Eusebius Cæsar. (Præparat. Evangel. l. VII. c. 8,) that they lived in many towns and villages of Judea, in populous districts.

introduced gradually among the Essenes, as they began to relax from their primitive eremetical severity and submit to the intercourse of civil life, we may notice another remarkable difference among them. In strict accordance with the Oriental element of their original ascetic turn, was the life of celibacy,—a thing alien to the spirit of the primitive Hebraism, by which a fruitful marriage was reckoned among the greatest blessings and ornaments. Hence we see already among the Essenes that reaction of the original Hebrew spirit against the foreign ascetic element,—which is analogous to something we shall hereafter have more frequent occasion to notice in the history of sects. There was a party of the Essenes which differed from the others, in tolerating the institution of marriage.[1]

It accorded with the character of this sect to unite the contemplative life with the practical; but in accommodation to the diversities already mentioned, the extent to which this was done must also have been various. The practical bent of the Essenes would naturally incline them to a life of industry. Such a life was probably intended, as in the case of the later monks, to answer a two-fold purpose; to occupy the senses, so as to prevent any disturbance from that quarter of the higher activity of the mind; and to furnish themselves with the means, while independently providing for their own subsistence, of contributing, at the same time, to the necessities of others. The occupations of peace were those about which they employed themselves; differing according to their different habits of life, according as they dwelt in communion with nature or joined in the intercourse of civil society; agriculture, the breeding of bees and of cattle, mechanical handiworks. They had sought to explore the powers of nature, and apply them to the healing of diseases. Connected with their secret doctrines, there was also a traditional knowledge relating to this subject. They were in possession of old writings which treated of such matters. Health of body and of soul they were in the habit of connecting together, as well as the cure of both. Their science of nature and their art of medicine seem to have had a religious, *Theosophic* character.[2] As they strove to explore the secret powers of nature, so were there also to be found among them, such as claimed for themselves, and endeavored to cultivate, a gift of prophecy. A particular method of ascetic preparation, by which one might become qualified for searching into the future, was taught among their secret traditions.[3] For this purpose they employed sacred writings; whether they were the Scriptures of the Old Testament, from the words of which they sought, by various interpretations, to unravel the secrets of futurity, just as the Bible was used for similar purposes in later periods; or whether they were those other writings, belonging to the sect, in which their secret doctrines were unfolded. All this bears the impress of the old Oriental spirit, certainly not of the elements of Grecian culture.

[1] See Joseph. B. J. l. II. c. 8, § 13.

[2] Joseph. B. J. l. II. c. 8, § 6: Σπουδάζουσιν ἐκτόπως περὶ τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν συγγράμματα, μάλιστα τὰ πρὸς ὠφέλειαν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἐκλέγοντες. Ἔνθεν αὐτοῖς πρὸς θεραπείαν παθῶν ῥίζαι τε ἀλεξητήριοι καὶ λιθῶν ἰδιότητες ἐνερευνῶνται.

[3] Διαφόροις ἁγνείαις ἐμπαιδοτριβοῦμενον See Joseph. B. J. l. II. c. 8, § 12.

By their consciousness of the equality of the higher dignity in man's nature, of the oneness of the divine image in all, to which the Old Testament of itself might have led them,[1] they rose above the narrow limits within which the developement of the human species was confined by the prejudices of antiquity. They considered all men as rational beings, destined to the enjoyment of personal freedom; they rejected slavery and suffered no slave to exist in their community, — in every kind of service mutually helping one another. As it was their idea to restore back the community founded originally by the Almighty in nature, and thereby to reconcile those differences which civil society had introduced among men, accordingly the distinctions of poverty and of wealth were also done away among them. There was a common treasury, formed by throwing together the property of the individuals who entered into the society, and by the earnings of each one's labor, out of which the necessities of all were provided for, — a community of goods, which, however, did not preclude the right of private property, and which was probably modified by the diversities already described.

There can be no doubt that this sect, by exciting a more earnest and lively spirit of devotion, by arousing the sense of the godlike within the little circles over which their influence extended, produced those wholesome fruits which have always sprung out of practical mysticism, wherever the religious life has become stiffened into mechanical forms. It was owing to their inoffensive mode of life, commanding universal respect, that they were enabled to preserve and extend themselves without molestation, amidst all the strifes of party, and all the revolutions to which Palestine was subjected, down to the extinction of the Jewish state.

They were particularly distinguished, in that corrupt age, among the Jews, on account of their industry, charitableness and hospitality; on account of their fidelity, so different from the seditious spirit of the Jews, in rendering obedience to magistrates as the powers ordained of God, and on account of their strict veracity. Every yea and nay was to possess, in their society, the validity of an oath; for every oath, said they, presupposes already a mutual distrust, which ought not to find place in a community of honest men. In one case only might an oath be administered among them, and that was, in confirming those who, after a novitiate of three years, were received among the number of the initiated.

Although now, under the view just presented, we cannot fail to recognize in this sect a sound practical bent, yet we should doubtless be under a mistake, if, led by the one-sided representations of the

[1] This view naturally resulted both from the development of the Old Testament idea respecting the image of God, and from the recognition of the origin of mankind from a single pair; as, on the contrary, slavery found its justification in the prevailing mode of thinking among Pagans; their misapprehension of the higher nature common to the species, and their assumption of an original difference of races, in virtue of which, some, by their reason, were destined and suited to rule over others, and these latter, with their bodily powers, to serve them as tools. Thus Aristotle, in his work on Politics, l. I. c. 2, says: Τὸ μὲν δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει. Τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματ· ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον

Alexandrian Jew, Philo,[1] we imagined the Essenes might be taken as an example of the purest practical mystics, at an equal remove from all Theosophic and speculative fancies,[2] and from all superstition and slavery to ceremonies. The fact, which has already been stated, of their affectation of the prophetic gift, is, of itself, inconsistent with this view of the matter; and their whole secret lore can hardly be imagined to have consisted simply of ethical elements, but we are here forced to the supposition of a peculiar *Theosophy* and Pneumatology. Why else should they have made so great a mystery of it? This supposition gathers strength, when we are informed that the candidates for admission into the sect, among other obligations, took an oath that they would reveal to no one the *names of the angels* which were to be communicated to them. It is confirmed again by the cautious secrecy with which they kept the ancient books of the sect. Even Philo himself makes it probable, when he says that they busied themselves with a φιλοσοφία διὰ συμβόλων, a philosophy resting on the allegoric interpretation of the Bible; since every mode of the allegoric interpretation of scripture is accompanied, side by side, with a certain speculative system. There is nothing to warrant us in supposing that it was the ideas of the Alexandrian Theology which constituted the basis of their scheme. There seems to have been grounded in this *Theosophy* of theirs a certain veneration of the sun, which we have to explain from the intermingling of Parsic rather than of Platonic doctrines. It was a daily custom with them to turn their faces devoutly towards the rising of the sun, and chaunt together certain ancient hymns, handed down in their sect, which were addressed to that luminary, purporting that his beams should fall upon nothing impure.[3] To this may be added their doctrine concerning the soul's prëexistence. Descended from some heavenly region, it had become imprisoned in this corporeal world, and after having led a life worthy of its celestial origin, it would be liberated again, and rise to a heavenly existence befitting its nature. This also, which was the fundamental doctrine of their asceticism, may be traced just as well to old Oriental tradition as to the Alexandrian

[1] In his writings, above cited. Although Josephus, too, as we have already observed, has given nothing that can be called an objective description of this sect; notwithstanding that when a youth of sixteen, he compared the different Jewish sects together, in order to choose between them, and endeavored, along with the rest, to make himself acquainted with the sect of the Essenes, though he hardly went beyond the period of a novitiate among them, and perhaps, in regard to their esoteric doctrines, was no better informed than Philo;—yet he *might* obtain a more accurate knowledge of the sect than the Alexandrian Jew; and his account, savoring as it does, with a smack of the Grecian taste, yet wears a more historical character than that of Philo, which was evidently written with the distinct purpose in view, of holding up the Essenes to the Greeks, as a pattern of practical wise men. Indeed, the latter writer was scarcely capable of looking at anything otherwise than in the light of his Alexandrian Platonism. He must involuntarily find again his own ideas wherever any point of union enables him to introduce them.

[2] I cannot at all agree with those who seize upon the words of Philo, in his book, quod omnis probus liber § 12, where he says, that of the three parts of philosophy, the Essenes accepted only Ethics, for the purpose of sketching out, after this hint, the main features of the Essenean system. It is impossible not to see, that in these words, the matter is set forth in an altogether subjective point of view; and besides, what Philo here asserts is contradicted by the more precise and accurate testimony of Josephus.

[3] Joseph. de B. J. l. II. c. 8, § 8, et 9.

Platonism. The original birth-place of this doctrine is, in truth, the East, from which quarter it first found its way into Greece.

If we may trust the words of Josephus,[1] they did indeed send gifts to the temple, and thus expressed their reverence for the original establishment; discharging in this manner the common duty of all Jews, as it was their principle to fulfil every obligation that bound them; yet they did not visit the temple themselves,[2] perhaps because they looked upon it as polluted by the vicious customs of the Jews. They thought that the holy rites could be performed in a worthier and more acceptable manner within the precincts of their own thoroughly pure and holy community. In like manner, also, they performed their sacrificial offerings, for the presentation of which, within the pale of their own society, they believed themselves best prepared by their ascetic lustrations. The authority of Moses standing so high with them, there is not the least reason for supposing they would wholly set aside the sacrificial worship appointed by him, unless it were true, perhaps, that they looked upon the original Mosaic religion as having been corrupted by later additions, and among these additions reckoned also the sacrificial worship, as we find asserted in the Clementines; which however, so far as it regards the Essenes at least, admits not the shadow of a proof. Now it is singular, it must be admitted, how, as Jews, they could entertain the opinion, that they might be allowed to offer sacrifices away from Jerusalem. But caprice in the treatment of whatever belongs to the positive in religion forms, indeed, one of the characteristic marks of such mystic sects. And it might well accord with the spirit of such a sect, that in proportion as they looked upon the sacrificial worship, instituted by Moses, as a holy service, they should be so much the less disposed to take any part in its celebration, amidst all the wickedness in the desecrated temple at Jerusalem; and should maintain that only among the really sanctified, the members of their own sect, was the true spiritual temple, where sacrifices could be offered with the proper consecration.[3]

[1] Archæol. l. XVIII. §. 4; Εἰς δὲ τὸ ἱερὸν ἀναθήματά τε στέλλοντες θυσίας οὐκ ἐπιτελοῦσι διαφορότητι ἁγνειῶν, ἃς νομίζοιεν, καὶ δι' αὐτὸ εἰργόμενοι τοῦ κοινοῦ τεμενίσματος, ἐφ' αὑτῶν τὰς θυσίας ἐπιτελοῦσι.

[2] For the word εἰργόμενοι cannot possibly be taken in any other sense than that of the middle voice.

[3] Even from Philo's language in the tract: Quod omnis probus liber, § 12, it is impossible to extract that meaning which some have wished to find in it; viz. that the Essenes gave a spiritual interpretation to the whole sacrificial worship, and rejected outward sacrifices entirely. Ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα θεραπευταὶ θεοῦ γεγόνασιν, οὐ ζῶα καταθύοντες, ἀλλ' ἱεροπρεπεῖς τὰς ἑαυτῶν διανοίας κατασκευάζειν ἀξιοῦντες. Philo is starting here from the doctrine of the Alexandrian theology, that the true worship of God is the purely spiritual, consisting in the consecration of the life of the spirit to God. This idea he represents as having been realized by the Essenes, whom he describes as Therapeutæ, in the true sense of the word. Simply for the sake of contrast, he mentions animal sacrifices, which were usually held to constitute the main part of the service; and in so doing he by no means affirms that the Essenes had entirely rejected the sacrificial worship. Not the negative but the positive is here the essential point. Had it been his intention to say that the Essenes rejected the sacrificial worship of Moses, he must have expressed this in a quite different tone. In *this* connection, Philo could have said the same thing of himself, and of every other Jew, possessed, according to his opinion, of a truly spiritual mind. By attaining to the knowledge that the true sacrifice is the spiritual sacrifice of one's self, one is not led, certainly, according to his doctrine to

With such mystical sects, it not unfrequently happens, that in connection with a bent of mind turned wholly inward, is found a disposition to set value upon certain external religious rites, which seems quite incongruous, two opposite elements being thus brought in contact — spiritual religion and slavery to forms. So it was with the Essenes. In a painfully superstitious observance of the Sabbath day of rest, according to the letter, not the spirit, of the law, they went even beyond the Jews; with this difference, however: that the custom in their case sprung out of an honest piety, while the Pharisaic casuistry knew how to accommodate the interpretation of the law, so as to suit the interest of the passing moment. They not only carefully avoided, like other Jews, all contact with uncircumcised persons, but, being separated, within their own body, into four different grades, they who had attained to the highest, dreaded the pollution of a touch from the member of an inferior grade; and they had recourse to ablutions, whenever an accident of this sort occurred. In general, they attached greater importance than other Jews to purification, by bathing in cold water, as a means of holiness. To their ascetic notions, the oriental and healthful practice of anointing with oil seemed an unholy thing; so that any one who had happened in any way to become thus defiled, felt obliged carefully to cleanse himself. They scrupulously avoided all food save such as had been prepared within their own sect. They would die rather than partake of any other. All this, then, should satisfy us, that while we grant a due respect to the religious spirit of this people, we ought not to be so far misled as to consider them the representatives of a simple and unalloyed practical mysticism.

Essentially different from the form of culture which prevailed in Palestine, was the shape and direction taken by the Jewish mind, on that spot, where, through a period of three centuries, it had been unfolding itself under circumstances and relations wholly peculiar,— amidst those elements of Hellenic culture, that, transplanted into the old seats of an altogether different civilization, had on this foreign soil gained the supremacy,—in the Grecian colony of Alexandria in Egypt. From an intermingling of Hellenic and Jewish mind, proceeded forth here one of the most influential of appearances, which had an important bearing, particularly on the process of the development of Christianity *in human thought*. We see here, how that great historical event, which, more than three hundred years before the birth of Christ, shattered the nations of the East, should serve to prepare the way for such a process. The world-subduing arms of Alexander, as afterwards the weapons of Rome, were to subserve the highest aim of man's history, by uniting and bringing within the influence of each other, parts hitherto separated, so that the minds of men might be prepared to

set aside the outward sacrificial worship. In this case, therefore, there is not the least opposition betwixt Philo and Josephus, but he is speaking of an entirely different thing. In the passage cited from Josephus, we cannot, for the purpose of reconciling a contradiction that does not exist, understand "sacrifice" in the *second* instance differently from that in the *first*, as referring to bloodless sacrifices, — the symbolical offerings of the gifts of nature. In this case, Josephus would have expressed the opposition after a different manner.

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grapple with Christianity, receive it into their thought, and work upon it with self-activity. Plutarch looked upon it as the great mission of Alexander, to transplant Grecian culture into distant countries,[1] and to conciliate and fuse into one, Greeks and barbarians. He says of him, not without reason, that he was sent of God for this purpose;[2] though he did not divine, that this end itself was to be only subsidiary to, and the means of, a higher,—to make the united peoples of the East and West more accessible for the new creation that was to proceed from Christianity, and in the combination of the elements of Oriental and Hellenic culture, to prepare for Christianity a material in which it might develop itself. If we look away from that ultimate purpose, if we do not fix our eye upon the higher quickening spirit, destined to convey into that combination, holding within itself the germ of corruption, the principle of a new life, we may, in such a case, indeed ask the question, whether that union was really a gain to either party, whether at least the gain was not everywhere accompanied with an equal loss, since the fresh life of the national spirit must in such circumstances be constantly repressed by the forcibly obtruded influence of the foreign element. It required something higher than *any* element of human culture, to introduce into that combination a new living principle of development, and to unite peculiarities the most diverse, without prejudice to their original essence, into a whole in which each part should be mutually a complement to the other. The true living fellowship between the East and the West, in which both the great peculiar principles that belong together for a complete exhibition of the type of humanity should be united, could first come only from Christianity. But as preparatory to this step, the influence which for a period of three centuries went forth from Alexandria, that centre of the intercourse of the world, was of great importance.

In the course of these centuries, the peculiar asperity and stiffness of the Jewish character must have been considerably tempered by intercourse with the Greeks,[3] and by the transforming influence of the Hellenic culture, which here preponderated. The ulterior effect might proceed to shape itself in two different ways. Either the religious element, which most strongly marked the Jewish peculiarity, might yield, under the overpowering influence of the foreign national spirit and of the foreign culture, and the Jews would suffer themselves to be misled, in ridicule of their old religious records, now become unintelligible to them, to assort with the Greeks among whom they dwelt, or, true to the religion of their fathers in the main, they might be forced to seek a conciliating mean betwixt this and the elements of Hellenic culture, which exercised an involuntary power over their minds, and which they were moreover induced to make their own, in subserviency to an apologetic interest.

[1] Τὰ *βαρβαρικὰ τοῖς ἑλληνικοῖς κεράσαι, καὶ τὴν ἑλλάδα σπεῖραι.* See Plutarch's I. orat. de Alex. virtute s. fortuna, § 10.

[2] *Κοινὸς ἥκειν θεόθεν ἁρμοστὴς καὶ διαλλακτὴς τῶν ὅλων νομίζων.* L. c. c. 6.

[3] Philo reckons the number of Jews residing in Alexandria and the countries adjacent, at "a hundred myriads." Orat. in Flaccum § 6.

We doubtless find some indications that the former of these effects was not wholly wanting; as, for instance, when that zealous champion of Judaism, the Alexandrian Philo, places in contrast with Moses, who, while in favor at the Egyptian court, still remains faithful to his people, those renegades[1] "that trample on the laws in which they were born and bred, upturn those customs of their country which were liable to no just censure, and in their predilection for the new, become utterly forgetful of the old." In another passage,[2] he rebukes those "who are impatient of the religious institutions of their country; who are ever on the alert for matter of censure and complaint against the laws of religion; who thoughtlessly urge these and the like objections in excuse of their ungodliness:[3] Do ye still make great account of your laws, as if they contained the rules of truth? Yet see, the holy Scriptures, as you term them, contain also fables, such as you are accustomed to laugh at, when you hear them from others."[4]

Yet, in the main, the power of their religious faith, so deeply rooted in the mind of this people, was too great over them to be weakened by the influence of that foreign culture; and hence the former of the effects above mentioned, was certainly the more rare, and the latter the more frequent case. It was this: the Jews, completely imbued with the elements of Hellenic culture, endeavored to find a mean betwixt these and the religion of their fathers, which they had no wish to renounce; and to this end availed themselves of the system most in vogue with those who busied themselves with religious matters in Alexandria, that of the Platonic philosophy, which had already become a mighty power over their own intellectual life. At the same time, they were very far from consciously entertaining the idea or wish to sacrifice the authority of their ancient religion and of their sacred writings to the authority of a human philosophy. On the contrary, they learned, from a comparison of the religious knowledge existing among their own people with that which might be found among the Egyptians and Greeks, to understand more clearly the distinguished character of their ancient religion, the divine agency manifested in the guidance of their people, and the destination of that people as bearing upon the whole human

[1] De vita Mosis l. I. f. 607, § 9. *Νόμους παραβαίνουσι, καθοὺς ἐγεννήθησαν καὶ ἐτράφησαν, ἤθη δὲ πάτρια, οἷς μέμψις οὐδεμία πρόσεστι δικαία, κινοῦσιν ἐκδιητημένοι καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν παρόντων ἀποδοχὴν οὐδενὸς ἔτι τῶν ἀρχαίων μνήμην λαμβάνουσιν.*

[2] De confus. ling. f. 320, § 5. *Οἱ μὲν δυσχεραίνοντες τῇ πατρίῳ πολιτείᾳ, ψόγον καὶ κατηγορίαν ἀεὶ τῶν νόμων μελετῶντες τούτοις καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις, ὡς ἂν ἐπιβάθραις τῆς ἀθεότητος αὐτῶν οἱ δυσσεβεῖς χῶνται.*

[3] He is speaking of the confusion of tongues at Babel.

[4] Also in the passage (de nom. mutat. p. 1053, § 8) where Philo quotes the scoffing language of an *ἄθεος* and *ἀσεβής*, the bitterness with which he speaks would seem to indicate that the scoffer was an infidel Jew. In a pagan this scoffing would have struck him as no such singular thing. He looks upon it as a punishment of the foolhardiness of this man, that he soon after hung himself; *ἵν' ὁ μιαρὸς καὶ δυσκάθαρτος μηδὲ καθάρῳ θανάτῳ τελευτήσῃ.* By means of his allegoric interpretation, Philo wishes to remove that which furnished this man an occasion for his scoffing, that others might not draw upon themselves a like punishment. He describes here a whole class of such people, who were waging an irreconcileable war with sacred things, and searching for matter of calumny wherever the letter admitted of no befitting sense. *Ἔνιοι τῶν φιλαπεχθημόνων καὶ μώμους ἀεὶ τοῖς ἀμώμοις προσάπτειν ἐθελόντων καὶ πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον πολεμούντων τοῖς ἱεροῖς.*

race; and their conviction that this was indeed the high destination of the Jews, could only be strengthened and confirmed by such a comparison. So says the individual whom we would choose to name as the representative of these Alexandrians, viz. Philo.[1] "That which is the portion only of a few disciples of a truly genuine philosophy, the knowledge of the Highest, has become the inheritance of the whole Jewish people by laws and customs." He calls the Jews priests and prophets for all mankind.[2] He was conscious of the relation to universal history lying at the ground of the particular in the history of his nation — saw how the Theocratic people, as such, had a mission to fulfil which regarded entire humanity. He describes them as a priestly people, whose calling it was to invoke the blessing of God on all mankind.[3] He says, with this reference, that the offering, presented for the whole people, was meant for the entire race of man.[4]

The spirit of Judaism enabled him to understand, that religious truth should be a public thing, the common property of all. Considering how easily a Jew at Alexandria might be tempted, under such inducements as were held out by the traffic in religious mysteries, to set up another description of mysteries in competition with those of the Greeks, it is the more worthy of remark, how decidedly Philo took his stand against every such tendency, greatly distinguishing himself, in this respect, from the heathen Platonists. It well nigh seems, as if he found cause to warn his fellow-believers themselves against the fascinations of mystery, by which they also could be attracted.[5] "All mysteries," says he, "all parade and trickery of that sort, Moses removed from the holy giving of the law; since he did not wish those that were trained under such a form of religious policy, to be exposed, by having their minds dazzled with mysterious things, to neglect the truth, and to follow after that which belongs to night and darkness, disregarding what is worthy of the light and of the day. Hence no one of those that know Moses, and count themselves among his disciples, should allow himself to be initiated into such mysteries, or initiate others; for both the learning and the teaching of such mysteries is no trifling sin. For why, ye initiated, if they are beautiful and useful things, do ye shut yourselves up in profound darkness, and confer the benefit on two or three alone, when you might confer it on all, were you willing to publish in the market-place what would be so salutary for every one, so that all might certainly participate of a better and happier life?" He points to the fact, that in the great and glorious works of nature, there is no mystery, all is open. He bears witness of the mere empty mechanism, into which the mysteries had then degenerated; men — he says — of the worst character, and crowds of abandoned women, were initiated for money.

[1] De caritate f. 699, § 2: *Ὅπερ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας τῆς δοκιμωτάτης περιγίνεται τοῖς ὁμιλητοῖς αὐτῆς, τοῦτο καὶ διὰ νόμων καὶ ἐθῶν Ἰουδαίοις, ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἀνωτάτου καὶ πρεσβυτάτου πάντων, τὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς γενητοῖς θεοῖς πλάνον ἀπωσαμένοις.*

[2] De Abrah. f. 364, § 19.

[3] De vita Mosis I. f. 625, § 27. *Ἔθνους, ὅπερ ἔμελλεν ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν ἄλλων ἱεράσεσθαι, τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ἀεὶ ποιησόμενον εὐχάς.*

[4] De victimis f. 238, at the end, § 3.

[5] De victimas offerentib. f. 856, § 12 *Μηδεὶς μήτε τελείσθω τῶν Μωϋσέως φοιτητῶν καὶ γνωρίμων μήτε τελείτω.*

These religious philosophers among the Alexandrian Jews, of whom we speak, can be rightly understood and judged of, only by taking into view their entire position, — the fundamental principle of their system, which had been formed out of contradictory elements, — as well as their relation to the two opposite parties, between which they were endeavoring to gain a reconciling mean. On the one hand, they held firmly to the religion of their fathers. They were devoted to it with true reverence and love, and looked upon the records of it as a work of the Divine Spirit. Every thing in these records, and particularly in the Pentateuch, passed with them as, in one and the same sense, divine. From these, in their opinion, were to be drawn all stores of wisdom. On the other hand, their minds were preoccupied by a philosophical culture at variance with these convictions. They were themselves unconscious of the conflicting elements that filled their minds, and must have felt constrained to seek after some artificial method of combining them into a harmonious whole. Thus would they be involuntarily driven to *imply* in the old records of religion, which for them possessed the highest authority, a sense foreign to these records themselves, supposing all the while, that they were thus really exalting their dignity as the source of all wisdom.

As to the parties between which they moved, and which they had particularly in mind in their interpretation of the sacred writings, they were two; standing related to the two several tendencies, in connection with which, also, the philosophy of religion according to Platonism, as already set forth by us, had gone on to shape itself among the Pagans; — a skeptical, and a superstitious tendency. On the one side were philosophically educated Greeks, who used what they knew of the Old Testament Scriptures according to their different turns of thinking; either with trifling spirit, to ridicule it, or with more earnestness of intention, stepping forth as defenders of the interests of true piety, to charge it with unworthy representations of God.[1] And there were Jews themselves, who, under the influence of foreign culture, had broke loose from the religion of their fathers, and joined themselves with these opponents. On the other side, were those no less arrogant than narrow-minded Pharisaical scribes, who would apprehend the things of God with fleshly sense, sought the highest wisdom in little verbal refinements, and by their grossly literal interpretations were led away into the most

[1] Thus Philo, in his second book de plantatione Noae, § 17, defends the Old Testament against those who found something blasphemous in the expression where God is called an inheritance (*κλῆρος*) of men, as, for instance, with reference to the Levites. *Καὶ νῦν εἰσί τινες τῶν ἐπιμορφαζόντων εὐσέβειαν, οἱ τὸ πρόχειρον τοῦ λόγου παρασυκοφαντοῦσι, φάσκοντες οὐθ' ὅσιον οὔτ' ἀσφαλὲς λέγειν ἀνθρώπου θεὸν κλῆρον.* We might suppose that this attack on the Old Testament proceeded from Jews, who, by the preponderant influence of their Greek education, had become alienated from the religion of their fathers, and inclined to a certain species of Deism that avoided anthropopathism. But the manner in which Philo expresses himself seems more accordant with the supposition that he had pagans in view; for if he were speaking of apostate Jews, his language would doubtless have been more excited and bitter, as it usually is in such cases. The allusion is to such pagan accusers of the Old Testament, as it seems to me, in a passage to be found only in the Armenian translation of quæst. in Genes. l. III. § 3, ed Lips. opp. Philon. T VII. p. 5.

absurd and extravagant opinions[1] — men who, from their fundamental principle of adhering to the letter, and their low, sensual views, came to form the rudest notions of God and divine things, — of God's shape, of his anger, of his arbitrary will, — and by such notions contributed most to bring Judaism into contempt with the educated Greeks.[2]

Now the object of those Jewish philosophers in religion, like that of the heathen Platonists, was, by making the distinction between spirit and letter, idea and symbol, in the old records of religion, to strike out for themselves a direct middle course betwixt the above mentioned extremes. There was this truth lying at the basis of their endeavors, that in those exhibitions of truth which belong to the religious province, matter and form are not so related to each other as in other writings; that here, where the form is something that cannot fully answer to the immeasurable greatness of the matter, the mind must read between the lines with its thoughts directed towards the divine, in order to a cognizance of the divine matter in its earthly vessel. This principle had, moreover, a special title to be employed in its application to the Old Testament, inasmuch as within the latter dwells a spirit enveloped under a form still more limited and more limiting than elsewhere, struggling towards a future revelation and development, whereby it was destined to be freed from this confinement. But as the consciousness of *this* spirit — first revealed by Christianity — was to them wanting, they might the more naturally, on this very account, allow themselves to be guided by a foreign spirit, in interpreting the religion of their fathers. It was a foreign principle, borrowed from the Platonic philosophy, from which they started in pursuit of the key to the spiritual understanding of the Old Testament. Instead of referring its contents to the end of practical religion, they were hunting everywhere after universal ideas, only hid under an allegorical cover, — such ideas as had been formed in their own minds from intercourse with the Platonic philosophy. To excite the receptive mind to explore these ideas, they represented as the highest aim of those writings.

One extreme opposed itself to the other. Over against that slavery to the letter which characterized a narrow, sensual *Rabbinism*, stood a tendency to evaporate everything into *universals*. The necessary means of arriving at a knowledge of the spirit contained under the cover of the letter were despised. The overleaping those mediating *momenta* of logical, grammatical and historical interpretation, met its own penalty, in the manifold delusions which ensued. Wholly a stranger to the history, the manners and the language of the ancient people, and despising the rules of grammatical and logical interpretation, a Philo found many difficulties in the Greek version of the so called Seventy Interpreters, in which he was accustomed to read the Old Testament,

[1] Philo, (de somniis l. I. f. 580, § 17,) describes them thus: Τοὺς τῆς ῥητῆς πραγματείας σοφιστὰς καὶ λίαν τὰς ὀφρῦς ἀνεσπακότας.

[2] Thus Philo, (de plantat. Noae l. II. f. 219, § 8,) directs his discourse against those who took every thing in a literal sense in the account of Paradise. He says of them: Πολλὴ καὶ δυσθεράπευτος ἡ εὐήθεια. He says, those sensual notions of God led to the destruction of practical religion; ἐπ' εὐσεβείας καὶ ὁσιότητος καθαιρέσει ἐκθεσμότατα ὄντα εὑρέματα.

—a version of the O. T. which was not only current at Alexandria, but of the highest authority, on account of the story of its miraculous origin. They were difficulties, however, which he might have easily solved by means of the helps above mentioned. He frequently overlooked here the simplest sense, which first offered itself, and instead of this, sought a more profound one, which was merely what had been put into the words by himself.[1] But in addition to this, that mistaken reverence for the sacred writings, that exaggerated view of the influence of the Holy Spirit, whereby the inspired writers were considered merely as passive organs, contributed no small share in compelling men who regarded every thing as in one and the same sense divine, and wholly overlooked the medium of connection between the divine and the human, to find at the position in which they had thus placed themselves, much that was difficult and revolting — much that they must labor to remove by an arbitrary spiritualization. Thus the one-sided *supernaturalistic* element of the Jewish position led directly to the opposite extreme of an arbitrary rationalism,[2] — an error which might have been avoided by that method of conciliatory mediation between the supernatural and the natural which was presented in our statement of the views of Plutarch.

Yet these Alexandrian Jews were well aware of the difference between the mythical religion of other nations and the historical religion of their own people. They did consider, it is true, the historical and literal sense as a veil for those universal ideas, the communication of which to the human mind was the highest aim of God's revelations; but still they insisted also, in the main, on the objective reality and truth of the history and of the letter, and ascribed to both their importance as a means of religious and moral training for such as could not soar to those heights of contemplation. Far was it from their thoughts, to deny the reality of the supernatural in the history of their nation, and to allow it only an ideal significancy. "He who will not believe the miraculous as miraculous," says Philo, in defending the Old Testament history, "proves by this, that he knows not God, and that he has never sought after Him; for otherwise he would have understood, by looking at that truly great and awe-inspiring sight, the miracle of the Universe, that these miracles (referring to the guidance of God's people) are but child's play for the divine power.[3] But the truly miraculous has become despised through familiarity. The unusual, on the contrary, although in itself insignificant, yet through our love of novelty, transports us with amazement."[4]

[1] We have a remarkable example in the work Quis rerum divinar. hæres, f. 492, § 16, where, in the phrase *ἐξήγαγεν αὐτὸν ἔξω*, he looks for some deeper meaning, in the apparently unnecessary repetition of the word *ἔξω*; and again, in the case where the repetition of the noun, according to the Hebrew usage, leads him to conceive of a two-fold subject, and furnishes him an occasion of introducing his idea of the Logos

[2] "Einer rationalistisch-idealistischen Willkuhr."

[3] De vitâ Mosis l. II. § 38: *Εἰ δέ τις τούτοις ἀπιστεῖ. θεὸν οὐτ' οἶδεν οὔτ' ἐζήτησε πώποτε. Ἔγνω γάρ ἂν εὐθέως, ὅτι τὰ παράδοξα δὴ ταῦτα καὶ παράλογα θεοῦ παιδία εἰσὶν, ἀτιδῶν εἰς τὰ τῷ ὄντι μεγάλα καὶ σπουδῆς ἄξια, γένεσιν οὐρανοῦ. κ. τ. λ.*

[4] *Ταῦτα μὲν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὄντα θαυμάσια, καταπεφρόνηται τῷ συνήθει. Τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐν ἔθει καὶ ἂν μικρὰ ἢ καταπληττόμεθα τῷ φιλοκαίνῳ.*

Still they found individual passages, the literal understanding of which presented insurmountable difficulties, — difficulties, it might be, for any rational apprehension whatever, or for their own minds, at the particular position assumed by *their philosophy of religion*. Such especially were those passages, in interpreting which, the Rabbins, who explained every thing according to the letter, fell, no doubt, into absurd and fantastic representations; as, for instance, in the account of Paradise. Now here, it was beyond the power of the Alexandrians, from their own position, to find a means of conciliation between the divine and human, answering to the necessities of reason; as, for example, in distinguishing between a fact lying at the bottom, and the purely symbolical character of a form of tradition. They were forced to push the opposition to the altogether literal mode of apprehension so far as to deny the reality of the literal and historical facts throughout, recognizing only some ideal truth, some universal thought, that presented itself to them out of the train of speculations created by a fusion of the Platonic philosophy with religious ideas of Judaism.[1] But it was far from the intention of a Philo, in maintaining such views, to derogate from the authority of the sacred writings. On the contrary, as he referred every thing they contained to the inspiration of the Divine Spirit, so he recognized the wisdom of that Spirit in permitting the writers actuated by Him, to represent many things in such a form, as, literally understood, could give no tenable sense whatever; to the end that those who would otherwise be tempted to rest satisfied with the bare letter, and search no farther, might be excited to explore that ideal sense lying at the bottom;[2] to conduct to this, being, in truth, the highest aim of the divine revelations. Hence such stones of stumbling must be scattered here and there, as means of excitement for the spiritually blind.[3]

Thus there came to be a two-fold position in respect to religion and the understanding of its records; — a faith clinging to the letter and to the history, and a contemplation soaring to the ideas veiled under the historical and the literal facts. The first was, as we see, in the main, common to both positions. Yet many individuals separated already into opposite parties, at the point where the higher spiritual apprehension did not admit of being joined with an adherence to the reality of the literal and historical facts, but these latter must be wholly given up. This, however, was not the only difference between the two positions. The difference lying at the root, and which developed itself out of this root, could not fail to exert a more wide-reaching influence on the whole mode of apprehending religion. From this source sprang such opposite views as follow. By those who adhered invariably to the principle of a barely literal interpretation, whatever had been said after an anthropopathic manner, in condescension to the sensuous many, concerning

[1] After pointing out the difficulty of understanding in a literal sense, the account of the creation of the woman, in Genesis, Philo concludes thus; Τὸ *ῥητὸν ἐπὶ τούτου ανυθῶδές ἐστι*. Legis. alleg. l. II. § 7.

[2] Μόνον *οὐκ ἐναργῶς προτρέπων ἀφίστασθαι τοῦ ῥητοῦ*. Quod deterior potiori insid § 6.

[3] Τὰ *σκάνδαλα τῆς γραφῆς, ἀφορμαὶ τοῖς τυφλοῖς τὴν διανοίαν*.

God, concerning the wrath of God, concerning His vindictive justice, was taken literally. This apprehension of religion after human analogies is, for men at such a stage of culture, a necessity, and subserves their interest, so far as it deters them from sin by the fear of punishment. But those who occupy the higher spiritual position, recognize in all this only a *pedagogical* element, and purify the idea of God from all admixture of the human.[1] It was an opposition, then, between the apprehension of God as man, and the apprehension of God not as man.[2] By this separation of everything pertaining to man, the idea of God was evaporated to a somewhat wholly without attributes, wholly transcendental; and the Being, (ὄν,) goodness in itself, the Absolute of Platonism, was substituted for the Jehovah of the Old Testament. By soaring upward, beyond all creaturely existence, the mind, disenfranchising itself from sense, attains to the intellectual intuition of this Absolute Being, concerning whom it can pronounce only that he is, waiving all other determinations, as not answering to the exalted nature of the Supreme Essence.[3] In accordance with this opposition of views, is the distinction which Philo makes between those who are in the proper sense sons of God, having elevated themselves, by means of contemplation, to the highest Being, or attained to the knowledge of him in his *immediate self-manifestation*,[4] and those who have come to the knowledge of God only as he declares[5] himself in his works, in creation, in the revelation, still enveloped in the letter, of Holy Writ; — those who attach themselves only to the Logos; consider *this* as the Supreme God himself; — rather sons of the Logos than of the true Being (ὄν.) The former, moreover, need no other motives to a moral life, than love to the Supreme Being for his own sake; — the principle of disinterested love of God. The others, who find themselves at that lower position, where God is known only after the analogy of man, must be trained to virtue by the hope of reward and the fear of punishment. Philo himself remarks, that answering to the two principles in religion according to which God is represented in the one case as man, and in the other, not

[1] This two-fold position is implied, in the book Quod Deus immutab. § 11, where the writer distinguishes that which answers to the truth in itself, and that which had been merely so expressed. Τοῦ νουθετῆσαι χάριν τοὺς ἑτέρως μὴ δυναμένους σωφρονίζεσθαι, ὅσα παιδείας καὶ νουθεσίας, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῷ πεφυκέναι τοιοῦτον εἶναι, λέλεκται.

[2] This opposition between a positive apprehension of God as man, and a negative apprehension of God, to the exclusion of all human attributes, and every thing anthropopathic, occurs often in Philo's writings. The comparison of Numb. 23: 19, and Deut. 1: 31, may be said to be classical with him, on this subject. Ἓν μὲν, ὅτι οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὁ θεὸς, ἕτερον δὲ, ὅτι ὡς ἄνθρωπος. Quod Deus immutab. § 11. Comp. also the Armenian translation of the tract, Quæst. in Genes. I. I. § 55.

[3] Οὐδεμᾷ τῶν γεγονότων ἰδέᾳ παραβάλλουσι τὸ ὄν, ἀλλ' ἐκβιβάσαντες αὐτὸ πάσης ποιότητος ψιλὴν ἄνευ χαρακτῆρος τὴν ὕπαρξιν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶναι φαντασίαν μόνην ἐνεδέξαντο, μὴ μορφώσαντες αὐτό. Quod Deus immutab. § 11.

[4] To this knowledge of God in his self-manifestation, Philo refers in the following passage: Μὴ ἐμφανισθείης μοι ὀἰ οὐρανοῦ ἢ γῆς ἢ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος ἢ τινος ἁπλῶς τῶν ἐν γενέσει, μηδὲ κατοπτρισαίμην ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ τὴν σὴν ἰδέαν ἢ ἐν σοὶ τῷ θεῷ, etc. Vid. Leg. allegor. l. III. § 33. And where he says that as light can be seen only by means of light, so God, only by his own self-manifestation. Συνόλως τὸ φῶς ἄρ' οὐ φωτὶ βλέπεται; τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἑαυτοῦ φέγγος ὢν ὀἰ αὐτοῦ μόνου θεωρεῖται. De præm. et pœn, § 7.

[5] The opposition between ὄν and λόγος εἶναι and λέγεσθαι

as man, are the two principles of fear and of love in religion.[1] Those that have attained to the last mentioned stage are to him the men of *pure intellect* or *pure spirit*, who have freed themselves from the dominion of sense.

Thus, to the sensuous *anthropo-morphism* and *anthropopathism*, which characterized the grosser mode of apprehension among the Alexandrian Jews, Philo opposed a one-sided *spiritualism*, whereby the idea of God was emptied of all determinate contents, — the *real* side of the Old Testament Theism, the objective truth, and reality at bottom in the Old Testament notions of God's holiness, of his wrath, and of his vindictive justice, were totally misapprehended, — whereby all such ideas of God were explained away, — a spiritualism far better suited to the Brahminic or the Buddhist system, than to the proper religion of the Old Testament. We have here, then, already, the appearance of a *mystical Rationalism*, placed in connection with the Jewish *Supra-naturalism*; — a prototype of tendencies, which at still later periods, more frequently recur, where the simplicity of revealed religion becomes overcharged with human inventions. The same individual, who, as we have seen, protested so strongly against the Grecian mysteries, introduced into Judaism that aristocratic distinction of the ancient world, between an *esoteric* and an *exoteric* religion; and with it, after the example of Platonism, the justification of falsehood, as a necessary means for training the uninitiated many.[2]

Now it is indeed true, that this mystic *Rationalism*, pushed to its extreme consequences, leads to the principle that positive religion is to be regarded simply as a means for training the many; a means which the wise can afford to dispense with, and which for them has no longer any significancy. And this mode of thinking, moreover, was actually carried, by many of the Alexandrian Jews, to an extreme where it must have finally resulted in the denial of the supra-naturalist principle itself. These Jews left off the observance of the ceremonial law, thus drawing upon themselves the charge of heresy from the more religious class, and may, doubtless, have brought the entire Alexandrian theology into bad repute.[3] "The observance of the outward forms of worship," said they, "belongs to the many. We, who know that the whole is but a symbolical veil of spiritual truth, have enough in the idea, and need not concern ourselves with external forms." But with the habit of thinking peculiar to Philo and his class, and which has been ex-

[1] Παρ' ὃ μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς προειρημένοις ὄυσὶ κεφαλαίοις τῷ τε "ὡς ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ οὐχ' ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὁ θεός" ἕτερα δύο συνυφῆναι ἀκόλουθα καὶ συγγενῆ, φόβον τε καὶ ἀγάπην· τοῖς θεοπρεπῶς αὐτὸ δὶ αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ ὂν τιμῶσι τὸ ἀγαπᾶν οἰκειότατον, φοβεῖσθαι δὲ ἑτέροις. Quod Deus immutab. § 14.

[2] Vid. Quod Deus immutab. § 14, and de Cherubim, § 5, in both which passages the well-known words of Plato in the Republic — relating to falshoods that may be justified in certain cases, where they can be used for the benefit of simple persons or the sick — plainly floated before the mind of Philo. Vid. l. II. p. 257, l. III. p. 266, Vol. VI. Ed. Bipont. These remarks of Plato, which were grounded, indeed, in the whole aristocratic spirit of the ancient world, exerted, through various intermediate channels, a great influence on the moral sense of men in the first centuries after Christ, and even modified a part of Christian education.

[3] Philo de migrat. Abraami, § 16: Εἰσί τινες, οἳ τοὺς ῥητοὺς νόμους σύμβολα νοητῶν πραγμάτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες, τὰ μὲν ἠκρίβωσαν, τῶν δὲ ῥαθύμως ὠλιγώρησαν.

plained above, such an extreme, to which his own avowed principles led, did not fall in. He says of those more decided and consistent Idealists, "as if they lived for themselves alone in a desert, or as if they were souls without bodies, and knew not anything of human society, they despise the faith of the many, and are willing to inquire only after pure truth, as it is in itself; when the word of God should have taught them to strive after a good name with the people, and to violate none of the reigning customs, which divine men, who were superior to us, have founded. As we must take care of the body, because it is the soul's mansion, so are we bound to be solicitous for the observance of the letter of the law. When we observe this, *that* also will become clearer, of which the letter is a symbol; and we shall escape thereby the censures and upbraidings of the multitude." [1]

In Egypt, the native land, in after times, of the anchorite and monastic life, this contemplative bent of the religious mind, which we have described thus far, led to results somewhat analogous to that later phenomenon. With a view of devoting themselves wholly to the contemplation of divine things, many withdrew from the world and retired into solitude. Philo was one of these; — but he was forced to learn, from his own experience, that the man carries his inward enemy into solitude with him, — that he cannot flee from himself and the world within his own breast. He gives us, himself, the result of his experience.[2] "Often I left kindred, friends, and country, and retired into the wilderness, that I might raise my thoughts to worthy contemplations: but I accomplished nothing so; — my thoughts, either scattered abroad, or, wounded by some impure impression, fell into the opposite current. But sometimes I find myself alone with my soul, in the midst of thousands, when God dispels the tumult from my breast; and so He teaches me that it is not change of place that brings evil or good; but all depends on *that* God who steers the ship of the soul in the direction he pleases." Already among the Alexandrian Jews arose the opposition between a contemplative and a practical direction of the religious life, of which Philo testifies, — the opposition between efforts directed solely towards the human, and those directed solely to the divine [3] — the Therapeutic life, devoted entirely to God, and the moral life, devoted entirely to exhibitions of love for man. Already was the same spectacle witnessed, which, at later periods, became a common occurrence in the large cities. The opposition of the worldly to the contemplative ascetic propensity became the occasion of divisions in the domestic circle. Philo observes that he knew many a father, given to luxurious living, to be abashed by the abstemious, philosophic life of a son, and for that reason to retire from all intercourse with him.[4]

[1] De migrat. Abraami, f. 402.

[2] Leg. allegor. l. II. § 21.

[3] As Philo describes it. Of the latter tendency he says: Ἄκρατον ἐμφορησάμενοι τὸν εὐσεβείας πόθον πολλὰ χαίρειν φράσαντες ταῖς ἄλλαις πραγματείαις ὅλον ἀνέθεσαν τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον θεραπείᾳ θεοῦ. Οἱ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔξω τῶν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δικαίων ὑποτοπήσαντες εἶναι μόνην τὴν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὁμιλίαν ἡπτήσαντο. τῶν τε ἀναθῶν τὴν χρῆσιν ἐξ ἴσου πᾶσι παρέχοντες διὰ κοινωνίας ἥμερον καὶ τὰ δεινὰ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπικουφίζειν ἀξιοῦντες. The φιλόθεοι and the φιλάνθρωποι. De decalogo, § 22.

[4] Ἤδη δὲ καὶ πατέρας οἶδα διὰ τὸ ἁβροδίαιτον, αὐστηρὸν καὶ φιλόσοφον βίον παιδῶν ἐκτραπομένους καὶ δι' αἰδῶ τὸν ἀγρὸν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως οἰκεῖν ἑλομένους. De profugis, § 1.

As Philo was anxious to find a just middle course between that class who were entangled in the letter, and the *Spiritualists* in religion, so again, he sought after some method of conciliation between the two last mentioned tendencies, the practical and the contemplative, the anthropological and the theological. He held a combination of them both to be the more perfect way, and looked upon each, by itself and separated from the other, as but half the whole.[1] The discipline of the practical life seemed to him the first step of purification and preparation necessary for entering the entirely contemplative life. Already he felt himself called upon to protest against the exaggerated estimate put on the ascetic life. "When you see one," says he, "who never takes his food or his drink at the proper time, or who disdains the bath and the unction, or who neglects the clothing of his body, or torments himself with a hard couch and night watchings, deceiving himself with this show of abstemiousness, inform him of the true way to continence, for the course he has chosen is labor to no purpose. By hunger, and the other kinds of self-torture, he is destroying both body and soul."[2] He speaks of people who, without being ripe for such a step, rushed suddenly on a strictly Therapeutic life, the renunciations of which they were too weak to endure, and hence were soon forced to abandon it.[3] And he must rebuke also the secret wickedness covered up under the outside show of a rigid asceticism.[4] "Truth," says he, "may rightly complain of those who, without any previous trial of themselves, leave the occupations and trades of social life, and say they have renounced its honors and its pleasures. They wear contempt for the world as an outside show, but do not really contemn it. That slovenly, austere look, that abstemious and miserable life, they use as baits; as if they were friends to strict morals and the government of self. But closer observers, who penetrate within, and are not to be led wrong by outward appearances, cannot be imposed upon thus." Philo would have those persons only who had been tried in the active duties of social life, pass over to the contemplative; as the Levites were permitted to rest from the active service of the temple only after having passed their fiftieth year. *Human* virtue should go first, — the *divine* follow after.[5]

This ascetic, contemplative propensity, which we observed in the bud among the Alexandrian Jews, gave birth to a spiritual society, composed of men and unmarried women, which sprung up in the neighborhood of Alexandria; a society, whose name simply, — the *Therapeutæ*,[6] — denotes the striving after a life abstracted from worldly things and consecrated to the contemplation of God. Their principal seat was in a quiet and pleasant district on the border of lake Mœris,

[1] Ἡμιτελεῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν, ὁλόκληροι οἱ παρ' ἀμφοτέροις εὐδοκιμοῦντες. De decalogo, § 22.

[2] The tract Quod deterior potiori insid. § 7.

[3] Such as went ἐπ' αὐλὰς τῆς θεραπείας and θᾶττον ἢ προελθεῖν ἀπεπήδεσαν, τὴν αὐστηρὰν δίαιταν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν ἄϋπνον ἀρεσκείαν καὶ τὸν συνεχῆ καὶ ἀκάματον πόνον οὐκ ἐνεγκόντες. De profugis, § 7.

[4] L. c. § 6.

[5] Γνωρίσθητε οὖν πρότερον τῇ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀρετῇ, ἵνα καὶ τῇ πρὸς θεὸν συσταθῆτε. De profugis, f. 455, § 6.

[6] Θεραπευταὶ καὶ θεραπευτρίδες.

not far from Alexandria. Here they lived, like the later anchorites, shut up singly in their cells,[1] their only employment being prayer and the contemplation of divine things. The basis of their contemplation was an allegoric interpretation of scripture, and they had old theosophic writings, which served to guide them in their more profound investigations of scripture, according to the principles of the Alexandrian Hermeneutics. Bread and water constituted their only diet, and they practised frequent fasting. They ate nothing until evening, for through contempt of the body they were ashamed, so long as sun-light was visible, to take sensible nourishment, to acknowledge this dependence on the world of sense. Many of them fasted for three or even six days in succession. Every sabbath they came together, and as the number seven was particularly sacred with them, they held a still more solemn convocation once in every seven weeks. They celebrated, on this occasion, a simple love-feast, consisting of bread seasoned with salt and hyssop; mystic discourses were delivered, hymns which had been handed down from old tradition were sung, and amidst choral music, dances of mystic import were kept up late into the night. The passage of their fathers through the Red Sea, on their departure from Egypt, is supposed to have been symbolically represented by the exhibition of these choirs and dances. As they were used to give to all historical facts a higher sense, bearing upon the life of the spirit, it is not improbable that they had something of the like nature in view in this celebration. Perhaps they considered the departure from Egypt as a symbol of the deliverance of the spirit from the bondage of sense, of its elevation from sensible things to the divine.[2]

Many features of relationship between the sect of the Therapeutæ and that of the Essenes, might seem to render probable the derivation of the one from the other; and this is the prevailing opinion in modern times. It might be fancied also that the same signification was to be recognized in the names of both these communities; for if we follow the derivation which Philo himself favors in a passage of the book concerning the Therapeutic mode of life,—and the name of this sect, according to *one* sense of the radical Greek word, signifies a physician, and the Essenes[3] so denominated themselves, as physicians of the soul and of the body,—it would be evident that the one is but a translation of the other. But this explanation of the name of the Therapeutæ can hardly be considered the right one. On the contrary, it suits much better with the peculiar spiritual bent of the Therapeutæ, and with the theological language of the Alexandrians, if we suppose they applied this name to themselves, as the genuine spiritual worshippers of God, the Contemplatists.[4] The features of resemblance between

1 Σεμνεῖα, *μοναστήρια*.

2 See Philo de sacrif. Abel et Caini, § 17: *Διάβασις ἐπὶ θεὸν τοῦ γεννητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ τὸ πάσχα εἴρηται.*

3 After the Chaldee אָסָא, *physician*.

4 Philo often uses the following expressions as synonymous:—*γένος θεραπευτικὸν, γένος ἱκετικὸν, γένος ὁρατικὸν, ὁ Ἰσραὴλ = ἀνὴρ ὁρῶν τὸν θεὸν*. De victimas offerentib. f. 854. *Ἱκέται καὶ θεραπευταὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος*. De monarchia, f. 816. *ἀνδρὸς ἱκέτου καὶ φιλοθέου θεὸν μόνον θεραπεύειν ἀξιοῦντος*. De decalogo, f. 760. *οἱ πολλὰ χαίρειν φράσαντες ταῖς ἄλλαις πραγματείαις, ὅλον ἀνέθεσαν τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον θεραπείᾳ θεοῦ*. L. III. de vitâ Mosis, f. 681. *τὸ θεραπευτικὸν αὐτοῦ (τοῦ θεοῦ) γένος*.

these societies, as well in the form of their association as in the circumstance of their repudiating slavery, as a thing contrary to nature, are yet by no means such as to warrant the theory of an outward connection. Analogous tendencies of the Jewish mind in Palestine, and of the Jewish-Alexandrian mind in Egypt, might have easily produced two such mystic fraternities, independently of one another, with a form adapted to the different countries. The Essenes owed their origin, as we have seen, to the existence of a practical mysticism, which is ever wont to be called forth by such party oppositions as were there manifested; and the society of the Therapeutæ appears to us as a natural efflux of the peculiar religious tendency which had developed itself among the Alexandrian Jews.

Neither the Essenes nor the Therapeutæ ought to be regarded as isolated phenomena, confined exclusively to certain countries. There were in this case, more general tendencies, which belonged to the signs of the times, at work beneath the surface; and the influence of such tendencies was at that time more widely spread than in Palestine and Egypt. In manifold forms of appearance which the history of Jewish Christian sects, in the first centuries after Christ, leads us to recognize or to presuppose, this influence is distinctly visible.[1]

Having thus given an outline of the different main directions of the religious and theological mind among the Jews, we would now consider more particularly the relation of the same to Christianity. Looking at the great mass of the Jewish people, we find that the predominance of the worldly spirit, which would apprehend the divine under notions of sense, the rage for the wonderful described by St. Paul, confidence in the inalienable rights of their theocratic descent according to the flesh and in the outward show of legal righteousness, constituted the chief obstacles to the reception of the gospel. Whenever men, in this position of mind, were led, under the impulse of momentary impressions, to embrace Christianity, it might easily happen, that because they saw their earthly expectations were not fulfilled, and they had always remained Jews in their mode of thinking, they would soon renounce again in the same outward way, that to which properly they had always remained strangers. Or if they continued to be Christians outwardly, they were never penetrated with the spirit of the gospel. Christianity itself, they apprehended only after a fleshly manner, mixing it up with all their Jewish delusions; and the faith in one God, as well as in Jesus as the Messiah, they converted into an *opus operatum*, wholly without influence on the inner life. They were such men as Justin Martyr describes,[2] who deceived themselves with the notion, that although they were sinners, if they did but have the knowledge of

[1] The language of Philo himself intimates this, when he says of the Therapeutæ: Πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ γένος. Ἔδει γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τελείου μετασχεῖν καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν Βάρβαρον. De vita contemplativa, § 3.

[2] In the dialogue, c. Tryph. f. 370. The words of Justin Martyr directed against such Jews, arguing that there can be no forgiveness of sin without repentance: Ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ὑμεῖς ἀπατᾶτε ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ὅμοιοι ὑμῖν κατὰ τοῦτο, οἱ λέγουσιν, ὅτι κἂν ἁμαρτωλοὶ ὦσι, θεὸν δὲ γινώσκωσιν, οὐ μὴ λογίσηται αὐτοῖς κύριος ἁμαρτίαν.

God,[1] the Lord would not charge sin to their account; such falsifiers of the gospel as the apostle Paul often rebukes; such nominal Christians as James writes against. But as the Pagans, on the other hand, could not be under the same temptation to hold a merely preparatory position as the end itself, as Christianity must have presented itself to them as in direct opposition to what they were before, hence it was the case, as Justin Martyr affirms, that converts, in greater numbers and of more genuine character, proceeded from the body of the Pagans, than from the great mass of the Jews.[2] Yet in every case, where the feeling of the higher necessities of man's nature, the recipiency for the divine element, made its appearance, although it might be enveloped under some still predominating element of sense, Christianity could find an entrance through all such obstacles. The expectation of the Messiah, although clouded by a strong coloring of sense, could prepare the way for it to such hearts, and they would then go on to become continually more spiritual in their views, through the power of Christian faith.

As to the particular systems of Jewish theology which have passed under our review, it may be observed, first, of the cold, egoistic Sadduceeism, which suffered no aspiration after things beyond the limits of an earthly existence to emerge, that it presented no point of union whatever for the gospel. At least, even in that case where the gospel found, as it did everywhere, a medium of entrance in the simply human element at bottom, which could not be wholly suppressed, the conversion of the Sadducees was not one for which the way had been prepared by the previous mode of thinking: and for the very reason that the previously existing habit of thought formed here no transition-point, and no medium of union between the two, it is impossible to conceive of any intermingling of Sadduceeism with Christianity. Where it has been attempted to find the traces of such a mixture, in the case of some deniers of the doctrine of the resurrection in the apostolic age, this has been done without any sufficient grounds, — as the fact may be traced to altogether different causes.[3]

In the case of the Pharisees, spiritual pride, self-righteousness, the narrowness and arrogance of a dead scripture-learning, and the absence of what our Saviour terms poverty of spirit, were in general, the hindrances to faith. We must be careful, however, to distinguish among the Pharisees, the *two* classes, which have been already pointed out. To those who, from the legal position, were striving with a certain honest earnestness after righteousness, the law might, without doubt, serve in the end as a school master to bring them to Christ. Through that painful struggle described by Paul, from his own experience, in the seventh chapter of the epistle to the Romans, they might obtain peace in believing. But those Pharisees who came to Christianity

[1] Such vain and empty knowledge of God as that which St. John is contending against in his first epistle.

[2] Justin Martyr, Apolog. I. II. f. 88. Πλείονάς τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρους τοὺς ἐξ ἐθνῶν τῶν ἀπὸ Ἰουδαίων καὶ Σαμαρέων χριστιανούς, ἀληθέστεροι οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐθνῶν καὶ πιστότεροι.

[3] See my History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church by the Apostles, Vol. I.

without passing through any such crisis of the inner life, might be liable to the temptation of blending their previous Pharisaical mode of thinking with the recognition of Jesus as the Messiah, — who for them, however, was not in any true sense, the Saviour, — and of wishing at the same time, to hold fast by their righteousness of works.

In Christianity there was also present an element of mysticism. And on this side it might particularly attract that description of religious mind which was exhibited in the societies of the Essenes and Therapeutæ. But the mystic element, carried to an undue extreme, which suppressed everything else that belongs to the purely human in our nature, might mislead men to shut themselves up within a little contracted circle of feeling and intuitions, and to bar themselves against every other influence which might strive to reach them. To meet Christianity with that poverty of spirit which it requires, must often have been the hardest task, also, for *such* men, if they must start from the position of their imagined spiritual perfection. And even if, attracted by the mystic element in Christianity, they surrendered to its power, yet they could not have appropriated to themselves that poverty of spirit, in any such measure as to be able to receive Christianity into their hearts in its unstinted entireness. Easily might such persons be tempted to carry over with them their supercilious theosophy and asceticism, insomuch that the divine foolishness of the gospel must forfeit its true character; and this was the source whence sprung many sects, corrupting in their influence on Christianity, the germs of which we find already in the epistle of Paul to the Colossians, and in his pastoral letters.

As to the Alexandrian theology, there were in it, as we have seen, two elements, — a *mystico-rationalist* element, sprung from the influence of the Platonic philosophy on the Jewish theism; and a *supra-naturalist* element, derived from the Jewish national spirit and education. These were blended together, or they might be said, rather, to subsist one beside the other, than to be united by any sort of organic interpenetration. Unless a new and higher power had come in to influence this process of development, one of two things must, doubtless, have been the final result; either the *supra-naturalist* element would have been overpowered and crushed by the *mystico-rationalist*, or the latter of these by the former. And if the last had been the case, the Alexandrian theology might then have paved the way for a certain mystic religion of reason, which had used historical Judaism simply as a symbolical drapery. Whoever, now, is unable to perceive the significancy of faith in a God above nature, — the significancy of Christianity as a religion proceeding out of supernatural facts in history, — to him this greatest among all the great phenomena in the history of the world, whereby the faith in a positive religion was once more introduced with such overwhelming power among men, must appear like the stumbling upon a monstrous retrograde step, by means of which the race was placed ages back from the goal which it had been already on the very point of reaching. Considered from such a point of view, it could not but be regretted, that instead of a primal type of

humanity — that ethereal idea of Alexandrian theology, — the Son of man must appear in flesh and blood; instead of an ideal word, the Word that became flesh must dwell among us. Yet the scanty thoughts that are constantly recurring under manifold shapes in the writings of Philo, the representative of that tendency, witness of its poverty, and show that without the infusion of a new creative spirit of life, it must have led of itself to its own dissolution.

Those two elements, combined together in the Alexandrian theology, might operate in different ways, — either to secure a point of union for Christianity, or to call forth an opposition to it.

The preponderance of Grecian culture and of the idealist element operated in the case of these Alexandrian Jews, as doubtless, also, of others over whom the Grecian culture generally had acquired great influence, — as for instance, of a Josephus, — very much to repress the expectation of a *personal Messiah*. With this expectation vanished the most important point of agreement and possible union between their system and Christianity; but with it vanished also that stone of stumbling, which the preaching of the cross must have proved to such as gave an earthly shaping to that idea of the Messiah. But yet we cannot suppose that the Alexandrian theology could have stripped away all those expectations, which were so deeply rooted in the religious spirit of the Jewish people, and so closely interwoven with the national sympathies and the national pride itself. Even Philo expresses the conviction that the Mosaic law, the temple, and the temple service are designed for perpetuity.[1] Regarding the calamities of the Jews as a righteous punishment, he cherished the hope, that when they should one day become converted, they would be gathered from all the nations among which they were scattered or in captivity, by some extraordinary appearance from heaven, and led back to Jerusalem. Their piety, inspiring reverence and awe, would repress the attacks of their enemies, or secure the victory on their side. Then would a golden age begin from Jerusalem. Every thing would be again restored to that primeval state from which mankind had become estranged by their fall from the heavenly image. All nature would then become once more subject to man, and no hostile power remain behind to annoy him.[2] We see here what peculiar shaping

[1] Vid. de vita Mosis, l. II. § 3, concerning the Mosaic laws. Τὰ δὲ τούτου μόνου βέβαια, ἀσάλευτα μένει παγίως ἀφ' ἧς ἡμέρας ἐγράφη μέχρι νῦν καὶ πρὸς ἔπειτα πάντα διαμένειν ἐλπὶς ἀντὰ αἰῶνα ὥσπερ ἀθάνατα, ἕως ἂν ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὐρανός τε καὶ κόσμος ᾖ. And concerning the revenues of the temple at Jerusalem, he says, that they will endure as long as this human race and the world. Ἐφ' ὅσον τὸ ἀνθρώπων γένος διαμενεῖ, ἀεὶ καὶ αἱ πρόσοδοι τοῦ ἱεροῦ φυλαχθήσονται συνδιαιωνίζουσαι παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ. De monarch. l. II. § 3. So far was he from thinking that the temple would ever be destroyed, or the worship of God could cease to be connected with it.

[2] See Philo's tract, de execrationib. § 9: Οἱ πρὸ μικροῦ σποράδες ἐν Ἑλλάδι καὶ Βαρβάρῳ, κατὰ νήσους καὶ κατὰ ἠπείρους ἀναστάντες ὁρμῇ μιᾷ πρὸς ἕνα συντείνουσιν ἀλλαχόθεν ἄλλοι τὸν ἀποδειχθέντα χῶρον ξεναγούμενοι πρός τινος θειοτέρας ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην ὄψεως ἀδήλου μὲν ἑτέροις, μόνοις δὲ τοῖς ἀνασωζομένοις ἐμφανοῦς. Comp. de præm. et pœnis, § 19. Concerning the reconciliation of nature with reformed man, where he had certain passages of the prophets before his mind, consult de præm. et pœnis, § 15.

the common Jewish notions of the Messiah's time and the attendant phenomena had taken, in the spiritualizing schools of the Alexandrians.

Thus was Christianity met in the present case also, not indeed by the craving after a personal Messiah, but yet by a desire for the universal re-establishment of the Theocracy, — for a glorious state of the world. It is possible that, with the doctrine concerning the opposition between the idea and its manifestation; with the recognition of a defect,[1] inherent in everything that appears in the world of sense; with the excited aspiration after a godlike life, raised above all sensual alloy, might be aroused the sense of a need of redemption, — the idea of it, and faith in its actual realization. Thus many of the peculiar ideas belonging to the Alexandrian philosophy of religion, as for instance, the idea of a mediating divine Word, through whom the world is connected with God; of his high-priestly office in relation to the phenomenal world; of the first heavenly man; of a godlike life,[2] might, by conducting to Christianity, become converted from a mere ideal element into a real one. Christianity might present itself to men of this Alexandrian school, as a Gnosis, which now for the first time taught a right understanding of the spirit of the Old Testament. The epistle ascribed to Barnabas contains examples of such points of transition, through which men of Alexandrian culture might be led over to Christianity.

But it is possible, too, that the *mystico-rationalist* element in the system of the Alexandrian Jews, which, in its self-sufficiency, would not admit the want of any new revelations, as well as the Jewish, which held fast to the traditional religious forms as of eternal validity, might oppose itself to Christianity. And both these tendencies combining together, might lead to peculiar corruptions of it; on the one side, by introducing an *idealistic* element, resolving everything else into itself, and the distinction between esoteric and exoteric religious doctrine; on the other, by making of it merely a spiritualized Judaism. We shall come across these influences again in the history of sects.

Individual ideas of the Alexandrian theology found their way also into those regions where the writings and studies of these men had not been introduced. They were connected with a doctrine concerning spirits, formed out of Jewish Oriental elements. There was a longing to lift the veil which covers the world of spirits, to have fellowship with it. Men busied themselves with legends and fictions respecting apparitions of the highest intelligences under the envelope of a human body.[3] It was such a vague foreboding tendency of mind, impatient

[1] "If God willed to judge the human race without mercy, He could only condemn them, since no man remains free from fault from his birth to his death." Quod Deus immutab. § 16. The *συγγενεῖς παντὶ γεννητῷ κῆρες.* — *Παντὶ γεννητῷ καὶ ἂν σπουδαῖον ᾖ, παρ' ὅσον ἦλθεν εἰς γένεσιν, συμφυὲς τὸ ἁμαρτάνον.* Hence the necessity of sin offerings. De vita Mosis, l. III. § 17.

[2] *Ζωὴ αἰώνιος ἡ πρὸς τὸ ὂν καταφυγή.* De profugis, § 15. *Ζωὴ ἀίδιος.* § 18. *Δύναμις ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς.* Legis allegor. I. § 12. But such language might easily proceed from the same common source of the mind, and it is only the most narrow understanding that can suppose, that in every case where it occurs, it must have been derived from Philo, or at least from this Alexandrian theology.

[3] Simon Magus, for instance, who appropriated to himself ideas of this sort that were floating about in the East. See also

of the limits of this earthly existence, and aspiring after communications from the unseen world, that preceded and accompanied the highest revelation.

Among the remarkable coincidences which prepared the way for the appearance of Christianity, must be reckoned the dispersion of the Jews among Greeks and Romans. Those of them who were Pharisaically disposed, took great pains to make proselytes. The wavering authority of the old national religions, the unsatisfied religious necessities of so many, came in to aid them. Reverence for that powerful being, the God of the Jewish people; for the hidden sanctities of the magnificent temple of Jerusalem, had long since found its way among pagans. Jewish magicians (Goetæ) ventured on many deceptive tricks, in the employment of which they were extremely skilful, to produce surprise and bewilderment. Hence the inclination to Judaism, particularly in several of the large capital towns, had become so widely extended, that, as it is well known, the Roman authors, in the time of the first emperors, often make it a subject of complaint; and Seneca, in his tract concerning superstition, could say of the Jews, "the conquered have given laws to the conquerors."[1] The Jewish proselyte-makers, blind teachers of the blind, having no conception of the essential character of the religion themselves, could impart none to others. Substituting a dead *particularistic* monotheism in the place of polytheism, they led those who chose them as guides, often merely to exchange one superstition for another; and so furnished them with new means for hushing the accusations of their conscience; — whence our Saviour's rebuke, directed against this class of men, that they made their proselytes two-fold more the children of hell, than themselves. But here, however, we must distinguish with precision, the two classes of proselytes: the proselytes in the strict sense of the word, the proselytes of justice, who took upon them circumcision and the whole ceremonial law; and the proselytes in the wider sense, the proselytes of the gate, who simply pledged themselves to the renunciation of idolatry, to the worship of the one God, to abstain from the pagan excesses, and from everything that seemed to stand connected with idolatry.[2] The former class usually became slaves to all Jewish superstition and fanaticism, and allowed themselves to be led blindfold by their Jewish teachers. The more difficult they had found it to bow themselves to a yoke which must have proved so burdensome to the national habits of a Greek or a Roman, the observance of the Jewish ceremonial law, the less could they be made conscious that all this should have been to no purpose, that they enjoyed thereby no advantage over others, that they should renounce this imagined righteousness. Hence such proselytes were often the fiercest persecutors of Christianity, and suffered themselves to become tools of the Jews, in exciting the pagans against the Christians. It is to this class, the language of Justin Martyr to the Jews should be applied.[3] "The proselytes do not simply not believe, but

the fragment of the apocryphal writing, Προσευχὴ Ἰωσὴφ, in Orig. in Joann. T. II. § 25.

[1] Victoribus victi leges dederunt.

[2] The so called seven precepts of Noah.

[3] His words are as follows: (Dialog. c

they blaspheme the name of Christ two-fold more than yourselves, — and they would murder and torture us, who do believe on him; for they strive in every respect to become like you." Those proselytes of the gate, on the other hand, had adopted from the Jewish system the principles of theism, without becoming wholly Jews. They had obtained some knowledge of the sacred writings of the Jews, and had heard of the great Teacher and King who was to come, — the Messiah. In what they had read in that Greek translation of the Old Testament, which to a reader not a Jew was often wholly unintelligible, or in what they had heard from Jewish teachers, there was much that still remained dark to them, — they were in the condition of inquirers. By means of the ideas they had acquired from the Jews, concerning the unity of God, the divine government of the world, the divine judgment, concerning the Messiah, they were better prepared for the gospel than other pagans; — and because they believed themselves already to *have* less; because they had, as yet, no perfected system of religion, and were eager for new instruction in divine things; because they had no sympathy with Jewish prejudices; for all these reasons, the gospel could find its way more easily to them than to the native Jews. From the beginning, their attention must have been drawn to a doctrine which engaged, without making them Jews, to secure for them a full participation in the fulfilment of all those promises of which the Jews had told them. Hence it was to these proselytes of the gate, (the *φοβούμενοι τὸν θεὸν*, *εὐσεβεῖς*, of the New Testament,) that the preaching of the gospel was usually directed, according to the Acts of the Apostles, after it had been rejected by the blinded Jews; and here the seed of the divine word found not unfrequently a receptive soil, in souls anxious for salvation. There were those also, without doubt, among the proselytes of the gate, who, falling short of the true earnestness in seeking after religious truth, were only wishing, in every case, to have a convenient way which would lead to heaven without the necessity of self-denial, and who, undecided between Judaism and paganism, in order, at all events, to go safe, sometimes invoked Jehovah in the synagogue, and sometimes the gods in the temples.[1]

Tryph. f. 350,) Οἱ δὲ προσήλυτοι οὐ μόνον οὐ πιστεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ διπλότερον ὑμῶν βλασφημοῦσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς εἰς ἐκεῖνον πιστεύοντας καὶ φονεύειν καὶ αἰκίζειν βούλονται, κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐξομοιοῖσθαι σπεύδουσιν.

[1] Commodianus, in his Instructions, has given a picture of this class of men, the *inter utrumque viventes*:

Inter utrumque putans dubie vivendo cavere,
Nudatus a lege decrepitus luxu procedis?
Quid in synagoga decurris ad Pharisæos,
Ut tibi misericors fiat, quem denegas ultro?
Exis inde foris, iterum tu fana requiris.

CHURCH HISTORY.

SECTION FIRST.

RELATION OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH TO THE UNCHRISTIAN WORLD.

I. Promulgation of Christianity.

1. *Promulgation of Christianity generally; Hindrances to its Spread, Causes and Means of its Progress.*

If we contemplate the essential character of Christianity in its relation to the religious state of the world as it has just been described, we shall be at no loss to see what it was that tended on the one hand to further, and on the other to retard the progress of the christian faith. Our Saviour referred to the signs of the times as witnessing of him, — and, in like manner, this contemplation will disclose to us, in the movements of the intellectual world then going on, the signs which heralded the new and great epoch in the history of the world; and it will be clear to us that, as has been intimated in the introduction, the same tendencies, which, singly and by themselves, presented the stoutest opposition to Christianity, and most effectually debarred its entrance, must, when combined together, only serve to hasten its triumph. It was a fact grounded in the relation of Christianity to the point of attainment which the general life of humanity had then reached, that the obstacles opposing themselves to the power which was destined to the sovereignty of the world, were converted into means for its advancement. We must therefore contemplate both in their connection with each other.

What, in the first place, particularly served to make possible and to facilitate the introduction of such a religion everywhere, was its own peculiar character, as one raised above every kind of outward, sensible form, and hence capable of entering into all the existing forms of human society, since it was not its aim to found a kingdom of this world. How Christianity could adapt itself to all earthly relations, and, while it allowed men still to remain in them, yet by the new spirit which it gave them, the divine life which it breathed into them, how it was enabled to raise men above these relations, is distinctly set before us by a Christian, living in the early part of the second century, who thus describes his contemporaries:[1] "The Christians are not separated

[1] The author of the letter to Diognet.

from other men by earthly abode, by language, or by customs. They dwell nowhere in cities by themselves; they do not use a different language, or affect a singular mode of life. They dwell in the cities of the Greeks, and of the Barbarians, each as his lot has been cast; and while they conform to the usages of the country, in respect to dress, food, and other things pertaining to the outward life, they yet show a peculiarity of conduct wonderful and striking to all. They obey the existing laws, and conquer the laws by their own living."

But this same loftier spirit, which could merge itself in all the forms it found at hand, must yet, while it coalesced with all the *purely human*, come into conflict with all the *ungodly* nature of mankind, with whatever issued from it and was connected with it. It announced itself as a power aiming at the *renovation of the world;* and the world sought to maintain itself in its old ungodly character. While Christ came not to destroy but to fulfil, so too he came not to bring peace upon the earth, but the sword. Hence the necessary collision with prevailing modes of thinking and manners. Christianity could find entrance everywhere, precisely because it was the religion of God's sovereignty in the heart, and excluded from itself every political element; but to the fundamental position of the old world, which Christianity was to overthrow, belonged religion as an institution of the State. The pagan religion, as such, was so closely interwoven with the entire civil and social life, that whatever attacked the one, must soon be brought into conflict also with the other. This conflict might, in many cases at least, have been avoided, if the early Church, like that of later times, had been inclined to accommodate itself to the world, more than the holiness of Christianity allowed, and to secularize itself, in order to gain the world as a mass. But with the primitive Christians this was not the case; they were much more inclined to a stern repulsion of everything that pertained to paganism, even of that which had but a seeming connection with it, than to any sort of lax accommodation; and assuredly it was at that period far more wholesome, and better adapted to preserve the purity of Christian doctrine and of the Christian life, to go to an extreme in the first of these ways than in the last.

And the religion which thus opposed itself to these deep-rooted customs and modes of thinking, which threatened to shake to the foundation what had been established by ages of duration, came from a people despised for the most part in the cultivated world, and at first found readiest admission among the lower classes of society; — a circumstance which sufficed of itself to make the learned aristocracy of Rome and Greece look down on such a religion with contempt. How should they hope to find more in the shops of mechanics, than in the schools of the philosophers! Celsus, the first writer against Christianity, jeers at the fact,[1] *that wool-workers, cobblers, leather-dressers, the*

[1] In Origen, c. Cels. l. III. f. 55: *Ὁρῶμεν δὴ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας οἰκίας ἐριουργοὺς καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ κναφεῖς τοὺς ἀπαιδευτοτάτους τε καὶ ἀγροικοτάτους ἐναντίον μὲν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων καὶ φρονιμωτέρων δεσποτῶν οὐδὲν φθέγγεσθαι, τολμῶντας, ἐπειδὰν δὲ τῶν παίδων ἰδίᾳ λάβωνται καὶ γυναίκων τινῶν σὺν αὐτοῖς ἀνοήτων θαυμάσιά τινα διεξιόντας.*

most illiterate and vulgar of mankind, were zealous preachers of the gospel, and addressed themselves, particularly in the outset, to women and children." Of a faith which, adapted to all stages of culture, presupposed a like want in all, the men of this stamp had not the remotest conception. Their standing objection against the Christians was, that they preached only a blind faith;[1] they should prove what they advanced on philosophic grounds. And as Christianity had against it, on the one hand, the pride of culture, and was placed in the same class with all kinds of superstition; so, on the other, it found in superstition itself, and in fanaticism, its fiercest enemies. It had to contend no less with the rudeness than with the cultivation of the world.

Without question it is true, the old popular religions had been shaken by the attacks of unbelief, and robbed of their authority; but we have seen also, how men had resorted back with renewed fanaticism to the old religion; and hence the bloody struggle in its defence. The dreadful rage of the populace against the Christians is a sufficient indication of the tone of religious feeling which existed at that time among them; — the superstition called forth by the assaults of unbelief held stronger dominion perhaps than ever over the people, and *a part* of the educated class. To the multitudes, who at this period moved in the dim twilight of superstition, Plutarch thought he might apply the language of Heraclitus in describing the world of dreams: "they found themselves, while awake in broad daylight, *each in his own world*," — a world that excluded every ray of reason and truth. These men, who would see their gods with the bodily eye, and were used to carry them about engraved on their rings, or in miniature pictures which served as amulets, so that they might kiss and worship them at pleasure; how often did they throw out to Christians the challenge, "*show us your God!*"[2] And to such men came a spiritual religion, bringing with it no worship of sensible objects, no sacrifices, temple, images, nor altars: — bald and naked, as the pagans reproachfully represented it.

There was, indeed, generally diffused, at this time, as we have already remarked, a spirit of inquiry, and of longing after some new communication from heaven. In spite of the pertinacity with which men clung to the old superstition, there existed a susceptibility, in various ways, for new religious impressions. But this longing, which, having no distinct consciousness of its object, was directed by blind feeling, easily exposed men also to deception, and opened the way for every species of fanaticism.

Quite at the beginning of the second century, Celsus supposed he could account for the rapid progress of Christianity, from the credulity of the age; and referred to the multitude of magicians that were trying to deceive men by a pretended exhibition of supernatural powers, and who with many found ready belief, creating a great sensation for the moment, which however soon subsided. Yet there was a great difference, as Origen justly replied to Celsus, between their mode of

[1] Πίστιν ἄλογόν.
[2] As we may see from the Apologies, particularly Theophilus ad Autolycum.

proceeding and that of the preachers of the gospel. Those magicians flattered men's sinful inclinations, they fell in with their previous modes of thinking, and required the renunciation of nothing. On the other hand, whoever in the primitive times would be a Christian, must break loose from many of his hitherto favorite inclinations, and be ready to give up everything for his faith. Tertullian says,[1] that more were deterred from embracing Christianity by unwillingness to forfeit their pleasures, than by the fear of hazarding their life. And the excitement of mind occasioned by such wandering fanatics and magicians, disappeared as suddenly as it was awakened. That it was quite otherwise with the power working in Christianity, appeared evident from the permanence of its effects, in their ever widening circle, — a testimony which Origen could cite from history against Celsus.

But the influence of such people, of which the opponents of Christianity themselves bear witness, presented a new obstacle to its progress. It must force its way through the ring of delusions, within which those people had succeeded in charm-binding the minds of men, before it could reach their consciences and hearts. The examples of a Simon Magus, an Elymas, an Alexander of Abonoteichos, show in what way this class of people opposed the progress of the gospel. It needed striking facts, addressed to the outward sense, to bring men entangled in such deceptive arts, out of their bewilderment to the sober exercise of reason, and render them receptive of higher spiritual impressions.

To this end served those supernatural effects, which proceeded from the new creative power of Christianity, and which were destined to accompany it, until it had entered completely into the natural process of human development. The Apostle Paul appeals to such effects, witnessing of the power of the Divine Spirit which inspired his preaching, as well-known and undeniable facts, in epistles addressed to the churches which had beheld them; and the narratives in the Acts illustrate, with particular examples, the power of those effects, in first arresting the attention, and in dispelling those delusive influences. The transition from that first period in the process of the development of the church, in which the supernatural, immediate and creative power predominated, to the second, in which the same divine principle displayed its activity in the form of natural connection, was not a sudden event, but took place by a series of gradual and insensible changes. We are not warranted, nor are we in a condition, to draw so sharply the line of demarkation between what is supernatural and what is natural in the effects proceeding from the power of Christianity, when it has once taken possession of human nature.

The church teachers, until after the middle of the third century, appeal in language that shows the consciousness of truth, and often before the pagans themselves, to such extraordinary phenomena, as conducing to the spread of the faith; and however we may be disposed to distinguish the facts at bottom from the point of view in which they

[1] De spectaculis, c. 2. Plures denique invenias, quos magis periculum voluptatis. quam vitæ, avocet ab hac secta

are contemplated by the narrator, we must still admit the facts themselves, and their effects on the minds of men. It remains, therefore, undeniable, that even subsequent to the Apostolic times, the spread of the gospel was advanced by such means. Let us present some of these cases in their living connection with the character and spirit of those times. The Christian meets with some unhappy man, plunged in heathenish superstition, and diseased in body and soul, who had hoped in vain to get relief in the temple of Esculapius, — the resort of multitudes at that time, who sought a cure for their diseases in dreams[1] sent from the god of medicine. He had tried also to no purpose the various incantations and amulets of pagan priests and magicians. The Christian admonishes him not to look for help from impotent dumb idols, or from demoniacal powers, but to betake himself to that Almighty God who only can help. He hears the prayers of such as invoke His aid in the name of Him by whom He has redeemed the world from sin. The Christian employs no magic formulas, no amulets; but simply calling upon God through Christ, he lays his hand on the sick man's head, in believing confidence in his Saviour. The sick man is healed; and the cure of the body leads to that of the soul. There were, — particularly at this period of the rending asunder and breaking up of the old world on its way to dissolution, — multitudes of persons, laboring under bodily and mental diseases, who, as we have already observed,[2] believed themselves under the dominion and persecution of some demoniacal power. The whole might of the ungodly, the destroying principle must be roused to action, when the healing power of the divine was to enter into humanity. The revelation of heavenly peace, bringing back all to harmony, must be preceded by the deep-felt inward disunion, which betrayed itself in such cases. There was no want, either among Pagans or Jews, of those who pretended to be able, by various methods, — perfuming with incense, embrocations, medicinal herbs, amulets, adjurations expressed in strange enigmatical formulas, — to expel those demoniacal powers. In every case, if they produced any effect, it was only to drive out one devil by means of another, and hence the true dominion of the demoniacal power must, by their means, have been much rather confirmed than weakened. The words which our Saviour himself spoke, in reference to such transactions, found here their appropriate application. "He that is not with me, is against me." But how much belief, at that time, these pretended exorcists could inspire, is shown by the prayer of thanks which the Emperor Marcus Aurelius offers to the gods, because he had learned from a wise instructor, to trust in none of the tales about the incantations and exorcisms of magicians and wonder-workers.[3]

It so happens now that one who has vainly sought relief from such impostors, falls in with a devout Christian. The latter recognizes here the power of darkness, and thinks of looking for no other cause of the disease. But he is confident of this, that his Saviour has overcome

[1] See the discourses of Aristides.

[2] P. 13.

[3] I. 6. Τὸ ἀπιστητικὸν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τερατευομένων καὶ γοητῶν περὶ ἐπῳδῶν καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων ἀποπομπῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λεγομένοις.

that power, and that in whatsoever shape it may manifest itself, it must yield to him. In this confidence, he prays, and witnesses of him, who by his sufferings triumphed over the gates of Hell; and his prayer, drawing down the powers of Heaven, works deeply upon the distracted nature of the sick man. Peace succeeds to the conflicts that had raged within; and led to the faith by this experience of a change in his own personal condition, he is now first delivered, in the full sense, from the dominion of evil, — thoroughly and permanently healed by the enlightening and sanctifying power of the truth; so that the evil spirit, returning back to the house, finds it no longer swept and garnished for his reception.

Of such effects, Justin Martyr witnesses, when, addressing himself to the pagans,[1] he says: "That the kingdom of evil spirits has been destroyed by Jesus, you may, even at the present time, convince yourselves by what passes before your own eyes; for many of our people, of us Christians, have healed and still continue to heal, in every part of the world, and in your city (Rome), numbers possessed of evil spirits, such as could not be healed by other exorcists, simply by adjuring them in the name of Jesus Christ, who was crucified under Pontius Pilate." We learn from Irenæus, that the cure of such disorders not unfrequently prepared the way for the conversion of men to Christianity; for he says, that often they who had been delivered from evil spirits attained to the faith, and united with the Church.[2] The inward conflicts of a soul that could find no longer the satisfaction of its religious wants in what the old world had to offer, may have frequently been the occasion of such forms of disease; and by the Christian influence, the disorder was overcome in its cause, and not in its symptoms merely. As a particular gift, quite distinct from the healing of those demoniacal diseases, Irenæus mentions other modes of restoring the sick, by the laying on of the hands of Christians,[3] — raising of the dead (i. e. such as seemed to be dead), who afterwards remained living in the church for many years.[4] He appeals to the variety of gifts which the true disciples of Christ had received from him, and which they employed, each after his own measure, for the benefit of other men. What was thus wrought by the Christians, simply from love, and without any expectation of temporal reward, through prayer to God and invocation of the name of Christ, he contrasts with the juggling tricks resorted to as a means of livelihood. Origen recognizes in the miraculous powers still existing in his time, though already sensibly diminished, a proof of what served in the first times of the appearance of Christianity particularly to advance its progress.[5] In his defence of Christianity against Celsus, he cites examples from his own experience, where he had been himself an *eye-witness of the fact*,

[1] In his first Apology, f. 45.

[2] Ὥστε πολλάκις καὶ πιστεύειν αὐτοὺς ἐκείνους τοὺς καθαρισθέντας ἀπὸ τῶν πνευμάτων καὶ εἶναι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ. Adv. hæres, l. II. c. 32, § 4. Ed. Massuet.

[3] Ἄλλοι δὲ τοὺς κάμνοντας διὰ τῆς τῶν χειρῶν ἐπιθέσεως ἰῶνται.

[4] Καὶ νεκροὶ ἠγέρθησαν καὶ παρέμειναι σὺν ἡμῖν ἱκανοῖς ἔτεσιν.

[5] Τὰς τερατίους δυνάμεις, ἃς κατασκευαστέον γεγονέναι ἐκ τοῦ ἰσχυὴ αὐτῶν ἔτι σώζεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ βούλημα τοῦ λόγου βιοῦσιν. c. Cels. l. I. § 2.

how, by invocation of the name of God and of Jesus, in connection with the preaching of his history, many were healed of grievous diseases and states of insanity, which had withstood all other means of the healing art.[1] It is a remarkable fact, attested by Tertullian and Origen, that so many were conducted to Christianity by extraordinary psychological phenomena. Tertullian relates, that the greater part came to the knowledge of the true God by means of visions.[2] Now although this church father was inclined to exaggeration generally, and to lay too much stress on such appearances in particular; yet what he says here is confirmed by the testimony of Origen. The latter asserts that "Many have come to Christianity, as it were against their will, their affections being suddenly changed, by a certain Spirit, from the hatred of the gospel to such love of it as makes them ready to lay down their lives for it, — and this through the medium of visions which occurred to them when awake or in dreams."[3] He calls God to witness, that it was most remote from his inclination to attempt adding anything to the glory of Christianity by false statements; — although he could relate many things seemingly incredible, which he had *himself witnessed.* Such testimonies are full of instruction, since they make us acquainted with the manner in which conversions, at this period, were often brought about. We shall, indeed, have to trace these phenomena, not so much to a divine miraculous agency, operating from without, as to the power with which Christianity moved the spiritual life of the period. From the manner in which the divine principle of life in Christianity, — the new force that had come in among mankind, — and the principle of paganism came into collision with each other, extraordinary phenomena in the world of consciousness could not fail to result, through which the crisis in the religious life of individuals must pass, ere it arrived at its end.

Yet as each particular miracle, wrought by Christ, was but a single flash from the fullness of the Godhead dwelling in him, and was to operate simply to this end, that the immediate self-manifestation of this fullness might be brought nearer before the minds of men; so too are all succeeding miracles but single flashes, issuing forth from the immediate divine power of the gospel, and contributing to introduce the revelation of this itself into the religious consciousness. Without this itself, and its relation to man's nature, and to the peculiar conditions of man's nature in this particular period, all else would have been to no purpose; and that which the divine power in the gospel wrought immediately by itself in man's nature, still allied to God though estranged from its original source, continued ever to be the main thing, the end for which all else was but subsidiary and preparatory. It is this which the Apostle Paul places above all other kinds of evidence,

[1] *Τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἑωράκαμεν πολλοὺς ἀπαλλαγέντας χαλεπῶν συμπτωμάτων ἐκστάσεων καὶ μανιῶν καὶ ἄλλων μυρίων, ἅπερ οὔτ' ἄνθρωποι οὔτε δαίμονες ἐθεράπευσαν.* c. Cels. l. III. c. 24.

[2] Major pæne vis hominum e visionibus Deum discunt. De anima, c. 47.

[3] *Πολλοὶ ὥσπερεὶ ἄκοντες προσεληλύθασι χριστιανισμῷ, πνεύματός τινος τρέψαντος αὐτῶν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αἰφνίδιον ἀπὸ τοῦ μισεῖν τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπεραποθανεῖν αὐτοῦ, καὶ φαντασιώσαντος αὐτοὺς ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ.* c. Cels. l. I. c. 46.

above all particular miracles, and describes as the demonstration of the Spirit and of power.[1] And as this divine power showed its efficacy on the inner life of the man, so it manifested itself, with an attractive force, in the outward appearance and actions of that life; and it was this, which, more than everything beside, wrought to the conversion of the heathen.

To this experience Justin Martyr makes his appeal,[2] where, after citing the words of our Lord, "Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in Heaven," he adds: "Our Lord would not have us recompense evil for evil, but requires that, by the power of patience and meekness, we should draw all from the shame of their evil passions. And we can point out many among us, who, from overbearing and tyrannical men, have been thus changed by a victorious power, when they have seen how their neighbors could bear all things, or observed the singular patience of their defrauded fellow-travellers, or come to be acquainted with Christians in any of the other relations of life." The distinguished virtues of the Christians must have shone forth the more brightly, as contrasted with the prevailing vices; their severity of morals, sometimes even carried to excess, as opposed to the general depravation of the age; their hearty fraternal love, in contrast with that predominant selfishness which separated man from man, and rendered each distrustful of the other, insomuch that men could not comprehend the nature of Christian fellowship, nor sufficiently wonder at its fruits. "See,"—was the common remark,—"how they love one another." "This seems so extraordinary to them,—says Tertullian,[3]—because *they* are used to hate one another. See how, among the Christians, one is ready to die for the others; this seems so wonderful to *them*, because *they* themselves are far more ready to murder one another." Although a brotherly union of this sort excited suspicion in those who were used to watch everything with the jealous eye of police espionage,[4] and several persecutions of the Christians were thereby occasioned; yet on all minds not narrowed by such habits or not abandoned to fanaticism, a quite different impression must have been produced, and the question could hardly fail to arise in them, "What is it, which can thus bind together the hearts of men, in other respects wholly strangers to one another?" In a time when civilization had degenerated to effeminacy,[5] in a time of servile cowardice, the life-renovating enthusiasm, the heroism of faith, with which the Christians despised tortures and death, when the question was whether they

[1] A passage, which, indeed, came to be misunderstood at a very early period, because too much importance was attached to *the outward*. Thus it was Origen's opinion that the ἀπόδειξις πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως is so predicated of the ἀπόδειξις—διὰ τὰς προφητείας καὶ τὰς τερατίους δυνάμεις. c. Cels. l. I. § 2.

[2] Apologet. II. f 63.

[3] Sed ejusmodi vel maxime dilectionis operatio notam nobis inurit penes quosdam. Vide, inquiunt, ut invicem se diligant. Ipsi enim invicem oderunt. Et pro alterutro mori sint parati, ipsi enim ad occidendum alterutrum paratiores. Apologet. c. 39.

[4] This view of the matter is expressed in the language of the Pagan Cæcilius, in the Octavius of Minucius Felix, (§ 9;) Occultis se notis et insignibus noscunt et amant mutuo pæne ante quam noverint.

[5] Ipsa urbanitate decepti, says Tertullian of his contemporaries.

would do what was contrary to conscience, — this heroism of the Christians did indeed strike many so forcibly as an appearance foreign to the age, that they were inclined to consider a character so well befitting the heroic days of antiquity, but not these more refined and gentle times, a matter of reproach.[1] But although the ordinary Roman statesmen, though the followers of a set worldly prudence, though the cool Stoic who required everywhere philosophic demonstration, — saw in the spirit with which the Christians, in testimony of their faith, went to death, nothing but blind enthusiasm; yet the confidence and the cheerfulness of these suffering, dying men, could not fail to make an impression on less hardened or less prejudiced minds, whereby they would be led to inquire more deeply into the cause, for which men could be thus impelled to sacrifice their all. Outward force could effect nothing against the inward power of divine truth; it could only operate to render the might of this truth more gloriously manifest. Hence Tertullian concludes his "Apology" with these words, addressed to the persecutors of the Christians: "All your refinements of cruelty can accomplish nothing; on the contrary, they serve as a lure to this sect. Our number increases, the more you destroy us. The blood of the Christians is the seed of a new harvest. Your philosophers, who exhort to the endurance of pain and death, make fewer disciples by their words, than the Christians by their deeds. That obstinacy, for which you reproach us, is a preceptor. For who that beholds it, is not impelled to inquire into the cause? And who, when he has inquired, does not embrace it; and when he has embraced it, does not himself wish to suffer for it?[2]

Add to this, that Christianity appeared when the time was now fulfilled, that the glory of the "eternal city" must depart from her: for so long as that power still had dominion over the minds of men, and swallowed up all other interests, small place was left for that feeling of need which led men to Christianity. But when all was now becoming old and withered, which had hitherto been an object of enthusiastic love and had given a certain buoyancy to the soul, Christianity appeared, and called men from the sinking old world to a new creation, destined for eternity. As Augustin finely expresses it, "Christ appeared to the men of a decrepit, dying world, that, while all around them was fading, they might through him receive a new youthful life." And the higher life which Christianity imparted, required no brilliant outward relations for the manifestation of its glory, like what had been wondered at as great in the old civic virtue. Into the midst of circumstances and situations the most cramping and depressing, this divine life could find its way, and cause its glory to shine forth in weak and despised vessels, and raise men above all that would bow them down to the earth, without their over-stepping the bounds

[1] Well enough for the ingenia duriora robustioris antiquitatis; but not for the tranquillitatem pacis and the ingenia mitiora. Tertull. ad. nat. I. c. 18.

[2] Semen est sanguis Christianorum — illa ipsa obstinatio, quam exprobratis, magistra est. Quis enim non contemplatione ejus concutitur ad requirendum, quid intus in re sit?

of that earthly order, in which they considered themselves placed by an overruling providence. The slave, in his earthly relations, remained a slave still, and fulfilled all the duties of his place with far greater fidelity and conscientiousness than before; and yet he felt himself free within, showed an elevation of soul, an assurance, a power of faith and of resignation, which must have filled his master with amazement. Men in the lowest class of society, who had hitherto known nothing in religion but ceremonial rites and mythical stories, attained to a clear and confident religious conviction. The remarkable words, already quoted from Celsus, as well as many individual examples of these first Christian times, show us how often from *women*,[1] who, as wives and mothers, let a spiritual light shine out in the midst of pagan corruption; how often from young men, boys and maidens; from slaves who put their masters to shame, Christianity was diffused through whole families. "Every Christian mechanic," says Tertullian,[2] "has found God, and shows him to you; and then points out to you everything in fact you require to know of God; although Plato (in Timæus) says, that it is hard to find the Creator of the universe, and impossible after one has found him, to make him known to all." In like manner, Athenagoras: "With us you may find ignorant people, mechanics, old women, who, though unable to prove with words the saving power of their religion, yet by their deeds prove the saving influence of the disposition it has bestowed on them; for they do not learn words by rote, but they exhibit good works; when struck, they strike not again; when robbed, they do not go to law; they give to them that ask them, and love their neighbors as themselves."

The gross material notions, which we find to have prevailed among a large portion of the early Christians, as for example, among the Chiliasts, have frequently been set forth as a reproach to Christianity. But precisely in this, is its distinguishing character manifest, — that as it is not a system of notions, but an announcement of facts, it could be brought within the range, even of a material habit of thinking, could lower itself down to its comprehension, mix in with it, and even in this material form, by the power of those facts, communicate a divine life, and thereby gradually ennoble the entire nature of the man, with all its powers and propensities, and so also spiritualize the habits of thinking. And in connection with this phenomenon, we must take still another; that, at the same time, the pole of humanity most opposite to this was seized by Christianity with overwhelming power, as is evident when we compare the Gnostics with those Chiliasts. So deeply marked, from the first, on the developing process of this religion, is the impress of its divinely human character, by virtue of which it could and must attract the opposite poles of man's nature, entering as well into these as into all the other intermediate stages. And it was, as we shall see, precisely by means of this, its distinguishing charac-

[1] Compare the words of the pagan Cæcilius in the Octavius of Minucius Felix, where he says, speaking of the Christians: (c. 8) Qui de ultima fæce collectis imperitioribus et *mulieribus credulis* sexus sui facilitate labentibus plebem profanæ conjurationis instituunt.

[2] Apologet. c. 46.

teristic, that the more general diffusion and triumph of Christianity over the old world were advanced.

2. *Propagation of Christianity in Particular Districts.*

The great highways by which the knowledge of the gospel was to be diffused abroad, had already been opened by the intercourse of nations. The easy means of inter-communication within the vast Roman empire; the close relation between the Jews dispersed through all lands, and those at Jerusalem; the manner in which all parts of the Roman empire were linked in with the great capital of the world; the connection of the provinces with their metropolitan towns, and of the larger portions of the empire with the more considerable cities, were all circumstances favorable to this object. These cities, such as Alexandria, Antioch, Ephesus, Corinth, were centres of commercial, political and literary correspondence; and hence became also the principal seats, chosen for the propagation of the gospel, where the first preachers tarried longest. Commercial intercourse, which had served from the earliest times, not merely for the exchange of worldly goods, but also for transmitting the nobler treasures of the mind, could now be used as a means for diffusing the highest spiritual blessings.

As a general thing, Christianity at first made progress in the cities; for as it was needful, above all, to gain fixed seats for the propagation of the gospel, the first preachers, passing rapidly over the country, had to propose their message first in the cities, whence it might afterwards be more easily diffused through the country by native teachers. On the other hand, in the country, greater obstacles must necessarily have been encountered, owing to the entire rudeness, the blind superstition, and the heathen fanaticism of the people: oftentimes also to the want of a knowledge in the early preachers of the old provincial dialects; while in the towns, they could, for the most part, make themselves sufficiently well understood in the Greek or the Latin language. Yet we know from Pliny's report to the Emperor Trajan, from the account given by the Roman Bishop Clemens,[1] and from the relation of Justin Martyr,[2] that this was not the case everywhere: and that in many districts, country churches were formed very early; and Origen says expressly,[3] that many considered it their duty to visit not only the cities, but also the country towns and villas. That this was so, seems evident moreover from the great number of country bishops in particular districts.

In the New Testament, we find accounts of the dissemination of Christianity in Syria, in Cilicia; probably also in the Parthian empire, at that time so widely extended;[4] in Arabia; in Lesser Asia, and the countries adjacent; in Greece, and the bordering countries as

[1] Ep. I. Corinth. c. 42.

[2] Apologet. II. f. 98.

[3] c. Cels. l. III. c. 9: *Τινὲς ἔργον πεποίηνται ἐκ περιέρχεσθαι οὐ μόνον πόλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ κώμας καὶ ἐπαύλεις.*

[4] For the circumstance that Peter (1 Ep. 5; 13,) greets from his wife in Babylon, — whether it was the then capital of Seleucia, or more probably the old fallen Babylon, — leads to the conjecture, that he was residing in those countries.

far as Illyricum; in Italy. But we are greatly deficient in further and credible accounts, on this subject; the later traditions, growing out of the eagerness to trace each national church to an apostolic origin, deserve no examination. We confine ourselves to what can be safely credited.

The ancient legend of the correspondence by letter between a prince belonging to the dynasty of the Abgares or Agbares, the Agbar Uchomo, (who ruled over the small state of Edessa Osrhoëne of Mesopotamia,) and our Saviour, to whom he is said to have applied for the cure of a grievous disorder, is entitled to no credit; nor that of his conversion by Thaddeus, one of the seventy disciples. Eusebius found the documents from which he drew up his narrative, in the public archives of Edessa; and permitted himself to be deceived by them. The letter ascribed to Christ is in no sense worthy of him, and bears throughout the marks of having been compiled from several passages of the gospels. It is moreover inconceivable how anything, written by Christ himself, could have remained down to Eusebius' time, unknown to the rest of the world. Finally, the letter of Abgarus is not couched in such language as would have been used by an oriental prince. Whether in other respects, there is any truth lying at the bottom of the account, we cannot know. It is only certain, that Christianity was early diffused in this country; yet it is not till between the years 160 — 170 we find indications that one of those princes, Abgar Bar Manu, was a Christian. The learned Christian Bardesanes is said to have stood very high with him; and we are informed by this writer, that Abgar forbade the self-mutilations usually connected with the worship of Cybele, under a severe penalty, (the loss of their hands to those who were guilty of it.) From this alone, it is by no means clear that he was a Christian; but it is also on the coins of this prince, that the usual symbols of the Baal worship of this country are, for the first time, wanting; and the sign of the cross appears in their place.[1] In the year 202, the Christians of Edessa had already a church, built, as it seems, after the model of the temple at Jerusalem.[2]

If Peter preached the gospel in the Parthian empire,[3] some seed of Christianity, at an early period, may have easily reached *Persia* also, which then belonged to that empire; but the frequent wars of the Parthians with the Romans hindered the communication between Parthian and Roman Christians. The above-mentioned Bardesanes of Edessa, who wrote in the time of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, notices the spread of Christianity in Parthia, Media, Persia, Bactria.[4] After the restoration of the ancient Persian empire to its independence, under

[1] Bayer, historia Edessena e nummis illustrata, l. III. p. 173. But Bayer places him, no doubt incorrectly, as late as A. C. 200.

[2] In the chronicle of Edessa, compiled from ancient documents, about the middle of the sixth century, it is reported, in expressions which presuppose a document not written by the hand of a Christian, that by the violence of a flood the templum ecclesiæ Christianorum had been destroyed. V. Assemani Bibliotheca orientalis, T. I. p 391.

[3] According to the tradition preserved in Origen; Euseb. III. 1, also the apostle Thomas.

[4] Euseb. Præparat. Evang. l. VI. c. 10

the Sassanides, the Persian Christians become better known to us by the attempts of the Persian Mani, in the last half of the third century, to form a new code of religious doctrines by the fusion of old Oriental systems of religion with Christianity.

In Arabia, the great number of Jews residing in that country might afford a medium of access for the preaching of the gospel; but the same circumstance would also present a powerful hinderance; and the latter, no doubt, was much more the case than the former. It is clear, from his own words, that the Apostle Paul, soon after his conversion, retired from Damascus to Arabia. But to what purpose he applied his residence in this country, and what he accomplished there, remains uncertain.[1] If the country called India, in a tradition of which we shall presently speak, is to be taken as meaning a part of Arabia, then the Apostle Bartholomew preached the gospel to the Jews in Arabia, and took with him, for this purpose, a gospel written in the Hebrew (Aramaic) language,—probably that compilation of our Lord's discourses by Matthew, which lies at the basis of our present gospel according to St. Matthew.[2] Allowing this to be so, then in the last half of the second century, the learned Alexandrian catechist, Pantænus, was teacher of a portion of this people. In the early part of the third century, the great Alexandrian church father, Origen, labored in the same field. Yet we must doubtless suppose here, only that part of Arabia is meant, which was already in subjection to the Roman empire. We have the account, namely, from Eusebius,[3] that at that time the Arabian commander sent an order to Demetrius, bishop of Alexandria, and to the then prefect of Egypt, earnestly requesting, that Origen might be allowed to come to him, since he was desirous of conferring with him in person.[4] Assuredly, this Arabian commander was not the hereditary chief of some wandering tribe of Arabs, as a person of that class could hardly be supposed to have ever heard anything of Origen; but a Roman governor, whom the fame of the great teacher,—celebrated at this time for his holy life, his wisdom and scientific attainments even among the pagans,—might have moved to seek a personal conversation with him on religious subjects. Perhaps he belonged to the number of *truth-seeking* men among the pagans of those times. If *so*, Origen would not have failed to avail himself of this interview, for the purpose of winning over the governor to the side of the gospel. At a somewhat later period, we find Christian churches in Arabia, with which Origen stood in some more intimate connection. To the further propagation of the gospel in these parts in still later times, the nomadic life of the people and the influence of hostile Jews presented great obstacles.

The ancient Syro-Persian church, whose remains have been preserved down to the present moment on the coast of Malabar in the East Indies,

[1] See my History of the Planting, &c. Vol. I. p. 126.

[2] See my History of the Planting, &c. Vol. I. p. 131, Remark.

[3] L. VI. c. 19.

[4] Ἐπιστάς τις τῶν στιρατιωτικῶν, (which suggests some person of the Roman office of dux Arabiæ,) ἀνεδίδου γράμματα Δημητρίῳ τε τῷ τῆς παροικίας ἐπισκόπῳ καὶ τῷ τότε τῆς Αἰγύπτου ἐπάρχῳ παρὰ τοῦ τῆς Ἀραβίας ἡγουμένου, (as a *dux Arabiæ* afterwards occurs in the Notitia imperii.)

names the Apostle Thomas as its founder, and professes to be able to point out the place of his burial. Were this a tradition handed down, independent of other accounts, within the community itself, we could not, it is true, consider it as credible testimony; but neither should we be warranted to assert absolutely its falsity.[1] Yet this church, of which we find the earliest notice in the reports of Cosmas Indicopleustes, about the middle of the sixth century, might perhaps be indebted for its existence to a later mercantile colony of Syro-Persian Christians, and having brought with it the traditions of the Greek church, might have simply transmitted these, but after a time forgotten the channel from whence it had originally derived them. We must examine more closely, then, these traditions themselves. But the Greek traditions, although old, are yet very indefinite and uncertain. The unsettled use of the geographic name India contributes to this uncertainty. Ethiopia, and Arabia Felix, the adjacent Insula Dioscoridis, (the island Diu Zocotara, near the mouth of the Arabian Gulf,) were designated by this name.[2] These countries, however, maintained by trade a lively intercourse with India proper, and could thus furnish a channel for the propagation of Christianity in the latter. Gregory Nanzianzen says[3] that Thomas preached the gospel to the Indians; but Jerome understands the India here meant to be Ethiopia.[4] If the tradition in Origen, which makes Thomas the Apostle to the Parthians, were credible, it would not be so very remote from the former legend, since the Parthian empire touched, at that time, on the boundaries of India. In all events, such legends are not deserving of much confidence. Eusebius[5] relates, as we have observed already, that Pantænus undertook a missionary tour to the people dwelling eastward, which he extended as far as India. There he found already some seeds of Christianity, which had been conveyed thither by the Apostle Bartholomew, as well as a Hebrew gospel which the same Apostle had taken with him. The mention of the Hebrew gospel is not at all inconsistent with the supposition, that India proper is here meant, if it may be assumed that the Jews who now dwell on the coast of Malabar, had then already arrived there. The language of Eusebius seems to intimate, that he himself had before his mind a remoter country than Arabia, and rather favors the supposition, that he meant to speak of India proper. Yet it may be a question, whether he was not himself deceived by the name. To settle the controverted question, what countries we are to think of here, we must compare also the later accounts of the fourth century. In the time of

[1] It becomes the conscientious inquirer, who leans neither on the side of arbitrary doubt nor on that of arbitrary assertion, to express himself, in matters of this sort, as my friend and honored colleague Ritter has done, in his instructive remarks on this point, in the Erdkunde von Asien: (Bd. IV., 1ste Abtheilung, S. 602,) "What European science cannot prove, is not therefore to be rejected as untrue, but only to be regarded as problematical for the present; by no means, however, is any structure to be erected upon it, as a safe foundation."

[2] According to Ritter (l. c. S. 603,) to be explained from the fact that not only Indian trade colonies — the Banianes, Banig-yana, according to the Sanscrit, trade-people, (see Ritter, l. c. S. 443,) had settled there, and that the whole region furnished staple places for Indian wares, but that these were the few direct intermediate stations for the uninterrupted commerce with foreign India.

[3] Orat. 25.

[4] Ep. 148.

[5] L. I. c. 10.

the Emperor Constantine,[1] there was a missionary, Theophilus, with the surname Indicus, who came from the Island Diu, (Διβοῦς,) by which is to be understood the above mentioned island, Zokotara. He found in his native land, and in the other districts of India,[2] which he visited from there, Christianity planted already, and had only many things to correct.

We next cross over to Africa. *The country* in this quarter of the world, where Christianity must be disseminated first, was *Egypt;* for here were presented, in the Grecian and Jewish culture at Alexandria, those points of contact and union of which we have already spoken. Even among the first zealous preachers of the gospel, we find men of Alexandrian education, as, for instance, Apollos of Alexandria, and probably also Barnabas of Cyprus. The epistle to the Hebrews, the epistle ascribed to Barnabas, the gospel of the Egyptians, (εὐαγγέλιον κατ' Αἰγυπτίους,) in which the Alexandrian-theosophic taste displays itself, — the Gnosis in the first half of the second century, — are proofs of the influence exerted by Christianity, at a very early period, on the philosophy of the Alexandrian Jews. An ancient tradition names the evangelist Mark as the founder of the Alexandrian Church. From Alexandria, Christianity must have easily found its way to Cyrene, on account of the constant intercourse and the congeniality of spirit between the two places. But although the gospel early found its way into the parts of Lower Egypt inhabited by Grecian and Jewish colonies, yet it would not be so easy for it to penetrate thence into Middle, and particularly into Upper Egypt; for in those parts, the foreign Coptic language, the dominion of the priests, and the old Egyptian superstition stood in the way. Yet a persecution of the Christians in Thebais, under the Emperor Septimius Severus,[3] proves that Christianity had already made progress in Upper Egypt, as early as the last times of the second century. Probably, in the first half of the third century, this province had a version of the New Testament in its own ancient dialect.

Respecting the diffusion of Christianity in *Ethiopia* (Abyssinia) we find, in these centuries, no distinct and credible account. History is silent as to the consequences which resulted from the conversion of that court-officer of Candace, Queen of Meroe, which is related in the Acts.[4] We shall find the first certain indications of the conversion of a part of Abyssinia, through the instrumentality of Frumentius, in the fourth century. Yet the question might be raised,[5] whether some seeds of Christianity may not, even earlier than this, have been brought into other districts of this country by Jewish Christians; and whether many Jewish customs, and the significancy which is ascribed by *one* party to the baptism of Christ,[6] may not be traced to this fact.

In consequence of their connection with Rome, the gospel early found its way to *Carthage*, and to the whole of *proconsular Africa*. This church at Carthage becomes first known to us, onward from the last

1 Vid. Philostorg. hist. l. III. c. 4 and 5.
2 Ἐκεῖθεν τίς τὴν ἄλλην ἀφίκετο Ἰνδικήν.
3 Euseb. l. VI. c. 1.
4 Chap. 8.
5 The late Hr. Rettig, if I mistake not, has somewhere directed attention to the same inquiry.
6 See Journal of a three years' residence in Abyssinia, by S. Gobat, p. 254. London, 1834.

years of the second century, through the presbyter Tertullian; but even then it appears to have been in a very flourishing condition. The Christians in those districts were, at that time, already very numerous, and it was a matter of complaint, that Christianity continued to spread, in town and country, among all ranks, and indeed in the highest.[1] To pass over those passages where Tertullian expresses himself rhetorically, we find in his tract addressed to the governor, Scapula,[2] that he could speak already of a persecution of Christians in Mauritania. After the middle of the third century, Christianity had now made such progress in Mauritania and Numidia, that under Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, a synod was held, consisting of eighty-seven bishops.

Passing over to Europe, we have in Rome a principal seat for the propagation of Christianity, yet not the only one. Flourishing communities, at Lugdunum (Lyons) and Vienna, come to our knowledge during a bloody persecution, in 177. The great number of Christians from Asia Minor, whom we find here, and the intimate connection of these communities with those of Asia Minor, lead to the conjecture, that the commercial intercourse between these districts of France and Asia Minor, an original seat of the Christian church, had led to the formation of a Christian colony in Gaul. For a long time, the pagan superstition in the other parts of Gaul withstood the further spread of Christianity. Even so late as the middle of the third century, few Christian communities were to be found there. According to the narrative of the French historian, Gregory of Tours, seven missionaries came, at that time, to Gaul from Rome, and established communities in seven cities, over which they became bishops. One of these was that Dionysius, first bishop of the community at Paris, whom the later legends confounded with Dionysius the Areopagite, who was converted by the Apostle Paul at Athens. Gregory of Tours, who wrote near the end of the sixth century, in a time when so many fables were propagated respecting the origin of church communities, is, we allow, no credible witness; at the same time there may be some truth lying at the ground of this account. One of these seven, Saturnin, founder of the community at Toulouse, becomes known to us by a much older document, — the relation of his martyrdom.

Irenæus, who became bishop of the community at Lyons sometime after the above mentioned persecution of 177, speaks of the spread of Christianity in *Germany*.[3] But we must here distinguish the different parts of Germany, — the districts in subjection to the Roman empire, and the still larger portion of free, independent Germany. Very easily might it happen, that a seed of Christianity should find its way into the first of the countries just mentioned, on account of their connection with the province of Gaul. But the case was quite different with those hardy tribes, that so fiercely maintained their ancient state of rudeness and freedom, and repelled everything from abroad. Irenæus, it is

[1] Apologet. c. 1. Obsessam vociferantur civitatem; in agris, in castellis, in insulis Christianos; omnem sexum, ætatem, conditionem, et jam *dignitatem* transgredi ad hoc nomen.

[2] Cap. 4.

[3] Adv. Hær. l. I. c. 10

true, says elsewhere,[1] "Many tribes of the barbarians have the words of salvation, written in their hearts, without paper and ink, by the Holy Ghost."[2] He recognized, in the efficacious power of Christianity, its distinguishing nature, by virtue of which, it could reach men in every stage of cultivation, and by its divine energy penetrate to their hearts; but it is also certain, that Christianity would nowhere long maintain itself with purity, in its distinguishing essence, unless it entered deep into the whole intellectual development of the people, and unless, along with the divine life proceeding from it, it gave an impulse, at the same time, to all human culture.

The same Irenæus is the first who speaks of the diffusion of Christianity in *Spain*, (ἐν ταῖς Ἰβηρίαις.) The tradition, which we find already at the beginning of the fourth century in Eusebius,[3] that the Apostle Paul had preached the gospel in Spain, cannot, it is true, be received as credible testimony; for in those times the propensity was but too strong to convert suppositions, inferences and conjectures, not always rightly formed, into facts; and so what St. Paul himself writes, (Romans xv. 24,) concerning his intention, might easily give occasion to this report. But when the Roman Bishop, Clemens, says,[4] that the Apostle Paul went as far as the bounds of the West, (τέρμα τῆς δύσεως,[5]) the expression can hardly be understood as referring to Rome; indeed, it most naturally applies only to Spain; and as Clemens was probably himself a disciple of the Apostle, it cannot possibly be supposed that he would be deceived in the same manner as might happen with those who came after him. It must be admitted, we find no room for a journey of the Apostle Paul to Spain, unless we suppose that he was set free from his imprisonment mentioned in the Acts, and after his release carried the purpose into effect, which he had previously announced. But this we must of necessity suppose, if we acknowledge the genuineness of the second epistle to Timothy, and cannot bring ourselves to consent to very tortuous interpretations of single passages.

Of the extension of Christianity thus early also to *Britain*, Tertullian is a witness;[6] although in that quite rhetorically expressed passage, that the gospel had penetrated already into those parts of Britain not subjected to the Roman dominion, the truth may be somewhat exaggerated. A later tradition, in Bede, of the eighth century, reports that Lucius, a British king, requested the Roman bishop Eleutherus, in the latter part of the second century, to send him some missionaries. But the peculiarity of the later British church is evidence against its origin from Rome; for in many ritual matters it departed from the usage of the Romish church, and agreed much more nearly with the churches of Asia Minor. It withstood, for a long time, the authority of the Romish papacy. This circumstance would

[1] L. III. c. 4.

[2] Sine charta et atramento scriptam habentes per Spiritum in cordibus suis salutem.

[3] L. I. c. 10, § 2.

[4] Ep. I. v. 5.

[5] We cannot avoid once more protesting against all the forced interpretations of these words, which have been set forth of late. See my History of the Planting, etc Vol. I. p. 455.

[6] Adv. Jud. c. 7.

seem to indicate, that the Britons had received their Christianity, either immediately or through Gaul, from Asia Minor, — a thing quite possible and easy, by means of the commercial intercourse. The later Anglo-Saxons, who opposed the spirit of ecclesiastical independence among the Britons, and endeavored to establish the church supremacy of Rome, were uniformly inclined to trace back the church establishments to a Roman origin; from which effort many false legends as well as this might have arisen.

We now pass over to the conflicts which the church within the Roman empire had to sustain with the state.

3. *Persecutions of the Christian Church.*

First, the Causes of them.

It is quite important to a just understanding of the nature of these persecutions, to be rightly informed, in the first place, of their causes. Many have been surprised, that the Romans, a people in other respects so tolerant, should exhibit so impatient and persecuting a spirit against the Christians; but whatever is said about the religious tolerance of the Romans, must be understood with considerable restriction. The ideas of man's universal rights, of universal religious freedom and liberty of conscience, were quite alien to the views of the whole ancient world. Nor could it be otherwise; since the idea of the state was the highest idea of ethics, and within that was included all actual realization of the highest good: — hence the development of all other goods pertaining to humanity was made dependent on this. Thus the *religious* element also was subordinated to the *political*. There were none but state religions and national gods. It was first and only Christianity that could overcome this principle of antiquity, release men from the bondage of the world, subvert *particularism* and the all-subjecting force of the political element, by its own generalizing Theism, by the awakened consciousness of the oneness of God's image in all, by the idea of the kingdom of God, as the highest good, comprehending all other goods in itself, which was substituted in place of the state as the realization of the highest good, whereby the state was necessitated to recognize a higher power over itself. Looked at from this point of view, which was the one actually taken by the ancient world, a defection from the religion of the state could not appear otherwise than as a crime against the state.[1]

Now all this must be especially true, in its application to the one-sided political principle which swallowed up every other interest, peculiar to the ancient Romanism. We recognize this principle in what Cicero lays down as a fundamental maxim of legislation.[2] No

[1] As Varro had before distinguished a theologia philosophica et vera, a theologia poetica et mythica, and a theologia civilis, so Dio Chrysostom, who flourished in the first half of the second century, (orat. 12,) distinguishes three sources of religion; the universal religious consciousness, the ἔμφυτος ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἐπίνοια; poetry and morality left to propagate itself in freedom; and legislation, which constrains, threatens and punishes, — τὸ νομοθετικὸν, τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ μετὰ ζημίας καὶ προστάξεων; — although he rightly fixes upon the first only, as the universal and original source, whence all the rest has been derived.

[2] De legib. l. II. c. 8.

man shall have for himself particular gods of his own; no man shall worship by himself any new or foreign gods, unless they are recognized by the public laws, (nisi publice adscitos.) Although the ancient laws in the times of the emperors were no longer so strictly observed, although foreign customs had been constantly gaining ground in Rome, and the ancient policy no less constantly declining, yet now there were many additional reasons to those which had previously existed, for guarding against the introduction of new religions. There prevailed, indeed, at this time, a sensitive dread of every thing with which a political aim could be connected, and the jealousy of despotism could be easily induced to suspect political aims, even where nothing of the kind was intended. Religion and religious associations seemed well calculated to serve as a cover for political plots and conspiracies. Hence the advice of Mæcenas to Augustus, in the well known discourse reported by Dio Cassius, where, although the very words of Mæcenas may not be used, yet the historian expresses the prevailing views of the Roman state at this period. "Worship the gods in all respects according to the laws of your country, and compel all others to do the same. But hate and punish those who would introduce any thing whatever, alien to our customs in this particular; not alone for the sake of the gods, because whoever despises them is incapable of reverence for any thing else; but because such persons, by introducing new divinities, mislead many to adopt also foreign laws. Hence conspiracies and secret combinations, — the last things to be borne in a monarchy. Suffer no man either to deny the gods,[1] or to practise sorcery." The Roman civilian, Julius Paulus, cites, as one of the ruling principles of civil law in the Roman state,[2] the following: "Whoever introduced new religions, the tendency and character of which were unknown, whereby the minds of men might be disturbed,[3] should, if belonging to the higher rank, be banished; if to the lower, punished with death." It is easy to see, that Christianity, which produced so great, and to the Roman statesman so unaccountable an agitation in the minds of men, must fall into this class of *religiones novæ*. We have presented here, then, the two points of view, under which Christianity came necessarily into collision with the laws of the state. 1. *It induced Roman citizens to renounce the religion of the state, to the observance of which they were bound by the laws, — to refuse compliance with the "cærimonias Romanas."* Hence many of the magistrates, who felt no *personal* antipathy to Christianity, explained to Christians, when arraigned before them, that they might comply, at least outwardly, with what the laws required; viz. observe the religious ceremonies prescribed by the state; that the state was concerned only with the outward act, and in case that were performed, they might believe and worship in their heart, whatever they chose; or that they might continue to worship their own God, provided only they would worship the Roman gods also. 2. *It introduced a new religion, not*

[1] Ἀθέῳ εἶναι, the very term applied to the Christians.

[2] Lib. V. tit. 21.

[3] De quibus animi hominum moventur

admitted by the laws of the state into the class of religiones licitæ. Hence the common taunt of the pagans against the Christians, according to Tertullian; non licet esse vos,—"you are not permitted by the laws;" and Celsus accuses them of secret compacts, contrary to the laws.[1]

Without doubt, the Romans did exercise a certain religious toleration, but it was a toleration not to be separated from their polytheistic religious notions and their civil policy, and which, by its own nature, could not be applied to Christianity. They were in the habit of securing to the nations they had conquered, the free exercise of their own religions,[2] inasmuch as they hoped by so doing to gain them over more completely to their interests, and also to make the gods of those nations their friends. The Romans, who were religiously inclined, attributed their sovereignty of the world to this policy of conciliating the gods of every nation.[3] Even without the limits of their own country, individuals of these nations were allowed the free exercise of their opinions; and hence Rome, into which there was a constant influx of strangers from all quarters of the world, became the seat of every description of religion. "Men of a thousand nations," says Dionysius of Halicarnassus,[4] "come to the city, and must worship the gods of their country, according to the prevailing laws at home." It doubtless happened, that with certain modifications, many things taken from these foreign modes of worship, were introduced into the public worship of the Roman state; but then a special decree of the senate was requisite, before any Roman citizen could be allowed to join in the observance of any such foreign rites. At this particular period, indeed, when the authority of all national religions was on the wane; when the unsatisfied religious need required and sought some new thing; and this was offered by the conflux of strangers from all countries into Rome; it was frequently the case, that Romans adopted the forms of those foreign modes of worship, which did not as yet belong to the religions recognized by the state (to the religionibus publice adscitis:) but this was an irregularity, which such as possessed any portion of the old Roman spirit attributed to the corruptions of the times and the decline of ancient manners. Like many other evils, which could not be suppressed, it was left unnoticed. The change, moreover, might be the less striking, since those who had adopted the foreign rites, observed at the same time the Roman ceremonies. Occasionally, however, when the evil threatened to get the upper hand, or when a zeal was awakened in behalf of the ancient manners and civic virtues, laws were passed for restraining profane rites (ad coercendos profanos ritus) and repressing the growth of foreign superstitions, (the

[1] Ὡς συνθήκας κρύβδην παρὰ τὰ νενομισμένα ποιουμένων. L. I. c. 1.

[2] See the words of Marcus Agrippa, in his plea for the religious freedom of the Jews: Τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἣν νῦν τὸ σύμπαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος δι' ὑμᾶς ἔχει τούτῳ μετροῦμεν, τῷ ἐξεῖναι κατὰ χώραν ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα τιμῶσιν ἄγειν καὶ διαζῆν. Joseph. Archæol. l. XVI. c. 2. § 4.

[3] See the Pagan's language in Minucius Felix, and in Aristides' Encom. Romæ.

[4] See Aristid. l. c. and Dionys. Halicarnass. Archæol. l. II. c. 19.

valescere superstitiones externas;[1]) every religion, not Roman, being regarded as a *superstition* by the Roman statesman. With these views, it is clear that the best emperors, who were seeking to restore the old life of the Roman state, must therefore be hostile to Christianity, which appeared to them only as a superstitio externa; while worse rulers, with nothing of the old Roman spirit, but at the same time not rising above the prejudices of a contracted nationality, might, from indifference to the old Roman policy in general, calmly look on when Christianity was making encroachments on all sides.

The Jews also had the free and undisturbed exercise of their religion secured to them by decrees of the senate and imperial edicts, and the God of the Jews was regarded by many as a powerful national God; they accused the people only of narrow-heartedness and intolerance, because they hostilely excluded the worship of other gods; or they found a reason for this in the jealous character of that Being himself, who would have no other gods beside him. Judaism was a *religio licita* for the Jews; and hence the Christians were reproached, as if they had contrived, by appearing as a Jewish sect, to slip in at first under the cover of a tolerated religion.[2] Yet for all this, the Jews were by no means allowed to propagate their religion among the *Roman* pagans; — the laws expressly forbade the latter, under severe penalties, to receive circumcision. It was the case, indeed, at this time, that the number of proselytes from the pagans was greatly multiplied. This the public authorities sometimes allowed to pass unnoticed; but occasionally severe laws were passed anew to repress the evil; as for instance, by the senate under the emperor Tiberius,[3] by Antoninus Pius, by Septimius Severus.

The case was altogether different with Christianity. Here was no ancient, national form of worship, as in all the other religions. Christianity appeared rather as a defection from a *religio licita*, — an insurrection against a venerable national faith.[4] This is brought as a charge against the Christians, in the spirit of the prevailing mode of thinking, by Celsus.[5] "The Jews," he says, "are a nation by themselves, and they observe the sacred institutions of their country, — whatever they may be, — and in so doing, act like other men. It is right for every people to reverence their ancient laws; but to desert them is a crime." Hence the very common taunt thrown out against the Christians, that they were neither one thing nor the other, neither Jews nor pagans, but genus tertium. A religion for mankind must have appeared, — as viewed from that position of antiquity according

[1] Tacitus places together, in a proposition to the senate, the phrases "Publica circa bonas artes socordia, et quia externæ superstitiones valescant." Annal. l. XI. c. 15. A lady of rank is accused as superstitionis rea. Annal. l. XIII. c. 32.

[2] Sub umbraculo religionis saltem licitæ. — Tertullian.

[3] The senatus consultum de sacris Ægyptiis Judaicisque pellendis. Tacit. Annal. l. II. c. 85.

[4] A religion proceeding from an *ἐστασιακέναι πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰουδαίων*. c. Cels. l. III. c. 7. For keeping the Christians united together *ἀξιόχρεως ὑπόθεσις ἡ στάσις*. L. III. c. 14.

[5] *Δεῖν πάντας ἀνθρώπους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια ζῆν, οὐκ ἂν μεμφθέντας ἐπὶ τουτῷ. Χριστιανοὺς δὲ τὰ πάτρια καταλιπόντας καὶ οὐχ ἓν τι τυγχανόντας ἔθνος ὡς Ἰουδαῖοι, ἐγκτήτως προστίθεσθαι τῇ τοῦ Ἰησου διδασκαλίᾳ*. L. V. c. 25.

to which every nation had its own particular religion, — a thing contrary to nature, threatening the dissolution of all existing order. The man that can believe it possible, — says Celsus, — for Greeks and Barbarians, in Asia, Europe and Lybia, to agree in one code of religious laws, must be quite void of understanding.[1] But what had been held impossible, seemed more likely every day to be realized. It was now perceived, that Christianity steadily made progress among people of every rank, and threatened to overthrow the religion of the state, together with the constitution of civil society which seemed closely interwoven with the same. Nothing else remained, therefore, but to oppose the inward power, which men were unwilling to acknowledge, by outward force. As well the whole shape and form of the Christian worship, as the *idea* of a religion for mankind, stood in direct contradiction with the point of religious development hitherto attained. It excited suspicion to observe, that the Christians had nothing of all that which men were accustomed to find in every other form of worship; nothing of all that which the Jews had in common with the pagans. So Celsus calls it the countersign of a secret compact, of an invisible order, that the Christians alone would have no altars, images or temples.[2] Again, the intimate brotherly union which prevailed among the Christians, the circumstance that every one among them, in every town where fellow-believers dwelt, immediately found friends, who were dearer to him than all the friends of this world — this was something that men could not comprehend.[3] The Roman police were utterly unable to fathom the nature of the bond which so united the Christians with one another. The jealousy of despotism could everywhere easily see or fear political aims. To the Roman statesman, who had no conception of the rights of conscience, the unbending will, which could be forced by no fear and by no tortures to yield obedience to the laws of the state in reference to religion, to perform the prescribed ceremonies, appeared a blind obstinacy, inflexibilis obstinatio, as men called it. But such an unconquerable wilfulness must have presented itself to those rulers, who were accustomed to servile obedience, as something extremely dangerous; and many would sooner pardon in the Christians their defection from the worship of the gods, than their want of reverence for the emperors, in declining to take any part in those idolatrous demonstrations of homage which pagan flattery had invented, such as sprinkling their images with incense, and swearing by their genius, "I will assuredly," said Tertullian, "call the emperor my lord,— but in the common acceptation,— but when I am not forced to call him Lord in the place of God. In other respects, I am free of him; for I have only one Lord,— the Almighty and eternal God,— the same who is also the emperor's Lord. How should he wish to be the *Lord*, who is the *father* of his country?"[4] What a

[1] His words are: Ὁ τοῦτο οἰόμενος οἰδεν οὐδὲν. L. VIII. c. 72.

[2] Πιστὸν ἀφανοῦς καὶ ἀποῤῥήτου κοινωνίας σύνθημα. L. VIII. c. 17.

[3] See the language of the pagan in Minucius Felix, cited above, at page 76.

[4] Dicam plane imperatorem dominum, sed more communi, sed quando non cogor ut dominum Dei vice dicam. Cæterum liber sum illi, dominus enim meus unus est, Deus omnipotens et æternus, idem qui et ipsius. Qui pater patriæ est, quomodo dominus est? Apologet. c. 34.

contrast to this free, high-hearted spirit of the Christians, is offered in the sort of language with which the supercilious and self-conceited philosopher, Celsus, addresses them: "Why should it be a wrong thing, then, to acquire favor with the rulers among men,[1] since these have been exalted to the control over the things of this world, not without a divine providence? And when it is required of you to swear by the emperor among men, there is nothing so mischievous in this; for whatever you receive in life, you receive from him." [2] Whenever, on the anniversary of the emperor's accession to the throne, or at the celebration of a triumph, public festivals were appointed, in which all were expected to participate, the Christians alone kept away, to avoid that which was calculated to wound their religious or moral feelings, which was uncongenial with the temper of mind inspired by their faith. It cannot be denied that, in this case, many went to an extreme, and shrunk from joining even in such demonstrations of respect and of joy as contained in them nothing that was repugnant to Christian faith and decorum, because they were associated in their minds with the pagan religion and manners, — such, for example, as the illumination of their dwellings, and the decorating them with festoons of laurel.[3] On one occasion, a certain sum of money was distributed by the emperor as a gratuity among the soldiers. All presented themselves, as was customary, with garlands on their heads, for the purpose of receiving their portion; but one Christian soldier came with the garland in his hand, because he held the practice of crowning to be a pagan rite.[4] Such acts were, indeed, but overdoings of individuals or of a party; — where, however, the earnest temper at bottom might deserve respect; — and the majority were far from approving such excess of zeal: but the mistake of *individuals* was easily laid to the charge of all. Hence the accusation, so dangerous in those times, of high treason, (crimen majestatis,) which was brought against the Christians. Men called them "irreverent to the Cæsars, enemies of the Cæsars, of the Roman people" (irreligiosos in Cæsares, hostes Cæsarum, hostes populi Romani.) In like manner, when only a minor party among the Christians regarded the occupation of a soldier as incompatible with the nature of Christian love and of the Christian calling, it was converted into an accusation against all, and against Christianity generally. "Does not the emperor punish you justly?" says Celsus; "for should all do like you, he would be left alone, — there would be none to defend him; the rudest barbarians would make themselves masters of the world, and every trace, as well of your own religion itself, as of true wisdom, would be obliterated from the human race; for believe not that your supreme God would come down from heaven and fight for us." [5]

[1] Τοὺς ἐν ἀνθρώποις δυνάστας καὶ βασιλέας ἐξευμενίζεσθαι.

[2] Δέδοται γὰρ τούτῳ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς, καὶ ὅτι ἂν λαμβάνῃς ἐν τῷ βίῳ, παρὰ τούτου λαμβάνεις. c. Cels. l. VIII. c. 63 et 67.

[3] Tertullian, in his book, de idololatria, complains because so many Christians had no hesitation to take a share in such festivities. Christ, he observes, had said, Let your works shine, at nunc lucent tabernæ et januæ nostræ, plures jam invenies ethnicorum fores sine lucernis et laureis, quam Christianorum. De idololatria, c. 15.

[4] Tertullian wrote his book, "de corona militis," in defence of this soldier against the accusations he met with from his fellow believers.

[5] L. VIII. c. 68.

If the Christians were accused generally of morosely withdrawing themselves from the world and from the courtesies of civil and social life, this charge was grounded partly in the relation itself of Christianity to paganism, as that relation was present to each one's own consciousness; but in part also to a certain one-sided tendency, growing in the first place out of the development of the Christian life in its opposition to the pagan world. So the Christians were represented as men dead to the world, and useless for all affairs of life;[1] dumb in public — loquacious among themselves; and it was asked, what would become of the business of life, if all were like them?

Of this kind were the causes by which the Roman state was moved to persecute the Christians; but all persecutions did not proceed from the state. *The Christians were often victims of the popular rage.* The populace saw in them the enemies of their gods; and this was the same thing as to have no religion at all. The deniers of the gods, the atheists, (ἄθεοι,) was the common name by which the Christians were designated among the people; and of such men the vilest and most improbable stories could easily gain belief: — that in their conclaves they were accustomed to abandon themselves to unnatural lust; that they killed and devoured children; — accusations which we find circulated, in the most diverse periods, against religious sects that have once become objects of the fanatic hatred of the populace. The reports of disaffected slaves, or of those from whom torture had wrung the confession desired, were next employed to support these absurd charges, and to justify the rage of the populace. If in hot climates the long absence of rain brought on a drought; if in Egypt the Nile failed to irrigate the fields; if in Rome the Tiber overflowed its banks; if a contagious disease was raging; if an earthquake, a famine, or any other public calamity occurred, the popular rage was easily turned against the Christians. "We may ascribe this," was the cry, "to the anger of the gods on account of the spread of Christianity." Thus it had become a proverb in North Africa, according to Augustine, "If there is no rain, tax it on the Christians."[2] And what wonder is it that the people so judged, when one who claimed to be a philosopher, when a Porphyry assigned as the cause why no stop could be put to a contagious and desolating sickness, that by reason of the spread of Christianity, Esculapius' influence on the earth was over.

There was, besides, no want of *individuals* who were ready to excite the popular rage against the Christians; priests, artisans and others, who, like Demetrius in the Acts, drew their gains from idolatry; magicians, who beheld their juggling tricks exposed; sanctimonious Cynics, who found their hypocrisy unmasked by the Christians. When, in the time of the emperor Marcus Aurelius, the magician whose life has been written by Lucian, Alexander of Abonoteichus, observed that his tricks had ceased to create any sensation in the cities, he exclaimed, "The Pontus is filled with atheists and Christians;" and called on the

[1] Homines infructuosi in negotio, in publico muti, in angulis garruli. See the words of the Pagan in Minucius Felix.

[2] Non pluit Deus, duc ad Christianos.

people to stone them, if they did not wish to draw down on themselves the anger of the gods. He would never exhibit his arts before the people, until he had first proclaimed, "If any Atheist, Christian or Epicurean has slipped in here as a spy, let him begone!" An appeal to popular violence seems, at this time, to have been considered the most convenient course, by the advocates of religion among the pagans.[1] Justin Martyr knew that Crescens, — one of the common Pseudo-cynics of the period, who were sanctimonious demagogues, — attempted to stir up the people against the Christians; and that he had threatened Justin's own life, because he had stripped him of his disguise.

From these remarks on the causes of the persecutions, the conclusion is obvious, *that until Christianity had been received, by express laws of the State, into the class of lawful religions, (religiones licitæ,) the Christians could not enjoy any general and certain tranquillity in the exercise of their religion; within the Roman empire they were constantly exposed to the rage of the populace and to the malice of individuals.* We shall now proceed to consider the ever-changing situation of the Christian church, under the governments of the several emperors who were so differently affected towards it.

4. *Situation of the Christian Church under the several Emperors.*

It is related by Tertullian,[2] of the emperor Tiberius, that he was moved by Pilate's report concerning the miracles of Christ and his resurrection, to propose to the senate, that Christ should be received among the gods of Rome; but that the senate set aside the proposition, lest they might yield somewhat of their ancient prerogative of deciding all matters relating to "new religions," upon their own movement (e motu proprio;) that the emperor, however, did not wholly desist from his object, but went so far at least, as to threaten with severe penalties all such as should accuse the Christians on the ground of their religion. But an author so wanting in critical judgment as Tertullian, cannot possibly be received as a credible witness for a story which wears on its face all the marks of untruth. Should the account be considered as an exaggerated one, but as still having some slight measure of truth at its foundation, even such an hypothesis could not be maintained; though it amounted to no more than this, that the emperor once proposed to grant to the Christians a free toleration. It is neither credible, on the ground of Pilate's character, that what he saw in Christ left on him any such lasting impression as this account assumes; nor is it probable that any such effect would have been produced by his report on the mind of Tiberius. Certainly it would not be in keeping with the servile character of the senate under Tiberius, for them to act, as they must have acted, according to this account; and as there were no accusers as yet of a Christian sect, there was no occasion for passing a law against such accusers. In fact, the succeeding history shows that no such previous law of Tiberius could have

[1] See the Timocles in Lucian's Jupiter Tragoed. [2] Apologet. c. 5 et 21

existed. Probably Tertullian had allowed himself to be deceived by some spurious document.

At first, the Christians were confounded with the Jews; consequently, the order issued under the emperor Claudius, in the year 53, for the banishment of the turbulent Jews, would involve the Christians also, if there were any at that time in Rome, and if Christianity made its first converts there among Jews, who continued to observe the Jewish customs. Suetonius says, "the emperor Claudius expelled the Jews from Rome, who were constantly raising disturbances, at the instigation of Chrestus."[1] We could suppose, that some factious Jew then living, of this name, one of the numerous class of Jewish freedmen in Rome, was intended. But as no individual so universally known as the Chrestus of Suetonius seems to have been considered by that writer, is elsewhere mentioned; and as the name of Christus (χριστος) was frequently pronounced Chrestus (χρήστος) by the pagans; it is quite probable that Suetonius, who wrote half a century after the event, throwing together what he had heard about the political expectations of a Messiah among the Jews, and the obscure and confused accounts which may have reached him respecting Christ, was thus led to express himself in a manner so vague and indefinite.

Christianity meanwhile, had been continually making progress among the pagans in the Roman empire; and the worship of God, shaped according to the principles of the apostle Paul, rendered it no longer possible to mistake the Christians for a Jewish sect. Such was the case particularly with the Roman communities, as the persecution, soon to be mentioned, shows; for this could not have arisen, if the Christians, as men who were descended from Jews and observed the Mosaic laws, had been held to be simply a sect of that people. They must have already drawn on themselves, in the capital of the world, the fanatical hatred of the populace, as the *tertium genus*, neither one thing nor the other. Already had the popular feeling given currency to those monstrous reports above noticed, of unnatural crimes to which the secret sect of these enemies of the gods abandoned themselves.[2] It was not the principles of the civil law of the empire, — it was this popular hate, which furnished the occasion for this first persecution of the Christians in Rome. But its immediate cause was something wholly accidental; and that precisely so reckless a monster as Nero must be the first persecutor of the Christians, was likewise owing immediately to a concurrence of accidental circumstances. Yet there was something intrinsically significant in the fact, that the individual by whom the renunciation of everything on the side of the divine and moral was most completely carried out, that the impersonation of creaturely will revolting against all higher order, must give the first impulse to the persecution of Christianity.

The moving cause which led Nero, in the year 64, to vent his fury against the Christians, was originally nothing else than a wish to divert

[1] Impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantes Roma expulit.

[2] We believe the passage in Tacitus, (Annal. l. XV. c. 44,) "per flagitia invisos quos vulgus Christianos appellabat," must have reference to these reports.

from himself the suspicion of being the author of the conflagration of Rome, and to fix the guilt on others; and as the Christians were already become objects of popular hatred, and the fanatic mob were prepared to believe them capable of any shameful crime that might be charged upon them, such an accusation, if brought against the Christians, would be most easily credited.[1] He could make himself popular by the sufferings inflicted on a class of men hated by the people, and at the same time secure a new gratification for his satanic cruelty. All being seized whom the popular hate had stigmatized as Christians, and therefore profligate men,[2] it might easily happen that some who were not really Christians would be included in the number.[3]

Those arrested as Christians were now, by the emperor's commands, executed in the most cruel manner. Some were crucified; others sewn up in the skins of wild beasts and exposed to be torn in pieces by dogs; others, again, had their garments smeared over with some combustible material, and were then set on fire to illuminate the public gardens at night.

This persecution was not, indeed, in its immediate effects, a general one; but fell exclusively on the Christians in Rome, accused as the incendiaries of the city. Yet what had occurred in the capital, could not fail of being attended with serious consequences affecting the situation of the Christians, — whose religion, moreover, was an unlawful one, — throughout all the provinces.

The impression which this first and truly horrible persecution, by a man who presented so noticeable a contrast with the great historical phenomenon of Christianity, left behind it, endured for a long time on the minds of the Christians. Nor was it altogether without truth, when the image of the Antichrist, — the representative of that last reaction of the power of ungodliness against the divine government and against Christianity, — was transferred to so collossal an exhibition of self-will rebelling against all holy restraints, and even passing over to the side of the unnatural,[4] as was presented in the character of Nero. It may often be observed, that the impression left by a man in whom an important principle, connected with the history of the world, has manifested

[1] Abolendo rumori subdidit reos, says Tacitus of Nero.

[2] Quos per flagitia invisos vulgus Christianos appellabat, says Tacitus.

[3] In the interpretation of Tacitus' account of this transaction, several points may be doubtful. When he says, Primo correpti, qui fatebantur, the question arises, what did they confess? — that they had set the fire, or that they were Christians? When he says, Deinde judicio eorum multitudo ingens haud perinde in crimine incendii, quam odio humani generis convicti sunt, the question occurs, does the latter refer to all, to those that "confessed," as well as the rest, — so that, by Tacitus, all are pronounced free from the alleged crime of being the authors of the conflagration; or do the words refer only to the multitudo ingens, so that the first named class, qui fatebantur, were designated as being really guilty of setting fire to the city? If the latter be the case, and if the *fateri* is to be referred to the *incendium*, and this account deserves confidence throughout, we must conceive here of persons actually employed by Nero for the perpetration of the deed; — not Christians, but such as the people designated by the name of Christians, — hated, abominable men. These, perhaps with the hope of bettering their fate, may then have denounced many others as Christians, among whom may have been some who really were, and others who were not such.

[4] A characteristic trait of Nero as described by Tacitus, — "incredibilium cupitor." Annal. l. XV. c. 42.

itself, or from whom a great power of destruction has gone forth, is not so immediately effaced, nor room allowed for the thought that such a person has really ceased to exist; as we see in the examples of the emperor Frederic II., and of Napoleon. So it was in the case of this monstrous exhibition of the power of evil. The rumor prevailed among the heathen people, that Nero was not dead, but had retired to some place of secrecy, from which he would again make his appearance,[1] — a rumor which several adventurers and impostors took advantage of for their own ends. Now this rumor assumed also a Christian dress, and it ran, that Nero had retired beyond the Euphrates, and would return as the Antichrist,[2] to finish what he had already begun, the destruction of that Babylon, the capital of the world.

Since the despotic Domitian, who ascended the imperial throne in 81, was in the practice of encouraging informers, and of removing out of the way, under various pretexts, those persons who had excited his suspicions or his cupidity, the charge of embracing Christianity would, in this reign, be the most common one after that of high treason (crimen majestatis.[3]) In consequence of such accusations, many were condemned to death, or to the confiscation of their property and banishment to an island.[4]

The emperor moreover was secretly informed that two individuals were living in Palestine, of the race of David and Jesus, who were engaged in seditious undertakings. The seditious tendency of the Jewish expectations of a Messiah were already well known, and the language of the Christians, in speaking of the kingdom of Christ, was often misunderstood.[5] He caused the individuals who had been accused to be brought before him, and convinced himself that they were poor, innocent countrymen, quite incapable of engaging in any political schemes; he therefore allowed them to return in peace to their homes.[6] But from this, certainly, it cannot be inferred, that the emperor revoked those measures which had been adopted against the Christians generally, and which had another motive.[7]

The emperor Nerva, who assumed the government in the year 96, was by the natural justice and philanthropy of his character, an enemy to that whole system of information and sycophancy which had been the occasion of so much evil in the time of his predecessors. This of

[1] The words of Tacitus are: Vario super exitu ejus rumore eoque pluribus vivere eum fingentibus credentibusque. Hist. l. II. c. 8.

[2] In the Pseudo-Sibylline books: Εἶτ' ἀνακάμψει ἰσάζων θεῷ αὐτόν.

[3] The words of Dio Cassius, l. LXVII. c. 14: Ἔγκλημα ἀθεότητος, ὑφ' ἧς καὶ ἄλλοι εἰς τὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἤθη ἐξοκέλλοντες πολλοὶ κατεδικάσθησαν. The uniting of the charge of ἀθεότης with that of an inclination to Jewish customs, may have allusion to Christianity, if ἀθεότης is not to be understood as barely referring to the denial of the gods of the state religion. At all events, the charge of ἀθεότης, if applied to the embracing of Judaism, which was at least the worship of a well-known national god, and for the Jews a lawful religion, could, a fortiori, be brought against the conversion to Christianity.

[4] Besides Dio Cassius, another historian cited in the chronicle of Eusebius, namely, Bruttius, says that many suffered martyrdom under the reign of this emperor.

[5] For evidence of this, see Justin Martyr, (Apolog. l. II. c. 58.) Ἀκούσαντες βασιλείαν προσδοκῶντας ἡμᾶς, ἀκρίτως ἀνθρώπινον λέγειν ἡμᾶς ὑπειλήφατε.

[6] Hegesippus in Euseb. l. III. c. 19 and 20.

[7] Tertullian certainly expresses himself in too general a manner, when he says, (Apologet. c 5,) that Domitian made but one attempt to persecute the Christians; but that he desisted from his purpose, and recalled those that had been banished.

itself was favorable to the Christians, inasmuch as the crime of passing over to their religion had been one of the most common subjects of accusation. Nerva set at liberty those who had been condemned on charges of this nature, and recalled such as had been banished; he caused all the slaves and freedmen, who had appeared as accusers of their masters, to be executed. He forbade generally the accusations of slaves against their masters to be received. All this must have operated favorably on the Christians, as the complaints brought against them proceeded frequently from ill-disposed slaves. Accusations on such accounts as had furnished the matter of the great number of condemnations under the preceding reign, were in general no longer to be allowed; and among these Christianity was probably included.[1] Thus it is true, the complaints against the Christians must, during the short reign of Nerva, have been suspended; yet no lasting tranquillity was secured to them, since their religion was not recognized by any public act as a *religio licita;* and we may easily conceive, that if Christianity, during these few years, could be diffused without opposition, the fury of its enemies, which had been held in check, would break forth with fresh violence on this emperor's death.

These consequences ensued under the reign of Trajan, after the year 99; since this emperor, a statesman in the Roman sense, could not overlook the encroachments on all sides of a religious community so entirely repugnant in its character to the Roman spirit. And the law issued by him against close associations, (the Hetæriæ,) for the purpose of suppressing the factious element in many districts, might easily be turned against the Christians, who formed a party so closely united together. It was at this time, (A. D. 110,) that the younger Pliny, whose noble susceptibility to all purely human feelings shines forth so amiably in his letters, came, as proconsul of Bithynia and Pontus, into countries over which many Christians were dispersed. A great number of them were arraigned before his tribunal. He was thrown into embarrassment, as he had never before taken a share in such transactions; as there was no settled law on the matter, except the general principles of the civil law of the empire, relating to "religiones novæ et peregrinæ," and as the number of the accused was so great; "for many," he writes to the emperor, "of all ages, of every rank, and of both sexes would be involved in the danger; for the contagion of this superstition has seized not only cities, but also the villages and open country." The temples were deserted, the ordinary rites of worship could not for a long time be celebrated, and victims for sacrifice were rarely purchased.[2] Pliny, like a lover of justice, did not allow himself to prejudge the case, but took all pains to inform himself as to the character of the Christian sect. He questioned such as had for many years been separated from the Christian community, and apostates are usually little inclined to

[1] Dio Cassius mentions, in connection with the crimen majestatis, the charge of ἀσέβεια, also of the Ἰουδαϊκὸς βιός, although certainly by ἀσέβεια, we are not to understand the ἀθεότης, or Christianity.

[2] Plin. l. X. ep. 97. Prope jam desolata templa, sacra solennia diu intermissa, victimæ, quarum adhuc rarissimus emtor inveniebatur.

speak well of the society to which they formerly belonged. Following the brutal custom of Roman justice, which paid no regard to man's universal rights, he applied torture to two female slaves, who held the office of deaconesses in the Christian communities, for the purpose of extorting from them the truth. And after all he could learn only, that the Christians were in the custom of meeting together on a certain day, (Sunday;) that they then united in a hymn of praise to their God, Christ; and that they bound one another,[1] — not to the commission of crimes,[2] — but to refrain from theft, from adultery; to be faithful in performing their promises, to withhold from none the property intrusted to their keeping;[3] that after this they separated, and met again in the evening at a simple and innocent meal.[4] But these latter assemblies had been discontinued in compliance with the emperor's edict against the Hetæriæ.

If we compare Pliny with his friend Tacitus, so far as it concerns their relation to Christianity, the former distinguishes himself at once by the greater freedom and impartiality of his judgment. Tacitus, without entering into any further investigation of the facts, allows himself to be swayed by his prejudices against everything not Roman, against a religion coming from the Jews, the founder of which had been executed by the order of a Roman governor, a religion which found so many adherents among people of the lower class; he is carried away by the popular reports which fell in with those prejudices. He reckons Christianity among the many new and bad customs, which from all quarters of the world flowed together and found sympathy in the great capital, Rome.[5] He sees in it nothing but an exitiabilis superstitio, — in the Christians, only homines per flagitiis invisos, — men hateful for their crimes, and who deserved the severest punishments.[6] Pliny does not allow himself to be hurried at once to a conclusion by his own prejudices or prevailing rumors. He considers it his duty to enter into a careful investigation of the case, before he decides. The result of his inquiry was favorable to the Christians, in so far as the judgment was based on purely moral grounds, and the general right of mankind to freedom in the worship of God was recognized. But Pliny shares in common with Tacitus the partial and contracted views of the Roman statesman, which prevented him from taking that elevated stand. He sees in a religion which absorbs the whole interest of men, and makes them forget everything else, nothing but a superstitio prava,[7] — or as we might express it, by converting the phrase into modern language, a misty pietism. He requires, inasmuch as he looks upon religion as a matter of the state, unconditional obedience to the laws of the empire.

[1] An allusion to the baptismal vow, the sacramentum militiæ Christianæ, to which there is frequent reference in the practical homilies.

[2] A plain contradiction of those popular rumors respecting the objects had in view in the secret assemblies among the Christians.

[3] Whoever by such a sin violated his baptismal vow, was excluded from the fellowship of the church.

[4] Plainly in contradiction of the popular rumors respecting those unnatural repasts of the Christians, the epulæ Thyesteæ.

[5] Quo cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda confluunt celebranturque.

[6] Sontes et novissima exempla meritos.

[7] Not *exitiabilis*, because he was obliged to acknowledge that the Christians were blameless in their lives.

With the character of the religion he has nothing to do. Whatever that might be, defiance of the imperial laws must be severely punished.[1]

The Christians must deny their faith, invoke the gods, offer incense and pour out libations before the image of the emperor, together with the images of the gods, and curse Christ. If they declined so to do, and, after having been thrice called upon, by the governor, to abjure their faith, continued steadfastly to confess that they were Christians and would remain so, Pliny condemned them to death, as obstinate confessors of a religio illicita, who dared publicly defy the laws of the empire. They who complied with the governor's terms, were pardoned.

It is no matter of wonder, considering the rapid and powerful spread of Christianity in this country, if the faith of many, who had come over to the religion during the peaceful times of Nerva, was of no such nature as to stand the trial of persecution. Sudden and extensive conversions of this kind are not apt to prove the most thorough. So was it in the present case; many who had embraced Christianity, or were on the point of embracing it, drew back at the threatening prospect of death, and the consequences of this change were visible in the increase of the numbers who participated in the public religious ceremonies.

In observing the effect of his measures, Pliny fell into the same mistake into which statesmen, crafty in all other things, have often fallen, with regard to concerns which stand related to what is highest and most free in human nature. The happy issue which for the moment seemed to attend the course he had chosen, led him to hope that by degrees the new sect might easily be suppressed, if the same method should continue to be pursued; if severity were suitably blended with mildness; if the obstinate were punished to terrify the others, while such as were disposed to retract, were not driven to desperation by the refusal of pardon.

In submitting the report of these transactions to the emperor Trajan,[2] he requested his advice particularly on the following questions: whether a distinction was to be made of different ages, or the young and tender were to be treated precisely in the same way with the more mature?[3] whether any time was to be allowed for repentance, or every person who had once been a Christian was in every case to be punished? whether the Christians were liable to punishment simply as such, or only on account of other offences? It is plain, from the judicial proceedings of Pliny above described, how most of these questions ought, according to his own view of the case, to be answered; and the emperor approved of these proceedings; moreover, in deciding the questions submitted to his authority, he went on the same principles. The Christians, he did not place in the same class with ordinary crim-

[1] His words are: Neque enim dubitabam, qualecunque esset, quod faterentur, pervicaciam certe et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri.

[2] L. X. ep. 97. This report of Pliny, which we have followed thus far, bears the indubitable marks of genuineness on its face. No one but the Roman statesman could *so* write on the affair.

[3] This question was probably occasioned by the fact that *many children and youth* (see above) were found among the Christians

mals, for whom the governors in the provinces caused search to be made by the police.[1] They were not to be sought after; but when information was lodged against them, and they were arraigned before the tribunal, they must be punished. In *what way*, the emperor does not explain; he even admits that on this point no certain rule of general application, could be given.[2] It appears, however, that the punishment was generally understood to be death. Moreover, Trajan accorded pardon to such as manifested repentance.

As early a Christian writer as Tertullian found that this decision involved a contradiction. If the emperor considered the Christians as guilty, he ought to have directed that, like all other criminals, they should be sought out and delivered over to punishment; if he regarded them as innocent, punishment was in all cases alike unjust. Without doubt, a correct judgment, when the matter is considered in its purely moral aspect; but this was not the view of it taken by the emperor. He stood in the position of a *politician* and a *judge*, governed by the laws of the Roman State. He was of the opinion, that open contempt of the "Roman ceremonies," open resistance to the laws of the empire, could not be suffered, in any case, to go unpunished, even though no act was connected with it of a *morally* punishable nature.[3] Thus the emperor believed himself *obliged* to proceed, whenever such unlawful conduct attracted public attention; but he wished, as far as possible, to ignore it, so that *indulgence* might be exercised to the full extent compatible with due regard for the laws. Agreeing with Pliny, that Christianity was but a fanatic delusion, *he* too probably imagined, that if severity were tempered with clemency, if too much notice were not to be taken of the matter, and if open offences were neither suffered to go unpunished, nor prosecuted with rigor, the hot enthusiasm would easily cool to indifference, and the cause gradually expire of its own accord. If Christianity had possessed no higher principle, the result would have justified the emperor's opinion.

The change produced by the rescript of Trajan was this: Christianity, which hitherto had *tacitly* passed for an "unlawful religion," (a religio illicita,) was now condemned as such by an *express law*.[4]

[1] The εἰρηνάρχους, Curiosos.

[2] Neque enim in universum aliquid, quod quasi certam formam habeat, constitui potest.

[3] Like Pliny; see his language cited on page 99, note 1.

[4] According to a document preserved in the chronicle of Johannes Malalas, (l. XI. p. 273, ed Niebuhr,) Tiberianus, Præfect of Palestina prima, had informed the emperor, that the Christians offered themselves in crowds, and that nothing could be accomplished by the effusion of blood. Moved by this information, the emperor issued a new edict, forbidding the execution of the Christians. Against the authenticity of the writing here communicated, we would not adduce the name "Galileans," which is applied to the Christians in no other document of *this period*. There might have been some particular local reason for the employment of this name. But when Tiberian says, that he had not become tired of destroying the Christians, this assuredly does not agree very well with the above-cited rescript of Trajan, which expressly commands that the Christians should *not be sought after*. And the statement that the Christians hastened to surrender themselves, hardly agrees with the times. It was the more violent persecutions, which first called forth such an enthusiastic tendency. Neither can we regard the report of the martyrdom of the bishop Ignatius of Antioch as a document belonging to this period In this narrative we do not recognize the Emperor Trajan, and therefore feel ourselves compelled to entertain doubts, with regard to every thing reported in this account; as, for example, that Christians were already, in the reign of this emperor, thrown to wild beasts.

It was the emperor's design, that the Christians should be subjected only to legal trials; but the impulse had been now given to a movement to which no limits could be fixed. With the political opposition associated itself the religious, which exercises a vastly greater power on men's passions. The open war of paganism with the spiritual might that threatened its destruction was lighted up. The fanatical rage of the populace imagined it had found a point of union and support in the laws, and the Christians were laid bare to their assaults. These commenced in the first years of the government of Hadrian, who was elevated to the imperial throne in 117. There were governors who looked on the shedding of human blood with indifference, and who were very ready to sacrifice persecuted men to the popular fury, in order to gain for themselves the good will of their provinces, or who also shared in the fanaticism of the people. They might the more easily believe they could pursue this course with impunity, or even with the emperor's approbation, because they knew he was ardently attached to the sacred customs (the sacra) of his country. When, in the year 124, he made a tour through Greece, and procured himself to be initiated into all the Hellenic mysteries, the enemies of Christianity thought it a favorable opportunity to begin their persecutions of the hated sect. The two learned Christians, Quadratus and Aristides, were hence induced to present, each of them, to the emperor, an apology in behalf of their companions in the faith. But a still greater influence than could possibly have come from such apologetic writings, was doubtless produced on an emperor who loved justice and social order, by the representations of Serrenius Granianus, proconsul of Asia Minor, who complained of the disorderly attacks of the populace on the Christians. In consequence of this complaint, the emperor issued a rescript to his successor in office, Minucius Fundanus.[1]

Hadrian declared himself decidedly against a practice, whereby the innocent might be disturbed, and opportunity would be given to false accusors of extorting money by threatening to bring before the tribunal such as were suspected of Christianity.[2] No accusations against

[1] The genuineness of the rescript is proved, not only by its being cited in an apology which the bishop Melito of Sardis addressed to the second successor of this emperor, (Euseb. l. IV. c. 26,) but still more clearly by *its contents;* for it cannot be supposed, that a Christian would have been contented with saying so little to the advantage of his fellow-believers. That Hadrian treated the Christians with gentleness, appears evident from the praise bestowed on him by some Christian, who probably wrote not long after this time, in the fifth book of the Pseudo-Sibyllines: *Ἀργυρόκρανος ἀνὴρ, τῷ δ' ἔσσεταί τ' οὔνομα πόντου, ἔσται καὶ πανάριστος ἀνὴρ καὶ πάντα νοήσει.*

[2] I am of the opinion that Rufinus had before him the Latin original, but that Eusebius, as usual, has not translated with sufficient accuracy. Eusebius says, (l. VI. c. 9.) *ἵνα μὴ τοῖς συκοφανταις χορηγία κακουργίας παρασχεθῇ.* Rufinus, ne calumniatoribus latrocinandi tribuatur occasio. It is not easy to see, how it could ever occur to Rufinus to translate the general term, *κακουργία*, into the special one, latrocinatio, when the context furnished no occasion whatsoever for such a change; while on the other hand, it is easy to see how Eusebius might loosely employ a general term to express the special one of the original. Latrocinari is here synonymous with concutere elsewhere. Tertullian's words to the Governor Scapula, when the latter began to appear as a persecutor, may serve to explain the sense: Parce provinciæ, quæ, visa intentione tua, obnoxia facta est concussioni bus et militum et inimicorum suorum cujusque.

Christians were to be received, but such as were in the legal form; the Christians were no longer to be arrested on mere popular clamor. When legally brought to trial, and convicted of doing contrary to the laws,[1] they were to be punished according to their deserts; but a severe punishment was also to be inflicted on false accusers. Similar rescripts were sent by the emperor to many other provinces.[2] If by "doing contrary to the laws" in this rescript, were meant criminal conduct, or any infraction of civil order, without reference to religion, we should be obliged to consider it as a proper edict of toleration, whereby Christianity was received into the class of "lawful religions;" but had this been the emperor's intention, he would certainly have explained more distinctly what was meant by acts contrary to the laws. After the rescript of Trajan, a particular declaration, distinctly expressed, was required, unless the silence itself was to be permitted to operate to the disadvantage of the Christians.[3] Hadrian's rescript was properly directed only against the attacks of the excited populace on such as were reported to be Christians; it only required a legal form of trial, which had been also the will of Trajan. At best, the vague expressions of the rescript might be turned to the advantage of the Christians, by those who were so disposed.[4] It was not so much his regard for Christianity, or the Christian people, as his love of justice, that led the emperor to the adoption of these measures; for Hadrian, as we have already remarked, was a strict and zealous follower of the old Roman, and, it may be added, the old Grecian religions, and looked upon the sacred rites of foreigners with disdain.[5] This temper of mind shines out through the remarkable letter which the emperor wrote to the Consul Servianus.[6] It is true, Christianity, in itself, forms no part of the subject of this letter, but is only introduced by the way. He is speaking simply of the multifarious and restless activity of the Alexandrians, of their *polypragmatic* character, and of the peculiar religious *syncretism*, which had sprung up in that common centre of the commerce of the world. A vein of sarcasm runs through the whole. "Those who worship Serapis," says Hadrian, "are Christians, and those who call themselves bishops of Christ, are worshipers of Serapis. There is no ruler of a synagogue, no Samaritan, no presbyter of

[1] Eos adversum leges quicquam agere.

[2] According to Melito of Sardis See Euseb. l. IV. c. 26.

[3] If Melito of Sardis (l. c.) says afterwards to the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, that his predecessors had honored Christianity together with other modes of worship, πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλαις θρησκείαις ἐτίμησαν, very little can be inferred from this; for whoever claimed an emperor's protection for Christianity, would naturally make the most of what had been done, or seemed to have been done, for the Christians, by his predecessors.

[4] Tertullian (ad Scapulam, c. 5,) cites the examples of two magistrates who took advantage of this rescript, to procure the acquittal of Christians. Vespronius Candidus dismissed a Christian who had been arraigned before him, because it was contrary to good order to follow the clamor of the multitude, (quasi tumultuosum civibus satisfacere.) Another, Pudens, observing from the protocol (elogium) with which a Christian was sent over to him, that he had been seized in a disorderly manner and with threats, (concussione ejus intellecta,) dismissed him, with the remark, that in conformity with the laws, he could not hear men, where there was no certain, legal accuser.

[5] Vid. Ælius Spartian. vita Hadriani c. 22.

[6] Flavii Vopisci Saturninus, c. 8

the Christians, who is not an astrologer, a soothsayer. The patriarch of the Jews himself, when he comes to Egypt, is forced by one party to worship Serapis, by the other, Christ.[1] They have but one God, who is none. Him, Christians, Jews, and all races, worship alike."[2] He touches on Christianity, merely as one element in this mixture of religions. The picture floating before his mind is rather the general aspect of Alexandrian life, or such exhibitions of it as might be presented, for example, in Gnostic sects, which started into existence there as purely Christian communities. At the same time, it is impossible not to perceive from this description, how *very* far Hadrian was from respecting Christianity, or *monotheistic* religion generally.

The account, therefore, appears incredible, which we have from a historian belonging to the early part of the fourth century, Ælius Lampridius,[3] that the emperor had it in view to place Christ among the Roman gods, and hence caused to be erected, in all the cities, temples without images, which were called "Hadrian's temples" (templa Hadriani)[4]; but that he was prevented, by the representations of the priests, from carrying out his design. This report probably sprung from the same source with that of so many other fictitious legends, — the desire of accounting for something, the true cause of which was unknown; in the present case, from the desire of explaining the object of these temples, which had been left unfinished. United with this, was the exaggerated opinion, resting on a few misapprehended facts, of the emperor's favorable disposition towards Christianity. On so slender a foundation, men thought themselves warranted to transfer to this emperor a mode of thinking which they found in others who came after him, — as, for instance, in Alexander Severus.

Under this government, so favorable to the Christians in the Roman empire, they suffered a serious persecution in another quarter. A certain Barcochba, — who pretended to be the Messiah, and under whom, as their leader, the Jews once more revolted against the Romans, — endeavored to prevail on the Christians in Palestine to renounce their faith, and join in the insurrection. Failing of his purpose, he caused those that fell into his hands to be executed in the most cruel manner.

After the death of Hadrian, A. D. 138, the rescripts issued by him lost their power; at the same time, under the government of his successor, Antoninus Pius, various public calamities, famine, an inundation of the Tiber, earthquakes in Asia Minor and in the island of Rhodes, ravaging fires at Rome, Antioch and Carthage, rekindled the popular fury against the Christians to greater violence than ever.[5] The mild and philanthropic emperor could not approve of such injurious treat-

[1] Illi, qui Serapim colunt, Christiani sunt, et devoti sunt Serapi, qui se Christi episcopos dicunt. Nemo illic archisynagogus Judæorum, nemo Samarites, nemo Christianorum presbyter non mathematicus, non haruspex, non aliptes. Compare this with Juvenal's description of the braggart disposition, the boastful pretension to clear understanding of all matters, which characterized the class whom he calls "Græculi." Sat. III. v. 75.

[2] Unus illis Deus nullus est. Hunc Christiani, hunc Judæi, hunc omnes venerantur et gentes.

[3] Alex. Sever. c. 24.

[4] Ἀδριανεῖα, mentioned already in Aristid orat. sacr. 1.

[5] Julii Capitolini vita Antonini Pii, c. 9.

ment of a part of his subjects. In different rescripts, addressed to Grecian States, he declared himself wholly opposed to these violent proceedings. The indulgence shown by this emperor to the Christians would appear to have been carried to a still greater length, might we regard as genuine a rescript ascribed in all probability to him, (not to his successor, Marcus Aurelius,) — the rescript to the Assembly of Deputies in Asia Minor, (πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῆς Ἀσίας;) for in this he declares expressly, that the Christians were to be punished only when convicted of political crimes; that, on the other hand, whoever accused them on the score of their religion, should be liable himself to prosecution. But the author of this rescript speaks rather the language of a Christian than of a pagan emperor, especially of one whose distinguishing praise was his "singular and scrupulous regard for the public ceremonies," (insignis erga cærimonias publicas cura et religio. Fabretti marmor.) The succeeding history, moreover, does not testify to the existence of such an edict.[1]

Under the reign of the succeeding emperor, Marcus Aurelius the philosopher, A. D. 161, many public calamities occurred, particularly a destructive pestilence, whose ravages gradually extended from Ethiopia through the entire Roman empire as far as Gaul. Such events could not fail to produce the same injurious impression of hostility to the enemies of the gods, on the feelings of the multitude. It was during this time, the magician Alexander stirred up the zeal of the people for their gods, promising them miraculous aid from these higher powers, and exasperating their hatred against the Christians. If the persecutions of this reign, however, had sprung only from the popular fury, and if Aurelius had been similarly disposed with his predecessors, this fury might have been restrained also under the influence of his administration. But, on the contrary, we now see the higher authorities of the state leagued together with the people in the cause of oppression. In Asia Minor, the Christians were persecuted with such extreme violence, that Melito, bishop of Sardis, who appeared as their advocate before the emperor, said,[2] "the race of God's worshipers in this country are persecuted as they never were before, by *new edicts;* for the shameless sycophants, greedy of others' possessions, — since they are furnished by these edicts with an opportunity of so doing, — plunder their innocent victims day and night. And let it be right, if it is done by your command, since a just emperor will never resolve on any unjust measure; and we will cheerfully bear the honorable lot of such a death. Yet we would submit this single petition, that you would inform yourself respecting the people who excite this contention, and impartially decide whether they deserve punishment and death, or deliverance and peace. But if this resolve, and this new edict, — an edict which ought not so

[1] Eusebius, it is true, says that Melito of Sardis refers to this rescript in his apology addressed to the succeeding emperor. But it is remarkable, that Melito, in the fragment introduced by Eusebius, *fails* to quote *this* rescript, though it would have been far more favorable to the Christians than the edict he actually cites. Euseb. l. c.

[2] Euseb. l. IV. c. 26.

to be issued even against hostile barbarians, — comes from yourself, we pray you the more not to leave us exposed to such public robbery."

These words of Melito, in which he shows no less of Christian dignity than of Christian prudence, lead us to several reflections. Already, after the edict of Trajan, *Christians once accused might be punished with death;* and this edict had never been officially revoked, though the clemency of the last emperors may have operated to prevent its being rigorously executed. But Melito says, that a new and terrible edict had been issued by the proconsul, *inviting men to lodge informations against the Christians.* This is the more extraordinary, as it happens to be under the government of an emperor who was by no means inclined to the disorderly practice of information,[1] and as it appears to have been the policy of Aurelius, in other cases, to diminish the penalties affixed to crimes by the laws.[2] And we can hardly suppose the proconsul would venture to issue a new edict on his own responsibility. Indeed, Melito himself seems not to have believed otherwise, than that the edict proceeded from the emperor. His expressions of doubt were necessary, to enable him, with due respect for the imperial authority, to invite a repeal of the obnoxious edict.

Perhaps by glancing at the philosophical and religious system of Marcus Aurelius, considered in its relation to Christianity, we shall be prepared to understand better his views and conduct with regard to it. The Stoic philosophy was not calculated to make him a friend to the Christians. What he esteemed as the highest attainment, was that composure in view of death, which proceeded from cool reflection, from conviction on scientific grounds — the resignation of the sage, ready to surrender even personal existence to the annihilation demanded by the iron law of the universal whole. But a thing altogether unintelligible to him, was the enthusiasm, springing out of a living faith, and a well-assured hope, grounded on that faith, with which the Christians met death. A conviction which by arguments of reason could not be communicated to all, appeared to him as nothing but fanaticism; and the way in which many Christians, really under fanatical excitement, even courted death, might confirm him in these views. He, too, like Pliny and Trajan, could see nothing in disobedience to the laws of the empire on matters of religion, but blind obstinacy.

Let us quote the emperor's own language respecting the Christians, as we find it in his Meditations.[3] "The soul," he says, "when it must depart from the body, should be ready to be extinguished, to be dispersed, or to subsist a while longer with the body. But this readiness must proceed from its own judgment, and not from mere obstinacy,[4] as with the Christians; it must be arrived at with reflection and dignity, so that you could even convince another, without declamation." Judging the Christians from this point of view, though he found them guilty, in other respects, of nothing immoral, though he could hardly credit the popular rumors which had been so often refuted, yet he might still

[1] Julii Capitolini vita, c. 11.
[2] L. c. c. 24.
[3] L. XI. c. 3.
[4] Μὴ κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν, ἀπραγῴδως pervicacia, obstinatio.

regard them as enthusiasts, dangerous to social order; and when he observed how Christianity, under the least mild governments, was continually making encroachments on all sides, he might consider himself called upon to check its further progress by energetic measures.

We must see in Marcus Aurelius, not barely the Roman statesman and the Stoic philosopher, but also the man of a child-like piety of disposition, for which he was indebted, as he tells us himself,[1] to the influence of a pious mother on his education; and assuredly, he had received in this way something of more substantial worth than an abstract religion of reason could have given him. To the question, (often proposed to the Christians,) where have you seen the gods, or whence know you their *existence*, that you so reverence them? he answers; "in the first place, they make themselves visible even to the eye of sense;" — where we may suppose he had in mind, either those visible deities, the heavenly bodies, or, what is more probable, appearances of the gods in visions and dreams. "But again, I have never seen my own soul, and yet I respect it. So too I come to know the existence of the gods, because I constantly experience the effects of their power, and hence I reverence them."[2] And certainly there was truth lying at the ground of those experiences, although Marcus Aurelius knew not the "unknown God" from whom they came, and to whom they were designed to lead him, as the God of revelation; as for example, when he says, on a retrospect of the divine providence which had guided him along from childhood, "so far as it depended on the gods, on the influences coming from them, on their aids and suggestions, I might have attained already to a life in harmony with nature; but if I still fall short of this mark, it is my own fault, and must be ascribed to my neglect of following the admonitions, I might almost say, the express instructions, of the gods."[3] We find traces in his writings of an honest self-examination; we see how very far he was from confounding *himself* with the ideal of the wise man, how the sense of his own deficiency disposed him to gentleness towards others. It is true, such kind of self-knowledge, which, for others, led the way to Christianity, could not conduct him thither, because he was skilful in interpreting those inner experiences by his Stoic doctrine of fatalism, which made the bad necessary, no less than the good, to the realization of the harmony of the universe. And in this view, also, he found comfort in a stoical resignation; for says he, "When you see others sin, reflect that you also sin in various ways, and are just such as they. And though you abstain from many sinful actions, yet you have within, the inclination to commit them, though you may be restrained from indulging it, by fear, by vanity, or some similar motive."[4] He belonged to the class of those, who, like the Platonists above mentioned, were seeking for a middle way between superstition and infidelity. He desired a cheerful piety, without superstition. He believed honestly, as appears evident from the passages above cited, in the reality of the gods,

[1] Παρὰ τῆς μητρὸς τὸ θεοσεβές.
[2] L. XII c. 28.
[3] L. I. c. 17.
[4] L. XI. c. 18

and of their appearances. With other devout pagans of his time, he was convinced that the gods revealed in dreams, sent to those that honored them, the knowledge of remedies for bodily disease, and imagined that he had experienced such assistance himself in several cases of sickness.[1] When the pestilence, already mentioned, was raging in Italy, he looked upon it as a warning to restore the ancient worship in its minutest particulars. He summoned priests from all quarters to Rome, and even put off his expedition against the Marcomannians, for the purpose of celebrating the religious solemnities by which he hoped that the evil might be averted.[2] The multitude of victims which he caused to be sacrificed in the preparation for that war, provoked ridicule, even from many of the pagans.[3]

It may easily be explained, then, how an emperor, with the love of justice and the gentleness which we see expressed in the actions and writings of Marcus Aurelius, could yet, from a political and a religious interest, become a persecutor of the Christians. We have a law from him, which condemns to banishment on an island, those "that do any thing whereby a superstitious fear of the deity could be insinuated into men's excitable minds."[4] That this law was pointed at the Christians, cannot, indeed, be *asserted;* inasmuch as there were, under this government, an unusual number of magicians and popular impostors, by whose practices such a law may have been called forth. But it may easily be conceived, that Marcus Aurelius, like Celsus, who wrote at that time against the Christians, would not scruple to place the latter in the same class with the others. This prince was inclined to pardon such as confessed their crimes and showed signs of penitence, even in cases where he could have punished without being severe.[5] But the Christians could not be induced to acknowledge they had done wrong; they rather persisted in that which was forbidden by the laws. It was, perhaps, for this reason, the emperor directed that every means should be employed to constrain them to a renunciation of their faith; and only in the last extremity, when they could not be forced to submit, was the punishment of death to be inflicted. But an ill-advised humanity, aiming to spare the effusion of human blood, might easily become the occasion of much cruelty.

Bringing together what offers itself to our notice as peculiar in the character of the persecutions of this time, we find two things particularly worthy of remark: *first*, that *search* was made for the Christians, by express command; although, indeed, such search was often anticipated by the popular fury. We have seen above, that, according to Trajan's rescript, the Christians were expressly distinguished from those criminals for whom it was the duty of the provincial authorities to make search. Now, on the contrary, diligent search was made for them; and they were often obliged to conceal themselves to save their

[1] L. I. c. 17.

[2] Jul. Capitol. c. 13 et 21.

[3] Hence the epigram, *οἱ λευκοὶ βόες Μάρκῳ τῷ Καίσαρι; ἂν σὺ νικήσῃς, ἡμεῖς ἀπωλόμεθα.* Ammian. Marcellin. l. XXV. c. 4.

[4] Relegandum ad insulam qui aliquid fecerit, quo leves hominum animi superstitione numinis terreantur, in the Pandects.

[5] See the example in Capitolinus, cap. 13.

lives, as appears from the several accounts of the persecutions, and from the assertions of Celsus.[1] *Next*, the practice hitherto had been this: *when the Christians accused, after repeated summons, persisted in refusing to deny their faith, they were executed without torture.* Now it was attempted to force them to a denial by tortures. An edict which agrees in all respects with this practice, is still extant, under the name of the Emperor *Aurelian*,[2] and as in style and contents it bears every mark of authenticity, may, doubtless, be the edict against the Christians, originally addressed by this emperor (Aurelius) to the presidents of the provinces. It runs thus: "We have heard that the laws are violated by those who in our times call themselves Christians. Let them be arrested; and unless they offer to the gods, let them be punished with divers tortures; yet so that justice may be mingled with severity, and that the punishment may cease, as soon as the end is gained of extirpating the crimes." The last clause is altogether in the character of Marcus Aurelius. The governors were to keep steadily in view the one object, which was to put down Christianity in its collision with the State religion, and to bring men back to the worship of the Roman gods. They were not to act by the promptings of blind passion; but even such a clause was plainly insufficient to place a check on cruel and arbitrary measures.[3]

We proceed now, under the guidance of authentic records, to take a

[1] Celsus, speaking of the Christians, that not without reason they do every thing in concealment: Ἅτε διωθούμενοι τὴν ἐπηρτημένην αὐτοῖς δίκην τοῦ θανάτου. L. I. c. 1. Ἥτοι φεύγοντες καὶ κρυπτόμενοι ἢ ἁλισκόμενοι καὶ ἀπολλύμενοι. L. VIII. c. 41. Ὑμῶν δὲ κἂν πλανᾶται τις ἔτι λανθάνων, ἀλλὰ ζητεῖται πρὸς θανάτου δίκην. L. VIII. c. 69.

[2] A name which, as Pagi and Ruinart rightly conjectured, probably stands for *Aurelius*.

[3] The edict, which is preserved to us in the actis Symphoriani, of which we shall afterwards speak, reads in the original as follows: "Aurelianus Imperator omnibus administratoribus suis atque rectoribus. Comperimus ab his, qui se temporibus nostris Christianos dicunt, legum præcepta violari. Hos comprehensos, nisi diis nostris sacrificaverint, diversis punite cruciatibus, quatenus habeat districtio prolata justitiam et in resecandis criminibus ultio terminata jam finem." Certainly no unprejudiced person can suppose this edict to be spurious, as there was no imaginable end to be gained by a forgery, as it is conceived wholly in the spirit of pagan statesmen, and expressed in the official language of the times. If it belonged to the age of Aurelian, whose name it bears, the martyr in whose history it stands, must have perished in that reign. But it can hardly be assumed, that the persecution under this emperor proceeded so far as to the effusion of Christian blood, (see beyond.) The manner, too, in which the Christians are spoken of, as a sect by no means old, suits better to the time of M. Aurelius than that of Aurelian, when the Christian sect had now been so long known. The charge brought against the Christians, that by the exercise of their religion they violated the laws of the empire, would hardly be so stated in the time of Aurelian, since Christianity had at that time been already for the space of fifteen years admitted into the class of "religiones licitæ." No doubt, therefore, Aurelius is the proper reading, instead of Aurelianus, such names being frequently confounded with each other. But Lucius Aurelius Commodus is out of the question, since he was well disposed towards the Christians. So it can only be M. Aurelius Antoninus. What Gieseler has said against this hypothesis, in the second vol. of his Church History, (2 te Auflage, S. 134,) does *not* suffice, to say the least, to invalidate the above reasoning. The language of the concluding clause is somewhat singular, it is true, for the age of the Antonines; yet I find nothing in particular in it, which is quite foreign to the Latinity of that age; and it by no means seems so clear to me that the Emperor M. Aurelius would not have employed the words *rectores* (rector provinciæ see Tacit. Annal. l. II. c. 4,) and *administratores*, as common terms to designate the various governors.

nearer view of the manner in which these persecutions were conducted in the provinces, and of the behavior of the Christians under them.

We have first to notice that which befel the church of Smyrna, in 167, and in which the aged and venerable Bishop Polycarp, a disciple of the Apostle John, gave up his life. Of this persecution we have a detailed account, in a circular letter addressed by the church of Smyrna to other Christian churches.[1] The proconsul of Asia Minor, at that time, does not appear to have been personally hostile to the Christians; but the heathen populace, with whom the lower class of Jews had united themselves, were fiercely hot against them. The proconsul yielded to the popular violence and to the demands of the law. He endeavored to move the Christians by threats, by displaying before them the instruments of torture, and the savage animals to which they were to be thrown, to deny their faith; if they remained firm, he condemned them to death. In one respect, he certainly evinced too ready a compliance with the ferocious will of the people. He chose deaths that were painful and ignominious; such as being thrown to wild beasts or perishing at the stake — punishments he was not compelled to resort to by the laws. Yet it must be allowed, that if the laws denounced death in general terms, as the penalty for perseverance in Christianity, it was considered right to assume, that such as were not Roman citizens ought to suffer a more painful death than those who were.[2]

Under the most agonizing torments, calculated to excite pity even in pagan bystanders, the Christians displayed great tranquillity and composure. "They made it evident to us all," says the church, "that in the midst of those sufferings, they were absent from the body; or rather, that the Lord stood by them and walked in the midst of them; and, staying themselves on the grace of Christ, they bid defiance to the torments of the world." But even here the difference was shown betwixt the momentary intoxication of enthusiasm, which, with a rash confidence in itself, courted and defied danger, and that calm, deliberate submission to God's will, which first awaited his call, and then looked to him for the needed strength. A certain Phrygian, Quintus by name, of a nation peculiarly inclined by nature to fanatical extravagance, presented himself, in company with many others, whom he had wrought up by his discourses to the same pitch of enthusiastic zeal, uncalled for, before the proconsul's tribunal, and declared himself a Christian. But when the magistrate pressed him, and wrought upon his fears, by showing him the wild beasts, he yielded, swore by the genius of the emperor, and sacrificed. After stating this fact, the

[1] By portions in Euseb. l. IV. c. 15. More complete in the collections of the Patres Apostolici.

[2] To many of the crimes charged on the Christians by blind popular rumor, *such* capital punishments were assigned. Qui sacra impia nocturnave, ut quem obcantarent, fecerint faciendave curaverint, aut cruci suffiguntur, aut bestiis objiciuntur. Qui hominem immolaverint, sive ejus sanguine litaverint, fanum, templumve polluerint, bestiis objiciuntur, vel si honestiores sint, capite puniuntur. Magicæ artis conscios summo supplicio affici placuit, id est, bestiis objici aut cruci suffigi, ipsi autem magi vivi exuruntur Julius Paulus in sententiis receptis.

church adds, "We therefore praise not those who voluntarily surrender themselves; for so are we not taught in the gospel."[1] Quite different from this was the behavior of the venerable Bishop Polycarp, now ninety years of age. When he heard the shouts of the people, demanding his death, it was his intention, at first, to remain quietly in the city, and await the issue which God might ordain for him. But, by the entreaties of the church, he suffered himself to be persuaded to take refuge in a neighboring villa. Here he spent the time, with a few friends, occupied, day and night, in praying for all the churches throughout the world. When search was made for him, he retreated to another villa; and directly after appeared the servants of the police, to whom his place of refuge had been betrayed by unworthy men, who enjoyed his confidence. The bishop himself, indeed, was gone; but they found two slaves, one of whom was put to the torture, and betrayed the place whither Polycarp had fled for refuge. As they were approaching, Polycarp, who was in the highest story of the dwelling, might have escaped to another house, by the flat roof peculiar to the oriental style of building; but he said, "The will of the Lord be done." Descending to the officers of justice, he ordered whatever they chose to eat and drink to be placed before them, requesting them only to indulge him with one hour for quiet prayer. But the fulness of his heart hurried him through two hours, so that the pagans themselves were touched by his devotion.

The time being now come, they conveyed him to the city on an ass, where they were met by the chief officer of the police, (*εἰρηνάρχος,*) coming, with his father, from the town. He took up Polycarp into his chariot, and addressing him kindly, asked "what harm there could be in saying '*the emperor, our Lord*,' and in sacrificing." At first, Polycarp was silent; but as they went on to urge him, he said mildly, "I shall not do as you advise me." When they perceived they could not persuade him, they grew angry. With opprobrious language, he was thrust out of the carriage, so violently as to injure a bone of one of his legs. Without looking round, he proceeded on his way, cheerful and composed, as though nothing had happened. Having arrived before the proconsul, he was urged by the latter to have respect at least to his own old age, to swear by the genius of the emperor, and give proof of his penitence, by joining in the shout of the people, "Away with the godless!" Polycarp looked with a firm eye at the assembled crowd, pointing to them with his finger; then with a sigh, and his eyes uplifted to heaven, he said, "Away with the godless!" But when the proconsul urged him farther, "Swear, curse Christ, and I release thee." "Six and eighty years," the old man replied, "have I served him, and he has done me nothing but good; and how could I curse him, my Lord and Saviour!" The proconsul still persisting to urge him, "Well," said Polycarp, "if you would know what I am, I tell you frankly, I am a Christian. Would you know what the doctrine of Christianity is,

[1] Διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινοῦμεν τοὺς προσιόντας ἑαυτοῖς, (where, if it is not bad Greek, the reading should be ἑκόντας,) ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οὕτως διδάσκει τὸ εὐαγγέλιον.

appoint me an hour and hear me." The proconsul, who showed here how far he was from sharing in the fanatic spirit of the people, how gladly he would have saved the old man, if he could have appeased the multitude, said, "Do but persuade the people." Polycarp replied, "To you I was bound to give account of myself, for our religion teaches us to pay due honor to the powers ordained of God, so far as it can be done without prejudice to our salvation. But those I regard as not worthy of hearing me defend myself before them." The governor having once more threatened him in vain with the wild beasts and the stake, caused it to be proclaimed by the herald, in the circus, "Polycarp has declared himself to be a Christian!" With these words, was pronounced the sentence of death. The heathen populace, with an infuriate shout, replied, "This is the teacher of atheism, the father of the Christians, the enemy of our gods, by whom so many have been turned from the worship of the gods and from sacrifice." The proconsul having yielded to the demands of the people, that Polycarp should die at the stake, Jews and pagans hastened together, to bring wood from the shops and the baths. As they were about to fasten him with nails to the stake of the pile, he said, "Leave me thus; he who has strengthened me to encounter the flames, will also enable me to stand firm at the stake." Before the fire was lighted, he prayed, "Lord, Almighty God, Father of thy beloved Son, Jesus Christ, through whom we have received from thee the knowledge of thyself; God of angels, and of the whole creation; of the human race, and of the just that live in thy presence; I praise thee that thou hast judged me worthy of this day and of this hour, to take part in the number of thy Witnesses, in the cup of thy Christ."

What appeared the greatest thing, to this church, was not the martyr's death of Polycarp in itself, but the Christian manner in which it was suffered. They expressed it as their conviction, that all had been so ordered, that he might exhibit what was the essential character of evangelical martyrdom;[1] "for," so they write, "he waited to be delivered up, (did not press forward uncalled to the martyr's death,) imitating, in this respect, our Lord, and leaving an example for us to follow; so that we should not look to that alone which may conduce to our own salvation, but also to that which may be serviceable to our neighbor. For this is the nature of true and genuine charity, to seek not merely our own salvation, but the salvation of all the brethren."[2]

The death of the pious shepherd contributed also to the temporal advantage of his flock. The rage of fanaticism, after having obtained this victim, became somewhat cooled; and the proconsul, who was no personal enemy of the Christians, suspended all farther search, and refused to know that another Christian existed.

The second persecution under this emperor's reign, of which we

[1] Σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντα τὰ προάγοντα ἐγένετο, ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ κύριος ἄνωθεν ἐπιδείξῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον μαρτύριον.

[2] Περιέμενεν γὰρ, ἵνα παραδοθῇ, ὡς καὶ ὁ κύριος, ἵνα μιμηταὶ καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοῦ γενώμεθα, μὴ μόνον σκοποῦντες τὸ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς πέλας, ἀγάπης γὰρ ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίας ἐστὶν μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν θέλειν σώζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἀδελφούς.

have any account, fell upon the churches of Lyons, (Lugdunum,) and of Vienna, in the year 177, and the source from which we derive our more exact knowledge of its details, is a letter from these churches to those of Asia Minor.[1] The fanatic excitement of the populace, in these cities, was the same as at Smyrna, if not still higher; but in addition to this, the superior magistrates seem to have been infected with the rage of the lower classes. The bursts of popular fury had gradually increased in violence; the Christians were insulted and abused whenever they appeared abroad, and were plundered in their own houses. At length the better known were seized and conducted before the magistrates. Having avowed themselves Christians, they were thrown into prison; for during the absence of the governor, or legate, they could not be brought at once to trial. The legate, on his arrival, immediately began the examination with tortures, not only for the purpose of forcing the Christians to abjure, but also of wringing from them a confession of the truth respecting those absurd stories of unnatural crimes, of which they were so generally accused. Vettius Epagatus, on learning that such charges were laid against his brethren, felt constrained to present himself at the legate's tribunal, as a witness of their innocence. He demanded a hearing, since he wished to show that nothing of a criminal nature was transacted in the Christian assemblies. The legate refused to listen; but only asked him if he too was a Christian. When he distinctly admitted that he was, he was imprisoned with the rest, as the Christian's advocate, (παράκλητος χριστιανῶν.) Although the testimony of slaves against their masters was, by an ancient law,[2] made inadmissible in criminal causes, — a law,[3] it must be owned, often violated in the arbitrary proceedings of the times of the empire,[4] — yet fanaticism would allow no attention to be paid to the regular forms of justice. The testimony of slaves was welcome, if it served to establish the incredible charges laid to the account of the Christians. The torture must be applied to pagan slaves. Terror made them say what they were required to say, — that those abominations, of which blind rumor accused the Christians, were practised by their masters. Men now believed they had a right to indulge themselves in every cruelty. No kindred, no age nor sex was spared. In the firmness and composure of many Christians, under tortures the most refined, it was seen, say the churches, in their report of these proceedings, "how they were bedewed and invigorated by the spring of living water that flows from the heart of Christ; how nothing is dreadful where the love of the Father dwells; nothing painful, where the glory of Christ prevails." Pothinus, the aged bishop of the church, a man of ninety years, infirm with old age and a sickness from which he was but just recovered, but inspired with the vigor of youth by his zeal to

[1] Euseb. l. V. c. 1.

[2] Vetere senatusconsulto quæstio in caput Domini prohibebatur. Tacit. Annal. l. II. c. 30.

[3] Even Pliny seems to have paid no attention to this law, in conducting his investigations against the Christians

[4] When Tiberius first allowed himself in this practice, he was in the habit, before he put the quæstio per tormenta, of giving the slaves their freedom, so as to observe the law in appearance, — callidus et novi juris repertor, as Tacitus calls him for this reason.

bear witness of the truth, was also dragged before the tribunal. The legate asked him, "Who is the God of the Christians?" He answered, "You shall come to the knowledge of him, when you show yourself worthy of it." All who surrounded the tribunal, now strove with each other in venting their rage on the venerable old man. Scarcely breathing, he was cast into a dungeon, where he survived only two days. Even those who yielded and denied, gained nothing by their inconstancy. They were now cast into prison, not, indeed, as Christians, but as guilty of those crimes with which the Christians were charged; and to justify the proceeding, advantage had doubtless been taken of the fact, that several, under the pains of torture, had acknowledged guilt. Numbers perished in the gloomy cells of the prisons, where means had been devised for adding to their torment, and even hunger and thirst employed to aggravate the sufferings of these imprisoned confessors. On the other hand, to use the language of the church, "many, who had endured so severe torments that it seemed impossible for them to be restored by the most careful assiduities, continued to live in their dungeon, destitute indeed of human aid, but strengthened and refreshed, in soul and body, by the Lord, so that they could encourage and comfort the rest. It so happened, 'by the grace of God, who wills not the death of the sinner, but has joy in his repentance,' that the exhortations of these heroes of the faith had a powerful effect on many who had been induced to deny their religion, and the mother church had the great satisfaction of receiving once more alive from the prison, those whom she had cast forth as dead."

The number of the prisoners being large, including several Roman citizens, who could not be sentenced in the province, it was thought best by the legate, with regard to them all, to send his report to Rome, and wait until the emperor's answer determined their fate. The imperial rescript was to this effect, that those who denied should be set free, and the rest beheaded. In this case, it is evident that Marcus Aurelius possessed the same views as Trajan, and was far from giving credit to the current charges laid against the Christians.

The legate now summoned first before his tribunal all who, in the previous examinations, had been brought to abjure their faith, and were awaiting, in prison, the decision of their fate. Nothing else was expected than that they would stand by their denial, and thus obtain deliverance; but great were the rage and the consternation of the multitude, at seeing many of these now stand forth and maintain a steadfast confession, thus passing sentence of death on themselves; so that, in the language of the church, none remained without, but such as possessed none of the marks of faith, no anticipation of the Lord's bridal garment, no fear, but had already, by their conduct, dishonored the way of truth. Those of the prisoners who possessed the rights of Roman citizenship, the legate ordered to be executed with the sword; although, to gratify the fury of the populace, he caused one of these, Attalus, in violation of the laws, to undergo a variety of tortures, and at last to be thrown to the wild beasts; and not until after he had survived the whole, was the sword of mercy allowed to put an end to

his sufferings. The rest were thrown to the wild beasts. Two of these,— Ponticus, a youth of fifteen, and Blandina, a young woman, — whom they attempted first to intimidate by making them witness the sufferings of the others, and then to shake from their constancy by exhausting upon them all their means of torture, created universal astonishment, at what God's power could effect in such weak and tender vessels. Although the intoxication of enthusiasm, suppressing the natural feelings, is capable of producing such extraordinary phenomena, yet the enthusiasm of these martyrs was distinguished by those true marks, a sobriety and a humility indicating the sense of weakness, and by love and gentleness. They declined the honors which the Christians were eager to bestow on them. Even when they were led back to prison, after having repeatedly undergone the most exquisite tortures, still they were by no means confident of victory, well foreseeing the struggle between the flesh and the spirit. They pointedly contradicted such as dignified them with the name of "martyrs." "This name," said they, "properly belongs only to the true and faithful Witness,[1] the First Born from the dead, the Prince of life; or, at least, only to those martyrs whose testimony Christ has sealed by their constancy to the end. We are but poor, humble confessors." With tears, they besought the brethren fervently to pray for them, that they might attain to the glorious consummation. They received with the kindest love such as had fallen from the faith; they became their companions in prison, praying, with many tears, that the Lord would restore these dead once more to life. Even their persecutors were never mentioned by them with resentment, but they prayed that God would forgive those who had subjected them to such cruel sufferings. They left as a legacy to their brethren, not strife and war, but joy and peace, unanimity and love.

With the mutilation and burning of the dead bodies, the rage of the populace had finally reached its utmost height. The ashes, with all the fire had left, was cast into the neighboring Rhone, that not a remnant of these enemies of the gods might pollute the earth. Neither by money, nor by entreaties, could the Christians succeed in obtaining possession of those so dear to them, for the purpose of interment. The blinded pagans imagined they could, in this way also, confound the hopes of the Christians. "We will now see," said they, "whether they will arise, and whether God can help them, and deliver them out of our hands." Yet so great was the number of the Christians, that even here men at last became weary of bloodshed, so that a branch of the church survived this terrible persecution.

In places where but few Christians dwelt, they could more easily remain concealed, and the popular rage was not turned against them. In such districts, the governors did not think it necessary to set on foot any inquiries for them, except in particular cases, when individuals had become notorious as enemies of the State religion. A case of this sort occurred, about this time, in the town of Autun,[2] at no great distance from Lyons. No one in the place was thinking of a persecution

[1] Μάρτυς Revel. 1: 5. [2] Augustodunum, Ædua.

against the small number of obscure Christians who were to be found there, when an individual first drew upon himself the public attention. The noisy multitude were celebrating, with great display, a festival in honor of Cybele, whose worship, probably derived from Asia Minor through the same channel which Christianity afterwards found, was held here in the highest repute. An image of Cybele, in one of the usual sacred cars, was carried round in procession, accompanied by a vast crowd of the people. All fell upon their knees; but Symphorian, a young man of a respectable family and a Christian, who happened to be standing by, thought that he could not conscientiously unite in the ceremony, and when called upon to explain his conduct, he might easily take occasion to speak of the vanity of idol worship. As a violator of the public ceremony and a disturber of the peace, he was immediately seized and conducted before the governor, Heraclius, a man of consular dignity. Said the governor to him, "You are a Christian. As far as I can see, you have escaped our notice, because so few of the followers of this sect happen to be among us." "I am a Christian," he replied; "I worship the true God, who reigns in heaven; but your idol, I cannot worship; nay, if permitted, I will dash it in pieces, on my own responsibility." Upon this, the governor declared him guilty of a double crime, — against the *religion*, and against the *laws* of the State; and as Symphorian could be moved neither by threats nor by promises to abandon his faith, he was sentenced to be beheaded. As they led him to the execution, his mother cried out to him, "My son, my son, have the living God in thy heart. Be steadfast. There is nothing fearful in that death which so surely conducts thee to life. Let thy heart be above, my son; look up to Him who dwells in heaven. To-day thy life is not taken from thee, but transfigured to a better. By a blessed exchange, my son, thou art this day passing to the life of heaven."[1]

According to a report widely diffused among the Christians after the beginning of the third century, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius was induced, by a wonderful event, to change the course of policy he had thus far adopted towards the Christians. While prosecuting the war with the Marcommanians and Quades, in 174, he, with his army, was thrown into a situation of extreme peril. The burning sun shone full in the faces of his soldiers, who were suffering under the torture of intolerable thirst; while, at the same time, under these unfavorable circumstances, they were threatened with an attack of the enemy. In this extremity, the twelfth legion, composed entirely of Christians, fell upon their knees. Their prayer was followed by a shower of rain, which allayed the thirst of the Roman soldiers, and by a storm, which frightened the barbarians. The Roman army obtained the victory, and the emperor, in commemoration of the event, gave those Christian soldiers the name of the "thundering legion." He ceased to persecute

[1] The story of the martyrdom of Symphorian is, in all the essential particulars, so simple, is so wholly free from the common exaggerations of later times, is so conformable to the circumstances of that period, that it is impossible to doubt that we have here a more than ordinarily genuine foundation, although the account is in places rhetorically overwrought. But all the particulars go to show, that the event took place very near to the time of the persecution at Lyons and Vienna.

the Christians; and though he did not receive Christianity immediately into the class of "lawful religions," yet he published an edict which threatened with severe penalties such as accused the Christians merely on the score of their religion.[1]

In this account, truth and falsehood are mixed together. In the first place, it cannot be true, that the emperor was led to put a stop to the persecution of the Christians by any event of this time; for the bloody persecution at Lyons did not take place till three years afterwards. Again, the "thundering legion," or "the twelfth of the Roman legions," had borne this name from the time of the Emperor Augustus.[2] The fact at bottom, namely, that the Roman army, about that time, was rescued from a threatening danger by some such remarkable providence, is undeniable. The heathen themselves acknowledged it to be the work of Heaven; they ascribed it, however, not to the Christian's God, nor to their prayers, but to their own gods, to their Jupiter, and to the prayers of the emperor, or of the pagan army; to say nothing of the blind superstition which attributed the storm to the spells of an Egyptian necromancer.[3] The emperor, it is said, stretched forth his hands, in supplication to Jupiter, with the words, "This hand, which has never yet shed human blood, I raise to thee." There were paintings, in which he was represented in the attitude of prayer, and the army catching the rain in their helmets.[4] The emperor has expressed his own conviction of the matter upon a medal, where Jupiter is exhibited launching his bolts on the barbarians, who lie stretched upon the ground;[5] and perhaps, also, at the close of the first Book of his Monologues, where he mentions, among the things for which he was indebted, not to himself, but to the gods and his good fortune, what had happened among the Quades.[6] It is certain, therefore, that this remarkable event can have had no influence in changing the disposition of the emperor towards the Christians. But it by no means follows, that the latter are to be charged with making up a false story. The matter admits of a natural explanation. It is not impossible that, in the thundering legion, there were Christians; perhaps a large number of them; for it is certain that it was but *a party* among them, who condemned the military profession. And although it was difficult for Christians, at all times, and especially under an emperor so unfavorably disposed, to avoid participating, while connected with a Roman army, in the rites of paganism, yet they might succeed in doing

[1] Tertullian. Apologet. c. 5; ad Scapulam, c. 4. Euseb. l. V. c. 5.

[2] Dio Cassius, in his catalogue of the legions existing from the time of this emperor, mentions (l. LV. c. 23): Τὸ δωδέκατον (στρατόπεδον) τὸ ἐν Καππαδοκίᾳ, τὸ κεραυνοφόρον. As late as the fifth century, we find mention in the Notitia dignitatum imperii Romani, Sect. 27, of the præfectura legionis duodecimae fulmineæ Melitenæ, under the dux Armeniæ. The province of Melitene was on the borders of Armenia, towards Cappadocia.

[3] Dio Cass. l. LXXI. § 8

[4] Themist. orat, 15: Τίς ἡ βασιλικωτάτη τῶν ἀρετῶν.

[5] In Eckhel numism. III. 64.

[6] Τὰ ἐν Κουάδοις πρὸς τῷ γρανούᾳ. Some suppose, it is true, that M. Aurelius here simply designates the place where this was written. But as a notice of this sort occurs nowhere else except in the third book, these words might rather refer, perhaps, to *events in certain places*, the remembrance of which was associated with the preceding meditations.

so, under particular circumstances. The Christian soldiers, then resorted, as they were ever wont to do on like occasions, to prayer, The deliverance which ensued, they regarded as an answer to their prayers; and, on their return home, they mentioned it to their brethren in the faith. These, naturally, would not fail to remind the heathen, how much they were indebted to the people whom they so violently persecuted. Claudius Apollinaris, Bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia, might have heard the story, soon after the event itself, from the Christian soldiers belonging to this legion, which had returned to its winter quarters in Cappadocia; and he introduced it, either in an apology addressed to this emperor, or in other apologetical works.[1] Tertullian refers to a letter of the emperor, addressed probably to the Roman Senate, in which he owns that the deliverance was due to the Christian soldiers. But this letter, if it contained, in so many words, a statement of this sort, must, as appears evident from the above remarks, have been either a spurious or interpolated one. It may be a question, however, whether the letter contained any distinct affirmation of this sort,—whether the emperor may not have spoken simply of *soldiers*, and Tertullian explained it, according to *his own* belief, of *Christian* soldiers. He expresses himself, at any rate, with some degree of hesitation.[2] How the Christians might possibly sometimes interpret the religious profession of the heathens according to the principles of their own faith, is shown by another account of this event, which we find in Tertullian. It is in these words: "Marcus Aurelius, in the German expedition also, obtained, through the prayers offered to God by Christian soldiers, showers of rain, during that time of thirst. When has not the land been delivered from drought, by our geniculations and fasts?[3] In such cases, the very people, when they cried to the God of gods, who alone is mighty, gave our God the glory, under the name of Jupiter."

It is the less necessary to search after any *single* cause for the cessation of the persecution, since it not only belongs to the nature of the passion, that rage will finally expend itself, but it is also true, in the present case, that, only a few years after the last bloody persecution in France, the government passed into different hands, and thus brought about an entire change of measures. The depravity of the contemptible Commodus, who succeeded to his father, A. D. 180, was made to subserve the interests of the Christians, by procuring for them a season of respite and tranquillity, after their long sufferings under M. Aurelius; for it cannot be supposed that a man like Commodus was capable of appreciating, in the slightest degree, the worth of Christianity.

[1] Where Eusebius represents Apollinaris as affirming that the legion received the name *fulminea* from this event, the suspicion naturally arises, that he read too hastily; since it is difficult to suppose, that a contemporary, who lived in the vicinity of the winter quarters of that legion, could have committed so gross a mistake. Perhaps Apollinaris merely said, the emperor might now rightly call the legion by the name fulminea, or something of that sort. There is no difficulty in supposing that some such expression lay at the foundation of Eusebius' words, l. V. c. 5. Ἐξ ἐκείνου τὴν δὶ εὐχῆς τὸ παράδοξον πεποιηκνῖαν λεγεῶνα υἱκείαν τῷ γεγονότι πρὸς τοῦ βασιλέως εἰληφέναι προσηγορίαν.

[2] Christianorum *forte* militum.

[3] Days of prayer and fasting were commonly united by the Christians.

A certain Marcia,[1] who stood with him in a forbidden connection, was, for some unknown reason, friendly to the Christians, and enlisted in their favor also the brutal emperor. It is not impossible, that the indulgent law cited above from Tertullian, proceeded from this sovereign, who was disposed to befriend the Christians, and was afterwards wrongly transferred to the last years of his predecessor. Under the government of this emperor, events did occur, in which it was supposed the effects of such a law might be traced. But it may be a question, whether it was not too hasty a conclusion, to infer from these events the existence of the law; whether it did not arise out of a misconception. At all events, it seems quite improbable that accusations against Christians would continue to be received as before, that Christians, when accused, would be condemned to death by Trajan's law, while their accusers, at the same time, were also capitally punished! An example will, perhaps, set the whole matter in its true light.[2] Apollonius, a Roman senator, was accused before the city præfect of being a Christian. His accuser was immediately sentenced to death, and executed. But Apollonius, who boldly confessed his faith before the senate, was also beheaded by a decree of that body. Now Jerome, who, in this case, would hardly be misled by a wrong interpretation of Eusebius, but spoke rather from a correct knowledge of the facts, says that the accuser was a slave of Apollonius; and the ignominious character of his punishment, death by breaking the limbs, (the suffringi crura,) confirms this account. The accuser, then, as it would seem, was punished, not as the accuser of a Christian, but as a servant faithless to his master. From too broad a conclusion drawn from cases of this description, it is quite possible, the tradition of the favorable law, referred to above, may have derived its origin.

Since this emperor, then, had probably made no change, by an express edict, in the situation of the Christians; since the old laws had never been distinctly repealed, but everything depended on the altered tone of the emperor himself; it follows, that the Christians must have been placed in very precarious circumstances. They were exposed still, as much as they ever were, to be persecuted by individual governors, inimically disposed. Thus Arrius Antoninus, proconsul of Asia Minor, began to wreak his vengeance on them; but a vast multitude

[1] Ἱστορεῖται δὲ αὐτη πολλά τε ὑπὲρ τῶν Χριστιανῶν σπουδάσαι καὶ πολλὰ αὐτοὺς εὐηργετηκέναι, ἅτε καὶ παρὰ τῷ Κομμόδῳ πᾶν δυναμένη. Dio Cass. l. LXXII. c. 4.

[2] We must allow, this matter gives occasion to many doubts. We must assent to the remark of Gieseler, so far as this, viz: that of course, either accusations proceeding from slaves against their masters were not received at all, or if they were received, the person from whom they proceeded might be punished as a criminal. Now Jerome, (de v. i. c. 42,) does not, indeed, say, that the slave was executed. The account in Eusebius, (l. V. c. 21,) might be one, then, mixed up with false reports, relating, as it did, to an event in the West He may have been deceived by Greek acta martyris, in which the false story of the condemnation of this slave had been fabricated out of the rumor of the law above mentioned against accusers of Christians. On the other side, the following considerations should be duly weighed. The narrative of Jerome, in conformity with its purpose, may have been incomplete, and therefore may furnish no evidence against the truth of what Eusebius has added. We are not obliged to presuppose, that the judges, especially where the question related to the death of a slave, acted in perfect consistency with justice.

of Christians immediately presented themselves before the tribunal, with a view to intimidate the proconsul by their numbers, — a proceeding which might easily have been attended with the desired effect, under a government where the persecutions did not proceed from the imperial throne, but from the will of individuals. In fact, the proconsul was intimidated, and contenting himself with condemning to death a few out of the multitude, he said to the rest,[1] "If you want to die, ye wretched men, you have precipices from which you can throw yourselves, or ropes."[2] Irenæus, who wrote under the reign of this emperor, remarks, that Christians were to be found in the imperial court, that they enjoyed the same privileges which belonged to all throughout the Roman empire, and were suffered to go unmolested, by land or by sea, wherever they chose.[3] Yet the same Irenæus observes, that the church, at all times, not excepting his own, sends many martyrs to their heavenly Father.[4] The apparent contradiction is explained by what has been said.

The political disorders which followed after the assassination of Commodus, in A. D. 192; the civil wars betwixt Pescennius Niger in the East, Claudius Albinus in Gaul, and Septimius Severus, who finally obtained the sovereign power in Rome, would, like all other public calamities, be attended with injurious effects on the situation of the Christians. Clement of Alexandria, who wrote soon after the death of Commodus, says, "Many martyrs are daily burned, crucified, beheaded, before our eyes."[5] When Septimius Severus obtained the victory, and found himself in secure possession of the sovereignty, he manifested, it is true, a favorable disposition towards the Christians; and Tertullian's account may doubtless be correct, that he was induced to this by an incident of a personal nature, having been restored to health through the skill of Proculus,[6] a Christian slave, whom he received

[1] Tertullian. ad Scapulam, c. 5: Ὦ δειλοί, εἰ θέλετε ἀποθνήσκειν, κρημνοὺς ἢ βρόχους ἔχετε.

[2] In the second century, three proconsuls are known under this name: the Antoninus Pius, who was afterwards Emperor; his grand father; and a third under the Emperor Commodus. Æl. Lamprid. vita Commodi, c. 6 et 7. We most naturally think of the one who was Tertullian's contemporary; for if he meant another, he would probably have given some intimation that he was speaking of an older man. This proconsul, as we learn from Lampridius, stood in high estimation with the people. Perhaps it was his eagerness to acquire this, that led him to persecute the Christians.

[3] L. IV. c. Hæres. c. 30: Hi, qui in regali aula sunt fideles.

[4] L. IV. c. 33, v. 9.

[5] L. II. stromat. p. 414.

[6] Thus we are informed by Tertullian, in his work addressed to Scapula, c. 4: Proculum Christianum, qui Torpacion cognominabatur, Euodiæ procuratorem, qui eum per oleum aliquando curaverat, requisivit et in palatio suo habuit usque ad mortem ejus. In respect to the right understanding of these words, it may be disputed, whether the term Euodiæ, (which moreover is written in different ways,) is a proper name or not, and how the word procurator should be taken. It might mean, "an overseer of the causeways;" yet probably it is a slave or freed man from the mansion of some Roman lady, who held under her the office of steward or bailiff. Through his connection with this noble woman, Septimius Severus, before he became Emperor, may have come in contact with this man, and the latter offered his services to heal him in some sickness. The oil, in this case has some connection probably with the charisma of healing, according to Mark, 6: 13, and James, 5: 14. The inadvertent, and where he had no particular interest in doubting, credulous Tertullian, is, indeed, not a witness of any great weight; but the circumstantiality with which he speaks of this matter, as one generally known, might point to something which had a true foundation. He appeals to the fact, that Caracalla. the

into his family, and retained constantly by his side. He knew that men and women of the highest rank in Rome, senators and their wives, were Christians; and protected them from the popular indignation.[1] But as the old laws remained still in force, violent persecutions could break out in particular provinces; and we know, from several of the works of Tertullian which were composed in these times, that one actually took place in proconsular Africa. The festivities in honor of the emperor, where the absence of the Christians excited public attention, might easily have been the occasion of it.[2]

If, in this reign, the law against "close associations" was renewed,[3] this circumstance must have operated, as under the government of Trajan, to the disadvantage of those whose union had always been declared to be a collegium illicitum. Finally Severus, in the year 202, passed a law which forbade, under severe penalties, a change, either to Judaism or to Christianity.[4] That he held it necessary to enact such a prohibition, which was in truth involved in the earlier laws, shows how little these laws were then regarded. It may be a question, too, how the matter of this law of Severus is to be interpreted. If the emperor forbade the change to Christianity, (Christianos fieri,) merely in the sense in which he forbade the change to Judaism, (Judæos fieri,) it would seem to be implied, that he held it necessary, only to *check* the *farther* inroads, as well of Christianity as of Judaism, but had no wish to disturb those who were already Christians, in the practice of their religion; — and such a tacit recognition of Christianity must certainly be regarded as an advantage gained by the Christian party in the empire. But, as may be inferred from what we have already said, the situation of the Christians, in this case, was quite different from that of the Jews. In the case of Judaism, it was naturally assumed in the prohibition, Judæos fieri, that *the Jews, as a nation*, were to remain unmolested in their right to the free exercise of their own religion; and in the criminality of the act, Judæos fieri, this law pronounced the criminality of all other Roman citizens, who had heretofore passed over to Judaism. But in the case of the Christians, no such distinction as this could be made; so that, as it concerned them, the law would pronounce all to be criminal, *without exception*, who had ever become

son of Severus, was very well acquainted with this Proculus; that Caracalla himself was lacte Christiano educatus, whether it was, that he had a Christian for his nurse, or had spent his childhood amidst Christians in the service of the imperial household. With this may be compared what Ælius Lampridius says in the life of this emperor, (c. 1,) namely, that the playmates of Caracalla, when he was seven years old, had, contrary to his father's will, led him to embrace Judaism, (ob Judaicam religionem gravius verberatus,) and in connection with the last, should be kept in mind what we quoted recently from Celsus, that Christianity was propagated among the children. But although Septimius Severus may have had Christians among the members of his household, yet it by no means follows, that he was himself favorable either to Christianity or its followers.

[1] Tertullian says of Septimius Severus (in the passage just referred to,) Clarissimas feminas et clarissimos viros sciens hujus sectæ esse, non modo non læsit, verum et testimonio exornavit et populo furenti in nos palam restitit.

[2] See above, p. 91.

[3] As may be inferred from the fact that he issued a rescript directing that those "qui illicitum collegium coisse dicantur," should be accused before the Præfectus urbi. Vid. Digest. l. XII. tit. XII. l. § 14.

[4] Ælii Spartiani Severus, c. 17: Judæos fieri sub gravi pœna vetuit. Item etiam de Christianis sanxit.

Christians. We should possess the words of the law itself, however, in order to decide with any certainty as to its true meaning.

At all events, so explicit a declaration, from an emperor who had thus far, shown himself personally favorable to the Christians, could only operate to render their circumstances still more distressing. In many districts, the persecution was so fierce, that it was looked upon as a sign of the speedy appearance of the Antichrist.[1] In Egypt and in proconsular Africa, this seems to have been particularly the case; yet these persecutions were certainly not general.

At a period somewhat earlier, the threat of lodging an information with the magistrates, had already been employed to extort money from the Christians;[2] and many had bargained, at a certain price, with informers, or greedy policemen, for the privilege of not being disturbed in the exercise of their religion.[3] But as, under this government, the laws against the Christians continued to be neither strictly nor universally carried into effect, such proceedings became more common, doubtless, than in earlier persecutions. And it was now the case, that entire communities purchased freedom from disturbance in this way.[4] Many bishops thought that, by this course, they consulted best for the interest of their churches.[5] But such measures would be opposed, not only by such as cherished a fanatic longing after martyrdom, but also on the score of prudence, and of zeal for the dignity and purity of the Christian name. On the score of prudence, because it was only individuals, after all, who could be satisfied thus; and the rage or cupidity of others would only be excited the more;[6] — on the score of interest for the honor and purity of the Christian name, because Christians became associated, by this course, with those who purchased immunity with bribes from the punishment due for unlawful or nefarious crimes or pursuits.[7] When the advocates of this course pleaded, in their defence, that men ought to give to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's, Tertullian answered them thus: "He who would extort money from me, in this way, demands nothing for the emperor, but rather acts against him, since, for the sake of gold, he lets the Christians go free, who are guilty by the laws."[8] It appears to him remarkable, that, at a period when so many new regulations were devising for the improvement of the revenue, when so

[1] Euseb. l. VI. c. 7.

[2] The concutere Christianos. — Quid dicit ille concussor? Da mihi pecuniam, certe ne eum tradat. Tertullian. de fuga in persecutione, c. 12.

[3] Tu pacisceris cum delatore vel milite vel furunculo aliquo præside, sub tunica et sinu, quod aiunt, ut furtivo, quem coram toto mundo Christus emit, imo et manumisit, says the high-hearted Tertullian, as the opponent of such transactions. l. c.

[4] Parum est, si unus aut alius ita eruitur. Massaliter totæ ecclesiæ tributum sibi irrogaverunt. Tertullian. l. c. c. 13.

[5] To this Tertullian sarcastically alludes: Ut regno suo securi frui possent, sub obtentu pacem procurandi.

[6] Neque enim statim et a populo eris tutus, si officia militaria redemeris, says Tertullian, l. c. c. 14.

[7] Tertullian says, with reference to this, (l. c. c. 13): Nescio dolendum an erubescendum sit, cum in matricibus beneficiariorum et curiosorum inter tabernarios et lanios et fures balnearum et aleones et lenones Christiani quoque vectigales continentur.

[8] Miles me vel delator vel inimicus concutit, nihil Cæsari exigens; imo contra faciens, cum Christianum, legibus humanis reum, mercede dimittit. Tertullian, l. c. c. 12

many new taxes were introduced, it had never occurred to any one, to propose the free profession of Christianity, at a certain rate, fixed by law. Thus, owing to the great number of the Christians, of which all were aware, the public revenue would be greatly increased.[1]

The situation of the Christians continued to be the same under the government of the insane Caracalla, although the cruel emperor himself was the occasion of no new persecutions. Everything depended on the accidental temper of the different governors. Many of these were active in devising expedients for saving, without open violation of the laws, the lives of those Christians who were arraigned before their tribunals.[2] Others were furious, from personal hatred, or to flatter the people. Others, again, were contented to proceed according to the letter of the law enacted by Trajan. In a letter to one of the persecutors of the Christians, the proconsul Scapula, Tertullian remarks, that if he would use the sword only *against the Christians according to the original laws*, and as was still done by the governor of Mauritania, and by the governor of Leon, in Spain, he might discharge every lawful duty of his office, without resorting to cruelty. Trajan's law, then, was still the governing rule.

We will now select a few individual examples which may serve to illustrate the character of the persecutions of this time.[3] In the year 200, some Christians belonging to the city of Scillita in Numidia, were brought before the tribunal of the proconsul Saturninus. He said to them, "You may obtain pardon of our emperors (Severus and Caracalla,) if in good earnest you will return to our gods." One of them, Speratus, replied, "We have injured no man; we have spoken ill of none; for all the evil you have brought upon us, we have only thanked you. We give praise for it all to our true Lord and King." The proconsul replied, "We also are devout; we swear by the genius of the emperor our master, and we pray for his welfare, as you too must do." Hereupon Speratus: "I know of no genius of the ruler of this earth; but I serve my God in heaven, whom no man hath seen nor can see. I have defrauded no man of his dues. I have never failed to pay

[1] Tanta quotidie ærario augendo prospiciuntur remedia censuum, vectigalium, collationum, stipendiorum, nec unquam usque adhuc ex Christianis tale aliquid prospectum est, sub aliquam redemptionem capitis et sectæ redigendis, cum tantæ multitudinis nemini ignotæ fructus ingens meti posset. L. c. c. 12.

[2] Tertullian relates, that a præses even went so far as to furnish the Christians himself with the means of so answering the questions of the judge, as to get discharged. Another released at once a Christian who had been brought before him, declaring it contrary to the laws to yield to the demands of his fellow-citizens, — i. e. if we take tumultuosum as neuter; or perhaps the correct reading may be, he discharged the individual as a factious person, who must settle the matter with his fellow-citizens; viz. do what would satisfy them, — dimisit quasi tumultuosum, civibus suis satisfacere (ut — satisfaceret.) A third subjected a Christian to slight torture, and as he yielded at once, dismissed him without requiring anything more of him, expressing at the same time his regret to the assistant judges, that he had anything to do with such business. Another tore in pieces the elogium or writ, when a Christian, seized by violence, was brought before him, declaring that secundum mandatum, — the law of Trajan, — he would listen to no complaint in the absence of the accusers. See Tertullian. ad Scapulam, c. 4.

[3] The documents from which we take them, are in Ruinart. Acta Martyrum, the Acta Martyrum Scillitanorum, and Acta Perpetuæ et Felicitatis

the custom upon all which I purchase, for I acknowledge the emperor as my lord; but I can *worship* none but my Lord, the King of kings, the Lord of all nations." Upon this the proconsul ordered the Christians to be conducted back to their prison until the next day. When they appeared again, he addressed them once more, and granted them a space of three days for reflection. But Speratus answered in the name of the rest; "I am a Christian, and we *all* are Christians; we abandon not our faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. Do with us as you please." Having thus confessed themselves Christians, and refused to pay due honor to the emperor, they were sentenced to decapitation. On receiving their sentence, they thanked God, and at the place of execution, they again kneeled and gave thanks.

Some few years afterwards, three young men, Revocatus, Saturnius, and Secundulus, and two young women, Perpetua and Felicitas, were arrested at Carthage, all of them being still catechumens. The story of their imprisonment and of their sufferings presents us with many a fine trait of the power of Christian faith, combined with Christian tenderness of feeling. Perpetua, two and twenty years of age, who was a mother, with her child at the breast, had to struggle not alone with the natural feelings which shrunk from death, and with the weakness of her sex. The hardest conflict which she had before her was with those purely human feelings, grounded in the sacred ties of nature, feelings which Christianity recognizes in all their rights, and makes even more profound and tender, but yet causes to be sacrificed to the One Thing for which all else must be yielded. The mother of Perpetua was a Christian, but her aged father was still a pagan. His daughter was dear to him, but he dreaded also the disgrace connected with her sufferings as a Christian. When she was first brought to the police office, her aged father came and urged her to recant. Pointing to a vessel that lay on the ground, she said, "Can I call this vessel anything else than what it is? No. Neither can I say to you anything else, than that I am a Christian." In the meantime, she was baptized; for the clergy usually found no difficulty in purchasing, at least, from the overseers of the prisons, admission to the Christians in confinement, for the purpose of administering to them the offices of religion; although, in the present case, even this was perhaps unnecessary, as the prisoners were not as yet placed under a rigorous guard. Perpetua said, "The Spirit bade me pray for nothing at my baptism but patience." After a few days they were thrown into the dungeon. "I was tempted," said she, "for I had never been in such darkness before. O what a dreadful day! The excessive heat occasioned by the multitude of prisoners, the rough treatment we experienced from the soldiers, and, finally, anxiety for my child, made me miserable." The deacons, who administered to them the communion in the dungeon, purchased for the Christian prisoners a better apartment, where they were separated from other criminals. Perpetua now took the child to herself in the dungeon, and placed it at her breast; she recommended it to her mother; she comforted her friends; and felt cheered herself by the possession of her babe. "The dungeon," said she, "became a palace to me."

The report reached her aged father, that they were about to be tried. He hastened to her and said, "My daughter, pity my grey hairs, pity thy father, if I am still worthy to be called thy father. If I have brought thee up to this bloom of thy age, if I have preferred thee above all thy brothers, expose me not to such shame among men. Look upon thy son, who, if thou diest, cannot long survive. Let that lofty spirit give way, lest thou plunge us all into ruin. For if thou diest thus, not one of us will ever have courage again to speak a free word." Whilst saying this, he kissed her hands, threw himself at her feet, and called her with tears not his daughter, but his mistress. "My father's grey hairs," said the daughter, "pained me, when I considered that he alone of my family would not rejoice that I must suffer." She replied to him, "What shall happen when I come before the tribunal, depends on the will of God; for know, we stand not in our own strength, but only by the power of God." On the arrival of this decisive hour, her aged father also appeared, that he might for the last time try his utmost to overcome the resolution of his daughter. Said the governor to Perpetua, "Have pity on thy father's grey hairs, have pity on thy helpless child. Offer sacrifice for the welfare of the emperor." She answered, "That I cannot do." "Art thou a Christian?" "Yes," she replied, "I am a Christian." Her fate was now decided. They were all condemned together to serve, at the approaching festival, on the anniversary of the young Geta's nomination,[1] as a cruel sport for the people and soldiers in a fight of wild beasts. They returned back rejoicing to the dungeon. But Perpetua did not suppress the tender feelings of the mother. Her first act was to send a request to her aged father that she might have the child, whom she wished to give the breast; but he refused to part with it. As to Felicitas, on her return to the dungeon, she was seized with the pains of labor. The jailer said to her, "If thy present sufferings are so great, what wilt thou do, when thou art thrown to the wild beasts? This thou didst not consider, when thou refusedst to sacrifice." She answered, "I *now* suffer *myself* all that I suffer; but then there will be *another* who shall suffer for *me*, because I also will suffer for him." A custom which had come down from the times of human sacrifices, under the bloody Baal-worship of the Carthaginians, still prevailed, of dressing those criminals who were condemned to die by wild beasts, in priestly raiment. It was therefore proposed, in the present case, that the men should be clothed as the priests of Saturn, and the women as the priestesses of Ceres. Nobly did their free, Christian spirit protest against such a proceeding. "We have come here," said they, "of our own will, that we may not suffer our freedom to be taken from us. We have given up our lives, that we may not be forced to such abominations." The pagans themselves acknowledged the justice of their demand and yielded.

After they had been torn by the wild beasts, and were about to receive the merciful stroke which was to end their sufferings, they took leave of each other, for the last time, with the mutual kiss of Christian love.

[1] Natales Cæsaris

A more quiet season for the Christian Church began with the reign of the ignoble Heliogabalus, A. D. 219. But we have already explained the singular phenomenon, that the worst princes proved to be the most favorably disposed towards the Christians. Heliogabalus was not a follower of the old religion of the state, but even devoted to a foreign superstition which united with itself the most abominable excesses, the Syrian worship of the Sun. This worship he wished to make predominant in the Roman empire, and to blend with it all other religions. To this end he tolerated Christianity, as he did other foreign religions. Had he ever proceeded to the execution of his plan, he would assuredly have met with the most determined opposition from the Christians.[1]

From an entirely different source proceeded the favorable disposition of the noble-minded and devout Alexander Severus, (from the year 222 to 235,) an emperor wholly unlike to his abandoned predecessor. This excellent prince possessed a ready sympathy with all that is good, and a reverence for everything connected with religion. He was attached to that religious eclecticism, the grounds of whose origin we have earlier explained. But he distinguished himself from others of the same principles, by giving Christianity a place in his system. In Christ he recognized a Divine Being, equal with the other gods; and in the domestic chapel (the Lararеum) where he was used to offer his morning devotions, among the images of those men whom he regarded as beings of a superior order,—of Apollonius of Tyana, of Orpheus,—stood also the bust of Christ. It is said that it was his intention to cause Christ to be enrolled among the Roman deities. The words of our Saviour, which this emperor was constantly repeating, "As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise,"—a maxim which, taken alone, is but little suited, it must be confessed, to mark the distinguishing character of Christianity,—he caused to be engraven on the walls of his palace and on public monuments. When the mother of this emperor, Julia Mammæa, resided at Antioch, she sent for Origen, the great teacher of the Alexandrian church; and we may be certain that this father, who, more than any other, knew how to make Christianity intelligible to a foreign mode of thinking, availed himself of this opportunity to do this in the case of Mammæa, who exercised a great influence over the feelings of her son. The declarations of this emperor on several occasions are based on the recognition of Christianity as a religio licita, and of the Christian church as a lawfully existing corporation; as, for example, when, in recommending a new mode of appointment to the civil offices of the state, he referred for a model to the regulations in Christian churches; and when in a dispute betwixt the guild of cooks and the Christian church in Rome, respecting a lot of land which the latter had appropriated, he decided in favor of the church; saying, "It was better that God should be worshipped in whatever manner, on that spot, than that it should be given

[1] Æl. Lamprid. vit. c. 3, 6, 7

up to the cooks. In view of this so favorable disposition of Alexander Severus towards the Christians, and of the declarations which imply a tacit recognition of Christianity as a religio licita; it is the more singular that he should still omit taking the decisive step, by which he would have given to the Christian church the greatest, the most certain and the most lasting advantage,— that of adopting Christianity by an express law of the empire among the tolerated religions. It is evident from this fact how difficult it was for a Roman emperor to effect a change in anything that related to the public religion of the state. In fact, it was under the reign of Severus, that the civilian whose authority stands so high in the Roman law, Domitius Ulpian, collected together in the seventh of his ten books, De officio proconsulis,[1] the rescripts of the emperors against the Christians.[2]

The rude Thracian, Maximinus, who in the year 235 raised himself to the imperial throne, after the assassination of the excellent Alexander Severus, hated the Christians on account of the friendly relations in which they stood with his predecessor, and persecuted in particular those bishops who had been on terms of intimacy with him.[3] In addition to this, several of the provinces, as Cappadocia and Pontus, were visited with destructive earthquakes, which re-enkindled the popular hatred against the Christians. The fury of the people, under such an emperor, had free scope; and it was, moreover, encouraged by hostile governors. The persecutions were confined, indeed, to single provinces, so that the Christians could save themselves by flying from one province to another. But although the persecutions were less violent than in other times, they made the greater impression, because they fell on those who, during the long interval of peace, had become unused to violence.[4]

A more favorable period for the Christians returned again with the accession of Philip the Arabian, in the year 244. It is said, that this emperor was himself a Christian.[5] We have a circumstantial account which states, that on the vigils of Easter, the night after Easter Sunday, he presented himself for the purpose of joining in the worship of a Christian assembly; that he was met at the door by the bishop of the church,[6] and told that, on account of his past crimes,[7] he could obtain no admittance there, until he had submitted to the penance of the church; and that the emperor actually consented to comply with the terms prescribed. But this story does not harmonize with all we otherwise know respecting the emperor Philip; for in no part of his public life, not even on his coins, has he left the least trace of his Christianity; but he everywhere appears as a follower of the pagan religion of the state.

[1] Of which the fragments are to be found in the Digests, l. I. tit. XIV. c. 4, and the following.

[2] Lactant. institut. l. V. c. 11: Ut doceret, quibus oportet eos pœnis affici, qui se cultores Dei confiterentur.

[3] Euseb. l. VI. c. 28.

[4] Vid. ep. Firmiliani Cæsareens. 75 apud Cypr. and Orig. Commentar. in Matth. T. III. p. 857. Ed. de la Rue.

[5] Eusebius, in his Church History, makes use of the expression: κατέχει λόγος. But in the Chronicle he calls him distinctly, the first Christian emperor.

[6] According to the later tradition of Babylas, bishop of Antioch.

[7] The assassination of his predecessor, Gordianus, was doubtless one of the crimes here meant.

Origen, who was on terms of correspondence with the imperial family,[1] and who wrote, during this reign, his work against Celsus, gives us to understand, indeed, that the Christians now enjoyed a season of quiet; but we find in this writer no intimation of the fact, that the ruler of the Roman empire was a Christian, when assuredly he had occasion to mention it, if it was true. The only possible way of explaining this would be to say, that the emperor, led by political motives, kept his conversion to Christianity a secret. But then again, this statement could not be reconciled with the other, namely, that he had visited a Christian assembly, especially on such an occasion, or that he had submitted to the penance of the church. We find, indeed, the first traces of the tradition respecting the conversion of this emperor to Christianity in an author of no less credit than Dionysius of Alexandria, who wrote under the reign of Valerian, the second in succession after Philip. He says of Valerian, that "He showed more good will towards the Christians, than even those emperors who were held to be Christians themselves."[2] By *those emperors*, we can conceive no others to be meant than the present Philip, and Alexander Severus. Probably, then, the well-informed Dionysius placed them both in the same class. Philip, like Alexander Severus, might have included Christianity in his system of religious eclecticism; and the exaggerated legend made of him a Christian. But the assassination of his predecessor, and many other actions of which he was known to be guilty, seemed inconsistent with his Christianity; to solve the contradiction, the legend added this figment of the occurrence at the Easter vigils.

But instead of dwelling longer upon this exaggerated story, we will cite, before we pass to new trials of the Christian church, the remarkable words of that great ecclesiastical teacher and writer of those times, — Origen, — respecting the trials which the church had already encountered, and respecting her then external condition and future prospects. In relation to the earlier persecutions, he remarks,[3] "As the Christians, who had been commanded not to defend themselves against their enemies by outward force, observed the mild and philanthropic injunctions; what they could not have gained, had they been ever so powerful, in case they had been permitted to wage war, *that* they *received* from the *God* who constantly *fought for them*, and who, from time to time, constrained to peace *those* who had arrayed themselves against the Christians and would have exterminated them from the earth; for in order to remind them, when they saw some few of their brethren exposed to sufferings on account of their religion, that they should be the bolder and despise death, a few, now and then, *so few* that they may easily *be numbered*, have died for the Christian religion;[4] while God has always prevented a war of extermination against the whole body of Christians, since it was his pleasure that they should remain, and that the whole earth should be filled with this saving and most holy doc-

[1] He had written letters to the emperor, and to his wife Severa, which have not been preserved.

[2] Euseb. l. VII. c. 10.

[3] Contra Celsum, lib. III. c. 8.

[4] Ὀλίγοι κατὰ καιροὺς καὶ σφόδρα εὐαρίθμητοι ὑπὲρ τῆς Χριστιανῶν θεοσεβείας τεθνήκασιν.

trine. And yet, on the other hand, in order that the weaker brethren might breathe freely, delivered from their fear of death, God has taken care of the faithful, scattering, by his mere will, all the assaults of their enemies, so that neither emperor, nor governor, nor the populace, has been able to rage against them longer." In reference to his own times, he observes, "The number of the Christians, God has caused continually to increase, and some addition is made to it every day; he has, moreover, *given them already the free exercise of their religion;*[1] although a thousand obstacles hindered the spread of the doctrines of Jesus in the world. But since it was God who willed that the doctrines of Jesus should become a blessing also to the heathen, the machinations of men against the Christians have all been turned to shame, and the more emperor, governor and the populace *have endeavored to destroy the Christians, the more powerful have they become.*"[2] He says, that among the multitude who became Christians, might be found men of wealth and of high stations in the government, as also rich and noble women;[3] that the teacher of a Christian church might now, indeed, obtain honor and respect, but that the contempt which he met with from others exceeded the respect which he enjoyed from his brethren in the faith.[4] He says, moreover, that those absurd accusations against the Christians were still believed by many, who carried their prejudice so far as even to avoid speaking with them.[5] He writes, that by the divine will, the persecutions against the Christians had long since ceased; but he adds, with a glance to the future, that this time of tranquillity would, in its turn, certainly come to an end, when the calumniators of Christianity had once more diffused abroad the opinion, that the cause of the many disturbances (in the latter part of this emperor's reign) was the great multitude of the Christians, who had so increased their numbers, because they were no longer persecuted.[6] Thus he foresaw, that the persecutions had not yet come to an end, and the opinion that the decline of the state religion and the unceasing progress of Christianity was bringing calamity upon the Roman empire, would, sooner or later, bring on another persecution of the Christians. "If God," says he, "grants liberty to the tempter, and gives him the power to persecute us, we shall be persecuted. But if it is God's will that we should *not* be exposed to these sufferings we shall, in some wonderful way, enjoy tranquillity, even in the midst of a world that hates us; and we trust in him who has said, Be of good cheer, I have overcome the world. And in truth he has overcome the world. In so far, then, as he who has overcome the world, wills

[1] Ἤδη δὲ καὶ παῤῥησίαν ἐπιδέδωκεν. L. VII. c. 26.

[2] Τοσούτῳ πλείους ἐγίνοντο καὶ κατίσχυον σφόδρα. L. c.

[3] Τινὲς τῶν ἐν ἀξιώμασι, καὶ γύναια τὰ ἁβρὰ καὶ εὐγενῆ. L. III c. 9.

[4] Καὶ νῦν δὲ πλείων ἐστὶν ἡ παρὰ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἀδοξία τῆς παρὰ τοῖς ὁμοδόξοις νομιζομένης δόξης καὶ οὐ πᾶσιν, (an allusion to the parties existing among the Christians.) L. c.

[5] L. VI. c. 28. Origen says, that Jews had spread abroad those reports about the murder of children, &c., against the Christians.

[6] Καὶ εἰκὸς παύσεσθαι τὸ ὡς πρὸς τὸν βίον τοῦτον τοῖς πιστεύουσιν ἐγγινόμενον ἀδεὲς, ἐπὰν πάλιν οἱ παντὶ τρόπῳ διαβάλλοντες τὸν λόγον, τὴν αἰτίαν τὴν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο νῦν στάσεως ἐν πλήθει τῶν πιστευόντων νομίσωσιν εἶναι. L. III. c. 15.

that we should overcome it, since he has received from the Father power to overcome the world, we rely upon *his victory*.[1] But if it is his pleasure that we should again strive and battle for the faith, then let the enemy come, and we will say to him, "We can do all things through him that strengthens us, Jesus Christ our Lord." Although Origen was too sensible and sagacious to place great confidence in the peaceful times which the Christian church then enjoyed, though he saw that new struggles must be undergone, yet he was firmly persuaded that the day was coming when Christianity, by virtue of its intrinsic, divine power, would come forth victorious out of them all, and gain the dominion over entire humanity. As Celsus had said, that in case all behaved like the Christians, the emperor would be left without an army, the Roman empire would fall a prey to the wildest barbarians, and consequently all culture become extinct; to this Origen replied, "If, as Celsus says, all did as I do, then the barbarians also would receive the divine word, and become the most moral and gentle of men. All other religions would cease from the earth, and Christianity alone be supreme, *which indeed is destined one day to have the supremacy, since the divine truth is continually bringing more souls under its sway*."[2] The conviction which Origen here expresses, — that Christianity, by its own intrinsic power, would in addition to its other conquests, subdue all the rudeness of the savage stock of human nature, and bestow all true culture on the barbarians, — this conviction was nothing new, but from the beginning given with the Christian consciousness itself. The Apostle Paul describes Christianity as a power that should reach as well to Scythians as to Greeks, and impart the same divine life to both these national stocks, binding them together in one divine family; and Justin Martyr testifies that no barbarian or Nomadic race was to be found, in which prayers did not ascend to God in the name of the crucified.[3] But the really new, — wherein we perceive the change which the onward progress of history, during the course of this century, had produced in the mode of thinking among Christians and in their anticipations of the future development of God's kingdom, —was, that Origen confidently avows the expectation that Christianity, *working outward from within*, would overcome and suppress every other religion, and gain the dominion of the world. Such an anticipation was foreign to the thoughts of the *older* teachers of the church. They could conceive of the Pagan state in no other relation than one of constant hostility to

[1] I render the passage, (l. VIII. c. 70,) according to what seems to me to be a necessary correction of the text: Διόπερ εἰς ὅσον νικῆσαι (instead of ς) ἡμᾶς (this I insert) αὐτὸν βούλεται, λαβὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τὸ νικᾶν τὸν κόσμον, θαῤῥοῦμεν (δὲ I omit) τῇ ἐκείνου νίκῃ.

[2] Δηλονότι καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι, τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ θεοῦ προσελθόντες, νομιμώτατοι ἔσονται, καὶ πᾶσα μὲν θρησκεία καταλυθήσεται, μόνη δὲ ἡ Χριστιανῶν κρατήσει· ἥτις καὶ μόνη ποτὲ κρατήσει, τοῦ λόγου ἀεὶ πλείονας νεμομένου ψυχάς. L. VIII. c. 68.

[3] Dial. c. Tryph. f. 345, ed. Colon: Οὐδὲ ἐν γὰρ ὅλως ἐστί τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπων, εἴτε βαρβάρων, εἴτε ἑλλήνων, εἴτε ἁπλῶς ὅτινιοῦν ὀνόματι προσαγορευομένων ἢ Ἀμαξοβίων ἢ ἀοίκων καλουμένων ἢ ἐν σκηναῖς κτηνοτρόφων οἰκούντων, ἐν οἷς μὴ διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ σταυρωθέντος Ἰησοῦ εὐχαὶ καὶ εὐχαριστίαι τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ποιητῇ τῶν ὅλω γίνονται.

Christianity, and expected the triumph of the church only as the result of a supernatural interposition, at the second coming of Christ.[1]

What the sagacious Origen had foretold, with regard to impending persecutions, was soon verified. Indeed, at the very time he was inditing these words at Cæsarea in Palestine, they had already begun to be verified in another district of the empire. When the enthusiastic followers of the old religion observed the encroachments which, during this long season of peace, Christianity had made on every side, threatening the destruction of all they held dearest, the fanatic spirit would be excited in them to so much the greater degree of violence. And so it was, that even before the change of rulers, a certain individual made his appearance in Alexandria, who imagined that he had been called by a revelation of the gods,[2] to arouse the people to war in defence of their ancient sanctuaries, against the enemies of the gods; and by his means the fury of the extremely excitable populace of that city was kindled against the Christians. They had already suffered much from this quarter.

It had repeatedly been the case before, that a government favorable to the Christians was immediately succeeded by another under which they were oppressed, — the reign of Antoninus Pius, for example, by that of Marcus Aurelius, — of Alexander Severus by that of Maximinus the Thracian. So it proved once more, when, in 249, Decius Trajan conquered Philip the Arabian, and placed himself on the throne of the Cæsars. It would be natural for an emperor, zealously devoted to the pagan religion, who succeeded to a government which had been lenient towards the Christians, to consider himself bound to reënforce the ancient laws, now fallen into desuetude, and to carry them into more rigorous execution against the religion which, during the preceding reign, had become so much more widely diffused. In many parts of the empire the Christians had now enjoyed undisturbed peace for a period of thirty years; in several districts, for a still longer time. A persecution, following after so many years of tranquillity, could not fail to prove a sifting process for the churches, where many had forgotten the conflict with the world to which they were called as Christians, and the virtues which they should maintain in this conflict. It was in this light, as such a process for the sifting and cleansing of the churches, now asleep and become worldly in part, under the long enjoyment of quiet, that this new persecution was regarded by the bishop Cyprian of Carthage. It was thus he expressed himself before the Christians under his spiritual guidance, soon after the first storm of the persecution was over.[3] "If," said he, "the cause of the disease is understood, the cure of the afflicted part is already found. The Lord would prove his people; and because the divinely prescribed regimen of life had be-

[1] This is expressed by Justin Martyr, in the Dial. c. Tryph. f. 358, where he says of the ἄρχοντες, — "Οι οὐ παύσονται θανατοῦντες καὶ διωκοντες τοὺς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁμολογοῦντας, ἕως πάλιν παρῇ καὶ καταλύσῃ πάντας.

[2] Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, in a letter to Fabius, bishop of Antioch, cited in Eusebius, (l. VI. c. 41,) calls him, Ὁ κακῶν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ μάντις καὶ ποιητής.

[3] In his sermo de lapsis.

come disturbed in the long season of peace, a divine judgment was sent to re-establish our fallen, and I might almost say slumbering faith. Our sins deserve more; but our gracious Lord has so ordered it, that all which has occurred seems rather like a trial than a persecution. Forgetting what believers did in the times of the apostles, and what they should always be doing, Christians labored, with insatiable desire, to increase their earthly possessions. Many of the bishops, who, by precept and example, should have guided others, neglected their divine calling, to engage in the management of worldly concerns." Such being the condition of things in many of the churches, it may be easily understood that a persecution, which was now so unusual an occurrence, and which in the present case, became after the first outbreak, so extremely violent, must have produced a powerful impression.

It was certainly the design of the emperor, *to suppress Christianity entirely*. In the year 250, he ordered rigorous search to be made for all suspected of refusing compliance with the national worship, and the Christians were to be required to conform to the ceremonies of the Roman religion. In case they declined, threats, and afterwards tortures were to be employed to compel submission. If they remained firm, it was resolved to inflict, particularly on the bishops, whom the emperor hated most bitterly, the punishment of death. There was a disposition, however, to try first the effect of commands, threats, persuasions and the milder forms of chastisement. By degrees, recourse was had to more violent measures; and gradually the persecution extended from the capital of the empire — where the presence of an emperor known to be hostile to the Christians made it the most severe at the beginning — into the provinces. Wherever the imperial edict was carried into execution, the first step was publicly to appoint a day against which all the Christians of a place were to present themselves before the magistrate, renounce their religion, and offer at the altar. In the case of those who before the end of the time fled their country, nothing further was done; except that their goods were confiscated, and themselves forbidden to return under penalty of death. But if they were unwilling to make so immediate a sacrifice of their earthly goods for the heavenly treasure, if they waited, in the expectation that some expedient might perhaps yet be found whereby both could be retained, then, unless they had voluntarily presented themselves by the day appointed, the examination was commenced before the magistrate, assisted by five of the principal citizens.[1] After repeated tortures, those who remained firm were cast into prison, where the additional sufferings of hunger and thirst were employed to overcome their resolution. The extreme penalty of death appears to have been resorted to less frequently. Many magistrates, whose avarice exceeded their zeal for the laws, or who were really desirous of sparing the Christians, gladly let them off, even without sacrificing, provided they bought a certificate, or libel, as it was called, attesting that they had satisfactorily

1 Cyprian. ep. 40. Quinque primores illi, qui edicto nuper magistratibus fuerant copulati, ut fidem nostram subruerent. The expression edicto renders it not probable, to say the least, that this regulation was confined to Carthage alone

complied with the requisitions of the edict.[1] Some Christians pursued a bolder course, and instead of providing such certificates, maintained, without appearing before the authorities, that their names were entered on the magistrate's protocol, along with those by whom the edict had been obeyed (acta facientes.)[2] Many erred through ignorance; supposing themselves guilty of no violation of religious constancy, when they did nothing contrary to their professed faith either by sacrificing or burning incense; but only allowed others to report that they had done so. But this proceeding the church always condemned as a tacit abjuration.[3]

The effect produced by this sanguinary edict among the Christians in large cities, such as Alexandria and Carthage, may best be described in the words of the Alexandrian bishop Dionysius.[4] "All," says he, "were thrown into consternation by the terrible decree; and of the more reputable citizens,[5] many presented themselves immediately, of their own accord: some, private individuals, impelled by their fears; others, such as were invested with some public office, and were forced to do it by their employment;[6] while others still were conducted forward by their relations and friends. As each was called by name, they approached the unholy offering; some pale and trembling, as if they were going not to *sacrifice*, but to be themselves sacrificed to the gods, so that the populace, who thronged around, derided them; and it was plain to all, that they were equally afraid to sacrifice and to die. Others advanced with more alacrity, carrying their boldness so far as to avow they never had been Christians. In all of these, was verified the saying of our Lord, 'how hardly can a rich man enter into the kingdom of heaven.' As to the rest, some followed the example of these two classes of the more reputable; others betook themselves to flight, and others were arrested; of these last, a part held out, indeed, till the manacles were fastened on, and some even suffered themselves to be imprisoned for several days; but they abjured before they were summoned to appear at the tribunal. Others endured their tortures to a certain point, but finally gave in. Yet the firm and ever blessed pillars of the Lord, who through him were made strong, and endured, with a power and steadfastness worthy of, and corresponding to, the strength of their faith, became wonderful witnesses of his kingdom." Among these, Dionysius mentions a boy, of fifteen years, Dioscurus by name, who, by his apt replies and constancy under torture, forced the

[1] Those who procured such a certificate were styled *libellatici*.

[2] Cyprian. ep. 31. Qui acta fecissent, licet præsentes, cum fierent, non affuissent — ut sic scriberetur mandando.

[3] The Roman clergy, in their letter to Cyprian, say: Non est immunis a scelere, qui ut fieret imperavit, nec est alienus a crimine, cujus consensu licet non a se admissum crimen tamen publice legitur.

[4] Euseb. l. VI. c. 41.

[5] Οἱ περιφανέστεροι, the personæ insignes, on whom the attention of the pagans was always first directed, and who, above all others, were exposed to danger.

[6] Among the personæ insignes, a distinction was made between the ἰδιωτεύοντες, who appeared voluntarily before the civil authorities and complied with the edict, and the δημοσιεύοντες, οἱ ὑπὸ τῶν ῥάξεων ἤγοντο, who were obliged by their official duties to appear in the places of public resort, and were therefore under the necessity of deciding immediately, whether they would obey the edict, or render themselves liable to the penalty by their disobedience publicly expressed

admiration of the governor himself, who finally dismissed him, declaring that, on account of his minority, he was willing to allow him time for better reflection.

If the number of the wavering, or of those who fell in the conflict, was great, yet were there, also, many glorious exhibitions of the power of faith, and of Christian devotedness. At Carthage, we find a certain Numidicus, who, for his exemplary conduct in the persecution, was, by bishop Cyprian, made a presbyter. This man, after having inspired many with courage to suffer martyrdom, and seen his own wife perish at the stake, had himself, when half burned and covered under a heap of stones, been left for dead. His daughter went to search under the stones for the body of her father, in order to bury it. Great was her joy at finding him still giving signs of life, and when her filial assiduities finally succeeded in completely restoring him. A woman had been brought to the altar by her husband, where she was forced to offer, by some one holding her hand. But she exclaimed, "I did it not, — it was you that did it;" and she was thereupon condemned to exile.[1] In the dungeon at Carthage, we find confessors of Christ, whom their persecutors had endeavored, for eight days, by heat, hunger and thirst, to force to abjuration, and who now saw death by starvation staring them in the face.[2] Certain confessors at Rome, who had already been confined for a year, wrote to the bishop Cyprian in the following terms:[3] "What more glorious and blessed lot can, by God's grace, fall to man, than, amidst tortures and the fear of death itself, to confess God, the Lord; than, with lacerated bodies, and a spirit departing, but yet free, to confess Christ, the Son of God; than to become fellow-sufferers with Christ, in the name of Christ? If we have not yet shed our blood, we are ready to shed it. Pray then, beloved Cyprian, that the Lord would daily confirm and strengthen each one of us, more and more, with the power of his might, and that he, as the best of leaders, would finally conduct his soldiers, whom he has disciplined and proved in the dangerous camp, to the field of battle which is before us, armed with those divine weapons which never can be conquered."[4]

The hatred of the emperor was particularly directed against the bishops, and perhaps the punishment of death was expressly intended for them alone. At the very outset of the persecution, the Roman bishop Fabianus suffered martyrdom. Several of the bishops withdrew from their communities, till the first tempest of the persecution was over. This course might be an act of weakness, if the fear of death, threatened first to themselves, impelled them to it. But they might also be actuated by loftier motives; they might look upon it as their duty, since their presence served merely to exasperate the pagans, to contribute, by their temporary absence, to the preservation of the peace of their flocks, and moreover, so far as was consistent with steadfastness to the faith and the discharge of their pastoral duties, to secure

[1] Cyprian. ep. 18.
[2] Ep. 21. Luciani ap Cyprian.
[3] Ep. 26.
[4] Ephes. 6, 11.

their own lives for the future services of their communities and of the church. But such a step was ever liable to different interpretations, and the bishops, particularly those in the large capital towns, on whom all eyes were turned, exposed themselves to many an accusation. Even the bishop Cyprian could not escape these censures, when, moved by the cry of these furious pagan people, who demanded his death, he withdrew, for a period, into a place of concealment.[1] His later conduct, at least, shows that he knew how to overcome the fear of death, and the frankness and peace of conscience with which, in a letter to the Roman church, he explains his conduct, clear him from all reproach.[2] "Immediately," he writes, "on the first commencement of the troubles, when the people, with furious clamors, had frequently demanded my death, I retired for a while, not so much out of regard for my own safety, as for the public peace of the brethren, lest the disturbances which had begun, might be increased by my obstinate presence." This conduct was in accordance with the principles which he recommended to others in all similar cases.[3] "Thus our Lord," he says, "commanded that, in times of persecution, we should give way and fly; he prescribed this rule, and followed it himself. For, as the crown of martyrdom comes from the grace of God, and can only be gained when the hour for receiving it is arrived, he who retires for a season, while he still remains true to Christ, denies not the faith, but abides his time." There was some difference, it must be allowed, between the case of all other Christians, and of one who had the office of a pastor to administer, and duties to fulfil towards souls which were committed to his care. But Cyprian waived none of these obligations. He could truly say, that although absent in the body, yet in spirit he was constantly present with his flock, and by counsel and act, endeavored to guide them according to the precepts of the Lord.[4] The letters which he sent from his retirement by means of certain ecclesiastics, through whom he maintained a constant correspondence with his people, show how truly he could say this of himself; how vigilantly he labored to maintain the discipline and order of his church, and to provide, in every way, for the wants of the poor, who were hindered by the persecution from pursuing their ordinary employments, and for the relief of the prisoners. The same principles of Christian prudence which moved him to avoid a momentary danger, were also exhibited in his exhortations to his flock, which, while they enforced the duty of Christian constancy, warned against every approach to fanatical extravagance. "I beg of you," he writes to his clergy,[5] "to use all prudence and care for the preservation of quiet; and if our brethren, in their love, are anxious to visit those worthy confessors whom divine grace has already honored by a glorious beginning, yet this must be done with caution, and not in crowds, lest the suspicion of the heathen should be excited, lest our access to them should be wholly prohibited, and, in our eagerness for too

[1] The Roman clergy, in their letter to the *Clerus* at Carthage, express themselves with some doubt on the matter: "They had learned Cyprianum secessisse certa ex causa, quod utique recte fecerit, propterea quod sit persona insignis." Ep. 2.

[2] Ep. 14. [3] De lapsis.

[4] Ep. 14. [5] Ep. 4

much, we should lose the whole. Be careful, then, that, for the greater safety, this matter be managed with due moderation; so that even the presbyters who administer the communion to the prisoners in their dungeon, may severally take their turns, as well as those deacons who go to assist; for, by this alternation of persons and change of visitors, the thing will be rendered less odious. Indeed, we must in all things, with meekness and humility, as becomes the servants of God, accommodate ourselves to the times, and seek for the preservation of peace and the best good of the people." He advised his church to regard this persecution as an admonition to the duty of prayer.[1] "Let each of us," he says, "pray to God, not for himself alone, but for all the brethren, according to the example which our Lord has given us, where we are taught to pray, not as individuals, each for himself, but as a common brotherhood, all for all. When the Lord shall see us humble and peaceful, united among ourselves, and made better by our present sufferings, he will deliver us from the persecutions of our enemies."

From a comparison of the letters of Cyprian which belong to this period, with those of Dionysius of Alexandria, we may conclude, that the persecution became gradually more severe; a fact to be accounted for, however, without supposing that any new edict was issued by the emperor Decius. As so many had wavered on the first menace of the magistrate, it was the more confidently hoped that the Christians might be altogether suppressed without resorting to extremities, if they were but deprived of their bishops, who constantly inflamed their zeal for the faith. The management of the whole matter had, at first, been intrusted to the city and local magistrates in the several provinces; persons who, from their acquaintance with the individual citizens, best knew how to approach them, and who could find out those means which were adapted to operate most effectually upon each individual, according to his particular character and his particular connections. The severest punishments, at first, were imprisonment and exile. But when it was seen that the hope which had been excited by the first successful result, was disappointed, the proconsuls took the matter into their own hands; and the proceedings against those whose constancy had been the cause of this disappointment, became more violent, in order that they might be forced, at least, to yield like the rest. Hunger and thirst, the more refined and cruel methods of torture, in some cases the punishment of death, inflicted even upon such as were not connected with the sacred office, were now employed. But it was natural that, in course of time, men would grow tired of their fury, and the excited passions become cool again. The change, moreover, which took place in the provincial governments, when the old proconsuls and presidents, with the beginning of the year 251, laid down their office, might, for a time, have been favorable for the Christians. Finally, the attention of Decius himself was more withdrawn from his persecutions of the Christians, by political events of greater importance to him, the insurrection in Macedonia, and the Gothic war. In this last war, towards the

[1] Ep. 7.

close of the year, he lost his life. The calm which the Christians enjoyed in consequence of this change, continued under the reign of Gallus and Volusianus, through a part of the following year, 252. But a destructive pestilence, which had broken out in the preceding reign and was now gradually spreading its ravages through the whole Roman empire, besides drought and famine in several of the provinces, excited, as usual, the fury of the populace against the Christians.[1] An imperial edict appeared, requiring all Roman subjects to sacrifice to the gods, in order to obtain deliverance from so great a public calamity.[2] The public attention was again arrested, by observing how many withdrew from these solemnities because they were Christians. Hence arose new persecutions, to increase the number of sacrifices, and to sustain everywhere the declining interests of the ancient religion.

On the approach of these new trials, the bishop Cyprian wrote a letter of encouragement to the African church of the Thibaritans,[3] in which he thus addresses them. "Let no one, my dearest brethren, when he observes how our people are scattered by the fear of persecution, be disturbed because he no longer sees the brethren together, nor hears the bishops preach. We, who may not shed others' blood, but must be ready to pour out our own, cannot, at such a time, all meet in the same place together. Wherever it may happen, in these days, that a brother is separated awhile from the church, in body, not in spirit, by the necessity of the times, let him not be moved by the fearful circumstances of such a flight, nor appalled at the solitude of the desert, which he may be obliged to make his refuge. *He* is not alone, who has Christ for a companion in his flight; he is not alone, who, preserving the temple of God inviolate, is not without God, wherever he may be. And if robber or wild beast fall upon the fugitive in the desert or on the mountains; if hunger, thirst or cold destroy him; or if his flight lead him over the sea, and the storm and waves overwhelm him; still Christ is present, to witness the conduct of his soldier, wherever he fights."

The bishops of the metropolis, under the eye of the emperor, became naturally the first mark for persecution; for how could it be expected to put down the Christians in the provinces, if their bishops were tolerated in *Rome?* Cornelius, who, at the hazard of his life, entered on his office while Decius was yet emperor, was first banished, then condemned to death. Lucius, who had the Christian courage to succeed him in the office during these perilous times, became his follower also, soon afterwards, in banishment and in martyrdom.

Yet the wars and the insurrections which occupied the attention of Gallus, prevented him from prosecuting with vigor any general persecutions in the provinces; and these events, which terminated, in the summer of the year 253, with his assassination, at length restored tranquillity and peace to the Christians throughout the empire.

The emperor Valerian, in the first year of his reign, treated the

[1] See Cyprian's Apology for the Christians against the charges of Demetrianus.

[2] Cypriani ep. 55 ad Cornel. Sacrificia, quæ edicto proposito celebrare populus jubebatur.

[3] Ep. 56.

Christians with unusual clemency; indeed, he is said to have had many of them about him, in his own palace.[1] But if, at first, he gave himself no concern about the affairs of religion, and let things take their course, without any intention, however, of leaving the old state religion to perish, yet the ever increasing multitude of the Christians, whose influence reached even into his own court, may have been used as an argument to convince him of the necessity of some stricter measures. It was manifestly his object, at first, when, in 257, he suffered himself to be induced to alter his conduct towards the Christians, to check the advance of Christianity without bloodshed. The churches were only to be deprived of their teachers and pastors, and particularly of their bishops. Next, the assembling of the churches was prohibited. Thus the trial was made, whether the end could be accomplished without the effusion of blood.

The forms of procedure, in the first persecution under this emperor, are most clearly presented in the protocols or minutes of examination, in the cases of the bishops Cyprian and Dionysius. The proconsul Paternus summoned Cyprian before his tribunal, and thus addressed him. "The emperors Valerian and Gallienus have sent me a rescript, in which they command, that all who do not observe the Roman religion shall immediately adopt the Roman ceremonies. I ask, therefore, what are you? what do you answer?" *Cyprian.* — "I am a Christian and a bishop. I know of no other god than the true and only God, who created the heavens, earth and sea, and all that they contain. This God we Christians serve; to him we pray, day and night, for ourselves, for all men, and for the welfare of the emperors themselves." *The proconsul.* — "Do you persist, then, in this resolution?" *Cyprian.* — "A good resolution, grounded on the knowledge of God, cannot be altered." Upon this, the proconsul, in compliance with the imperial edict, pronounced upon him the sentence of banishment; and at the same time, having explained to him, that the rescript had reference not only to the bishops, but also to the presbyters, proceeded thus: "I desire, therefore, to know of you, who the presbyters are who dwell in this city." *Cyprian.* — "Your laws have justly forbidden against informing; therefore I cannot inform you; but in the places where they preside, you will be able to find them." *Proconsul.* — "The question relates to this place. To-day I am prosecuting the investigation here, in the place where we are." *Cyprian.* — "As our doctrine forbids a man to inform against himself, and it is likewise contrary to your own rules, so neither can *they* inform against themselves; but if you seek for them, you will find them." The proconsul dismissed him with the declaration, that the assembling of the Christians, in whatsoever place, and the visiting of Christian cemeteries, were forbidden under pain of death.

The design, at present, was only to separate the bishops completely from their churches; but spiritual ties are not to be sundered by any earthly power. We soon find not only bishops and clergy, who con

[1] See the letter of Dionysius of Alexandria, in Eusebius, l. VII. c. 10.

tinued to be the special objects of persecutions, but also the laity, even women and children, subjected to the scourge, and then condemned to imprisonment, or to labor in the mines. They had probably been seized at the graves, or in the forbidden assemblies. The bishop Cyprian was active in providing, from his place of exile at Curubis, for their bodily and spiritual wants, and in proving his sympathy by words and deeds of love. On sending them, for their support and for the relief of their sufferings, a large sum of money, taken from his own income and the treasury of the church, he thus addressed them:[1] "In the mines, the body is refreshed not by beds and pillows, but by the comforts and joys of Christ. Your limbs, wearied with labor, recline upon the earth; but with Christ, it is no punishment to lie there. If the outward man is defiled, the inner man is but the more purified by the spirit from above. Your bread is scanty; but man lives not by bread alone, but by every word of God. You are in want of clothing, to defend you from the cold; but he who has put on Christ, is provided with clothing and ornament enough. Even in the fact, my dearest brethren, that you cannot now celebrate the communion of the Lord's supper, your faith may still be conscious of no want. You celebrate the most glorious communion; you present God the costliest offering, since the holy scriptures declare, that to God the most acceptable sacrifice is a broken and a contrite heart. You present yourselves to God as a pure and holy offering." "Your example," he writes to the clergy, "has been followed by a large portion of the church, who have confessed and been crowned with you. United to you by ties of the strongest love, they would not be separated from their shepherds by dungeons and mines. Even young maidens and boys are with you. What power do you now possess of a victorious conscience; what triumph in your hearts; when you can walk through the mines, with imprisoned body, but a heart conscious of the mastery over itself; when you know that Christ is with you, rejoicing over the patience of his servants, who, in his own footsteps, and by his own way, are entering into the kingdom of eternity!"

The emperor must soon have learned, that nothing could be accomplished by such measures. This local separation could not tear the bishops from their connection with their flocks. By letters, by ecclesiastics, whose travels preserved the means of correspondence, they still acted upon the churches as if they were in the midst of them, and their state of exile only made them dearer to their people. Wherever they were banished, a little church gathered round them; so that in many countries where the seed of the gospel had never been scattered, it was by such exiles, whose life as well as lips bore testimony to their faith, the kingdom of God was first introduced. Thus the bishop Dionysius, who had been banished to a remote district of Lybia, could say of his exile:[2] "We were, at first, persecuted and stoned; but soon, not a few of the pagans forsook their idols, and turned to God. It was by us, that the first seed of the divine word was conveyed to

[1] Ep. 77. [2] Euseb. l. VII. c. 11

that spot; and, as if God had conducted us thither for this sole purpose, he brought us back again after we had fulfilled the commission."

Valerian thought it necessary, therefore, to employ more vigorous and severe measures to effect a total suppression of Christianity. In the following year, 258, appeared the edict. "Bishops, presbyters and deacons were to be put to death immediately by the sword; senators and knights were to forfeit their rank and their property, and if they still remained Christians, to suffer the like punishment; women of condition, after being deprived of their property, were to be banished. Those Christians who were in the service of the palace," — slaves and freedmen are, without doubt, particularly intended here, — "who had formerly made profession of Christianity, or now made such profession, should be treated as the emperor's property, and after being chained,[1] distributed to labor on the various imperial estates."[2] From this rescript, it is evident the emperor had it especially in view, *to deprive the Christians of their spiritual heads, and to check the progress of Christianity in the higher classes.* Unnecessary cruelty did not enter into his design; but yet, the people and the governors did not always stop here, as we may learn from certain martyr legends of the time, against the authenticity of which no valid objection can be urged.

The Roman bishop Sixtus, and four deacons of his church, were the first who suffered martyrdom in consequence of this rescript, on the sixth of August, 258.

In the provinces, the new governors had provisionally recalled from exile those who had been banished under their predecessors, and were now causing them to await in retirement, — where they were obliged to remain, — the decision of their fate by the new rescript expected from Rome. Cyprian resided at a secluded villa in the neighborhood of Carthage, until he heard he was to be conveyed to Utica, there to suffer the sentence of the proconsul, who for the present happened to be residing in that place. It was his choice to give his last testimony, by word and by suffering, like a faithful shepherd, in the presence of his flock; he therefore yielded to the persuasions of his friends, and withdrew himself for a while, until the proconsul should return. From the place of his concealment, he addressed the last letter to his church.[3]

[1] Perhaps, according to one reading, branded also.

[2] The rescript of the emperor to the senate, in the original, is extant in Cyprian, ep. 82, ad. Successum: Ut episcopi et presbyteri et diacones in continenti animadvertantur; senatores vero, egregii viri et (the second et is doubtless surreptitious, — the egregii viri are the equites themselves, as the senatores are the clarissimi,) equites Romani, dignitate amissa, etiam bonis spolientur, et si, ademptis facultatibus, Christiani esse perseveraverint, capite quoque mulctentur; matronæ vero, ademptis bonis, in exsilium relegentur; Cæsariani autem quicunque vel prius confessi fuerant, vel nunc confessi fuerint, confiscentur et vincti in Cæsarianas possessiones descripti mittantur. Instead of descripti, (distributed,) another text has, scripti, or inscripti, — *branded.* That as early as the persecution of Decian, Christians were branded on the forehead, may be gathered from a passage in Pontius' Life of Cyprian: Tot confessores frontium notatorum secunda inscriptione signatos. The prima inscriptio, namely, the inscriptio crucis, χαρακτὴρ, σφραγὶς τοῦ σταυροῦ, was that received at baptism. Yet the position of the words would better correspond, perhaps, with the common reading

[3] Ep. 83.

"I have allowed myself," he says, "to be persuaded to retire for a short time, since it becomes the bishop to confess the Lord in the place where he presides over the church of the Lord, so that the whole church may be honored by the confession of their bishop. For whatever proceeds from the lips of the confessing bishop, in the moment of confession, comes, under the guidance of the divine Spirit, from the mouths of all. Let me, then, in this secret retirement, await the return of the proconsul to Carthage, that I may learn from him the commands of the emperor in relation to the laity and the bishops among the Christians, and speak whatever it may please the Lord, in that hour, to cause me to speak. But do you, my dearest brethren, in conformity with the directions which, according to the doctrine of the Lord, you have often received from me, study to preserve quiet. Let no one of you lead the brethren into tumults, nor voluntarily give himself up to the heathen. The only time for any one to speak, is after he has been apprehended; in that hour, the *Lord*, who dwells in us, speaks in us." At length the proconsul returned; and when, on the fourteenth of September, the fatal sentence was pronounced by him, the last words of Cyprian were, "God be thanked."[1]

This persecution ended with the reign of its author, when Valerian, by the unfortunate issue of the war, became, in the year 259, a prisoner in the hands of the Persians, and his son Gallienus, who had already been associated with him in the government, obtained the sole authority. With regard to all public affairs, and so, consequently, to the maintenance of the national worship, this prince was more indifferent than his father. He immediately published an edict, by which he secured the Christians in the free exercise of their religion, and commanded the cemeteries, as well as other buildings and lands belonging to the churches, which had been confiscated in the preceding reign, to be restored. He thus recognized *the Christian church as a legally existing corporation;* for no other, according to the Roman laws, could hold common property.

But as Macrianus had usurped the imperial authority in the East and in Egypt, it was not till after his overthrow, in the year 261, that the edict of toleration, by Gallienus, could go into effect in these provinces.[2] Hence, while the Christians of the West were already in the enjoyment of repose, the persecutions might still be going on in these provinces, under the laws of Valerian. A remarkable example which occurred at this period in Palestine, is mentioned by Eusebius.[3] Marius, a Christian soldier of Cæsarea Stratonis, was about to be invested with the office of centurion. Just as he was to receive the centurion's staff, (the vitis,) another soldier, the next claimant to the office, stepped forward and declared that, according to the ancient laws, Marius was incapable of holding rank in the Roman army, because he was a Christian, and did not sacrifice to the gods and to the emperor. Upon this,

[1] He was condemned as inimicus Diis Romanis et sacris legibus.

[2] Eusebius, (l. VII. c. 13,) has not preserved the original edict of this emperor, but the rescript by which the same edict, after the defeat of Macrianus, was applied also to Egypt.

[3] L. VII. c. 15.

a delay of three hours was granted to Marius, within which time he must decide whether he preferred to remain a Christian. Meanwhile the bishop Theotecnus led him into the church. On the one hand, he pointed to the sword, which the centurion wore at his side, and on the other, to a volume of the gospels, which he held up before him. He was to choose between the two; the military office and the gospel. Without hesitation, Marius raised his right hand, seized the sacred volume. "Now," said the bishop, "hold fast on God, and may you obtain what you have chosen. So depart in peace." He bravely confessed, and was beheaded.

By the law of Gallienus an essential change, prolific of consequences, would necessarily be produced in the situation of the Christians. The important step at which many an emperor, still more favorably disposed to Christianity than Gallienus, had hesitated, was now taken. Christianity was become a religio licita; and the religious party that threatened destruction to the old state religion and all the institutions connected with it, had now for once attained a legal existence. Many a prince, who at an earlier period, in accordance with the existing laws, would have had no scruples in persecuting the Christians, would now doubtless be shy of attacking a corporation, once established by law. This was shown directly, in the case of the second successor of Gallienus, Lucius Domitius Aurelian, who became emperor in 270. Sprung from a low rank, and educated in pagan superstition, he could be hardly otherwise than hostilely disposed towards the Christians from the first; for he was not only devoted, with singular fanaticism, to the Oriental worship of the Sun, — which doubtless would not have prevented him, however, from showing toleration to various other foreign rites (sacra,) — but he was also in every respect a blind devotee to the old religion. The well-being of the state seemed to him closely connected with the proper administration of the ancient rites (sacra.) When on an occasion of threatening danger from a war with German tribes, certain persons in the Roman senate moved that, according to the ancient practice, the Sibylline books should be opened and consulted for advice, other senators replied, that there was no need of having recourse to them; the emperor's power was so great, that it was unnecessary to consult the gods. The matter remained for the present, and was not called up again till afterwards. But the emperor, who perhaps had been informed of these proceedings in the Roman senate, expressed his displeasure, and wrote to them, "I am surprised, that you have hesitated so long about consulting the Sibylline books, as if you were conducting your deliberations in a Christian church, and not in the temple of all the gods."[1] He called upon them to support him in every way by the ceremonies of religion; since it was no disgrace to conquer with the assistance of the gods. He declared himself ready to defray all expenses which might be incurred in offering every description of sacrifice, and *to furnish captives for that purpose from all*

[1] This language perhaps may have conveyed a suspicion that there were several Christians among the senators themselves, who had an influence on the deliberations

nations. Human sacrifices, then, must have been included.[1] We may presume, therefore, that this emperor was not averse to the shedding of the blood of the Christians in honor of his gods. He was inclined by natural temperament to harsh and violent measures. Yet in the first years of his reign, he engaged in no persecution of the Christians. He even showed by his conduct on one occasion, in the third year, that he recognized the Christian church as a lawfully existing corporation; for a dispute having arisen among the Christians of Antioch, as to the individual who should be their bishop, the church applied to the emperor himself and submitted it to his arbitration, whether the bishop Paul of Samosata, long since deposed on account of his doctrinal opinions, but who had found a patroness in Queen Zenobia, now vanquished by Aurelian, should not at last be *compelled* to resign his office. The emperor decided, that the one should be bishop who was recognized as such by the bishop of Rome, his own residence. It was not till the year 275, when busied with warlike enterprises in Thrace, that with a view perhaps to show his gratitude to the gods, who, in his opinion, had thus far so signally favored him, and to conciliate their good will for the future, he resolved to dismiss all farther scruples, and proceed to severities against the Christians. But before he could carry his plan into effect, he was assassinated in a conspiracy.[2]

For more than fifty years, the Christian church remained in this condition of peace and repose. Meanwhile, the number of Christians, in every rank of society, went on increasing. But without doubt, among the multitude who embraced Christianity at a time when it required no sacrifice to be a Christian, not a few were counterfeits, bringing over with them into the Christian church the vices of paganism. The outward form of the church underwent a change, with the increased wealth of its members, and instead of the simple places of assembly, splendid churches began to be erected in the large cities. The emperor Dioclesian, who from the year 284 was the sole ruler, but soon after 286 shared the sovereignty with Maximian Herculius, seemed, at least to outward appearance, no otherwise than favorable to the Christians; for the stories of persecutions in the earlier years of this emperor are at variance with the records of authentic history, and altogether unworthy of credit. Christians held offices of trust in the imperial palace. They were to be found among the principal eunuchs and officers of the bed-chamber, (cubiculariis;) although it could not be fairly presumed, it is true, from this circumstance alone, that the emperor was governed by any special regard for the Christians, — since from an early period, Christians had been members of the Cæsarian household, (Cæsariani,) — and if but one individual were such, his zeal and prudence might have a great influence in bringing the majority of

[1] Flav. Vopisc. c. 20.

[2] Eusebius says, in his History of the Church, that Aurelian died as he was upon the point of subscribing an edict against the Christians. In the book, De mortibus persecutorum, it is said, the edict had already been issued, but could not reach the more distant provinces until after the death of the emperor. Others represent the persecution as having already begun. But it is most probable, that the report of Eusebius, who says the least, contains the truth, and the rest was added through exaggeration

his associates to embrace Christianity, or in causing that none but Christians should be chosen to these offices.

The chief chamberlain (præpositus cubiculariorum) Lucianus was probably one of this class, a man in high favor with his prince, and to whom Theonas, bishop of Alexandria, imparted much wise counsel as to the management of his office, in a letter which has come down to our times.[1] He exhorts him to assume nothing to himself, because many in the palace of the emperor had been brought through him to the knowledge of the truth; but rather to thank God, who had used him as the instrument of so good a work, and given him great authority with the emperor, in order that by his means the reputation of the Christian name might be promoted. If he recommends to him the greater zeal and prudence, inasmuch as the emperor, though not a Christian himself,[2] yet entrusted to Christians, as his most faithful servants, the care of his life and person, still we ought not to infer too much from an expression of this kind, as to the emperor's favorable opinion of Christianity. The bishop allowed himself, without doubt, to transfer the judgment of his own mind to that of the emperor; indeed, this would seem natural from the fact that many who had entered into the service of the palace as pagans, had been converted by the influence of this Lucian. In case the charge over the imperial library should be committed to any one of the Christian chamberlains,[3] this, it was represented, would be a very important occurrence; the favored individual was exhorted to take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded him, to render the emperor favorably disposed towards Christianity. He should not show contempt for pagan literature, but let it be seen that he was a proficient in it; should praise it, and use it for the emperor's entertainment. Only at times he should introduce some notice of the sacred scriptures, and endeavor to lead the emperor to remark their superiority. It might so happen in the course of conversation, that Christ would be mentioned; in that case, it might be gradually shown, that he is the only true God.[4] So important did it seem

[1] This letter was first published in the 3d vol. of D'Archery's Spicilegium, f. 297, and reprinted in Galland's Bibl. patr. T. IV. It cannot be certainly ascertained, it must be allowed, *who* the emperor was that is spoken of in this letter, nor who the bishop Theonas was, by whom it was written. It states how Christianity was glorified by the persecutions, how its diffusion was promoted by them, and finally, how peace was granted to the church by good princes. Persecutionum procellis velut aurum in fornace expurgatum enituit et ejus veritas ac celsitudo magis semper ac magis splendent, ut jam, pace per bonum principem ecclesiis concessa, Christianorum opera etiam coram infidelibus luceant. By this prince we might understand Constantine; but if he were intended, the immediately preceding persecution of Dioclesian would doubtless have been more distinctly noticed. If this had been written subsequently to the final triumph of Christianity, which followed the Dioclesian persecution, the author assuredly would not have employed so indistinct a phraseology as: Quia nos maleficos *olim* et omnibus flagitiis refertos *nonnulli priores principes* putaverunt. On the other hand, these words suit well to the times of Dioclesian. Moreover, the situation of the emperor, which is here the subject of discourse, appears by no means such as would apply to the case of Constantine, especially after he had become master of the East. The expression, "pacem concedere," is so general, that it might be properly applied to the tranquil situation which the Christians owed to Dioclesian.

[2] Princeps, nondum Christianæ religioni adscriptus.

[3] For the librarian was still a pagan.

[4] Insurgere poterit Christi mentio. Expli-

to the wise bishop to warn against an intemperate zeal, which, by aiming at too much at once, might occasion more injury than advantage.

To Roman statesmen the thought would naturally present itself, that that the ancient political glory of the emperor stood intimately connected with the old national worship, and that it was impossible to restore the one without the other. Now, as it was Dioclesian's wish to bring back the ancient splendor of the Roman empire, it might appear to him necessary for this purpose, to infuse life into the old religion now fast going to decay, and to destroy that foreign faith which was constantly extending itself on every side, and threatening to acquire the sole dominion. In an inscription belonging to a somewhat later date, where the emperor boasts of having suppressed Christianity, it is brought as a charge against the Christians, that they were ruining the state.[1] In the edict whereby Galerius put an end to the persecution of which he was himself the author, he declared that it had been the intention of the emperors to reform and correct everything according to the ancient laws and constitution of the Roman state.[2] We are not to believe, therefore, that the cause which held back this emperor from a persecution in which, on the grounds that have just been mentioned, he might have been induced to engage at a still earlier period, was any recognition of human rights and of the limits of the civil power in matters of conscience, to which the earlier Roman emperors had been strangers. How entirely foreign to the views of Dioclesian was a recognition of this kind, is evinced by the principles he avows in a law directed against the Manichæan sect, A. D. 296; though it may be admitted, that he entertained towards this sect a peculiar aversion, on account of its having arisen among his enemies the Persians.[3] "The immortal gods have, by their providence, arranged and established what is right. Many wise and good men are agreed that this should be maintained unaltered. They ought not to be opposed. No new religion must presume to censure the old; since it is the greatest of crimes, to overturn what has been once established by our ancestors, and what has supremacy in the state." Would not the principles here avowed, necessarily make Dioclesian also an enemy and persecutor of Christianity?[4]

But if, during so long a period, he could never bring himself to the resolution of openly becoming such, some counteracting cause must have been at work on the other side. Beside the influence of the Christians more or less immediately about his person, he may have been induced to hesitate by reasons similar to those which, in the work,

cabitur paulatim ejus sola divinitas. Omnia hæc cum Christi adjutorio provenire possent.

[1] Christiani, qui rem publicam evertebant.

[2] Nos quidem volueramus juxta leges veteres et publicam disciplinam Romanorum cuncta corrigere.

[3] This edict, known already to Hilarius, author of the Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul, bears every internal mark of genuineness; and no motive can be imagined, either in pagan or Christian, for fabricating it. The diffusion of that sect, at this earlier period, in Africa, which is pre-supposed in the edict, is a thing by no means impossible.

[4] Neque reprehendi a nova vetus religio deberet. Maximi enim criminis est, retractare quæ semel ab antiquis tractata et definita sunt, statum et cursum tenent et possident.

De mortibus persecutorum, he is said afterwards to have urged against the proposition of his son-in-law Galerius, in the conference at Nicomedia, soon to be more particularly noticed; — namely, that the Christians, after a long period of time, had at length become a lawfully existing religious community; that they were widely diffused through every part of the empire; that there would be a profuse shedding of blood, and the public tranquillity might easily be disturbed; and finally, that the effusion of blood had hitherto served rather to advance Christianity than to procure its subversion. Anxious as Diocletian might be to raise up the old Roman religion, yet assuredly he would never have overcome these scruples, if he had not been hurried on by some more powerful influence.

The pagans could not but see, that the time when their ancient ceremonies must cease and the hated Christian become predominant, was fast approaching; and they must have expended every effort to prevent the decisive crisis. The pagan party, to which belonged statesmen, priests, self-styled philosophers, such as Hierocles,[1] needed only a powerful instrument to carry their schemes into execution. Such a one they found in Diocletian's son-in-law, the Cæsar, Caius Galerius Maximian. This prince had raised himself from obscurity by his warlike talents. Educated in the blind superstition of paganism, he was devoted to his religion, and moreover made great account of sacrifices and divinations. Whenever he performed these ceremonies in time of war, where Christian officers were present, the latter were used to sign themselves with the cross, the symbol of Christ's victory over the kingdom of darkness, in order to protect themselves against the influence of those hostile (demoniacal) powers, whose agency, as they supposed, was visibly manifested in the pagan worship.

Now as the Christians saw in paganism, not a barely subjective notion, a work of human imagination or fraud, but a real outward power, hostile to Christianity;[2] so the pagans beheld, *after their manner*, in Christianity, such a power in relation to the operations and appearances of their own gods; and the pagan priests might say: the sign of the cross, hateful to the gods, keeps them from being present and from manifesting themselves at the sacrifices and other rites consecrated to their service.[3]

[1] Not the author of the Commentary on the Golden Verses.

[2] When the triumph of Christianity was already decided, and paganism no longer presented itself, as so formidable a power in life, to the Christian consciousness; namely, in the fourth century, — another view of the matter could be admitted, and Eusebius of Cæsarea could say, that the pagan art of divination ought to be traced, not to the influence of the gods, nor even to demons, but to human fraud, which was sufficient to account for the whole. After having spoken of the deceptive arts of pagan priests and magicians, exposed in the times of the Emperor Constantine, he says: *Ταῦτα δή τις καὶ πλείω τούτων ἔτι συνάγων, εἴποι ἂν μὴ θεοὺς εἶναι, μηδὲ μὴν δαίμονας τοὺς τῶν κατὰ πολεῖς χρηστηρίων αἰτίους, πλάνην δὲ καὶ ἀπάτην ἀνδρῶν γοητῶν.* Euseb. Præparat. evangel. l. IV. c. 2.

[3] This is the view of the matter which presents itself to us, particularly when we compare the following passages: Lactant. Institut. l. IV. c. 27; de mortibus persecutorum, c. 10; and Euseb. vit. Constantin. l. II c. 50. In the passage first mentioned, it is said: Cum Diis suis immolant, si assistat aliquis signatam frontem gerens, sacra nullo modo litant. Nec responsa potest consultus reddere vates. Et hæc sæpe causa præcipua justitiam persequendi malis regibus fuit. Aruspices conquerentes, profanos homines sacris interesse, egerunt principes suos in furorem. True, it might be said, the Christians had only transferred

There were, up to this time, many Christians connected with the military service, both in the higher and lower ranks; and they as yet had never been compelled to do any thing contrary to their conscience. This is evident, not only from Eusebius' narrative, but from a particular incident worthy of being noticed, which took place in 295.[1] At Teveste, in Numidia, a young man, Maximilianus, was brought before the proconsul, as a proper subject for military duty. Immediately as he came up, and was about to be measured, to see if his size tallied with the standard of the service, he exclaimed, "I cannot serve as a soldier; I cannot do what is wrong; I am a Christian." The proconsul took no notice of these words, but calmly ordered him to be measured. Being found of the standard height, said the proconsul to him, without noticing his confession of Christianity, "Take the badge of the service,[2] and be a soldier." The young man replied, "I shall take no such badge; I wear already the badge of Christ, my God." Hereupon said the proconsul, who was a pagan, with a sarcastic threat, "I shall presently send you to your Christ." "Would you but do that," said the youth, "you would confer on me the highest honor." Without further remark, the proconsul directed the leaden badge of the service to be hung round his neck. The young man resisted, and in the ardor of his youthful faith, exclaimed, "I accept not the badge of the service of this world, and if you hang it about me, I shall break it off, for it is useless. I cannot wear this lead on my neck, after having once received the saving token of my Lord, Jesus Christ, whom you know not, but who has suffered for our salvation." The proconsul endeavored to explain to him, that he might be a soldier and a Christian at the same time; that, in truth, Christians were to be found, performing military service without scruple, in the body guard of all the four Cæsars, Diocleslan, Maximian Herculius, Constantius Chlorus and Galerius. But as the youth of one and twenty years could not consent to yield up his own conviction to the example of others, he was sentenced to death;[3]

their own subjective point of view to the pagans, and the legend respecting the origin of this persecution had thus arisen; but we have no good reason whatever to call in question this explanation, derived from the very life of the times, and which answers to the views mutually conditioning each other, of both Christians and pagans, with regard to the relation of their respective religious positions to one another. Thus the Christians appeal to the testimony of their adversary, Porphyry, to show that by the power of Christianity the influence of those demoniacal powers in paganism was hindered; for Porphyry complains, that a pestilence in some city or other, could not be arrested, because the appearance and healing influence of Esculapius was scared away by the worship of Jesus. Porphyry's language, in his book against Christianity, is as follows: Νυνὶ δὲ θαυμάζουσιν, εἰ τοσούτων ἐτῶν κατείληφε τὴν πόλιν ἡ νόσος, Ἀσκληπίου μὲν ἐπιδημίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν μηκέτ' οὔσης. Ἰησοῦ γὰρ τιμωμένου οὐδεμιᾶς τις θεῶν δημοσίας ὀφελείας ἤσθετο. Euseb. Præparat. evangel. l. V. c. 1.

[1] The time can be definitely determined, since the mention of the consuls in the actis Maximiliani, a report drawn up by an eye witness, furnishes a certain chronological datum.

[2] Signaculum militiæ.

[3] He received his sentence to death with an expression of thanks to God. To the Christians around, he said, when he was led away from the midst of them to execution, "My dearest brethren, strive with all your power, that you may attain to the vision of the Lord, and that he may bestow on you also such a crown." And he begged his father, — who would not persuade him to do contrary to his conscience, — regarding him with a joyful face, to present the new garment which he caused to be made for him on his entrance into the military service, to the soldier who was to execute the sentence of death on him.

yet, in the sentence, nothing was said of his Christianity, but only his refusal to do military service assigned, as the reason for his punishment.[1] Here, then, is good evidence, that the soldiers also could still openly profess Christianity, and that, if they only did their duty in other respects, they were not compelled to take any part in the pagan ceremonies.

Only a few years elapsed, however, after this occurrence, when the case was altered. Religious and political motives induced Galerius, in the first place, to remove from the army all that refused to sacrifice. It was easy for him to bring it about, that an order should be sent to the army, requiring every soldier to join in the sacrificial rites. Perhaps the celebration of the third lustrum since the elevation of Maximianus Herculius to the dignity of Cæsar and Augustus,[2] was chosen as a befitting occasion for issuing such an order to the army; — it being a festival usually celebrated with sacrifices and sacrificial banquets, in which all the soldiers were now required to take a part. Many gave in their commissions,[3] and soldiers of all ranks, from the highest to the lowest, quitted the service, that they might remain steadfast to their faith. Only a few were sentenced to death, — perhaps none except where some peculiar circumstances of the case furnished a pretext, at least in appearance, not only for dismissing them from the service as Christians, but also for punishing them as guilty of treason. Such as were not careful to express in moderate language and behavior their honest indignation at the unrighteous demand, might easily be represented, according to the military code, as refractory subjects. We have an illustration of this in the case of Marcellus the centurion, who was connected with the army at Tingis, (now Tangiers,) in Africa.

While the legion was celebrating the festival in honor of the Cæsar, after the pagan fashion, with sacrifices and banquetings, the centurion Marcellus rose up from the soldier's table, and throwing down his staff of office, his belt and arms, exclaimed, "From this moment I cease to serve your emperor as a soldier. I despise the worship of your gods of wood and stone, which are deaf and dumb idols. Since the service involves the obligation of sacrificing to the gods and to the emperors, I throw down my staff and belt, renounce the standards, and am a soldier no longer."[4] The two facts were now put together, that Marcellus had publicly cast off the badges of the service, and that he had indulged, before all the people, in abusive language towards the gods and the emperors. For this he was condemned to death.

These were the first premonitory signs of the persecution. Diocle-sian, for several years, could not be induced to proceed any farther. At length, in the winter of the year 303, Galerius came to Nicomedia, in Bithynia, on a visit to his aged and infirm father-in-law, who was already meditating to retire from the government. On this occasion Galerius employed every art of persuasion, seconded by many zealous

[1] Eo quod indevoto animo sacramentum militiæ recusaverit, gladio animadverti placuit.

[2] Dies natalis Cæsaris.

[3] As Eusebius relates, l. VIII. c. 4.

[4] Ecce, projicio vitem et cingulum, renuntio signis et militare recuso.

pagans among the state officers, to bring about a general persecution of the Christians. Dioclesian finally yielded; and one of the great pagan festivals, the Terminalia, which occurred on the 23d of February, was selected for the onslaught. At the first dawn of day, the magnificent church in that city, then the imperial residence, was broken open, the copies of the Bible found in it were burned, and the whole church abandoned to plunder and then to destruction. The next day, was published an edict, to the following effect: "All assembling of the Christians, for the purpose of religious worship, was forbidden; the Christian churches were to be demolished to their foundations; all manuscripts of the Bible should be burned; those who held places of honor and rank, must either renounce their faith or be degraded; in judicial proceedings, the torture might be used against all Christians, of whatsoever rank; those belonging to the lower walks of private life, were to be divested of their rights as citizens and freemen; Christian slaves were to be incapable of receiving their freedom, so long as they remained Christians." To what extent Christians in humble life were to lose the enjoyment of their rights, was not clearly defined, but free scope left for applying the law to particular cases. It is rendered certain, by the edict in which the emperor Constantine afterwards annulled all the consequences which resulted from this persecution in the East, that in some instances free born Christians were made slaves, and put to the lowest and most degrading servile employments, for which they were the least suited by their former habits of life.[1]

A Christian of noble rank suffered himself to be hurried, by his inconsiderate zeal, into a violation of that precept of the gospel which enjoins respect towards all in authority. He openly tore down the edict, and rending it contemptuously, exclaimed, "Victories announced again over the Goths and Sarmatians! The emperor treats the Christians, his own subjects, no better than the conquered Goths and Sarmatians." Welcome was the occasion thus furnished by the delinquent himself, for condemning him to death, not as a Christian, but as a violator of the imperial majesty.

The impression produced by this edict must have been the more ter-

[1] Euseb. vit. Constantin. l. II. c. 32, et seq. To arrive at the fullest knowledge possible of what this edict contained, it is necessary to compare the two incomplete and inaccurate reports of it in Eusebius, (hist. eccles. l. VIII. c. 2,) and in the book de Mortib., as also the translation of Rufinus. The prohibition of assemblies for religious worship is not expressly mentioned, indeed, in any one of these places; but from the nature of the case, it is tacitly implied by the edict itself. But it is clear, also, from the credible and official records of this first period of the persecution in Proconsular Africa, that such a prohibition was positively expressed. The most obscure is the passage in Eusebius, respecting the true meaning of which there has been no little dispute: *Τοὺς ἐν οἰκετίαις εἰ ἔτι ἐπιμένοιεν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Χριστιανισμοῦ προθέσει, ἐλευθερίας στερεῖσθαι.* By *ἐν οἰκετίαις*, nothing else can be understood, according to the usage of the language, than men of the laboring class, slaves. To bring meaning into the passage, therefore, we must look round for some other interpretation of the word *ἐλευθερία* than that which first presents itself. By the phrase, "deprived of their freedom," might be understood, "thrown into chains and imprisoned." See above, p. 139, the edict of Valerian against the Cæsarianos. It is the safest course, however, to follow Rufinus, who might have seen the original edict: "Si quis servorum permansisset Christianus, libertatem consequi non posset." If this is right, the translation of Eusebius, it must be admitted, was very defective.

rific, inasmuch as it became known, in many of the provinces, near the time of the Easter festival, and in several districts on the very day of Easter.[1] It is quite evident that the plan now was, to extirpate Christianity from the root. There was something novel in the undertaking to deprive the Christians of their religious writings. It differed from the mode of proceeding in the former persecutions, when it was hoped to suppress the sect by removing away their teachers and guides. The importance of these documents, as a means of preserving and propagating the Christian faith, must now have been understood. And there can be no doubt that the destruction of every copy of the Bible, had such a thing been possible, would have proved more effectual than the removal of those living witnesses of the faith, whose example served only to call forth a still greater number to supply their place. On the other hand, could the plan have been carried out, to destroy every existing copy of the scriptures, the *very source* would have been cut off, from which true Christianity and the life of the church was ever freshly springing with unconquerable vigor. Let preachers of the gospel, bishops and clergy, be executed; it was all to no purpose, so long as this book, by which new teachers could always be formed, remained in the hands of the Christians. The transmission of Christianity was not, in itself, it is true, inseparably and necessarily connected with the letter of the scriptures. Written, not on tables of stone, but on the living tablets of the heart, the divine doctrine, once lodged in the human soul, could preserve and propagate itself through its own divine power. But exposed to those manifold sources of corruption in human nature, Christianity, without the well-spring of scripture from which it could ever be restored back to its purity, would, as all history teaches, have been soon overwhelmed, and have become no longer recognizable under the load of falsehoods and corruptions. Yet how was it possible for the arbitrary human will to succeed in actually executing this cunningly devised means for the suppression of Christianity? How could the arm of despotism, though disregarding all private rights, yet reach so far as to grasp and destroy every existing copy, not only of those scriptures which were deposited in the churches, but also in so many private dwellings? The blind policy of the kingdom of lies is ever true to its character, in imagining that nothing can escape its investigation, and that, by fire and sword, it can destroy what is protected by

[1] Eusebius and Rufinus place the publication of the edict in the month of March, which harmonizes well with its first publication at the imperial residence, Nicomedia. In Egypt, according to Coptic accounts, it was published on the first of Parmuthi, i. e. by Ideler's tables, the 27th of March;—which also harmonizes with the rest. See Zoëga Catalog. codd. Copt. Romæ, 1810, f. 25, or the fragments of the Coptic acta Martyrum, published by Georgi, Romæ, 1793, Præfat. 109, where Georgi proposes an unnecessary emendation, and other passages. When these Coptic accounts, however, which contain a good deal that is fabulous, represent the persecution as following immediately after the victory over the Persians, to express Dioclesian's thanks to the gods for the success of his arms, this must be an anachronism; unless the first persecution among the soldiers was confounded with this second one. What is stated in these Coptic records, about the cause of the persecution, — viz. that a Christian metropolitan had released the son of the Persian King, Sapor, who had been committed to him for safe keeping. hardly admits of being reconciled in any way with the history as known to us.

a higher power and necessity. The infatuated zeal for the preservation of the old religion proceeded to such length with many, that they would fain have seen burnt with the holy scriptures of the Christians, some of the noblest monuments of their own ancient literature; that they were for having every thing destroyed which could be used by Christians as a testimony against paganism, and as a means of transition to their own faith. They called for a law, ordering the destruction of all the writings of antiquity which did such good service for the Christians.[1] It may be easily conceived that, where individuals of this stamp, or men who would sooner do too much than too little to gain the emperor's favor, were found among the governors and provincial magistrates, there would exist already, in the executing of this first edict for the surrender of the scriptures and the suspension of all assemblies for religious worship, an occasion for the exercise of every species of oppression and cruelty towards the Christians, — especially as by this same edict, Christians of all ranks and conditions were liable to the torture in judicial investigations.

But there were, also, magistrates of an entirely different temper, who endeavored to soften, as far as possible, the rigor of these measures, and executed them with as much lenity as they could, without a manifest infraction of the imperial edict. They very willingly allowed themselves to be deceived; or even suggested means of evading the edict, by an apparent compliance with its requisitions. Mensurius, bishop of Carthage, had taken the precaution to remove all manuscripts of the Bible from the church at Carthage to his own house, as a place of greater security, leaving behind only the writings of heretics. When the search-officers arrived, they seized the latter, asking no further questions. These, too, were religious writings of the Christians, — and nothing was said in the edict as to what sacred writings were intended, nor of what Christian party. But certain senators at Carthage took pains to expose the artifice to the proconsul Annubenus, and advised him to cause search to be made in the house of the bishop, where the whole would be found. But the proconsul, — who, it should seem, therefore, was willing to be deceived, — declined to follow the advice.[2] When Secundus, a Numidian bishop, refused to surrender the sacred scriptures, the officers of police demanded if he would not give them then some useless fragments, or any thing he pleased.[3] Such, very probably, may have been the meaning, also, of the proconsul's legate, when he repeatedly put the question to the Numidian bishop Felix, "Why do you not give up your useless writings?"[4] So the question of the

[1] This is said by the North-African writer, Arnobius, who in these times composed in defence of Christianity, his disputationes adversus gentes. Lib. III. c. 7: Cum alios audiam mussitare indignanter et dicere: oportere, per Senatum aboleantur ut hæc scripta, quibus Christiana religio comprobetur et vetustatis opprimatur auctoritas. Arnobius remarks, in objection to this proposal: Intercipere scripta et publicatam velle submergere lectionem, non est Deos defendere, sed veritatis testificationem timere.

[2] Augustin. brevicul. collat. c. Donatistis, d. III. c. 13. Optat. Milev., ed. du Pin, p. 174.

[3] Aliqua ἐκβολα aut quodcunque.

[4] Quare scripturas non tradis supervacuas, doubtless with intentional ambiguity, so that the words might be understood in the sense, that all the sacred writings of the Christians were useless.

prætorian prefect to Felix, the African bishop, "Why do you not surrender the sacred writings? — or perhaps you have none;" was evidently shaped with a view to suggest the desired reply.[1]

This critical and trying period brought to light both good and evil in the great body of Christians. The weak faith, the false zeal of enthusiastically excited feelings, and the true mean of genuine, evangelical good sense, were both discernible in the different modes of behavior. Some yielded to the fear of torture and death, and gave up their copies of the Bible, which were immediately committed to the flames in the public market-place. These, who passed by the name of Traditores, were excluded from the fellowship of the church. Others — and examples of this class we find particularly in North Africa, where a certain leaning to enthusiasm belonged to the native temperament of the people — challenged the pagan magistrates to do their office, and courted martyrdom with a fanatic zeal. Such persons declared, without being asked, that they were Christians, that they had copies of the sacred scriptures, but that they would surrender them on no account; or they disdainfully spurned those means of evasion which were offered to them by humane magistrates. They refused to comply with the suggestions of those who were desirous of executing the imperial ordinance only in form, and who would have them surrender other writings instead of the Bible. They imagined that they ought to follow the example of Eleazer, 2 Maccab. 6, who would not even *seem* to eat of the swine's flesh. There were others again, who, oppressed with debts, or conscious of grave transgressions, either wanted to rid themselves of a life that was burdensome to them in an honorable and seemingly pious manner, or sought in martyrdom an expiation of their sins; or who were ambitious of the honor which would be paid them by the brethren in the cells of their prison, or greedy of the gifts which they might hope to receive there.[2] Among the bishops themselves, there were individuals who applauded every mode of confessing the faith, and gave countenance to that fanatic zeal by which they were seized themselves. Others endeavored to unite, to steadfastness in the faith, Christian prudence and sobriety, — and at the head of these stood the Bishop Mensurius, of Carthage. He would not consent to it, that such persons as had themselves invited the pagan magistrates to do their worst, in the way above mentioned, should be honored as martyrs. In these opposite tendencies of the religious spirit here manifested, we may discern the germ of those divisions which broke out in the church of North Africa, after peace from without had been once more restored.

Let us now proceed as before, to contemplate in detail, some examples, derived from authentic sources, of the power of Christian faith and the intrepidity of Christian courage. In an inland town of Numidia, a band of Christians, — among whom was a lad in the tenderest

[1] See the acta Felicis in Ruinart.

[2] Vid. Augustin. breviculi. collat. c. Donatistis, d. III. c. 13, T. IX. opp. ed. Benedictin. f. 568: Quidam facinorosi arguebantur et fisci debitores, qui occasione persecutionis vel carere vellent onerosa multis debitis vita, vel purgare se putarent et quasi abluere facinora sua, vel certe adquirere pecuniam et in custodia deliciis perfrui De obsequio Christianorum.

years, — were seized in the house of a church-reader, where they had assembled under the direction of a presbyter, for the purpose of reading the scriptures and celebrating the communion. They were brought to Carthage, to be arraigned before the tribunal of the proconsul, singing hymns to the praise of God all the way. Several of them were put to the torture, for the purpose of drawing confessions from the rest. One of them exclaimed, in the midst of his sufferings, "Ye are wrong, unhappy men; you lacerate the innocent. We are no murderers, — we have never defrauded any man. — O God, have pity! I thank thee, O Lord, — give me power to suffer in thy name. Deliver thy servants out of the prison of this world — I thank thee, and yet am unable to thank thee, — to glory! I thank the God of the kingdom. It appears, — the eternal, the imperishable kingdom! Lord, Christ, we are Christians, we are thy servants; thou art our hope." While he thus prayed, the proconsul said to him, "You should have obeyed the law of the emperor." He replied, with a strong spirit, though in a weak and exhausted body, "I reverence only that law of God which I have learned. For this law, I am willing to die. In this law, I am made perfect. There is no other." In the midst of his tortures, another cried out, "Help, O Christ! I pray thee, have compassion, — preserve my soul, that it fall not into shame. O give me power to suffer." To the reader in whose house the assembly was held, said the proconsul, "You ought not to have received them." He replied, under the rack, "I could not do otherwise than receive my brethren." "But the emperor's command," said the proconsul, "should have been of more consequence to you." "God," he replied, "is greater than the emperor." "Have you in your house," demanded the proconsul, "any sacred writings?" "Such have I," he replied, "but they are in my heart." Among the other prisoners was a Christian maiden, named Victoria, whose father and brother were still pagans. The brother, Fortunatianus, had come for the purpose of persuading her to renounce her religion, and thus procuring her release. When she steadfastly declared that she was a Christian, her brother pretended that she was not in her right mind. But said she, "*This is my mind*, and I have never altered it." The proconsul asked her if she would not go with her brother. "No," she replied, "for I am a Christian, and they are my brethren who obey God's commands." As to the lad, Hilarianus, the proconsul supposed he would be easily intimidated by threats; but even in the child, the power of God proved mighty; "Do what you please," he replied; "I am a Christian."[1]

The persecution once begun, it was impossible to stop half-way. The first measures failing of their object, it became necessary to go farther. The first step against the Christians was the most difficult; the second did not linger. Certain occurrences, moreover, had happened, which

[1] The sources are the Acta Saturnini, Dativi et aliorum in Africa. Baluz Miscell. T. II. Ruinart, in the above cited collection of Du Pin. It is true, the report has not been preserved in its simple, original form; but with an introduction, running remarks, and a conclusion, written by some Donatist. Yet the acta proconsularia, which form the ground-work, may still be easily recognized.

placed the Christians in a more unfavorable light, or which at least could easily be turned to that account. A fire broke out in the imperial palace of Nicomedia: it was quite natural to ascribe such an occurrence to the desire of revenge in the Christians, — and the accusation may have had its good grounds, without involving in the disgrace the whole Christian church of that period. Among so large a number of Christians, there might perhaps have been some who allowed themselves to be urged on by passion, which they excused to themselves under the plea of religion, to forget thus far what manner of spirit became them as disciples of Christ. Certain it is, however, that this charge against the Christians could never be substantiated. The sensitive author of "God's Judgments on the Persecutors," maintains that the fire was kindled by Galerius himself, to give him an opportunity of accusing the Christians, — a statement that cannot be received on such authority alone. The emperor Constantine ascribes the fire to lightning, and looks upon it as a judgment of God. The truth is, as Eusebius candidly admits, the real cause was never ascertained, — enough that the Christians were accused of conspiring against the emperors, and multitudes of them thrown into prison, without discrimination of those who were or were not liable to suspicion. The most cruel tortures were resorted to, for the purpose of extorting a confession; but in vain. Many were burned to death, beheaded or drowned. It is true, that fourteen days after, a second fire broke out, which, however, was extinguished without damage, so that the supposition becomes certainly more probable that it was the work of an incendiary.[1]

Some disturbances which, soon after this event, arose in Armenia and Syria, afforded new occasion of political jealousy against the Christians. It was intimated that the clergy, as the heads of the party, were particularly liable to suspicion; and under this pretext, the edict was issued, which directed that all of the clerical order should be seized and thrown in chains. Thus in a short time the prisons were filled with persons of this class. It is seen on various occasions, how strong was the inclination to fasten upon the Christians charges of a political character; nor were the Christians always careful to avoid every even seeming ground for such charges as their enemies were seeking to bring against them. A young Christian from Egypt, who had been apprehended at Cæsarea in Palestine, being asked of what country he was, by the Roman proconsul, replied, "I am of Jerusalem, which lies towards the rising sun, the city of the saints." The Roman, who perhaps was not aware, in his ignorance, that even such a place existed as the earthly Jerusalem, which might be known to him only by its Roman name, Ælia Capitolina, — and who was still more ignorant of the heavenly Jerusalem, — immediately concluded that the Christians had founded somewhere in the East a city, which they intended to make the central point of a general insurrection. The matter appeared to

[1] Lactantius (de mortib.) relates this. It is mentioned by no other author. But Lactantius, who probably resided himself at that time at Nicomedia, would be more familiar with the particulars of these events than others. Yet it is possible he may have been deceived by some rumor then current in the city.

him one of grave importance, and he plied the young man with a great many questions under the torture.[1] Procopius, a presbyter of Palestine, when called upon to sacrifice, declared that he knew of only one God, to whom men were bound to bring such offerings as he would accept. Being then required to offer his libation to the four sovereigns of the empire, the two Augusti, and the two Cæsars, he replied, —doubtless, to show that men are bound to acknowledge but one God as their Lord,—with the Homeric verse, "The government of many is not good; let there be one ruler, one king."[2] It seems, however, that it was construed into a political offence, as if he meant to censure the existing Tetrarchy.[3]

All the prisons being now filled with Christians of the spiritual order, a new edict appeared, commanding that such of the prisoners as were willing to sacrifice, should be set free, and the rest, by every means, compelled to offer. This was followed at last, in 304, by a fourth and still more rigorous edict, which extended the same order to the whole body of Christians.[4] In the cities, where the edict was most strictly executed, public proclamation was made through the streets, that men, women and children, should all repair to the temples. Every individual was summoned by name from lists previously made out; at the city gates all were subjected to rigid examination, and such as were found to be Christians immediately secured. At Alexandria, pagans themselves concealed the persecuted Christians in their houses, and many of them chose rather to sacrifice their property and liberty, than to betray those who had taken refuge with them.[5] *Sentence of death*, it is true, was not formally pronounced on the refractory; but we may well suppose, that an edict which authorized the employment of every means to compel the Christians to sacrifice, would, still more than an unconditional decree of death to confessors, expose them to every cruelty which the fanaticism of a governor, or his desire of courting the imperial favor, might dispose him to inflict. Each one doubtless felt sure of never being called to account for any excesses he might be guilty of against the Christians. Already did the persecutors fondly imagine that they should triumph over the fall of Christianity. Already was added to the other honorary titles of the Augusti, the glory of having extinguished the Christian superstition and restored the worship of the gods. "Amplificato per orientem et occidentem imperio Romano, et nomine Christianorum deleto, qui rempublicam evertebant. Superstitione Christiana ubique deleta et cultu Deorum propagato." Yet at the very time they were thus triumphing, the circumstances were already prepared by Providence, which were destined to work an entire change in the situation of the Christians.

One of the four regents, Constantius Chlorus, who presided as Cæsar over the government of Gaul, Britain and Spain, possessed naturally a mild and humane disposition, averse to persecutions. He was more-

[1] Euseb. de martyrib. Palæstinæ, c. 9.
[2] Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω, εἷς βασιλεύς. Ilias II. 204.
[3] Euseb. de martyrib. Palæst. c. 1.
[4] L. c. c. 3.
[5] Athanas. Hist. Arianor. ad Monachos § 64.

over, though not himself a decided Christian, yet evidently a friend to Christianity and its professors; — whether it was, as Eusebius affirms, that he really perceived the vanity of paganism, and without being a Christian was an upright monotheist, — or whether, as is more probable, he was, like Alexander Severus, an eclectic in his religion. Those Christians about his person who continued steadfast in their faith, he treated with special regard and confidence; it being a common remark with him, that one who has proved unfaithful to his God, would be still less likely to remain faithful to his prince. Yet what Eusebius relates about his method of putting their constancy to the proof, wears but little appearance of probability. As he could not, while a Cæsar, show an open disregard to the edict that had been issued by the Augusti, he suffered the work of destroying the churches to proceed far enough to save appearances. In Gaul, where he usually resided, the Christians enjoyed perfect liberty and quiet, while the persecutions raged in other provinces.[1] In Spain, he may not have been able to effect so much; but it is certain, that in no one of his provinces was the persecution of the same character as in other districts of the empire. The influence of this emperor, so favorable to the Christians, was still more efficient, when, in 305, Dioclesian and Herculius abdicated the sovereignty, and he was elevated, in conjunction with Galerius, to the dignity of Augustus.

On the other hand, there now entered the line of the Cæsars, a man who, in blind heathenish superstition and cruelty, perfectly resembled the emperor Galerius, who nominated him to that station. This was Caius Galerius Valerius Maximinus. It is natural to suppose, that in the provinces committed to his care, — Syria, with the adjacent parts of the Roman empire, and Egypt, — the persecutions would be renewed with increased violence. At times, it is true, men grew weary of their own rage, when they saw that their efforts were to no purpose. The imperial edict flagged in its execution, the persecution slept, and the Christians enjoyed a temporary respite; but when their enemies perceived that they recovered breath, maddened to think they had not succeeded in extinguishing Christianity and restoring Paganism to its ancient splendor, their fury broke out afresh, and a new storm, more violent than ever, arose. Thus, at length, in the year 308, and about the sixth year of the persecution, after much effusion of blood in the states of Maximinus, from the time of his accession, a season of tranquillity had commenced. The Christians who had been condemned to labor in the mines, were treated with greater lenity and forbearance. But, all at once, the Christians of these provinces were startled out of their transient repose by a furious storm. A new and more rigorous command was addressed by the emperor to all the officers of his government, from the highest to the lowest, both in the civil and in the military service, directing that the fallen temples of the gods should be restored, that all free men and women, all slaves, and even little

[1] So say the work De mortib. persecutor. c. 16, and a letter of the Donatists to the Emperor Constantine, in which, on this very account, they demanded Gallic bishops for their judges. Optat. Milev. de schismate, Donatistar. l. 1. c. 22.

children, should sacrifice, and partake of what was offered at heathen altars. All provisions in the market were to be sprinkled with the water or the wine which had been used in the sacrifices, that the Christians might thus be forced into contact with idolatrous offerings. To such length did fanaticism and despotic power proceed! New tortures and a fresh effusion of blood ensued.

Again there was a respite, which lasted till the beginning of the year 310. Christians confined to the mines in Palestine were allowed to meet together for worship, but the governor of the province, observing this in one of his visitations, reported it to the emperor. The prisoners were now kept apart and put to severe labor. Thirty-nine confessors, who after much suffering were enjoying a season of rest, were beheaded at once. It was the last blood that flowed in this persecution, tranquillity having for some time been already restored to the Christians in the West.

The instigator of the persecution himself, the emperor Galerius, softened by a severe and painful disease, the consequence of his excesses, had perhaps been led to think that the God of the Christians might, after all, be a powerful being, whose anger punished him, and whose favor he must endeavor to conciliate. At any rate, he could hardly fail to be struck with the fact, that all his bloody and violent proceedings had inflicted no material harm on Christianity. So, in the year 311, the remarkable edict appeared which put an end to the last sanguinary conflict of the Christian Church in the Roman empire.

It declared, that it had been the intention of the emperors to reclaim the Christians to the religion of their fathers, in departing from which, they had invented laws according to their own fancy, and given birth to a multitude of sects, — a reproach frequently thrown against the Christians of this age.[1] But as the majority of the Christians, in spite of every measure to the contrary, persevered in their opinions, and it had now become evident, that they could not worship their own Deity, and at the same time pay due homage to the gods, the emperors had resolved to extend to them their wonted clemency. They might once more be Christians, and would be allowed to hold their assemblies, provided only they did nothing contrary to the good order of the Roman state, (ita ut ne quid contra disciplinam agant;)[2] "let them now, therefore, after experiencing this proof of our indulgence, pray to their God for our prosperity, for the well-being of the state, and for their own; that the state may still continue to be, in all respects, well maintained, and they themselves may be enabled to live quietly in their own homes."

[1] "Behold, since you have left the unity of ancient tradition, the authority of the fathers, you have been led entirely by your own caprice, and have fallen from one innovation into another; hence the multitude of your sects." The Latin words of the decree, — Siquidem quadam ratione tanta eosdem Christianos voluntas (such caprice ἰθελοθρησκεία,) invasisset et tanta stultitia occupasset, ut non illa veterum instituta sequerentur, quæ forsitan primi parentes eorundem constituerant; sed pro arbitrio suo atque ut hisdem erat libitum, ita sibimet leges facerent, quas observarent et per diversa vanos populos congregarent.

[2] The emperor had probably explained himself more distinctly on this point, in a rescript which has not come down to us.

Attacks on Christianity. Defence of Christianity against these writings.

While the ancient world, in order to maintain itself on its own religious foundation, was endeavoring to suppress Christianity by force, the culture of the age enlisted itself in the same cause and entered the contest with its writings. Intellectual weapons were combined with outward violence in attacking the new principle which had begun to reveal its power in human life. In these written assaults of Christianity, the relation of the religious and moral principles of the then existing world, and of its different intellectual tendencies — as set forth by us in the introduction — to this new principle which was now entering into the life of humanity, may be easily recognized. If He whose external appearance was the perfectly unsullied mirror of his divine life, still did not fail to distinguish, in the hostile judgments passed upon his own person, the sins against the Son of Man from those against the Holy Ghost, much more should we feel it incumbent on us to institute a like distinction between the judgments of misapprehension and of calumny passed upon Christianity, where its divine life exhibited itself under circumstances and forms exposing it to such various debasing mixtures. In the ferment which Christianity produced on its first appearance, many impure elements necessarily became mixed with it, which were destined to be expelled during the purifying process of its development. The crisis brought on by Christianity, which was to introduce a genuine healthfulness of the spiritual life, must needs call forth also some considerable degree of morbid action, as a necessary means of arriving at that ultimate healthy condition. Much that savored of a jealous and narrowly exclusive spirit, would naturally be engendered by that opposition to the world, in which the new faith must first display itself before it could furnish the world with the principle of its own renovation. Now in order to judge rightly of these impure admixtures in their relation to the essence of Christianity, and to discern the higher element lying at the ground of them, it was necessary that Christianity itself should be studied and understood in its essential character. Whoever contemplated these phenomena from some outward position, and by the very peculiarity of this point of view found himself opposed to Christianity, would easily confound these accidents attending the process of its development, with the essential thing itself, and from his knowledge of the former, imagine that he comprehended the latter. This remark we shall have to apply to everything which wears the form of opposition to Christianity in these centuries.

Thus Lucian, — of whose peculiar bent on religious matters we have spoken before, — fixing on certain accidental marks by which his attention had been caught, could place Christianity in the same class with the various appearances of fanaticism and boastful jugglery which he made the butt of his ridicule. When he heard of men who were said to possess the power of curing demoniacs, and of healing other diseases, he placed them down on the same list with the common vagabond exorcists and magicians. He has most to say about the Christians, in a

work where, in his own peculiar style, he has described the life and self-procured death of the Cynic philosopher, Peregrinus Proteus. This personage, according to Lucian's account, was one of those notorious hypocrites, who understood the art of concealing their vanity and wickedness under the Cynic guise, and of enchaining the multitude by various other fraudulent tricks. Yet it may be a question, how far this picture, drawn by satire, answers to the truth, or whether it contains any at all,— especially as we have a description of this individual by another contemporary,[1] which would lead us to form an altogether different view of his character; unless we choose to assume that this other contemporary suffered himself to be imposed upon by a hypocritical show of moral earnestness and zeal. This Peregrinus then, as we are told, joined himself for a while with the Christians, and being imprisoned for confessing Christianity, acquired among them the highest consideration. All which account may be a pure invention of Lucian for the purpose of connecting his hero with the Christians, that he might have a good opportunity for satirizing the latter.

The importance which was given, from the Christian point of view, to the individual, personal existence, as destined, in its entireness, for endless duration; the lively confidence of faith in an eternal life and resurrection; the opposition to the whole previously existing world into which Christianity caused its followers to enter; the hearty brotherly love which bound them to each other; — all these Lucian acknowledges as effects which had proceeded from the man who was crucified in Palestine. But without troubling himself to seek for profounder reasons to account for effects so great, and, as he himself admits, so abiding, he throws them into the same class with all the other kinds of fanaticism which he ridicules. "They still worship," says he of the Christians, "that great man who was crucified in Palestine, because it was he by whom the initiation into these new mysteries was introduced into human life. These poor creatures have persuaded themselves that they are all immortal, and shall live for ever. For this reason they despise death itself, and many even court it. But again, their first lawgiver[2] has persuaded them to believe that, as soon as they have broken loose from the prevailing customs and denied the gods of Greece,

[1] Aulus Gellius, (in his Noctes Atticæ, l. XII. c. 11,) tells us that while residing at Athens, he visited this Peregrinus, who lived in a hut without the city. He calls him virum gravem et constantem. He cites from his mouth the maxim: wickedness ought to be shunned, not from fear of punishment or disgrace, but only from love of goodness; virum sapientem non peccaturum, etiamsi peccasse eum dii atque homines ignoraturi forent. If the purely moral effort which these words express, was really his own, it is not difficult to see how he might thus be induced to attach himself to Christianity; while at the same time, he soon fell away from it, because he could not bring himself to believe the facts which it announced. Yet we do not hold this to be probable, for the following reason, if there were no other, viz. we believe, that if any thing of this kind had happened, some trace or other of such an occurrence would have been preserved in the religious traditions of this period.

[2] We find no good reason for supposing that Paul is intended by this expression; but we must conceive of the same person, whom he characterizes as the ἀνεσκολοπισμένος σοφιστής, and of whose laws he is speaking, — the sole founder of Christianity. We recognize, also, the allusion to what Christ himself had said respecting brotherly love. In this particular description by Lucian, we do not remark a single element which could be considered as belonging peculiarly to the Apostle Paul.

reverencing instead of these their crucified teacher, and living after his laws, they stand to each other in the relation of brethren. Thus they are led to despise everything alike, to consider everything else as profane, adopting these notions without any sufficient grounds of evidence."[1] Under the example of Peregrinus, he gives a lively description of the sympathy displayed by the Christians for those confessors who were languishing in prison. "When he was incarcerated," says Lucian, "the Christians, who regarded it as a great calamity, spared no expense and no sacrifice to procure his liberation. Finding this to be impossible, they were exceeding careful, that he should in all respects be well provided for. And from the early dawn, old women, widows and orphans might be seen waiting at the doors of his prison; the more respectable among these, having bribed the keepers, slept near him in the dungeon. Then various dishes were brought in; and religious discourses were delivered in his presence.[2] Even from cities in Asia Minor deputies from the Christian communities were sent to assist in protecting and consoling him. They show incredible despatch in a public concern of this sort. In a brief space they give away all."

Again, Lucian accuses the Christians as an ignorant, uncultivated set, of excessive credulity; whence it happened that their charitable disposition was in many ways imposed upon. "If a magician, an impostor, who is apt at his trade, comes among them, having to deal with an ignorant class of people, he can shortly make himself rich." He describes the Christians as men "who thought it the greatest sin to take a morsel of food which, in their opinion, was forbidden, and who would rather do anything than this." Peregrinus was excluded from their community, "because he had offended *even against their* laws, for he had been seen to eat something or other which is forbidden among them." It is possible that Lucian had in mind here the example of Jewish Christian communities; or, perhaps, the very punctilious and superstitious observance of the regulations adopted by the apostolic council at Jerusalem, (Acts xv.) which prevailed after the suppression of the more liberal spirit of St. Paul, may have given occasion to such a judgment. At all events, we cannot fail to see how, in this case, the contracted views of believers led to a misapprehension as to the essential character of their religion.

The stoic Arrian, who lived at a somewhat earlier period than Lucian, judged of the Christians — as the emperor Marcus Aurelius had done before — strictly according to the relation of the stoic philosophy to Christianity. In his work, which aims to elucidate the principles of his master Epictetus,[3] he starts the question, "Whether by insight of reason into the laws which govern the system of the universe it might not be possible to acquire the same intrepidity in view of death which the Galilæans attained to by mad fanaticism and custom."

[1] Ἀνευ τινὸς ἀκριβοῦς πίστεως.

[2] Ecclesiastics visited him, and gave religious discourses in the cell, where he was confined; — unless the words "λόγοι ἱεροὶ αὐτῶν ἐλέγοντο," are to be understood as referring to extracts read from the sacred Scriptures. By the "ἐν τέλει," who remained with him during the night, may doubtless be meant also Ecclesiastics.

[3] Diatrib. l. IV. c. 7.

It may easily be understood, from what we have said respecting the relation of the *New Platonism* to the religious stage of development in the ancient world, and to Christianity, that while on one hand it might serve as a transition-point to the Christian faith, and a source from whence to borrow the scientific form to be used in the explanation and defence of Christian truth; so on the other, it would be the school from which the most numerous as well as the most formidable antagonists of the same religion would proceed. Perhaps the first man who felt sufficiently interested in the subject to attack Christianity in an express work, was from this school; viz. Celsus, who under the government of Marcus Aurelius, when it was attempted to extirpate Christianity by the sword, attacked it at the same time with the weapons of his witty and acute intellect. He wrote against the Christians a work in two books, entitled "The true doctrine."[1]

Origen himself, however, started the conjecture, that this Celsus was no other than the person otherwise known as Celsus the Epicurean, Lucian's contemporary and friend. Still it is plain, from the uncertainty with which he expresses himself, that he was led to this conjecture, not by any evidence of historical tradition, but only by the identity of the name; and that he was thrown into doubt again by the internal evidence presented in the work itself. Now since it is by no means impossible, that two authors of the same name should write at the same period — especially when the name is not an unusual one — the inference from the identity of names must be extremely uncertain, unless supported by some agreement also in the way of thinking.

Lucian was induced by the last mentioned Celsus to publish his life

[1] Λόγος ἀληθής, Orig. c. Cels. l. I. c. 4. Several learned writers have supposed it might be inferred from Origen's language, (c. Cels. l. IV. c. 36,) that besides the work just mentioned, which, as to its essential contents may be restored from the fragments preserved in Origen's reply, Celsus wrote another work, in two books, against Christianity. But we cannot think that the interpretation of the passage which lies at the basis of their theory, is the correct one. The passage is this: Ὁ Ἐπικούρειος Κέλσος, εἴγε οὗτός ἐστι, καὶ κατὰ Χριστιανῶν ἄλλα δύο βίβλια συντάξας. I cannot understand ἄλλα, in this connection, as referring to other works against Christianity, besides the one of which alone Origen uniformly speaks, and which it is his business to refute; but I understand by it other works than those known to belong to Celsus, in which he betrays his Epicureanism without any attempt at concealment. "The Epicurean Celsus, if indeed, — so I consider myself warranted by the Greek usus loquendi of this period to understand the word εἴγε, while at the same time I acknowledge the *original* difference between εἴγε and εἴπερ, — if indeed he is the same with the one who wrote two other books against the Christians." By the other books, in this case, none can be meant but that one work which Origen undertook to refute. Precisely this was the point in question, whether the *Epicurean* could be the author of *that work*. Whether the same individual had composed two other works besides, against Christianity, was a question that did not belong here. Had it been Origen's intention to designate two books distinct from that work, he would have expressed himself somewhat as follows: Ὁ καὶ ταῦτα τὰ βίβλια καὶ ἄλλα δύο, etc. Moreover, the prefixing the words, κατὰ Χριστιανῶν, confirms my interpretation. And if Celsus had written another additional work against the Christians, two cases only can be supposed. Either Origen had read this work also, or else he had merely been informed that Celsus had written such a work, without having seen it himself. In the first case, he would not have failed to take some notice, in this controversy, of what Celsus had said in his other work against the Christians. In the second case, he would, at least, not have omitted to declare distinctly, that the other work of Celsus had never come under his eye, as he does in fact observe where he is speaking of a writing of Celsus, which we shall have occasion to mention hereafter

of the magician Alexander of Abonoteichus, a work which he dedicated to that friend. This fact would correspond with the views expressed in the work of Celsus against Christianity. For the antagonist of Christianity places it in the same class with all phenomena belonging to the art of magic, and compares it with the latter when he attempts to account for its origin and diffusion. He might naturally wish, also, to know more about the great magician who had made so much noise in his day, with a view to avail himself of this knowledge in behalf of his own scheme of *enlightenment*, which would throw all religious phenomena, transcending the ordinary standard, into the same category. This Celsus had written a book, as Origen also was aware, against pretended enchantments,[1] and which was intended to counteract the fraudulent tricks of those vagrant Goetæ. It is described by Lucian as a work well adapted to lead men back to sober thought.[2] Now it might very easily happen, that on these principles, the same zeal against fanaticism would induce Celsus to write against those who endeavored to deceive the multitude by their pretended art of magic, and against the Christians who insisted on their own miraculous gifts. Celsus does, in fact, compare, in one place, the miracles of Christ with the works of magicians who learned their art from the Egyptians, and for a few oboli exhibited them in the open market-place, pretending to expel evil spirits from men, to drive away diseases by a breath, to call up the souls of heroes, to charm into their presence costly viands, to make dead things move as if they were alive; and he asks, "Shall we, because they do such things, consider them as sons of God — or shall we say these are the tricks of wicked and pitiable men?"[3] Origen was doubtless wrong in supposing that in these words Celsus conceded the reality of magic; and that the only way therefore, of reconciling this concession with the attack on magic by the same Celsus, if he were the same, was to assume that, to subserve a particular end, he here pretended to believe what he did not actually believe. For Celsus might express himself thus, even though he looked upon those magicians as no better than jugglers, skilful in deceiving the senses by a certain sleight of hand;[4] and the same writer, in his work against the magicians, may have undertaken to show how such deceptions were brought about. Yet it must be admitted, that in another passage of the work against the Christians, Celsus expresses himself as though he considered magic to be an art possessed of a certain power, though held by him in no great account.[5] He says he had heard it from Dionysius, an Egyptian musician, that magic exercised an influence over uncultivated and profligate men, but not over those who had received a philosophical education. This view of magic may be easily traced back to a common opinion among the Platonists of that period, who supposed that by taking

[1] Κατὰ μάγων.

[2] He says in his tract, dedicated to this Celsus, and entitled, Ἀλέξανδρος or Ψευδομάντις, (§ 12.) addressing himself to Celsus: Οἷς κατὰ μάγων συνέγραψας, καλλίστοις τε ἅμα καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτοις συγγράμμασι καὶ δυναμένοις σωφρονίζειν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας.

[3] Orig. c. Cels. l. I. c. 28.

[4] Μέχρι φαντασίας φαινόμενα τοιαῦτα.

[5] c. Cels. l. VI. c. 41.

advantage of certain attractive and repulsive powers in nature — certain magnetic influences — it would be possible to exercise a great control over such as were still fettered by the bonds of nature, though not over those who had risen to freedom, and lived in the divine element which is exalted above all natural forces. With this the assertion first quoted from Celsus may be easily reconciled, that magic, as practised in Egypt, its proper home,[1] so influenced men at a subordinate stage of culture, that sights, and affections of whatever kind, might be produced in them at pleasure. It may be questioned, however, whether Lucian's friend would have conceded as much as this to magic.

Lucian praises the mild temper and the moderation of his friend. But in Celsus' work against the Christians we see no marks of such qualities as these; but we feel that we have to do with a man of vehement passions, a man altogether incapable of allowing the cause which he attacks, to be right on any side whatever. At the same time, we cannot be certain, that Lucian's opinion of his friend was according to truth. Besides, there are those who find no difficulty in preserving their temper until certain topics are introduced, when they flash out at once into fire and flames. And especially on religious matters, nothing is more common than for men of acute minds, who have entrenched themselves in some negative position of the understanding and feel jealous of every eccentric appearance in this province, to lose all self-possession whenever powerful phenomena of the religious life are presented to their notice. The heat with which Celsus attacks Christianity betrays his own oppressive sense of the power with which it was extending itself on all sides.

There can be no doubt, that the Celsus who was Lucian's friend, favored for the most part the school of Epicurus. But in the work against Christianity, very little is to be found which indicates a tendency to this way of thinking, and even this little vanishes under a more careful examination. On the other hand, the marks of an entirely opposite system are everywhere apparent.

In this book we certainly perceive a mind which would not consent to surrender itself to the system of any other individual; we find ourselves in contact with a man who, by combining the ideas predominant in the general philosophical consciousness of his time, the popular ideas — so to speak — of that period, had framed a system of his own, of which he felt rather proud, and which, after he had appeared as a polemic in his work against the Christians, it was his intention to unfold in another performance, under a more positive form. In this second work, he meant to show how it would be necessary for those to live,

[1] And so the possession of the art of magic was ascribed. by those who acknowledged its reality, particularly to the Egyptian priests. Moreover, Celsus (l. I c. 28) brings forward the story, borrowed perhaps from the Jews, that Jesus, on account of his poverty, was obliged in Egypt to let himself out for wages, and there learned the arts by which he performed his pretended miracles, and contrived to attain to such eminence as to be worshipped as a divine being. Ὅτι οὗτος διὰ πενίαν εἰς Αἴγυπτον μισθαρνήσας κἀκεῖ δυνάμεων τινων πειραθεὶς, ἐφ' αἷς Αἰγύπτιοι σεμνύνονται, ἐτανήλθεν, ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσι μέγα φρονῶν καὶ διὰ αὐτὰς θεὸν αὑτὸν ἀνηγόρευσεν.

who were willing and able to follow him. Whether this plan was ever executed, we are not informed.[1]

But in this system, the main ideas are borrowed from Platonism. Among these we reckon the idea of the Absolute, the ὄν, to which the contemplative spirit of the philosopher alone could soar; — the distinction between the highest, primal Being or Essence, and his self-manifestation in the Universe,— between the Highest, who reposes in being, and the second god, who reveals himself in becoming, — the world, as the Son of the Supreme God; — the idea of the celestial luminaries as divine essences, of the higher intelligences animating those heavenly bodies, of the gods appearing visible in the phenomenal world,[2] as opposed to the invisible, hidden deities; the idea of subordinate deities, presiding over the several parts of the world, — the national gods to whom the different portions of the world are subject, and to whom men are bound to render due homage, by acknowledging this dependence grounded on the nature of the earthly life; the idea that the imperishable element in human nature, the spirit alone, derives its origin from God; that this element, possessing an affinity to God, exists in the human soul; the hypothesis of a power struggling against the divine and formative principle in the world, of the ὕλη as the source of evil; hence of evil in this world as something necessary. From this ὕλη are derived the evil spirits, the powers that struggle against the divine, against reason.

These ideas, scattered through his work, betray not the Epicurean certainly, but one who had appropriated nearly all he possessed from the current ideas of the New Platonic philosophy of religion. Though we cannot but suppose that Celsus, in opposing the Christian mode of thinking, and for the purpose of bantering the Christians, said many things which he did not seriously mean; yet assuredly we have no reason to suppose that the tinge of Platonism which appears everywhere through the surface, was assumed merely out of pretence. And however strong we may be inclined to suppose the tendency to eclecticism was at this particular period of time, still we cannot consider it to be natural or probable that Epicurean views would be blended with so predominating an element of New Platonism. But whoever this Celsus may have been, he is for us an important individual, being, in fact, the original representative of a kind of intellect which has presented itself over and over again in the various attacks made on Christianity: wit and acuteness, without earnest purpose or depth of research; a worldly understanding that glances merely on the surface, and delights in hunting up difficulties and contradictions. His objections against Christianity serve one important end. They present, in the clearest manner, the opposition between the Christian standing ground and that of the ancient world; and, in general, the relation which revealed religion will ever be found to hold to the ground assumed by natural reason.

[1] Origen, at the conclusion of his work, begs of his friend Ambrosius, that if Celsus had actually executed this plan, he would procure for him this work also, that he might take measures for its refutation. These words, too, clearly prove, that Origen had no knowledge of a second work of Celsus against Christianity.

[2] Θεοὶ φανεροί.

Thus many of his objections and strictures became testimonies for the truth.

How the divine foolishness of the gospel, the faith whereby the highest truth was to be made the common property of all mankind, must needs appear to the twilight wisdom, and aristocratic culture of the ancient world, may be seen in those remarks of Celsus, where he objects to the Christians,[1] that they refused to give reasons for what they believed, but were ever repeating, "Do not examine, only believe; thy faith will make thee blessed. Wisdom is a bad thing in life, foolishness is to be preferred."[2] He makes the Christians say, "Let no educated, no wise man approach; but whoever is ignorant, uncultivated, — whoever is like a child, let him come and be comforted."[3] This objection was, in part, called forth by the divine paradox of the gospel itself; but in part, there was also a one-sided tendency among the Christians themselves to set up faith as something opposed to culture and scientific inquiry, — a course which led to the misapprehension of Christianity itself, and to accusations which had no other ground than this misapprehension. Along with this class of objections we find another of the directly opposite character, showing how much the religion which was thus accused of demanding and encouraging implicit faith, claimed and excited intellectual inquiry, called into requisition the powers of thought. We refer to the objection drawn from the multitude of conflicting sects among the Christians.[4] "In the outset," says he,[5] "when the Christians were few in number, they may, perhaps, have agreed among themselves. But as their numbers increased, they separated into parties, mutually attacking and refuting each other, and retaining nothing in common but their name, if indeed they did that."[6] He accuses them of calumniating each other, and of refusing to yield up a single point for the sake of unanimity.[7]

In objecting to Christianity the many oppositions of human opinion which it called forth, Celsus testifies against himself. How could a religion of bare faith, a religion that called the unenlightened and repelled the wise of this world, give birth to such a multitude of heresies? If he had not been so superficial an observer, he could not have failed to be struck with this contradiction; and in endeavoring to resolve it, must have had his attention directed to that peculiarity, by which Christianity is so clearly distinguished from all preceding phenomena in the

[1] A similar objection to Judaism and Christianity is made also by Galen, that celebrated physician of the second and third centuries, — a man incapable of rising to the higher fields of thought. From the position at which he contemplates the world, on one particular side of it, and by the mere understanding, he observes: *Ἵνα μὴ τις εὐθὺς κατ' ἀρχὰς ὡς εἰς Μωϋσοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ διατριβὴν ἀφιγμένος νόμων ἀναποδείκτων ἀκουῇ.* De different. puls. l. II. c. 4.

[2] L. I. c. 9.

[3] L. III. c. 44: *Ἀῆλοί εἰσιν, ὅτι μόνους νοὺς ἠλιθίους καὶ ἀγεννεῖς καὶ ἀναισθήτους καὶ ἀνδράποδα καὶ γύναια καὶ παιδάρια πείθειν ἐθέλουσί τε καὶ δύνανται.*

[4] Clement of Alexandria observes, that pagans and Jews were used to bring this objection against Christianity; *μὴ δεῖν πιστεύειν διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν τῶν αἱρέσεων.* Strom. l. VII. f. 753. Ed Paris, 1641.

[5] L. III. c. 10, and the following.

[6] *Στάσεις ἰδίας ἔχειν ἕκαστοι θέλουσι, σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐλέγχουσιν, ἑνός, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἔτι κοινωνοῦντες, εἴγε κοινωνοῦσιν ἔτι, τοῦ ὀνόματος.*

[7] L. V. c. 63: *Βλασφημοῦσι δὲ εἰς ἀλλήλους οὗτοι πάνδεινα ῥητὰ καὶ ἄῤῥητα καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴξαιεν οὐδὲ καθ' ὁτιοῦν εἰς ὁμόνοιαν*

intellectual world. Celsus was of the opinion, that these oppositions of knowledge, so hotly conflicting with each other, would bring about the dissolution of Christianity. But history has decided against him; it has shown how the indwelling power of unity in Christianity could overcome these oppositions, and make them subservient to its own ends.

Celsus then, as we see, was aware of the fact, that many different sects existed among the Christians. But he did not give himself the pains, which a lover of justice and of truth would have done, to distinguish what was grounded in the original Christian doctrine, and what had been added by these sects; what was acknowledged as true doctrine by the great body of Christians, and what was adopted only by this or that particular party. He was somewhat deeply read in the religious records of the Christians, and had heard a great deal repeated which was derived from them. But the spirit in which he had read and heard all this, was not one that prepared him to receive, or made him capable of understanding it; but one which, keeping him on the alert for opportunities of ridicule and misrepresentation, must find these opportunities. He threw the religious writings, as he had done the religious parties of the Christians, into one class, without examining either into the origin of them or into their character. Whatever he could lay hold of, belonging to the most opposite parties, — to those fanatical spiritualists, the Gnostics, and to those gross anthropomorphists, the Chiliasts, — which served to present Christianity on different sides in the most unfavorable light, was eagerly welcomed by him.

Sometimes he objects to the Christians that they had nothing in common with all other religions, — neither temples, images nor altars; at others, — opposing an abstract knowledge of God to the religion that had its birth in historical facts, — he calls them a miserable sense-bound, sense-loving race,[1] who would acknowledge nothing but that which was palpable to the outward senses. He preaches to them, that men should close their senses and turn away from all sensible things, so as to have the intuition of God through the eye of the mind.

On the watch for every weak spot which the Christians might expose, and which he could take advantage of in assailing their faith, the pains taken by many to work into form the traditions relating to the history of Christ did not escape his notice. "Many of the faithful," says he, "who have come, as it were, out of the fit of intoxication to their sober senses, alter the evangelical narrative from the shape in which it was first recorded, in three, four, manifold ways, that they may have wherewith to deny objections."[2] He brings this to prove the position, that the more prudent and discreet among the Christians could not help

[1] Δειλὸν καὶ φιλοσώματον γένος. L. VII. c. 36. Παντελῶς τῇ σαρκὶ ἐνδεδεμένοι καὶ μηδὲν καθαρὸν βλέποντες. L. c. c. 42.

[2] The remarkable words of Celsus, (l. II. c. 27,) are: Τινὰς τῶν πιστευόντων ὡς ἐκ μέθης ἥκοντας εἰς τὸ ἐφεστάναι αὐτοῖς μεταχαράττειν ἐκ τῆς πρώτης γραφῆς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τριχῇ καὶ τετραχῇ καὶ πολλαχῇ καὶ μεταπλάττειν, ἵν' ἔχοιεν πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχους ἀρνεῖσθαι. Origen supposes that what Celsus says can apply only to the Gnostics, who allowed themselves in the practice of altering the evangelical records to suit their peculiar doctrines. Celsus, however, could hardly have in view this class of men, but more probably referred to those who, by their criticism of the text, springing out of some apologetical interest, were for removing what might prove offensive to the sen sus communis.

feeling the insuperable difficulties in those accounts, and therefore felt themselves called upon to remove these difficulties by their emendations. But even this is still a witness in favor of the inward power with which these facts had found their way into the religious consciousness; since notwithstanding the stones of stumbling that offered themselves to the common understanding, still, when these accounts came to be spread among the cultivated, they could win conviction on their side.

In like manner Celsus bears witness, against his will, of the distinguishing peculiarity of the gospel, and at the same time of that which lay at the very ground of his own want of susceptibility to its power, when he imagines he can ridicule Christianity, because it invites sinners only to participate in the kingdom of God, and excludes such as are wholly without sin. "They who invite us," says he,[1] "to become initiated into other religious mysteries, begin by proclaiming 'Let him approach who is free from all stains, who is conscious of no wickedness, who has lived a good and upright life;' — and this they proclaim who promise purification from sins. But let us hear who it is these Christians call: 'Whoever is a sinner,' say they, 'whoever is foolish, unlettered, in a word, whoever is wretched, him will the kingdom of God receive.'" And then he asks, "But how? Was not Christ sent in behalf of those who are sinless?"[2] As Celsus was wanting in a just sense of the nature of sin, and hence could express surprise that Christ did not announce himself as sent particularly in behalf of the sinless, so too he was without a presentiment of the soul-transforming power which Christianity carries with it, of that mystery of an entire moral renovation of the nature estranged from God, which Christ sets forth in his conversation with Nicodemus. He had no conception of the fact, that by the power of divine love, a change could be produced, beginning from within and working outwards, which no fear of punishment could ever effect from without. His words bearing on this subject are well deserving of notice.[3] "It is manifest to every one, that it lies within no man's power to produce an entire change in a person to whom sin has become a second nature, even by punishment, *to say nothing of mercy;* for to effect a complete *change* of nature *is the most difficult of things;* but the sinless are the safer companions in life."

It is evident, that with the habit of thinking which expresses itself in the passages already cited, Celsus would be incapable of understanding another point which belongs to the characteristic marks of the Christian position as distinguished from that of antiquity, namely, the nature of humility. In virtue of his Platonism, he did, indeed, see that the ταπεινότης, which, from the ordinary ethical position of antiquity, was looked upon only as something wrong and evil, might also be a virtue; and hence he refers to the passage in Plato's fourth book of the Laws, which has already been cited on page 19. But instead of recognizing in this something typical and prophetic in relation to Christianity, he derives the Christian idea of humility from a misunderstanding of

[1] Lib. III. c. 59.

[2] Τί δὲ; τοῖς ἀναμαρτήτοις οὐκ ἐπέμφθη; L. c. c. 62.

[3] Οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ κολάζων πάντῃ μεταβάλοι, μήτι γε ἐλεῶν. L. III. c. 65

that Platonic sentiment.[1] The true nature of humility was a matter too foreign to his own way of thinking and apprehension, to make it easy for him to understand the Christian life on this particular side. Thus, in those caricatures of humility which came under his observation in exceedingly imperfect exhibitions of the Christian life, he was unable to discern the truth at bottom; and he seized on such morbid offshoots, to represent the essence of Christian humility itself as a morbid thing; — as if, according to the doctrine of the Christians, the humble man was a creature "for ever on his knees, or rolling in the dust, a man who dressed meanly and sprinkled himself with ashes."[2]

It may appear strange, that Celsus, who taunts the Christians for their self-abasement before God, should accuse them at the same time of the directly contrary error, immoderate pride, a foolish self-exaltation towards God. But as he had no proper conception of true humility, so neither had he any just conception of true loftiness, — both being intimately connected together in the Christian consciousness, according to the words of Christ, who makes the humiliation of self the condition of man's exaltation. At the position held by the natural man, these appear as incompatible opposites; but they find their resolution in Christianity. Hence Celsus must necessarily mistake the Christian ground of standing on both sides. Hence he could attack it on both these opposite aspects. He ridicules the Christians for presuming to ascribe to themselves, to *man*, compared with the rest of creation, such worth and dignity in the sight of God, as they did, when they taught that God had created all things on man's account, and when they represented man as the end of the creation and of the government of the world. The importance which Christianity attached to personal existence, struck him as singular and strange. It appeared to him, in accordance with the prevailing view of the ancient world, that the *universal whole* was the only end worthy of the divine mind; and that man was of account only as an integrant part of this whole, subjected to those unchangeable laws of its evolution which operate with iron necessity. "It is not for man," says he, "that every thing has been given; but every thing grows and decays for the sustentation of the whole."[3] How little capable he was of understanding, indeed, the great idea, that all things have been created for man, is evident from the form of some of his objections. "Although it might be said that trees, plants, herbs grow for the sake of man, yet might it not be said with the same propriety that they grow also for the wildest animals?"[4] And comparing these latter with man, he observes,[5] — "We with great labor and care are scarcely able to support ourselves; but for the brutes every thing grows spontaneously, without any sowing and ploughing of

[1] Παράκουσμα τῶν Πλάτωνος λόγων. L. VI. c. 15.

[2] L. VI. c. 15. Origen justly replies, "If there are some who, through ignorance and the want of a right understanding of the true doctrine of humility, do this, the Christian system is not therefore to be accused; but it must be charitably imputed to the ignorance of those who propose to do what is right, but fail for want of knowledge."

[3] Ἕκαστα τῆς τοῦ ὅλου σωτηρίας εἵνεκα γίνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται. L. IV. c. 69.

[4] L. c. c. 75.

[5] L. c. c. 76.

theirs." In his passionate opposition to what Christianity teaches respecting the worth of human nature, he goes so far as to exalt the brutes at man's expense.[1] "If you say, God has given you the power to capture the brutes and make them subservient to your ends, we will say, that before cities, arts, trades and weapons had existence, men were torn by wild beasts, not they taken by men." Instead of marking how in the brutes nature is striving upward to man, he adduces the bees and the ants as examples to show, that even the order of civil society is no prerogative of man.[2] What the Christians taught concerning a particular providence, and concerning God's care for the well-being of individuals, appeared, therefore, to him as vain arrogance, as an altogether anthropomorphite notion. "It is not for man," he asserts,[3] "any more than for lions or eagles, that every thing in the world has been created; but it is in order that the world, as the work of God, might present a complete and perfect whole. God provides only for the whole; and this his providence never deserts. And this world never becomes any worse. God does not return to it after a long interval. He is as little angry with man as he is with apes or flies." Like a consistent Platonist, Celsus rejects every thing *teleological* in the creation and government of the world. A redemption, according to his doctrine, is wholly out of the question. For in this world, evil is a necessary thing. It has no origin, and will have no end. It remains constantly as it is, just as the nature of the universe generally remains eternally the same.[4] The ὑλη is the source, whence what we term evil ever springs afresh. By this Platonic principle, a redemption, triumphing over evil, is excluded. Celsus conceives the evolution of the universe as a circle constantly repeating itself according to precisely the same laws. With such notions of God's relation to the world, and to man in particular, with such mistaken views of the worth and significance of personal existence, he could bring against the Christian view of God's government of the world, and of his method of salvation, and especially of the work of redemption, the objection so often repeated in after times, "that the universe has been provided, once for all, with all the powers necessary for its preservation and for developing itself after the same laws; that God has not, like a human architect, so executed his work, that at some future period it would need repair.[5]

Characteristic of the man, is the way in which Celsus treats the history of Christ. In part, he follows the stories set in circulation by the Jews; in part, other spurious or mistaken traditions, and partly, the evangelical narratives, which, because he possessed no single collective intuition of Christ's person, he could not understand in their true

[1] To avoid the mistake of many, who have supposed they found, in what Celsus here says, a token of his leaning much rather to the side of Epicureanism than Platonism in his mode of thinking, it should be duly considered, that passion and obstinacy lead him here to push every thing to the extreme, and that even according to the New Platonic principles, a soul bearing some affinity to that of man, but only checked in its development by the constraint of the ὕλη, was supposed to exist in brute animals.

[2] L. IV. c. 81.

[3] L. c. c. 99

[4] L. c. c. 62, and the following.

[5] Οὔτε τῷ θεῷ καινοτέρας δεῖ διορθώσεως. L. c. c. 69.

significance.[1] Wherever he thinks the evangelical narratives can be made to answer his purpose, he considers their authority to be unimpeachable; but when they refuse to lend themselves to his polemical interest, he denies their truth.[2] The Jew whom he introduces as an opponent of Christianity, is made to say, that he had many true things to state in relation to Christ's history, and altogether different from those reported by his disciples, but he purposely kept them back.[3] Yet Celsus, whose perfect hatred of Christianity led him to collect together everything that could be said with the least show of probability against it, would not have failed, certainly, to avail himself of such accounts, if they were really within his reach. We must consider this, therefore, with Origen, as one of those rhetorical tricks of which Celsus set the example for later antagonists of Christianity.

Accordingly, he assails the position that Christ was wholly free from sin;[4] yet without producing a single action of Christ to show the contrary.

Among other stories, he lays hold of the wholly unfounded tradition respecting the uncomliness of Christ's person,[5] to represent it as inconsistent with the supposition that Christ partook of the divine nature beyond all other men.[6]

In respect to the resurrection of Christ, it did not occur to him to deny the reality of his death; but he denied the truth of the accounts concerning his reappearance after he had risen. Without entering into any careful examination of these accounts, he leaves it optional, either to suppose them pure inventions, or cases of optical delusion — visions belonging to the same class with the apparition of ghosts.[7] The objections which Celsus urges against the reality of Christ's miracles and of his resurrection, harmonize perfectly with his ignorance of the true significancy of these facts. "Why did Christ perform no miracle when challenged to do so by the Jews in the temple?"[8] "If he really intended to manifest his divine power, he ought to have shown himself to those who condemned him, and generally to all."[9] How he is compelled, from overlooking the connection of the divine with the human in history, to testify against himself, appears once more in a very remarkable manner, where he says, "How is it, that a *man*, who was incensed with the Jews, should destroy them all at a stroke and send up their city in flames! — so utterly nothing were they before him; — but the Great God, angry and threatening, sends his own son, as they say, and he must suffer all this."[10]

Thus, to the man who was incapable of understanding the true import of Christ's appearance, the course of history generally, the signs of

[1] Origen aptly characterizes the sources of information of which Celsus availed himself: Εἴτ' ἐκ παραπουσμάτων, εἴτε καὶ ἐξ ἀναγνωσμάτων, εἴτ' ἐκ διηγημάτων Ἰουδαϊκῶν. L. II. c. 10.

[2] L. c. c. 34.

[3] L. c. c. 13.

[4] Μηδὲ ἀνεπίληπτον γεγονέναι τὸν Ἰησοῦν L. c. c. 41 and 42.

[5] Which tradition had grown out of the idea, — pushed to the extreme, — of Christ's appearance in the form of a servant, and the literal interpretation of Isaiah 53.

[6] Ἀμήχανον, ὅτῳ θεῖόν τι πλέον τῶν ἄλλων προσῆν μηδὲν ἄλλου διαφέρειν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλου διέφερεν, ἀλλ' ὡς φασι μικρὸν καὶ δυσειδὲς καὶ ἀγεννὲς ἦν. L. IV c. 75.

[7] L. II. c. 55; l. VII. c. 35.

[8] L. I. c. 67.

[9] L. II. c. 63 and 67.

[10] L. IV. c. 73.

the times, must also be unintelligible. He could not perceive that men whose anger had been excited against the Jewish people, served as instruments of the divine justice to inflict the penalty which that people had brought upon themselves by the accumulated measure of their guilt.

From the same school of Platonism proceeded, in the latter half of the third century, another opponent of Christianity, — one in whom we recognize a man of noble spirit united with profound intellectual attainments, altogether the reverse of Celsus. Porphyry, a Phœnician by birth, was a man of the East, in whom the Oriental basis of character had been completely fused with the elements of Grecian culture. The account which comes from the church historian Socrates,[1] that he had originally been a Christian, and only became embittered against Christianity on account of the ill treatment he had suffered from some of his fellow-believers, resembles, too much to deserve any credit, one of the common stories by which men endeavored to account, from outward causes, for an opposition grounded in the inward bent of the mind itself. In all that belongs to Porphyry, no trace can be discovered of his having once been a Christian; for, assuredly, those ideas of his which are, or rather which seem to be, related to Christianity, cannot rightly be considered as any evidence of this sort. In part, those ideas sprung naturally out of that part of Platonism which may claim some relationship with Christian doctrines, and which was more distinctly brought out by the effort to refine paganism and hold it up in opposition to Christianity; and in part, they showed the power exerted by Christianity even over those minds that were opposed to it; as, for instance, when Porphyry describes the triad of Christian principles, Faith, Love, and Hope, — though not apprehended according to the profound meaning of St. Paul, — as the foundation of genuine piety.[2] If Porphyry had not been a disciple of Plotinus, it is possible that by the fusion of Oriental Theosophy with Christianity he might have become a Gnostic. That speculative direction, opposed to the Oriental Gnosticism, which he received from Plotinus, the union of a Theosophy based on Platonism with the spiritualized polytheistic system, rendered him a violent enemy of Christianity, which could not be forced to accommodate itself to his eclectic theory.

(Porphyry, in the letter to his wife, calls it the noblest fruit of piety to worship God after the manner of one's country.[3]) Christianity, then, would be hateful to him, if on no other grounds, because it was a religion that conflicted with the national worship. As it was his wish that such a worship should be maintained as could not otherwise be reduced to harmony with the fundamental ideas of his philosophical religion than by artificial interpretations, unintelligible to the multitude, he was necessarily betrayed into many self-contradictions. He was, as we have seen, a zealous advocate of image-worship; and in encouraging

[1] L. III. c. 23.

[2] In his letter to his wife, Marcella, which was published by Mai, in Milan, 1816, (c. 24:) Τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα μάλιστα κεκρατύνθω περὶ θεοῦ· πίστις, ἀλήθεια, ἔρως, ἐλπίς.

[3] Ep. ad Marcellam, ed. Mai. c. 18, where perhaps the reading should be: Τιμᾶν τὸ θεῖον κατὰ τὰ πάτρια.

this, he countenanced at the same time the old superstitions, since the people associated with these images their ancient notions. And yet he writes to his wife: "*That man is not so much of an Atheist who neglects to worship the images of the gods, as he who transfers to God the opinions of the multitude.*"

He wrote a work against Christianity, in which he endeavored to detect contradictions in the sacred scriptures, — contradictions between the Apostles, — especially between the Apostles Peter and Paul.[1] Doubtless he may have adroitly availed himself, in this work, of the weak spots presented, not by the matter itself which he was attacking, but by the manner in which men had set forth and defended it; as, for example, when he was led by those harmonists who regarded the New Testament only as a rigid unity, to point out the discrepancies existing in the same, — of which, as we may suppose, he would be sure to make a false use; when, as Celsus had done before him,[2] he seized upon the artificial, allegorical interpretations, resorted to for the purpose of so explaining the Old Testament as to show that every part of it was equally divine and that every Christian doctrine might be found in it, and turned them into an argument to prove that the Old Testament admitted of no worthy sense to the natural and simple apprehension. Not without good reason could he say of such explanations, that men had contrived to dazzle and bewilder the judgment by pompous show.[3] Yet what he could assert with so much justice against this artificial interpretation of the Old Testament, fell back with no less weight against himself and the school to which he belonged, who took the same unwarrantable liberties in interpreting the Greek religion and its fables.

There is another work of Porphyry's, respecting which our information is more accurate, where too he has spoken against Christianity, and may have intended, indirectly at least, to present some check to its progress, — a system of Theology such as could be drawn up from the ancient, pretended responses of the Oracles.[4] He aimed in this way, as we have already observed in the Introduction, to supply the craving now awakened for religious instruction on the basis of some divine authority that could be relied on, — an interest by which many were led along to Christianity. Now, among the responses of the Oracles, some are to be found which relate to Christ and Christianity, — an evidence of the power of the Christian religion, which had so early infused its influence into the spiritual atmosphere, and already pressed itself upon the heathens from all that surrounded them. Hence many were at a loss to know how they should act with regard to it, and sought for

[1] Where he has recourse to the fallacious argument grounded on the well-known incident at Antioch, Gal. 2.

[2] See c. Cels. l. I. c. 17; l. IV. c. 48.

[3] The words of Porphyry, which very aptly characterize this sort of self-delusion in the interpretation of the records of religion, are as follows: *Διὰ τοῦ τύφου τὸ κριτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καταγοητεύσαντες.* Euseb. hist. eccles. l. VI. c. 19.

[4] *Περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας*, of which, in many respects very interesting work, considerable fragments have been preserved in the twelve sermonib. curat. affect. of Theodoretus, in Augustine's work de Civitate Dei, after a Latin version, in which Augustine had read it; and especially in that great literary store-house, the Præparat. Evang. and Demonstrat. Evangel. of Eusebius. Maii has published a new fragment in connection with the letter to Marcella.

advice from the Oracles or from the priests who spoke in their name. The responses given in answer to these applications differed in tone and import, according to the different modes of thinking of the priests who gave them. It was a case of frequent occurrence, in the first centuries, that the women became zealous Christians, while their husbands remained wholly devoted to Paganism. In a case of this sort, a man inquired of Apollo what god he should propitiate in order to bring back his wife from Christianity.[1] The pretended Apollo, who knew doubtless the force of conviction among the Christians, gave for a response, "that he might sooner write on the flowing stream, or fly on the empty air, than change the mind of his wife after she had once become impure and godless. Leave her, then, to lament *her deceased God*."[2] Apollo appears, next, justifying the judges who had condemned Jesus to death as a revolter against Judaism: "for the Jews acknowledged God, at least more than the Christians," (the common judgment of the pagans. See the preceding history.)

Many of the pagans were led to suppose from what they had heard concerning Christ, that he might be worshipped as a god along with the other gods, and they consulted the Oracle on this point. It is noticeable that the priests, who composed the response in this case, were cautious against saying anything disrespectful of Christ himself. The answer was, "He who is wise, knows that the soul rises immortal from the body; but the soul of that man is preëminent in piety."[3] When they inquired further, why Christ had suffered death, it was responded, "To be subjected to the weaker sufferings is always the lot of the body, but the soul of the pious rises to the fields of heaven."[4] Here Porphyry himself takes occasion to explain that Christ, therefore, must not

[1] Maii infers from this place, altogether without reason, that Porphyry's Marcella was a Christian. Porphyry undoubtedly cites here the *question* of *another*, as he does frequently in this work. The letter to Marcella contains no evidence whatever that she was a Christian, but rather proves the contrary.

[2] Augustin. de civitate Dei, l. XIX. c. 23. The strength of religious conviction among Jews and Christians became proverbial, as we see from the words of the celebrated physician Galen, where he is speaking of the great difficulty of bringing about any change in the opinions of those who are devoted to particular schools of medicine or philosophy, and makes use of the following comparison: Θᾶττον ἂν τις τοὺς ἀπὸ Μωϋσοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ μεταδιδάξειεν, ἢ κ, τ. λ. De different. pulsuum, l. III. c. 3, ed. Charter, T. VIII. f. 68.

[3] Ὅτι μὲν ἀθανάτη ψυχὴ μετὰ σῶμα προβαίνει,
γιγνώσκει σοφίῃ τετιμημενος, ἀλλά γε ψυχή
ἀνέρος εὐσεβίῃ προφερεστάτη ἐστὶν ἐκείνου.
Euseb. Demonstrat. evang. l. III. p. 134.

[4] Σῶμα μὲν ἀδρανέσιν βασάνοις αἰεὶ προβέβληται·
ψυχὴ δ' εὐσεβέων εἰς οὐράνιον πέδον ἵζει.
It may be, that Porphyry was occasionally deceived by spurious oracles, that had been interpolated either by Alexandrian Jews, or other and older pagan Platonicians. It is quite possible also, that oracles of this description had been interpolated by some other more rightly thinking pagan, under the name of the god or the goddess; — though it may be very well conceived, and indeed is more natural to suppose, that these oracles were actually given on the occasions specified. But assuredly the suspicion is altogether unfounded, that they were invented by some Christian, for Christians would certainly have never been able to make up their minds to say *so little* of Christ. The example being once given of such pagan oracles in relation to Christ, Christians might then be led, no doubt, to invent others. In the oracular response cited by Lactantius, (institut. l. VI. c. 13) the words concerning Christ, θνητὸς ἐὴν κατὰ σάρκα, σοφὸς τερατώδεσιν ἔργοις, and several others, betray their Christian author

be calumniated; they only should be pitied who worship him as God. "That pious soul, which had ascended to heaven, had by a certain fatality become an occasion of error to those souls which were destined to have no share in the gifts of the gods and in the knowledge of the eternal Zeus."

The list of authors who wrote against Christianity is closed by *Hierocles*, president of Bithynia, and afterwards præfect of Alexandria. The time which this writer chose for making his attack, was the last which any man of noble and generous feelings would have been disposed to choose, that of the Dioclesian persecution. And it was particularly unbecoming in Hierocles to obtrude himself on the Christians in the character of a teacher, as he was himself one of the instigators of the persecution, and a principal instrument in carrying it into effect. Yet he assumed the air of one who was actuated by an impartial love of the truth, and who wrote with the kindest feelings towards the Christians, entitling his performance, "Words to the Christians, from a lover of truth."[1] In this work, he repeats over a great deal that had been said already by Celsus and Porphyry. He indulges himself in retailing the most abominable falsehoods about the history of Christ. In particular, for the purpose of at once glorifying the old religion and attacking the Christian faith, he made use of a comparison of which probably he has no claim to be considered the original inventor. To give the declining religion of paganism a new impulse in its resistance to the overwhelming power of Christianity, it was necessary to direct men's attention to those heroes of the old religion who could be set up, it was imagined, in opposition to him on whom alone the faith of the Christians reposed. Thus the lives of the ancient sages, — of Pythagoras, for example, as exhibited by the New-Platonic philosopher, Jamblichus, — were colored over with a tinge of the miraculous, if not purposely for an object of this sort, at least under the influence of such a tendency, which reigned supreme in the religious consciousness of the pagans. But men did not wish to go back for the pictures of such heroes of the faith to hoary antiquity, they wanted to find them nearer home. The appearance of men who had occasioned unusual excitement in the public mind, of such men, for example, as Apollonius of Tyana, were made available against Christianity in two different ways. One class, who were in the habit of referring all eccentric phenomena of the religious spirit alike to fanaticism or fraud — as Lucian, who places Apollonius of Tyana on the same level with Alexander of Abonoteichus, — would avail themselves of this comparison to account also for the appearance and effects of Christianity. Others, again, would oppose Apollonius, as a prophet and worker of miracles among the Greeks, to the founder of the new religion. This was the course adopted by Hierocles. He wanted to deprive the miracles of Christ of their force of evidence, by the miracles of this Apollonius. He considered every fable which the rhetorical Philostratus, ages after the alleged events, had drawn from unauthentic sources, or out of his own imagination, to

[1] Λόγοι φιλαλήθεις πρὸς τοὺς Χριστιανούς

be entirely worthy of credit; as, for example, that Apollonius understood the language of brutes; while the apostles, uneducated, lying men,—jugglers, as Hierocles abusively called them without attempting to prove it,—are declared to have stated nothing but falsehoods. "You hold Christ to be God," said he, "because he is reported to have made a few blind men see, and to have performed some other works of the like kind; and yet the Greeks hold an Apollonius, who was the author of so many miracles, not to be a god, but only a man particularly beloved of the gods." Such was the peculiar method of argument adopted by Hierocles.[1]

In this very life of Apollonius, used by Hierocles, and composed by the rhetorician Philostratus the elder, a favorite of Julia Domna the wife of Septimius Severus, some have supposed they discovered a side aim against Christianity. But there is no single passage of the work which furnishes any evidence that such was its design, while opportunities were not wanting to introduce in some way or other remarks hostile to Christianity, as, for instance, where he speaks of the Jews. On the other hand, he mentions the divine vengeance inflicted on Jerusalem, of which the Roman arms were only the instrument,[2] in such a way as would be favorable to the Christian interest, and might be supposed, indeed, to indicate that he was unconsciously influenced by the prevailing mode of contemplating that event among the Christians. Yet the remarks on the preceding page are not wholly inapplicable to the case of Philostratus. Whether it sprang from a conscious design, or from an involuntary interest, the effort is apparent to give dignity to his hero as a counter-picture to Christ; and in doing this we need not suppose he was influenced by any *polemic aim against* the Christian faith, but only by a wish to set forth the splendor of the Greek religion in rivalship with Christianity.[3] It may be that the miracles of Christ, of which he had informed himself, furnished the occasion for many scattered embellishments of his own invention, although no reference of this kind is to be found so *distinct* and *palpable* as to leave this beyond question.

These attacks on the Christian church were met, from the time of the Emperor Hadrian and onwards, by men who stood up for the defence of Christianity and of the Christians. We reserve it for another portion of our history to speak more in detail of these apologists and of their writings. Here we shall simply remark that these apologies were of two different forms, and had two distinct objects in view. One class of them were expositions of Christian doctrine, designed for the use of enlightened Pagans generally; the other class had a more official character, as the authors advocated the cause of the Christians before emperors, or before the proconsuls and presidents of the provinces.

[1] See, respecting him, Lactant. l. V. c. 2; de mortib. persecutor. c. 16. Euseb. adv. Hieroc.

[2] L. VI. c. 29, he makes Titus say, in reference to the destruction of Jerusalem: Μὴ αὐτὸς ταῦτα εἰργάσθαι, θεῷ δὲ ὀργὴν φήναντι ἐπιδεδωκέναι τὰς ἑαυτοῦ χεῖρας.

[3] As Dr. Baur also supposes, in his Essay on Apollonios of Tyana, (in the Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie, Jahrg. 1832, 4tes Heft, also separately printed,) although I cannot allow that all the references to the history of Christ which Baur finds in this book, are sufficiently proved.

As they could not obtain a personal hearing, it was necessary for them to speak through their writings. The supposition that the forms of address to the emperors, to the senate, and the governors, were mere drapery, after the fashion of the declamations practised in the Pagan rhetorical schools, is certainly inconsistent with the situation and temper of the Christians of this time. It is far more natural to suppose that the authors of such writings were seeking to correct the judgment of the civil authorities respecting Christianity and its adherents. We cannot wonder, however, that these apologies seldom or never produced their desired effect on the authorities of the state; for the latter would hardly give themselves the time, or find themselves in a suitable mood, to examine with calmness what these apologists had to advance. Even master-pieces of apologetic art, which these productions, written from the fullness of conviction, certainly were not, could, in this case, have effected nothing; for there was no possible way in which they could recommend Christianity so as to meet the *politico-religious* views of Roman statesmen. In relation to the fundamental position of a Roman, it was of no avail, though they bore witness, with the force of inspiration, of those truths, the more general recognition of which was certainly owing, in the first place, to the revolution in the opinions of mankind brought about by Christianity; though they appealed to the universal rights belonging to man by his creation; though they assumed as a point which every man must concede, that religion is a matter of free conviction and feeling, that belief cannot be forced, that God cannot be served with the worship of constraint. "It belongs to the human rights and natural power of each individual," says Tertullian, "to worship the God in whom he believes; it is not the part of religion to force religion: it must be embraced voluntarily, not imposed by constraint, as sacrifices are required only from the willing heart. Although, then, you compel us to sacrifice, you will still gain nothing for your gods."[1] But by the principle of the laws of the Roman empire, which here came immediately into consideration, there was no question respecting the *inward religion*, but only respecting the *outward fulfilment of the laws*, the observance of the "Roman ceremonies." There was nothing here that taught any distinction between men and citizens. The apologists might appeal to the blameless lives of the Christians, they might challenge the magistrates to subject them to the severest judicial examinations, and punish the guilty, but this could avail nothing. The more intelligent had long since ceased to believe those fantastic reports of the populace. (Like Pliny, they could not accuse the Christians, as a body, of any moral delinquency.) But yet the Christian life appeared to them incompatible with the "Roman manners," and Christianity a feverish fanaticism dangerous to the good order of the Roman state.

It was a sound and healthy feeling that induced the apologists of Christianity to assume the existence of a prophetic element, not in

[1] Humani juris et naturalis potestatis est unicuique, quod putaverit, colere, nec alii obest aut prodest alterius religio. Sed nec religionis est, cogere religionem, quæ sponte suscipi debeat, non vi, cum et hostiæ ab animo libenti expostulentur. Ad Scapulam, c. 2.

Judaism alone but also in Paganism, and to make appeal to this, as the apostle Paul, at Athens, in proclaiming the God of revelation, appealed to the presentiment of the unknown God in the immediate consciousness of mankind, and to those forms in which this consciousness had been expressed by the words of inspired poets. Christianity, in truth, is the end to which all development of the religious consciousness must tend, and of which, therefore, it cannot do otherwise than offer a prophetic testimony. Thus there dwells an element of prophecy not barely in revealed religion, unfolding itself beneath the fostering care of the divine vintager (John xv.) as it struggles onward from Judaism to its complete disclosure in Christianity, but also in religion as it grows wild[1] on the soil of paganism, which by nature must strive unconsciously towards the same end. But though the apologists had a well-grounded right to search through those stages of culture from which they themselves had passed over to Christianity, in quest of such points of agreement, — for which purpose they made copious collections from the ancient philosophers and poets, — yet they were too closely involved in the very process of development to be able rightly to understand the earlier culture, as well in that part of it which was opposed to Christianity as in that which was in relationship with it and led to it. Very easily might it happen that they would be led involuntarily to transfer their Christian mode of apprehension to their earlier positions, and allow themselves to be deceived by mere appearances of resemblance. Add to this, that Alexandrian Jews and pagan Platonists may have already introduced many forgeries under the famous names of antiquity, which could serve as testimonies in behalf of the religious truths taken for granted by Christianity in opposition to pagan Polytheism. And at a time when all critical skill, as well as all interest in critical inquiries, were alike wanting, it would be easy for men who were seeking, under the influence of a purely religious interest, after the testimonies of the ancients, for such a use, to allow themselves to be imposed upon by spurious and interpolated matter. This happened not seldom with the Christian apologists.

Thus, for instance, there were interpolated writings of this description passing under the name of that mythic personage of antiquity, the Grecian Hermes (Trismegistus) or the Egyptian Thoth; also under the names of the Persian Hystaspes, (Gushtasp) and of the Sibyls, so celebrated in the Greek and Roman legends, which were used in good faith by the apologists. Whatever truth at bottom might be lying in those time-old legends of the Sibylline prophecies,[2] of which the pro-

[1] I here make use of an expression, coined for this purpose by Schelling, a man endowed above all others with the gift of finding its right word for the expression of the idea, — to mark the notion of nature-religion in its relation to the religion of revelation. In like manner, Clement of Alexandria styles the Hellenic philosophy, in its relation to Christianity, the *ἀγριέλαιος*. Strom. VI. f. 672.

[2] The prophetic element, as a natural power in nature-religion, is characteristically distinguished from the supernatural prophetic element of revealed religion. Thus we find the character of the former expressed in ancient verses, cited under the name of the Sibyl, in Plutarch de Pythiæ oraculis, c. 9: *Ὡς οὐδὲ ἀποθανοῦσα λήξει μαντικῆς, ἀλλ' αὖτη μὲν ἐν τῇ σελήνῃ περίεισι τὸ καλούμενον φαινόμενον γενομένη πρόσωπον, τῷ δὲ ἀέρι τὸ πνεῦμα συγκραθὲν ἐν φήμαις ἀεὶ φορήσεται καὶ κληδόσιν. ἐκ δὲ*

found Heraclitus, five hundred years before Christ, had said, "their unadorned, earnest words, spoken with inspired mouth, reached through a thousand years,"[1] the consciousness of such a prophetic element in Paganism, that which in these predictions was supposed to refer to the fates of cities and nations, and more particularly to a last and golden age of the world,[2] gave occasion to divers interpretations taken from Jewish and Christian points of view; and as it had been the practice from very early times, with both pagans and Jews, to interpolate spurious verses, accommodated to their respective religious views and principles, under the name of Sibylline prophecies,[3] so Christian fiction, from the very first century after Christ, added its own *quota* to the rest. When Celsus reproached the Christians with interpolating many scandalous things into the Sibylline writings,[4] Origen in his reply could appeal to the fact that the more ancient Sibylline writings were full of interpolations. With this use of the so called Sibylline prophecies, all Christians, however, were not satisfied. Celsus mentions, among other Christian sects, the Sibyllists,[5] and Origen accounts for it by supposing that Celsus might some time or other have heard how this name of reproach had been applied to those who quoted the Sibyl as a prophetess, by other Christians who did not approve of this practice. This, however, is not to be so understood as to imply that those opponents of the Sibylline prophecies had ascertained, on grounds of criticism, the spuriousness of these writings,[6] and for this reason refused to countenance such a fraud for pious purposes; more probably, they revolted *a priori*, at the very supposition that anything of the nature of a prophetic power existed *among the heathen*.

While, by others, the testimonies, genuine and interpolated, derived from their own literature, were employed against the Pagans, Tertullian chose a different course. Inclined to perceive in all culture, science and art, the falsification of original truth, he preferred to appeal to the involuntary utterances of the immediate, original voice of God in nature. He adduced, as evidence for Christian truth against Polytheism, the spontaneous expressions of an irrepressible, immediate, religious consciousness in common life, — the testimony of the soul, which he held to be Christian by nature,[7] — the testimony of the simple, uncultivated, ignorant soul, previous to all cultivation.[8] In his apology before the pagans he makes appeal to this witness of the soul, "which, though confined in the prison of the body, though led astray by wrong

τοῦ σώματος μεταβαλόντος ἐν τῇ γῇ πόας καὶ ὕλης ἀναφυομένης, βοσκήσεται ταύτην ἱερὰ θρέμματα χρόας τε παντοδαπὰς ἴσχοντα καὶ μορφὰς καὶ ποιότητας ἐπὶ τῶν σπλάγχνων, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ προδηλώσεις ἀνθρώποις τοῦ μέλλοντος.

[1] Σίβυλλα μαινομένῳ στόματι ἀγέλαστα καὶ ἀκαλλώπιστα καὶ ἀμύριστα φθεγγομένη χιλίων ἐτῶν ἐξικνεῖται τῇ φωνῇ διὰ τὸν θεόν. Plutarch. de Pythiæ oraculis, c. 6.

[2] Ultima Cumæi carminis ætas; vid. Virgil, IV. Eclog.

[3] Varro, in his great archæological work, treated, already in his time, of the different constituent parts of the Sibylline books, and of the interpolated verses. See Dionysius of Halicarn. Archæol. l. IV. c. 62.

[4] L. VII. c. 56: Ὅτι παρενέγραψαν εἰς τὰ ἐκείνης πολλὰ καὶ βλάσφημα

[5] c. Cels. l. V. c. 61.

[6] Testimonium animæ naturaliter Christianæ. Tert. Apologet. c. 17.

[7] De testimonio animæ, c. 1: Te simplicem et rudem et impolitam et idioticam compello, qualem habent, qui te solam habent, illam ipsam de compito, de trivio, de textrino totam.

[8] Apologet. c. 17.

training, though enfeebled by the desires and passions, yet when it comes to itself, as out of a fit of intoxication, as out of a sleep, out of a disease, and when conscious of its healthful condition, calls God by this name alone, because it is the proper name of the true God. Great God — good God — and what God gives, — these are common expressions with all. It adjures also this God as its judge, in such expressions as these: — God is my witness,— to God I commit my cause, — God will requite me. Finally, in using these expressions, it looks, not to the Capitol, but upward to heaven; for it knows the seat of the living God — from Him and from thence it descended."[1]

[1] Quæ, licet carcere corporis pressa, licet institutionibus pravis circumscripta, licet libidinibus ac concupiscentiis evigorata, licet falsis Diis exancillata, cum tamen resipiscit, ut ex crapula, ut ex somno, ut ex aliqua valetudine, et sanitatem suam patitur, Deum nominat, hoc solo nomine, quia proprio Dei veri. Deus magnus, Deus bonus, et quod Deus dederit, omnium vox est. Judicem quoque contestatur illum, Deus videt, et Deo commendo, et Deus mihi reddet. Denique, pronuntians hæc, non ad Capitolium, sed ad cœlum respicit. Novit enim sedem Dei vivi, ab illo et inde descendit.

SECTION SECOND.

HISTORY OF THE CHURCH CONSTITUTION, OF CHURCH DISCIPLINE, AND OF SCHISMS IN THE CHURCH.

I. History of the Constitution of the Church.

1. *Of the Constitution of Church Communities generally.*

In considering the history of the formation of the Christian church constitution, two different epochs must be carefully distinguished: *The first epoch of its formation, as it sprang immediately, in the Apostolic age, out of the peculiar essence of Christianity,* — that essential character of Christianity whereby it is wholly distinguished, as well from the Old Testament position, as from all previous forms of religious community; *and secondly, the epoch in which this original form of fellowship among Christians became gradually changed under various foreign influences, reaching down to the end of this period of the history.* We speak first, then, of *the foundation laid for the constitution of Christian communities in the Apostolic age.*

A. *The first foundation for the constitution of Christian communities in the Apostolic age.*

What Moses expressed as a wish,[1] that the Spirit of God might rest upon all, and all might be prophets, is a prediction of that which was to be realized through Christ. By him was instituted a fellowship of divine life, which, proceeding from the equal and equally immediate relation of all to the one God, as the divine source of life to all, removed those boundaries within which, at the Old Testament position, the development of the higher life was still confined; and hence the fellowship thus derived, essentially distinguishes itself from the constitution of all previously existing religious societies. There could be no longer a priestly or prophetic office, constituted to serve as a medium for the propagation and development of the kingdom of God, on which office the religious consciousness of the community was to be dependent. Such a guild of priests as existed in the previous systems of religion, empowered to guide other men, who remained, as it were, in a state of religious pupilage; having the *exclusive* care of providing for their religious wants, and serving as mediators, by whom all other men must first be placed in connection with God and divine things; such a priestly caste could find no place within Christianity. In removing out of the way that which separated men *from God*, in communicating to

[1] Numbers, 11:29.

all the same fellowship *with God*, Christ also removed the barrier which had hitherto divided men *from one another*. Christ, the Prophet and High Priest for entire humanity, was the end of the prophetic office and of the priesthood. There was now the same High Priest and Mediator for all, through whom all, become reconciled and united with God, are themselves made a priestly and spiritual race; one heavenly King, Guide and Teacher, through whom all are taught of God; one faith, one hope, one Spirit which should quicken all; one oracle in the hearts of all, the voice of the Spirit proceeding from the Father; — all were to be citizens of one heavenly kingdom, with whose heavenly powers, even while strangers in the world, they should be already furnished. When the Apostles applied the Old Testament idea of the priesthood to Christianity, this was done invariably for the simple purpose of showing that no such visible, particular priesthood could find place in the new community; that since free access to God and to heaven had been, once for all, opened to believers by one High Priest, even Christ, they had, by virtue of their union to him, become themselves a spiritual people, consecrated to God; their calling being none other than to dedicate their entire life to God as a thank-offering for the grace of redemption, to publish abroad the power and grace of him who had called them out of the kingdom of darkness into his marvellous light, to make their life one continual priesthood, one spiritual worship springing from the temper of faith working by love, one continuous testimony for their Saviour (compare 1 Pet. ii. 9, Rom. xii. 1, and the spirit and whole train of thought running through the epistle to the Hebrews.) So, too, the advancement of God's kingdom in general and in particular, the diffusion of Christianity among the heathens and the good of each particular community, was now to be, not the duty of one select class of Christians alone, but the most immediate concern of each individual. Every one, from the position assigned him by the invisible Head of the church, should coöperate in promoting this object by the special gifts which God had bestowed on him, — gifts grounded in *his peculiar nature*, but that nature renewed and ennobled by the Holy Spirit. There was no distinction here of spiritual and secular; but all, as Christians, should, in their inner life, in temper and disposition, be dead to the ungodlike, to the world, and in so far separate from the world, — men animated by the Spirit of God and not by the spirit of the world. The individual predominant capabilities of Christians, sanctified, made godly by this Spirit and appropriated as organs for its activity, should be transformed to *charismata*, gifts of grace. It was thus, therefore, the Apostle Paul began his exposition of spiritual gifts, addressed to the Corinthian church, (1 Corinth. xii.) "Once, when ye were heathens, and suffered yourselves to be led blindfold by your priests to dumb idols, ye were as dead and dumb as they. Now that through Christ ye serve the living God, ye no longer have such guides, drawing you along blindfold by leading-strings. Ye have yourselves for a guide the Spirit of God, that enlightens you. Ye no longer dumbly follow; He speaks out of you; there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit."

The essence of the Christian community rested on this: that no one individual should be the chosen, preëminent organ of the Holy Spirit for the guidance of the whole; but all were to coöperate,—each at his particular position, and with the gifts bestowed on him, one supplying what might be wanted by another,—for the advancement of the Christian life and of the common end. In this view of it, the New Testament idea of the *charisma* becomes important; the charisma, by which is designated the individuality and diversity in the operations of the Spirit that quickens all, as contradistinguished from that which in all is the same; the *peculiar* kind and manner or form of the activity of that common principle, so far as it is conditioned by the peculiar natural characteristics of each individual. Just as the unity of that higher Spirit must reveal itself in the manifoldness of the charismata, so must all these peculiarities, quickened by the same Spirit, serve as organs, mutually helping each other for one common end, the edification of the church. We understand edification here, according to the general and original sense of the term in the writings of St. Paul, as referring to the advancement and development, from its common ground, of the entire life of the church-community. The edification of the church, in this sense, was the common work of all. Even edification by the word was not assigned exclusively to one individual; but every man who felt the inward call to it, might give utterance to the word in the assembled church. Referring to the same end, there were likewise different gifts, grounded in the diversity of peculiar natures, quickened by the Holy Spirit; according as, for example, the productive, (prophecy,) or the receptive, (interpretation, the *διερμηνεία*,) or the critical faculty, (proving of spirits;) according as the capacity for feeling and intuition, or that of sober reflective thought predominated; according as the Divine, in its overwhelming force, had the preponderance, and the Human, in its independent development, gave place to it; or a harmonious coöperation of both the Divine and the Human prevailed; according as the momentaneous and sudden seizure of inspiration had the ascendency, or what was contained in the Christian consciousness became unfolded through a process of thought quickened by the Holy Spirit, (where again there were manifold gradations, from an ecstatic elevation of mind down to the uniform, discreet and cautious unfolding of the understanding, speaking with tongues, prophecy, the ordinary gift of teaching,) in fine, according as the prevailing tendency was to the theoretical or to the practical, (the *Gnosis* or the *Sophia*.)

Since Christianity did not destroy any of the natural distinctions grounded in the laws of the original creation, but sanctified and ennobled them; for our Saviour's words, that he came not to destroy but to fulfil, apply also to the natural world; so, although the dividing wall between man and woman, in respect to the higher life, was removed by Christ, and in him man and woman become one, yet Christianity would have the woman remain true to the particular sphere and destination assigned her by nature. Women were excluded from taking

any public part in the transactions of the church assemblies; they were referred to their appropriate sphere of activity within the bosom of the family, or some corresponding place in the administration of church affairs. The Apostle Paul, (1 Cor. xiv. 34,) interdicts the female part of the church alone from publicly speaking in the assemblies; which makes it evident again, that no other exception existed to the universality of this right among the Christians. But this last mentioned exception continued to be made, after the same manner, in succeeding times. Even the enthusiastic Montanists recognized it; only maintaining that the extraordinary operations of the divine Spirit were not bound by this rule. In proof of this, they referred to the case of the prophecying women, mentioned in 1 Corinth. xi. 5; but incorrectly, since the Apostle simply speaks here of a practice that prevailed in the Corinthian church, without approving that practice, but with a design of correcting it in a later part of the epistle. This will be evident on comparing 1 Corinth. xi. 5, with xiv. 34.[1]

As the *inner* fellowship of divine life introduced by Christianity strove, however, from the beginning, to exhibit itself in an outward fellowship, it must necessarily appropriate to itself some determinate form, answering to its own essence, a form in which this union could appear and shape itself as a spiritual body; because without such form no association, for whatever purpose, can have actual being and subsistence. To this end, a certain organization was necessary; a certain relative superordination and subordination of the different members, according to the different positions assigned them in reference to the whole; a certain guidance and direction of the common concerns, and therefore separation of organs destined for that particular end. And this stands in no manner of contradiction with what we asserted respecting the essential character of Christianity and the fellowship grounded therein, and respecting the mutual relations of Christians to each other. On the contrary, the natural relation of members to one another points already to such an organic form in the constitution of the community as a necessary thing. For, as there were individualities of character predominantly productive, and others of a more receptive bent; as there were those preëminently calculated to guide and rule; and, as the Christian life shaped itself after the form of these natural peculiarities, which it ennobled,—the natural talent being elevated to a charisma,—the result was, that some members of the community would come to be possessed of the gift which is designated in the epistles of St. Paul as the χάρισμα κυβερνήσεως (governments.) This mutual relation of gifts, grounded in the natural talents of individuals, pointed to a corresponding position of the several members of the community in their relation to one another. The χάρισμα κυβερνήσεως required a corres-

[1] The Hilary, who wrote commentaries on the epistles of St. Paul, is remarkable for the freedom from prejudice with which he contemplates Christian antiquity. In speaking of these matters also, he correctly distinguishes the earlier from the later practice of the church. Primum omnes docebant et omnes baptizabant, ut cresceret plebs et multiplicaretur, omnibus inter initia concessum est, et evangelizare et baptizare et scripturas explorare. Hilar. in epist. Ephes. c. IV. v. 12

ponding office, the fitness for which had been conferred by that gift, in the organization of the church. This was a whole, composed of equal members, all the members being but organs of the community, as this was the body quickened by the Spirit of Christ. All these members, as organs of the whole and of the one Spirit which gave it life, were to coöperate, each in his appropriate place, for the common end; and some of the members acted in this organization of parts as the preëminently guiding ones. But it could hardly work itself out in a natural way from the essence of the Christian life and of Christian fellowship, that *this guidance should be placed in the hands of only one individual. The monarchical form of government was not suited to the Christian community of spirit.*

The preponderance of one individual at the head of the whole might too easily operate as a check on the free development of the life of the church, and the free coöperation of the different organs, in whom the consciousness of mutual independence must ever be kept alive. The individual on whom everything depended, might acquire too great an importance for the whole; and so become the centre, round which all would gather, so as to obscure the sense of their common relation to *that only One*, who should be the centre for all. The Apostles stood to the collective body of Christians in a relation which corresponded only to their peculiar position in the development of the church, and which, for that very reason, could not be transferred to another office; since they alone were to be the bearers of Christ's word and spirit for all ages; the chosen witnesses of his personal appearance and ministry, of his resurrection to a new and more glorious state of being; the necessary intermediate links by which the whole church was connected with Christ. This was a relation of dependence and subordination, grounded in the nature of the historical development, which could not be repeated. And these apostles themselves, to whom this position in the guidance of the church belonged, how far were they from any thought of exercising a constraining preponderance in its affairs, to lord it over the faith, of which the foundation had once been laid, and which was now to develop itself with freedom, and give shape to everything by its own inherent power alone! How much respect they showed for the free development of the collective body! They endeavored to gain the free coöperation of the communities in all the affairs which concerned those communities,—a point on which we shall speak more particularly hereafter. Peter and John place themselves in their epistles in the same class with other presiding officers of the communities, instead of claiming a place *above* them as general rulers of the church. How difficult it might be to find in the communities an individual uniting in himself all the qualifications for guiding the affairs of the body, and who alone possessed the confidence of all! How much easier to find in every community several fathers of families, whose peculiarities together might supply the deficiencies of each as an individual, one of whom might enjoy the most confidence in this, and the other in that class of the community, and who together therefore might be qualified for such a function. *Monarchy in spiritual things* does

not harmonize with the spirit of Christianity; for this points everywhere to the feeling of a mutual need of help, to the necessity and to the great advantage as well of common counsel as of common prayer. Where two or three are assembled in the name of the Lord, he promises to be in the midst of them.

Besides, Christianity freely appropriated to its own use such already existing forms as were adapted to its spirit and essential character. Now in the Jewish synagogue, and in all the sects that sprung out of Judaism, there existed a form of government which was not monarchical, but aristocratic; consisting of a council of elders, זְקֵנִים, *πρεσβύτεροι*, who had the guidance of all affairs belonging to the common interest. To this form, Christianity, which unfolded itself out of Judaism, would most naturally attach itself. The same polity, moreover, would appear most natural, in whatever part of the Roman empire communities were founded among the pagans, for men had long been used to see the affairs of state administered by a senate, by the assembly of decuriones. It is an evidence of the relationship between the ecclesiastical and civil administration, that at a somewhat later period, the clergy were denominated *ordo*, the guiding senate of the community; since *ordo* stands preëminently for the ordo senatorum.

The guidance of the communities was accordingly everywhere entrusted to a counsel of elders. It was not necessary that these should be the oldest in years, though some respect doubtless was had to age. But age here was a designation of worth, as in the Latin "senatus." and in the Greek "*γερουσία.*" Besides the usual name *πρεσβύτεροι*, given to these heads of the community, there were also many others, denoting their appropriate sphere of action, as *ποιμένες*, shepherds; פַּרְנָסִין, *ἡγούμενοι, προεστῶτες τῶν ἀδελφῶν.* The founding of communities among the pagans led to another name, more conformed to the Grecian mode of designating such relations, than the appellations above cited, which clearly show their Jewish origin. This name was *ἐπίσκοποι*, borrowed from the city form of government among the Greeks,[1] and applied to the presiding officers of the Christian communities, as overseers of the whole, leaders of the community.

That the name *ἐπίσκοποι* or bishops, was altogether *synonymous* with that of Presbyters, is clearly evident from those passages of scripture, where both appellations are used interchangeably. Acts 20, comp. v. 17 with v. 28; Ep. to Titus, c. 1, v. 5 with v. 7 and from those where the office of deacon is named immediately after that of bishop, so that between these two church offices there could not still be a third intervening one. Ep. to Philipp. 1: 1; 1 Tim. 3: 1 and 8. This interchange in the use of the two appellations shows that they were perfectly identical. Even were the name bishop originally nothing more than the distinctive title of a president of this church-senate, of a Primus inter pares, yet even in this case such interchange would be quite inadmissible. Likewise in the letter which Clemens, the disciple of Paul, writes in the name of the Roman church, the deacons are

[1] See on this point, my Hist. of the Planting, &c., Vol. I. p. 198.

named immediately after the bishops, as the presiding officers of the communities.[1]

But we here go on the supposition, that in each town, from the beginning onward, one single community formed itself under the guidance of a senate of elders. Are we warranted to suppose this? An opposite hypothesis has been proposed by several writers in more recent times.[2] It is held, according to this view, that there were not single churches formed from the beginning, especially in the larger towns; but as Christianity was introduced from many different quarters and by different preachers, *single*, *small* communities must have been founded, independent of one another, which remained separate, and held their assemblies at different places. Not till later, then, would one community be formed from the coming together of these several conventicles. Of such separate conventicles preceding the formation of one community, indications are supposed to be found, in those passages of St. Paul's epistles, where one person, with the church assembling in his house, is greeted. Coloss. 4: 15; 1 Corinth. 16: 19; Rom. 16: 5—14, 15; Philem. 2. Each of these small communities is supposed to have had its own presiding officer, and in this sense the monarchical was the original form of government in the constitution of the church. According to one view, the contentions of these little bands and their presiding officers with one another, first caused the want to be felt of greater unity and closer connection under a common head; by which the gradual formation of the episcopal government of the church would be promoted. According to the other view, the name ἐπίσκοποι designated originally the function of these local presidents, and the name presbyters, the collegial union of these several presidents of communities.

Such an atomic theory, however, corresponds, certainly, least of all, to the essence of Christianity, of the Christian community of Spirit, which tended everywhere to fellowship and unity, and conveyed with it the consciousness of all belonging together to one body.[3] Everywhere in the epistles of the New Testament, Christians of the same city appear as members associated together to form one ἐκκλησία. This unity never represents itself as something which is yet to take place, but as the original form, having its ground from the beginning in the essence of the Christian consciousness; and the party divisions which threatened to dissolve this unity, appear rather as a morbid affection which had crept in later, as in the Corinthian church. And if portions of the church sometimes formed separate assemblies in the houses of such individuals as possessed local conveniences for the purpose, or who were eminently qualified to edify those who assembled in their dwell-

[1] See Cap. 42.

[2] Dr. Kist of Leyden; see his Essay on the Origin of the Episcopal Power in the Christian Church, translated from the Dutch in Illgen's Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie, Bd. II., 2tes Stück, S. 48, — and Dr. von Baur, in his Treatise on the Pastoral Letters.

[3] Comp. what I have said in objection to this theory, in my History of the Planting, &c., p. 49 and 199; also Rothe, in his work Uber die Anfänge der Christlichen Kirche p. 197, and onward.

ings, by the preaching of the word;[1] yet this was something which did not occur till later, when the communities that were already regularly organized became more numerous; and those who met in such assemblies did not, by so doing, separate themselves from the great whole of the *community* which subsisted under that *guiding* senate. Of course the distinction, which has its sole ground in the theory above mentioned, between bishops and presbyters, vanishes; and all we can admit is, that the latter was particularly the name of dignity, the former the name designating the function, or particular sphere of activity.

These presbyters or bishops then, as we may call the same functionaries considered under different points of view, had the general superintendence of the communities, the direction of all affairs pertaining to the common interest; but the *office of teaching* was not committed exclusively to them; for, as we have remarked above, *all Christians*, originally, had the right of pouring out their hearts before the brethren, and of speaking for their edification, in the public assemblies. It does not follow, however, *from this*, that *all* the members of a community were fitted for the *ordinary and regular office of teaching;* a distinction is to be made between a gift of teaching, such as, like every other cultivated talent, stood constantly at the command of him that once possessed it, and those effusions proceeding from the inspiration of the moment,[2] which were connected with insulated and transient states of elevated feeling, such as, in especial manner, belonged to the characteristic features of that primitive time of extraordinary mental excitement from above, when the divine life was first entering within the limits of the earthly world, and sudden transitions in conversion must more frequently occur. On such transient awakenings and excitements of the religious consciousness alone, the care necessary to preserve, propagate and advance religious knowledge, and to defend the genuine, pure, apostolic doctrine against the various corrupting tendencies — already threatening to come in — of Jewish or Pagan modes of thinking, could not be made to depend. Christianity claimed for its service the faculties of knowledge, no less than those of feeling. Where one of these two faculties predominated to the exclusion of the other, disturbances of the Christian consciousness and life always ensued. That healthy and harmonious development, by virtue of which all exclusive preponderance of single charismata would be precluded, was one of the characteristic features of the apostolic period. Hence the watchful counteraction of the Apostle Paul, wherever he noticed any exclusive tendency of this kind which threatened to interfere with the harmoni-

[1] Comp. my Hist. of the Planting, etc., p. 208.

[2] As prophecy, speaking with tongues. I will take this occasion to point out a passage in Irenæus, which serves to confirm what I have so often advanced, that by the gift of tongues, was designated something that differed only in degree, not in kind, from the prophetic gift, — an inspiration raised to a higher grade, and suppressing more entirely the ordinary consciousness. The passage in Acts, 10: 46, relating to the gift of tongues, Irenæus, III. 12, 15, explains thus: while the Holy Ghost rested on them, they poured out their feelings in the manner of prophecy. Τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου ἐπαναπαύοντος αὐτοῖς, προφητεύοντας αὐτοὺς ἀκηκόει.

ous and healthy development of the Christian life,— as we see in his first epistle to the Corinthians. Care was to be taken, therefore, that along with those utterances of extraordinary inspiration, to be connected with no particular function, there should never fail to be in the communities such as were qualified to satisfy the need of knowledge, men capable of unfolding and of defending for them Christian truth: the function denoted by the λόγος γνώσεως and the χάρισμα διδασκαλίας. This latter presupposed a certain previous cultivation of the understanding, a power of clear and discriminating thought, a certain gift of communication; all which, if once present, when quickened by the agency of the Holy Spirit, became a charisma of this kind. Such as possessed this charisma, were on that account fitted to take care for the continual preservation of sound doctrine in the community and for the establishment and furtherance of Christian knowledge, without excluding the coöperation of the rest, who were at liberty to assist, each from his own position, and according to the particular gift which might belong to him. Hence, in the apostolic age, the gift of teaching, χάρισμα διδασκαλίας, and the order of teachers, διδάσκαλοι, who were distinguished by this gift, are represented as constituting an entirely distinct function and order. All the members of a community might, at particular seasons, feel the impulse to address the assembled brethren, or to break forth before them in acts of invocation or praise to their God; but only a few possessed that χάρισμα διδασκαλίας, and were διδάσκαλοι.

It is clear of itself, however, that this faculty of teaching is a thing quite distinct from the talent for administering the outward concerns of the community, the χάρισμα κυβερνήσεως, which was particularly required for the office of assessor in the church council, the office of presbyter or bishop. These gifts, so different in their kind, could not always be united in the same individual. In the early apostolic church, to which all arbitrary and idle distinctions of ranks were so alien, and where every office was considered simply with reference to the end it was to subserve and circumscribed by an inner necessity, the function of teaching and that of church government, the function of a διδάσκαλος and that of a ποιμήν, as also the gifts requisite for both,[1] were hence also originally distinguished and held separate from each other.[2]

In the unfolding of these relations, it is necessary to distinguish different steps, or stages; and we should not be warranted in assuming, as the original form, every thing which we find in the later portions of the apostolic times. The historic progress itself must have introduced many changes; and it would be a mistake if we supposed that every arrangement in the communities when St. Paul wrote his last epistles remained the same as when he sent the first. Thus, with regard to the ministration of doctrine, the following gradations are to be distinguished in the progressive development.[3] 1. It occurred naturally that individuals, qualified for it by previous cultivation of mind, were, by virtue

[1] The χάρισμα διδασκαλίας and the χάρισμα κυβερνήσεως.

[2] Comp. for instance, Rom. 12: 7, 8, and the passages already noticed, for the purpose of seeing the distinction between the διδάσκων and the προεστώς.

[3] See my Hist. of the Planting, &c, p. 210 et. seq.

of this qualification, particularly called to the regular dispensation of doctrine. 2. Such persons were commonly ordained and set apart as teachers of the church. 3. The functions of church-teacher and of elder became more closely connected with each other. It must have been held a salutary thing, tending to the good order and quiet of the communities, that among their presiding officers there should be also those who possessed the talent for administering the office of teaching. If in some cases, as in Paul's farewell address to the elders of the Church of Ephesus, the care of maintaining pure doctrine was committed to the presbyters generally, yet it by no means follows that it belonged to them to administer the office of teaching in the more restricted sense; for the Apostle may be speaking here simply of one among the general cares of church government. But when, in the epistle to Titus, it is required of a bishop, that he should not only himself hold fast the genuine, pure doctrine of the gospel, but also be able to establish others in it, and confute its adversaries, it is certainly implied that the bishop must possess also the gift of teaching. Indeed under many circumstances of the church, such as those, for example, which are alluded to in the above mentioned epistle, this would be highly desirable on account of the threatening danger from the spread of erroneous doctrines, which was to be met by the paternal authority of elders of the community, supported by their oral teaching. So, too, in the first epistle to Timothy (5:17), those of the presbyters who, to the talent for government, *κυβέρνησις*, could unite also that of teaching, *διδασκαλία*, are counted worthy of double honor; and the prominence given here to each may be regarded as another proof that the two were not *necessarily* and *always* united.

Besides these, we find only one other church office in the Apostolic age, that of deacons. The duties of this office were from the beginning simply external, as it was instituted in the first place, according to Acts vi, to assist in the distribution of alms. The care of providing for the poor and sick of the communities, to which many other external duties were afterwards added, devolved particularly on this office. Besides the deacons, there were appointed also deaconesses, for the female portion of the communities, because the free access of men to the female sex, especially in the East, where custom demanded so careful a separation of the sexes, might excite suspicion and give offence. If the women, in conformity with their natural destination, were excluded from the offices of teaching and church government, yet the peculiar qualifications of the sex were now claimed, in this way, as peculiar gifts for the service of the communities. By means of such deaconesses the gospel could be introduced into the bosom of families, where, owing to the customs of the East, no man could gain admittance.[1] They were also bound, as Christian wives and mothers of tried experience in all the relations of their sex, to assist the younger women of the communities with their counsel and encouragement.[2]

[1] As a proof, see the words of Clement of Alexandria, (St. l. III. p. 448,) respecting Christian women: *Δι' ὧν καὶ εἰς τὴν γυναικωνῖτιν ἀδιαβλήτως παρεισεδύετο ἡ τοῦ κυρίου διδασκαλία.*

[2] Tertull. de virginib. velandis, c. 9: Ut

As regards the election to these church offices, we are in want of sufficient information to enable us to decide how it was managed in the early Apostolic times. Indeed, it is quite possible that the method of procedure differed under different circumstances. As in the institution of deacons the apostles left the choice to the communities themselves, and as the same was the case in the choice of deputies to attend the apostles in the name of the communities (2 Corinth. viii: 19), we might argue that a similar course would be pursued in filling other offices of the church. Yet it may be that in many cases the apostles themselves, where they could not as yet have sufficient confidence in the spirit of the first new communities, conferred the important office of presbyters on such as in their own judgment, under the light of the Divine Spirit, appeared to be the fittest persons. *Their* choice would, moreover, deserve in the highest degree the confidence of the communities (comp. Acts xiv: 23; Titus i: 5); although when St. Paul empowers Titus to set presiding officers over the communities who possessed the requisite qualifications, *this circumstance* decides nothing as to the mode of choice, nor is a choice by the community itself *thereby* necessarily excluded. The regular course seems to have been this: the church offices were entrusted in preference to the first converts of the communities, provided that in other respects they possessed the requisite qualifications. (1 Corinth. vi: 15).[1] Clement of Rome cites the following rule, as one which had been handed down from the apostles, relative to the appointment to church offices; "*that they should be filled, according to the judgment of approved men, with the consent of the whole community.*" It may have been the general practice for the presbyters themselves, in case of a vacancy, to propose another to the community in place of the person deceased, and leave it to the whole body either to approve or decline their selection for reasons assigned.[2] Where asking for the assent of the community had not yet become a mere formality, this mode of filling church offices had the salutary effect of causing the votes of the majority to be guided by those capable of judging, and of suppressing divisions; while at the same time no one was obtruded on the community who would not be welcome to their hearts.

Again, as regards the relation in which these presbyters stood to the communities, they were not designed to exercise absolute authority, but to act as presiding officers and guides of an ecclesiastical republic; to conduct all things with the coöperation of the communities as their ministers, and not their masters. So the apostles regarded this relation when they addressed their epistles, which treat not barely of matters of doctrine but of things relating to the life and discipline of the church, not to the presiding officers of the communities alone, but to the entire communities. In the instance where the Apostle Paul pro-

experimentis omnium affectuum structæ, facile norint cæteras et consilio et solatio juvare; et ut nihilominus ea decucurrerint, per quæ femina probari potest.

[1] So also Clement of Rome, (cap. 42,) says of the Apostles: Κατὰ χώραν καὶ πόλεις κηρύσσοντες καθέστανον τὰς ἀπαρχὰς αὐτῶν, δοκιμάσαντες τῷ πνεύματι εἰς ἐπισκόπους καὶ διακόνους μελλόντων πιστεύειν.

[2] Clement, Cap. 44: Τοὺς καταστάντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἢ μεταξὺ ὑφ' ἑτέρων ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν, συνευδοκησάσης τῆς ἐκκλησίας πάσης.

nounces a sentence of excommunication from the fellowship of the church, he conceives himself united in spirit with the whole community (1 Corinth. 5, 4), assuming that regularly, in a matter of such common concern, the participation of the whole community was required.

B. *Changes in the Constitution of the Christian Church after the age of the Apostles.*

The changes which the Constitution of the Christian Church underwent during this period, related especially to the three following particulars; 1. the distinction of bishops from presbyters, and the gradual development of the monarchico-episcopal church government; 2. the distinction of the clergy from the laity, and the formation of a sacerdotal caste, as opposed to the evangelical idea of the priesthood; 3. the multiplication of church offices.

As to the first of these particulars, we are in want, it is true, of exact and full information respecting the manner in which the change took place in single cases; but a comprehensive view on grounds of analogy will set the matter in a very clear light. Since the presbyters constituted a deliberative assembly, it would of course soon become the practice for one of their number to preside over the rest. This might be so arranged as to take place by some law of rotation, so that the presidency would thus pass in turn from one to the other. Possibly, in many places, such was the original arrangement. Yet we find no trace, at least in history, of anything of this kind. But neither, as we have already observed, do we, on the other hand, meet with any vestige of a fact which would lead us to infer that the presidency over the presbyterial college was originally distinguished by a special name. However the case may have been, then, as to this point, what we find existing in the second century enables us to infer, respecting the preceding times, that soon after the Apostolic age the standing office of president of the presbytery must have been formed; which president, as having preëminently the oversight over all, was designated by the special name of Ἐπίσκοπος, and thus distinguished from the other presbyters. Thus the name came at length to be applied exclusively to this presbyter, while the name presbyter continued at first to be common to all; for the bishops, as presiding presbyters, had no official character other than that of the presbyters generally. They were only Primi inter pares.[1]

[1] Many of the later fathers still have a right understanding of this process of the matter. Hilar. in ep. I. ad Timoth. c. 3: Omnis episcopus presbyter, non tamen omnis presbyter episcopus; hic enim episcopus est, qui inter presbyteros primus est. Jerome, (146, ad Evangel.) says that it had been the practice in the Alexandrian church, until the times of the bishops Hierocles and Dionysius, in the middle of the third century, for the presbyters to choose one of their own number as a president, and call him bishop. And so also there may be some foundation of truth in the account of Eutychius, though it may not be wholly true, and must be chronologically false. This person, who was patriarch of Alexandria in the first half of the tenth century, relates, that in the Alexandrian church, up to the time of the bishop Alexander, in the beginning of the fourth century, the following arrangement had existed: there was a college of twelve presbyters, one of whom presided over the rest as bishop, and these presbyters always chose their bishop out of their own number, and the other eleven ordained him.

The aristocratic constitution will ever find it easy, by various gradual changes, to pass over to the monarchical; and circumstances where the need becomes felt of guidance by the energy and authority of an individual, will have an influence beyond all things else to bring about such a change. It may have been circumstances of this kind, which, near the times dividing the first and second centuries, tended to give preponderance to a president of the council of elders, and to assign him his distinctive title, as the general overseer. Already, in the latter part of the age of St. Paul, we shall see many things different from what they had been originally; and so it cannot appear strange if other changes came to be introduced into the constitution of the communities, by the altered circumstances of the times immediately succeeding those of St. Paul or St. John. Then ensued those strongly marked oppositions and schisms, those dangers with which the corruptions engendered by manifold foreign elements threatened primitive Christianity.[1] It was these dangers that had called the Apostle John to Asia Minor, and induced him to make this country the seat of his labors. Amidst circumstances so embarrassing, amidst conflicts so severe from within and from without — for then came forth the first edict of Trajan against the Christians — the authority of individual men, distinguished for piety, firmness and activity, would make itself particularly availing, and would be augmented by a necessity become generally apparent. Thus the predominant influence of individuals, who, as moderators over the college of presbyters, were denominated bishops, might spring of itself out of the circumstances of the times in which the Christian communities were multiplied, without any necessity of supposing an *intentional* remodelling of the earlier constitution of the church. In favor of this view is also the manner in which we find the names "presbyter" and "bishop" interchanged for each other until far into the second century. It may be, that as the labors of the Apostle John in Asia Minor had a great influence generally on the succeeding development of the church, such an influence proceeded also from the course he pursued in this matter, that he was induced by the circumstances of the times to entrust to certain individual presbyters in particular, who had made themselves worthy of his special confidence, the care of maintaining pure doctrine, of warding off those threatening dangers, and of keeping an oversight over the whole life of the church amidst those scatterings of the chaff. The tradition current at the end of the second century, respecting individuals who had been placed at the head of communities by the Apostle John and ordained by him as bishops, may have been thence derived. This would be the truth lying at the bottom in this report, and there would be no necessity of inferring from this circumstance that an episcopate was designedly founded by this apostle.[2]

[1] These I have more fully unfolded in my History of the Planting, &c., Vol. II.

[2] There is no evidence to establish any such supposition; for to indefinite traditions the force of evidence cannot be ascribed. In the so called epistles of Ignatius, I perceive, besides that which took its shape without any preconceived design, an evident purpose. As the tradition of Ignatius' journey to Rome, where he was to be thrown to the wild beasts, appears to me, for reasons already alleged, extremely liable to suspicion; so his letters, which presuppose the truth of this story, inspire me

This relation of the bishops to the presbyters, we may observe all along to the end of the second century. It is hence that Irenæus sometimes uses the names "bishop" and "presbyter" as wholly synonymous, and at others, distinguishes the bishops, as presiding officers, from the presbyters.[1] Tertullian also calls the presiding officers of the Christian communities by the common name of Seniores, including under this title both bishops and presbyters;[2] though elsewhere in the writings of this father, the distinction between bishops and presbyters is already decidedly drawn. In many respects, Tertullian may be considered as standing on the boundary line between an old and a new era in the Christian church.

The novel and violent conflicts, internal and external, which the church had to encounter in these and the next succeeding times, might contribute anew to foster the monarchical element in the constitution of the church. Yet as late as the third century, the presbyters still maintained their own footing, as a college of counsellors, at the side of the bishops, and the latter could undertake nothing of importance without calling to their assistance the deliberative assembly of presbyters.[3] When Cyprian, bishop of the church in Carthage, was separated from his community by his flight from persecution, if he had business to transact relating to the interests of the church, he immediately communicated it to his presbyters remaining behind in Carthage, and excused himself to them whenever he was obliged to decide any matter without their assistance. He declares it to be his invariable principle to do nothing on his own responsibility and without their advice.[4] Alluding to the original relation of the bishops to the presbyters, he calls them his *Compresbyteros*. Since then, in the constitution of the church, two elements met together, — the aristocratic and the monarchical, — it could not fail to be the case, that a conflict would ensue between them. The bishops considered themselves as invested with supreme power in the guidance of the church, and would maintain themselves in this authority. The presbyters would not concede to them this authority, and would seek to render themselves again more independent. These struggles between the presbyterial and episcopal systems belong among the most important phenomena connected with the process of the devel-

with as little confidence in their authenticity. That a man with death immediately before him, could have nothing to say more befitting than such things about obedience to the bishops, I cannot well conceive; at least when I transfer myself to the time when these letters profess to have been written. But even supposing the Apostle John did institute the order of bishops, for the purpose of satisfying a necessity of the times, still it would by no means follow, that this was a form of church government, either necessary or beneficial for *all times*.

[1] The two names are used synonymously, (l. IV. 26,) where the successio episcopatus is given to the *presbyteris*. In l. III. 14, he distinguishes them. In the narrative, Acts, 20: 17, where Paul sends for the presbyters of the churches of Asia Minor, Irenæus reckons among them also the bishops, in the view that these latter were no more than presiding elders; in Mileto convocatis episcopis et presbyteris. The confusion spread over the whole subject of the succession of the first Romish bishops may doubtless be owing to the fact, that these names were originally not so distinguished, and hence several might bear at the same time the titles of bishops or presbyters.

[2] Apologet. c. 39: Præsident probati quique *seniores*.

[3] Presbyterium contrahere.

[4] A primordio episcopatus mei statui, nihil sine consilio vestro mea privatim sententia gerere. — Sicut honor mutuus poscit, in commune tractabimus. Pag. 5. ed. Baluz.

opment of church life in the third century. Many presbyters made a capricious use of their power, hurtful to good discipline and order in the communities. Divisions arose, of which we shall speak more particularly hereafter; and out of these troubles, the authority of the bishops, closely united among themselves, came victorious over the presbyters, who opposed them single handed. The energy and activity of a Cyprian contributed in no small measure to further this victory; but it would both be doing injustice to him, and changing the point of view from which the whole matter ought to be contemplated, if we should charge him with having labored from the beginning, on a systematic plan, to elevate the episcopal order; as it is generally true, in matters of this sort, that it hardly lies within the compass of one individual to change the relations of a whole period after some scheme for his own aggrandizement. Cyprian acted, in this case, rather without being conscious of any plan, in the spirit of a whole party and of a tendency belonging to the entire church in his time. He acted as the representative of the episcopal system, whose conflict with the presbyterian church policy had its ground and root in the general process of the development of the church. The contentions of the presbyterian parties with one another might certainly have proved injurious to discipline and good order in the churches; the triumph of the episcopal system undoubtedly promoted their unity, order and tranquillity; but on the other hand, it was unfriendly to the free development of church life, and served, not a little, to encourage the formation of a priesthood, foreign to the essence of the New Testament development of the kingdom of God; while on the other hand, a revolution of sentiment for which the way had already been prepared, an altered view of the idea of the priesthood, had no small influence on the development of the episcopal system. Thus does this change of the original constitution of the Christian communities stand intimately connected with another and still more radical change, — *the formation of a sacerdotal caste in the Christian church.* Without doubt, many changes in church relations might flow of themselves out of the historical course of development, without witnessing of any such revolution in the general apprehension of Christians, or being at all connected with it. Succeeding the time of the first Christian inspiration, of that effusion of the Spirit which made all differences of cultivation retreat more into the back-ground, came a time when the human element assumed more importance in relation to the progressive movement of the church. Differences in the degree of cultivation and of Christian knowledge became more strongly marked; and it might hence happen, that the guidance of church affairs was surrendered more and more to the above mentioned church senate, and the edification of the church by the word more and more confined to those who made themselves preëminent as teachers. But besides what came of itself in the natural course of historical progress, there entered in imperceptibly another idea alien to the Christian principle; an idea which could not fail to bring about a revolution of views, destined to last for ages, and ever to unfold itself in a wider circle from the germ which had once been implanted.

Christianity had sprung to freedom and self-subsistence out of the envelope of Judaism, — had stripped off the forms in which it was first enwrapt, and within which the new spirit lay at first concealed, until by its own inherent power it burst its way through them. This evolution belonged more particularly to the Pauline position, from which proceeded the form of the church in the pagan world. This principle had triumphantly pushed its way through, in the conflict with the Jewish elements which opposed themselves to that free development of Christianity. In the communities of pagan Christians, the new creation stood forth completely unfolded; but the Jewish principle, which had been vanquished, pressed in once more from another quarter. Humanity was as yet incapable of maintaining itself at that lofty position of pure spiritual religion. The Jewish position descended nearer to the mass, which needed first to be trained in order to the apprehension of pure Christianity, — needed to be disaccustomed from paganism. Out of Christianity, now become independent, a principle once more sprang forth, akin to the Old Testament position, — a new *making outward* of the kingdom of God, a new law discipline, destined to serve one day for the training of rude nations, a new tutorship for the spirit of humanity until it should arrive at the maturity of the manly age in Christ. This retrogression of the Christian spirit to a form nearly related to the Old Testament position, could not fail, after the fruitful principle had once made its appearance, to unfold itself more and more, bringing to light, one after another, all the consequences which it involved; but a reaction of the Christian consciousness, striving after freedom, began also, which was ever bursting forth anew in an endless variety of appearances, until it reached its triumph at the Reformation.

While the great principle of the New Testament is the unfolding of the kingdom of God from within, from the union with Christ, brought about after the like *immediate* manner in all, by faith; the readmission of the Old Testament position, in making the kingdom of God outward, went on the assumption that an *outward mediation was necessary* in order to the spread of this kingdom in the world. Such a mediation was to form for the Christian church a priesthood fashioned after the model of that of the Old Testament. The universal priestly character, grounded in that common and immediate relation of all to Christ as the source of the divine life, was repressed, the idea interposing itself of a particular, mediatory priesthood attached to a distinct order. This recasting of the Christian spirit in the Old Testament form did not take place, it is true, every where uniformly alike. Where some Jewish element chiefly predominated, it might very easily grow up out of this;[1] where the Pauline element among the pagan Christians had un-

[1] Thus in the Jewish-Christian apocryphal writing, called the Testament of the twelve Patriarchs, (in the Testament III. of Levi, c. 8,) it is promised of the Messiah, that he should found a new priesthood among the pagan nations; *ποιήσει ἱερατείαν νέαν εἰς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη.* Whether in the letter of Polycrates, bishop of Ephesus, a contemporary of Irenæus, (cited in Euseb. l. V. c. 24,) the Apostle John is denominated *ἱερεὺς τὸ πέταλον πεφορηκώς*, as standing at the head of the government of the church in Asia Minor, may indeed be doubted. The phrase might also be used simply to designate the highest position of the spiritual priesthood in the witnessing of the faith. (See Testament. Levi, c. 8: *πέταλον τῆς πίστεως.*)

folded itself in opposition to the Jewish, still the Christian spirit, grown up to independence, but not being able to maintain itself at this lofty position, by virtue of a relationship springing up in itself with the Jewish position, passed over again to the Jewish. Of such a change which had now taken place in the Christian mode of thinking, we have a witness as early as Tertullian, when he calls the bishop summus sacerdos,[1] a title certainly not invented by him, but which had been adopted from a prevailing mode both of speaking and thinking, in a certain portion at least, of the church. This title presupposes that men had begun already to compare the presbyters with the priests; the deacons, or the spiritual class generally, with the Levites. And so it becomes manifest, how the false comparison of the Christian priesthood with the Jewish must tend once more to advance the elevation of the episcopacy over the presbyterial office. In general, the more men fell back from the evangelical to the Jewish point of view, the more must the original, free constitution of the communities, grounded in those original Christian views, become also changed. We find Cyprian already completely imbued with the notions which sprang out of this confounding together of the different points of view of the Old and New Testaments.

In the names by which at first those who administered church offices were distinguished from the rest of the community, no trace of this confusion might as yet be found. The Latin expression, "ordo," denoted simply the guiding senate of the Christian people, (plebs.) See above. Into the Greek words κλῆρος, κληρικοί, men had introduced, it is true, already in the time of Cyprian, the unevangelical sense of persons preëminently consecrated to God, like the Levites of the Old Testament, men employed on the affairs of religion to the exclusion of all earthly concerns, and who did not gain their living, like others, by worldly employments, but for the very reason that, for the good of others, they lived only in intercourse with God, were supported by the rest, just as the Levites, when the lands were apportioned, received no particular allotment, but were to have God alone for their inheritance, and to receive tithes from the rest for the administration of the public functions of religion, οἱ εἰσιν ὁ κληρος τοῦ θεοῦ, or ὧν ὁ κλῆρος ὁ θεός ἐστι. See Deuteronom. c. 18. This notion of a peculiar people of God, (a κλῆρος τοῦ θεοῦ,) applied distinctively to a particular order of men among the Christians, is now, we must admit, in this sense, something wholly foreign to the original Christian consciousness; for according to this, all Christians should be a people consecrated to God, a κλῆρος τοῦ θεοῦ, and all the employments of their earthly calling should in like manner be sanctified by the temper in which they are discharged. Their whole living and doing, — pointed with one reference to Christ, the great High Priest of humanity, striking root in the consciousness of redemption, and bearing witness of its effects, — should hence become a consecrated thank-offering, and a spiritual worship, (a λογικὴ λατρεία.) This was the original, evangelical idea. It may be questioned, however, whether that other notion, so much at variance with the primitive Christian idea,

[1] De baptismo, c. 17.

was from the first actually associated with the appellation κληρικοί as applied to the clergy. If we trace along the history of its usage, it becomes much more probable, that this sense was brought into the word at some later period, when a change had taken place in the Christian mode of thinking, and the original sense was forgotten. The word κλῆρος signified originally the place which had been allotted to each one in the community by God's providence, or the choice of the people directed by that providence; hence the church officers were particularly denominated κλῆροι, and the persons chosen to them, κληρικοί.[1]

But although the idea of the priesthood, in the purely evangelical sense, grew continually more obscure and was thrust farther into the back-ground, in proportion as that unevangelical point of view became predominant, yet it was too deeply rooted in the very essence of Christianity to be totally suppressed. In the boundary epoch of Tertullian, we still find many very significant proofs that there was a reaction of the primitive Christian consciousness of the universal priesthood and the common rights grounded therein, against the arrogated power of that particular priesthood, which had recently begun to form itself on the model of the Old Testament. Tertullian, in his work on Baptism, written before he went over to Montanism, distinguishes with reference to this matter *divine right* and *human order*. "In itself considered," he says, "the laity also have the right to administer the sacraments and to teach in the community. The word of God and the sacraments were by the grace of God *communicated to all*, and may therefore be communicated *by all Christians* as instruments of the divine grace. But the question here relates not barely to what is permitted in general, but also to what is expedient under existing circumstances. We may here use the words of St. Paul, 'all things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient.' If we look at the order necessary to be maintained in the church, the laity are therefore to exercise their priestly right of administering the sacraments, only when the time and circumstances require it."[2]

Sometimes, in their conflict with the clergy, the laity made good their original priestly rights, as we learn from those words of Tertullian the *Montanist*, where in a certain case he requires the laity, if they would have the same rights with the clergy, to bind themselves to the same

[1] Thus it is made clear, how the more restricted notion of casting lots in these words might be lost, though elsewhere the ἀρχαὶ κληρωταί are opposed to the ἀρχαῖς χειροτονήταις. So at first, in Acts, 1: 17: κλῆρος τῆς διακονίας; in Irenæus III. 3: κληροῦσθαι τὴν ἐπισκοπήν. Clemens Alex. quis dives salv. c. 42, employs κλῆρος and κληροῦν with reciprocal reference to each other. Ignat. ep. Ephes. c. 11: κλῆρος Ἐφεσίων, by which he understands the collective body of Christians in that place. It is true, the Old Testament relations could be found applied to the Christian church in a writer as early as Clemens of Rome, (c. 40;) but assuredly this epistle, as well as that of Ignatius, although not to such a degree, had suffered interpolation from a hierarchical interest. In other passages of the same epistle, we meet, on the contrary, with the freer spirit of the original presbyterial constitution of the church. How simply, without any mixture of hierarchical display, is the appointment of bishops or presbyters, and of deacons, spoken of in the 42d chapter! A disciple of the Apostle Paul, moreover, is the last person whom we should expect to find thus confounding together the points of view peculiar to the Old and to the New Testaments.

[2] De baptismo, c. 17.

duties; and where in a sarcastic tone he says to them:[1] "When we exalt and inflate ourselves against the clergy, then we are all one, we are all priests, since he has made us kings and priests unto God and his Father." Rev. 1: 6.

Although the office of teaching in the church assemblies was confined more and more to the bishops and presbyters, yet we still find many traces of that original equality of the spiritual right among all Christians. Towards the middle of the third century, two bishops in Palestine did not hesitate to allow the learned Origen, although he had as yet received no ordination, to expound the scriptures before their people; and when reproved by Demetrius, bishop of Alexandria, who was strongly inclined to hierarchy, they appealed in their defence to the practice of many bishops of the East who invited competent laymen even to preach the word.[2] In the pretended Apostolic Constitutions themselves, a work otherwise well tinged with the hierarchical spirit, and compiled, indeed, out of a mass of heterogeneous elements, there is yet an ordinance under the name of the Apostle Paul to the following effect,[3] "*If any man, though a layman, is skilful in expounding doctrine, and of venerable manners, he may be allowed to teach, for all should be taught of God.*"

In the early times, those who took upon them church offices in the communities, continued, in all probability, to exercise their former trades and occupations, supporting themselves and their families in the same manner as before. The communities, composed for the most part of poor members, were scarcely in a condition to provide for their presbyters and deacons, especially as they had from the first to meet so many other expenses, in supporting helpless widows, the poor, the sick, and the orphans. It might indeed be, that the presbyters belonged to the richer class in the communities, and this without doubt must have been the case quite often, since their office required, besides other qualifications, a certain worldly education, such as would more likely be found in the higher or middle than in the lower class of the people. When it is required of the presbyters, or bishops, (1 Timothy, 3: 2,) that they should be patterns to other Christians of hospitality also, they must have belonged to the better class, of whom the number was small in the first communities, — and how could such persons be induced to support themselves on the scanty earnings of the poor! The Apostle Paul does, indeed, declare the travelling preachers of the gospel to be warranted to expect, that those for whose spiritual necessities they labored would provide for their bodily wants; but it cannot be hence inferred that the case was the same with those who held church offices in distinct communities. It would be difficult for the former to unite the labors necessary for their own maintenance with the duties of their spiritual calling, although the self-denial of a Paul could make this also possible. The latter, on the other hand, might at the beginning very easily unite the prosecution of their labors for a maintenance with the discharge of their official functions in the church, and the simple way

[1] De monogamia, c. 12. [2] Euseb. l. VI. c. 19. [3] L. VIII. c. 32

of thinking among primitive Christians would find nothing repulsive in such a union; convinced as they were, that every earthly employment could and should be sanctified by the temper with which it was pursued, and knowing that even an apostle had prosecuted a worldly calling in connection with the preaching of the gospel. But when the communities grew larger, and the duties connected with church offices became multiplied; when especially the office of teaching came to be confined chiefly to the presbyters; when the calling of the spiritual class, if rightly discharged, required all their time and activity, it was often no longer possible for them to provide, at the same time, for their own support;—and besides, the wealthier communities were now in a condition to maintain them. Of the common fund which was raised from the voluntary contributions of each member of the community, at each service on the Lord's day, or, as in the North African church, on every first Sunday of the month,[1] a part was appropriated for the maintenance of the clergy. It was now attempted from design, to separate the clergy entirely from all worldly employments; and in the third century, they were already strictly forbidden to undertake any such business, even a wardship.[2] Without doubt, this ordinance might have a very good reason, and a very salutary end, namely, to prevent the clergy from forgetting their spiritual calling in the business of the world. We see from Cyprian's book de Lapsis,[3] how extensively even then, during long periods of tranquillity, the spirit of the world had found its way among the bishops, who, immersed in secular business, neglected their spiritual concerns and the interests of their communities. But there was assuredly some other cause also which operated to bring about a change of views whereby the administration of a church office came to be regarded as something which could not possibly be united with worldly employments, and the clergy deemed themselves bound to keep aloof from them.

When the idea of the universal Christian priesthood retired to the back-ground, that of the priestly consecration which all Christians should make of their entire life, went along with it. As men had distinguished, in a way contradictory to the original Christian consciousness, a particular priesthood from the universal and ordinary calling of all Christians; so now they set over against each other a spiritual and a secular province of life and action; notwithstanding Christ had raised the *entire* earthly life to the dignity of a spiritual life. And from this view of the matter, it was deemed necessary to forbid the priestly,

[1] The divisiones mensuræ, as salaries for the clergy in this church, answer to the monthly collections.

[2] Cyprian. ep. 66, to the community at Furnæ.

[3] Also from the Instructiones of his contemporary, Commodianus, c. 69: Redditur in culpa pastor sæcularia servans, (who gives himself up to secular business;) and from Can. 18 of the council of Elvira, (Illiberis,) in the year 305: Episcopi, presbyteri et diaconi de locis suis negotiandi causa non discedant, nec circumeuntes provincias quæstuosas nundinas sectentur. Yet even here it is still supposed that they may in many cases be obliged so to do, "ad victum sibi conquirendum," where, perhaps, though they had a salary, they yet received no pay in *money*. But in these cases they were to conduct their business by the agency of a son, a freed man, or some person hired for the purpose, and never beyond the bounds of their own province.

consecrated clergy, all contact with the world and the things of the world. Thus we have here the germ out of which sprang at length the whole medieval priesthood and the laws of celibacy. But by this outward holding at a distance of secular things, the worldly sense could not be charmed away from the clergy, nor the sense for divine things awakened in them. This external renunciation of the world might be the means of introducing into the heart a spiritual pride, hiding the worldly sense under this mask. Cyprian quotes 2 Timoth. 2 : 4, as warranting the prohibition given in the above mentioned letter.[1] But he could not remain ignorant of what, at this particular time, when the universal Christian calling was commonly regarded as a militia Christi, must have immediately suggested itself to every one, that these words applied to all Christians, who, as soldiers of Christ, were bound to perform their duty faithfully, and to guard against every foreign and worldly thing which might hinder them in their warfare. Acknowledging and presupposing this himself, he concludes, "Since this is said of all Christians, how much more should they keep themselves clear of being involved in worldly matters, who, engrossed with divine and spiritual things, ought never to turn aside from the church, nor have time for earthly and secular employments." The clergy, then, were, in following that apostolic rule, only to shine forth as patterns for all others, by avoiding what was foreign to their vocation, what might turn them from the faithful discharge of it. But still that false opposition between the worldly and the spiritual, which we have before described, found here also a point of attachment.

In respect to the election to church offices, the ancient principle was still adhered to, that the consent of the community was necessary to the validity of every such election, and each one was at liberty to offer reasons against it. The emperor Alexander Severus was aware of this regulation in the Christian church, and referred to it when he was wishing to introduce a similar practice in the appointment to civil offices in the provinces.[2] When the bishop Cyprian of Carthage, while separated from his community by the persecution, proceeded to nominate to church offices, individuals about his person, who had distinguished themselves in the trials of the time, he excused this arbitrary procedure, to which necessity compelled him, both to the laity and to the clergy, writing to them as follows:[3] "We are used to call you together for counsel whenever any are to be consecrated to sacred offices, and to weigh the character and claims of each candidate in common deliberation."

The same principle was also observed in the appointment to the episcopal office. It was in the third century a prevailing custom, which Cyprian therefore derived from apostolic tradition, for the bishops

[1] Ep. 66.

[2] Æl. Lamprid. vit. c. 45: Grave esse, cum id Christiani et *Judæi*, (a customary form then of choosing presiding officers even among the Jews.) facerent in prædicandis sacerdotibus, qui ordinandi sunt, non fieri in provinciarum rectoribus, quibus et fortunæ hominum committerentur et capita. From which language it is also apparent, how far the man who so expressed himself, was from doing homage to the Christian church, though he acknowledged something divine in Christianity.

[3] Ep. 33.

of the province, in connection with the clergy, to proceed to fill the vacant church in the presence of the community, who were witnesses of the conduct of each individual on whom the choice might fall, and could therefore give the safest testimony of his character. Cyprian conceded to the community the right of choosing worthy bishops, or of rejecting unworthy ones.[1] This conceded right of approving or rejecting, was not a mere formality. Sometimes it happened, that before the usual arrangements for an election could be made, a bishop was proclaimed by the voice of the community. Thus there might possibly be a difference between the will of the community and that of the majority of the clergy, — the source of many divisions.

In other concerns of the community also, the participation of the laity was not yet wholly excluded. Cyprian declared that it had been his resolution, from the commencement of his episcopal administration, to do nothing without the consent of the community.[2] An affair of this kind which belonged to the general interests of the community, was the restoration to the fellowship of the church of a fallen brother; and the examination connected *with this proceeding* was to be conducted with the assistance of the whole community of Christians; for in Cyprian's judgment, this respect was due to the faith of those who had stood firm through the trials of persecution.[3] Besides, there were individuals, not belonging to the clerical order, who still, on account of the respect which they personally enjoyed, had obtained an influence over the management of church affairs, which even the clergy found it difficult to oppose. Such were those heroes of the faith, the confessors, who in the face of tortures and death, or under the actual suffering of torture, had laid down their testimony before pagan magistrates. We shall hereafter, in speaking of the schisms of the church, have occasion to consider more particularly the extent of their influence.

The *third*, less important change in the constitution of the church related to the multiplication of church offices. This was in part rendered necessary by the growth of the communities, and the accumulation of business on the hands of the deacons, from whose office many things had to be taken away; in part, new matters of business in the churches of large capital towns, required new offices for their proper discharge; in part, the new notions respecting the dignity of the clerus, led men to believe that what had hitherto been regarded as the free gift of the Spirit to all or to individual Christians, must be confined to a particular office in the service of the church. It is clear from what has been said, that none of these changes, which were conditioned partly by local circumstances, should be considered universal ones. The new church offices were as follows: after the deacons, followed the

[1] Cyprian, in the name of a synod, to the communities at Lyons and Astorga, ep. 68: Apostolica observatione servandum est, quod apud nos quoque et fere per provincias universas tenetur, ut ad ordinationes rite celebrandas, ad eam plebem, cui præpositus ordinatur, episcopi ejusdem provinciæ proximi quique conveniant, et episcopus deligatur plebe præsente, quæ singulorum vitam plenissime novit et uniuscujusque actum de ejus conversatione perspexit.

[2] Nihil sine consensu plebis gerere. Ep. 5.

[3] Præsente etiam stantium plebe, quibus et ipsis pro fide et timore suo honor habendus est. Ep. 13.

sub-deacons, collateral officers to the former in administering the outward concerns of the church; then, the lectores (ἀνάγνωσται,) who read the scriptures before the assembled community, and also had the care of the biblical manuscripts used on these occasions, — a duty performed at first, probably, by the presbyters themselves, or by the deacons, as in later times the reading of the scriptures, particularly the *gospels*, still continued to be left to the deacons in many churches; — next, the acolytes (ἀκόλουθοι, acolythi) who, as the name indicates, waited on the bishops while discharging their official functions; the exorcistæ, who made prayer over those who were supposed to be possessed of evil spirits, (the energumeni;) finally, the θυρωροὶ, πυλωροὶ, ostiarii, whose business it was to attend to such outward matters as the cleanliness and good order, the opening and closing, of the places of public worship.

The office of church reader is, perhaps, the oldest among these. It is mentioned as early as the second century by Tertullian.[1] The others are noticed collectively not till about the middle of the third century, and indeed the whole of them for the first time, in a letter of the Roman bishop Cornelius, cited by Eusebius.[2] The office of acolyte had its origin most probably in the hierarchical assumptions of the Roman church. It did not find its way into the Greek church. The Greek name of the office is not inconsistent with this view of its origin; for the Greek language was in frequent use at Rome, and many of the Roman bishops were of Grecian extraction. As regards the office of exorcist, the end to be accomplished by it had, originally, been considered a work of the Holy Spirit confined to no outward institution, — whether it was supposed that any Christian might be employed as the instrument, who called on the name of Christ with believing confidence in him as having overcome the power of evil, or whether it was regarded as a spiritual gift peculiar to individuals. Now, the free working of the Spirit was to be confined to a formal, mechanical process. The spirit of the ancient church, preserved for a longer time in the East,[3] was rightly expressed, on the other hand, by the Apostolic constitutions; "An exorcist cannot be chosen, for it is the gift of free grace."[4]

We now leave the general constitution of the communities, and proceed to the forms of union by which the individual communities were bound together.

Forms of union by which the individual communities were bound together.

With the inner fellowship, Christianity produced among its professors from the first a living outward union, whereby the distantly separated

[1] Præscript. hæret. c. 41.

[2] L. VI. c. 43.

[3] In the letter of Firmilianus, bishop of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, (Cyprian. ep. 75,) mention is made of the church exorcists. But Origen describes this sort of influence as something that was not confined to any determinate office, but wholly free. He considers the influence as a thing depending on the subjective piety of the individual that exercises it, in Matth. T. XIII. § 7: Εἶποτε δέοι περὶ θεραπείαν ἀσχολεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς τοιοῦτόν τι πεπονθότος τινὸς, μὴ ὁρκίζωμεν, μηδὲ ἐπερωτῶμεν, μηδὲ λαλῶμεν ὡς ἀκούοντι τῷ ἀκαθάρτῳ πνεύματι, ἀλλὰ σχολάζοντες προσευχῇ καὶ νηστείᾳ, ἐπιτύχωμεν προσευχόμενοι περὶ τοῦ πεπονθότος.

[4] L. VIII. c. 26: Οὐ χειροτονεῖται, εὐνοίας γὰρ ἑκουσίου τὸ ἔπαθλον, καὶ χάριτι θεοῦ διὰ Χριστοῦ.

were brought near to each other. This union must be realized in a determinate form, which latter was conditioned by the existing forms of social life under which Christianity first unfolded itself in the Roman empire. A system of fraternal equality in the relations of the communities to each other, would, independent of these determinate circumstances, have answered best to the spirit of Christianity, and been most promotive of its free, uncorrupted manifestation. But those circumstances soon gave rise to a system of subordination in the mutual relation of the communities to each other. This system, as well as every other social form which had sprung out of the historical development of the race and contained nothing sinful, Christianity could appropriate to itself. Yet, since this relation was not sufficiently interpenetrated with the free and free-making spirit of the gospel, it operated, by its undue preponderance, to check and interrupt the development of Christian doctrine and of church life.

We have observed already, that in many districts, Christianity very early made progress in the open country. Now wherever this was the case, and the Christians in a village or country town were in sufficient numbers to form a separate community, it was the most natural course for these to choose at once their own presiding officers, presbyters or bishops, who were quite as independent as the presiding officers of the city churches. In these first centuries themselves, it is indeed impossible, from the want of authentic records of so early a period, to point out any particular example of this kind; but in the fourth century we find, in many districts of the East, country bishops, as they are called, (χωρεπισκόπους,) who, beyond doubt, might trace back their origin to the oldest times; for in the later period, when the church system of subordination had become established, and the country churches were now accustomed to receive their presiding officers from the city, it is certain that no such relation *could have arisen;* on the contrary, the country bishops, wherever they yet existed, must have entered into a struggle with those of the city, for the *preservation of their independence.* But the more common case, as we have likewise already remarked, was for Christianity to be diffused from the city into the country; and while the Christians in the immediate neighborhood of the cities were still few in number, they would most naturally repair on the Lord's day to the city to join in public worship with the assemblies there convened. But in process of time, when their number was so increased as to enable them to form a community of their own, they applied to the bishop of the city church with which they had been connected, to set over them a presbyter, who consequently remained ever after subordinate to the city bishop. Thus arose the first greater church union between city and country communities, which together formed one whole.[1] In the larger cities it might now have become necessary also to separate the city communities themselves into several divisions; as in Rome, where, according to the report of the Roman bishop Cornelius, already referred

[1] The presbyters ot whom Cyprian, at his examination before the proconsul, said, invenientur in civitatibus suis, were such presiding officers of country communities

to, there were in his time six and forty presbyters; though the statement of Optatus of Mileve, that Rome contained, in the beginning of the fourth century, more than forty churches, is an exaggeration. Yet in this case, distinct and subordinate filial communities were not always formed by the side of the one episcopal Head and Mother church; but more often, the community remained united as a whole; and only on Sundays and feast days, when *one* church was insufficient to accommodate all the members, they were divided into several churches, where the different presbyters, according to a certain rotation, conducted the public worship. But it must be admitted, that with regard to the early shaping of these incipient relations, nothing can be decided with certainty, and in default of immediate information on the subject, we can only infer respecting the past from what we find to have been the case in the succeeding times.

Again, as Christianity was diffused, for the most part, from the cities into the country, so, as a general thing, it spread from the principal cities (*μητροπόλεις*) to the other provincial towns. Now as these latter were politically subordinate to the former, a close bond of union and subordinate relation were gradually formed between the communities of the provincial towns and those of the principal city or metropolis. The churches of a province constituted a whole, at the head of which stood the church of the metropolis. The bishop of this became in relation to the other bishops of the province, Primus inter pares. Yet owing to local causes, this relation did not every where unfold itself in the same way, and in this period was limited, for the most part, to the East.

A like relation to that between these metropolitan cities and the provincial towns, existed between the capitals of the larger divisions of the Roman empire, — as seats of government, channels of commerce and of all intercourse, — and the latter. It was from such larger capitals, Christianity was diffused through entire sections of the vast empire; it was here the apostles themselves had founded churches, appointed over them their presiding officers, and orally preached the gospel; and to the churches here established they had written their epistles. Hence, these churches, which went under the name of ecclesiæ, sedes apostolicæ, matrices ecclesiæ, were held in peculiar veneration. When a controversy arose with regard to any regulation or doctrine of the church, it was the first inquiry, how is the matter regarded in these communities, where the principles taught on the spot by the apostles themselves, have been faithfully preserved from one generation to another? Such ecclesiæ apostolicæ were especially Rome, Antioch, Alexandria, Ephesus, Corinth.

But all this, which held good of all the churches in the *great* capital cities, might be applied in a preëminent sense to the church of Rome, the great capital of the world. The legend that Peter, as well as Paul, died as a martyr at Rome, is not raised, it is true, beyond all doubt; but assuredly it is older than the effort to glorify the Roman church through the primacy of the Apostle Peter, its founder. From many other causes; from the eagerness to confute the Jews and Gnostics, who

endeavored to make out a difference between these two great apostles, by showing that they were united even to a common martyrdom in the capital of the world; from the stories of the contest between St. Peter and Simon Magus, the origin of such a legend would admit of being more easily explained. But these reasons surely are not sufficient to warrant us in absolutely denying its truth, when so high antiquity speaks in favor of it; and many difficulties which present themselves in relation to the concatenation of events, may have their ground in our defective historical information.[1] (At all events, the universally diffused belief, that these two great apostles had taught in the Roman church, and honored it by their martyrdom, contributed to promote its authority.) From Rome, the larger portion of the West had received the gospel; from Rome, the common interests of Christianity, through the whole extent of the Roman empire, could best be advanced. The Roman bishops, heads of the wealthiest community, were early distinguished and known in the most distant lands, for their liberal benefactions to the Christian brethren;[2] and a common interest bound all the communities of the Roman empire to the church of the great capital. In Rome was the ecclesia apostolica to which the largest portion of the West could appeal as to their common mother. In general, whatever transpired in this "apostolic church" could not fail to be well known to all; for here Christians were continually pouring in from all quarters of the world. So Irenæus, who wrote in Gaul, appeals, — as he does also occasionally to other apostolic churches, — in one passage particularly to the ecclesia apostolica in Rome, as the greatest, the oldest, (which must be doubted,) the universally known, the church founded by the two most illustrious apostles, where Christians congregate from the communities of the whole world, and could not fail to learn the doctrine taught by the Apostles.[3]

[1] Comp. the new inquiry into this matter in the 3d edition of my History of the Planting, &c., p. 516, et seq.

[2] Euseb. l. IV. c. 23.

[3] L. III. c. 3. According to the ancient Latin translation, the original Greek text being unfortunately lost: "Ad hanc ecclesiam, propter potiorem principalitatem, necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam, hoc est, eos qui sunt undique fideles, in qua semper ab his, qui sunt undique, conservata est ea, quæ est ab apostolis traditio." If the word convenire is taken in the intellectual sense, — all churches must *agree* with the Roman church, as the one having preëminence over the rest, — we have a meaning which is by no means perfectly natural, and which scarcely in the least degree coincides with the circle of ideas elsewhere exhibited in Irenæus. What would be meant by saying, the communities of the whole world have preserved in the Roman church the apostolic tradition? It would be understood only in some such way as this; that the Roman church was the central and representative point of all the Christian churches; as if, — what was said in later times, — the whole church was contained *virtualiter* in the Roman; an idea of which not the least trace is to be found in Irenæus, and a mode of expression foreign to this whole period. If the passage is really to be understood in this way, we could not avoid the suspicion, that here was one of the interpolations, of which so many indications are to be observed in this writer. But although it is impossible to decide with perfect certainty as to the right interpretation of these words, because we have not the original Greek yet there are other ways of explaining them, which agree more completely with Irenæus' mode of thinking as elsewhere exhibited, and with the connection in this place. In the first place, I must state that I cannot approve of the interpretation proposed by the Licenciate Thiersch in the Studien und Kritiken, J. 1842, 2tes Heft, S. 527, by which, we may admit, all difficulties would be removed. According to that exposition, the phrase ' in qua," "ἐν ᾗ," should refer, not to the more remote subject, "hanc ecclesiam," but to that which stands nearer,

Moreover, by means of letters, and Christian brethren who were travelling, a mutual correspondence was maintained between the most distant churches in the Roman empire. When a Christian entered a foreign city, his first inquiry was for the church; and here he was received as a brother, and supplied with whatever could contribute to his spiritual and to his bodily refreshment. But as deceivers, informers, false teachers seeking only to gain more followers for their peculiar opinions, abused the confidence and charity of the Christians, it became necessary to adopt precautionary measures to prevent the manifold evils which might in this way arise. The regulation was therefore adopted, that in foreign churches those travelling Christians only should be received as Christian brethren, who could produce a certificate from the bishop of the community to which they belonged. These church letters, — which were as tessaræ hospitales, whereby Christians from every quarter of the world stood in fraternal union with each other, — received the name of epistolæ or literæ formatæ; (*γράμματα τετυπωμένα*,) because, to guard against counterfeits, they were drawn up after a certain form; (forma, *τύπος*;)[1] and also "epistolæ communicatoriæ,"

"omnem ecclesiam," as determining this antecedent, — every church in which the doctrine has been preserved pure, as the author himself explains: "Dummodo ne in ea per hæreticos ipsos traditionis puritas inquinata sit, sive, ut Irenæi verbis utar, dummodo in ea a fidelibus cujusvis sint loci pure conservata sit tradita ab Apostolis veritas." But this exposition seems to me attended with an insurmountable difficulty already, in the interposed sentence, "hoc est eos," etc. If Irenæus intended any such determination of ecclesia, he would certainly have affixed it immediately to the word ecclesiam. And after all, it is most natural to refer the relative to the Roman church as the principal subject. But now the question arises, to what Greek word does the term "convenire" correspond; whether to *συμβαίνειν*, as Dr. Gieseler, and agreeing with him, Dr. Nitzsch, in his letter to Delbrück and Licenciate Thiersch, in the treatise above cited, suppose, or to *συνέρχεσθαι*. If the latter is the word, by *coming* must be understood a coming to that place in person, and the passage would have to be explained thus: On account of the rank which this church maintains as the ecclesia urbis, all churches, that is, believers from all countries must, — the "must" lies in the nature of the case, — come together there; and since now from the beginning, Christians from all countries must come together there, it follows that the apostolic tradition has been preserved from generation to generation by the Christians from all countries of the world, who are there united together. Every deviation from it would here fall immediately under the observation of all. As confirmatory of this interpretation, might be cited what Athenæus says of the *city* of Rome, (Deipnosoph. l. 1, § 36:) "'Οικουμένης δῆμον τὴν Ῥώμην, τὴν Ῥώμην πόλιν ἐπιτομὴν τῆς οἰκουμένης, ἐν ᾗ συνιδεῖν ἐστιν οὕτως πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἱδρυμένας." So might one say: Ἐν τῇ Ῥωμαίων ἐκκλησίᾳ πάσας ἐκκλησίας ἱδρυμένας." Yet I will not deny the difficulty attending the interpretation of the second sentence; to the alteration of conservata into observata, I can no longer agree. If we consider *συμβαίνειν* to be the word which answers to "convenire," it would be the best way, with Gieseler, to suppose an error of translation, — that the translator, out of mistake, rendered the Greek dative into "ab his." The words would have to be understood thus: "in which church the apostolic tradition has *ever* been preserved *for* the Christians of all countries of the world." I cannot deny, that in the comparison of these words with those at the beginning of the same chapter, "in omni ecclesia adest respicere omnibus," an argument may be found in favor of the sense just given. But even according to this interpretation, the same general view of Rome as that contained in the passage from Athenæus, would lie at the basis of the whole. I think it will be unnecessary for me to remark here, that I am very far from being influenced in this investigation by any protestant interest. At the position where a scientific understanding of the historical development of Christianity is aimed at, the interests of Protestantism, which I profess, could not be in the least endangered by recognizing a high antiquity of the Catholic element, both in general and in particular.

[1] How very necessary it was to guard against the falsification of such church let

(*γράμματα κοινωνικά,*) inasmuch as they indicated as well that the bearers were in the fellowship of the church, as that the bishops who mutually sent and received such letters, were united together in the bonds of church fellowship. By degrees the church letters (epistolæ clericæ) were divided into different classes, according to the different objects for which they were written.

It was remarked above, that a closer bond of union existed in the early times between communities belonging to the same province. We may add as another effect of the catholic spirit of Christianity, that in all cases of emergency, in disputes respecting matters of doctrine, of church life, of church discipline, common deliberations were frequently held by deputed members from these communities. Such assemblies become known to us in the controversies respecting the time of Easter, and in the discussions on the Montanistic prophecies, towards the close of the second century. But as a permanent and regular institution, bound to stated seasons, these provincial synods first make their appearance at the end of the second or beginning of the third century; and then, as a peculiar practice of a single district, where local causes may have led to an arrangement of this kind, earlier than in other countries. This district was *Greece proper*, where, from the time of the Achæan league, the spirit of confederacy had been still preserved; and as Christianity could attach itself to all national peculiarities, so far as they contained in them nothing immoral; nay, become so merged in them as to manifest itself under their peculiar form; it might well happen, that the *civil* spirit of federation, already existing here, passed over to the *ecclesiastical*, and gave to the latter, still earlier than in other countries, a form which was in fact well suited for the common deliberations of the Christians; — so that out of the representative assemblies of the city communities, — the Amphictyonic councils, — sprung the representative assemblies of the church communities, — the provincial synods. As the Christians, in the consciousness that they were nothing and could do nothing without the Spirit from on High, were used to begin every important business with prayer, so also at the opening of these assemblies, they prepared themselves for the public deliberations by uniting in prayer to Him who had promised to enlighten and guide by his Spirit his faithful disciples, when they cast themselves wholly on him, and to be in the midst of them wherever they were assembled in his name.[1]

It seems that this regular institution was at first objected to as an innovation, so that Tertullian felt himself called upon to stand forth as its advocate.[2] Yet the prevailing spirit of the church decided in favor of the arrangement, and to the middle of the third century, the annual provincial synods appear to have been universal, — if we may judge

ters, may be seen from a passage in Eusebius, l. IV. c. 23, and another in Cyprian, ep. 3.

[1] See the passage of Tertullian, in a work written at the beginning of the third century, (de jejuniis, c. 13:) Aguntur per Græcias illa *certis in locis* concilia, ex universis ecclesiis, per quæ et altiora quæque in commune tractantur, et ipsa *repræsentatio* totius nominis Christiani magna veneratione celebratur.

[2] Ista solennia, quibus tunc præsens patrocinatus est sermo.

from the fact, that we find them observed at the same time in parts of the church so widely remote from each other as Northern Africa and Cappadocia.[1]

These provincial synods *might*, beyond a doubt, have proved eminently salutary in unfolding and purifying the Christian and church life, and indeed did prove so in many respects. In these common deliberations, the views of different individuals might mutually correct each others' errors and supply each others' defects; wants, abuses, and necessary reforms might be discussed more easily and under more different points of view; and the communicated experience of each member, made available to all. Certainly also, it savored neither of fanaticism nor hierarchical arrogance, if the delegates and presiding officers of the communities, in the consciousness that they were assembled in the name of Christ, confidently relied on the guidance of his Spirit, whose organs alone they wished to be.

But this confidence, in itself so right and so salutary, took a false and mischievous direction, when it ceased to be accompanied by a spirit of humility and self-renunciation, by the constantly living consciousness of the condition to which Christ had attached that promise, that Christians should be assembled *in his name*. When, unmindful of this condition, the bishops believed they were entitled merely as bishops to rely on the illumination of the Holy Spirit, a confidence so ungrounded became the source of all the self-deception of spiritual pride, that expressed itself in the customary words with which the decrees of such synods were made known, "under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit,"—"spiritæ sancto suggerente."

The provincial synods, again, must have operated as a check on the development of the church, when, instead of providing for the interests of the communities according to the varying wants of each point of time, they sought to bind mutable things to unchangeable laws. Finally, it was an evil, that the communities were excluded from all participation in these assemblies; that at length the bishops came to constitute the sole power in them, and by the union which these synods enabled them to enter into with one another, made themselves more powerful every day.

As the provincial synods were used to communicate their decisions on all important matters of common interest to distant bishops, they thus served, at the same time, to place the distantly separated portions of the church in living union with each other, and to preserve them in this connection.

Union of the entire Church in one whole, closely connected and interdependent in all its parts. Outward unity of the Catholic Church, and its Mode of Representation.

Thus from the unapparent grain of mustard seed, sown in the field of the world, sprung up a tree, towering above all the plants of

[1] Cyprian, ep. 40, and Firmilianus of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, in Cyprian, ep. 75: Necessario apud nos fit, ut per singulos annos seniores et præpositi in unum convenia mus, ad disponenda ea, quæ curæ nostræ commissa sunt.

the earth, and spreading its branches in every direction. Such was that great unity of the catholic church, which, closely connected through all its scattered parts, was so distinguished in its origin, its course of development, and its constitution, from all barely human institutions. The consciousness of being a member of such a body, that had come off victorious over all opposition of earthly power, and was destined for perpetuity, must have been felt with the more liveliness and power by pagans, inasmuch as they had been familiar only with the political and earthly bond of union, but never had a presentiment of such a spiritual and moral tie binding men together as members of the same heavenly community. Still stronger and more elevated must this consciousness have become in times of persecution, when outward force tried in vain to sunder this connection. With good right might the Christians attach importance even to this unity in its outward manifestation, even to this intimate external connection, as serving to represent that higher life, in the fellowship of which all were as one, and to exhibit the unity of the kingdom of God. In this outward fellowship of the church life, they experienced the blessed effects of the inward fellowship of God's invisible kingdom; and to preserve this unity entire, they entered into conflict with two different parties,— those idealistic sects, which threatened to sever the inward bond of fellowship itself,— the bond of faith; to introduce into the Christian church the old distinction between a religion for the educated and refined, and a popular faith, (πίστις and γνῶσις,) and, as was justly charged upon them by Clement of Alexandria, to divide up the church into a multitude of Theosophic schools;[1] and next, those men who, blinded by self-will or passion, brought in divisions on the ground of mere outward differences, while in faith they continued to agree with the rest.

But the conflict arising out of a genuine Christian interest, and aimed against some one-sided subjective element that threatened to dissolve this wholesome unity of the church, might easily mislead to another extreme, — an undue estimation of externals, — of the existing church forms, with which at first this unity was closely knit. Since that outward unity was, beyond all doubt, not barely outward, but the image and expression of the unity within, and in this connection exhibited itself to the Christian consciousness and experience; men could the more easily suffer themselves, in this polemic attitude, to be so misled as to confound, in their conceptions, things which had been fused together in each one's feelings and experience, and to consider them as inseparably connected. Thus the conception of the church and its necessary unity was thrown outward (veräusserlichte sich.) This outward church became the original one for the religious consciousness; and, in this its outward form, the only possible medium of fellowship with Christ. That which in all should, in like manner, have formed itself outwardly from within, was transferred to this fellowship, mediated by means of a determinate outward organism, in certain visible forms, — and so the inner and the outward, the invisible and the visible,

[1] For the words of Clemens see St. l. VII. p. 755: Αὐχοῦσι προίστασθαι διατριβῆς ἀλλον ἢ ἐκκλησίας

inseparably fused together. This association of the Christian consciousness we may perceive already in a writer as early as Irenæus, who defines, in the first place, the conception of the church subsisting under this determinate form of constitution, and then puts down the communion of the Holy Spirit as something first derived from, and mediated by, the former, when he begins by saying, "Ubi ecclesia, ibi et Spiritus Dei," and then first adds, "et ubi Spiritus Dei, illic ecclesia."[1] An entirely different apprehension of the idea of the church and its necessary unity would have presented itself, by reversing the order of these propositions. "It is only at the breast of the church," as Irenæus says, "that one can be nursed to life. He who takes not refuge in the church, cannot partake of the Holy Spirit. He who separates himself from this church, renounces the fellowship of the Holy Spirit." Such are the propositions grounded in that association of ideas. It is true, Irenæus has in his mind simply such opponents of the church as, by unchristian doctrine and temper, by selfish interests, had excluded *themselves* from the fellowship of the divine life.[2] Not without good and sufficient reason could he complain of those "who, from frivolous causes, divided, and, so far as in them lay, annihilated, the great and glorious body of Christ."[3] With great truth, doubtless, could he say of them, that it was utterly out of their power to occasion as much good, as they had done evil through the divisions excited by their means. But the position held by Irenæus might easily lead to the mistake of imputing a bad temper and purpose to *all* those who, from whatever tendency, occasioned a reaction against the dominant church system, excited some movement or other in the church, and hence, divisions. Now as that which distinguishes the New Testament position from the Old, is the outward development of the kingdom of God from within man's spirit, so we may recognize in this *making outward* of the kingdom of God, in this notion of the outward church as an indispensable mediation, that same confounding together of the Old and New Testament positions, which we were forced to recognize before, in the notions of the priesthood and of the Clerus. Indeed, both are necessarily connected; for the existence and propagation of the church was, in fact, to depend on the priesthood; and its connection with Christ was to be mediated through the latter. To the priesthood was added afterwards the episcopal system, as the outward mediation and foundation of the outward church unity, — a new step in the progress of Theocracy made outward, whose deep-reaching consequences must ever go on unfolding themselves more widely.

In bringing the episcopal system to its completion, we have seen the important part acted by Cyprian, bishop of Carthage. Not *less* important was his agency in this process of converting the church into an outward system of mediation, and confounding together the Old and New Testament positions generally. In this regard, his work, De uni-

[1] L. III. c. 24, § 1.

[2] Semetipsos fraudant a vita per sententiam malam et operationem pessimam.

[3] L. IV c. 33, § 7: Διὰ μικρὰς καὶ τυχούσας αἰτίας τὸ μέγα καὶ ἔνδοξον σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ τέμνοντας καὶ διαιροῦντας, καὶ ὅσον τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἀναιροῦντας.

tate ecclesiæ, written after the middle of the third century, amidst the divisions with which he had to contend, constitutes an epoch. This book contains a remarkable mixture of the true with the false, arising from that outward view of the church; and we shall recognize, in much that he says, only the pure expression of the Christian consciousness, when we strip away from it that outward notion, and understand it after a more inward sense; when we apply to the propositions he lays down the distinction of the visible and the invisible church. We shall then find in this work much that is true, directed against a self-seeking, insulating tendency, that breaks loose from all connection with the fellowship of life, of which the foundation is Christ. We need only to apply what he says of the outward relation to a determinate visible form of manifestation of the church, to that inner relation to the community of holy men subsisting in union with Christ its head, whence the divine life flows forth to the collective body of all the members, which community, we must admit, is not necessarily confined to any determinate form of constitution. "Try to pluck away his beams from the sun," says Cyprian, "the unity of the light cannot be so divided asunder. Break away the twig from the tree, it cannot produce fruit. Cut off the stream from its fountain, it becomes dry. Just so the church, interpenetrated by the light of the Lord, sends its rays through the whole world. Yet the light which is thus diffused in all directions, is *one*. In the lap of that church we were born; we are nourished by its milk, and quickened by its spirit. Whatever breaks itself off from the original stock, when thus apart by itself, cannot breathe and live." But all this, which is in itself true, Cyprian referred exclusively to the determinate church, connected, — by means of the bishops, its foundation pillars, as the successors of the apostles and inheritors of their spiritual power, — with these apostles, and through them with Christ. His chain of ideas is this: Christ communicated to the apostles, the apostles to the bishops by ordination,[1] the power of the Holy Ghost; by the succession of bishops, the power of the Holy Ghost, whence alone all religious acts can receive their efficacy, is extended, through the channel of this outward transmission, to all times. Thus is preserved, in this organism of the church, ever unfolding itself with a living progression, that divine life, which, flowing from the fountain-head through this point of mediation, is thus distributed to all the members united with the organic whole; and whoever breaks off his outward connection with this outward organism, does, by so doing, exclude himself from participating in that divine life and from the way to salvation. No one, by himself alone, can, by faith in the Saviour, have any share in the divine life that flows from him; no one can, by this faith alone, secure to himself all the blessings of God's kingdom; but all this remains necessarily mediated through these organs and the connection with them, — the connection with the catholic church derived from Christ through the succession of bishops.

This outward view of the church, however, where it had progressed

[1] See on its original form and significancy, my History of the Planting, etc. Vol. I. p. 213

so far, called forth a reaction, in the effort after a more spiritual understanding of its idea, based on the words of Christ himself. A class of persons, perhaps laymen,[1] arose in opposition to Cyprian, who appealed to the promise of Christ, that "where two or three were gathered together in his name, there he would be in the midst of them;" (Matth. xviii. 20;) every association of true believers, then, was a church. But Cyprian styled such as urged this objection, corruptors of the gospel. He accused them of rending these words from their connection, and hence giving them a false explanation. He maintained, on the other hand, that Christ had just before established harmony among believers, the union of hearts in love, as the condition to which the fulfilment of this promise was annexed. He then proceeded to argue;[2] "But how is it possible for that person to agree with any individual, who does not agree with the body of the church itself? How can two or three be assembled in the name of Christ, who are separated from Christ and his gospel?" He looks in vain for the fulfilment of the condition of this promise in men, who, from leaning to the side of their own opinions, had separated themselves from the church; for *they* were the authors of the schism, — the church had not separated itself from them.[3] But who is the infallible judge of men's inward disposition, so as to infer with certainty from their outward conduct towards a church, not always free from blemish, that such a temper exists; where ignorance and misapprehension are quite possible, and right and wrong, in the struggle between the parties, *may be* on both sides?

The church once conceived as wholly outward, it must also be conceived as having a necessary *outward unity;* and this principle established, it came next to be thought necessary to settle on some outward representation of this outward unity, at some one determinate point. This was at first a thing wholly vague and undefined; — but it was the germ from where sprang the papal monarchy of the middle age.

Now it was, without doubt, not an accidental circumstance, that the Apostle Peter, rather than any other one of the apostles, became the representative of this unity for the religious consciousness of the Western church. For on him had been bestowed, in virtue of his peculiar natural character, ennobled by the Holy Spirit, more particularly the charisma of church government. This gift Christ claimed for the development of the first community, when he named him the Man of Rock and made him the man of rock, on which he would build his church. Yet he said this not to that Peter with whom the human passed for more than the divine, — not to that Peter whom he called rather a Satan; but to the one who had uttered the powerful witness

[1] Cyprian describes them thus: Nec se quidam vana interpretatione decipiant, quod dixerit Dominus: Ubicunque fuerint duo aut tres collecti in nomine meo, ego cum iis sum. Corruptores evangelii atque interpretes falsi. See next note.

[2] Extrema ponunt et superiora præterunt, partis memores et partem subdole comprimentes. Ut ipsi ab ecclesia scissi sunt, ita spiritui unitatis sententiam et in dunt —. Unanimitatem prius posuit, concordiam pacis ante præmisit, ut conveniat nobis, fideliter et firmiter docuit. Quomodo autem potest ei cum aliquo convenire, cui cum corpore ipsius ecclesiæ non convenit? Quomodo possunt duo aut tres in nomine Christi colligi, quos constat a Christo et ab ejus evangelio separari?

[3] Non enim nos ab illis sed illi a nobis recesserunt.

of him as the Son of God; and inasmuch as he had uttered this, that one to whom he could say, "Blessed art thou, for flesh and blood have not revealed this unto thee, but my Father in Heaven." That peculiar charisma procured for this apostle the position he assumed in speaking and acting in the name of all who composed the first community of Christians.[1] Yet with all this was by no means conceded to him a preference and precedence over the rest of the apostles. Of any rank, indeed, of one above another, the question generally was never to be raised among them. Every assumption of that kind, he who came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, severely rebuked, (Luke xxii: 24.) The only contention was to be a mutual strife of each to serve the other. There were three apostles whom Christ, by virtue of their personal traits of character, distinguished above the rest; Peter was only *one of these*. Each of them had his own particular charisma, and his peculiar position which depended on this. As Peter was the man of Rock, working outwardly; so John possessed that charisma by virtue of which he leaned on the Lord's bosom, penetrated most deeply into his being, and into the matter of his discourses. As his own peculiar charisma and position caused Peter first to appear prominent at the founding of the church; so his own charisma and position caused John to retreat more out of view, acting no prominent part until a later period, when it became important to reconcile the oppositions that had arisen, to restore peace among the conflicting elements, to tranquillize and establish the communities when fallen into commotions. The great apostle to the Gentiles maintained, in a manner the most decided, his apostolic independence, against that Jewish principle, estimating every thing by a standard of outwardness, which subsequently, under another form, mixed itself in with the development of the church; and Paul could say of himself, that grace had effected more by him than by all the others.

From these remarks, then, it is clear, that the idea of a primacy of the Apostle Peter had nothing to fix on but a misunderstanding as well of the position assigned him in the progressive movement of the church development, as also of the particular predicates which were given to him; although it had its good ground, that this peculiar tendency centered precisely in him.

In his work on the unity of the church, Cyprian justly observes, that all the apostles had received from Christ the same dignity and the same power with Peter; but he supposes that in one passage, however, Christ bestows this power on Peter in particular, — says of him in particular, that on him he will build his church, — gives it in charge to him in particular to feed his sheep, — for the purpose of showing how the whole development of the church and of the priesthood was to radiate from one point, and thus making clearly evident the unity of the church, the unity of the episcopal power. The Apostle Peter appears here as the representative of the *one* church, abiding in the unity she derived from the divine appointment, and of the one episcopal power,

[1] See my History of the Planting, &c., Vol. II. p. 505, et seq.

which, though distributed among many organs, yet in its origin and essence is, and ever remains, but one. Whoever, therefore, forsakes the outward fellowship with the one visible, catholic church, tears himself away from the representation of the unity of the church, connected by divine appointment with the person of the Apostle Peter. How is it possible for any one to suppose he continues still to be a member of the church of Christ, when he forsakes the cathedra Petri, on which the church was founded?[1]

But even allowing that the Apostle Peter might be considered as the representative of the unity of the church, still it by no means follows, that an individual representative of this kind must continue to exist in the church through every age. Still less does it follow, that this individual representative must be connected particularly with the Roman church; for although the tradition that the Apostle Peter visited the church at Rome cannot, on good and sufficient grounds, be called in question, yet certain it is, that he was not the founder of this church, and that he was never, in any special sense, its presiding officer. This church could with as little propriety be called the cathedra Petri, as the cathedra Pauli. Irenæus and Tertullian seem to be aware, indeed, that Peter and Paul were its founders, that they gave it a bishop, and honored it by their martyrdom. But that the Roman church held a prominence, as the cathedra Petri, over all other apostolic churches, they still remain ignorant. Yet as the idea of an outward unity of the church could suggest the notion of an outward individual representative of that unity, so the recognition of such a historical representation might easily pass out of the ideal into the real world, so that the exhibition of the church unity at a determinate point came to be considered not barely as a thing *once existing*, but as necessary for the existence of the church in all times. And as it was no accidental thing, that the apostle had been made the representative of the church guidance, so too was it no accidental thing, that men, when once impelled to seek for such an outward representation of the church unity for all times, transferred this dignity precisely to the church of the great city which was called to rule in the world. As most of the western communities were used to regard the Roman church as their mother, their ecclesia apostolica, to whose authority they especially appealed; as they were in the habit of naming Peter the founder of the Roman church, and to trace back the tradition of the Roman church to him; and as Rome was once the seat of the dominion of the world; it so happened that men began to consider the Roman church as the cathedra Petri, and to apply what had been said of the Apostle Peter, as the representative of the church unity, to this cathedra Petri. In the *making outward* of the conception of the church, from which this form of the outward presentation of its unity gradually shaped itself, the way was already

[1] Some trace of *this* mode of explaining the above passages relating to the Apostle Peter, may be found even in Tertullian. Præscript. hæret. c. 22: "Latuit aliquid Petrum ædificandæ ecclesiæ Petrum dictum, claves regni cœlorum consecutum et solvendi et alligandi in cœlis et in terris potestatem?" This language shows that he was not a Montanist when he wrote this book; as is evident by comparing it with what he wrote when a Montanist, in his book de Pudicitia, of which we shall speak hereafter.

prepared for the conversion of the political supremacy of the "city" into this spiritual form, — which moreover contained the germ of the secularizing of Christ's kingdom.

In Cyprian we find this transference already complete. As evidence of this, may serve not only *those* passages in his book de unitate ecclesiæ, where the reading is disputed;[1] — in an uncontroverted passage, ep 55 ad Cornel., he styles the Roman church the "Petri cathedra, ecclesia principalis, unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est."

Without doubt, this idea was still very obscure and vague; but a false principle once established, the more vague the notion, the more room would be left for introducing new meanings, and extracting new inferences. In the minds of the Roman bishops, this idea seems early to have obtained a more fixed and definite shape; and here the Roman love of empire seems early to have insinuated itself into ecclesiastical affairs, and made its appearance in a spiritual dress.

Far back we observe already in the Roman bishops traces of the assumption, that to them, as successors of the Apostle Peter, belonged a peculiar and ultimate authority in ecclesiastical disputes; that the cathedra Petri must take precedence of all other apostolic churches, as the source of the apostolic tradition. Such an assumption was shown by the Roman bishop Victor, when, about the year 190, he excommunicated the churches of Asia Minor on account of some trifling dispute relating to mere externals.[2] In the Montanistic writings of Tertullian we find indications, showing that the Roman bishops issued peremptory edicts on ecclesiastical matters; endeavored to make themselves considered as the *bishops of bishops*, — episcopos episcoporum;[3] and were in the habit of appealing to the authority of their "antecessores."[4]

After the middle of the third century, the Roman bishop Stephanus allowed himself to be carried away by the same spirit of hierarchical arrogance as his predecessor Victor. It was his wish, too, in a dispute by no means important,[5] to obtrude the tradition of the Roman church on all other churches as an unalterable and decisive law; and he excommunicated the churches of Asia Minor and of North Africa, which refused to acknowledge this rule.[6]

[1] Though in the passage from Cyprian, "Qui ecclesiæ renititur et resistit, [qui cathedram Petri, super quem fundata est ecclesia, deserit] in ecclesia se esse confidit?" the suspected clause, here included in brackets, were genuine, yet it would not follow, that, in *this particular instance*, he had in his mind the cathedra Petri, subsisting at his time in the *Roman* church; but the phrases, "ecclesiæ reniti," and "cathedram Petri deserere," might rather, according to the connection, be wholly coördinate, so that he would say: he who breaks his connection with the one only church, does by that very act attack the representation of the church unity which had been attached by Christ himself to the person of the Apostle Peter. The whole apostolic and episcopal fulness of authority as one, although manifesting itself through different organs, appears to him to be represented in the spiritual power transferred to the Apostle Peter. The entire episcopatus, or the cathedra of all the bishops conceived as one = the cathedra Petri, = hence to renounce obedience to the bishops is the same as to attack the cathedra Petri.

[2] The dispute about the time of celebrating Easter, of which mention will be made hereafter.

[3] Tertullian, de Pudicitia, c. 1: Audio, edictum esse propositum et quidem peremptorium: pontifex scilicet maximus, quod est episcopus episcoporum, edicit.

[4] Tertullian, de virg. velandis.

[5] The dispute about the validity of baptism administered by heretics, also to be noticed elsewhere.

[6] Nihil innovetur nisi quod traditum est, — he declared, — se per successionem cathedram Petri habere. Cyprian, ep. 74 et 75.

But it was far from being the case, that these assumptions of the Roman bishops could penetrate even through the western church — to say nothing here of the reaction they had to encounter from the freer tendencies of the Greek church. In the first named dispute, the communities of Asia Minor, nothing daunted by the arrogant language of Victor, maintained their own principles, and set over against the tradition of the Roman church, the tradition of their own sedes apostolicæ. Irenæus, bishop of Lyons,[1] in a letter to the Roman bishop Victor, severely rebuked his unchristian arrogance, although agreeing with him as to the matter in dispute. He disapproved of his attempt to obtrude *one* form of church life on all the communities; and declared that nothing was required but unity in faith and in love; and that this, instead of being disturbed by differences in respect to outward things, did but shine forth through these differences with the greater strength. He recognized the right of all the communities, in such matters, to act freely and independently, according to *their own* ancient usage. He objected to the authority of the tradition of a single determinate church the fact, that tradition often originates in, and is propagated by, simplicity and ignorance.[2] Although Cyprian, as we have before remarked, looked upon the Roman church as really the cathedra Petri, and as the representative of the outward church unity, yet he was far from inferring thence the right of this church to determine all matters of church controversy. On the contrary, he maintained, with firmness and energy, the independent right of the individual bishops to manage the affairs of their churches according to their own principles; and he carried through what he recognized as right, in spite of the opposition of the Roman church. In communicating to Stephanus, bishop of Rome, at the commencement of the second of the above mentioned controversies, the principles of the North African church, which he well knew did not accord with the Roman usages, he addressed him in the name of a synod, as one colleague, conscious of an equality of dignity and of rights, addresses another. "In virtue of our equal dignity," says he, "and in unfeigned love, we have imparted these things to you, dearest brother; for we hope, that whatever is agreeable to piety and truth — will also, in accordance with your own true faith and true piety, be pleasing to *you*. We are well aware, however, that many are reluctant to part with the opinions they have once imbibed, and slow to change their principles; but so far as they can do it, without violating the bond of unity and peace, binding them to their colleagues, cling to many peculiarities which have become customary among them. In matters of this sort, we put no restraint, we impose no law, on any man; since each presiding officer of a community has, in the management of these matters, his own free will, and is accountable for his mode of proceeding to the Lord alone."[3]

[1] Euseb. l. V. c. 24.

[2] Τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ὡς εἰκὸς κρατούντων τὴν καθ' ἁπλότητα καὶ ἰδιωτισμὸν συνήθειαν εἰς τὸ μετέπειτα πεποιηκότων.

[3] Qua in re nec nos vim cuiquam facimus aut legem damus, quando habeat in ecclesiæ administratione voluntatis suæ arbitrium liberum unusquisque præpositus, rationem actus sui Domino redditurus.

After the violent declarations which ensued from the Roman bishop, he continued to avow the same principle before a council of more than eighty of the bishops of North Africa; inviting each of them to express his own views with freedom; "for no one," said he, "should make himself a bishop of bishops." When Stephanus appealed to the authority of the ancient Roman tradition, and spoke against innovations, Cyprian replied,[1] that it was rather Stephanus himself who made the innovations, and broke away from the unity of the church. "Whence then," he says, "comes that tradition? Is it derived from the words of our Lord and from the authority of the gospels, or from the instructions and the letters of the apostles? Custom, which has crept in among some unawares, ought not to hinder the truth from prevailing and triumphing; for custom without truth is only inveterate error."[2] He finely remarks, "that it is no more beneath the dignity of a Roman bishop than of any other man, to suffer himself to be corrected when he is in the wrong; for the bishop ought not only to *teach* but to *learn*, for he becomes even the better *teacher*, who is daily adding to his knowledge and making progress by the correction of his errors." Firmilianus also, the bishop of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, in expressing his agreement with Cyprian, declared himself quite strongly against the unchristian behavior of Stephanus, who forbade the Roman church to receive the delegates of the North African church into their houses. He considered it a reproach that one who boasted of being the successor of the Apostle Peter, on whom was built the unity of the church, should rend that unity by his uncharitable and arrogant proceedings. In opposition to the alleged tradition of the Roman church, he produced the tradition of other ancient churches, as also doctrinal reasons; and as evidence that the Romans did not observe, in all points, the original tradition, and appealed in vain to the authority of the apostles, he adduces the fact, that in many church matters, they departed from the customs of the church at Jerusalem, and of the ancient apostolical churches;[3] yet notwithstanding all these differences, the unity and peace of the catholic church had never been disturbed.[4]

On another and earlier occasion, Cyprian had already shown how far he was from yielding to the Roman bishops a supreme jurisdiction in the church, and from countenancing them in the exercise of it. Basilides and Martialis, two Spanish bishops, had been deposed by a synod, because they were *libellatici*, and for other offences; and it is said, they acknowledged themselves the validity of their sentence. In the place of Basilides, a successor had already been chosen by the provincial bishops, with the assistance of the church over which he had presided. The two deposed bishops, however, had recourse to Stephanus, the bishop of Rome, and the latter, assuming a supreme judicatory power, reversed the sentence of the Spanish ecclesiastical court, and

[1] Ep. 74, ad Pompej.

[2] Nec consuetudo, quæ apud quosdam obrepserat, impedire debet, quominus veritas prævaleat et vincat; nam consuetudo sine veritate vetustas erroris est.

[3] Ep. 75.

[4] Eos autem, qui Romæ sunt, non ea in omnibus observare, quæ sunt ab origine tradita, et frustra apostolorum auctoritatem prætendere.

restored them both to their office; whether it was that he found good reasons for so doing in what they alleged in their own justification, or that there was already a strong inclination in the Roman church to take part with those that appealed to its jurisdiction. A contest now arose in Spain on the question whether the first or the second sentence should be respected, and the communities of North Africa were applied to for their opinion. The North African synod at Carthage, in whose name Cyprian replied, did not hesitate to declare that the decision of the Roman bishop was without force, and strongly charged the Spanish churches not to suffer the two unworthy bishops to continue in office. Into the question, whether the Roman bishop was justified in prosecuting such a judicial examination, Cyprian did not enter; but he declared without farther discussion, the unjust sentence, resting as it did on insufficient grounds, to be void. "The regular ordination," he observed,[1] (meaning of the successor to the deposed bishop Basilides,) "cannot be rendered null, because Basilides, after his offences were discovered, and had been acknowledged too by himself, went to Rome and deceived our colleague Stephanus, who was at a distance, and not acquainted with the real circumstances of the case; so that he who had been deposed by a just sentence, fraudulently contrived to be reinstated in his office." Perhaps the mortification which the ambitious, hierarchical views of Stephanus experienced on this occasion — although in other respects Cyprian speaks of him with great moderation — had much influence in deciding him to the obstinate stand which he took in the later controversy of which we have before spoken.

Church Discipline. Exclusion from the Fellowship of the Visible Church. Re-admission to the same.

As the founder of the church had foretold, the process of its development could be none other than a process of refining, renewed over and over again. The idea of a perfectly pure and perfectly holy church could not be realized in the earthly course of its history; — for the life communicated by Christ to humanity can be sustained and transmitted only in a never ceasing conflict with the power of sin, which resists the current of that life from without, and even threatens to mix in and disturb it with its own impurities. The church itself which truly answers to its conception, the church of the regenerate and sanctified, continues ever to be inwardly affected by the reactions of this principle of sin never wholly overcome; and hence in continual need of cleansing. But this church, though represented in a visible form, is yet in its essence invisible; and to this its visible appearance various elements become attached, partaking in no respect of that inner essence; — and there are no sure and certain marks whereby it is possible to separate from one another these heterogeneous components. Manifold are the gradations through which the transition is made from the true church to the opposite world, which strives to draw her into itself and to transform her by its own spirit; a thing impossible, unless she enter herself

[1] Ep. 68.

into such a union. Hence the sifting of the chaff from the wheat, which can be accomplished by no human tribunal, and which strives prematurely to sever the threads of historical development ordained and surely guided by divine Wisdom, and would hinder the very work of the church itself to reform the world, must be left to a higher judgment, and can only take place after the thread of history is wholly unwound.

But the church, when left wholly to herself, and unmixed as yet with the state, might bring about, if not a perfect, yet a *certain* separation — so as to exclude from herself the *manifestly* foreign elements, showing themselves to be such by marks *not to be mistaken;* indeed, the Jewish synagogues had before exercised a disciplinary judgment of this kind over their members. The early communities were thus to seek to secure themselves against the infection of pagan immorality, and thereby practically to bear witness, that the mere confession of faith made no man a Christian; — that whoever contradicted by his daily living the laws of Christianity, could not be regarded as a Christian brother.

Hence the Apostle Paul declared the Christian communities to be not merely justified, but bound, to eject such unworthy members from their body. With *all pagans*, the Christians might eat, and stand in every social relation; but with such apostate brethren, they were to avoid all manner of intercourse, for the purpose of practically showing them, that they could no longer claim the title of Christian brethren. It was from this point of view, that Tertullian could now say to the pagans: "Those who are no Christians, are wrongly so called; such in truth take no part in our religious assemblies; such receive not with us the communion; they have by their sins become yours again, since we hold not even common intercourse with those whom your cruelty has forced to denial; although we should certainly be likely to tolerate amongst us more easily those who through constraint than those who have voluntarily deserted the principles of our religion. Besides, it is without reason you call those Christians who are not recognized as such by the Christians, who cannot deny their own."[1]

But the church was designed also to be an institution for training; it was not to give up the hope of reclaiming the fallen. By this very exclusion from the society of the brethren, the fallen members, if they retained any susceptibility for better feelings, were to be brought to the sense of their guilt and awakened to a fruitful repentance. If they manifested any such penitence in their living, they were to be taken under the fostering care of the church, and at length, after their repentance had been sufficiently proved, once more adopted into the community. Such was the direction of the Apostle Paul. In later times, various regulations were gradually introduced, relating to the cases in which resort should be had to such exclusion from the church fellowship; to the manner of life which the excluded members ought to lead; to the proofs of remorse and penitence which they must give, and

[1] Ad nation. l. I. c. 5.

to the duration of the time of their exclusion. All these points were differently determined, according to the different nature of the offences, and the different moral character evinced by the offenders. Those who stood in this relation to the community, were made a particular class, designated by the name of pœnitentes. Tertullian requires "that the inward compunction of conscience should be manifested also by outward acts;[1] that they should express their sorrow by their whole deportment, pray for the forgiveness of their sins with fasting, present a confession of their sins before the community, request the intercessions of all the Christian brethren, and especially humble themselves before the presbyters and the known friends of God."[2] To those who suffered themselves to be kept back by shame from making confession before the church, he says,[3] "This may be grievous, where one exposes himself to contempt and to mockery; where others exalt themselves at the expense of him who has fallen. But in the midst of brethren and fellow-servants, where the hope, fear, joy, pain, and suffering are shared in common; because one common spirit proceeds from one common Lord and Father, — how should you there consider your own as different from yourself? Why fly from those to whom your grief is as their own, as if they rejoiced over it? The body cannot rejoice at the suffering of one of its members. The whole body must share in the pain and coöperate towards the cure. Where two are together, there is the church; but the church is Christ. When you embrace the knees of your brother, you embrace Christ, you are a suppliant to Christ. And so when they weep over you, Christ suffers, Christ supplicates the Father. Easily is that ever obtained, which the Son supplicates of the Father." Origen writes:[4] "The Christians sorrow over those who have been overcome by lust, or any other noticeable vice, as if they were dead; and, after a longer probation than that appointed for catechumens, if they have given sufficient evidence of a change of heart, they receive them once more as those risen from the dead." When their penitence had been satisfactorily proved, they were absolved and restored to the fellowship of the church with the sign of blessing, the laying on of the hands of the bishop and clergy.

Salutary as these regulations might be, as a means of Christian culture, in the then existing state of the church, yet here also there was great danger of confounding the Inner essence with the Outward form, especially when the outward notion of the church had already become a fundamental principle. Such must have been the case, for example, when it was attempted to confine the expression of penitent feelings to certain uniform signs, and it was thought that in manifesting these consisted the essence of true penitence itself; and again, when no distinction was made betwixt absolution and the divine forgiveness of sins. The church teachers, however, did not fail to point out the inward disposition as that on which everything depended, and to guard against that confusion of ideas. "When the man condemns himself," says

[1] Ut non sola conscientia præferatur, sed aliquo etiam actu administretur. De pœnitentia, c. 9.

[2] L. c.

[3] L. c. c. 10.

[4] c. Cels. l. III. c. 51.

Tertullian,[1] "God acquits him. So far — believe me — as thou sparest not thyself, God will spare thee." And the bishop Firmilianus of Cæsarea in Cappadocia says, in a letter written in the latter half of the third century: "With us, the bishops and presbyters meet once a year to consult together for the recovery by repentance of fallen brethren; not as though they could receive from us the forgiveness of sins, but that they may by us be brought to a sense of their sins and constrained to render a more full satisfaction to the Lord.[2] Cyprian explains himself thus:[3] "We do not prejudge the Lord's judgment; so that if he find the sinner's repentance full and satisfactory, he may ratify our decision; but if any man shall have deceived us by a hypocritical repentance, then let God, who cannot be mocked, and who looketh on the heart, decide with regard to that which we have failed to explore to the bottom, and the master correct the judgment of his servants."

But still it cannot be denied, that the consequences resulting from that *making outward* of the conception of the church, and that Old Testament view of the priesthood, had here already mixed in. Thus the judgment on an individual who had rendered himself liable to the church penance was reckoned among the acts of this priesthood; and the full power of exercising it, derived from the authority to bind and to loose, given to the apostles. That one should thus submit himself to the judgment of the priest, appeared as an act of that humility which belongs to the essence of true penitence.[4] The notion took such a shape, that the whole system of church penance came to be considered as a satisfaction to be done to God.[5] Perhaps there were some who opposed this view of the necessity of outward church penance, and who endeavored to establish the principle that all depended on the direction of the heart and of the affections towards God, not on external things.[6] We say *perhaps*, — for from the language of Tertullian in combatting this class, from his own assumed position, we cannot decide with certainty in what sense that principle was understood. It is certainly possible, that they may have been a class, who made a *false* distinction between the Inner and the Outward in the religious life, and under the pretext that all depended on the inner direction of the affections towards God, alone, allowed themselves to excuse the failings of the outward life.[7]

Connected with the remarks here made on church penance and church absolution, must be our judgment also of a controversy which arose with regard to these matters. Had the notion of absolution been rightly understood, as an announcement of the divine forgiveness of sin, always conditioned on repentance and faith, instead of being converted into a judicial act of the clergy, a mutual understanding might have

[1] De pœnitentia, c. 9.

[2] Cyprian, ep. 75.

[3] In his 52d letter ad Antonian.

[4] See the words, in a letter of the Confessors, in Cyprian, (ep. 26.) Humilitas atque subjectio, alienum de se expectasse judicium, alienam de suo sustinuisse sententiam.

[5] Satisfactio, in Tertullian's book de Pœnitentia; a term derived from the civil law, which he had studied and practised in early life.

[6] Sed ajunt quidam, satis Deum habere, si corde et animo suspiciatur, licet actu minus fiat. De pœnitentia, c. 5.

[7] "Itaque se salvo metu et fide peccare," says Tertullian, — prone, as he was, to infer evil from the doctrines of his opponents.

been easily brought about on the matter of dispute which we are now about to mention. We allude to the controversy between a milder and a more rigid party on the subject of church penance.

All were agreed in distinguishing those sins into which all Christians might fall through the remaining sinfulness of their nature, and those which clearly indicated that the transgressor was still living under bondage to sin as an abiding condition; that he was not one of the regenerate; that he had either never attained to that condition, or had again fallen from it;— peccata venalia — and peccata mortalia, or ad mortem. These terms they had derived from the first epistle of St. John. Among sins of the second class they reckoned, besides the denial of Christianity, deception, theft, incontinence, adultery, etc.[1] Now it was the principle of the milder party, which gradually became the predominant one, that the church was bound to receive every fallen member, into whatever sins he may have fallen, — to hold out to all, under the condition of sincere repentance, the hope of the forgiveness of sin. At least, in the hour of death, absolution and the communion should be granted to those who manifested true repentance. The other party would never consent to admit again to the fellowship of the church, such as had violated their baptismal vow by sins of the latter class. Such persons, — said they, — have once despised the forgiveness of sin obtained for them by Christ, and assured to them in baptism. There is no purpose of divine grace with regard to such, which is revealed to us; hence the church is in no case warranted to announce to them the forgiveness of sin. If the church exhorts them also to repentance, yet she can promise nothing to them as to the issue, since the power bestowed on her to bind and to loose has no reference to such. She must leave them to the judgment of God. The one party would not suffer that any limits should be set to the mercy of God towards penitent men; the other would preserve erect the holiness of God, and feared that, by a false confidence in the power of priestly absolution, men would be encouraged to feel more safe in their sins.

Church Divisions or Schisms.

The schisms, or *church divisions* in the more limited sense, must be distinguished from the *heresies* properly so called. The former were such divisions of the catholic church, as proceeded from certain outward occasions, aiming at objects connected with the constitution or the discipline of the church; the latter, divisions which sprung out of differences and disputes on matters of doctrine. While all that is to be said of the latter stands intimately connected with the *genetic* development of doctrines, the exhibition of the former cannot be separated from the history of the constitution and discipline of the church; and each serves to illustrate the other. In a doctrinal point of view, the history of church *divisions* is important only so far as it serves to unfold the doctrine on the *church;* but the development of *this* doctrine stands closely

[1] Homicidium, idololatria, fraus, negatio, blasphemia, mœchia et fornicatio. Tertullian de pudicitia, c. 19.

connected again with the history of the church constitution. It seems, therefore, in every view, best suited to our purpose, to annex the history of church divisions with the section which relates the history of the constitution of the church.

We have to notice in this period two remarkable divisions of the church, both intimately connected with each other, as well in respect to the *time of their origin*, as in respect to the *churches* and persons, that especially took part in them. In the history of both, the monarchical system of episcopacy is seen coming forth victoriously out of the contest with presbyterianism; in both, Catholicism is seen triumphing over *Separatism;* both divisions conduced to the establishment of the system of church unity. We refer to the divisions of *Felicissimus* and to that of *Novatian;* the first proceeding out of the church of proconsular Africa, the second out of the church of Rome.

In the history of the first mentioned division, the bishop Cyprian of Carthage appears as the head of a party, and as the most important among the actors in the scene; and the origin of the schism was immediately connected with the manner in which he arrived at the episcopal dignity. It will serve, therefore, to give us a clearer understanding of the whole subject, if we begin with casting a glance at the history of this man's life. Cyprian had remained a pagan until the last years of his manhood. He was by profession a rhetorician, if not an advocate,[1] and the rhetorical cast of his style of writing testifies of this his earlier occupation. In the years of his paganism he had already gained public confidence by the uprightness of his life.[2] By the influence of the presbyter Cæcilius, whose name he afterwards adopted, and who at his death committed his wife and children to Cyprian's care, he was brought to embrace the Christian faith. Although, while a pagan, he had led a blameless life in the common estimation, yet it by no means appeared so to himself, after he had learned to contemplate the requisitions of the divine law, and to know himself in the light of Christianity. The profound sense of sin, as a power from which man cannot deliver himself by his own strength, preceded also in his case the experience of that which grace alone can effect; as he expresses it in the letter addressed to his friend Donatus, written probably soon after his baptism. Hence he was now the more inspired with a glowing enthusiasm to reach that idea of the divine life which Christianity had lighted up within his soul. And as he interpreted the words of our Lord,—"If thou wilt be perfect, go sell that thou hast and give it to the poor," according to the prevailing views of that period, more closely to their letter than to their spirit, for the purpose of fulfiling this requisition, he sold the two landed estates of which he was possessed,[3] and distributed the proceeds among

[1] Jerome says, (d. v. i. c. 67,) that he was a rhetorician, and we have no good reason to doubt this account. We are under no necessity of supposing that in what he says (ep. I. ad Donatum,) respecting the opposition between spiritual and worldly eloquence, (in judiciis, in concione, pro rostris,) that he was thinking of his own calling, and therefore had once been used to such public discourse.

[2] See the biographical sketch of his life, composed by his disciple, the Deacon Pontius.

[3] His garden was soon restored back to him, probably by the love of the church, as we may gather from the language of Pon-

the poor. The devout zeal which shone forth so brilliantly in his conduct even while a neophyte, acquired for him, to a great degree, the love and esteem of the community. He became the man of the people; and the community made use of the influence they could then command, in his behalf. He was raised by their votes, contrary to the letter of the church laws, soon after his baptism, in 247, to the dignity of a presbyter, and as early as the year 248, placed at the head, as bishop. The community environed his house, for the purpose of compelling him to accept the episcopal dignity. But this very circumstance, that he had been raised to the station he occupied by the enthusiastic love of the church, contributed from the first to create a party against him, at the head of which stood five presbyters.[1] Of these, several, perhaps, put forward claims themselves to the episcopal office, and looked with eyes of jealousy on the upstart neophyte who superseded those that had grown gray in the service of the church. They might also be led on by other motives to us unknown. Cyprian was well aware of the difficult position he was about to assume, when he shrank back from the assumption of the chief pastoral office. the whole weight and responsibleness of which stood clearly before him, — attractive as it must have seemed, on the other hand, to a man of his peculiar bent and talent for rule to be placed at the head of the church governance. We discover here the first ground and the germ of the ensuing controversies. The five presbyters above mentioned now proceeded with their followers to contest the episcopal authority of Cyprian; and as the presbyters were still mindful of their ancient rights, and still striving to maintain their former influence in the government of the church, there could be no want of disputes between a bishop, and especially one like Cyprian, so resolutely active, in the consciousness of that supreme spiritual power which he believed himself to possess by divine right, and his antagonists in the presbyterial college.

Where men are contending for their rights, even those men in whom a life from God has indeed begun, but the strength of the old nature still makes itself felt, it is usually the case, that instead of emulating each other, with the spirit of love and self-renunciation, in the fulfilment of duties, they allow, on both sides, their own will and their passions to give that which is wrong the color of right. So it happened in the present case. But we are not well enough informed of all the circumstances to be able clearly to separate the right from the wrong on either side; for we have only the representations of one party in the dispute, — representations which sometimes bear on their very front the marks of strong excitement.

An unbiassed contemplation will certainly not fail to discover in Cyprian, the man inspired and animated with true love to the Redeemer

tius: Hortos, quos inter initia fidei suæ venditos, et Dei indulgentia restitutos.

[1] We see this from the words of Pontius, in speaking of Cyprian's election: Quidam illi restiterunt, etiam ut vinceret; with which compare ep. 40, respecting the intrigues of the five presbyters: Conjurationis suæ memores, et antiqua illa contra episcopatum meum, imo contra suffragium vestrum et Dei judicium venena retinentes, instaurant veterem contra nos impugnationem suam

and to his church. It is undeniable that he was devoted to his community, as a faithful shepherd; that its interests honestly lay nearest his heart; and that he meant to exercise his episcopal authority for the preservation of good order and discipline in the flock; — but it is also certain, that he was not sufficiently on his guard against that fundamental evil of man's nature, which so easily fastens on what is best in him, and by which the best qualities may be even perverted and destroyed, — an evil which may be most dangerous to those endowed with great gifts and powers for the Lord's service, — most dangerous, where it exhibits itself under the spiritual garb, — that he was not watchful enough against the risings and suggestions of self-will and pride. The point he was contending for, the full power of the episcopate, proved to him certainly, at times, the rock whereon his spiritual life made shipwreck. He forgot, in the bishop, "*appointed by God himself and acting in the name of* Christ," the *man*, still living in the flesh, and *exposed*, like all other men, to the temptations of sin; in the *bishop*, over whom no layman might set up himself to judge, the bishop called to rule and gifted with an inviolable authority from God, he forgot the disciple of Christ, of him who was meek and lowly of spirit, and for the good of his *brethren*, appeared in the *form of a servant*. Had he ever remained true to this spirit of Christ's disciples, he might assuredly have gained the victory over his adversaries with far more ease to himself and safety to the church, than by all his stir about the inalienable rights of the episcopate, and his appeals to the dignity of the priestly office with which God had invested him.

The five presbyters of the opposite party, or some of them at least, seem to have been at the head of separate communities in Carthage or its neighborhood; and they now ventured, in defiance of the bishop whom they hated, to introduce several arbitrary measures in the management of their filial communities; or, at any rate, such measures as Cyprian, from the principles he maintained with regard to the episcopal system, might properly consider as encroachments on the episcopal rights. One of them, Novatus by name, president of a community situated upon a hill in or near by Carthage, was, so far as we can judge,[1] a man of restless and enterprising mind, who, with a fierce spirit

[1] The charges which Cyprian himself brings against him, (ep. 49,) if well founded, do, indeed, place him in the most unfavorable light; but these charges wear every appearance of being dictated by blind passion, trusting in deceptive reports without due investigation, and indulging a most unwarrantable liberty of drawing conclusions. A common method in controversies, — to impute the worst motives to an opponent, and suppose them just as true as if one could read into his heart, yet without offering the least evidence to justify the supposition. Of Novatus, it was said, that he was about to be arraigned before an ecclesiastical court; his own conscience declared him guilty; happily for him, the Decian persecution broke out, and interrupted the proceedings which had commenced against him. And now, in order to evade the sentence which awaited him as soon as the persecution was over, he excited all those agitations, of which we shall speak hereafter, and separated himself from the dominant church. How cleverly put together, yet how improbable is all this! Cyprian himself, during the Decian persecution, still recognized Novatus as a lawful presbyter, see ep. 5. Now, for the first time, he knows of this man such wicked things as, if they were true, would testify against the bishop who could suffer a man of such a character to retain the office of presbyter. Cyprian does, indeed, bring forward facts against him; but what vouches for the truth of those facts? How would it have

of ecclesiastical freedom, spurned from him the yoke of episcopal monarchy.[1] This person, without authority from the bishop, proceeded to ordain one of his followers, Felicissimus, a man well calculated for the position of a zealous and enterprising partizan, and who doubtless, by his personal relations, had great influence in the community, to the office of deacon in this his own church.[2] Cyprian declares this act an encroachment on his episcopal rights; but it may have been the opinion of Novatus, on the principles of his presbyterian system, that as a presbyter and presiding officer of the church, he was warranted so to proceed. The right and the wrong in the transaction was a point certainly not so clearly made out, at a time when the struggle betwixt the aristocratic and monarchical forms of church government remained still undecided. Cyprian permitted Felicissimus to retain his office; whether it was out of deference to a powerful party, or whether it was not till later that he was induced, by the hostile proceedings of Felicissimus, to declare his ordination irregular and a violation of the episcopal authority. He avoided in the outset, as it should seem, to take any violent measures; he sought by indulgence and gentleness, with a prudence befitting the circumstances, to gain over his opponents.[3] Perhaps his success would have been complete, if he could have exercised sufficient control over himself to follow out this course with patience; or if the Decian persecution, which broke out soon after, had not furnished the opposite party too inviting an opportunity to com-

been possible for this man, if such accusations could be justly laid against him, to play the part he did? (What is there which idle tattle will not gradually set a going amidst party strifes of this kind?) The opponents of Cyprian too, as we may infer from his letter to Pupianus, of which we shall speak hereafter, had said many hard things against him.

[1] So far there may have been truth in Cyprian's statement, when he calls him, (ep. 49:) Fax et ignis ad conflanda seditionis incendia.

In order to a right understanding of Novatus' conduct in these disputes, it is important to have the question settled, whether he was one of the five presbyters who opposed Cyprian from the beginning. Mosheim has urged several objections against this supposition, the most weighty of which we shall notice further along. The question, we must admit, cannot be decided with absolute certainty. But yet the whole connection of the history seems to be in favor of the affirmative. In Cyprian's fifth letter, already cited, the names of four presbyters are introduced, who brought him a petition. One of these, Fortunatus, belonged, according to Cyprian's own statement, ep. 55, to the number of the five presbyters. Now as the name of Novatus occurs here along with that of Fortunatus, it is highly probable that all the four presbyters, which seem in this case to have formed one party, were in fact no other than the old opposition party, — the five presbyters or presbyterium Felicissimi. And in the repulsive answer which Cyprian gave to their petition, we may perhaps discern a new cause of their irritation against the bishop. A comparison of what Cyprian says respecting the intrigues of Novatus, ep. 49, with what he says respecting the intrigues of those five presbyters, ep. 40, and with what Pontius reports about the old adversaries of Cyprian, speaks for the existence of but one anti-Cyprian party, which held together from the beginning, and in which Novatus occupied an important place.

[2] See Cyprian, ep. 49, of Novatus: Qui Felicissimum satellitem suum diaconum, nec permittente me nec sciente, sua factione et ambitione, constituit. All goes to show that this nomination of Felicissimus to the office of deacon preceded the schism of which he was the author; although the whole subject is involved in much obscurity on account of our imperfect knowledge of the circumstances.

[3] To this doubtless refers what Pontius says of Cyprian's conduct towards his opponents: Quibus tamen quanta levitate, quam patienter, quam benevolenter indulsit, quam clementer ignovit, amicissimos eos postmodum inter et necessarios computans, mirantibus multis!

mence a public attack on the man, whom from the first they had unwillingly seen placed at the head of the church government.

We have already observed, that at the first beginning of this persecution, Cyprian retired for a while from his community. He had good reasons, indeed, as we then saw, to justify this step, and the best of all justifications was his subsequent martyrdom; but still it was a step which would always admit of being differently construed. The enemies of Cyprian were glad to look upon the thing in its worst light, and accused him of allowing himself to be influenced to violate his duties as a pastor, by motives of fear.[1]

Besides this, the party opposed to Cyprian had many opportunities, arising out of events that transpired in the persecution, to increase the number of their followers, and to excite the minds of men against the bishop. Numbers, as we have already observed in our account of this persecution, had been induced by their fears, or compelled by torture, to resort to measures which were regarded as a virtual denial of the faith, and which actually excluded them from the communion of the church. But most of them were afterwards seized with compunctions of remorse, and longed to be restored to the community of the brethren, and to the privilege of participating with them in the Lord's supper. The question now arose, whether their wishes should be complied with: — was their petition to be absolutely rejected, or should a middle course be pursued, by holding out to them, indeed, the hope of being restored to the fellowship of the church; but before the privilege was actually granted them, by subjecting their conduct to a longer probation, and requiring evidence of continued penitence? Should the same course be pursued with all the lapsed, or should the treatment be varied according to the difference of circumstances and the character of the offences? The church at this time was still without any generally acknowledged principles of church penance in cases of this sort. There was one party, who were for refusing to grant absolution, on any conditions, to such as had violated their baptismal vow by one of the so called mortal sins. Following that Jewish principle which did not allow *all* duties to be regarded alike as *duties to God*, and *all* sins alike, as sins *against God*, men made an arbitrary distinction, — for which they cited as their authority the passage 1 Samuel ii. 25, — between sins against God and against man; and to the former was reckoned every act of denying the faith, though the degree of guiltiness, if the denial was simply a yielding to the weakness of sense, might be far inferior to that involved in some of the so called sins *against man*. Cyprian, who was in the habit of calling Tertullian especially his

[1] We remarked at page 134, how doubtfully the Roman clergy expressed themselves with regard to Cyprian's conduct; their words, "quod utique *recte fecerit*," indicate that Cyprian's enemies had contrived to represent the matter in an unfavorable light Hence Cyprian intimated a suspicion that this letter, in which passages occurred which were so strange to him, might be a forgery, ep. 3. Afterwards, when he learned that his adversaries had represented his conduct in an unfavorable light at Rome, he considered it necessary to justify himself by a correct account of the whole course of the affair, and he writes thus to the Roman clergy, ep. 14: Quoniam comperi minus simpliciter et minus fideliter vobis renuntiari, quæ hic a nobis et gesta sunt et geruntur.

teacher,[1] might, perhaps, from the study of that father's writings, have received a bias towards the principles of the more rigid party with regard to penance. Many passages of his works, written previous to the Decian persecution, would lead us to conclude, that he was at first in favor of the principle of granting absolution to none who had committed a mortal sin; as, for instance, when he says,[2] "The words of the Lord, who warns while he heals, are 'Behold, thou art made whole; sin no more, lest a worse thing come unto thee.' After he has bestowed health, he gives the rule of life; nor does he leave the man thenceforth to wander about as he lists; but as the man was bound to serve him by the very fact that he had been healed by him, our Lord threatens him with the greater severity; for the guilt is less, to have sinned before one has known the doctrines of the Lord, but when one sins after he has begun to know them, there is no place for forgiveness."[3] It may be said, perhaps, that Cyprian, in this case, meant simply to mark the greater criminality of a sin committed by a Christian, and that the passage is to be understood only in a relative sense; but assuredly more than this is implied in one of his positions laid down in the collection of Biblical Testimonies.[4] "That to him who has sinned against God, no forgiveness can be granted in the church."[5] Besides the already cited passages from the Old Testament,[6] he quotes on this occasion that from the gospel, relating to the sin against the Son of man, and against the Holy Ghost; whence it is plain, how greatly he misunderstood these conceptions, and this antithesis.

But if Cyprian was an advocate of *this* principle when he first entered on the episcopal office, yet, cherishing as he did the heart of a father towards his church, he could not fail to be shaken by the great multitude of the lapsed, who, sometimes with bitter tears of repentance, entreated him to grant them absolution. Must all these, many of whom, as for example, the libellatici, had fallen only from defect of knowledge, and others from simply yielding to the flesh under the severity of their tortures, remain forever excluded from the blessed community of their brethren, and, in Cyprian's view, from that church in which alone was to be found the way to heaven? The paternal heart of the bishop revolted at the thought, but he dared not act here upon his own responsibility. In this state of indecision, he declared that the fallen should be received and exhorted to repentance; but that the decision of their fate should be reserved to that time when, on the restoration of peace, the bishops, clergy and churches, in joint and cautious deliberation, after having examined the question in all its bearings, should be able to unite on some common principles, in relation to a matter where every Christian was so deeply interested. Be-

[1] According to Jerome, de vir. illustr. When he asked for Tertullian's writings, he used to say to his secretary, "Da magistrum."

[2] De habitu virginum.

[3] *Nulla venia* ultra delinquere, postquam Deum nosse cœpisti.

[4] De testimoniis, l. III. c. 28.

[5] Non posse in ecclesia remitti ei, qui in Deum deliquit.

[6] The same texts which Cyprian quotes in the epistle to the clergy of Carthage, ep. 9, on the subject of denial of the faith under persecution. So also in ep. 11, we find the antithesis: Minora delicta, quæ *non in Deum* committuntur.

sides, there was a great difference between the offences of these fallen brethren. While some, merely to avoid the sacrifice of their worldly possessions, had, without a struggle, even hastened up to the altars of the gods; others had fallen only through ignorance, or under the force of torture. The disorders of the times made it impossible to examine carefully into the difference of offences, and the difference of moral character in the individuals. Moreover, those that had fallen should, by practical demonstration of their penitence, render themselves worthy of re-admission to the fellowship of the church, — and the persecution itself presented them with the best opportunity for this. "He who cannot endure the delay," says Cyprian, "may obtain the crown of martyrdom."

It was under this view of the case he acted; directing all the lapsed who applied for absolution, to look forward with hope to the time for the restoration of tranquillity, when their cases should be examined. But some of the clergy, and as Cyprian afterwards learned, his old adversaries, espoused the interest of these men, and, instead of exhorting them to peace and order, according to the wishes of the bishop, confirmed them in their importunate demands, availing themselves of this opportunity to foment the wished for division in the church.

Had these lapsed individuals been upheld in their importunate demands by the presbyters opposed to Cyprian alone, without finding any other support, their resistance to the measures of the bishop would have been of less consequence. But now they found means to gain over to their cause a voice which in those days had great influence with the Christians, — the voice of those witnesses of the faith, who under the pains of torture had laid down their witness of the Lord, or who, after having laid down their testimony, confronted martyrdom. It was, in itself considered, altogether consonant with the spirit of Christianity, that the last legacy of these men should be a *legacy of affection;* that their last words should be an *expression of love* to their brethren; that they, who, after having victoriously sustained the conflict, were about to enter into glory, should show sympathy for their weaker brethren, who had fallen in the struggle; that finally, they should recommend these fallen to the charitable acceptance of the church. It was just and right, moreover, that the word of these witnesses of the faith should be held in peculiar respect, provided only it were not forgotten, that they were sinful men, needing, like all others, the forgiveness of their sins, and that, so long as they were in the flesh, they had still to maintain the contest with the flesh; and provided only, these witnesses of the faith themselves had not forgotten this, and dazzled by the excessive veneration which was paid them, had not been, on this very account, the more exposed to the lurking enemy with which even they, as sinful men, had still to contend, and turned the momentary victory, gained by the grace of God, to the nourishment of a spiritual pride. Many fell under this temptation; and controversies were excited and nourished by such confessors. The poet Commodian, so distinguished for his moral enthusiasm, held it needful to remind such persons, that

even by their sufferings they could not expiate sin.[1] There were confessors, who, in an authoritative tone, gave to all applicants the peace of the church, and acted as if it needed only their word to exculpate and discharge the fallen. Many of the clergy, who, according to Cyprian's advice, ought to have set them right and led them to humility, rather confirmed them in their delusion, and used them as tools in their intrigues against the bishop. By their peremptory declarations, oft-times vaguely expressed, as for example, "Let such an individual, *with his*," — an expression admitting of interpretations and applications without limit, — "be received to the fellowship of the church," they caused the bishop no slight embarrassment.[2] Those who applied such vague declarations to themselves, now boasted that the confessors or martyrs had granted them absolution, and they would brook no delay, suffer no trial of their conduct. When Cyprian evinced the less disposition to comply with their impetuous demands, in proportion to the want which they betrayed of true contrition and humility, he made himself extremely unpopular by his resistance. On two sides, he appeared in an unfavorable light, on the side of his severity against the lapsed and of his lack of reverence for the confessors.[3]

He fulfilled his duty as a pastor, by taking a firm and decided stand against the exaggerated reverence paid to these confessors, which might be a fruitful source of superstition, and against the false confidence in their intercession, leading men to feel secure in their sins. He made the confessors observe, that true confession was not an *opus operatum*, but that it must consist in the whole tenor of conduct. "The tongue," he said, "which has confessed Christ, must preserve its honor, pure and untarnished; for he who, according to our Lord's precept, speaks what tends to peace, to goodness and to truth, confesses Christ every day of his life." In warning them against false security and pride, he observes,[4] "It must be your endeavor to carry out what you have happily begun. It is but little to have succeeded in *obtaining* an advantage; it is more, to be able to *preserve* what you have obtained. Our Lord taught us this, when he said, 'Behold, thou art made whole: sin no more, lest a worse thing come unto thee.' Think that he also says this to his confessor; 'Behold thou art made a confessor; sin no more, lest a worse thing come unto thee.' In fine, Solomon and Saul and many others were able, so long as they walked in the ways of the Lord,

[1] See his Instructio, 47:
Impia martyribus odio reputantur in ignem,
Distruitur martyr, cujus est confessio talis,
Expiari malum nec sanguine fuso docetur.

[2] Communicet ille cum suis. According to Cyprian, ep. 14, thousands of such "libelli pacis" were daily issued by the confessors without examination. Tertullian, at the close of the second century, speaks already of this practice as a traditional one. "Pacem in ecclesia non habentes, a martyribus in carcere exorare consueverunt." Ad martyr. c. 1. As a Montanist he speaks carnestly against the excessive abuse to which this practice was carried; and intimates that many were made to feel secure in their sin by these libelli pacis, inconsiderately bestowed by the confessors, de pudicitia, c. 22. Against the abuses growing out of recommendatory letters of the confessors, spurious or genuine, the council of Elvira speaks on this wise, c. 25: Quod omnes sub hac nominis gloria passim concutiunt simplices.

[3] He gives us himself to understand how much he had to suffer in this way, ep. 22: Laborantes hic nos et contra invidiæ impetum totis fidei viribus resistentes

[4] Ep. 6.

to retain the grace which was given them; but no sooner were they left by the discipline of the Lord, than they were left also by his grace. I hear that some are elated with pride; and yet it is written, 'Be not high-minded, but fear.' Our Lord 'was led as a sheep to the slaughter; as a lamb before her shearers is dumb, so opened he not his mouth;' and is there any one now, who lives by him and in him, that dares to be proud and high-minded, unmindful of the life which He led, and of the doctrines which He has given us either by himself or by his apostles? If the servant be not greater than his Lord, then let those that follow the Lord, humbly, peacefully and quietly walk in his footsteps: the more one abases himself the more shall he be exalted."

When a certain confessor, Lucianus, professing to act "in the name of Paul, a martyr," and in obedience to his last injunctions, proceeded to bestow on the fallen the peace of the church, and to furnish them with the so called certificates of church-fellowship (libellos pacis,) Cyprian refused to acknowledge their validity, and observed, "Although our Lord has given command that the nations shall be baptized and their sins forgiven in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost; yet this man, in ignorance of the divine law, proclaims peace and the forgiveness of sins in the name of Paul; — he does not consider that the martyrs make not the gospel, but the gospel, the martyrs."[1] He spoke on this point with the same emphasis in the discourse, already referred to, delivered on his return to his church.[2] "Let no man deceive himself, the Lord alone can show mercy. He alone can bestow forgiveness of the sins which have been committed against him, who bore our sins; who suffered for us; whom God delivered up for our offences. The servant may not forgive a crime committed against his Master, lest the offender contract additional guilt, if he be unmindful of what is written, 'Cursed is he that putteth his trust in man.' We must address our prayer to the Lord, who has assured us he will deny those that deny him, who alone has received all judgment from the Father. The martyrs require something to be done; — but what they require must be written in the law of the Lord; — we must know, first of all, that they have *obtained* from God what they *require;* and *then only can we do* what they require; for it by no means follows, as a matter of course, that the Divine Majesty will grant what a man has promised. Either the martyrs are nothing, if the gospel can be made void; or if the gospel cannot be made void, then *they* are not authorized to act against the gospel, who by its means become martyrs. *That man can neither say nor do anything against* Christ, *whose faith and hope, whose power and glory are nowhere but in Christ.*"

Still Cyprian was not firm and consistent enough in his opposition to the extravagant respect paid to these witnesses of the faith. He was, to a certain degree, carried away himself by the prevailing spirit of the multitude, which he ought to have controlled and guided by the spirit of the gospel. When the summer heats of an African climate began

[1] Quod non martyres evangelium faciant, sed per evangelium martyres fiant. Ep. 22.

[2] Sermo de lapsis.

to multiply cases of sickness, he yielded so far as to grant absolution to those of the fallen, who in sickness and the fear of death were earnestly desirous of the communion, and *were depending on such certificates given them by witnesses of the faith.*[1] In his report to the Roman church, he assigns as his reason for so doing, that he wished by such a compliance in one particular, to assuage, in some measure at least, the violence of the multitude, and so to counteract the plots of those who were at the bottom of the mischief, and to remove from himself the obloquy of refusing to the martyrs the respect which belonged to them.[2]

Thus by his half-way measures of resistance to the violence of this erroneous tendency, and by his inconsistency, Cyprian did injury to the interests of Christian truth and to his own cause. If, on the one hand, he attacked with the weapons of truth that false confidence in the martyrs' intercession, on the other hand, he supported it, by yielding his ground; for must not the recommendation of the martyr become possessed of a peculiar power and significance, as soon as it was understood, that those only who were supported by such a recommendation, might in the hour of death, *simply on the strength of this recommendation*, obtain the peace of the church and receive the communion, while it might easily happen that many who had *not* sought for this recommendation of the martyrs, were distinguished above those who had secured it, by their sincere contrition and penitence.[2] Cyprian favored this conclusion, for which his conduct furnished so natural a pretext, by his peculiar form of expressing this concession, addressing it "to those, who by help of the martyrs may obtain succor from the Lord in their sins."[3] By this inconsistency, he laid open a weak spot to his enemies, of which they would not fail to take advantage.

Another circumstance which must have particularly contributed to give a more decided weight to the opposite party in their connection with the fallen, was the powerful voice of the Roman church, which had declared itself in favor of the milder principle, if not in its application to all the fallen, at least to those who were sick. Cyprian avowed also, in making his concession, that he was partly induced to this measure by his respect for the Roman church, with which he did not choose to be at variance.[4] But the proceedings of this church had been more consonant with the spirit of evangelical truth, in directing the fallen to the one and only Mediator, and allowing of no other distinction among them, but that of a penitent or impenitent disposition.[5] In their first letter addressed to the clergy at Carthage, the Roman church had said of the fallen, "We have, indeed, separated them from us, yet we have not left them to themselves; but we have exhorted them and do still

[1] Cyprian, ep. 12, 13 et 14.

[2] Ep. 14: "Ad illorum violentiam interim quoquo genere mitigandam —, cum videretur et honor martyribus habendus, et eorum qui omnia turbare cupiebant, impetus comprimendus." Of the other lapsi, on the contrary, he says, ep. 13: "Qui nullo libello a martyribus accepto *invidiam faciunt;*" it was therefore this invidia which he feared.

[3] Auxilio eorum adjuvari apud Dominum in delictis suis possunt.

[4] Ep. 14. to the Roman clergy. Standum putavi et cum vestra sententia, ne actus noster, qui adunatus esse et consentire circa omnia debet, in aliquo discreparet.

[5] Ep. 2.

exhort them to repent, if peradventure they may obtain forgiveness from Him who alone can bestow it. We do this, lest they should become worse, if deserted by us. If such persons are attacked by sickness, become penitent for their offences, and anxiously desire the communion, they should certainly be assisted."

Yet by the Christian prudence manifested in the rest of his conduct, where he understood how to unite mildness with energy; by instructions and friendly paternal representations, winning over the better disposed among the confessors; by the firmness with which he maintained his ground against the presbyters who were so obstinate in their opposition; by the love and esteem in which he stood with the majority of the church, the bishop Cyprian seemed to have succeeded in restoring tranquillity at Carthage, and he was rejoicing in the hope, as the Decian persecution began to wane in its violence, of returning back to the church from which he had been painfully separated for a year, and of being able to celebrate with his flock the Easter of the year 251. But ere his hopes could be realized, he had to learn that the intrigues of the opposite party were too deeply laid, and too closely and firmly interwoven, to admit of being so easily destroyed. The fire which was smouldering on in secret, wanted but a favorable occasion to break forth into an open flame. This occasion Cyprian himself presented by the exercise of his episcopal power in an important matter.

Before he returned to his church, he had sent two bishops and two presbyters, as his deputies, with full powers to hold a visitation. They were to give to the poor of the church, who on account of their age or sickness could do nothing for their own support, so much out of the church treasury as might be necessary for the supply of their bodily wants. They were to add to the earnings of those who had a trade, but could not gain from it enough for their subsistence, or who wanted money to purchase the tools and stock necessary for their employments, or who had been interrupted in their business by the persecution, and were now wishing to commence it again, so much as might be needed in these several cases. Finally, they were to draw up a schedule of all the poor, who were to be supported out of the church funds, with a notice of their different ages, and of their behavior during the persecution, in order that the bishop, whose care it was, might become accurately acquainted with them all, and might promote the worthy, and as is here particularly specified, the *meek* and the *humble*, to such places in the service of the church, as they might be found qualified to fill. The last of these arrangements promised the following advantages,— that the abilities of such persons would be suitably employed in the service of the church; that they would secure for themselves an adequate support; and that, at the same time, a burden would be removed from the church funds. The qualifications to which particular attention was to be directed, namely, *meekness* and *humility*, were peculiarly needful, during this period of ferment and uneasiness in the church, in *those* who entered into its service, that the peace of the church might be restored on a solid foundation, and the first germs of division suppressed. The presbyterian party opposed to Cyprian may not have admit

ted the bishop's right to order such a church visitation, or distribution of the church funds, on his own responsibility, and without the concurrence of the whole presbyterial college; or they may have disputed, at least, the right in *Cyprian*, inasmuch as they were no longer willing to own him as their bishop; at any rate, it would be quite contrary to their plans, should he successfully carry through such an act of episcopal authority, which must tend to confirm his power in the church, to bind the church more closely to himself, and thus give strength to his party. At the head of the opposition in this instance appeared the deacon *Felicissimus*. His official character alone would give him considerable influence with a portion of his community, for in the church of North Africa as well as in the nearly related church of Spain,[1] the deacons had more power than they possessed in other countries. Besides, from circumstances of which we have no accurate knowledge, he had become an influential organ of his party, thought he was entitled, especially, perhaps, because part of the church funds was entrusted to his care,[2] to put in his word in a matter that concerned the application of the money of the church. He employed all his arts of persuasion, his influence and power, to excite a general spirit of determined opposition to this episcopal ordinance. He declared in particular to the poor belonging to the church of Novatus, over which he had been made deacon, that he should contrive means without fail, of providing for all their wants; and threatened, in case they appeared before those episcopal commissioners, that he would never admit them to the communion in his church.[3] This church now became the general resort of all the

[1] Concil. Illiberit. c. 77: Diaconus regens plebem.

[2] That in the North African church, it belonged to the deacons to keep and manage the church funds, we learn from the 49th letter of Cyprian, where it is brought as a charge against a deacon, that ecclesiasticæ pecuniæ sacrilega fraude subtractæ et viduarum ac pupillorum deposita denegata. And this was the case not only in North Africa, but also in the churches of an entirely different quarter of the world; as we learn from Origen's complaints of those deacons who enriched themselves at the expense of the church, (in Matth. T. XVI. c. 22:) Οἱ μὴ καλῶς διάκονοι διοικοῦντες τὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας χρήματα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ μὲν ταῦτα ῥηλαφῶντες, οὐ καλῶς δὲ αὐτὰ οἰκονομοῦντες, ἀλλὰ σωρεύοντες τὸν νομιζόμενον πλοῦτον καὶ χρήματα, ἵνα πλουτῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς λόγον πτωχῶν διδομένων, οὗτοι εἰσὶν οἱ κολλυβίσται τραπέζας χρημάτων ἔχοντες, ἃς κατέστρεψεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς. It is with reference to this fact, that Felicissimus is accused of "fraudes" and "rapinæ," ep. 55. Pecuniæ commissæ sibi fraudator. Similar charges were brought against Novatus, the presbyter and presiding officer of the community in which Felicissimus had been appointed deacon. True, these accusations against both, from the mouth of their enemy Cyprian, cannot be considered as credible testimony against them. An independent application of *that portion* of the church funds which was deposited in this filial community, — an application of them which, with the views they entertained of their relation to the bishop, they may have thought themselves warranted to make, — an application suited perhaps to the objects and ends of their party, may have been represented by Cyprian as embezzlement. At all events, the want of an impartial statement of the whole matter leaves it impossible to assert any thing here with confidence.

[3] Every thing here depends on the correct reading and interpretation of those difficult words in Cyprian, ep. 38: "comminatus, quod secum in morte," or "in monte non communicarent, qui nobis obtemperare voluissent." According to the reading "in morte," the meaning might be *either*, if the phrase "in morte" be referred to Felicissimus, that at his own death he would not acknowledge them as Christian brethren, would pronounce them excluded from church fellowship, — in other words, would never be reconciled to them; — in which case, however, it would be difficult to see how a threat of this kind could be so dreadful a thing to the Christians at Carthage; or, what would be a more natural construction, the phrase "in morte" being referred

lapsed who were unwilling to wait with patience till the whole matter relating to their case could be decided. Here, without any preparation, they were admitted to the communion,—here was the rallying point of all the disaffected,—a circumstance which must have been attended with the most disastrous effects on the discipline and order of the community.

It was these troubles which induced Cyprian to defer his return to Carthage until after the Easter of 251. He chose this particular time, because he could reckon on meeting at that time the other bishops of North Africa, who would be there assembled at the annual synod. This secured to him two advantages;—united with the collective body of his North African colleagues, he would be enabled to take a firm stand against the refractory; and certain settled principles having been fixed upon, after mature deliberation, by the synod, with regard to the proper treatment of the lapsi, he might hope that a limit would be set generally to the hitherto wavering practice of the North African church with regard to penance. In this council of the North African church, it was resolved to adopt a middle course between that excessive severity which cut off the lapsed from all hope, and a lax indulgence in complying with their wishes; to maintain the soundness of church discipline, and yet not drive the lapsed to despair by an unconditional refusal of absolution and re-admission to the church, whereby they might be led at length to abandon themselves to their lusts, or to sink back again into paganism. First, the different character of the offences should be carefully investigated,[1] and to all, not excepting even the *sacrificati*, who gave evidence by their conduct of a truly penitent spirit, the communion was to be granted, at least in cases of mortal sickness. Should such persons recover, they were not to be deprived of the privilege they had obtained by the grace of God, but might remain in the fellowship of the church.[2] When afterwards the persecution was renewed with increased violence, another indulgence, prompted by Christian charity and wisdom, was conceded, namely, that the communion should be granted to *all who had given evidence by their conduct of true penitence*, so that they might not enter the conflict unarmed, but strengthened by communion with the Lord's body.[3] But they who had not given the least evidence of repentance in any of their conduct,

to the subject understood in "communicarent," the meaning might be that they, at their own death, should not be admitted by him to the fellowship of the church, should not receive from him, as deacon, whose office it was to convey the consecrated elements to the sick, the communion of the supper. The latter interpretation gives a good sense, if we bear in mind, that Felicissimus was deacon of a particular parish church, and that he was well agreed with Novatus the presbyter and pastor of this church, so that it was in his power to refuse the communion to those who dwelt in this part of the diocese. An analogous sense results, if the reading "in monte" be adopted. In this case, we must suppose that the community over which Novatus and Felicissimus were placed, resided on an eminence in or near by Carthage,—and hence we might be reminded of the Montenses, the Donatists at Rome, who were so called from their place of assembly, which was situated on a hill. Felicissimus threatened to exclude those that complied with the requisition of Cyprian, from communion in this church.

[1] The different degree of guilt in the *sacrificati*, according to the different ways in which they had been induced to renounce the faith; and so also in the *libellatici*.

[2] Ep. 52.

[3] Ep. 54.

and first expressed a desire for the communion when on the sick bed, should not then receive it, because it was not sorrow for sin, but the fear of approaching death which had prompted the desire, and *he* was not deserving of consolation in death, who had not thought of death till it was near at hand. In this explanation, it certainly is not difficult to perceive the truly Christian effort to fix men's attention on the nature of true repentance, and to warn them against the error of reposing confidence on the opus operatum of absolution and the communion.[1] But as we see, the synod allowed itself, by this purely Christian interest, to be led into the mistake of pronouncing a sentence, too harsh and indiscriminate in this general form, on those who first expressed signs of penitence at the hour of death; for although such repentance might in most cases be false, resulting from mere sensuous impressions, yet in some cases, known only to the Omniscient, it might also be true. And it is clear that the synod might have secured its object without resorting to this unwarranted decision, by a more correct and clearer exposition of the nature of absolution in relation to the forgiveness of sin, as we have already explained. At this church assembly, sentence of condemnation was passed on the party of Felicissimus; and Cyprian, united with the bishops of North Africa, succeeded in putting an end to the schism.

It is true, the party did not at once give up their opposition. They sought to extend their influence in this part of the church; and several of the African bishops, who were at variance with their other colleagues, or who had been deposed for their bad conduct, united themselves to this party. They chose in the place of Cyprian, as bishop of Carthage, Fortunatus, one of the five disorderly presbyters. They sent delegates to Rome for the purpose of gaining over to their side this principal church of the West, and there demanded a hearing of the charges which they had to bring against Cyprian; but they were unable to dissolve the bond of friendship existing between the two most influential bishops of the West, although their clamors excited a momentary sensation. In a letter expressing in a remarkable manner the spirit of the episcopal theocracy, — a theocracy that savored more of Judaism than of Christianity,[2] — Cyprian urged the Roman bishop to defend against the schismatics the unity of the church founded on the union of the bishops. In the same letter, he strenuously contends also for the independence of the bishops in their own dioceses. "Since it has been decided by us all," he writes, "and is, moreover, just and right, that every man's cause should be examined into on the spot where the wrong has been done, and since *his own part* of the flock has been allotted to each pastor, which he is to guide and govern as *one who must render to the Lord an account of his stewardship;* those who are under our jurisdiction ought not to be suffered to go where they please, and by their deceptions and effrontery interrupt the harmony of the united bishops, but they should be obliged to prosecute their causes where accusers and witnesses of their offences can be had."

[1] Ep. 52

[2] Ep. 55 ad Cornel.

It is clear even from this exhibition of the case, in which we have been able to use the reports of only one party as the sources of our information, that Cyprian's conduct in this controversy was not wholly free from reproach; and we should, perhaps, find still more to censure, were it in our power to compare together the reports of the opposite parties. In this regard, a letter of Cyprian,[1] addressed to one of the opposition, Florentius Pupianus, who having maintained a good confession under the pains of torture, stood in high authority as a martyr, is particularly deserving of notice; for this letter is in answer to another, and hence we may gather from it, what Pupianus had to object against Cyprian. Although not free from that error of the *separatist* tendency which attaches undue importance to the subjective views and feelings, yet he appears to have been a pious, well-meaning man, — certainly not disinclined to hearken to reason. He had referred to many charges against Cyprian, of which we possess no further distinct information. He said that he had scruples which must first be removed before he could enter into terms of fellowship with him as a bishop.[2] He reminds him that priests should be humble, as even our Lord and his apostles were humble.[3]

Cyprian, by virtue of a tendency of mind not uncommon in North Africa, was inclined to lay too great stress on unusual psychological phenomena, on presentiments, visions and dreams, and was thus exposed to many delusions. He doubtless insisted on the voice of the Spirit, which he pretended to have heard on these occasions, where he ought to have maintained his positions on rational grounds; but Pupian disdained these evidences.[4]

The way in which Cyprian replied to this person was certainly not calculated to remove his scruples. Without entering at all into the matter of his opponent's charges, Cyprian continually insists on the same thing, — the inviolable authority of the bishop ordained of God, — and declares it impiety for any man to set up himself as a judge over the judicium Dei et Christi. He maintains that, as the bishop stands in fellowship with the entire church, so the church rests on the bishop; and whoever separates from the bishop, separates from the church.[5] His hierarchical arrogance inspired in him dreams and visions, which he pronounced divine revelations. He pretended that he had heard a divine voice, saying, "He that believes not Christ who appoints the priest, will be compelled to believe him when he avenges the priest."[6] He brings in proof of the necessity of the obedience to be rendered to the bishop, the fact that even the bees had a queen which they obeyed, and robbers, a captain whom they followed in all things. Moreover, the way in which he appeals to the testimony of Christians and pagans

[1] Ep. 69.

[2] This we gather from Cyprian's answer: Dixisti, scrupulum tibi esse tollendum de animo, in quem incidisti.

[3] Sacerdotes humiles esse debere, quia et Dominus et Apostoli ejus humiles fuerunt.

[4] As may be inferred from Cyprian's words: Quanquam sciam somnia ridicula et visiones ineptas videri.

[5] Unde scire debes, episcopum in ecclesia esse, et ecclesiam in episcopo; et si quis cum episcopo non sit, in ecclesia non esse.

[6] Qui Christo non credit sacerdotem facienti, postea credere incipiet, sacerdotem vindicanti.

concerning his humility, is not exactly suited to refute what Pupian had said respecting his want of that virtue.[1]

When Cyprian wrote the above mentioned letter, in the year 253 or 254, — for according to his own account he had then administered the episcopal office for a period of six years, — the conventicles of this party, where the holy supper was distributed, still remained open.[2] Pupian had reproached him also with this, that by his fault a part was separated from the whole community.[3] Commodian, who wrote his Christian Admonitions at a somewhat later period, considered it still needful to combat this separatist tendency, which, as usually happens, perhaps continued to be cherished for a short time even after the occasion was forgotten which first called it forth. He rebukes those who see the motes in others' eyes, but cannot discern the beams that are in their own.[4]

The second schism had its origin in the Roman church; and as in the suppression of the first, Cornelius of Rome coöperated with Cyprian of Carthage, so in this we see Cyprian joined with Cornelius in maintaining the church unity. This latter division, like the former, sprung out of a controversy relating to the choice of a bishop, and from the collision of opposite opinions respecting the proper administration of church penance; but with this difference, that in the first case, the schism proceeded from the laxer party, in the last, from the more rigid one. The immediate occasion which led to the actual outbreak of this as well as the other schisms, were various occurrences which took place during the persecution of Decius. We have already observed, that in the Roman church, the prevailing inclination was on the whole to the milder principle in regard to the matter of penance; but there was also in that church a more rigid party, at the head of which stood *Novatian*, an eminent presbyter, who had acquired celebrity as a theological writer.

For the rest, we possess but scanty means of accurate information with regard to the character of this man, — not enough to enable us to form any certain conclusions as to the relation of his views on this question and of his whole conduct in this affair to the peculiar bent of his disposition; for the sayings of exasperated enemies, and representations which every where bear the marks of passionate exaggeration, are of course entitled to no credit. When we endeavor to separate the facts at bottom from the distorted and spiteful representations of Novatian's opponents, the following presents itself as the most probable state of the case. Novatian had been thrown, by fierce conflicts within, from an earnest frame of mind into one of those states, usually existing in connection with a demoniacal possession. This was for him, as it was for

[1] Humilitatem meam et fratres omnes et gentiles quoque optime novunt et diligunt; et tu quoque noveras et diligebas, cum adhuc in ecclesia esses et mecum communicares.

[2] As Cyprian himself gives us to understand, when he says: Frustra sibi blandiri eos, qui, pacem cum sacerdotibus Dei non habentes, obrepunt et latenter apud quosdam communicare se credunt.

[3] Scripsisti quoque, quod ecclesia nunc propter me portionem sui in dispenso habeat.

[4] Cap 66:

Dispositum tempus venit nostris. Pax est in orbe
Et ruina simul blandiente seculo premit
Præcipitis populi, quem in schisma misistis.
Conspicitis stipulam cohærentem in oculis nostris
Et vestris in oculis non vultis cernere trabem.

so many others of that period, the hard way to faith. It was to the prayer of an exorcist of the Roman church, that he, — who had perhaps already been touched in various ways by the power of Christianity, — owed his restoration for the moment. From this violent convulsion of his whole being, he fell into a severe sickness, whence first resulted his entire and radical cure. In the course of this sickness his faith became established, and seeing death near at hand, he received baptism on the sick bed. He found in Christianity peace, rest and sanctifying power. As he became distinguished for stedfastness in faith, clearness of Christian knowledge, — of which his writings bear witness, — for a happy faculty of teaching and for an ardor in the pursuit of holiness, which afterwards led him to the ascetic life, the bishop Fabian ordained him presbyter, overlooking the fact that he had first made profession of his faith and been baptized on the bed of sickness. The Roman clergy were dissatisfied, from the first, with this procedure; because they held to the *letter* of that church law, which required that no individual baptized on the sick bed, — no clinicus, — should receive ordination; but the wiser Fabian decided more according to the *spirit* than according to the *letter* of this law,[1] for its object was simply to exclude from the spiritual order those who had been induced to receive baptism without true repentance, conviction and knowledge, in the momentary agitation excited by the fear of death. In Novatian's case, every apprehension of this kind was removed by his subsequent life. For a season, he exchanged the active life of a practical ecclesiastic for the noiseless seclusion of the ascetic; but afterwards, perhaps not till he had made up his mind to place himself at the head of a party, he was induced once more to resume the active duties of his office.[2]

[1] As this is expressed in the 12th canon of the council held at Neo Cæsarea, A. D. 314; for after it had been here declared, that a person baptized in sickness could not be consecrated as a presbyter, it was assigned as a reason, "that such faith did not spring from free conviction, but was forced," (*οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως γὰρ ἡ πίστις αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης.*) Hence too, an exception was made, viz. unless it might be permitted on account of his subsequent zeal and faith, (*διὰ τὴν μετὰ ταῦτα αὐτοῦ σπουδὴν καὶ πίστιν.*) This exception might apply to Novatian.

[2] It is particularly important to compare here the synodal letter of Cornelius, bishop of Rome, to Fabius, bishop of Antioch. A fragment of it has been preserved by Eusebius, (l. VI. c. 43.) This letter deserves notice as illustrating that tendency of the church spirit to confound the outward with the inner life, which became, at an early period, so markedly prominent, especially at Rome. It is urged as an objection against Novatian, that his restoration from a demoniacal frenzy, (see above,) as it was called, by exorcists of the Roman church, had been the means of his conversion. Whether this were the case or not, that surely could bring no reproach on Novatian's character as a Christian, which belonged simply to the means whereby he had been led to embrace Christianity. Not less wanting in good sense than unworthy of a Christian, was the reproachful language of Cornelius, that Satan was the occasion of Novatian's faith, (*ᾧ γε ἀφορμὴ τοῦ πιστεύσαι γέγονεν ὁ σατανᾶς*;) as if the works of the evil one must not often become subservient to the foundation and increase of the kingdom of God. After his restoration from this demoniacal disease, it is objected again, that he fell into a severe fit of sickness, (which may be very naturally explained; the crisis in his whole organic system, for which he was indebted to the restoration from that frenzy-like condition, was the cause of the sickness,) and that in the apprehension of death, he received baptism, but baptism only by sprinkling, as his condition required, (the baptismus clinicorum not being, according to the usual practice of those times, by immersion,) if it could be said, indeed, that such a one had been baptized at all. It is objected, moreover, that subsequently he received none of those rites which should have been bestowed on him according to the usages of the

Some slight hints of Cyprian by no means suffice to prove that Novatian, previous to his conversion, had been a stoic philosopher, and that the spirit of the stoic morality, mixing in with his Christianity, had produced that severe tone of thinking which distinguished him on these matters. His principles admit of so natural an explanation from the sternness of his Christian character, he acted in this case so entirely in the spirit of a whole party of the church in his time, that there is the less need of attempting to derive them from some outward source, for which there is not the least ground of historical evidence.[1]

Here a question arises of considerable importance, as the right answer to it would materially assist us in forming a judgment both as to the matters in dispute, and as to the character of Novatian. It is this, — whether his opposition was, in the first place, to Cornelius as bishop, or to the milder principles of church penance. According to the accusations of his passionate opponents, we must, indeed, suppose, that in the outset he was striving, from motives of ambition, after the episcopal dignity, and was thence induced to excite these troubles and throw himself at the head of a party. If it could be proved, that during the Decian persecution he still belonged to the milder party, it might in this way be made to appear probable, that he had been driven to those extremes by outward causes of excitement. Now the Roman clergy, in the time of the Decian persecution, and while they were without a bishop, sent to Cyprian, bishop of Carthage,[2] a letter in which he was informed of their decision, that absolution ought to be

church, — not confirmation by the hand of the bishop. "*How then could he possibly have received the Holy Ghost?*" (All this is *so wholly* characteristic of the outwardness and passionate slavery to prejudice of the hierarchical spirit then acquiring strength in the Roman church!) A bishop of Rome, probably Fabianus, — the letter goes on to say, — ordained him presbyter, against the wishes of the rest of the clergy, who objected to the ordination of a person who had been baptized by sprinkling, on a sick bed. The bishop, (probably a man of more liberal spirit,) wished in this case to make an exception. Cornelius again objects to him, that during the persecution, he had shut himself up in a chamber, out of fear; and was unwilling to leave it, to perform the duties of his office in behalf of such as needed his help. When his deacons asked him to do this, he turned them off with the reply, that "he was the friend of another philosophy." We can here, to be sure, merely *conjecture* what the fact at bottom is, which lies under the distorted representation of Cornelius's hatred. By the ἑτέρα φιλοσοφία, is to be understood, probably, the secluded life of the ascetic as compared to that of the practical ecclesiastic. Novatian may have retired, for a season, into solitude, and withdrawn himself from public occupations. This is in keeping with the austere character which expresses itself in his principles of penitence; and he might, as an ascetic, too, stand in high consideration with the church. Novatian may have been wrong in this respect, that by the misleadings of a false asceticism, he forgot Christian charity, and was unwilling to leave his spiritual quiet and solitude, to serve the brethren who needed his priestly offices; but Cornelius may have allowed himself to invent for his conduct on this occasion, another motive, inconsistent with Novatian's character.

[1] It is by no means clear, that Novatian's opponents seriously thought of deriving his peculiar views from any such source as this. When Cyprian objects to these views, that they are more stoic than Christian, (ep. 52 ad Antonian.,) this naturally refers to their character only, and not to their origin; and when he upbraids him, "Jactet se licet et philosophiam vel eloquentiam suam superbis vocibus prædicet," the first alludes perhaps to the τρίβων, the pallium of the ἀσκητης, (see the preceding note,) or to the fame of a distinguished dogmatic writer which Novatian had acquired as author of the work De regula fidei, or De trinitate Thus too, Cornelius speaks of him in the above cited letter, as Οὗτος ὁ δογματιστὴς, ὁ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς ἐτιστήμης ὑπερασπιστὴς.

[2] Ep. 31

granted at the extremity of death to all lapsed persons who manifested true penitence; — a decision at variance with the principles of the more rigid party, according to which all who had been convicted of peccata mortalia should be unconditionally excluded from church absolution. And yet, according to Cyprian's testimony, this letter was composed by Novatian.[1] But even if Cyprian's account be entirely correct, yet from a letter setting forth the common decision of a college of presbyters, no certain inference can be drawn with regard to the subjective opinion of the individual who composed it; for nothing else needed to proceed from him besides the form and style of composition. It may be, that Novatian at this time submitted to the voice of the majority, which he afterwards felt himself bound to oppose. By the same letter, in fact, notice was also given, that a settled decision on these controverted matters should finally be made, at the restoration of peace, and after a new bishop had been chosen. Novatian, although himself inclined to the severer principles, might the more readily yield for the moment, in the hope of being able to succeed, when the matter should be discussed preparatory to the final decision, in procuring an authoritative sanction of his own principles. In the same letter, too, he expresses himself doubtfully enough with regard to the significancy of the absolution imparted in such cases, — "God only knows," he says, "how he will dispose of such, and by what rule he will judge them;"[2] language which intimates the writer's own opinion, that absolution could not with propriety be granted to such persons; that they should only be recommended to the divine mercy, and the decision of their fate left with God; although we would not deny that one might express himself thus from the position of the milder party, in the consciousness of the deceptive nature of all outward signs of penitence.[3] If Novatian generally performed at this time the function of secretary to the Roman church,[4] he must be considered as the writer also of a somewhat earlier letter,[5] composed in the name of the Roman clergy, in which the same principles are expressed as in the second. Supposing this to be so, then what we have just said respecting the relation of the writer's own opinions to the views expressed in the communication of a public body, must be applied also to this letter.[6] It was never objected to Novatian, that

[1] He says, for instance, ep. 52, of this letter: Novatiano tunc scribente et quod scripserat, sua voce recitante.

[2] Deo ipso sciente, quid de talibus faciat et qualiter judicii sui examinet pondera.

[3] See Cyprian, ep. 52: Si nos aliquis pœnitentiæ simulatione deluserit, Deus, qui non deridetur, et qui cor hominis intuetur, de his quæ nos minus perspeximus, judicet, et servorum suorum sententiam Dominus emendet

[4] Which, however, cannot be certainly inferred from the testimony of Cyprian, already cited. For it is left doubtful, whether it was by a mere accident that Novatian composed that letter, or whether he wrote it in his official capacity. We must allow it, however, to be not improbable, that the theological author, in a church where learning and talent for composition were not so common, would be made the church secretary.

[5] The letter we have cited already at page 134, note 1, and page 226, note 1.

[6] In this letter, too, the subjective opinion of the writer *may* gleam through the language, where he speaks of the admonitions given to the fallen: "Ipsos cohortati sumus et hortamur, agere pœnitentiam, si quo modo indulgentiam poterunt recipere ab eo qui potest præstare," — though the words do not *necessarily* express as much. In the severity of tone with which this letter speaks of those bishops that forsook their communities, we might likewise recognize the sentiments of the more rigid Novatian.

his later views contradicted the convictions he had earlier expressed; and it admits of being easily explained, how it should happen that the opposition of the more rigid party did not assume a bolder form until the close of the persecution, when the deliberations respecting the treatment of the lapsi commenced, and when the milder party obtained a leader in the person of their bishop Cornelius. We have the less reason to doubt, that it was his zeal for the more rigid principles which inspired Novatian from the first, because they accorded so perfectly with his character. The accusations of his opponents should not be suffered to embarrass us; for it is the usual way with theological polemics, to trace schisms and heresies to some outward, unhallowed motive, even where there is no evidence at all that any such motive nas existed. Novatian had on some occasion solemnly declared, after the Roman bishopric was vacated by the death of Fabian, that he would not be a candidate for the episcopal dignity,—an office to which perhaps, on account of the high respect entertained for him, as an ascetic and a divine, by a large portion of the community, he might easily have attained. But he said he had no longing for that office. We have no reason, with the bishop Cornelius, to accuse Novatian in this case of falsehood. He could say this with perfect sincerity; he, the quiet loving ascetic, the theologian glad to be left undisturbed to his dogmatic speculations, surely had no wish to burden himself with an office so overwhelmed with cares as that of a Roman bishop had already become. Cornelius knows, indeed, that he *secretly* aspired after the episcopal dignity; but whence had Cornelius the faculty to penetrate thus into the secret feelings and inmost recesses of his opponent's heart? Cyprian himself intimates, that a party strife *concerning principles*, in the outset wholly objective, had preceded; and it was not until this dispute made a schism inevitable, that the opposite party set up another bishop, as their chief, against Cornelius.[1] Inspired by his ascetic zeal, Novatian was only contending for what he conceived to be the purity of the church, and against the decline of discipline, without wishing or seeking for anything besides. Settled in his own convictions, zealous in the defence of them, but averse, by natural disposition, to everything that savored of a boisterous outward activity, he was, against his own will, made the head of a party by those who agreed with him in principles, and compelled by them to assume the episcopal dignity. In this regard, he could say with truth, in his letter to Dionysius bishop of Alexandria, "*that he had been hurried on against his will.*"[2]

The man who, properly, was the *moving soul* of this party, and to whose influence, doubtless, it was owing, that they broke entirely with Cornelius and created another bishop for themselves, came from a different quarter. *Novatus*, the Carthagenian presbyter, who had been the chief instigator of the troubles in the church of North Africa, had left that country, when Cyprian gained the ascendancy; whether

[1] Cyprian, ep. 42: Diversæ partis obstinata et inflexibilis pertinacia *non tantum* matris sinum recusavit; sed etiam, *gliscente et in pejus recrudescente discordia, episcopum* sibi constituit.

[2] Ὅτι ἄκων ἠχθη. Euseb. l. VI. c. 46.

it was, that he no longer agreed with the principles of Felicissimus, and yet could not be reconciled to Cyprian, and would not have him for his bishop, or whether it was only the *failure* of his intrigues against Cyprian, that induced him to this step. He had betaken himself to Rome, where he found those disputes already existing in the bud. His temperament did not allow him to lie idle and neutral where strife and agitation were going on. According to the principles which, in common with the other four presbyters and Felicissimus, he had advocated at Carthage, he ought to have leaned to the cause of Cornelius.[1] But whether he had now undergone a radical change in his views on the matters in dispute, either through the influence of Novatian, his superior as a theoretical theologian, or in consequence of his ardent temperament, so ready to fly from one extreme to another; or whether he took no interest in the real object of the dispute, either at Carthage or at Rome, but was only, in his way, everywhere a friend to the party in opposition; whether he was inclined to espouse the cause of that party which *had no bishop at its head*, or whether he hated Cornelius for other reasons,—it suffices to know, that Novatus enlisted warmly in the contest for the principles of Novatian. He was the man, wherever he might be, at Carthage or at Rome, to become the moving spring of agitation, although he placed some one else at the head and caused every thing to move under the name of the latter. Thus may it have been through *his* active influence, that the schism became more decided in its character, and that Novatian was forced by his party to place himself, as bishop, in opposition to Cornelius.

As to the latter, he had been governed, in his treatment of those who had fallen during the persecution of Decius, by the milder principles of the church. He had received many to church fellowship, who were accused, at least by the other party, of being *sacrificati*. It was laid to his account, by Novatian and his followers, that he had polluted the church by the admission of the unclean; and on both sides, great liberties were taken in ascribing the actions of the opposite party to secret motives, calculated to place them in the most unfavorable light. As Cornelius pretended to believe that Novatian acted under the impulse of an ambitious longing after the episcopal dignity, so a part at least of Novatian's followers attributed the mildness of Cornelius towards others to the consciousness of similar guilt in himself, for he, as they affirmed, was a libellaticus.[2] Both parties sought, as usual in such cases of dispute, to secure on their own side the verdict of the great metropolitan churches at Alexandria, Antioch and Carthage, and both sent delegates to those communities. The zeal shown by Novatian for

[1] Mosheim defends Novatus against the reproach of contradicting himself, by recalling the fact, that Novatus was not one of those five presbyters, and that he agreed with these and with Felicissimus, not in every respect, but only in their opposition to Cyprian. But the evidence above cited stands in the way of this assertion. The strongest argument which Mosheim brings in favor of *his* opinion is, that Cyprian, who hunted up every possible charge against Novatian, yet *never* accuses him, even when he had occasion for so doing, of self-contradiction. But it may be conceived, that Cyprian was loth to touch on this point, because he had reason to fear a retort on account of his own change of principles.

[2] Cyprian, ep. 52.

the strictness of church discipline and the purity of Christian conduct, to the honesty of which zeal his own life bore testimony, and the authority of certain confessors united with him in the beginning, procured for his delegates a favorable reception. One bishop, Fabius of Antioch, was even on the point of deciding in his favor. Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, a mild, prudent, liberal minded man, was opposed to the Novatian principles from the first; but he began with trying by friendly persuasions to prevail on Novatian to submit. He wrote in reply to his application,[1] "If you have been urged on, as you say, against your own will, you will prove this by voluntarily turning about; for there is nothing you ought not to be willing to suffer rather than create a schism in the church of God. And martyrdom incurred for the sake of preventing such a schism would be not less glorious, than martyrdom to avoid being an idolater; nay, it would, in my opinion, be a nobler act, — for in the one case, you become a martyr for the peace of your own soul, in the other, for the good of the entire church. If, then, you should now, either by persuasion or by constraint, restore the brethren to unanimity, the good you would thus effect would exceed the evil which you have occasioned. The latter would not be charged to your account, and the former would redound to your praise. But should they refuse to follow you, and the affair prove impracticable, hasten at least to deliver *your own* soul Follow after peace; and I bid you farewell in the Lord." But Novatian was too firmly set in his opinions, and too far carried away by his polemic zeal, to listen to such representations as these. The amiable Dionysius, therefore, now declared more decidedly against him, and used his influence also to draw away others from his party. He accused him of promulgating the most mischievous doctrines concerning God, and of misrepresenting the compassionate Saviour as an unmerciful being.[2]

Novatian might now rely with the more confidence on finding support in North Africa, because Cyprian had himself been hitherto inclined to favor similar principles on the matter of penitence. But meanwhile Cyprian, as we have already observed, had changed his views and his line of conduct, thus bringing upon himself the charge of inconsistency and fickleness of mind.[3] At the same time, he looked upon Novatian as a disturber of the church unity, who set up himself against a bishop regularly chosen and appointed by God himself, and who would prescribe his own peculiar principles as laws for the entire church.

The controversy with the Novatian party turned upon two general points; one relating to the principles of penitence, the other to the question, what constitutes the idea and essence of a true church? In respect to the first point of dispute, Novatian had been often unjustly accused of maintaining, that no person, having once violated his baptismal vows, can ever obtain forgiveness of sin, — he is certainly exposed to eternal damnation. But first, Novatian by no means maintained that a Christian is a perfect saint; he spoke here not of all sins, but

[1] Euseb. l. VI. c. 46.

[2] Euseb. l. VII. c. 8: Τὸν χρηστότατον κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, ὡς ἀνηλεῆ συκοφαντοῦντι.

[3] Ep. 52: Ne me aliquis existimet, a proposito meo leviter recessisse.

assuming as valid the above-mentioned distinction between "peccata venialia" and "peccata mortalia," he was treating only of the latter. Again, he was speaking by no means of the *divine forgiveness of sin*, but only of the church tribunal, of *absolution* by the church. The *church*, he would say, has no right to grant absolution to a person who, by any mortal sin, has trifled away the pardon obtained for him by Christ, and appropriated to him by baptism. No counsel of God, touching the case of such persons, has been revealed; for the forgiveness of sin, which the gospel assures us of, relates only to sins committed before baptism. We ought doubtless to be interested for such fallen brethren, but nothing can be done for them save to exhort them to repent, and to commend them to God's mercy. "The sacrificati," Novatian wrote,[1] "must not be received to the communion; they should only be exhorted to repentance, — the forgiveness of their sins must be left to that God, who alone has power to forgive sin." That this was Novatian's doctrine, even Cyprian, — though in the heat of controversy he was not always mindful of it, — evidently presupposes, when he says,[2] "Oh, what mockery of the deceived brethren, what empty cheating of those afflicted, unhappy men, — to exhort them to a repentance whereby they are to satisfy God, and yet deprive them of the salvation which they were to obtain by this satisfaction! To say to your brother, — mourn, weep tears, sigh day and night, abound in good works, so thou mayst wash away thy sins, but after all thou shalt die *without the church*. Thou must do all that serves to obtain peace; but the peace thou seekest, thou shalt not obtain! Who would not give up at once? Who would not sink in very despair? Think you, the husbandman could labor, were it said to him, 'Bestow all diligence and care on the culture of your fields, but you shall reap no harvest?'" It must be allowed that Cyprian, even in what he says here, does not enter enough into his opponent's train of thought, and is not entirely fair towards him. For it was, by no means, Novatian's doctrine, that all the efforts of a person, doing penance in this sense, were to no purpose. He maintained *only*, that the church was not warranted to announce to him the forgiveness of sin, which was sought and which divine grace might bestow.

As we see from Novatian's declaration in the passage just quoted from Socrates, the question in this controversy related, in the outset, only to *one* of *those offences* reckoned among the peccata mortalia, only to acts involving the denial of Christianity. On the supposition that Novatian was at first so severe only against *this* class of offences, Cyprian was right in attacking the standard of the whole moral judgment which must lie at the basis of this mode of procedure, — in combatting the notion, that barely *such* offences were to be denominated sins against God, denial of God, denial of Christianity; as if every sin were not a sin against God, a practical denial of God, and of Christianity. "It must be allowed," says Cyprian,[3] "the sin of an adulterer and deceiver is more aggravated than that of the libellatici; for the latter

[1] Vid. Socrat. l. IV. c. 28. [2] Ep. 52. [3] Ep. 52.

have fallen into sin by yielding to force, under the wrong impression that it is enough merely not to have sacrificed, while the former sins out of free choice. Adulterers and deceivers, according to the apostle Paul, Eph. 5: 5, are as idolaters." "For since our bodies are the members of Christ, and each of us is a temple of God, whoever by adultery violates God's temple, offends God himself; and whoever in committing sin does the will of the devil, serves evil spirits and false gods: for evil works proceed not from the Holy Spirit, but from the instigations of the adversary, and evil desires proceeding from the unclean spirit impel men to act against God and to serve Satan."

But later, at least, the Novatian party applied their principle avowedly to the entire class of "mortal sins;" which application Novatian himself most probably had in mind from the beginning, though the immediate turn of the controversy led him to speak of one description only of mortal sins. The ascetic was assuredly not disposed to treat sins of voluptuousness with too much indulgence.

Again, Novatian speaks, in the passage from Socrates, of those only who had sacrificed. But if Cyprian does not misrepresent Novatian, the latter, in the outset at least, must, with great injustice, have placed in the same category, all who had in any way proved unfaithful under the persecution, as well libellatici as sacrificati, without respect to the different gradations of guilt, or to the different circumstances that accompanied it; and utterly refused absolution to all libellatici as well as sacrificati, without considering how many of the libellatics were guilty rather of an error and mistake of the understanding, than of an actual sin.

There is beautifully expressed, in the manner in which Cyprian combated these principles of Novatian,[1] the loving, paternal heart of the pious shepherd, following his Master's example — the animating spirit of Christian charity and Christian sympathy. Having supposed the case, that many a libellatic, whose conscience reproved him of no crime, might be tempted, in despair, to tear himself away, with his family, from the church, and seek admission into some heretical sect, he observes — "At the day of judgment, it will be laid to our charge that we took no care of the wounded sheep, and on account of one that was diseased, left many sound ones to perish; that while our Lord left the ninety and nine whole sheep, and went after the one that had wandered and become weary, and when he had found it, brought it away himself on his shoulders, we not only do not seek after the fallen, but even reject them when they return to us." He contrasts with this severity several passages from the apostle Paul, (1 Corinth. 9: 22, — 12: 26, —10: 33, etc.) and then adds, "The case stands differently with the philosophers and stoics, who say all sins are alike, and that a sound man should not easily be brought to bend. But the difference is wide betwixt philosophers and Christians. We are bound to keep aloof from what proceeds, not from God's grace, but from the pride of a severe philosophy. Our Lord says, in his gospel, 'Be ye merciful, even as

[1] Ep. 52

your Father is merciful;' and 'the whole need not a physician, but the sick;' but such a physican he cannot be, who says, I take care only of the sound who need no physician. Behold, yonder lies thy brother, wounded in battle by his enemy. On the one hand, Satan is trying to destroy him whom he has wounded; on the other, Christ exhorts us not to leave him to perish, whom he has redeemed. Which cause do we espouse; on whose side do we stand? Do we help the devil finish his work of destruction? Do we, like the priest and the Levite in the gospel, pass by our brother lying half dead? Or do we, like the priests of God and of Christ, following Christ's precepts and example, snatch the wounded man from the grasp of his enemy; that having done every thing for his salvation, we may leave the final decision of his case to the judgment of God?"[1]

Beautifully and truly said as all this was, in opposition to *the spirit* of Novatianism, yet Novatian's principles could neither be touched nor refuted by it. Novatian too declared that the fallen brethren must be cared for, and exhorted to repentance. He too acknowledged God's mercy towards sinners, and allowed it right to recommend the fallen to that mercy; but that men could once more surely announce to them that forgiveness of sins they had trifled away, this he was unwilling to concede, because he could find no objective ground for such confidence. Hence, the only way in which he could be substantially refuted, was to point out such an objective ground of confidence for all sinners, — namely, in the merits of Christ, which the sinner needed ever but to appropriate to himself in believing penitence and believing trust, when the true relation was unfolded between the objective and subjective in justification and regeneration. But on this point, Novatian's opponents themselves had not the clearest views; — for though, in opposing his principles, they did sometimes refer, indeed, to 1 John 2: 1, 2, yet in so doing, they expressed themselves as if the forgiveness of sin obtained by Christ, related properly to those sins alone which had been committed before baptism; and as if in respect to sins committed afterwards, there was need of a new and special satisfaction by good works. This position once taken, Novatian might fairly ask, who can vouch for it, that such a satisfaction will suffice?

With regard to the second main point of the controversy,[2] the idea of the church, Novatian maintained, that one of the essential marks of a true church being purity and holiness, every church which, neglecting the right exercise of church discipline, tolerated in its bosom, or readmitted to its communion, such persons as, by gross sins, have broken their baptismal vow, ceased by that very act to be a true Christian church, and forfeited all the rights and privileges of such a church.

[1] Ut curatum Deo judici reservemus, upon the supposition, that is, that absolution cannot forestall God's judgment, but remains valid at the divine tribunal only when God, who tries the secrets of the heart, finds the temper of the man to correspond with this absolution.

[2] Pacianus, of Barcelona, who wrote in the latter part of the fourth century, concisely expressed the two main positions of Novatian in these words: "Quod mortale peccatum ecclesia donare non possit, immo quod ipsa pereat recipiendo peccantes." Ep. III. contra Novatian. Galland. bibl patr. T. VII.

Hence the Novatianists, as they held themselves to be alone the pure, immaculate church, called themselves "*οἱ καθαροί*," the Pure. It was rightly urged against Novatian, that individuals could be accountable and punishable only for their own sins, and not for the sins of others in which they had no share; that it was only the inner fellowship with sinners by the disposition of the heart, not outward companionship with them, that tended necessarily to contaminate; and that it was a mere assumption of human pride, to pretend to the exercise here below of that judicial power of separation between the true and false members of the church, which the Lord has reserved in his own hands. On this point, Cyprian finely remarks, "Though the tares appear to exist in the church, this should not disturb our faith or our love so far as to lead us to separate ourselves from the church itself, because there are tares in it. We should see to it, that we ourselves belong to the wheat, so that when the grain is gathered into our Lord's garner, we may receive the reward of our work. The apostle says, 'in a great house, there are not only vessels of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honor and some to dishonor.' Let us labor with all diligence, that we may be vessels of gold or of silver. To dash the earthen vessel in pieces, belongs to the Lord alone, to whom is also given the rod of iron. The servant cannot be greater than his Master; and no man may arrogate to himself what the Father has given only to his Son; nor suppose himself able to wield the fan to winnow and cleanse the floor; or of separating, by mere human judgment, every tare from the wheat."

But after all, it was impossible in this direction to find the real point at issue for the confutation of Novatianism; rather, Novatian and his opponents were here involved in the same fundamental error and differed only in their application of it. It was the fundamental error of confounding the notions of the visible and the invisible church. Hence was it, that Novatian, transferring the predicate of purity and unspotted holiness, which belongs to the invisible church, the community of the saints as such, to the visible form in which the invisible church appears, drew the conclusion, that every community which suffered unclean members to remain in it, ceased to be any longer a true church. The same error of conceiving the church as something wholly outward, which lies at the bottom of Novatian's false application of the predicates belonging to the notion of the church, is also betrayed when he maintains that a person is made impure by outward connection with the impure in the same church fellowship. But the opponents of Novatian, who started with the same fundamental error, differ from him *only* by laying at the basis of their speculations the notion of the church as mediated by the succession of bishops, and then deriving the predicates of purity and holiness from that notion. The church transmitted and propagated by the succession of bishops was, in their view, as such, a pure and holy one. Novatian, on the other hand, laid at the basis of his theory, the visible church as a pure and holy one, and this was, in his view, the condition of the truly catholic church. The catholic church, transmitted by the succession of bishops, ceases, in his opinion,

to be a truly catholic one, as soon as it becomes stained and desecrated through the fellowship of unworthy men. The more objective or subjective tendency made all the difference between the two parties, in their application of the same fundamental principle.

Now, instead of distinguishing different applications of the notion of the church, Cyprian is contented to distinguish simply a *two-fold condition of one and the same church*, its condition on earth and its condition in glory, where the separation has been made complete by the final judgment. Entangled in this fundamental error of confounding Outward things with Inner, it came about on a subsequent occasion, when the controversy with Novatianism was no longer before his mind, that he approached very nearly himself to the Novatian principles, declaring to certain Spanish communities,[1] that by tolerating unworthy priests they would be defiled themselves; that they who remained in union with sinners would become themselves partakers of their sins.[2]

Out of this controversy too, the catholic church system, so firmly established and exactly compacted in all its parts, came forth victorious; and the Novatianists continued to linger along in the following centuries only as an insulated and insignificant sect.

[1] Ep. 68.

[2] Consortes et participes alienorum delictorum fieri, qui fuerint delinquentibus copulati.

Reached this page in my reading on March 1st 1893 and will henceforth substitute my own markings for Dr. Johnston's.
Jno Lyda Vance.

SECTION THIRD.

CHRISTIAN LIFE AND CHRISTIAN WORSHIP.

Christian Life.

Christianity, since it first entered into human nature, has operated, wherever it has struck root, with the same divine power for sanctification; and this divine power cannot be weakened by the lapse of ages. In this respect, therefore, the period of the first appearance of Christianity could have no advantage over any of the following ages of the Christian church. There was but one peculiarity of this first period, viz. that the change wrought by Christianity, in the consciousness and life of those in whom it was produced, could not fail to be more strongly marked by the contrast it presented with what they had previously been, as pagans; — and so the Apostle Paul, in writing to Christians converted from Paganism, reminds them of what they once were, when they walked according to the course of this world, according to the spirit that was then working in the children of disobedience — and after enumerating some of the prevailing vices of the corrupt pagan world, says to them, "and such were some of you; but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God." Teachers of the church, who had been pagans, frequently appeal to such experiences of which they themselves had been the subjects. Thus Cyprian, under the first glow of conversion, witnesses of it.[1] "Receive from me, what must be felt ere it is *learned*, what is not gathered from a course of long continued study, but seized at once, by the shorter method of grace. While I was lying in darkness and blind night, tossed about by the waves of the world, ignorant of the way of life, estranged from the truth and from the light; what divine mercy promised for my salvation, seemed to me, in my then state of mind, a hard and impracticable thing; — that a man should *be born again*, and casting off his former self, while his bodily nature remained the same, become in soul and disposition, another man. How, said I, can *such a change* be possible; that what is so deep-rooted within should be extirpated at once? Entangled in the many errors of my earlier life, from which I could see no deliverance, I abandoned myself to my besetting sins, and despairing of amendment, nurtured the evil within me as if it belonged to my nature. But when, after the stains of my former life had been washed away by the water of regeneration, light from on high was shed abroad in a heart now freed from guilt, made clear and pure; when I breathed the spirit of heaven, and

Nicodemus a
Jesus on
generation

[1] Ad Donat.

was changed by the second birth into a *new* man, all my doubts were, at once, strangely resolved. That lay open, which had been shut to me; that was light, where I had seen nothing but darkness; that became easy, which was before difficult; practicable, which before seemed impossible; so that I could understand how it was that, being born in the flesh, I lived subject to sin,—a worldly life; but the life I had now begun to live, was the commencement of a life from God, of a life quickened by the Holy Spirit. From God, from *God*, I repeat, proceeds all we can now do; from Him we derive our life and our power." Justin Martyr describes thus the change produced in Christians:[1] "We, who were once slaves of lust, now have delight only in purity of morals; we, who once practised arts of magic, have consecrated ourselves to the Eternal and Good God; we, who once prized gain above all things, give even what we have to the common use, and share it with such as are in need; we, who once hated and murdered one another, who on account of differences of customs would have no common hearth with strangers, do now, since the appearance of Christ, live together with them; we pray for our enemies; we seek to convince those that hate us without cause, so that they may order their lives according to Christ's glorious doctrine and attain to the joyful hope of receiving like blessings with us from God, the Lord of all." Origen appeals to the effects wrought by Christianity in the communities scattered through the world, as evidence of the truth of the evangelical history. "The work of Jesus," he says,[2] "reveals itself among all mankind, where communities of God, founded by Jesus, exist, which are composed of men reclaimed from a thousand vices; and to this day the name of Jesus produces a wonderful mildness, decency of manners, humanity, goodness and gentleness in *those* who embrace the faith in the doctrine of God and Christ, and of the judgment to come, not hypocritically, for the sake of worldly advantage and human ends, but in sincerity and truth."

As the contrast of Christianity with paganism — which is none other than that of the old with the new man — was strongly marked in comparing different periods of the life of the same individual, so was it also, in comparing the Christian life with the pagan, as a whole; for the opposition now stood forth open and undisguised; since paganism needed not as yet to hide itself under any foreign guise. To this contrast, Origen referred, when he said, "The Christian communities, compared with those among whom they dwell, are as lights in the world."[3]

The inducements to a mere outward Christianity that presented themselves in later times, — the worldly advantages connected with the profession of Christianity as the state religion; custom, which leads men without any special reasons or inward call in their own minds to abide by the religion of their fathers, — all this, in the period of which we

[1] Apolog. II.

[2] c. Cels. l. I. § 67: Ἐμποιεῖ δὲ θαυμασίαν πραότητα καὶ καταστολὴν τοῦ ἤθους καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ χρηστότητα καὶ ἡμερότητα ἐν τοῖς μὴ διὰ τὰ βιωτικὰ ἢ τινας χρείας ἀνθρωπικὰς ὑποκριναμένοις, ἀλλὰ παραδεξαμένοις γνησίως τὴν περὶ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐσομένης κρίσεως λόγον.

[3] c. Cels. l. III. c. 29.

treat — especially the early part of it — could effect nothing for the advantage of Christianity. The majority forsook a religion recommended to them by education, by the reverence for antiquity, by the force of custom, by the worldly benefits connected with its observance, for one which had *against it*, everything that favored the other, and which from the very outset required of them many sacrifices, and exposed them to many dangers and sufferings.

Still one must be very slightly versed in human nature to believe that in any period whatever, there could be a total absence of the causes that tend to produce a conscious or unconscious hypocrisy in the reception of Christianity. Even in this period many such inducements were at hand, particularly in those longer intervals of peace, which the church occasionally enjoyed. Says Origen — "There was always a great diversity among those who sought Jesus, since all did not seek him in the genuine way, for the sake of their own salvation, and to receive advantage *from Him*. There were those that sought Jesus from various improper motives; whence it was, too, that they alone found peace with Him, who sought Him in the right way — of whom it may with propriety be said, that they sought Him as the *Word* which was in the beginning and was with God, and for the purpose of obtaining from him fellowship with the Father."[1] The charitableness of the Christians offered to many a strong temptation to unite themselves to the Christian community, without having become Christians by conviction and in the temper of their minds; as is evident from the passage before cited from Origen; and Clement of Alexandria, too, speaks of those who hypocritically adopted the Christian profession for the sake of temporal advantages.[2]

But besides these pretended Christians, there would be some even among those within whose hearts some seed of the gospel had been lodged, whose case would be represented by our Lord's parable of the sower. It was not in every heart where the seed fell, that it found the congenial soil in which it would spring up immediately and bring forth fruit. In this period, as at all times, there would be those who had been for a moment touched by the power of truth, but who, neglecting to follow up the impressions they had received, proved faithless to the truth; who, instead of consecrating to it their whole life, wished to serve at one and the same time God and the world, and soon became once more completely enslaved to the world. Whoever failed to watch over his own heart, whoever failed of seeking earnestly and constantly, with fear and trembling, under the guidance of the divine Spirit, to distinguish and separate in his inmost being what was of the Spirit from what was of the world, exposed himself to the same causes of dangerous self-deception and consequently to the same fall, as Christians were liable to in other times. There are general sources of self-deception having their seat in human nature itself, to which general sources all particular

Phil. 2:12

[1] Orig. T. XIX. in Joh. § 3: Εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ μυρίας ἀποπεπτωκυίας τοῦ καλοῦ προθέσεις ζητοῦντες τὸν Ἰησοῦν.

[2] Stromat. I. f. 272: Μεταλήψεως χαρὶν τῶν κοσμικῶν προστίασιν, κοινωνικοὺς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων μαθόντες τοὺς καθωσιωμένους τῷ Χριστῷ.

forms of it may be ultimately referred, and these manifest themselves outwardly in different ways according to different circumstances. There are also particular sources of self-deception, belonging to different ages of the world. Everything in fact without us, even what in itself considered may be for man's highest advantage, is yet capable, if the true light has not risen within him, or if he does not watch over his own heart, of proving only an occasion of self-deception. Of nothing outward, no situation, relations, or circumstances, can it be unconditionally affirmed, that by these means *vital Christianity must necessarily* be promoted. That which may promote it in one man, may to another, who uses it otherwise than he ought, prove the occasion of his fall.

The contrast between Christianity and paganism, which was so strongly marked in the life, contributed to preserve the Christian consciousness and life more pure, and to guard it against many a debasing mixture. But here, also, what proved to some the means of awakening many Christian virtues, and in general served to promote the Christian temper of mind, became to others a source of self-deception; — to those, namely, who fancied that by a stern rejection of every thing pagan, they had quite satisfied the requisitions of Christianity, and made out of this an opus operatum; — when they were thus led to conceive of the warfare with the world in too outward a sense, and on this account the more easily overlooked the inner conflict with the inward world; and spiritual pride, uncharitable fanaticism fastened at the root of their religion.

Many among the number who had been led along to Christianity by a profound sense of religious need, fell into a mistake, which hindered them from rightly appropriating to themselves the gospel, and from giving themselves up to its divine, intrinsic power. The longing after reconciliation with God and the forgiveness of sin often lay, in truth, as we have seen already, at the root of the superstition of this period; but this longing remained covered under a grossly material form. A craving of this sort met with eagerness the annunciation of a Redeemer, the promise of the cleansing away of all sin by means of baptism; — but this was the very source, too, of the delusion which led to the misapprehension — say rather the crass, material apprehension of what Christianity proposed. Such persons sought in Christ, not a Saviour from sin, but the bestower of an outward and magical annihilation of sin. Bringing their pagan notions over with them into Christianity, they were seeking in baptism a magical lustration, which could render them at once wholly pure. That outward view of the church and the sacraments, of which we have spoken before, presented beyond doubt a convenient point of support for this erroneous notion. Hence it was, that many who meant to embrace Christianity, delayed their baptism for a long time, that they might meanwhile surrender themselves without disturbance to their pleasures, hoping to be made quite pure at last by the rite of baptism. Against such delusions, Tertullian thus expresses himself:[1] "How foolish, how wrong it is, to put off the duty

[1] In his book de pœnitentia, c. 6: Quam ineptum, quam iniquum, pœnitentiam non adimplere et veniam delictorum sustinere, hoc est, pretium non exhibere, ad merce-

of repentance and yet expect the pardon of sin; that is, to hold back the price, and yet reach out the hand for the goods: for it has pleased the Lord to affix *this* price to the forgiveness of sin. If those that sell, then, first examine the money for which they offered the goods, to make themselves sure that it is neither worn, filed, nor counterfeit, so we may conceive that the Lord also first makes trial of our penitence before he will bestow on us the inestimable treasure of eternal life. The divine grace, full and free forgiveness of sin, awaits those who will come to baptism; but we also must do what belongs to our part, in order to qualify us to receive it. Thou mayst, it is true, obtain baptism easily, — by thy protestations deceiving him whose business it is to confer it on thee. But God guards his own treasure, — he will never suffer it to be surreptitiously obtained by the unworthy. In whatever darkness thou mayst veil *thy* work, God still is light. But many fancy that God is under a certain necessity of performing even for the unworthy, what he has once promised, and thus turn his free grace into an obligation." Tertullian appeals to experience to prove that in those who come in this spirit to baptism, the genuine effects of Christianity cannot be manifested, and that such individuals often fall away from their profession, since they built their house on the sand. With an eye to the same class, Origen remarks that the whole profit of baptism depends on the disposition of the recipient; that it is to be enjoyed by him only who comes to this ordinance with true penitence; that, on the other hand, baptism redounds only to the condemnation of him who is destitute of such penitence; that the spirit of renewal, therefore, which goes with baptism, is not shared by all.[1] To guard men against the mistake of such outward Christians, Cyprian, in his collection of scripture proofs for a layman, (libri testimoniorum,) having laid down the position, that no man can attain to the kingdom of God, unless baptized and regenerated, adds: "It is, however, nothing for one to be baptized, and to receive the communion, who in his life gives no evidence of reformation."[2] And the passages he cites on this occasion from the New Testament, go expressly to show the vanity of such outward Christianity; 1 Corinth. 9: 24, Matth. 3: 10, — 5: 16, — 7: 22, Philipp. 2: 15. He then proceeds to say that "even the baptized person may lose the grace bestowed, and will do so unless he continues to remain pure from sin," citing in evidence the following passages of warning: John 5: 14, 1 Corinth. 3: 17, 2 Corinth. 15: 2.

It belonged, indeed, to the peculiar essence of Christianity, that as it was capable of becoming all things to all men, of adapting itself to the most different and opposite positions of humanity, so it could let itself down even to those modes of apprehending divine things, which were as yet altogether sensuous and material; and thus, by the power of a

dem manum emittere. Hoc enim pretio Dominus veniam addicere instituit; hac pœnitentiæ compensatione redimendam proponit impunitatem. Si ergo qui venditant, prius rimmum, quo paciscuntur, examinant, ut scalptus, neve rasus, ne adulter, etiam Dominum credimus, pœnitentiæ probationem prius inire, antam nobis mercedem perennis scilicet vitæ concessurum.

[1] T. VI. John c. 17.

[2] L. III. c. 25, 26: Parum esse baptizari et eucharistiam accipere, nisi quis factis et opere proficiat.

divine *life*, beginning from within, transform them gradually from sensuous to spiritual apprehensions. We should take good care, then, in estimating the religious appearances of these primitive times, how, from the material habits of feeling and thinking which they brought along from some earlier position, we make up our judgment respecting those who might really be wanting in nothing but the appropriate vessel to receive the transcendent, divine element that had, in truth, filled their inner life. In this case, too, the great saying of the apostle might find its verification, that the divine treasure was received — and for a season preserved — in earthen vessels, that the abundant power might be of God and not of man. It would be, therefore, a very superficial and unjust proceeding, to conclude at once, that men who framed to themselves such strange conceptions of God, of the things of God and of his kingdom, could have nothing of the Christian life in them. But in the case of the class just described, when the sensuous element unduly predominated, and they would not yield themselves to the purifying influences of the Spirit of Christ, every motion of the higher life necessarily became vitiated by this sensuous element, and in the end suppressed. Every Christian quality was transformed into some shape of the flesh and secularized; — was thus divested of its true significancy. Thus they apprehended Christ and his kingdom. Even though the expectation of some future state of sensual bliss, of which their fanatical imaginations drew ravishing pictures to the fleshly sense, enabled them to deny the pleasures of the moment, and even to face tortures and death, yet they might be, notwithstanding all this, strangers to the true nature of the new birth, by which alone the kingdom of God can be entered; — might be wanting in the spirit of ennobling love.

Far be it from us, then, to be looking for any such appearance of the church in which it was found without spot or blemish, — a condition of it never to be realized till the final consummation. Nor do the defenders of the cause of Christianity in this period deny the existence of such blemishes. They acknowledge that among those who called themselves Christians, were some whose lives contradicted the essential character of Christianity and gave occasion to the heathen to blaspheme; — yet they declare that such would not be recognized as Christians by the Christian communities; yet they challenge the heathen to judge every man by his life, and to chastise those whose morals deserved it, wherever they found them. Thus Justin Martyr and Tertullian express themselves.[1] Says the latter, "If you assert that the Christians are, in avarice, in riotousness, in dishonesty, the worst of men, we shall not deny that some *are* so. In the purest bodies, some freckle doubtless may be discovered." But neither should we be led away by these blemishes that attached themselves to the surface of the church, to overlook the heavenly beauty which shone through them all. When the eye is fixed exclusively on the one or the other, the picture may be easily colored to an ideal perfection, or sunk to a distorted caricature. An unbiassed observation will shun both these extremes.

[1] Ad nationes, l. I. c. 5.

That which our Lord himself, in his last interview with his disciples, described as the test by which his disciples might always be distinguished,— as the mark of their fellowship with him and the Father in heaven, the mark of his glory dwelling in the midst of them,— namely, that they loved one another, — precisely this constituted the prominent mark, plain and striking to the pagans themselves, of the first Christian fellowship. The names, "brother" and "sister," which the Christians gave to each other, were not names without meaning. The fraternal kiss, with which every one, after being baptized, was received into the community, by the Christians into whose immediate fellowship he entered,— which the members bestowed on each other just before the celebration of the communion, and with which every Christian saluted his brother, though he never saw him before, — this was not an empty form, but the expression of Christian feelings,— a token of the relation in which Christians conceived themselves to stand to each other. It was this, indeed, as we have had occasion to remark already, which, in a cold and selfish age, struck the pagans with wonder, — to behold men of different countries, ranks, relations, stages of culture, so intimately bound together, — to see the stranger who came into a city, and by his letter of recognition (his epistola formata) made himself known to the Christians of the place as a brother beyond suspicion, finding at once among those to whom he was personally unknown, all manner of brotherly sympathy and protection.

The care of providing for the support and maintenance of strangers, of the poor, the sick, the old, of widows and orphans, and of those in prison on account of their faith, devolved on the whole church. This was one of the main purposes for which the collection of voluntary contributions in the assemblies convened for public worship, was instituted; and the charity of individuals, moreover, led them to emulate each other in the same good work. In particular, it was considered as belonging to the office of the Christian matron to provide for the poor, for the brethren languishing in prison, to show hospitality to strangers. The hindrance occasioned to this kind of Christian activity, is reckoned by Tertullian among the disadvantages of a mixed marriage. "What heathen," says he, "will suffer his wife to go about from one street to another to the houses of strangers, to the meanest hovels indeed, for the purpose of visiting the brethren? What heathen will allow her to steal away into the dungeon to kiss the chain of the martyr? If a brother arrives from abroad, what reception will he meet with in the house of the *stranger?*[1] If an alms is to be bestowed, store-house and cellar are shut fast."[2] On the other hand, he counts it among the felicities of a marriage contracted between Christians, that the wife is at liberty to visit the sick and relieve the needy, and is never straitened or perplexed in the bestowment of her charities.[3]

[1] Tertullian meant, probably, that a peculiar emphasis should be laid on the word "stranger," — in aliena domo, in the house which, to a Christian, is a stranger's, — when the house of a Christian matron ought not to be a stranger's house to him.

[2] Ad uxorem. l. II. c. 4.

[3] L. c. c. 8: Libere æger visitatur, indigens sustentatur, eleemosynæ sine tormento.

Nor did the active brotherly love of each community confine itself to what transpired in its own immediate circle, but extended itself also to the wants of the Christian communities in distant lands. On urgent occasions of this kind, the bishops made arrangements for special collections. They appointed fasts; so that what was saved, even by the poorest of the flock, from their daily food, might help to supply the common wants.[1] When the communities of the provincial towns were too poor to provide any relief in cases of distress, they had recourse to the more wealthy communities of the metropolis. Thus it had happened in Numidia, that certain Christians, men and women, had been carried away captive by neighboring barbarians, and the Numidian churches were unable to contribute the sum of money required for their ransom; — they therefore applied to the more wealthy communities of the great capital of North Africa. The bishop Cyprian of Carthage very shortly raised a contribution of more than four thousand dollars,[2] and transmitted the whole to the Numidian bishops, with a letter full of the spirit of Christian, brotherly affection.[3] "In afflictions of this sort," he writes to them, "who ought not to feel pained, who ought not to look on the distress of his brother as his own, when the apostle Paul tells us, if one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; and in another place says, 'Who is weak and I am not weak?' Wherefore in the present case also it becomes us to regard the captivity of our brethren as if it were our own, and the distress of those now in peril as our own distress, since we are united together by one bond of love. And not love alone, but religion ought to urge and stimulate us to redeem the brethren who are our members. For when the apostle Paul again, in another place, asks, 'Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?' we must be reminded here, if charity alone were not enough to impel us to aid our brethren, that it is the temple of God which has been made captive, and that it does not become us, by delay, and in neglect of our own distress, to suffer that temple to remain long in bondage. And when the same apostle tells us, that 'as many of you as are baptized have put on Christ,' we are bound, in our captive brethren, to see Christ, and to redeem him from captivity, who has redeemed us from death; so that he who delivered us from the jaws of Satan, and who now himself dwells and abides in us, may be rescued from the hands of the barbarians; and he be ransomed for a sum of money, who has ransomed us by his blood and cross. Meanwhile, he has suffered this to happen to try our faith, — whether each one of us is ready to do for the other, what in like circumstances he would wish to have done for himself. For who that respects the claims of humanity and of mutual love, ought not, if he is a father, to consider it as though his own children were among those barbarians, and if a husband, as though his own wife were there in captivity, to the grief and shame of the marriage bond? It is indeed our earnest hope, that you may never be visited again with a like afflic-

[1] Tertullian, de jejuniis, c. 13: Episcopi universæ plebi mandare jejunia assolent, — industria stipium conferendarum.

[2] Sestertia centum millia nummorum.

[3] Ep. 60.

tion, and that our brethren may be saved by the mighty power of the Lord from the recurrence of those dangers to which they are now exposed. But should any similar calamity again befall you, to try the love and faith of our hearts, delay not to inform us of it by letter; for be assured, it is the prayer of all the brethren here that nothing of the kind may again happen, but if it should, they are ready cheerfully and abundantly to assist you."

That from which such works took the impress of a truly Christian character, was indeed nothing else than the temper — which here expresses itself — of Christian love simply following the impulse from within. This Christian character was no longer present in its purity, when the charitable action had reference to an outward end; when it was converted into a ground of merit before God, into a means for extinguishing sin. And this disturbing element found entrance whenever the Christian consciousness became in any way diverted from its central point, so as to cease referring to Christ as the sole ground for salvation. In proportion as the reference to Christ, which the habit already noticed, of confounding the church with a set of outward forms, had no tendency to encourage, was forgotten, in the the same proportion rose the estimate which men placed on their own doings, and on the merit of good works. This also must be considered as belonging to the reaction of the Jewish principle, which had been overcome by the independent development of Christianity among the pagans, but which afterwards found means of again introducing itself. In the third century, we may observe both modes of contemplating acts of charity running along side by side, and occasionally crossing each other; as for example, in the tract composed by Cyprian with a view to exhort Christians, many of whom had grown cold in brotherly love, to the exercise of this virtue, — the tract de opere et eleemosynis. To the father of a family, who, when invited to some charitable act, excuses himself on the plea that he is obliged to provide for a large family of children, he says, "Seek for your sons another father than the frail and mortal one, even an almighty and everlasting Father of spiritual children. Let him be your children's guardian and provider, — let him, with his divine majesty, be their protector against all injustice of the world. You who are striving more to secure for them an earthly than a heavenly inheritance, seeking rather to commend your sons to Satan than to Christ, incur a double sin, in neglecting to secure for your children the help of their heavenly Father, and in teaching them to prize their earthly inheritance more than Christ."

In times of public calamity, the contrast was strikingly displayed between the cowardly selfishness of the pagans and the self-sacrificing brotherly love of the Christians. Let us hear how the bishop Dionysius of Alexandria describes this contrast, as it was manifested in the different conduct of the Christians and the pagans during a contagious sickness, which, in the reign of the emperor Gallienus, raged in that great capital. "To the pagans, this pestilence appeared a most frightful calamity that left nothing to hope for; not so to us. We regarded it as a special trial and exercise for our faith. It was true of most of our brethren, that,

in the fulness of their brotherly love, they spared not themselves. Their only anxiety was a mutual one for each other; and as they waited on the sick without thinking of themselves, readily ministering to their wants, for Christ's sake, with them they cheerfully gave up their own lives. Many died, after others, by their care, had been recovered from the sickness. Some of the best among our brethren, presbyters, deacons and distinguished men of the laity, thus ended their lives — so that the manner of their death, being the fruit of such eminent piety and mighty faith, seemed not to fall short of martyrdom. Many who took the bodies of Christian brethren into their arms and to their bosoms, composed their features and buried them with all possible care, afterwards followed them in death. But with the heathens it was quite otherwise; those who showed the first symptoms of the disease, they drove from them; they fled from their dearest friends. The half-dead they cast into the streets, and left the dead unburied, making it their chief care to avoid the contagion, which however in spite of every precaution they could hardly escape."[1]

In like manner, the Christians at Carthage distinguished themselves by their disinterested conduct from the pagan world, during the pestilence which at a somewhat earlier period, in the reign of Gallus, ravaged North Africa. The pagans in a cowardly manner deserted their own sick and dying. The streets were covered with dead bodies, which none dared to touch. Avarice alone overcame the fear of death; abandoned men took advantage of the misfortunes of others to plunder them. Meantime the pagans, instead of being led by this calamity to reflect on their own guiltiness and corruption, accused the Christians, those enemies of the gods, as the cause of it.[2] But Cyprian exhorted his church to look upon the desolating scourge as a trial of their faith.[3] "How necessary is it, my dearest brethren," said he to them, "that this pestilence which appears among us, bringing with it death and destruction, should try men's souls — should show whether the healthy will take care of the sick; whether relations have a tender regard for each other; *whether masters will take home their sick servants.*" It was not enough, however, to satisfy a bishop who took the Great Shepherd for his example, that the Christians should simply show the spirit of brotherly love towards each other. He called his church together and addressed them as follows: "If we do good only to our own, we do no more than the publicans and heathens. But if we are the children of God, who makes his sun to rise and sends his rain on the just and on the unjust, who scatters his gifts and blessings not barely on his own, but even on those whose thoughts are far from him, we must show it by our actions, striving to be perfect even as our Father in heaven is perfect, blessing those that curse us, and doing good to them that despitefully use us." Animated by his fatherly words, the members of the church quickly divided the work among them. The rich gave of their substance, the poor contributed their labor; and in a

[1] Euseb. l. VII. c. 22. [2] Cyprian, ad Demetrianum. [3] Lib. de mortalitate

short time, the bodies which filled the streets were buried, and the city delivered from the danger of a universal infection.

There were opposite sinful tendencies which Christianty taught men to avoid, and between which the development of the Christian life had to make good its way. In these times of despotism it was no rare thing to find, united with a servile spirit that gave to the creature the honor which is due to God alone,— with a slavish obedience that sprung only from fear, a contempt for the laws of the state where they bore hard on selfish interests and the restraint of fear was removed. But Christianity, by the *positive* spirit which went forth from it, secured men against both these errors. By it was rendered an obedience that had its root in the love of God and pointed ultimately to *him*,— therefore a free obedience, equally removed from the slavish fear of man on the one hand, and lawless self-will on the other. The same spirit of Christianity which inculcated obedience to man for the sake of God, taught also that God should be obeyed rather than man, that every consideration must be sacrificed, property and life despised, in all cases where human authority demanded an obedience contrary to the laws and ordinances of God. Here was displayed in the Christians that true spirit of freedom, against which despotic power could avail nothing. We have already had occasion, in the first section of this history, to observe the effects of the Christian spirit in both these directions. In this sense, Justin Martyr says,[1] "Tribute and customs we seek uniformly, before all others, to pay over to your appointed officers, as we have been taught to do by our Master, Matth. 22: 21. Therefore we pray to God alone; but you we cheerfully serve in all other things, since we acknowledge you as rulers of men." Tertullian boldly asserted, that what the state lost in its revenue from the temples by the spread of Christianity, would be found to be made up by what it gained in the way of tribute and customs, through the honesty of the Christians, when compared to the common frauds resorted to in paying them.[2] He gives to those words of Christ in Matthew 22: 21, which were ever on the lips and in the hearts of Christians, as a maxim of daily life, the following interpretation,—in opposition to those who understood them, as he supposed, in too wide and indefinite a sense:—"Let the image of Cæsar, which is on the coin, be rendered to Cæsar; and the image of God, which is in man, be given to God,—hence give the money to Cæsar, but yourself to God; for what will be left for God if all belongs to Cæsar?"[3]

The principles by which men were bound to act in this case, could be easily laid down in theory, and easily deduced from the Holy Scriptures and from the nature of Christianity. Hence, in theory, all Christians were agreed; but there was some difficulty in applying these principles to particular cases, and in answering the question in every instance, how the line was to be drawn between what belonged to Cæsar and what belonged to God,—between what might be considered, in

[1] Apolog. II.

[2] Apolog. c. 42: Si ineatur (ratio,) quantum vectigalibus pereat fraude et mendac'o vestrarum professionum.

[3] De idololatria, c. 15.

reference to religion, matters of indifference, and what not. The pagan religion was, in truth, so closely interwoven with all the arrangements of civil and social life, that it was not always easy to separate and distinguish the barely civil or social from the religious element. Many customs had really sprung from a religious source, whose connection, however, with religion had long been forgotten by the multitude, and, remembered only by a few learned antiquarians, lay too far back to be recalled in the popular consciousness.[1] The question here arose, whether such customs should, like others, be considered as in themselves indifferent; whether men might be allowed in such matters to follow the barely social or civil usages, or whether they should set aside all other considerations on the ground of the connection of such customs with paganism.

Again, Christianity, from its nature, must pronounce sentence of condemnation against all ungodliness, but at the same time appropriate to itself all purely human relations and arrangements, consecrating and ennobling, instead of annihilating them. But the question might arise in particular cases, as to what *was* purely human, and adapted therefore to be received into union with Christianity; and what had sprung originally out of the corruption of human nature, and, being in its essence ungodly, must therefore be rejected. Christianity having appeared as the *new leaven* in the *old* world,— and being destined to produce a *new creation* in an old one that had grown out of an entirely different principle of life, the question might the more readily occur; which of the already existing elements needed only to be transformed and ennobled, and which should be purged wholly away? In what already existed, there might be many things which, through the particular turn and direction they had assumed in the corrupt world, might seem utterly at variance with the essence of Christianity; but which, at the same time, by receiving another turn and direction — by being applied in another way, might really admit of being easily brought into harmony with it. Now there might be some, who, in condemning the abuse of these things, might also deny the possible good use of them; and others, who, in conceiving of their possible good use, might be led to approve the existing abuse of them.

Finally, many customs may have existed, which would never have found any place in a state of things that had grown out of Christianity, — which in their origin and nature were alien to pure Christianity, — but which still, under the influence of the Christian spirit, might be so modified and applied, as to be divested of that which made them wholly incompatible with the religion of the gospel. That religion which aimed nowhere to produce violent and convulsive changes from without, but led to reforms by beginning in the first place within, — whose peculiar character it was to operate positively rather than negatively, — to displace and destroy no faster than it substituted something better, might,

[1] Consult, for example, what Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria have been able to draw from the stores of their own learning and the works of other literary men, concerning the religious meaning and reference of the custom of crowning, — things which assuredly would not easily occur to men in common life.

by virtue of this its law of action, suffer many of the existing customs to remain just as they were, in their old defective forms, aiming simply to infuse into them a new spirit, in trust that this would eventually throw off the unbefitting exterior, and create *all* things new.

Hence, notwithstanding that Christians were agreed as to general principles, disputes might arise among them with regard to the application of these principles in particular cases; according as they were led by their different positions and tendencies of mind to take a different view of the circumstances,— disputes similar to those which at various periods afterwards were not unfrequently arising, relative to the management of missions among foreign tribes of men, to the organization of new churches, and to the disposition of matters not essential (*ἀδιάφορα*.) Men were liable to err here on both extremes, — on that of too lax an accommodation to, or on that of too stern a repulsion of, existing usages. The aggressive or the assimilating power of Christianity, which should both be intimately united to secure the healthy development of life, might one or the other be allowed an undue predominance. The few excepted, who had already progressed farther in the genuine liberty of the gospel, who to deep Christian earnestness united the prudence and clearness of science, these few excepted, the better class of Christians were generally more inclined to the latter than to the former of these extremes; they chose rather to reject many of those customs, which as pagans they had once practised in the service of sin and falsehood, but which were capable also of another application, than run the risk of adopting with them the corruptions of heathenism; they were glad to let go everything which was associated in their minds with sin or with pagan rites; they chose rather to do too much, than to forfeit a tittle of that Christianity which constituted their jewel, the pearl for which they were willing to sell all they had; as in general it is more natural for men, in the first ardor of conversion, the first glow of genuine love, to go to excess in opposing the world, than in yielding to it. The church at large has to pass through periods of development as to this matter, analogous to those of the individual Christian. Hence, in the commencing development of the Christian life, the extreme aggressive element must first predominate.

As regards the controversy between the two parties described, one class appealed to the rule, that men are bound to render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, — that in matters pertaining to civil order, they are bound to obey the existing laws, — that they ought not unnecessarily to give offence to the heathens, nor afford them any occasion for blaspheming the name of God, — that in order to win all to embrace the gospel, it was necessary to become all things to all men. The other party could not deny that these were scripture principles; but, said they, while we are to consider all outward, earthly possessions as belonging to the emperor, our hearts and our lives certainly must belong wholly to God. That which is the emperor's, ought never to be put in competition with that which is God's. If the injunction that we should give the heathen no occasion to blaspheme the Christian name, must be so unconditionally understood, it would be necessary to put off

Christianity entirely. Let them continue to blaspheme us, provided only we give them no occasion for so doing by our unchristian conduct, provided they blaspheme in *us* only what belongs to Christianity. We should indeed, in every proper way, become all things to all men; but yet in no such sense as to become worldly to worldly men; for it is also said, "If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ."[1] We see plainly that each of these two parties were correct in the principles they would maintain; the only question to be determined was, where these principles found their right application.

While one of these classes believed that they ought to avoid every thing which excited attention among the pagans, and which might invite them to resort to persecuting measures, the other condemned all such prudence and reserve, as a disposition that was either ashamed or afraid of public confession. Clement of Alexandria rebuked those who, whenever they met in the street, publicly saluted each other with the fraternal kiss, and would thus every where draw attention to themselves as Christians. He calls it a foolish provocation of the pagans.[2] He charges them with falsely wearing that Christian love for a show, which is an inward sentiment, and of not knowing how to suit their actions to the time; in doing which, it must be admitted, he makes a wrong application of the words of Paul in the fifth chapter to the Ephesians.[3]

Whoever followed a trade or occupation which was contrary to the generally received Christian principles, was not admitted to baptism, till he had pledged himself to lay it aside.[4] He must enter on some new occupation to earn the means of subsistence; or if not in a situation to do this, he was received into the number of the poor maintained by the church. To these occupations were reckoned all that stood in any way connected with idolatry, or which were calculated to promote it; those, for instance, of the artists and handicraftsmen who employed themselves in making or adorning images of the gods. There were doubtless many, who, wishing to pursue these trades for a subsistence, excused themselves on the ground, that they did not worship the idols, that they did not consider them as objects of religion, but simply as objects of art; though, in these times, it assuredly argued a peculiar coldness of religious feeling, to distinguish thus what belonged to art and what belonged to religion. Against such excuses Tertullian exclaimed with pious warmth,[5] — "Assuredly you *are* a worshipper of idols, when you help to promote their worship. It is true, you bring to them no outward victim; but you sacrifice to them your mind; your sweat is their drink-offering, — you kindle for them the light of your skill." With these employments were reckoned the various kinds of astrology and of

[1] Tertullian, de idololatria, c. 11.

[2] Strom. III. f. 257: Οἱ κατὰ τὰς ὁδους τῶν ἀγαπήτων ἀσπασμοὶ παῤῥησίας ἀνοήτου γέμοντες, καταφανῶν τοῖς ἐκτὸς εἶναι βουλομένων οὐδὲ ἐλαχίστης μετέχουσι χάριτος.

[3] That they should μυστικῶς φιλοφρονεῖσθαι ἔννοθεν, ἐξαγοραζομένους τὸν καιρόν.

[4] Apostol. Constit. l. VIII. c. 31. Also, Council of Elvira, can. 62: Si auriga et pantomimus credere voluerint, placuit, ut prius actibus suis renuntient, et tunc demum suscipiantur, ita ut ulterius ad ea non revertantur. Qui si facere contra interdictum tentaverint, projiciantur ab ecclesia.

[5] De idololatria, c. 6.

magic, a species of self-deception or of fraud which was at that time so prevalent and so lucrative.

A remarkable proof, how far the moral and humane feelings of our nature could be blunted by the force of education and custom, how a narrow-hearted political tendency could suppress the sentiment of a common humanity, is presented in that favorite sport of the Roman people, the bloody gladiatorial shows; exhibitions given them by men who claimed to be cultivated, and which many even of the legislators, statesmen and self-styled philosophers, countenanced and encouraged. But the feeling of universal philanthropy, roused into life and action by Christianity, must have struggled, from the first, against this cruel custom, justified and sanctioned as it was by the established laws and by the prevalent habits of thinking among the Romans. Whoever frequented the gladiatorial shows and the combats of wild beasts, was, by the general principle of the church, excluded from its communion. Irenæus names it with abhorrence as the last denial of the Christian character, when certain individuals (belonging to the wildly fanatical and antinomian sects of the Gnostics) did not even refrain from participating in those bloody shows, alike hateful to God and to men.[1] Cyprian, describing the joy of a Christian who has just escaped from the polluted heathen world, and looks back upon it from his new position, says:[2] "If you cast your eye on the cities, you behold an assembly of men, presenting a more melancholy sight than any solitude. A combat of gladiators is in preparation, that blood may appease the lust of cruel eyes. A man is killed for the amusement of his fellow men; murder is turned into an art, and crime not only perpetrated, but taught as a profession." Tertullian says to those pagans who defended the gladiatorial sports,[3] and who probably drew one of their arguments from the fact, that criminals condemned to death by the laws were sometimes employed as the actors in them: "It is well, that criminals should be punished; as who else than a criminal can deny? And yet no innocent man can find pleasure in witnessing his neighbor's punishment; it behooves him rather to grieve, when a man, his fellow, has become so guilty as to subject himself to so cruel a death. But who is my voucher, that it is always the guilty who are thrown to the wild beasts, or condemned to other kinds of death; that innocence also does not sometimes meet with the same fate, through revenge on the part of the judge, weakness in the advocate, or the force of torture? The *gladiators* at least, as you must allow, come to the combat, not as criminals, but as an offering to the public pleasure. And however the case may be with *those who are condemned* to the gladiatorial combats, yet consider what is this — that punishment, whose tendency *should be* to reform those who are guilty of minor offences, should tend in fact to make them murderers?"

But it was not the participation in these cruel sports alone, which to the Christians appeared incompatible with the nature of their calling;

[1] Irenæus, l. I. c. 6: Ὡς μηδὲ τῆς παρὰ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώποις μεμισημένης τῆς τῶν θεριομάχων καὶ μονομαχίας ἀνδροφόνου θεᾶς ἀπέχεσθαι ἑνίους αὐτῶν.

[2] Ep. ad Donat.

[3] De spectaculis, c. 19

the same censure extended to all the different public exhibitions of that period; to the pantomimes, the comedies and tragedies, the chariot and foot races, and the various amusements of the circus and the theatre. Such was the prevailing and passionate fondness of the Romans at that time for theatrical entertainments, that many were known to be Christians simply from the fact that they absented themselves wholly from the theatre.[1] The spectacles, in the first place, were considered as an appendage of idolatry, by virtue of their origin from pagan rites and of their connection with several of the pagan festivals. Among the pomps of idolatry or devil-worship, (πομπῇ διαβόλου,) which the Christians, when enrolled at their baptism into the service of God's kingdom, were obliged to renounce, (the sacramentum militiæ Christi,) *these spectacles* were particularly included. In the next place, many things occurred in them which were revolting to the Christian sense of propriety; and where this was not the case, yet the occupying of one's self for hours with mere nonsense, — the unholy spirit which ruled in these assemblies, — the wild uproar of the congregated multitude, seemed unsuited to the holy seriousness of the Christian, priestly character. The Christians did, in truth, consider themselves as priests, consecrated, in their whole life, to God; as temples of the Holy Spirit; every thing, therefore, which was alien to this Spirit, for which they should always keep in readiness the dwelling in their hearts, must be avoided. "God has commanded," says Tertullian,[2] "that the Holy Spirit, as a tender and gentle Spirit, should, according to its own excellent nature, be treated with tranquillity and gentleness, with quiet and peace; — that it should not be disturbed by passion, fury, anger, and emotions of violent grief. How can such a spirit consist with the spectacles? For no spectacle passes off without violently agitating the passions. When one goes to the play, one thinks of nothing else than to see and to be seen. Can one, while listening to the declamation of an actor, think on the sentence of a prophet, or in the midst of the song of an effeminate stage-player, meditate on a psalm? If every species of immodesty is abominable to us, how should we allow ourselves to hear, what we cannot feel at liberty to speak; when we know that every idle and unprofitable word is condemned by our Lord?"

To Tertullian, who was inclined to look upon *all* art as a lie, a counterfeiting of the original nature which God created, the whole system of spectacles appeared merely as an art of dissimulation and falsehood. "The Creator of truth," said he,[3] "loves nothing that is false, — all fiction is, to him, falsification. He who condemns every thing in the shape of hypocrisy, cannot look with complacency on him who dissimulates voice, sex, age, love, anger, sighs or tears."

Weak minded individuals, who allowed themselves to be so far carried away by the power of prevailing custom, which contradicted their Christian feelings, as to visit such scenes, might be wounded by impressions thus received, and permanently robbed of their peace.

[1] De spectaculis, c. 24: Hinc vel maxime ethnici intelligunt factum Christianum, de repudio spectaculorum.

[2] De spectaculis, c. 15.

[3] L. c.

We find examples of a distempered state of mind, like the demoniacal, which had been brought on by such inward distraction.[1] Others, after they had been prevailed upon once or twice by the love of pleasure, and in spite of their conscience, to indulge in these amusements, contracted a new taste for them, and by their passionate fondness for the theatre, were, in the end, gradually drawn back again to heathenism.[2]

The pagans and the more thoughtless class of Christians were in the habit of urging the seriously disposed with arguments like the following: Why should they withdraw themselves from these public amusements? Such *outward* pleasures, addressed to the eye and ear, might be quite consistent with religion in the heart. God is not injured by man's enjoyment, which in its proper time and place may be partaken of without sin, as long as the fear and the reverence of God remain in the heart.[3] Thus Celsus invites the Christians to join in the public festivals. "God," he says to them, "is the common God of all, — he is good, stands in need of nothing, is a stranger to all jealousy. What then should hinder men, however much they may be devoted to him, from participating in the sports of the people?"[4] Thus it is, that the cold frivolity of a worldly mind, when it comes in contact with a character of deeper moral earnestness, commonly assumes the airs of the philosopher. To such arguments Tertullian replies, the very point to be shown is, how these amusements can agree with true religion and with true obedience towards the true God.

Others, infected with the passion for these trifles, who were seeking for reasons by which to hush their conscientious scruples as Christians, argued that nothing was made use of in the public spectacles but God's gifts, which he had bestowed on men that they might enjoy them. No particular passage of scripture could in fact be shown where the shows were expressly forbidden. As to the chariot race, there could assuredly be nothing sinful in it, since Elijah rode in a chariot to heaven. The music and dancing of the theatre could not be forbidden, for we read in the scriptures of choirs, stringed instruments, cymbals, trumpets and shawns, harp and psaltery; we see king David dancing and playing before the ark; and the apostle Paul, in exhorting Christians, borrows images from the stadium and the circus.[5] At this sophistry Tertullian exclaims, "Ah, how adroit a reasoner does human ignorance imagine itself, particularly when it fears that it may lose

[1] For examples, see Tertullian de spectaculis, c. 26: A woman who visited the theatre, came home from there in the sad condition of a person demoniacally possessed. The evil spirit, having been adjured to tell why it had taken possession of the soul of a Christian, said, or rather the patient, who imagined herself to be speaking in the name of the demon: "I in this did perfectly right, for I found her where my own kingdom is." Another, the night following her visit to the theatre, had a frightful vision, and it was perhaps in consequence of the alarm into which she was thrown by it, that five days afterwards she died.

[2] L. c. c. 26: Quot documenta de his, qui, cum diabolo apud spectaculo communicando, a Domino exciderunt!

[3] L. c. c. 1.

[4] Orig. c. Cels. l. VIII. c. 21: Ὁ γε μὴν θεὸς ἅπασι κοινὸς ἀγαθός τε καὶ ἀπροσδεής, καὶ ἔξω φθόνου. Τί οὖν κωλύει τοὺς μάλιστα καθωσιωμένους αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν δημοτελῶν ἑορτῶν μεταλαμβάνειν;

[5] The tract de spectaculis, among the works of Cyprian.

some of the pleasures and amusements of the world." In answer to the first of these arguments he says: "To be sure, all things are God's gifts; but the question is, for what end has God given them, and how may they be so used as to answer their true end? What is the original creation, and what the abuse of sin? for there is a wide difference between nature in its original purity, and nature corrupted, between the Creator and the Creator's counterfeiter." In reply to the second, he says: "Though in scripture there may be found no express prohibition of theatrical exhibitions, yet it contains the general principles, from which this prohibition follows of itself. All which is there said generally against the lusts of the flesh and of the eye, must be applied also to this particular kind of lust. When we can maintain that wrath, cruelty and rudeness are permitted in scripture, then may we be at liberty to visit the amphitheatre. If we are such as we call ourselves, then let us, if we can, take delight in the shedding of human blood." Against such as wrested the scriptures after the manner above described, the author of the treatise "On Spectacles," in the works of Cyprian, uses the following language: "I can truly say, it were better that such persons knew nothing of the scriptures than to read them thus; for the language and illustrations employed to exhort men to the virtue of the gospel, they pervert to the defence of vice; for it was so written for the purpose of inflaming us with a livelier zeal in things profitable, while the heathens display so much earnestness on trifles. Reason itself can draw from the general rules laid down in scripture those conclusions, which are not expressly unfolded by the scriptures themselves.[1] Let each take counsel only of himself, — let each confer only with that person whom, as a Christian, he ought to represent; he will then never do any thing unbecoming the Christian, for that conscience which depends on itself and not on another, will then preponderate." [2]

Tertullian invites the Christians to compare with those empty pleasures of the pagan world, the true, spiritual pleasures which had become theirs through faith.[3] "Tell me, pray, have *we* any other desire, than that which was also the desire of the apostle, to depart from the world, and be with the Lord? Your pleasures are in the direction of your wishes. But why are you so unthankful, that you are not satisfied with, that you do not recognize, the pleasures so many and so great, which even now are bestowed on you by the Lord. For what is there more joyous than reconciliation with God, your Father and Lord; than the revelation of truth, the knowledge of error, the forgiveness of multitudes of past sins? What greater pleasure than the despising of such pleasures, the contempt of the whole world; than true freedom, the pure conscience, the guiltless life, and fearlessness of death; than that you can tread under foot the gods of the pagan world, that you can expel evil spirits, heal diseases, and pray for revelations? These are the pleasures, these the entertainments of the Christian; holy, everlast-

[1] Ratio docet, quæ scriptura conticuit.

[2] Unusquisque cum persona professionis suæ loquatur et nihil unquam indecorum geret. Plus enim ponderis habebit conscientia, quæ nulli se alteri debebit, nisi sibi

[3] De spectaculis, c. 29.

ing, not to be purchased with money. And what must those be which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, and which it hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive?" In like manner, the author of the above cited treatise in the works of Cyprian remarks: "He can never look with wonder on the works of man, who has come to know himself as a child of God. It were letting himself down from his noble preëminence, to look with wonder upon any thing else than the Lord. Let the faithful Christian apply himself with all diligence to the holy scriptures, and in them he will find the worthier spectacles of faith, — exhibitions which even he who has lost his eyesight may enjoy."

If the mere attending as a looker on at these theatrical entertainments was considered a wrong thing by the Christians, much more would they reprobate the profession of an actor. In the time of Cyprian, there was the case of an actor who became a Christian, and then for the sake of a living set up a school to instruct boys in the art which he formerly practised. The bishop Cyprian was asked whether such an individual could be suffered to remain in the communion of the church, and he declared strongly against it. If a man, said he, is even forbidden (Deut. 22: 5) to put on the garment of a woman, and a curse is pronounced on any one who does this, "how much more criminal must it appear, to form the *man*, by an immodest art, to effeminate and unseemly gestures, to falsify the image of God by the tricks of the devil." "In case such an one," he adds, "pleads the necessity of his poverty, he may assuredly find relief from that necessity amongst the rest who are maintained by the church, provided that he can be satisfied with a homelier but more innocent fare. He must not, however, suppose, that he is to be hired to leave off sinning, since he does this not for our sake, but for his own. If the church where he resides is too poor to support him, let him come to Carthage; here he may receive whatever is necessary for his support in food and clothing, provided only he teach not others who are without the pale of the church what is pernicious, but learn himself, within the church, what tends to salvation."[1]

Among those social relations which were alien to the nature of Christianity, and which Christianity found existing at the time of its first propagation, belonged *slavery*. By the estrangement of humanity from God, its original unity was disturbed. Mankind, destined to be one, split asunder into a multitude of nations, each striving to assert itself as the whole, and each taking an opposite direction to the other in its course of development. Thus the consciousness of possessing a common human worth was lost; and it became possible for man to be placed in that relation to his fellow in which nature alone should stand to humanity, and his own nature to the individual.[2] A relation so unnatural could find its justification only by assuming the position, that the differ-

[1] Ep. 61, ad Euchrat.

[2] So says he who has most distinctly defined the ethical and political conceptions which presented themselves at the position gained by the ancient world. So says Aristotle, Eth. Nicomach. l. IX. c. 13. The relation between master and slave is like that between the artisan and his tools, the soul and the body, the man and his horse or ox; *ὁ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος.* In this relation, to speak of a *δίκαιον*, a *φιλία*, would be out of place.

ence among nations, — which took place at a later period, and originated in sin, — *that* difference, by virtue of which there exists so great a disparity of intellectual and moral power, was something original. Hence men could no longer recognize the fundamental identity of human nature, and believed one class destined by nature itself to be the tools of another, and without any will of their own. Thus was this relation a necessary result of the position held by antiquity, when state and nation constituted the absolute form for the realization of the highest good; and thus it could happen, that the nation which was most ardent for civil liberty, still employed thousands only as slaves.[1] And though their situation was often rendered more tolerable through the influence of manners and the pure sentiments of humanity, — which, breaking through unnatural restraints, would introduce a heartier fellowship between master and slave,[2] — yet the contradiction between this whole relation and man's essential dignity could not thus be set aside; and in general it still continued to be the prevailing habit, to regard slaves not as men gifted with the same rights as all others, but as things. In a judicial process, slaves who were acknowledged to be implicated in no guilt, might still be subjected to all the tortures of the rack, for the purpose of extorting confessions from them. If a master was murdered by one of his slaves, the terrible severity of the Roman laws required the sacrifice of all the slaves, male and female, which were in the house when the crime was committed; and this, too, whatever might be their number, and even though they were not liable to the slightest suspicion.[3]

But Christianity brought about that change in the consciousness of humanity, from which a dissolution of this whole relation, though it could not be immediately effected, yet by virtue of the consequences resulting from that change, must eventually take place. This effect Christianity produced, first by the facts of which it was a witness; and next by the ideas which, by occasion of these facts, it set in circulation. By Christ, the Saviour, belonging to all mankind, the antagonisms among men resulting from sin were annulled; by him the original oneness was restored. These facts must now continue to operate in transforming the life of mankind. Masters as well as servants were obliged to acknowledge themselves the servants of sin, and to receive in the same manner, as a gift of God's free grace, their deliverance from this common bondage, — the *true, the highest freedom.* Servants and masters, if they had become believers, were brought together under the same bond of an heavenly union, destined for immortality; they became brethren in Christ, in whom there is neither bond nor free, mem-

[1] See above, p. 46, the way in which Aristotle seeks to justify this relation, to show that it is one aimed at by nature herself.

[2] Even Aristotle, Eth. Nicomach. l. IX. c. 13, makes this distinction in reference to the relation between master and slave: *ὁ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτὸν, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος, δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης καὶ φιλίας δὴ καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος.*

[3] Tacitus, Annal. l. XIV. c. 42, et seq relates how, in a case of this sort, when the blood of so many innocent persons of every age and sex was to be shed, the compassion of the people was roused, and it was necessary to use force to prevent an insurrection.

bers of one body, baptized into one spirit, heirs of the same heavenly inheritance. Servants often became teachers of their masters in the gospel, after having practically exhibited before them the loftiness of a divine life, which must express itself even under the most constraining of relations, and shine forth the more conspicuously by the contrast.[1] The masters looked upon their servants no longer as slaves, but as their beloved brethren; they prayed and sang in company; they could sit at each other's side at the feast of brotherly love, and receive together the body of the Lord. Thus, by the spirit and by the effects of Christianity, ideas and feelings could not fail of being widely diffused, which were directly opposed to this relation, so consonant with the habits of thinking that had hitherto prevailed. Christianity could not fail to give birth to the wish, that every man might be placed in such a relation as would least hinder the free and independent use of his intellectual and moral powers, according to the will of God. Hence the apostle Paul, speaking to the servant, says, (1 Cor. 7 : 21,) "If thou mayst be made free, use it rather." Yet Christianity nowhere began with outward revolutions and changes, which, in all cases where they have not been prepared from within, and are not based upon conviction, fail of their salutary ends. The new creation to which Christianity gave birth, was in all respects an inward one, from which the outward effects gradually, and therefore more surely and healthfully, unfolded themselves to their full extent. It gave servants first the true, inward freedom, without which the outward and earthly freedom is a mere show, and which, wherever it exists, can be cramped by no earthly bond, no earthly yoke. The apostle Paul says, "He that is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the Lord's freeman." Tertullian, wishing to show how much superior this heavenly freedom is to the earthly, observes,[2] "In the world, they who have received their freedom, are crowned. But thou art ransomed already by Christ, and indeed bought with a price. How can the world give freedom to him, who is already the servant of another? All is mere show in the world, and nothing, truth. For even then thou wast free in relation to man, being redeemed by Christ; and now thou art a servant of Christ, although made free by a man. If thou deemest *that* the true freedom which the world can give thee, thou art, for that very reason, become once more the servant of man, and the freedom which Christ bestows, thou hast lost, because thou thinkest it bondage." The bishop Ignatius of Antioch writes to the bishop Polycarp of Smyrna,[3] "Be not proud towards servants and maids; but neither must they exalt themselves; but they must serve the more zealously for the honor of God, so that they may receive from God the higher freedom. Let them not be eager to be redeemed at the expense of the church, lest they be found slaves of their own lusts."[4] One of

[1] The example of Onesimus often recurred. Tertullian refers to cases in which a master, who had for a long time patiently endured the vices of a slave; but who, on observing that he had suddenly reformed, and being at the same time told that *Christianity* had wrought this change in him, out of hatred to this religion, sent him off to the house of correction. Apologet. c. 3: Servum jam fidelem dominus olim mitis ab oculis relegavit.

[2] De corona militis, c. 13.

[3] Cap. 4.

[4] The genuineness of the letter is here of

the imperial slaves, Euelpistus by name, who was arraigned with Justin Martyr and other Christians before the tribunal, expressed himself thus: "I too am a Christian; I have obtained my freedom from Christ; and through the grace of Christ, I am a sharer of the same hope."[1]

On the question whether a Christian could properly hold any civil or military office, especially the latter, opinions were divided. As the pagan religion of the state was closely interwoven with all political and social arrangements, every such office might easily place one in situations where joining in the pagan ceremonies was a thing not to be avoided. For this, all Christians were agreed, no necessity whatever constituted an excuse. On this point, Tertullian's remark was assuredly spoken from the soul of every believer, — "To be a Christian is not one thing here and another there. There is one gospel and one Jesus, who will deny all them that deny him, and confess all them that confess God. With him the believing citizen is a soldier of the Lord, and the soldier owes the same duties to the faith as the citizen."[2]

But independent of this was the *question*, whether such an office, considered in itself, was compatible with the Christian calling; which was answered by one party in the affirmative, by another in the negative. We must here take into view the circumstances in which the church found itself placed. The prevailing idea of the Christian life was — to follow in humility, in self-denial and the renunciation of all earthly good, a Redeemer who had made his outward appearance in poverty and a low estate, — had veiled his glory under the form of a servant. The glory of the Christian was with his Saviour in heaven; as to his earthly appearance, what was lowly, what was without pomp or show, like the appearance of his Saviour, whom he loved to follow in every particular, best suited his wishes. He despised the power and the glory of this world, above which he felt himself elevated by the consciousness of sharing in another power and another glory. It is true, this renunciation of earthly things consisted essentially in the temper of the heart; and this, under different external circumstances, might still remain the same; the *outward* possessions of earthly property, of earthly splendor, such as the temporal relations might require, the exercise of earthly power and authority in an earthly calling, were not thereby necessarily excluded; all this might be, and indeed was to be, sanctified by Christianity. But the first glow of conversion did not allow those with whom the living feeling was the predominant power, soberly to distinguish what pertained simply to the idea and disposition in itself and what to the manifestation of it and the outward conduct. They were inclined to take the figure — of following their Lord, who appeared in the form of a servant — in an outward sense, to refer it to an

no importance. At all events, we find a witness of the Christian mode of thinking in the first century.

[1] Acta Mart. Justini.

[2] De corona militis, c. 11: Apud hunc tam miles est paganus fidelis, quam paganus est miles infidelis. I have translated on the supposition that fidelis is the true reading, — a correction warranted perhaps by what Tertullian has just before said respecting the fides pagana. Still the common reading gives also a good sense: The unbelieving soldier, who violates the duties of Christian fidelity, is excluded by him, as a paganus, in reference to his militia, from the ranks of the milites Christi, whose obligations he has violated.

identity of outward circumstances with those in which he had lived. Thus wealth, worldly power and glory, — which too they so often saw arrayed against the kingdom of God, — seemed to be shut out from them, and the first fervor of their zeal led them to disdain all this as alien to their calling.[1] It is in this spirit Tertullian says:[2] "Thou art bound, as a Christian, to follow thy Lord's example. He, the Lord, went about in humility and loneliness, without a certain home, for he says, 'The Son of Man hath not where to lay his head;' in poor apparel, or he would not have said, 'Behold, they that wear soft clothing are in kings' houses;' without beauty or comeliness of appearance, as Isaiah had foretold, (cap. 53.) If he exercised his right of authority over none, not even his own disciples, for whom he performed the most menial service; if, finally, conscious of his *own* royal dignity, he refused to become a king, he gave his disciples the most perfect example to shun all that is lofty and great in earthly power and dignity. For who was better entitled to use these things than the Son of God? What fasces, and how many of them, must have gone before *him;* what purple flowed from his shoulders; what gold gleamed on his brow; — had he not judged that the glory of this world was alien both to himself and to his! What he rejected, therefore, he condemned."[3]

Many Christians, again, from a conscientiousness in itself worthy of all respect, thought themselves bound to take passages like Matth. 5: 39, in the literal sense. That tone of mind very generally prevailed, which, in leading men to take such words of Christ as positive commands, hindered them on this very account from understanding them rightly, according to their spirit, — as the expression of that which is rooted in the essence of Christianity, of that new life and law of living which proceeds from Christ by an inward necessity. That which ought to have been applied as referring immediately to the disposition alone, was referred to the outwardness of the act. It revolted their Christian feelings to suffer themselves to be employed as instruments of pain to others, to serve as the executors of laws which, in all cases, were dictated and animated by the spirit of rigid justice, without any mixture of mercy or love.[4]

In general, the Christians became accustomed by their circumstances at that time, to consider the state as a hostile power, standing in opposition to the church; and it was as yet, in the main, quite remote from their ideas to expect that Christianity could and would appropriate to

[1] Hence the pagan in Minucius Felix, c. 8, describes the Christians as men who, half naked themselves, despise honor and the purple, honores et purpuras despiciunt, ipsi seminudi.

[2] De idololatria, c. 18.

[3] Tertullian, one of the sternest representatives, it must be allowed, of this mode of thinking, and in whom it appears, like everything else that had seized and animated him, to have been pushed to the utmost extreme, says, (Gloriam seculi) quam damnavit, in pompa diaboli deputavit.

[4] Tertullian, where he treats this matter in the first place separates those cases in which a Christian could not be allowed *under any circumstances* to administer a civil office: Jam vero quæ sunt potestatis, neque judicet de capite alicujus vel pudore, feras enim de pecunia, neminem vinciat, neminem recludat aut torqueat, si hæc credibile est fieri posse. The council of Elvira, can. 56, decreed that magistrates, during the years in which, as Duumvirs, they had to decide on matters of life and death, ought not to attend church.

itself, also, the relations of the state.[1] The Christians stood over against the state, as a priestly, spiritual race; and the *only* way in which it seemed possible that Christianity could exert an influence on civil life, was (which it must be allowed was the purest way) by tending continually to diffuse more of a holy temper among the citizens of the state. When Celsus called on the Christians to take up arms like other subjects, for the protection of the emperor's rights, and fight in his ranks, Origen replied: "We are rendering the emperors a divine assistance, when we put on a divine armor, wherein we follow the command of the apostle; 1 Tim. 2: 1. The more devout the man, the more is it in his power to render the emperor a far better service than can be done by ordinary soldiers. Again we might thus reply to the heathen: Your priests keep themselves pure, that they may present the customary offerings to the gods with hands unstained by blood. In war, you do not compel them to take the field. As priests of God it is their duty to fight, by prayer to him, for those who are engaged in a just war and for the lawful emperor, that all opposition to those who do right may be put down. The Christians render greater service to their country than other men, by forming the hearts of the citizens, and teaching them piety towards that God on whom the well-being of the state depends, and who receives those who in the meanest cities have led a good life, into a city which is heavenly and divine."[2] To another proposal made by Celsus to the Christians, namely, that they should undertake the administration of civil affairs in their country, Origen replies: "But we know, that in whatever city we are, we have another country, which is founded on the word of God; and we require those who by their gift of teaching and by their pious life are competent to the task, to undertake the administration of the offices of the church."

They, on the other hand, who maintained that the Christians were at liberty to assume the civil and military offices, appealed to examples from the Old Testament. But here the difference between the two stages of religious development was held up in reply. Tertullian maintains against such, that for the higher stage of Christianity, the *claims* rise also higher.[3] Again, the defenders of the military profession quoted in their defence the instance of John the Baptist, who did not bid the

[1] So far from Tertullian's mind was the thought, that the emperors themselves would at some future day be Christians, that in Apologet. c. 21, he says: Sed et Cæsares credidissent super Christo, si aut Cæsares non essent sæculo necessarii aut si Christiani potuissent esse Cæsares. Comp. above, p. 126.

[2] In vindication of the translation given above to the passage at the end of the eighth letter against Celsus, I must add a few critical remarks. In Origen's words, the reading εἰς τὸν πολιέα θεὸν seems to me to be the correct one, — the reading εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεὸν, false. It admits of being easily explained how the predicate, which was an unusual one in the Christian sense, might be altered into the phraseology common among the Christians; but not so easily how the latter could be changed into the former. But that Origen himself, speaking from his own Christian position, should apply the term πολιεύς to God, cannot appear singular, as the comparison with the Ζεὺς πολιεύς was hovering before his mind. The word πόλις, which occurs so often in this sentence, favors the supposition of such an allusion. If this reading is adopted, the allusion makes it probable that ἀναλαμβάνοντες should be read instead of ἀναλαμβάνοντα.

[3] De idololatria, c. 18: Scito non semper comparanda esse vetera et nova, rudia et polita, cœpta et explicita, servilia et liberalia.

soldiers that came to him to relinquish their former calling, but prescribed to them certain rules, by which they might pursue it in a manner well-pleasing to God; but, it was replied to them, that John stood on the dividing line between the two economies. But when they brought forward in their defence the example of the centurion, whose faith Christ himself had commended, (Luke 7,) and especially the example of the believing Cornelius; the force of such an appeal could be more readily felt by their opponents, and Tertullian himself, that zealous antagonist of the military profession amongst Christians, believed it could not be wholly condemned, in the case where such as had become Christians while they were soldiers, persevered in the calling they had once chosen, so far as it could be done consistently with their steadfastness in the faith.[1] Against the profession of arms was also quoted the command to Peter, in Matth. 26: 52, to put up again his sword into its place.[2] This command, the opponents of the military calling, in despite of the context and of the manifest end for which it was given, would consider as addressed to all Christians.

Christianity, beginning with the consciousness of redemption, the central point of all that is distinctively Christian, aimed to assimilate and to appropriate whatever belongs purely to man and to his worldly relations, for the kingdom of God. All this was to be pervaded with the divine life, all this was to be ennobled by it. This Christian mode of appropriating the world manifested itself in opposition to the method in the two previous stages of human development; one of which was a secularizing of the spirit, a confounding it with the world and a deification of the worldly, in paganism; the other, opposition to the world, arising out of the consciousness of the inward schism of sin, when the world presented itself to the consciousness only as that which is without God and contrary to God—the Jewish, legal position. Contemplated from both these positions, the Christian life was unintelligible in its true import and significancy. Contemplated from the legal position, it appeared as something too free, verging near to paganism; and from the heathen position, as something too *unfree*, too constrained. The Christian life could not fail to be reproached as a being righteous overmuch, as the *immodica superstitio*, the *nimium pietatis*,[3] — sheer pietism. The Christians must have seemed a race that hated the light, that were dead to the world, and hence of no use in it.[4]

To this charge, laid against the Christians, Tertullian replies:[5] "How is it possible they should be such, who live in the midst of you, have the same food and clothing, the same necessaries of life as yourselves? For we are no Brahmins, or Indian gymnosophists, no dwellers in the woods, no recluses retired from the haunts of men. We well understand what thanks we owe to God, our Lord and Creator; we despise not the enjoyment of his works. We only moderate that enjoyment,

[1] De corona milit. c. 2.

[2] De idololatria, c. 19: Omnem postea militem Dominus in Petro exarmando discinxit.

[3] In an epitaph which Gilbert Burnet discovered at Lyons, and published in the first of his letters, the pagan husband says of his wife, a Christian, "quæ, dum nimis pia fuit, facta est impia."

[4] See the words cited above, on page 92 "natio latebrosa et lucifuga," and others.

[5] Apologet. c. 42.

that it may not degenerate into excess or abuse. With you, therefore, we inhabit this world, not without markets, baths, inns, workshops, fairs, and whatever else is considered necessary to the intercourse of life. We also pursue with you the business of navigation, *of war*, of agriculture, of commerce; we share in your employments, and contribute of our labor, to your profit, for the public service."[1]

Yet while it was true, that the Christians by no means withdrew themselves from the intercourse of life, they were, at the same time, in the frequent habit of setting apart certain days for the purpose of self-examination and quiet devotion, for the purpose of renewedly consecrating their lives to God; so that they might return back, with fresh zeal and vigor and renovated powers of holy living, to their ordinary avocations. These days of holy consecration, of penitence and prayer, which individual Christians appointed for their own use, were oftentimes also a sort of fast-days. That they might be less disturbed by sense whilst their minds were intent on holy things, they were accustomed on such days to confine their bodily wants within stricter limits than usual, or else to fast entirely; where we must take into consideration the peculiar nature of that hot climate in which Christianity first began to spread. Whatever they saved by their abstinence on these days, was appropriated to the maintenance of the poor brethren. There were also many, who, in the warmth of their first love, after being baptized, immediately gave a large portion of their earthly property, or all that they had, to the church fund or to the poor, feeling themselves constrained to express, in the strongest manner, their contempt of the earthly things by which their hearts had been hitherto enslaved; to declare most decidedly, — what now had full possession of their hearts, — the wish to sacrifice, to give away anything, so they might but win the heavenly pearl. It was to them as though the words of our Lord were addressed directly to themselves: "If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come and follow me." Within the bosom of the church, they led a quiet, retired life, maintained themselves by the labor of their hands, and remained unmarried, that, without being disturbed by earthly cares, they might devote themselves to prayer, to the study of the scriptures, to holy meditations, and to active labors for the kingdom of God; and all that remained from the earnings of their industry, after barely satisfying the most necessary wants of life, they devoted to objects of Christian charity. Such Christians were called the *Abstenients*, the zealous seekers after Christian perfection, continentes, ἀσκῆται.[2] There were many others, again, who, through the influence of a pious

[1] How far remote the idea of the later monachism lay from the apprehension of Christians generally, is evident from a passage in Irenæus, where he is speaking of their dependence for the means of support on the heathens among whom they lived, l. IV. c. 30: Etenim, si is qui tibi hæc imputat, separatus est a gentilium cœtu, et nihil est alienorum apud eum, sed est simpliciter nudus, et nudis pedibus et sine domo in montibus conversatur, quemadmodum aliquot ex his animalibus, quæ herbis vescuntur, veniam merebitur, ideo quod ignoret necessitates nostræ conversationis.

[2] Ἀσκεῖν, ἀσκῆτης, a current word among pagans and Christians in this period, to denote a peculiarly rigid moral discipline.

Christian education, had from the earliest years imbibed such a love for divine things, as made them solicitous to loosen to the utmost every tie which bound them to the earth. Individuals of this class were to be found belonging to both the sexes; — the females were called distinctively *πάρθενοι*, virgins.[1]

Amongst the pagans themselves, it was then the custom of those who led lives consecrated to meditation, to be ascetics in the sense above given. Philosopher and ascetic were synonymous expressions.[2] The term "philosophy" was to denote the direction and bent of the whole life. But it must be admitted, that among the pagans this had already become also a mask for hypocrisy, as for example, with the notorious pseudo-cynics. Now it sometimes happened, that these pagan ascetics were led, in their earnest strivings after perfection, to embrace Christianity; and after having become Christians, still adhered to their former habits of life, — sought to transfigure the old form by a Christian spirit; or that others, in whom Christianity first produced a more serious turn of life, adopted these habits, as a token of the change that had been wrought in them. They could avail themselves of the attention they attracted by publicly appearing in the garb of these philosophical ascetics, — the philosopher's cloak,[3] — and of the respect paid to them by the multitude on account of their mode of life, to enter into philosophical and religious conversation with those who, out of respect or curiosity, gathered round them in the public walks or places of resort; and thus to present to them Christianity as the new and heavenly philosophy,[4] which had come from the East. It was assuredly a picture taken from the very life of those times, where we are told by Justin Martyr,[5] that early one morning, as he made his appearance on the public walk, he was presently accosted by several with the salutation, "Good morrow, philosopher;"[6] whilst one of them added, that he had received it as a lesson from his master in philosophy, never to slight the philosopher's cloak, but to welcome with every civility those that appeared in it, and endeavor to draw them into conversation. This led to a dialogue on the marks of true religion, and on Christianity. "Joy to thee," exclaims Tertullian to the philosopher's cloak,[7] "a better philosophy has deigned to wrap itself in thy folds, since thou hast began to be the garb of the Christian."

While spiritual pride could so easily attach itself to this mode of life, the spirit of Christian love and humility, in such a form, shines forth with the more splendor, as in the example of that Alcibiades,

[1] Of such Tertullian speaks, de cult. femin. l. II. c. 9: Aliqui abstinentes vino et animalibus esculentis, multi se spadonatui obsignant propter regnum Dei; — and Justin Mart. Apolog. II: Πολλοί τινες καὶ πολλαὶ ἐξηκοντοῦτοι καὶ ἑβδομηκοντοῦτοι, οἱ ἐκ παίδων ἐμαθητεύσησαν τῷ Χριστῷ, ἀφθοροι διαμένουσι, — which, indeed, is not to be so understood as if all these had from the first purposely adopted such a mode of life.

[2] See e. g. Artemidor. oneirocrit. IV. where he speaks of an Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἔμελε δὲ αὐτῷ, ὄντι ἀνδρὶ ἀσκήτῃ, οὔτε γάμου, οὔτε κοινωνίας, οὔτε πλούτου· — and V. 18: Ἐφιλοσόφησεν εὐτόνως καὶ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ τῇ ἀσκήσει χρησάμενος ἀκολούθως.

[3] Τρίβων, τριβώνιον, pallium.

[4] Φιλοσοφία τῶν βαρβάρων.

[5] Dial. c. Tryph. Jud.

[6] Φιλόσοφε, χαῖρε!

[7] In his tract de pallio.

who was one of the imprisoned confessors at Lyons.[1] Having accustomed himself, as an ascetic, to live on bread and water, he continued to observe the same habits in the prison; when, by the inward voice of the Spirit, it was revealed to Attalus, one of the other confessors, that Alcibiades was wrong in refusing to enjoy what God had created, and thus giving occasion of offence to other Christians. To this admonition, Alcibiades immediately submitted, and without further scruple partook indiscriminately of all that was set before him, giving God thanks.[2]

Now, though *such* ascetics were fully penetrated with a Christian spirit, — a spirit of love and humility, — yet we cannot fail to perceive, even here, a one-sided tendency, which, in the earlier stages of the development of Christian life, might easily become excessive. Christianity was designed to be the *world-subjecting principle*. It was to take up into itself and appropriate to its own ends all that belongs to man, — all that is of the world. But to bring this about, it was necessary that it should first enter into a conflict with what had hitherto been the world-subjecting principle, — into a conflict with sin and the principle of heathenism and everything connected therewith, concerning which necessary conflict we have had occasion to speak elsewhere. The clearing away of these hindrances must therefore be the first aim of Christianity; although indeed this was an object that could not be really accomplished without the positive appropriation of the purely human element. In the development, in time, the negative, aggressive tendency must needs appear first; and of this there might easily come to be an undue predominance, while the positive appropriating element, without which the problem of Christianity could never be resolved, might retreat out of sight. Hence a one-sided ascetic tendency easily introduced itself into the earliest stages, into the first *stadium*, of the development of the Christian life, and more particularly in the case of those who embraced Christianity with their whole soul. Wherever this religion awakened in the first place disgust at the worldly pursuits which had previously swallowed up the life, enkindled the holy flame of love for the divine, of aspiration after eternal life, this first movement would readily assume an ascetic shape. With this, other elements might now intermingle, that had formed themselves, independent of Christianity, out of the previous process of the world's development, and which, without the creative influence of Christianity, would have taken a much wider sweep, and which could be finally subdued only by the might of this new principle of life. The sprightly, youthful life of the pagan world had passed over at length into the sense of inward disunion, of schism, and had given place to the dualistic and ascetic tendencies coming from the East. Accordingly, Christianity at its first appearance found such tendencies already existing, and these, which found a point of contact and union in the deep-felt breach, would have pressed onward to a still more extravagant length, if the consciousness of redemption proceeding from Christianity had not, in

[1] See above, p. 112, and the following. [2] Euseb. l. V. c. 3

proportion as it unfolded itself, deprived them more and more of this point of union. But beyond a doubt, this already existing tendency to a misconceived renunciation of the world and of sense, might mix in with the one-sided negative tendency, which, as we have seen, would first become prominent in the development of Christian life, and might in this way assume a Christian shape and coloring.

Thus arose an undue estimation of the ascetic, contemplative life — of celibacy — which could go to the extreme of awarding to such life a much more exalted stage of future blessedness.[1] It was here, that the mistaken apprehension of our Saviour's language to the rich found its support, — that a perfection, surpassing that ordinary standard of the Christian life which is occupied in fulfilling the duties of one's earthly calling, was denoted by those words, — which perfection consisted in the renunciation of every earthly good, (the germ of the doctrine of the concilii evangelici.) Now in this manner it became possible, that an opposition which belonged to the fundamental principles of antiquity, — but which by the consciousness of redemption, of the principle of the divine life destined to enoble *all* that belongs to humanity, was overcome and banished, — should imperceptibly gain admission once more into the evolution of Christianity itself; — we mean, that opposition between the common and the higher, the practical and the contemplative life, — between divine and human virtue. It is clear, how this apprehension must have coincided with the notion of a caste of priests, preëminently consecrated to God, who must hold themselves aloof from all intercourse with the world; and so too the opinion might have had its birth, that celibacy belonged to the perfection of the spiritual order.[2]

This falsely conceived opposition to the world had already become the mask for a worldly temper, which would affect the appearance of holiness, or sought to gain an easier life at the expense of the church.[3] Cyprian had to write a tract of admonition and warning against the showy dress and display which had crept in among the rich virgins, at Carthage, who had consecrated themselves to God.[4] And thus it happened, that in disdaining what is in harmony with nature, — which is also what corresponds to Christianity, — men devised unnatural forms of relation between the two sexes; and in this case, nature, so proudly disdained, could easily exercise a dangerous reaction, and sensuality corruptly intermingle with the spiritual state; as in the cohabitation of such virgins with unmarried ecclesiastics, under the pretence of a purely spiritual connection.[5]

[1] As is done expressly by Origen, Homil. XIX. in Jerem. § 4. Comp. Cyprian, de habitu virginum.

[2] The council of Elvira, (A. D. 305,) — from which, however, no inference can be drawn with regard to the general practice of the church. This council, where the one-sided ascetic spirit spoken of above, prevailed to an eminent degree, decreed already, can. 33, that bishops, presbyters and deacons, living with their wives, should be deposed from their places.

[3] See what Tertullian, who was now a violent, over-heated accuser of the catholic church, indeed, but who must have felt that he had some ground for such charges, says against many *virgines*: Æmulatio illas non religio producit; aliquando et ipse venter, Deus eorum, *quia facile virgines fraternitas suscipit.* De idololatria, c. 14.

[4] Comp. the tract de habitu virginum.

[5] The *συνείσακτοι*, as they were afterwards called, subintroductæ. Against them. Cyprian, ep. 62, ad Pompon. Though Cy-

And while thus the secluded life of ascetics and ecclesiastics was extolled above the common life of Christians, another mischievous consequence resulted. They who were occupied in the common business of life, forgot the greatness of their Christian calling, and thought they were entitled to lower very much the requisitions as to their own daily living.

As early as the time of Clement of Alexandria there were those who, on being advised not to put themselves on a level with the pagans in their rage for the public shows, but to ponder well what belonged to the seriousness of the Christian calling, were accustomed to repel such exhortations, and excuse themselves by saying, "We cannot all be philosophers and ascetics; we are ignorant people; we cannot read; we understand nothing of the holy scriptures; why should we be subjected to such rigorous demands?"[1]

Yet we observe many indications, too, that a sound Christian spirit opposed itself to this false ascetic tendency. Such we find in an ancient writing known by the name of the Shepherd, which is said to have been composed by a certain Hermas, and had great authority in the first centuries. In regard to fasting, it is here said,[2] "Above all, exercise thy abstinence in this, to refrain both from speaking and from hearing what is wrong; and cleanse thy heart from all pollution, from all revengeful feelings, and from all covetousness; and on the day thou fastest, content thyself with bread, vegetables and water, and thank God for these. But reckon up what thy meal on this day would have cost thee, and give the amount to some widow, or orphan, or to the poor. Happy for thee, if, with thy children and whole household, thou observest these things." Clement of Alexandria notices the fact, that many kinds of pagan worship required celibacy and abstinence from meat and wine in their priests; that there were rigid ascetics among the Indians, namely the Samaneans, and hence argued that usages which may exist also in other religions and even be combined with superstition, cannot, in themselves considered, be peculiarly Christian. He then adds, — "Paul declares that the kingdom of heaven consists not in meat and drink, neither therefore in abstaining from wine and flesh, but in righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. As humility is shown, not by the castigation of the body, but by gentleness of disposition, so also abstinence is a virtue of the soul, consisting not in that which is without, but in that which is within the man. Abstinence has reference not to some one thing alone, not merely to pleasure, but it is abstinence also to despise money, to tame the tongue, and to obtain by reason the dominion over sin."[3]

prian elsewhere speaks, even in extravagant terms, of the obligations which were connected with the entrance into such a mode of life as a connubium spiritale cum Domino, yet he expresses himself here with becoming moderation: Si autem perseverare nolunt vel non possunt, melius est, ut nubant, quam in ignem delictis suis cadant. But the council of Elvira decreed, in their 13th canon, that such fallen virgins who refused to return back to their former condition, should be refused communion, even in the article of death.

[1] Ἀλλ' οὐ πάντες φιλοσοφοῦμεν, γράμματα οὐκ ἐμαθον. Clemens Pædagog. l. III. f. 255.

[2] Lib. III, Similitud. V.

[3] Clemens Strom. l. III. f. 446, et seq.

When those people of whom we have spoken above, excused themselves from the more severe requisitions regarding their daily walk, with the plea, we are not all philosophers, not of the spiritual order, he replies to them: But are we not all striving after life? What sayest thou? How art thou then a believer? How lovest thou God and thy neighbor? Is that not philosophy? Thou sayest, I have never learned to read. But if thou hast not learned to read, thou canst not excuse thyself thus, for *not having heard;* for there is no need of any one's teaching thee this. (All hear the preached word, hear the scriptures read in the church assemblies.) But faith is not the possession of the wise of this world, but of the wise in God. Faith is taught also without writing; and its writing, which is adapted even to the knowledge of the ignorant, is still divine, and is called love. Even the business of the world may be managed in an unworldly, in a godly manner." [1] Thus Clement insists on the common spiritual and priestly calling of all believers, and he requires even of those engaged in trades, and of publicans, that they should exhibit philosophy in their practice.[2] It was for the purpose of correcting the opinion of those who considered the renunciation of all worldly goods as true Christian perfection, misunderstanding Christ's language to the rich young man, that the same Clement wrote his beautiful tract on the question, "What must be the rich man's character, in order that he may be saved." [3] In this tract, he endeavors to show that in Christianity the disposition of the heart is the essential thing. "Our Saviour," says Clement, "does not, as many groundlessly assume, command us to throw away our earthly goods, but to banish the *opinion* of money, the passion for it,— that canker of the soul,— the cares, the thorns of *worldly* life, which choke the seed of the *divine* life. What does our Lord teach as something new, as the only life-giving doctrine, of which those who came before him knew nothing? What is it, that is peculiarly his own, and the new creation? Not some outward act, that others also have done; but something higher, more divine, more perfect, intimated only by the outward act, that *all which is foreign*, should be torn up, *root and branch*, and cast forth from the soul. For even those before him despised outward things, and in fact gave away their earthly goods; but the inward passions of the soul only became the stronger, for they were filled with vanity, pride and contempt for other men, — as if they had done something themselves beyond the reach of humanity. A man may have thrown away his earthly possessions and still retain the desire of them in his heart; thus subjecting himself to the double disquietude of having to regret his prodigality and of feeling himself deprived of the necessaries of life. What means would be left of communicating one to another, if none had the means to bestow? And were *this* the doc-

[1] Πίστις δὲ οὐ σοφῶν τῶν κατὰ κόσμον, ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ θεόν ἐστι τὸ κτῆμα, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ γραμμάτων ἐκπαιδεύεται· καὶ τὸ σύγγραμμα αὐτῆς, τὸ ἰδιωτικὸν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον, ἀγάπη κέκληται. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν κοσμῷ κοσμίως, (a play upon words which cannot be exactly rendered,) κατὰ θεὸν ἀπάγειν οὐ κεκώλυται.

[2] Καὶ ταυτῇ φιλοσοφούντων οἱ ἀγοραῖοι καὶ οἱ κάπηλοι. Pædagog. l. III. f. 255.

[3] Τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος; § 11.

trine of our Lord, how could it fail to be at variance with many other glorious doctrines of his? Earthly property should be considered in the light of a staff, an instrument for good uses, to be turned to the proper account by those who know how to use it rightly."

Clement recognized a divine order and arrangement in the unequal distribution of property, which was to serve as a material for Christian virtue. Community of goods appears to him as a thing repugnant to the divine plan.[1] "As food does not advantage us in God's sight," says he, "so neither does the married or the unmarried life without knowledge, but virtuous action done with knowledge."[2]

When the Montanists would have imposed new fasts and new laws of abstinence on the church, the spirit of evangelical freedom among the Christians took strong ground against them. They were accused of not duly distinguishing between the economies of the Old and of the New Testament; of making laws where, according to the spirit of the gospel, all should be free, where every one should act without constraint, according to his own peculiar temperament and his own individual necessities. The only fasts prescribed by God was fasting from bosom sins.[3]

Like others whose language we had occasion to cite above, Commodian also rebuked the extravagant estimation in which martyrdom was held as an opus operatum. He showed, that whoever was a martyr in disposition, whoever exercised love, humility, patience, was equal to the martyr without shedding a drop of blood.[4] "Many err," said he, "when they say, we have conquered the enemy by our blood; and they will not conquer him, if he comes to assault them (if he plunges them into temptations of another kind.)[5] Thou, then, who wouldst become a martyr by the confessions of thy mouth, robe thyself in time of peace with all goodness, and rest secure."

If the ascetic tendency was but a transient moment of excess on one side in the development of the Christian life; we see on the other hand, from the first, in that which presents the strongest contrast to it, in the ennobled family relation, the power of the Christian principle of life in its healthy development. And this great effect resulted first from the fact that the true import of marriage was realized by Christianity; — its import as the harmonious union of two individuals separated by sex, in a higher spiritual oneness of life, by the communication of a divine life destined to reconcile all antitheses. Connected with this, was the fact, that wherever Christianity found entrance, the equal dignity and worth of the female sex, as possessing a nature created in the image of

[1] Ὡς ἐξ ἐναντίων ὁ κόσμος σύγκειται, ὥσπερ ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, ξηροῦ τε καὶ ὑγροῦ, οὕτω κἀκ τῶν διδόντων κἀκ τῶν λαμβανόντων. Stromat. l. III. f. 449.

[2] Stromat. l. IV. f. 533.

[3] See Tertullian, de jejuniis.

[4] Instruct. 48:

Multa sint martyria, quæ fiunt sine sanguine fuso.
Alienum non cupere, velle martyrium habere,
Linguam refrænare, humilem te reddere debes,
Vim ultra non facere, nec factam reddere contra,
Mons (which gives no good sense) patiens fueris, in tellige te martyrem esse.

[5] Instruct. 62:

Multi quidem errant dicentes, sanguine nostro,
Vicimus iniquum, quo manente,

(Which may be referred either to the nearest subject iniquus, as I have rendered, or the more remote sanguis: — they do not want that victory which is won without blood.)

Tu ergo, qui quæris martyrium tollere verbo
In pace te vesti bonis, et esto securus

God and allied to the divine no less than the male, was brought distinctly before the consciousness; and that the sex was invested with the rights belonging to it — in opposition to the principle of the ancient world, particularly in the East, where the woman was placed in an altogether subordinate relation to the man.[1] Thus Clement of Alexandria gives prominence to the Christian import of marriage and of the family life, in opposition to those who were given to the excessive ascetic tendency. "The genuine Christian," says he, "has the apostles for his example; and in truth, it is not in the solitary life, one shows himself a *man;* but *he* gets the victory over other men, who, as a husband and father of a family, withstands all the temptations that assail him in providing for wife and children, servants and substance, without allowing himself to be turned from the love of God. The man with no family escapes many temptations; but as he has none save himself to care for, he is of less worth than the man, who has more to disturb him, it is true, in the work of his own salvation, but accomplishes more in social life, and in truth presents in his own case a miniature of providence itself."[2] Describing the Christian matron, he says:[3] "The mother is the glory of her children; the wife, of her husband; both are the glory of the wife, and God is the glory of them all." And Tertullian:[4] "What a union is that between two believers, having in common one hope, one desire, one order of life, one service of the Lord? Both, like brother and sister, undivided in spirit or body, nay, in the true sense twain in one flesh, kneel, pray and fast together, mutually teach, exhort, and bear with, each other; they are not separated in the church of God, and at the Lord's supper; they share each other's troubles, persecutions, joys; neither has any thing to hide from the other; neither avoids the other; there is free liberty to visit the sick, to sustain the needy; the harmony of psalms and hymns goes up between them, and each vies with the other in singing the praise of their God. Christ rejoices to behold and hear such things, and sends them his peace. Where there are two, there he is also; and where he is, the spirit of evil cannot enter."

It was required of the Christian mistress of a family, that by the sobriety of her whole demeanor, by the decency and simplicity of her dress,[5] she should show the spirit that ruled within, and thus let her very appearance shine as a light, in an age characterized by excessive display, luxury and corruption of manners.

But here again there were two opposite parties. While to some, poverty of apparel seemed inseparably connected with the essence of humility, and to be implied in the idea of the *servant form* of the Christian life, others said, "it is enough to have the disposition which becomes Christian women. God looks on the heart — the outward appearance is nothing. Why make a display of the change that has been wrought in us? Far rather are we bound to furnish the heathens

[1] Also in the Ethic. magn. of Aristotle, l. I. c. 34: Χεῖρον ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ ἀνδρός.
[2] Stromat. l. VII. f. 741.
[3] Pædagog. l. III. f. 250.
[4] Ad uxorem, l. II. c. 8.
[5] Comp. Commodian. instructiones, 59, — the satiric remarks directed against the gaudy apparel of the Christian women.

no occasion for blaspheming the Christian name and to accuse Christianity of being irreconcilable with the customs of the world.[1] These earthly goods are in *our* possession; why may we not use them? Why may we not enjoy what we have? For whom were these precious objects created, if not for us? Who are to enjoy the *costly* articles if all prefer the *cheap?*"[2] To the latter argument, Clement of Alexandria replied: "Even though all things are *given* us, though all things are *allowed* us; though all things are *lawful* for us, yet, as the apostle says, all things are not expedient. God has created our race for doing good and communicating; he has created every thing for all; everything, therefore, is a common good; and the more wealthy should not make of it an exclusive possession. Such reasoning, therefore, is not humane, does not correspond with our social affections. Love will rather speak thus: 'I have it,—why should I not bestow it on the needy?'"[3]

Tertullian says: "What reasons can you have for going about in gay apparel, when you are removed from all with whom this is required? You do not go the round of the temples, you ask for no public shows, you have nothing to do with pagan festivals. You have no other than serious reasons for appearing abroad. It is to visit a sick brother, to be present at the communion, or a sermon; and if offices of courtesy or friendship call you among pagans, why not appear in your own peculiar armor,—especially as you are to mix with unbelievers,—that so the difference may be seen between the servants of God and of Satan, that you may serve for an example to them, and that they may be edified by you?"

Adhering strictly to that religious and moral point of view in which the marriage relation was first presented by Christianity, many believed that where there was no union of hearts by the bond of religion, where there was rather disunion in regard to the highest concerns of the inward life, the true significancy of marriage could not be realized. Hence they discountenanced all marriage relation between Christians and pagans. Tertullian labors to show how inevitably the pious Christian woman, who regarded Christianity as the soul of her life, who belonged to the church as one of its living members, and felt herself happy in its communion, must, in a thousand ways, be checked and disturbed in her religious duties and injured in her feelings, by living with a heathen. "Is there a meeting for prayer," says he, "the husband will devote this day to the use of the bath; is a fast to be observed, he will on this day make a banquet for his friends. Never will more hindrances arise from the business of the household, than precisely when the duties of Christian charity call the wife to go abroad. (Next follows the passage, which we have already quoted, relating to those duties of the Christian mistress of a family, in the performance of which she is hindered by her pagan husband.) What shall her hus-

[1] Tertullian de cultu feminarum, particularly l. II. c. 11.

[2] Clemens Pædagog. l. II. c. 12.

[3] The same thing is said by Tertullian, in the works above referred to, and by Cyprian, de habitu virginum. Perhaps Tertullian and Cyprian had both read this work of Clement.

band sing to her, or she to her husband? Would she like to hear anything from the theatre, or from the tavern? What mention is there of God, what invocation to Christ? Where is the nourishment for faith by the quoting of scripture in their conversation?[1] Where is there refreshment of spirit; where, the divine blessing?"

In the cases just mentioned, the question related to a marriage that was to be contracted, where as yet no pledge had been given. It was different, where a connection, which was not to be dissolved but sanctified by Christianity, already existed, and one of the parties became a convert. This case Tertullian expressly distinguishes from the former. "It is different with those, who, when they came to the faith, found themselves already connected in marriage with pagans. If such a marriage is valid with God, why should it not go on with his blessing, so that it may continue to be spared from many afflictions, disquietudes and stains, enjoying, as it does on one side, the protection of divine grace. But where one enters voluntarily and uncalled into forbidden relations, that is another thing." "The manner in which his wife was converted to Christianity," continues Tertullian, "may have a strong impression on the heathen husband himself, so that he may be cautious how he disturbs her too much, or watches her too narrowly. He has witnessed a great event, he has seen the proofs of what God has wrought, he knows that she has become better for the change. Thus are those the more easily gained over to the faith, to whom the grace of God is become familiar." It is true, the observance of such a change did not always make this favorable impression. Many a blind devotee to paganism, when he observed that his wife, whose manners he was before obliged to watch with an anxious scrutiny, had become all at once so domestic and exemplary, — but at the same time that Christianity had produced the change, — spurned from him the wife whose vices he had before tolerated. The case sometimes occurred, too, where the Christian woman, who was married to a vicious heathen, and previously, when a heathen herself, had been the pander of his vices, was now as a Christian forbidden by her conscience to persist in this course. She endeavored first by exhortations and remonstrances to lead him in a better way. But as these would be indignantly rejected, she found herself compelled, in order to avoid participating in his sinful life, to obtain a separation from him; and this proved the occasion of not a few persecutions, excited by exasperated husbands.[2]

It resulted from this Christian point of view in the consideration of marriage, that it early became a custom to add the *sanction* of the church to the civil contract. The presiding officers of the church and the deaconesses were convoked. It was to be understood that the mar-

[1] Ubi fomenta fidei de scripturarum interjectione? according to the reading in Rigaltius' edition. According to the reading in that of Pamelius, "interlectione," — "by the intermingled reading of the Holy Scriptures." It hardly admits of being determined which is the correct reading. As the whole passage relates to quotations in conversation, the first reading is to the point. And even if this is the right one, it follows from it that husband and wife must possess a familiar acquaintance with the Bible.

[2] See Justin Mart. apolog. II.

riage was contracted by the will of God, and not by the impulse of passion, and that all was done to the glory of God.[1] Bride and bride groom sat down together at the Lord's table and partook of the com munion. They presented a common offering to the church, and in return, the blessing of God was specially implored on this new marriage in the prayer of the church connected with the communion. What importance was attached by the Christians to the sanction of the church, appears from the following passage of Tertullian:[2] "In what language can we express the happiness of that marriage which is concluded by the church, sealed by the communion, and consecrated by the benediction; which the angels announce and God the Father ratifies."

The soul of the whole Christian life was considered to be *prayer*. Even they who otherwise differed widely in bent of mind, or habits of thinking on many important points, were agreed in acknowledging this. Where the spirit of Christianity brings together the most opposite natures, it would be difficult to find a stronger contrast, than that between the practical realism of Tertullian, so inclined to reduce everything to forms of sense, and the speculative turn of Origen, who was quite too prone to sublimate everything into spirit. But both appear equally penetrated with a living Christianity, when they come to discourse of prayer; both seem to speak from their own inward experience, and in both, the essential Christian spirit presses through all individual peculiarities. Tertullian, in accordance with a prevailing view of those early Christian times, contemplates prayer as an exercise of the priestly office of Christians. "It is the spiritual sacrifice," says he,[3] "which has superseded the sacrifices of the old covenant, Is. 1: 11. This passage informs us what God does *not* seek; but the gospel teaches us what he *does* seek,— 'The hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth; for God is a spirit.' We are the true worshippers and the true priests, who pray in the spirit, and thus offer the sacrifice which is befitting God's nature, and well-pleasing in his sight, — that sacrifice which he has sought. And what is there, which the God who seeks this prayer can withhold from the prayer that springs from the spirit and from truth? How much do we read, hear, believe of the proofs of its efficacy!" He then proceeds to describe the peculiar efficacy of *Christian* prayer; to show how it should correspond to the peculiar nature of the religious constitution under the New Testament; how *Christian* prayer reveals its true power, *not in delivering men miraculously in the hour of death and of suffering*, but *in making them capable of enduring death and suffering with composure and cheerful resignation.* "By virtue of imparted grace it dulls not the sense of pain, but arms him who suffers the pain with strength to bear it. The prayer of the Christian draws down no retribution from heaven, but it averts God's anger; it watches for its enemies; it intercedes for the persecutors; it obtains the forgiveness of sins; it dispels temptations; it comforts the feeble-minded;

[1] Ignat. ep. II. ad Polycarp, § 5.
[2] Ad uxor. l. II. c. 8.
[3] Cap. 28, de orat. in the piece published first by Muratori, T. III. Anecdotor. bibl Ambros.

it refreshes the strong. *Prayer is the bulwark of faith.*" Origen says,[1] "How much has each one among us to say about the efficacy of prayer, when we would thankfully record the benefits received from God! Souls which had long lain barren, and which became conscious of their dearth, rendered fruitful by the Holy Spirit through persevering prayer, have given forth words of salvation full of the intuitions of truth. What mighty enemies, aiming at the overthrow of our divine faith, have, time and again, been brought to shame! Our confidence was in those words, 'Some trust in chariots and in horses, but we will remember the name of the Lord our God;' and verily we experienced, that the horse is a vain thing for safety. The power, also, of bewildering arguments, which might indeed stagger many who are accounted believers, has been often vanquished by him who trusts in prayer. How many instances are there of those who have fallen into temptations difficult to be overcome, but suffered no injury in them, and come forth unharmed, without being even touched by the smell of the hostile flames! And what shall I further say? How often has it happened, when they have been thrown before ravenous beasts or exposed to malignant spirits and cruel men, they have reduced them to silence by their prayers, so that their teeth could not touch us, who were the members of Christ! We know that many, who had departed from the precepts of our Lord, and lay already in the jaws of death, have been rescued by the prayer of penitence."

The same Father contemplates prayer in its inseparable unity with the entire life, when he says:[2] "He prays without ceasing, who suitably unites prayer with action; for active duty is an integrant part of prayer; since it would be impossible to understand the words of the apostle, 'Pray without ceasing,' in any practicable sense, unless we represented to ourselves the whole life of the believer as one entire and connected prayer,[3] of which prayer, commonly so called, forms but a part."

We recognize here a mode of thinking grounded in the essence of primitive Christianity, intimately connected with the consciousness of the universal Christian priesthood, which distinguishes the Christian standing ground as well from the pagan as from the Jewish,—the view of prayer as an act embracing the *whole* life,—making the entire Christian life a continuous prayer. In this reference, Origen says in his exposition of the Lord's prayer:[4] "We ought not to think that a set of words has been taught us which we are to repeat at certain stated seasons for prayer. If we duly understand what was said in regard to the duty of 'praying without ceasing,' then our whole life—if we do thus pray without ceasing—must express 'Our Father which art in heaven;' such a life having its conversation, not on earth, but always in heaven, and we being thrones of God, inasmuch as the kingdom of God has its seat in all who bear the image of the Man from heaven, and have thus

[1] De orat. § 13.
[2] De orat. c. 12.
[3] Εἰ πάντα τὸν βίον τοῦ ἁγίου μίαν συναπτομένην μεγάλην εἰποιμεν εὐχήν.
[4] De orat. c. 22

become heavenly themselves." Clement of Alexandria says:[1] "Prayer, if I may speak so boldly, is intercourse with God. Although we do but lisp, although we address God without opening the lips, in silence, we cry to him in the inward recesses of the heart; for when the whole direction of the inmost soul is to him, God always hears."[2] Again, when he is wishing to present the ideal of a devout Christian, arrived at the maturity of knowledge, the same writer says:[3] "He will pray in every place, but not openly, to be seen of men. He prays in every situation, in his walks for recreation, in his intercourse with others, in silence, in reading, in all rational pursuits. And although he is only thinking on God in the little chamber of *the soul*, and calling upon his Father with silent aspirations, *God is near him* and with him, while he is yet speaking."[4]

Tertullian's description, above quoted, of the blessedness of a Christian marriage, shows that uniting together in spiritual songs and the reading of scripture belonged to the daily edification of Christian families. In like manner Clement of Alexandria recommends union in prayer and the reading of the Bible,[5] as a daily morning employment for Christian heads of families. The controversial writings of Tertullian concerning matters of church life and morality, where he conceives of laymen as his opponents, prove that even they were well acquainted with the scriptures, and were used to judge concerning the relations of life from them.

The Christians were, in general, accustomed to fall in with the customary seasons of prayer already fixed upon among the Jews; namely, the third, the sixth and the ninth hours of the day, as it was then divided; or at nine, at twelve and at three in the afternoon; not that they wished to confine the duty of prayer to any stated times, but as Tertullian explained,[6] "for the purpose of reminding those of their duty who might be drawn away from it by their worldly business." Yet the Christians were accustomed to sanctify with prayer all the more important portions of the day, and all the more important transactions of life, whether relating to the mind or the body; since even the concerns of the world were to be made holy by receiving a heavenly direction. "It behoves the faithful," says Tertullian, "neither to take food, nor to enter a bath, without interposing a prayer; for the nourishing and refreshing of the spirit should have precedence of the nourishing and refreshing of the body, the heavenly of the earthly." Thus too, a Christian, who had received into his house a brother from a distant land, and entertained him with all the bodily refreshments in his power, was not to dismiss him without prayer; he was to treat him no otherwise than if he saw in the stranger the Lord himself; and the guest was not to look upon the earthly refreshment which he had received from his brother as of more value than the heavenly which he

[1] Stromat. l. VII. f. 722.
[2] Πᾶσαν γὰρ τὴν ἐνδιάθετον ὁμιλίαν ὁ θεὸς ἀδιάλειπτως ἐπαΐει.
[3] Stromat. l. VII. f. 728.
[4] Ὁ δὲ ἐγγὺς ἔτι λαλοῦντος πάρεστιν.
[5] Εὐχὴ καὶ ἀνάγνωσις. Pædagog. l. II f. 194. D.
[6] De orat. c. 25.

bestowed on him at parting.[1] On pressing emergencies, affecting either the church in general, or individual members of it in whom all felt a special interest, the whole church assembled for prayer; and all general deliberations were opened with prayer. It was in prayer, that the brotherly fellowship, the mutual sympathy of the members of the One Body was to be specially expressed; each was to pray in the spirit of all, and to present the interests of all the brethren, which he regarded as his own, before the great Head of the Church, and through him, before Eternal Love. Thus Cyprian, in his exposition of the Lord's prayer, says, "The teacher of peace and of mutual fellowship was desirous, not that each individual should pray for himself alone, but that each should pray for all. We say not, *my* Father, but *our* Father; nor do we pray, each for the forgiveness of *his own sins* alone, nor for *himself alone*, that he may not be led into temptation, and that he may be delivered from the evil. Ours is a common prayer; and when we pray, we pray not for individuals, but for the whole church, because, being members of the church, we are all one. That God who is the Author of peace and of union, would have each individual pray for all, even as he, in one, has borne us all." And when Cyprian, the bishop, in the pressure of persecution, was encouraging his church to prayer, he wrote to them: — "Let each of you pray to God, not for himself alone, but for all the brethren, as the Lord has taught us to pray."

Convinced that the things of God were to be understood only in the light of God's Spirit, and that the heavenly fountain was opened to man by prayer, the Christians regarded this exercise as the necessary means to the knowledge of divine things and to the right understanding of scripture. When Origen, that great teacher of the church, who had availed himself of every human aid accessible in his time for the understanding of the scriptures and for the unfolding of the doctrines therein contained, and turned to this purpose all the resources of his vast learning and profound speculations, was exhorting his disciple, the young Gregory, (afterwards called Thaumaturgus,) to diligent "seeking and knocking" in the study of scripture, he added, "Be not content, however, with seeking and knocking, to gain insight into the things of God; prayer is the most necessary means of all.[2] Inciting us to this, our Saviour did not say alone, 'Knock and it shall be opened to you; seek and ye shall find;' but also, 'Pray and it shall be given you.'"

On those days which were specially consecrated to the remembrance

[1] The passage in Tertullian, de orat. c. 21, which is not without its difficulties, I will here present translated: "But he himself too, (the brother from abroad,) after having been entertained by the brethren," — I suppose in this place exceptus should be read instead of exemptis, — must not value the earthly refreshments more highly than the heavenly; for thy faith would at once be sentenced; (i. e. he would thereby evince his unbelief, if he valued the parting prayer, the blessing of the Christian brother his entertainer, as of no account compared with the bodily refreshment bestowed;) or how shalt thou say, according to the Lord's precept, Peace be with this house! unless thou returnest to those in the house the blessing, (previously received from them.)

[2] Ἀναγκαιοτάτη γὰρ καὶ ἡ περὶ τοῦ νοεῖν τὰ θεῖα εὐχή.

of Christ, *the Risen*, the Christians were accustomed to pray standing erect, to signify that Christ had raised up to heaven those who were fallen and sunk in the mire of the earth; on all other days they prayed kneeling. Yet Origen warned Christians against the self-delusion which in the outward form forgot the temper of the heart; he pointed them from the latter to the former, and labored to show that the latter was utterly without significance unless connected with the former; was, in itself considered, an indifferent matter. "Before one stretches out his hands to heaven," he says,[1] "one must lift his soul upward; and before one raises up his eyes, one must lift up his spirit to God; for there can be no doubt, that among a thousand possible positions of the body, outstretched hands and uplifted eye are to be preferred above all others, as imaging forth those directions of the soul which are befitting in prayer. We are of opinion that this posture should be preferred where there is nothing to forbid it; for there are certain circumstances, as sickness, where one may pray even sitting or lying. And under certain circumstances, as for example, on board ship, or in situations which would not allow one to retire for the purpose of offering up the suitable prayer, one may pray, without seeming to do so. And since the bowing of the knee is required when a man is confessing before God his own sins and imploring their healing and pardon, he should know that this posture is the sign of a bowed down and humble spirit." Origen supposes the passage in Philip. 2: 10, to refer to such a spiritual bowing the knee in self-humiliation at the name of Jesus. Tertullian and Cyprian explain, that prayer does not consist in the pomp of outward gestures, but in the direction of the heart to God. "God hears not the voice, but the heart," says Cyprian. "He who discerns the thoughts of men, needs not to be reminded of their cry; thus Hannah, in the book of Kings, presents the type of the church. She supplicated God, not with noisy prayer, but in the silent depths of the heart. Her prayer was in silence, but her faith was known to God."

In Commodian's Collection of rules for the Christian life, we find this laid down with the rest: that prayer, not accompanied with works of Christian love, is nothing.[2]

We now pass from the consideration of the Christian life generally, and of family devotion, to the forms of public worship.

II. *Public and Common Worship of God.*

1. *Character of the Christian Worship generally.*

That in which the peculiar character of the Christian worship was really grounded, and by which it was clearly distinguished from every other kind of religious cultus, was that same fundamental intuition out of which the entire Christian life originally sprang, — the idea of the universal Christian priesthood — of that worship of God in spirit and in truth, which is confined to no special time or place, and to no particular

[1] Cap. 31.

[2] Instruct. 79:

Orantem si cupias exaudiri de cœlo,
Rumpe de latibulis nequitiæ vincla;
Aut si benefactis ores miseratur egenis,
Ne dubites quin quod petieris detur oranti.
Tu sane si nudus benefactis Deum adores,
In totum ne facias sic orationes inepte

class of actions, but embraces in like manner all the actions of the whole life. This distinguishing character of the Christian worship developed itself, among the communities of pagan Christians founded by the Apostle Paul, first, in contradistinction to Judaism, and afterwards, in opposition likewise to paganism. Later indeed, and as the result of that revolution of Christian views which we adverted to in speaking of the history of the church constitution, a reaction of the Jewish principle began to manifest itself in the forms of worship, as the opposition to that principle became more feeble. The simple and spiritual character of the Christian worship was, from the first, a very singular and striking phenomenon to the pagans — particularly the fact that nothing of that outward pomp and show was to be seen in it which in all other religions was considered to be so essential — "no temples, no altars, no images!" When Celsus taunted the Christians on this peculiarity, Origen replied: "In the highest sense, God's temple and image are in the humanity of Christ; — next, in all actuated by the spirit of Christ; — living images these, with which no Jupiter of Phidias is worthy to be compared!"[1] Christianity led men to withdraw from the bustle of the world to the still retirement of the sanctuary within, there to pour out their hearts before Him who chose *this* for his peculiar dwelling; but it also kindled in the hearts of individuals flames of love which sought after communion, after the means of mutually lending strength to one another, and rising upward in one common holocaust to heaven. *Fellowship* in prayer and devotion was considered a means of promoting holiness, since it was known that the Lord was present with his Spirit, in the midst of those who were assembled together in his name; but nothing could be more distant from the thoughts of Christians generally than to attribute any special sacredness to the *place* of meeting. Such a fancy seemed to savor of paganism; and it was the less possible for Christians to be led into such a mistake at the beginning, because their earliest places of assembly were ordinary rooms in private houses, such as any member of the church, who had a dwelling suited to the purpose, could furnish. Thus Gaius of Corinth is called, Rom. 16, the host of the whole church; because the church was accustomed to assemble in a room of his house. Origen says:[2] "The place where believers assemble for prayer has something about it wholesome and profitable;" but it is the importance of *this spiritual* fellowship only, which he aims to impress. "Christ, with the host of angels," he supposes, "attends the assembly of the faithful; and hence such assemblies for prayer should not be despised or neglected, since they have a peculiar power for him who joins in them with a sincere heart." "It is not the place, but it is the congregation of the elect, which I call the church," says Clement of Alexandria.[3] Tertullian remarks:[4] "We may pray in every place which the occasion or which necessity may furnish; for the apostles who prayed to God and sang his praise in the prison, within the hearing of the keepers, surely did

[1] c. Cels. l. VIII. § 17.
[2] De orat. c. 31.
[3] Οὐ γὰρ νῦν τὸν τόπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄθροισμα τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν ἐκκλησίαν κάλω. Strom. l. VII. f. 715. B.
[4] De orat. c. 24.

nothing contrary to the commands of our Lord, any more than did Paul, when in the ship and before the eyes of all, he consecrated the Lord's supper." Acts 27.

It could not fail to happen, indeed, that the principle which tended to make religion an outward thing, confined to particular times and places, — which principle Christianity had overcome, — would once more find entrance into the Christian life; but the power of the pure Christian spirit caused itself to be felt against such depravations when they threatened to spread farther. Of such a thing Clement of Alexandria testifies when he says:[1] "The disciples of Christ ought so to appear and so to shape their conduct in their daily living, as, for the sake of propriety, they strive to appear in the church; they should really *be*, and not merely *seem* to be such, — so gentle, so devout, so amiable. But I know not how it is that, with the place, they change their appearance and their manners, just as it is said of the polypus, that it changes its color with the roots to which it clings. They lay aside the spiritual demeanor which they assumed in the church, as soon as they leave it, and put themselves on a level with the multitude with whom they mingle. They convict themselves of insincerity, and show what was really the temper of their hearts, by laying off their assumed mask of decorum. They profess to honor the word of God, but leave it behind them in the place where they heard it."

2. *The Places of Assembly used by the Christians.*

We have already said that the place where the congregations assembled was at first a room in the house of some member of the church. In large towns, where such a place of assembly could not accommodate all, it became necessary that smaller portions of the community dwelling at a distance, should choose other places for their meeting on the Sunday. When a man distinguished for the talent of communicating doctrinal instruction settled down in a town, he also might form a circle in the church, who would assemble at his dwelling for the purpose of hearing his spiritual discourses. Thus the passages in Paul's epistles concerning churches in the house of Aquilas and of others will become intelligible;[2] and to this Justin Martyr alluded, when, in the audience

[1] Pædagog. l. III. f. 257.

[2] The church in his house, ἡ κατ' οἶκον αὐτοῦ ἐκκλησία. In such passages, the reference certainly cannot be to places of assembly for entire congregations, since in several instances this ἡ κατ' οἰκόν τινος ἐκκλησία is expressly distinguished from the whole community; 1 Cor. 16: 19 and 20, — the church at Ephesus assembling in the house of Aquilas and Priscilla, is first mentioned, and then besides, *all* the brethren, which, according to the above supposition, would be the same thing. Coloss. 4: 15, is another case of the same sort. Again, an objection presents itself against this explanation, from the fact that the same Aquilas should have the church meet in *his* house, when he resided at Rome, his ordinary home, and when he abode at Ephesus; comp. Rom. 16: 5, and 1 Corinth. 16: 19. But it is very unlikely, that the community would have constantly changed its place of meeting on the arrival of Aquilas It is more easy to conceive, that men, who like the tent-maker Aquilas, were obliged on account of their occupation, to provide themselves with large and commodious dwellings wherever they took up their residence, were in the habit of giving up *one* apartment of their house for the assembling of a portion of the community; especially when such a person was also fitted, as probably Aquilas was, by his gift of teaching, to conduct the exercises of *small* assemblies

which he had with the prefect of Rome, in answer to the question, "Where do you assemble?" he replied, "Where each man can and will. You believe, doubtless, that we all meet together in one place But it is not so; for the God of the Christian is not confined to one spot, but his invisible presence fills heaven and earth, and in all places he is worshipped by the faithful." Justin then adds, that whenever he came to Rome, it was his custom to take up his residence in one particular spot, where those Christians who were instructed by him,[1] and who wished to hear his discourses, were accustomed to assemble. Other places of assembly he had not visited.

Gradually such arrangements were made in these places of assembly, as the proprieties of Christian worship required. An elevated seat was constructed for the reading of the scriptures and the delivering of the sermon;[2] and a table set for the distribution of the supper, to which, so early as the time of Tertullian — perhaps not without some mixture of the foreign Old Testament idea of sacrifice, at least not without furnishing a pretext for the speedy admission of this idea — was given the name of altar; ara, altare. As the communities became larger and wealthier, church buildings were erected expressly for the use of the Christians. This appears to have been the case as early as the third century, for mention is made already of the *θρησκεύσιμοι τόποι*, (places of worship,) of the Christians, in the edict of Gallien.[3] In the time of the outward prosperity of the church, under the reign of Diocletian, many splendid church structures had already arisen in the large cities.

The use of images was originally foreign to the worship and excluded from the churches of the Christians; and so in general, it continued to be in this period. The confounding of religion and art in paganism, made the early Christians suspicious of art. As at the pagan position the sense for the beautiful had often appeared at variance with, and even opposed to, the moral taste, so the early warmth of Christian zeal was inclined to reverse the relation. The religious consciousness easily took an opposite direction to the æsthetic principle of the ancient world; and the Holy disdained the beautiful form which had been allied to the unholy. The idea of the appearance of the godlike in the form of a servant, an idea so well suited to the oppressed condition of the afflicted church of this age, men were inclined to push to an undue extreme, rather than to seek to ennoble the divine by the beautiful form. This exhibits itself more particularly in the universal opinion of the primitive church, according to which Christ veiled his intrinsic divine majesty under an uncomely appearance, which served to conceal it; an opinion for which they found authority in the Messianic passage, Is. 53: 2, too literally understood. Thus Clement of Alexandria admonishes the

in the capacity of a *διδάσκαλος*. Comp. above, p. 185, and my History of the Planting, &c., Bd. I. S. 208.

[1] This was accordingly *ἡ κατ' οἶκον τοῦ Ἰουστίνου ἐκκλησία*.

[2] Suggestus, pulpitum.

[3] See above, p. 140, and the following. If any confidence is to be placed in the narrative of the Chronicle of Edessa, cited in Assemani Bibliotheca oriental. T. I. f. 391, (see above, p. 80,) there was a Christian church structure in Edessa as early as the year 202; and if the explanation of that passage by Michaelis, Orientalische und exegetische Bibliothek, Theil. X., S. 61, is made out, this church was separated thus early into three parts, according to the pattern of the Jewish temple.

Christians against placing too high a value on beauty of person, by reference to the example of Christ. "Our Lord himself is said to have been *without comeliness* in his outward appearance; and who is *better* than our *Lord?* But if he did not reveal himself in that personal beauty which is perceptible to sense, he appeared in the true beauty both of soul and of body; of the soul, in goodness; and of the body, in its destination for an imperishable existence."[1]

Church teachers of the most opposite bent of mind, those inclined to a more sensuous and those to a more spiritual mode of conceiving divine things,— Realists and Idealists, who, on account of these different intellectual tendencies, might be expected to have different views in relation to this matter, as we find that different views of the same did result from such diverse intellectual tendencies in later times,— were yet united on this point by their common repugnance to that practice of confounding the natural with the divine in paganism, and by their efforts to preserve pure and uncontaminated the worship of God in spirit and in truth. Clement of Alexandria is as little favorable to religious images as Tertullian. "We must not cling to the sensuous," he remarks, when speaking against the pagan use of images, "but we must rise to the spiritual. The familiarity of daily sight lowers the dignity of the divine, and to pretend to worship a spiritual essence through earthly matter, is to degrade that essence to the world of sense." It is evident from these remarks how foreign, on the whole, to the notions of Christians in this age must have been images of Christ. Pagans, like Alexander Severus,[2] who recognized something of a divine nature in Christ, and sects which confounded paganism with Christianity, were the first to introduce images of Christ; as, for example, the gnostic sect of the Carpocratians, who placed such images beside the busts of Plato and Aristotle.

It was not in the church, but in the family, that religious images first came into use among the Christians. In their daily intercourse with men, the Christians saw themselves everywhere surrounded by the objects of the pagan mythology, or, at least, by objects offensive to their moral and Christian sentiments. Representations of this sort covered the walls in shops, were the ornaments of drinking vessels, and seal-rings, on which the pagans frequently had engraven the images of their gods, so that they might worship them when they pleased. It was natural that in place of these objects, so offensive to their religious and moral sentiments, the Christians should wish to substitute others more agreeable to them. Thus they preferred to have on their goblets, the figure of a shepherd, carrying a lamb on his shoulder, which was the symbol of our Saviour, rescuing the repentant sinner, according to the gospel parable.[3] And Clement of Alexandria says, in reference to

[1] Pædagog. l. III. c. 1: Τὸν κύριον αὐτὸν τήν ὄψιν αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι, διὰ Ἡσαΐου τὸ πνεῦμα μαρτυρεῖ.

[2] Eusebius says, likewise, hist. eccles. l. VII. c. 18, that *pagans* were the first to provide themselves, according to their heathen notions, with painted images of *Christ*, *Peter* and *Paul*, as benefactors of mankind. This admits of being easily explained from the religious eclecticism of that period.

[3] Tertullian, de pudicitia, c. 7: Procedant ipsæ picturæ calicum vestrorum. Cap. 10: Pastor, quem in calice depingis. The figure of Christ on the cup seems not to

the seal-rings of the Christians,[1] "Let our signets be a dove, (the symbol of the Holy Spirit,) or a fish,[2] or a ship sailing towards heaven, (the symbol of the Christian church and of the individual Christian soul,) or a lyre, (the symbol of Christian joy,) or an anchor, (the symbol of Christian hope,) and he who is a fisherman will not be forgetful of the Apostle Peter, and of the children taken from the water;[3] for no images of gods should be engraved on the rings of those who are forbidden all intercourse with idols; no sword nor bow, on the rings of those who strive after peace; no goblets, on the rings of those who are the friends of sobriety." Yet religious emblems passed from domestic use into the churches, perhaps as early as the end of the third century. The walls of them were painted in this manner. The council of Elvira, in the year 305, opposed this innovation as an abuse, and forbade "the objects of worship and adoration to be painted on the walls."[4] The visible representation of the cross may, doubtless, have early found its way among the Christians, both in their domestic and ecclesiastical life. This token was peculiarly common with them. It was the sign of blessing when they rose in the morning and when they retired at night, when they went out and when they came in; employed indeed in all the transactions of daily life. It was the sign which the Christians unconsciously made, in all cases of sudden surprize.[5] It was a sensible expression of the truly Christian idea, that all the transactions of Christians, as well as their whole life, should be sanctified by the faith in Christ crucified, by being referred to him; that this faith was the most effectual means of obtaining the triumph over, and securing protection against all evil. It was but too easily, however, that men confounded this idea with the symbol which represented it; and the efficacy of the faith in Christ crucified was transferred to the outward sign, and a supernatural, sanctifying, protecting power, attributed to this — an error, the vestiges of which may be traced as far back as the third century.

We now pass from the consideration of places of public worship, to that of the seasons of worship and the festivals of the Christians.

3. *Seasons of Public Worship and Festivals.*

What we have said in general respecting the essential character of Christian worship, is also to be applied to the feasts in particular; namely, that the spirit of universality in Christianity abolished all sep-

have been pleasing to the Montanistic asceticism.

[1] Pædagog. l. III f. 246 and 247.

[2] The same allusion as in the case of the fishermen, — also an allusion to the anagram of Christ's name, ΙΧΘΥΣ = Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, Θεοῦ Υἱός, Σωτήρ.

[3] The Christians, whom the divine teacher, the θεῖος παιδαγωγός, — Christ, leads through baptism to regeneration.

[4] Ne, quod colitur et adoratur in parietibus depingatur. Concil. Illibert. can. 36. It must be admitted, that the interpretation of this canon cannot be settled with entire certainty. There is a two fold ambiguity. The phrase "quod colitur et adoratur," may be understood as referring to objects of religion generally, or more *strictly* to objects of proper worship, to images of Christ, or symbolical representations of God, — of the Trinity. The term "walls," may also be understood in two different senses, either as referring to the walls of the house of those of the church.

[5] Comp. Tertullian, de corona milit. c. 3

arative and particularizing limitation; the Christian worship of God claiming for itself the entire life flowing out from a commerce with heaven, that clung no longer to the elements of the world, was no longer to be confined either to any particular place or to a particular time. In the New Testament fulfilment, i. e., the keeping holy of the entire life as a life consecrated every day alike to God, the Old Testament law of the Sabbath must find its resolution. Not barely the observance of Jewish feasts, but all forms and modes of particularizing the Christian life by reference to certain times, is reprobated by the apostle Paul, as a Jewish practice,[1] a descent to servile dependence on the elements of the world. But if men did, notwithstanding, now select certain days for the purpose of associating with them the remembrance of the great facts connected with the history of Redemption, to which the whole Christian life was ever to be referred, for the purpose of making these occasions central points of Christian fellowship, yet this was by no means inconsistent with that Christian tendency and intuition which were at bottom. It was only a descent from the elevation of the pure spirit, at which even the Christian, still partaking of a double nature, cannot always sustain himself, to the position of sensuous weakness, — a descent which must become the more necessary, in the same proportion as the fire of the first enthusiasm, the glow of the first love, abated. But even in this respect, as well as in reference to the idea of the priesthood, the particularizing spirit of the Old Testament dispensation introduced a disturbing influence, by fastening itself on that which had sprung originally from the purer development of the Christian life.

When the Montanists were wishing to introduce new fasts *by law*, which were to be confined to *stated times*, what Paul had written in the epistle to the Galatians against the Jewish observance of times was very justly quoted against them; but Tertullian, the defender of Montanism, whom we have described above as standing on the dividing line between the early Christian — the purely evangelical — period, and the Christian Jewish period which was now about to commence, already shows himself incapable of rightly distinguishing the two positions, that of the Old and that of the New Testament; for he conceives the Judaizing spirit, reprobated by St. Paul, to consist simply in the observance of *Jewish* festivals, and not in *the whole relation, corresponding to the Jewish position, of particular days*, — whatever days they might be, — to the religious consciousness. According to his view, it would savor in no respect of Judaism, if feasts which had reference to what is simply Christian, were placed in *such a relation* to the religious consciousness.[2]

The *weekly* and *yearly* festivals of the Christians originated in the same fundamental idea, which formed the centre of the whole Chris-

[1] See my History of the Planting, etc., Bd. I., S. 215, ff.

[2] Against this objection of conforming to Jewish practices, — "Galaticari," Tertullian, de jejuniis, c. 14, replies: Galaticamur plane, si Judaicarum ceremoniarum, si legalium solennitatum observantes sumus; illas enim Apostolus dedocet, compescens veteris Testamenti in Christo sepulti perseverantiam. Quodsi nova conditio in Christo, jam nova et solennia esse debebunt.

tian life, — the idea of imitating Christ, the crucified and the risen, — imitating him in his *death*, by appropriating through faith and repentance the effects of his death, by dying to self and to the world, — imitating him in his *resurrection*, by rising with him, in faith and through the power which he imparts, to a new and holy life, consecrated to God, commencing here in the germ, and unfolding itself to maturity in another world. Hence, the *jubilee* was the *festival of the resurrection;* and the preparation for it, the remembrance of Christ's sufferings with penitence and crucifixion of the flesh, was the *day of fasting* and *penitence*. Accordingly, in the *week*, the jubilee or festival of joy was Sunday; the preparation for it were the days of fasting and prayer consecrated to the remembrance of the sufferings of Christ, and of what preceded them, on Thursday and Friday. Accordingly, the *yearly festivals* were in remembrance of the resurrection of Christ, and of his works after his resurrection and ascension; — the preparation for these, were the remembrance of Christ's sufferings and the fasts. Having presented this general view, we shall now proceed to consider, more in detail, the several weekly and yearly festivals.

The opposition to Judaism early led to the special observance of Sunday in place of the Sabbath. The first intimation of this change is in Acts 20 : 7, where we find the church assembled on the first day of the week;[1] a still later one is in Rev. 1 : 10, where by the "Lord's day," can hardly be understood the day of judgment. Thus in the catholic epistle ascribed to Barnabas, at the close of the 15th chapter, Sunday is designated as the day of jubilee in remembrance of Christ's resurrection and ascension to heaven,[2] and of the new creation which then commenced; and in the epistle of Ignatius to the Magnesians it is presupposed,[3] that even the Jews who had come over to Christianity substituted Sunday in place of the Sabbath. As the Sabbath was regarded as representing Judaism, Sunday was contemplated as a symbol of the new life consecrated to the risen Christ and grounded in his resurrection. Sunday was distinguished as a day of joy, by being exempted from fasts, and by the circumstance that prayer was performed on this day in a standing and not in a kneeling posture, as Christ, by his resurrection, had raised up fallen man again to heaven. But as we have already observed in Tertullian a confounding of the Jewish with the Christian view of feasts, so we find also in him indications of the transfer of the law of the Jewish Sabbath to Sunday; for by him, attend-

[1] See my History of the Planting, etc., Vol. I. p. 215, f.

[2] Considering the close connection in which the resurrection of Christ and his ascension to heaven stood with each other in the Christian consciousness, — since his resurrection was regarded as but a transition point to his entire exaltation above the region of earth in this new, glorified form of existence, — I cannot lay so great stress on the manner in which the writer of this letter expresses himself with regard to Sunday: "ἐν ᾗ καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ φανερωθεὶς ἀνέβη εἰς τοὺς οὐρανούς." Nor can I think myself authorized to infer from it, either that according to the author's opinion, Christ's ascension also occurred on Sunday, or that he conceived the fact to have been that Christ rose to heaven immediately after his first appearance to Mary, as the risen Saviour.

[3] Chap. 9: Μηκέτι σαββατίζοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ κυριακὴν ζωὴν ζῶντες.

ing to any business on Sunday seems to have been regarded as sinful.[1]

Again, the Friday of every week — this day in particular — and the Wednesday were specially consecrated to the remembrance of the sufferings of Christ and of the preparatory circumstances. On these days there were meetings for prayer, and fasts till three o'clock in the afternoon; yet nothing in regard to these arrangements was defined by law. Every one took a part in these observances according to his own particular necessities and his inclination. Such fasts, united with prayer, the Christians, — who were fond of comparing their calling to a militia Christi, — called *stationes*,[2] as if they constituted the sentry duties of the soldiers of Christ; — hence both these days were named *dies stationum*.[3]

Those churches, however, which were composed of Jewish Christians,[4] though they admitted, with the rest, the festival of Sunday, yet retained also that of the Sabbath; and it was from these that the custom became general in the Eastern church of distinguishing this day, as well as Sunday, by the exclusion of fasts and by the standing position in prayer; while in the Western, and especially in the Roman church, where the opposition against Judaism predominated, the custom, on the other hand, grew out of this opposition, of observing the Sabbath also as a fast day.[5] This difference in customs became striking whenever

[1] As is to be inferred from Tertullian's language, de orat. c. 23: Solo die dominico resurrectionis non ab isto tantum (the bowing of the knee,) sed omni anxietatis habitu et officio cavere debemus, *differentes etiam negotia, ne quem diabolo locum demus.*

[2] We find the word statio used in this sense, first in Hermas Pastor, l. III. Similitud. V. — often in Tertullian. Statio was the technical designation for this half-fast, as contradistinguished from the proper jejunia. Tertullian, de jejuniis, c. 14.

[3] Feria quarta et sexta, probably = feria diei quartæ, sextæ; hence the signification of the word feria in the Latin phrascology of the church.

[4] From the language of the passage, which has already been cited, Ignat. ep. ad. Magnes: Οἱ ἐν παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἀναστραφέντες, — μηκέτι σαββατίζοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ κυριακὴν ζωὴν ζῶντες, it might be inferred, indeed, that the Jewish Christians had substituted Sunday in place of the Sabbath; the inference, however, thus generally expressed, assuredly cannot be true.

[5] Tertullian, de jejun. c. 14: Quanquam vos etiam sabbatum si quando continuatis, nunquam nisi in Paschate jejunandum. He objects, as a Montanist, to his Roman opponents, that they had deprived the Sabbath of its due celebration, and sometimes continued the fast on Friday over into the Sabbath, when properly the only exception to be made here was in the case of the passover. The same practice of continuing the fast on Friday over into the Sabbath, which Tertullian the Montanist here attacks, we find mentioned by Victorinus, bishop of Petabio in Pannonia, (now Pettau in Steiermark,) near the close of the third century, in the fragment on the History of the Creation, first published by Cave hist. lit. He calls this continuation "superpositio jejunii." Fasting on the Sabbath appears in this case to have been a preparation for the jubilee of the communion on Sunday, as opposed to the Jewish celebration of the Sabbath, which had been abrogated by Christ. Hoc die solemus superponere; idcirco, ut die dominico cum gratiarum actione ad panem (the sacrament of the supper,) exeamus. Et parasceve superpositio fiat, ne quid cum Judæis sabbatum observare videamus. Galland. bibl. patr. T. IV. and Routh reliquiæ sacræ, Vol. III. pag. 237. Oxon. 1815.

The council of Elvira opposed to the error of the Sabbath celebration, such a continuation of the fast on Friday over into the Sabbath; Can. 26: Errorem placuit corrigi, ut omni sabbati die superpositiones celebremus. This canon may, without question, be differently understood, according as we refer the phrase "errorem corrigi," to something not expressly stated, but supplied by the mind, or to the following context. If it is referred to the last, the council must be understood as declaring itself expressly *opposed* to these *superpositiones*. But the analogy of the whole style of expression in the other canons of this council would rather favor the first interpreta

members of Eastern churches passed their Sabbaths in churches of the West. But too soon, the principles of the apostolic church, which, amidst all the differences in outward things, abode firmly by the unity of faith and of spirit in the bond of love, was departed from, and *uniformity* in such matters was *required*. Tertullian, previous to his conversion to Montanism, spoke on this disputed point with Christian moderation. He said of the few advocates of the Eastern custom,[1] "The Lord will bestow his grace, so that they will either yield, or else follow their own opinion without giving offence to others." As early as the beginning of the third century, the learned Hippolytus was led to write on this controversy between the Eastern and Western church.[2]

From the same point of view originated the first *yearly festivals* among the Christians; yet here, that opposition between the communities composed of Jewish and those composed of Gentile Christians, which had such important influence on the unfolding of the life of the church as well as of its doctrines, was strongly manifested at the very beginning. The former retained, with the whole Jewish ceremonial law, all the Jewish festivals, although gradually they ascribed to them such Christian import as might naturally present itself. On the contrary, among the churches of Gentile Christians, there were probably, from the first, no yearly festivals whatever, as may be inferred from the epistles of St. Paul.[3] This then must have been the case also with the churches of Asia Minor, which assuredly were founded by the Apostle Paul. But from *these churches* started the controversies in the second century respecting the time of the passover; and they appealed to the authority of an ancient usage introduced by the Apostle John. In regard to this point, thus much of truth may doubtless lie at bottom; that the changes which took place in these churches, after the times of St. Paul, in the particular form of worship and the introduction of the annual feast, — which we must assume, and search for its cause, — might be derived from the Apostle John, whose longer residence in Minor Asia must have had a lasting influence on the state of the churches there. As it regards *him*, it is in itself probable, that as he had been accustomed heretofore to celebrate the Jewish annual festival, and as the feast of the passover, which called to mind the great facts of which he had been an eye-witness, must have had a peculiar significancy for him, he may have introduced its celebration when he took up his permanent residence among the churches of that region. Thus is it explained how it happened that men were guided there wholly by the chronology of the Jewish passover.

tion. At a later period, when the point of view from which the subject was regarded in the early Christian times, had passed out of mind, and the cause of that custom in the Roman church of fasting on the Sabbath was no longer obvious, fables were invented in explanation of the matter; as, for example, that Peter had fasted on this day to prepare himself for the dispute with Simon Magus.

[1] De orat. c. 23.

[2] Cfr. Hieronymus ep. 72, ad Vital.

[3] The passage, 1 Corinth. 5: 7, contains in no sort, any allusion to a celebration of the passover in the Corinthian church, which was peculiar to the Christians; but simply opposes that cleansing of the heart which is the result of faith, to the *outward* Jewish celebration of the feast. Comp. my History of the Planting, &c., Vol. I. p. 220.

Now in modern times, it has become the prevailing opinion,[1] that the paschal supper which the Christians of Asia Minor observed in remembrance of the last paschal supper of Christ, was the point by which they determined the time of the Christian paschal supper. But it may be questioned, whether the most reliable and the oldest document on this controversy, — the letter of the bishop Polycrates of Ephesus,[2] — favors this view.[3] From the language used in this document, it might much rather be inferred, that in the churches of Asia Minor, the Christians who followed the Johannean tradition, went on the supposition, that the 14th day of the month Nisan ought to be regarded as the day of Christ's passion. Hence it was believed that this day ought ever to be appropriated to the remembrance of Christ's passion, since also the paschal lamb, slain by the Jews on this day, was considered a foretype of the offering of Christ.[4] At all events, then, it is settled, that in Asia Minor the celebration of the passover was established wholly according to the Jewish chronology. Hence it might come about, that the remembrance of Christ's passion was celebrated on another day of the week than Friday, the remembrance of Christ's resurrection on another day than Sunday. When, on the other hand, in the course of the second century, annual feasts were introduced also into the Western churches, men proceeded from an altogether different point in determining their times. Following the same method according to which the weekly festivals had been arranged, Christians held it necessary that a Friday should always be consecrated to the memory of Christ's passion, a Sunday to the memory of Christ's resurrection.

This difference of outward use existed at first, without being deemed of sufficient importance, — since it was an external thing, — to be made a matter of dispute; it was still kept in mind, that the kingdom of

[1] The first start to which was given by the Dissertation published by myself in the 2d Hefte des Kirchenhistorischen Archiv's von Vater, J. 1823. See the history of the treatises on this subject, — a subject rendered obscure and difficult by the deficiency of ancient accounts and the ambiguity of the term *Pascha*, — in Illgen's Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie, Bd. II. 4tes Stück, J. 1832, by Dr. Rettberg.

[2] Euseb. l. V. c. 24. The fragment, preserved to us in the Chronicon paschale Alexandrinum, from a work by Apollinaris of Hierapolis, on the feast of the Passover, of which I have made much use in the Dissertation just referred to, is, to say the least, suspicious; since in the ancient lists of the writings of Apollinaris, in Eusebius, in Jerome and in Photius, no such work is mentioned; and it were singular if in the district where he wrote, the usage of the church in Asia Minor was not followed.

[3] Polycrates, in the letter referred to, says of his predecessors: Πάντες ἐτήρησαν τὴν ἡμέραν τῆς τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτης τοῦ πάσχα κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον. This, to say the least, would be singularly expressed, if it is to be understood as referring only to the paschal supper to be held on the evening of this day, which supper, according to the gospel narrative relating to the last paschal supper of Christ, it was believed should be held at the beginning of the Jewish feast of the passover, on the fourteenth day of the month Nisan. Afterwards it is said: Πάντοτε τὴν ἡμέραν ἤγαγον οἱ συγγενεῖς μου, ὅταν τῶν Ἰουδαίων ὁ λαὸς ἤρνυε τὴν ζύμην. What sense would this afford, if the subject of discourse were the paschal supper? It is, in fact, evident of itself, that the *paschal supper* could be held only on the day when the Jews removed the leaven from their houses. This would be idem per idem. On the other hand, every thing is consistent, if we suppose, that the writer is speaking of the celebration *in remembrance of Christ's passion*, on the fourteenth of the month Nisan. The source of proof appealed to here was the gospel, by which may be understood either the evangelical history generally, or the gospel of John in particular.

[4] Comp. Justin M. Dial. c. Tryph. Jud. f. 259, and f. 338, ed Colon.

God consists neither in meat nor drink, nor any other kind of external action.

This diversity, together with several other differences, between the church of Asia Minor and the church of Rome, first came into discussion when, in the year 162, the bishop Polycarp of Smyrna made a visit to Anicetus bishop of Rome.[1] Polycarp alleged that he himself had observed such a passover with the Apostle John, whose disciple he was. Anicetus alleged, that his predecessors (in a church consisting of Gentile Christians from the school of Paul, and in which there were originally no yearly feasts at all[2]) had introduced nothing of that sort. But as it was not supposed that the apostles were agreed in respect to such outward matters, nor that they would have considered uniformity in regard to such things as necessary, it was believed that without prejudice to the fellowship and unity of Christians, a difference on these points might be suffered to remain. As a token that the bond of Christian brotherhood was not to be disturbed by such, and, as it seems, other still more important points of difference, Anicetus permitted Polycarp to preside in the church in place of himself, at the celebration of the Lord's supper.

If two books which, about the year 171, the bishop Melito of Sardis wrote upon the passover,[3] referred to this dispute, it must about this time have broken out anew; yet it does not admit of being proved, that the work contained any reference of that sort. The typical explanation of the Jewish passover might also have led to the composition of such a work, independent of this controversy.

But about the year 190, when Victor was bishop of the Roman church,[4] the controversy broke out afresh. On the one side stood the church of Rome, together with the churches of Cæsarea in Palestine, of Jerusalem, of Tyre, and of Alexandria; on the other were the churches of Asia Minor, headed by the bishop Polycrates of Ephesus.

The Roman bishop, actuated by that hierarchical spirit, which, as we have already observed, had already begun to show itself in the Roman church,[5] published sentence of excommunication against the churches of

[1] At any rate, if we may judge from the language of Irenæus, cited by Eusebius, the object of Polycarp's journey to Rome was not to settle the disputes respecting the feast of the passover. No disputes on *this* question had as yet arisen; and the conversation upon it was only cursorily introduced, while the parties were speaking on the points in which the churches differed. Neither is it by any means clear, although it is possible, that the object of the journey was to discuss those other differences. More importance has been sometimes attributed to this visit, than it can be proved historically to have had.

[2] The matter is obscure, as we have in our hands only a disconnected fragment of the letter of Irenæus. Perhaps there was not as yet even then in the Roman church any yearly feast; perhaps the difference *at that time* had reference to this very point. — the conflict between the ancient rites according to Paul, and the more recent ones according to John. I speak here only by way of conjecture.

[3] Euseb. l. IV. c. 26.

[4] I once inferred, from the fact that Irenæus, in his letter to Victor, holds up only those Roman bishops who preceded Soter, as patterns of toleration, that a change had already taken place under the latter; but if we mark how the phrases in Irenæus, οι (πρὸ) Σωτῆρος πρεσβύτεροι and οἱ πρόσου πρεσβύτεροι, answer to each other, it becomes evident that no stress can be laid on the former of them. Irenæus means simply to say, that difference, and withal that tolerance, did not first begin under the last bishops, but existed already before Soter.

[5] See above, p. 214.

Asia Minor, on account of this trivial point of dispute; but this unchristian proceeding could not fail to encounter decided resistance, in an age when some portion of the gospel spirit still remained. Irenæus, in the name of the churches at Lyons and Vienna, wrote him a letter, in which he sharply rebuked this method of procedure. He endeavored to make Victor ashamed of his conduct, by comparing it with the example of his predecessor, Anicetus, and declared to him, "Notwithstanding these differences, we live together in peace, and our disagreement with regard to the regulation of fasts serves only to make our unity of faith the more clearly evident." In the same letter, or another document originating in the same controversy, he said, "The apostles have directed us to let no man judge us in meat or in drink, or in respect of a holy day, or of the new moon or of Sabbath days. Why then these disputes, why these divisions? We observe fasts, but with the sour leaven of malice and cunning, rending the church of God; we observe the externals, so as to let go those weightier matters of faith and love. We have learned from the prophets, however, that such feasts and such fasts are an abomination to the Lord."

As Friday was customarily considered a day of penitence and fasting preparatory to the celebration of the resurrection Sunday, it was the practice of these churches, where one Friday in the year was consecrated to the remembrance of the passion, and one Sunday to the remembrance of the resurrection of Christ, to make this Friday a day of penitence and fasting preparatory to the greatest Christian festival, the celebration of the remembrance of Christ's resurrection on Easter Sunday. Yet with respect to the duration of this season of fasting, nothing was determined. In order to imitate the temptation of Jesus during forty days in the wilderness, this fast was extended in some districts to forty hours, which led afterwards to the forty days,[1] or Quadragesimal fast.

After the feast of the resurrection followed the feast of Pentecost, (Whitsuntide,) in remembrance of Christ risen and glorified, as he thus revealed himself to the faithful, and at length actively manifested himself, in a self-subsistent community of divine life, in the effusion of the Holy Spirit. All this was embraced as one included sum of the activity and self-revelation of the ascended and glorified Redeemer, in this prolonged celebration of fifty days. It is evident from this, how closely connected in the Christian consciousness of this period were the conceptions of Christ ascended and glorified.[2] This entire period was observed as Sunday; that is, there was never any fasting; prayers were made in the standing and not in the kneeling posture; it was perhaps

[1] Irenæus, in Euseb. l. V. c. 24.

[2] This mode of contemplating the subject was still adopted also by Origen, and accounts for the manner in which he places in juxtaposition with the weekly feasts, the *παρασκευαί* and *κυριακαί*, the yearly feasts, the *πάσχα* and the *πεντηκοστή*, regarding the feast of the resurrection as the point at which the feast of pentecost began. Hence he observes: "Whoever in sincerity of heart can say, God has raised us up and set us with him in heavenly places, celebrates constantly the feast of pentecost." (*Ὁ δυνάμενος μετὰ ἀληθείας λέγειν, συνανέστημεν τῷ Χριστῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συνήγειρε καὶ συνεκάθισεν ἡμᾶς ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις ἐν Χριστῷ, ἀεί ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς τῆς πεντηκοστῆς ἡμέραις.*) Orig. c. Cels. l. VIII. c. 22

the case also, (in many of the churches at least,) that the congregations daily assembled and celebrated the communion.[1] Afterwards, two special events were selected out of this whole period, the ascension of Christ, and the effusion of the Holy Spirit, to which the celebration of Pentecost was confined.

These feasts, as it appears from the passage cited out of Origen, were the only ones generally observed in this period. That fundamental view of the whole Christian life, which referred everything to the sufferings, resurrection and glory of Christ, and the accommodation or opposition to the Jewish observances, were reasons that these in particular constituted the only general festivals. The idea of a *birth-day* festival was foreign to the Christians of this period generally; they regarded the second birth as the man's true birth. So far as it concerned the birth of the Saviour, the case must have been somewhat different, indeed. By him, human nature was to be sanctified from its earliest development. But this fact could not at first present itself in so prominent a point of light to the early Christians, so many of whom had embraced Christianity when now advanced in years, and after a decisive crisis of their life. It was, moreover, only by degrees that Christianity could pass over into all the relations of domestic life. Besides, it was, in truth, unknown at what definite time the celebration of the remembrance of Christ's birth should be placed, as nothing definite was ascertained respecting the date of his birth. The case was entirely different with those more ancient annual feasts.

Yet we find even in this period some trace, probably, of the festival of *Christmas*. The history of it is closely connected with the history of another kindred festival, the festival of the *manifestation of Jesus* in his character as the Messiah, his consecration to the office of Messiah at his baptism by John and the beginning of his public ministry, called afterwards the ἑορτὴ τῶν ἐπιφανίων, τῆς ἐπιφανείας τοῦ Χριστοῦ. We find in later times, that these festivals spread in opposite directions; the former extended itself from the West to the East, and the latter from the East to the West.[2] Clement of Alexandria simply notices, that the

[1] We might infer from Tertullian, de orat. c. 23, where he had said that worldly business on Sunday was deferred, and where he subsequently transfers the entire celebration of Sunday to the pentecost, that the former practice was observed also through the whole of Pentecost; which, however, can hardly be credited. De Idololatria, c. 14, he says, wishing to withhold Christians from taking any part in the heathen festivals: Excerpe singulas sollennitates nationum, Pentecosten implere non poterunt The first trace of a limitation of the pentecost to one day, is to be found perhaps in the 43d canon of the council of Elvira. This certainly very obscure canon seems most naturally to admit of being understood as meaning that some had selected out of the whole time of pentecost merely the feast of ascension. On the other hand, by the pentecost the council understands only the feast of the effusion of the Holy Spirit: and hence requires, that it should be celebrated fifty days after Easter. It charges the former, who did but wrongly apply the name of pentecost, of departing from the authority of Scripture. Ut cuncti diem Pentecostes post Pascha celebremus, non quadragesimam, nisi quinquagesimam.

[2] The feast of Epiphany, considered as the feast of Christ's baptism, stood in high consideration towards the close of the fourth century, at Antioch, while the introduction of the Christmas festival, coming from the West, met there with a good deal of opposition. Several Eastern churches, where men became first acquainted with the festival of Christmas in the last part of the fourth century, or still later, but where the feast of Christ's baptism had been longer known, afterwards united both feasts together; just as in the Western churches a

Gnostic sect of the Basilidians kept the latter festival in his time at Alexandria. It can hardly be admitted, however, that this sect invented the festival, interested as they were in observing it on the ground of their doctrines; for we cannot suppose that the catholic church would ever have received it from the Gnostics. They had most probably borrowed it from Jewish Christian churches in Palestine or Syria. With Jewish Christians it probably originated; for to their peculiar mode of thinking, this moment in the life of Jesus must have appeared most important. The Gnostics afterwards gave it their own interpretation. Clement speaks, at the same time, of individuals who were disposed to calculate not only the *year* but also the *day* of the nativity of Jesus, and indeed seems to censure such inquiries as idle and unprofitable, in which, moreover, it was impossible to arrive at any certainty. He does not state indeed that they observed the day which they attempted to determine, as a festival; yet it is probable that the day which they took so much pains to reckon, they also observed; and the general shaping of the passage in Clement would seem to indicate that this was his meaning.[1] He could not have alluded, however, to the Gnostics, of whom he speaks afterwards, for with *their* system the festival of Christmas stood in direct contradiction. Thus these two feasts answer to two stages of Christian intuition, a lower and a higher; that which attached itself immediately to Judaism, and the Christian stage carried forward to an independent development; the view of Jesus as the anointed of the Holy Spirit, armed with divine powers for his work as the Messiah, and of Jesus as the god-man, the Word become flesh, whose humanity was from the beginning filled with the divine essence. We pass now to consider the several acts of Christian worship.

4. *The several acts of Christian Worship.*

The nature of the single acts of Christian worship will be evident from what we have remarked respecting its essence generally. As the elevation of the spirit and heart of the united church to God was the end of the whole, so instruction and edification by uniting in the common contemplation of the divine word, constituted, from the first, a principal part of Christian worship. The mode in which this was done, might, like the form of the church constitution, be closely connected with the arrangement of the assemblies of the Jewish communities in the synagogues.[2] As in the synagogue assemblies of the Jews the reading of portions from the Old Testament formed the basis of religious instruction, so the same practice passed over into the Christian

somewhat different meaning was given to the recent feast of Epiphany, which came to them from the East. The Donatists refused to adopt the feast of Epiphany, considering it as an innovation coming from the *Eastern* church. Quia nec orientali ecclesiæ, ubi apparuit illa stella, communicant. Augustini Sermo, 202, § 2. These are only preliminary remarks, introduced here in confirmation of the conjecture above expressed; the subject will be resumed in the following period.

[1] Clemens Stromat, l. I. f. 340: Εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ περιεργότερον τῇ γενέσει τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν οὐ μόνον τὸ ἔτος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν προστιθέντες· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Βασιλείδου καὶ τοῦ βαπτίσματος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἡμέραν ἑορτάζουσι.

[2] See my History of the Planting, etc. Vol. I. p. 39.

assemblies. The Old Testament was read first, particularly the prophetic parts of it, as referring to the Messiah; next, the gospels, and finally the apostolic epistles.

The reading of the scriptures was of the greater consequence, since it was desired to make every Christian familiar with them; and yet, on account of the rarity and high price of manuscripts, and the poverty of a great proportion of the Christians, or because all could not read, placing the Bible itself in the hands of all was out of the question. The frequent *hearing* of the word must therefore, in the case of many, be a substitute for their own *reading* it. The scriptures were read in a *language* that all could understand. This, in most of the countries belonging to the Roman empire, was either the Greek or the Latin. Various *translations* of the Bible into Latin made their appearance at a very early period; since every one who had but a slight knowledge of Greek, felt the want of thus making himself familiar with the word of God in his native tongue.[1] In places where the Greek or the Latin language was understood by only a part of the community, the men of education, the rest being acquainted only with the ancient dialect of their country, which was the case in many cities of Egypt and Syria, church interpreters were appointed, as they were in the Jewish synagogues,[2] who immediately translated what was read into the provincial dialect, that it might be universally understood.[3]

As early as the third century it was the practice, as we learn from the complete liturgies of the fourth which are known to us, for the deacons, before the Anagnost began to read, to exhort the community in a certain customary form of words, to attention and devotion in listening to the divine word.[4]

The reading of the scriptures was followed, as in the Jewish synagogues, by short, and originally very *simple addresses*, in familiar language, such as the heart prompted at the moment, which contained the exposition and application of what had been read. On this point, Justin Martyr expresses himself as follows:[5] "The presiding officer of the church gives a word of exhortation, and incites the people to exemplify in their lives the good things they had listened to." It was among the Greeks, who were more given to the culture of rhetoric, that the *sermon* first began to take a wider scope, and to assume an important place in the acts of worship.[6]

[1] Augustin. de doctrina christiana, l. II. c. 11.

[2] The הוּרְגְמָנִים, Dragomans.

[3] Ἑρμηνευταὶ γλώσσης εἰς γλῶσσαν, ἢ ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσιν, ἢ ἐν ταῖς προσομιλίαις. Epiphan. exposit. fid. Cathol. c. 21. Procopius, the martyr, in the persecution of Dioclesian, united in his own person, at Scythopolis in Palestine, the offices of Anagnost, exorcist, and interpreter, (from the Greek into Syriac.) See his Acta.

[4] As we may see from the words of Commodian, against the speaking, particularly of the female sex, in the church:

Buccina præconum clamat, lectore legente,
Ut pateant aures, et tu magis obstruis illas.
L. c. c. 76.

[5] Apolog. II.

[6] When Sozomen, hist. eccles. l. VII. c. 19, who wrote in the first half of the fifth century, says that the practice of preaching did not exist in the Roman church, the remark could in no case have reference to the *early times;* but, supposing the statement is to be depended upon, it would simply amount to this, that by the predominance of outward show and liturgical pomp, the sermon was finally pushed out. But the fact may have been, that this Eastern writer

Church psalmody, also, passed over from the synagogue into the Christian church. The Apostle Paul exhorts the primitive churches to sing spiritual songs. For this purpose were used the psalms of the Old Testament, and partly *hymns composed expressly for this object*, especially hymns of praise and of thanks to God and to Christ; such having been known to Pliny, as in customary use among the Christians of his time. In the controversies with the Unitarians, at the end of the second and the beginning of the third centuries, the *hymns* were appealed to, in which from early times Christ had been worshipped as God. The power of church melody on the heart was soon acknowledged; and hence such as were desirous of propagating peculiar opinions of their own, like Bardasanes or Paul of Samosata, seized upon this as an instrument well adapted to their purpose.

The *visible church* required *visible* signs, for the spiritual facts on which its inward essence rests. Hence Christ, who meant to found a visible church, instituted *two outward signs*, as symbols of the invisible fellowship between him, the *Head* of the spiritual body, and its members, the believers, and of the union of these members not only *with himself*, but *with one another* — visible means of representing the invisible heavenly benefits to be communicated by him to the members of this body; and with the believing use of these signs, furnished to the *outward* man of *sense* in behalf of the *inward spiritual* man, was to be connected the enjoyment of that fellowship and of those heavenly benefits. As in Christianity and all Christian life, there is nothing which stands separate and insulated, but all forms one whole, radiating from a common centre, so in the present case, what is represented by these outward signs was to be something which should proceed on through the whole inward, Christian life; something which from one single moment of that life should be diffused over the whole of it; and again, from other single moments, should be specially awakened and carried still further onward. Such was *baptism*, the sign of the first entrance into fellowship with the Redeemer and with the church, the first appropriation of the benefits which he bestowed on mankind — the forgiveness of sins and the inward union of life thence resulting — the participation in a sanctifying, divine spirit of life; and such was the *Lord's* supper, the sign of a constantly progressive perseverance in this fellowship and in the appropriation and enjoyment of these benefits; both representing the essentials of the whole Christian life within, in its first rise and its progressive development. The whole peculiar spirit of the Christian worship invariably stamped itself upon the mode in which these outward signs of divine realities were administered; and again, the mode of their administration powerfully reacted upon the character of the worship. The connection of the moments represented by these outward signs with the whole of the Christian life, the union of the inward and divine things with the outward transactions, were present to the lively Christian feelings of the early believers; but it was here a

was deceived by false accounts from the West. And the mistake may have arisen from some observation, that the Sermon in the Roman church did not occupy so important a place in the worship, as in the Greek church

source of great practical mischief, — just as we observed in the case of the doctrine concerning the church, — that men neglected duly to separate and distinguish in their conceptions, what was connected together in their feelings. It was from the same source that the outward conception, not merely of the church, but also of those symbols which were so closely connected with the being of the church, proceeded. And one kind of outward conception reacted upon the other.

We shall speak first of *baptism*. At the beginning, when it was important that the church should rapidly extend itself, those who confessed their belief in *Jesus* as the *Messiah*, (among the Jews,) or their belief in one God, and in *Jesus* as the *Messiah*, (among the Gentiles,) were immediately baptized, as appears from the New Testament. Gradually it came to be thought necessary, that those who wished to be received into the Christian church, should be subjected to a more careful preparatory instruction, and to a stricter examination.[1] This whole class were denominated *κατηχούμενοι, ἀκροαταί,* auditores or audientes. By these appellations they were designated as those who were receiving their first instruction in Christianity, and who could only be permitted to hear the reading of the scriptures and the preaching of the word. The period of probation must have been determined by the different conditions of individuals; yet the Council of Elvira decided generally on a period of two years. Originally there was but one common name for all who had not as yet received baptism, but were in the state of probation and preparation. But as different stages and gradations were here distinguished, these were also designated by particular names. Accordingly in Origen we find these catechumens distinctly separated into two divisions. 1. Those who were for the first time receiving private instruction, and 2. Those who were admitted to the meetings of the church, and who were immediately prepared for baptism.[2]

[1] The assertion advanced by Dr. Rothe, in his interesting tract, (De disciplinæ arcani, quæ dicitur, in ecclesia Christiana origine. Heidelberg, 1841,) that the instruction and examination of catechumens related in the first place to matters of practice only, and that an important change took place when, at a later period, the instruction and examination was directed to matters of theory, — this assertion I cannot think established on good and sufficient grounds. Both were, from the beginning, united together, as Christianity required. This is clear also from the passage in the greater Apology of Justin Martyr, § 61, where he says of those who are preparing themselves for baptism: *Ὅσοι ἂν πεισθῶσι καὶ πιστεύωσιν ἀληθῆ ταῦτα τὰ ὑφ' ἡμῶν διδασκόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα εἶναι καὶ βιοῦν οὕτως δύνασθαι ὑπισχνῶνται.* Here instruction in doctrine is assuredly presupposed, and the corresponding conduct of the life derived from it, and both supposed to be so united with each other, that those who wished to receive baptism should declare themselves convinced of the truth of the doctrines they had been taught, and bind themselves to rule their lives by them, — the same method of uniting doctrine and practice which must prevail at all periods in the instruction of catechumens. It is beyond my power to conceive what conclusion can be drawn from the words of Celsus, l. III. c. 50, with regard to the instruction of catechumens; for these words are totally foreign to the subject, having reference simply to the mode which the Christians adopted of seeking first to gain access to the uneducated, to slaves and youth, and bring them over to Christianity. Neither has the relation of Clement's two works (the Pædagogue and the Stromata) to each other, any thing to do with the present subject; it answers to the relation of the *πίστις* to the *γνῶσις*, among the Alexandrians; and the Gnosis assuredly could not be taught to catechumens. Instruction in the fundamental doctrines of Christianity is quite another thing.

[2] Origen, c. Cels. l. III. c. 51, says that to those who wished to embrace Christianity, private instruction was first imparted, (by this circumstance he explains their name

For the private instruction of these catechumens, a distinct office was instituted in the church. At Carthage the duty was devolved, after a period of probation, on some individual who had distinguished himself among the church readers. At Alexandria, where it often happened that men of education, even the learned, and those habituated to philosophical reflection, applied to receive instruction in Christianity, it was necessary that the catechists should be men of liberal education, qualified to meet the objections and doubts of pagans, and to follow them on their own position. Able and learned laymen were therefore selected here; and this class of catechists led afterwards to the formation of an important theological school among the Christians.[1]

Some traces of a *confession of faith*, which was made at baptism, are to be found even in the New Testament.[2] Such confessions of faith were afterwards more fully drawn out, in opposition to Jews, to pagans and to heretics. These confessions were intended to embrace those essentials of Christianity, wherein all the churches were agreed. It was believed that the doctrine expressed in these confessions of faith proceeded from the apostles; that it was the doctrine which they preached in living words and in their writings; but it was by no means the opinion in the beginning, that the apostles had drawn up any such confession in words. In *this* sense it was called the *κήρυγμα ἀποστολικόν*, the *παράδοσις ἀποστολική*; the misconception of this phraseology afterwards gave birth to the fiction, that the apostles had verbally composed such a confession.[3] This formula of confession was then designated by the distinctive term of Symbolum. It may be a question, whether, in this use of the word Symbolum, the allusion was to its general meaning of "a sign," in the sense that the words of the confession were a characteristic, representative sign of the faith, or whether a particular application of this meaning was intended, having reference to the *σύμβολον στρατιωτικόν*, the tessera militaris: so that the confession was, as it were, the watchword of the miles Christi, communicated to every one on his admission into the militia Christi. So far as we can trace the history of the phrase, the first seems to be the more probable supposition; for where the word Symbolum first occurs in connection with baptism, it has only that general signification.[4]

ἀκροαταί.) For when they had sufficiently held to their purpose of leading a Christian life, they would be introduced into the community; *τοτηνικάδε αὐτοὺς εἰσαγούσιν, ἰδίᾳ μὲν ποιήσαντες τάγμα τῶν ἄρτι ἀρχομένων καὶ εἰσαγομένων καὶ οὐδέπω τὸ σύμβολον τοῦ ἀποκεκαθάρθαι ἀνειληφότων*. The last distinction shows evidently that these should be distinguished from the baptized, who are afterwards spoken of. It was only the moral oversight to be extended to the baptized members of the congregation, which forms the subject of discourse afterwards. And so Origen describes, not three, but two classes of catechumens.

[1] More on this whole subject hereafter, in the section relating to the Alexandrian school.

[2] See 1 Pet. 3: 21.—1 Tim. 6: 12, is not so clear, as this might refer to a profession voluntarily made by Timothy, from the impulse of his own feelings, on a special occasion, when he was chosen and consecrated as a missionary to the heathen.

[3] Rufin. exposit. symbol. apostol.

[4] As, for example, where Tertullian, de pœnitentia, c. 6, says, that baptism, which by its nature should be a symbolum vitæ, becomes to those who receive it without the right disposition, a symbolum mortis. So in his work, contr. Marcion. l. V. c. 1, symbolum is used by him as equivalent to mark, sign, generally. So in the letter of Firmilianus of Cæsarea, where the "symbolum trinitatis" is expressly distinguished from the confession of faith, and employed

The very significant word *σύμβολον*, symbolum, would now give occasion to many different religious allusions; the one that soon became predominant was that which fixed on the favorite comparison among the early Christians of their vocation to a military service (militia.) In the Alexandrian church, on the other hand, where a taste prevailed for tracing analogies with the pagan mysteries, and sometimes, indeed, in a way but little suited to the simple character of the gospel, the term was compared to the watch-word of the initiated.[1] Others fixed on another meaning of the word "Symbolum," namely, a commercial compact; as if the pledge of a spiritual fellowship was the thing designed to be represented.[2] Again, the fable recorded by Rufinus,[3] which ascribed the authorship of a confession of faith to the apostles, gave currency afterwards to the notion, that this confession had been formed by contributions from each of the apostles; and so the meaning of the word *σύμβολον*, *συμβολή*, a contribution, was applied in the present case to denote a confession which had grown out of the contributions of the several apostles.

This confession was put into the hands of the catechumens as a document which contained the essentials of Christianity. Many who had been led to embrace the faith after much inquiry, after consulting different religious writings and reading the scriptures for themselves, of course did not need it to introduce them to the knowledge of Christianity. It could only serve in their case as a means of convincing them, that the church with which they wished to become connected, agreed in doctrine with the holy scriptures from which they had already derived their faith. Thus Clement of Alexandria invites the heathen to convince themselves what the true Christian doctrine is, by searching the scriptures, where it was to be found, if they would but apply their mental powers to distinguish the true from the plausible, the doctrine really derived from the scriptures from that which merely attached itself to them in appearance.[4]

Others, however, obtained their first knowledge of Christianity from the instruction contained in the confession of faith and imparted in connection with it, without finding themselves in a situation, till sometime afterwards, of comparing with the scriptures what they had thus received from human tradition. It was of these, the Gnostic Heracleon remarked:[5] "They are led first to believe on the Saviour by the testi-

as a designation of the formula of baptism, (Baptismus) cui nec symbolum trinitatis nec interrogatio legitima et ecclesiastica defuit. Again, ep. 76, Cyprian, ad Magnum: "eodem symbolo baptizare," to baptize with the same formula. Perhaps this word was originally nothing more than a designation of the formula of baptism, and became subsequently transferred to the confession of faith.

[1] Stromat. l. V. f. 582. The *λοῦτρον* compared with the *καθαρσίοις* of the pagan mysteries. In the designation "*φωτισμός*," borrowed from the New Testament, we can find, however, no reference to the mysteries; for this is assuredly a designation borrowed from the New Testament.

[2] Augustin, sermo, 212: Symbolum inter se faciunt mercatores, quo eorum societas pacto fidei teneatur; et vestra societas est commercium spiritualium.

[3] In his expositio in symbolum apostolorum.

[4] Stromat. l. VII. f. 754 et 55· *Δὶ αὐτὼν τῶν γραφῶν ἐκμανθάνειν ἀποδεικτικῶς.* — *Διακρίνειν τε τῇ καταληπτικῇ θεωρίᾳ*, (comprehending intuition,) *καὶ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ λογισμῷ*, (right thinking,) *τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀτὸ τοῦ φαινομένου.*

[5] Orig. Tom. XIII. in Joann. § 52.

mony of men; but when they come to his own words, they believe no longer on the ground of human testimony alone, but for the sake of the truth itself;" and in reference to the same class, Clement of Alexandria says:[1] "The first saving change from heathenism is *faith*, that is, a compendious knowledge of all that is necessary to salvation. On this foundation is built the *Gnosis*, which is a solid demonstration, derived from the doctrine of our Lord, of that which has been received by faith." Others, who were wholly uneducated, and unable to read any writing, could only learn from the mouth of others, and never come themselves to the fountain of God's word; but still the divine doctrine, which they imbibed from the lips of others, proved itself independently a divine power in their hearts. Where the word but once found admission, an independent Christian consciousness was capable of being thereby awakened. "Many of us," says Clement of Alexandria, "have received the divine doctrine, without the use of writings, in the power of God through faith."[2]

The few words of this confession of faith needed not, of course, to be communicated in *writing*. They were to pass into the heart of the catechumen; to pass from the living word into his life; to be expressed by him as the deep conviction of his heart. Was it wished to attach to this custom, which arose so naturally, of orally communicating the confession of faith, some higher meaning? The interpretation most readily presenting itself was, that the Christian doctrine should not come to men from without, through the medium of letters, but should be written in their hearts by the Spirit of God, and propagate itself there as a living principle. Jer. 31: 33.[3] In later times a disposition to dip into mysteries quite alien from the spirit of the simple gospel, which disposition had first found entrance into the Alexandrian church from her leaning to an accommodation with the pagan mysteries and from the influence of the Neo-Platonic mysticism, gave to this custom the meaning, that the most sacred things ought not be entrusted to writing, lest they should be produced among the uninitiated, and thereby become profaned:[4] — while yet the scriptures, the holiest tradition of the divine, might come into the hands of every heathen; while the apologists felt no scruples in presenting before the heathen the inmost mysteries of Christian doctrine!

This confession of faith was made by the catechumens at baptism, in answers to distinct questions.[5]

[1] Stromat. l. VII. f. 732, Lit. D.

[2] Stromat. l. I. f. 319: Οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ γραμμάτων δυνάμει τὸν περὶ θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως παρειλήφαμεν λόγον.

[3] So Augustin, Sermo 212: Hujus rei significandæ causa, audiendo symbolum discitur, nec in tabulis vel in aliqua materia, sed in corde scribitur.

[4] The like play and parade about mysteries, to which more importance came to be attached than they originally possessed, afterwards led to the invention of the obscure, vague and unhistorical idea of a disciplina arcani, of which, from its very vagueness and want of foundation, men could make whatever they pleased.

[5] According to the most natural interpretation, 1 Pet. 3: 21, has reference already to the question proposed at baptism. Ἐπερώτημα, metonymice for the pledge in answer to the questions. Tertullian, de corona milit. c. 3: Amplius aliquid *respondentes*, quam Dominus in evangelio determinavit. Again, Tertullian, de resurrect. c. 48, respecting baptism: Anima *responsione* sancitur. The council of eighty-seven Bishops in the time of Cyprian, respecting these questions "*Sacramentum interrogare*," (sacramentum

With the oral confession of faith was also connected the avowal of a moral engagement. The transaction was looked upon in the following light: the candidate for baptism separated himself from the kingdom of sin, of darkness, of Satan, which, as a heathen devoted to his lusts, he had hitherto served, and came over to the kingdom of God and of Christ. He was now, therefore, solemnly to renounce all fellowship with that kingdom of which he had before been a subject. Giving his hand to the bishop, he solemnly declared,[1] that he renounced the devil and all his pomps, — meaning particularly by these the pagan shows and things of the like nature — and his angels — an expression probably based on the notion, that the heathen gods were evil spirits, who had seduced mankind.[2] In accordance with the favorite comparison already alluded to, this pledge was regarded as the Christian's military oath, the sacramentum militiæ christianæ, whereby he bound himself to live and fight as a miles Dei et Christi.

This form of renunciation, which we meet with in the second century, should be distinguished from the *exorcism*, which could not have sprung so early out of the prevailing mode of thinking in Christian antiquity. It is true, the idea of a deliverance from the dominion of the evil spirit in a moral and spiritual respect, of a separation from the kingdom of evil, and of a communication by the new birth of a divine life, which should be victorious over the principle of evil, is to be reckoned among the number of original and essential Christian ideas; but the whole act of baptism was to be in truth precisely a representation of this idea; there was no need, therefore, that any separate act should still be added to denote or to effectuate that which the whole act of baptism was intended to denote, and to the believer truly and effectually to represent. The case was different with the form of renunciation. This, like the confession of faith, had reference to what the candidate was bound, on his part, to do, in order to enjoy the benefit of baptism. As in Christianity faith and life are closely conjoined, so the renunciation accompanied the confession. Hence we find in the second century no trace as yet of any such form of exorcism against the evil spirit. But the tendency to confound the inward with the outward, the inclination to the magical, the fondness for pomp and display, caused that *those* forms of exorcism which had been employed in the case of the energumens or demoniacally possessed, should be introduced in the baptism of all heathens. Perhaps the fact also had some connection with this change, that exorcism, which in earlier times was a free *charisma*, had become generally transformed into a lifeless mechanical act, attached to a distinct office in the church. In the Apostolic Constitutions, we find neither the one nor the other. The first unequivocal trace of exorcism in baptism is found in the acts

is here equivalent to doctrina sacra.) In a letter of Dionysius of Alexandria, cited in Eusebius, l. VII. c. 9: Ἐπερωτήσεις καὶ ὑποκρίσεις. Cyprian, ep. 76, ad Magnum, cites one of these questions: Credis remissionem peccatorum et vitam æternam per sanctam ecclesiam?

[1] According to Tertullian, de corona milit. c. 3, — twice, — first, before he went to baptism, perhaps on his first admission to the church assemblies, next at baptism itself.

[2] Ἀποτάσσεσθαι τῷ διαβόλῳ καὶ τῇ πομπῇ καὶ τοῖς ἀγγέλοις αὐτοῦ.

of the council of eighty-five or eighty-seven bishops, which convened at Carthage in the year 256.[1]

In respect to the form of baptism, it was in conformity with the original institution and the original import of the symbol, performed by immersion, as a sign of entire baptism into the Holy Spirit, of being entirely penetrated by the same.[2] It was only with the sick, where the exigency required it, that any exception was made; and in this case baptism was administered by sprinkling. Many superstitious persons,[3] clinging to the outward form, imagined that such baptism by sprinkling was not fully valid; and hence they distinguished those who had been so baptized by denominating them the *clinici*. The bishop Cyprian expressed himself strongly against this delusion.[4] "It is otherwise," — he says, — "the breast of the believer is washed, the soul of man is cleansed by the merits of faith. In the sacraments of salvation, where necessity compels and God gives permission, the divine thing, though outwardly abridged, bestows all that it implies on the faithful.[5] Or if any one supposes that they have obtained nothing because they have been merely *sprinkled* with the water of salvation, they must not be so deceived themselves, as to think that they ought therefore to be baptized over again, in case they recover from their sickness. But if those who have once been consecrated by the baptism *of the church*, cannot again be baptized, why fill them with perplexity in regard to their faith and the grace of the Lord? Or is it admitted that they have indeed become sharers of the grace of the Lord, but in a smaller measure of the divine largess and of the Holy Spirit, so that they must be considered as Christians indeed, but yet not placed on the same level with the rest? No; the Holy Spirit is not given by measure, but poured out in full on the faithful. For if the day breaks alike on all, and if the sun pours his light on all in equal measure, how much more shall Christ, the true sun and the true day in his church, distribute the light of eternal life with unstinted equality!"

The *formula of baptism*, in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, which is cited as the traditional one by Justin Martyr, is perhaps not the oldest; but the older is perhaps the shorter formula which refers only to Christ, to which there is allusion in the New Testament, which Marcion also insists on in his attempt to bring about a restoration of the original gospel, and which, amid the disputes concerning the baptism of heretics, still received special recognition. At all events, this

[1] The North African bishop, Cæcilius, of Bilta, goes on the supposition by his vote in this case, that exorcism belonged essentially to the whole act of baptism. So too the votum of the fanatical Vincentius a Thibari, that the manuum impositio in exorcismo must precede the baptism of heretics. But from the 76th letter of Cyprian ad Magnum, the presence of exorcism in baptism generally cannot be proved; he is speaking there simply of exorcism in the case of energumens, and it is rather Cyprian's object to show that baptism is far mightier than exorcism. Spiritus nequam ultra remanere non possunt in hominis corpore, in quo *baptizato et sanctificato* incipit spiritus sanctus habitare.

[2] See my Hist. of the Planting, etc., Vol. I. p. 222.

[3] See above, p. 238.

[4] Ep. 76 ad Magnum.

[5] The passage rendered here according to the sense, to make it intelligible: "Totum credentibus conferunt divina compendia."

shorter formula contains within it, as must be allowed, all that which in the longer one is but more fully analyzed and unfolded.[1]

Baptism was administered at first only to adults, as men were accustomed to conceive baptism and faith as strictly connected. We have all reason for not deriving infant baptism from apostolic institution,[2] and the recognition of it which followed somewhat later, as an apostolical tradition, serves to confirm this hypothesis. Irenæus is the first church teacher in whom we find any allusion to infant baptism, and in his mode of expressing himself on the subject, he leads us at the same time to recognize its connection with the essence of the Christian consciousness; he testifies of the profound Christian idea, out of which infant baptism arose, and which procured for it at length universal recognition. Irenæus is wishing to show that Christ did not interrupt the progressive development of that human nature, which was to be sanctified by him, but sanctified it in accordance with its natural course of development, and in all its several stages. "He came to redeem all by himself; all who, through him, are regenerated to God; infants, little children, boys, young men and old. Hence he passed through every age, and for the infants he became an infant, sanctifying the infants; — among the little children he became a little child, sanctifying those who belong to this age, and at the same time presenting to them an example of piety, of well-doing and of obedience; among the young men, he became a young man, that he might set them an example and sanctify them to the Lord."[3] It is here especially important to observe, that infants (infantes) are expressly distinguished from children, (parvulis,) whom Christ could *also* benefit by his example; and that they are represented as capable of receiving from Christ, who had appeared in their age, nothing more than an objective sanctification. This sanctification becomes theirs, in so far as they are regenerated by Christ to God. Regeneration and baptism are in Irenæus intimately connected; and it is difficult to conceive how the term regeneration can be employed, in reference to this age, to denote anything else than baptism. Infant baptism, then, appears here as the medium, through which the principle of sanctification, imparted by Christ to human nature from its earliest development, became appropriated to children. It is the idea of infant baptism, that Christ, through the divine life which he imparted to and revealed in human nature, sanctified that nature from the germ of its earliest development. The child born in a Christian family was, when all things were as they should be, to have this advantage above others, that he did not first come to Christianity out of heathenism, or the sinful nature-life, but from the first dawning of consciousness, unfolded his powers under the imperceptible preventing influences of a sanctify-

[1] See my History of the Planting, etc., Vol. I. p. 222.

[2] The same, p. 224, ff.

[3] Irenæus, l. II. c. 22, § 4: Omnes enim per semetipsum venit salvare: omnes, inquam, qui per eum renascuntur in Deum, infantes et parvulos et pueros et juvenes et seniores. Ideo per omnem venit ætatem, et infantibus infans factus, sanctificans infantes; in parvulis, parvulus, sanctificans hanc ipsam habentes ætatem, simul et exemplum illis pietatis effectus, et justitiæ et subjectionis; in juvenibus, juvenis, exemplum juvenibus fiens et sanctificans Domino.

ing, ennobling religion; that with the earliest germination of the natural self-conscious life, another divine principle of life, transforming the nature, should be brought nigh to him, ere yet the ungodly principle could come into full activity; and the latter should at once find here its powerful counterpoise. In such a life, the new birth was not to constitute a new crisis, beginning at some definable moment, but it was to begin imperceptibly, and so proceed through the whole life. Hence baptism, the visible sign of regeneration, was to be given to the child at the very outset; the child was to be consecrated to the Redeemer from the beginning of its life. From this idea, founded on what is inmost in Christianity, becoming predominant in the feelings of Christians, resulted the practice of infant baptism.

But immediately after Irenæus,[1] in the last years of the second century, Tertullian appears as a zealous opponent of infant baptism; a proof that the practice had not as yet come to be regarded as an apostolical institution; for otherwise, he would hardly have ventured to express himself so strongly against it. We perceive from his argument against infant baptism, that its advocates already appealed to Matth. 19: 14, a passage which it would be natural for every one to apply in this manner. "Our Lord rebuked not the little children, but commanded them to be brought to him that he might bless them." Tertullian advises, that in consideration of the great importance of the transaction, and of the preparation necessary to be made for it on the part of the recipients, baptism, as a general thing, should rather be delayed than prematurely applied, and he takes this occasion to declare himself particularly opposed to haste in the baptism of children.[2] In answer to the objection drawn from those words of Christ, he replies: — "Let them come, while they are growing up; let them come while they are learning, while they are being taught to what it is they are coming; let them become Christians, when they are susceptible of the knowledge of Christ. What haste, to procure the forgiveness of sins for the age of innocence? We show more prudence in the management of our worldly concerns, than we do in entrusting the divine treasure to those who cannot be entrusted with earthly property. Let them first learn to feel their need of salvation; so it may appear that we have given to those that wanted." Tertullian evidently means, that children should be led to Christ by instructing them in Christianity; but that they should not receive baptism, until, after having been sufficiently instructed, they are led from personal conviction and by their own free choice to seek for it with sincere longing of the heart. It may be said, indeed, that he is only speaking of the course to be followed according to the general rule; whenever there was momentary danger of death, bap-

[1] It has been attempted to prove the practice of infant baptism from the passage already cited from Clement of Alexandria, Pædagog. lib. III. f. 247: "*τῶν ἐξ ὕδατος ἀνασπωμένων παιδίων*," which, beyond question, refers to baptism; but this can hardly be considered a valid proof; for as the idea of the *θεῖος παιδαγωγός* was floating before Clement's mind, he could denominate *all* Christians *παιδία*. Beyond doubt, the writer is speaking in this passage directly of conversion and regeneration, in reference to all men.

[2] De baptismo, c. 18: Cunctatio baptismi utilior est, præcipue tamen circa parvulos.

tism might be administered, even according to his views. But if he had considered this to be so necessary, he could not have failed to mention it expressly. It seems, in fact, according to the principles laid down by him, that he could not conceive of *any efficacy whatever* residing in baptism, without the conscious participation and individual faith of the person baptized; nor could he see any danger accruing to the age of innocence from delaying it; although this view of the matter was not logically consistent with *his own* system.

But when, now, on the one hand, the doctrine of the corruption and guilt, cleaving to human nature in consequence of the first transgression, was reduced to a more precise and systematic form, and on the other, from the want of duly distinguishing between what is outward and what is inward in baptism, (the baptism by water and the baptism by the Spirit,) the error became more firmly established that without external baptism no one could be delivered from that inherent guilt, could be saved from the everlasting punishment that threatened him, or raised to eternal life; and when the notion of a magical influence, a charm connected with the sacraments continually gained ground, the theory was finally evolved of the *unconditional necessity of infant baptism.* About the middle of the *third* century, this theory was already generally admitted in the North African church. The only question that remained was, whether the child ought to be baptized immediately after its birth, or not till eight days after, as in the case of the rite of circumcision. The latter was the opinion of the bishop Fidus, who proposed the question to a council convened at Carthage. Cyprian answered it, in the year 252, in the name of sixty-six bishops.[1] His answer evinces how full he was of that great Christian idea which has just been unfolded, and out of which the practice of infant baptism proceeded. But embarrassed by his habit of confounding the inward with the outward, by his materialism, he mingled with it much that is erroneous. He declares himself against the arbitrary limitation of Fidus. "None of us could agree to your opinion. On the contrary, it is the opinion of us all, that the mercy and grace of God must be refused to no human being, so soon as he is born; for since our Lord says in his gospel, 'The Son of man is not come to destroy men's souls, but to save them,' Luke 9: 50, so everything that lies in our power must be done that no soul may be lost. As God has no respect of persons, so too he has no respect of age, offering himself as a Father with equal freeness to all, that they may be enabled to obtain the heavenly grace. As to what you say, that the child in the first days of its birth is not *clean* to the touch, and that each of us would shrink from kissing such an object, even this, in our opinion, ought to present no obstacle to the bestowment of the heavenly grace; for it is written, 'to the pure all things are pure;' and none of us ought to revolt at that which God has condescended to create. Although the child be but just born, yet it is no such object that any one ought to demur at kissing it to impart the divine grace and the salutation of peace, (i. e.

[1] Ep. 59.

the brotherly kiss, which was given to persons newly baptized, as the sign of the fellowship of peace in the Lord,) since each of us must be led, by his own religious sensibility, to think upon the creative hands of God, fresh from the completion of their work, which we kiss in the newly formed man when we take in our arms what God has made. As to the rest, if anything could prove a hindrance to men in the attainment of grace, much rather might those be hindered whose maturer years have involved them in heavy sins. But if even the chief of sinners, who have been exceedingly guilty before God, receive the forgiveness of sins on coming to the faith, and no one is precluded from baptism and from grace, how much less should the child be kept back, which, as it is but just born, cannot have sinned, but has only brought with it, by its descent from Adam, the infection of the old death; and which may the more easily obtain the remission of sins, because the sins which are forgiven it, are not its own, but those of another."

In the Alexandrian church also, which, in respect to its whole theological and dogmatic direction of mind was so essentially distinguished from the church of North Africa, we find prevailing, even at a somewhat earlier period, the doctrine of the necessity of infant baptism. Origen, in whose system infant baptism could readily find its place,[1] though not in the same connection as in the system of the North African church, declares it to be an apostolical tradition;[2] an expression, by the way, which cannot be regarded as of much weight in this age, when the inclination was so strong to trace every institution which was considered of special importance, to the apostles; and when so many walls of separation, hindering the freedom of prospect, had already been set up between this and the apostolic age. Also in the Persian church, infant baptism was, in the course of the third century, so generally recognized that the sect founder Mani thought he could draw an argument from it in favor of a doctrine which seemed to him necessarily presupposed by this application of the rite.

But if the necessity of infant baptism was acknowledged in theory, it was still far from being uniformly recognized in practice. Nor was it always from the purest motives that men were induced to put off their baptism. Precisely the same false notion of baptism as an opus operatum, which had moved some to consider the baptism of infants so unconditionally necessary, led many others, who mistook indeed, in a far grosser and more dangerous manner, the nature of this rite, to delay their baptism, that they might, in the meantime, the more freely abandon themselves to their lusts, and yet, cleansed in the hour of death by the magical annihilation of their sins, be able to pass without hindrance into eternal life. We have already noticed the pious indignation

[1] Namely, in its relation to his theory, that human souls are fallen heavenly essences, and are to be cleansed from a guilt which they brought with them; see below.

[2] This, expressly in the fifth book of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, according to the Latin translation of Rufinus. In Origen's time, too, difficulties were still frequently urged against infant baptism, similar to those thrown out by Tertullian. Comp. his Homil. XIV. in Lucam, (according to the translation of Jerome.)

and force with which Tertullian, who was otherwise opposed to haste in baptism, combated this error.

Infant baptism, also, furnished probably the *first* occasion for the appointment of sponsors or god-fathers; for as this was a case in which the persons baptized could not themselves declare their confession of faith and the required renunciation, it became necessary for others to do it in their name; and these at the same time engaged to take care that the children should be rightly instructed in Christianity, and trained up in a life corresponding to the vows given at baptism; hence they were called sponsors, (sponsores.) Tertullian adds it to his other arguments against infant baptism, that these sponsors were obliged to assume an obligation which they might be prevented from fulfilling, either by their own death, or by the untoward conduct of the child.[1]

With the act of baptism, several *symbolical customs* were united, which flowed from the idea of this transaction, and in which this idea was to be represented to the senses. Thus it came about that, as the participation of the universal priesthood of all the faithful was considered as necessarily united with the introduction to the fellowship of Christians, so the symbol of priestly consecration was made to follow the act of baptism. As, in the Old Testament, anointing was the sign of consecration to the priestly office; so oil, which had been blessed expressly for this purpose, was applied to the newly baptized, as a sign of consecration to this spiritual priesthood. We first meet with this custom in Tertullian, and in Cyprian it appears already to constitute an essential part of the rite of baptism.[2] The imposition of hands accompanied by prayer, with which the act of baptism was concluded, is beyond doubt a still older custom. The sign of the imposition of hands (*ἐπίθεσις τῶν χειρῶν, χειροθεσία,* סְמִיכָה) was the common token of religious consecration, borrowed from the Jews, and employed on various occasions, either to denote consecration to the Christian calling in general, or to the particular branches of it. The apostles, or presiding officers of the church, laying their hands on the head of the baptized individual, called upon the Lord to bestow his blessing on the holy transaction now completed, to cause to be fulfilled in him whatever was implied in it, to consecrate him with his Spirit for the Christian calling, and to pour out his Spirit upon him. This closing rite was inseparably connected with the whole act of baptism. All, indeed, had reference here to the same principal thing, without which no one could be a Christian, — the birth to a new life from God, the baptism of the Spirit,

[1] De baptismo, c. 18: Quid enim necesse est, sponsores etiam periculo ingeri? quia et ipsi per mortalitatem destituere promissiones suas possunt, et proventu malæ indolis falli.

[2] L. c. c. 7: Egressi de lavacro, perunguimur benedicta unctione, de pristina disciplina, qua ungui oleo de cornu in sacerdotium solebant. Adv. Marcion, l. I. c. 14; de res. carn. c. 8. Yet in the book de corona milit. c. 3, where he describes the usages in baptism which were derived not from Scripture, but from ecclesiastical tradition, he makes no mention of this unction.—Cyprian, ep. 70, in the name of an ecclesiastical assembly: Ungi quoque necesse est eum qui baptizatus sit, ut, accepto chrismate, esse unctus Dei et habere in se gratiam Christi possit; (the next following words, respecting the sacrament of the supper, are manifestly a gloss, disturbing the sense, and occasioned by the subsequent mention of the supper,) unde baptizati unguuntur *oleo in altari sanctificato.*

which was symbolically represented by the baptism of water. Tertullian still considers this transaction and baptism as one whole, belonging together; although he distinguishes in it the two separate moments, the negative and the positive, the forgiveness of sin and cleansing from sin which was mediated by baptism in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the importation of the Holy Spirit following thereupon, upon the individual now restored to the original state of innocence, to which importation the imposition of hands refers.[1]

But now, since the idea had sprung up of a spiritual character belonging exclusively to the bishops, or successors of the apostles, and communicated to them by ordination; on which character the propagation of the Holy Spirit in the church was dependent; it was considered as their prerogative to seal, by this consecration of the imposition of hands, the whole act of baptism; (hence this rite was called signaculum, σφραγίς.) It was supposed that a good and valid reason for this rite could be drawn from the fact that the Samaritans, baptized by a deacon, were first endowed with spiritual gifts by the imposition of the hands of the apostles, which was added afterwards, (Acts 19,[2]) as this passage was then understood. So now the presbyters, and in case of necessity, even the deacons, were empowered to baptize, but the bishops only were authorized to consummate that second holy act. This notion had been formed so early as the middle of the third century. The bishops were under the necessity, therefore, of occasionally going through their dioceses, in order to administer to those who had been baptized by their subordinates, the country presbyters, the rite which was afterwards denominated *confirmation*. In ordinary cases, where the bishop himself administered the baptism, both were still united together as one whole, and thus constituted *the complete act of baptism*.[3]

After all this had been performed, in many of the churches, in those for instance of North Africa and of Alexandria, there was given to the person newly baptized a mixture of milk and honey, as a symbol of filiation into the new life, and as a spiritual application of the promise

[1] De baptismo, c. 8: Dehinc manus imponitur per benedictionem, advocans et invitans Spiritum sanctum. He names together, de res carn. c. 8, in connection with baptism, all the *three* things which afterwards, separated from it and combined together in one whole, constituted in the Roman church, the sacrament of confirmation: the *unction*, conveying with it *the consecration of the soul;* the *signing with the cross*, conveying with it *protection from evil; the imposition of hands*, the illuminatio spiritus.

[2] See on this subject, my History of the Planting, etc., Vol. I. p. 82, ff.

[3] Cyprian speaks of a sacramentum duplex, water baptism, and spiritual baptism, represented by the imposition of hands, (sacramento utroque nasci,) yet both united in the church act of baptism, ep. 72, ad Jubajanum, and ep. 72, ad Stephan. We must not lose sight here of the unsettled meaning affixed to the word sacramentum, according to which it signified any sacred thing, sacred doctrine, sacred sign. After citing the example of Philip and the apostles, he says: Quod nunc quoque apud nos geritur, ut, qui in ecclesia baptizantur, præpositis ecclesiæ offerantur, et per nostram orationem ac manus impositionem spiritum sanctum consequantur et signaculo dominico consummentur. The same notion occurs in the contemporary work, as is most probable, de rebaptismate; this act is here denominated baptisma spiritale. Cornelius, in Euseb. l. VI. c. 43, asks respecting one who may not have received this confirmation of the bishop: "How could he without *this* become partaker of the Holy Spirit?"

concerning the land flowing with milk and honey, to that heavenly country, with all its blessed privileges, to which the baptized belonged.[1] He was then received into the church by the first kiss of Christian brotherhood, the salutation of peace, of that peace with God which he now participated in common with all Christians;[2] and from henceforth he had the right of saluting all Christians with this fraternal sign. But Clement of Alexandria already had to complain that this brotherly kiss, originally a natural expression of Christian feeling, was become an opus operatum, a thing of conscious display, by which the suspicion of the heathens was excited.[3] His objection to it is, that love evinces itself not in the brotherly kiss, but in the disposition of the heart.[4]

Before taking leave of this subject we must touch on a controverted question, which, in the second half of the third century, created no small agitation. It was the question, *what constitutes the validity of baptism?* What was to be done in the case of a heretic, who, after having received baptism in his own sect, came over to the orthodox church? Before any special inquiries on this point had as yet been instituted, the churches in different countries had been in the habit of pursuing different courses, just as they happened, as is usual in such cases, to proceed unintentionally from different starting points. In Asia Minor and the adjacent countries, the point started from was that no baptism was valid, save that administered in the orthodox church, where alone all religious acts had their true significancy; that the baptism of heretics was null and void, and that the true baptism ought therefore to be administered to such as came over from the sects, in the same manner as to heathens. This may be easily explained from the asperity of the polemical relations which existed in these particular districts between the church and the sects, and from the character of these sects; for instance, the Gnostic, who departed widely in regard to the most essential points of doctrine and of practice from the commonly received opinions. In the Roman church, on the contrary, where too in other respects a bitter hostility prevailed against the heretics, the matter was conducted in a milder spirit, more importance being here attached to the objective side of baptism. The principle was pursued in practice, that baptism, in virtue of the objective significancy of the name of Christ or of the Trinity, with the invocation of which it was administered, always has validity, by whomsoever and under whatsoever religious views it may be administered. The heretics, therefore, who came over to the church, were recognized as baptized Christians; and only the rite of confirmation, in the sense above explained, was bestowed on them by the bishop, that

[1] See the passage above quoted from Tertullian's de corona milit. and adv. Marcion. l. I. c. 14: Deus mellis et lactis societate suos infantat, (he causes them to be known as his new-born children.) Clemens, Pædagog. l. I. f. 103: *Εὐθὺς ἀναγεννηθέντες τετιμήμεθα τῆς ἀναπαύσεως τὴν ἐλπίδα, τὴν ἄνω Ἱερουσαλὴμ εὐαγγελιζόμενοι, ἐν ᾗ μέλι καὶ γάλα ὀμβρεῖν ἀναγέγραπται.*

[2] Osculum pacis, *εἰρήνη*. See above.

[3] In the passage already cited from the Pædagog, l. III. f. 256: *Οἱ δὲ οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' ἢ φιλήματι καταψοφοῦσι τὰς ἐκκλησίας, τὸ φιλοῦν ἔνδον οὐκ ἔχοντες αὐτό. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο ἐκπέπληκεν ὑπονοίας αἰσχρὰς καὶ βλασφημίας τὸ ἀναίδην χρῆσθαι τῷ φιλήματι, ὅπερ ἐχρῆν εἶναι μυστικόν.*

[4] *Ἀγάπη δὲ οὐκ ἐν φιλήματι, ἀλλ' ἐν εὐνοίᾳ κρίνεται.*

the Holy Spirit might render efficacious the baptism they had received; a practice which was one of the occasions of separating confirmation from baptism. As the different communities willingly directed themselves according to the model of their apostolical mother churches, (the sedes apostolicæ,) it is probable that most of the Western churches followed the example which had been set them at Rome.

But towards the close of the second century, the custom, which thus far had been tacitly observed, became an object of especial inquiry in Asia Minor; whether it was that the prevailing principle in that region, being followed also by the Montanistic churches,[1] was therefore called in question by those who were glad of any opportunity to oppose the Montanists, or whether it was for some other reason. The majority declared in favor of adhering to the old principle. Somewhat later, when the matter again came up, this principle was solemnly confirmed by two ecclesiastical councils at Iconium and Synnada in Phrygia. This led to the discussion of the same question in other countries. Tertullian, most probably while he was still a member of the Catholic church, wrote in the Greek language a special treatise on the subject, in which he did not hesitate to depart in this particular from the custom of the Roman church. To defend the necessity of recognizing heretical baptism, the opposite party had doubtless already appealed to Ephes. 4: 5, 6, "One Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all," — and had drawn from it the conclusion that wherever men were found to call on that one God and that one Lord, it was necessary to recognize the validity of their baptism. But Tertullian replies:[2] "This can relate only to us, who know and call upon the true God and Christ. The heretics have not this God and this Christ. These words, therefore, cannot be applied to them; and as they do not rightly administer the ordinance, their baptism is the same as none."

In the North African church, men willingly followed, for the most part, the example of the mother church at Rome, but were at the same time far from submitting their own judgment to the authority of that church.[3] At a council held in Carthage, over which the bishop Agrippinus presided, seventy bishops of North Africa declared themselves for the opposite opinion. Yet neither party was disposed as yet to obtrude its own views and practice on the other. The churches which differed on this point, in no case dissolved the bond of fraternal harmony on account of a disagreement which so little concerned the essentials of Christianity. But here again, it was a *Roman* bishop, Stephanus, who, instigated by the spirit of ecclesiastical arrogance, domination and zeal without knowledge, attached to this point of dispute a paramount importance. Hence towards the close of the year 253, he issued a sentence of excommunication against the bishops of Asia Minor, Cappadocia, Galatia, and Cilicia,[4] stigmatizing them as anabaptists, (ἀναβαπτισταί,)[5] a name, however, which they could justly

[1] See Tertullian, de pudicitia, c. 19.
[2] De baptismo, c. 15.
[3] See above.
[4] Dionysius, in Euseb. l. VII. c. 5; Firmilianus in Cyprian, ep. 75
[5] The words of Cyprian, ep. 71 ad Quintum: Nos autem dicimus eos qui inde veniunt, non rebaptizari apud nos, sed baptizari

affirm they did not deserve by their principles; for it was not their wish to administer a *second* baptism to those who had been already baptized, but they contended that the previous baptism, given by heretics, could not be recognized as a *true* one.

From Asia, the discussions in regard to this matter extended themselves to North Africa. Here there was always a party which stood firm by the old Roman usages. The earlier discussions were now forgotten; and hence there arose new questions and investigations relative to this matter. These induced Cyprian, the bishop, to propose the point for discussion at two synods held in Carthage in the year 255, the one composed of eighteen, and the other of seventy-one bishops; and both assemblies declared in favor of Cyprian's views, that the baptism of heretics ought not to be regarded as valid. As he was well aware[1] what importance the church of Rome and its followers attached to traditional customs, and that they held up this long observed practice in the light of an apostolical tradition, although from the nature of the thing, cases of this sort could not well occur in the time of the apostles; he expressed himself after the following manner in a letter to Quintus,[2] an African bishop, to whom he communicated the decisions of the first council: "This is a case in which we are not to be arbitrarily directed by custom, but to be convinced by arguments. For even Peter, whom our Lord chose to be first, and on whom he founded his church, did not arrogantly pretend, when Paul afterwards disputed with him concerning circumcision, Gal. 2,[3] that he held the primacy, and that the later and younger apostle should yield obedience to him; nor did he despise Paul, because he was once a persecutor of the church; but he took counsel of the truth and easily acquiesced in the correct views which Paul succeeded to establish. He thus gave us an example of unanimity and of patience, that we should not obstinately cleave to our own way, but rather, when any useful and salutary thing is occasionally suggested to us by our brethren and colleagues, make it ours, if it be true and lawful." He communicated the decisions of the greater council to Stephanus also, the Roman bishop, in a letter written with great freedom of spirit, though in a tone of forbearance;[4] but Stephanus, in his arrogant reply,[5] set up against Cyprian the tradition of the Roman church. He is said to have carried his blind, unchristian zeal so far as to indulge himself in undignified and abusive language towards his African colleague, refuse the bishops an audience who came to him as delegates of the North African council, and even forbid his church to receive them into their houses! Yet far from Cyprian was the thought of submitting his reason to the authority of the Roman church. He convened at Carthage, in the year 256, a still larger council, composed of eighty-seven bishops, and this assembly also acceded to the principles before expressed. In the North African church was evinced, under this zeal for the exclusive validity of Catholic bap-

[1] See above.
[2] Ep. 71.
[3] It is remarkable how constantly the unbiassed, unprejudiced view of this fact had been preserved in the North African church
[4] Ep. 72.
[5] See above, p. 216, ff.

tism, a fanatical hatred of heretics; an exaggerated opinion of the exclusive holiness of the Catholic church.[1] But it is noticeable how the same individual, who held tradition generally in so high esteem, opposed to it on this occasion, truth and right reason. "In vain," he says, "some who were cast in the argument, oppose to us usage, as if usage were greater than truth, or as if in spiritual things, one must not follow that better way which has been revealed by the Holy Spirit."[2]

Cyprian now endeavored to form a connection with the Asiatics, who entertained the same views of this matter with himself; and to this end laid the whole case before one of the most eminent of the Asiatic bishops, Firmilianus, of Cæsarea in Cappadocia. The latter signified his entire concurrence in Cyprian's views,[3] and added some well-timed remarks on the advantages of common deliberation on spiritual matters, when such deliberation is conducted in the spirit of Christ. "Since divine doctrine transcends the bounds of human nature, and the soul of man cannot grasp the Whole and the Perfect, therefore is the number of prophets so great, that the manifold wisdom of God may be apportioned among many. And hence he who has first spoken as a prophet, is commanded to keep silence when any thing is revealed to another." 1 Cor. 14: 30.

The Christian moderation of the bishop Dionysius of Alexandria has been noticed already in a former controversy.[4] We find him manifesting the same temper in *this*. On the point in question he agreed, it is true, with the churches of North Africa and Asia Minor, the same views having for a long time prevailed in the Alexandrian church;[5] though he differed from them in one respect, that *his more liberal spirit was rather inclined to make exceptions to the rule*,[6] in regard to many sects, who in doctrine harmonized completely with the church. But at the same time he endeavored to maintain brotherly harmony with the bishops of Rome, and dispose them for peace. He besought the Roman bishop Stephanus with earnest representations not to disturb again the Eastern church in her enjoyment of that external peace which she had obtained from the emperor Valerian, and of the internal

[1] See Cyprian's words, ep. 71: Hæreticorum sordidam et profanam tinctionem vero, unico et legitimo ecclesiæ catholicæ baptismo præponere. Nihil potest esse commune Antichristo et Christo. He styles the baptism of heretics, "aqua perfida et mendax." The opinions expressed by many of these bishops manifest the same spirit, —a premonitory sign of those struggles which in the fourth century were produced in these districts by a fanatical separative spirit.

[2] Proinde frustra quidam, qui ratione vincuntur, consuetudinem nobis opponunt, quasi consuetudo major sit veritate, aut non id sit in spiritalibus sequendum, quod in melius a Sancto Spiritu revelatum. Ep. 73.

[3] Cyprian, ep. 75, in a Latin translation, often literal.

[4] See above, the Novatian schism.

[5] That the Alexandrian church, too, rejected baptism administered in the churches of heretics, seems necessarily to follow from the declaration of Dionysius in his letter to the Roman bishop, Sixtus II., Euseb. l. VII. c. 7, where he says, that when members of the Catholic church who had gone over to the heretics, returned back again to the former, it was not the custom to re-baptize them, for they had before received the *holy* baptism from the bishop. — This therefore was the *only* case. Consequently baptism administered *out of the Catholic church*, was not recognized as holy, as valid.

[6] Thus he made an exception of this sort with respect to the baptism administered in the Montanist churches, probably because he entertained milder views respecting their relation to the universal church. See Basil Cæsar. ep. 188, or ep. canon 1.

peace which accompanied it since the suppression of the schism of Novatian. "Know, my brother," [1] he wrote, "that all the once divided churches in the East and still beyond are now united together, and that all the presiding officers of these churches agree, rejoicing exceedingly in the peace which, contrary to expectation, has fallen to our lot. All give praise to God in harmony and brotherly love." It was probably in consequence of his negotiations with the Roman church, conducted in this spirit of love and wise forbearance, that Stephanus did not venture to excommunicate him with the rest. He continued the correspondence with Sixtus, the successor of Stephanus; and to maintain the bond of brotherly love, he even asked his advice in relation to one matter, where both of them could start from the same principles.[2]

The emperor Valerian becoming soon after a persecutor of the Christian church, this outward conflict contributed to hush the disputes within it; perhaps, also, the successor of Stephanus did not partake of his blind zeal.

It remains that we should consider somewhat more minutely the points in dispute between the two parties, and the mode of their development on both sides. There were two points of dispute. In respect to *the first*, the Roman party maintained that the validity of baptism depended simply on its being administered as instituted by Christ. The *formula of baptism*, in particular, gave it its objective validity; it mattered not what was the subjective character of the officiating priest, who served merely as an instrument in the transaction; it was of no consequence where the baptism was administered. That which is objectively divine in the transaction could evince its power, the grace of God could thus operate through the objective symbol, if it but found in the person baptized a recipient soul; that person could receive the grace of baptism, wherever he might be baptized, through *his own faith*, and through his own *disposition of heart*.[3] But Cyprian brings against his opponents a charge of inconsistency, from which they could not easily defend themselves. If the *baptism* of heretics possessed an objective validity, then, for the same reason, their *confirmation* must also possess an objective validity. "For," says Cyprian, "if a person born out of the church, (namely, to the new life,) may become a temple of God, why may not also the Holy Spirit be poured out on this temple? He who has put off sin in baptism and become sanctified, spiritually transformed into a new man, is capable of receiving the Holy Spirit. The apostle says, 'As many of you as are baptized, have put on Christ.' It follows, then, that he who may put on Christ when

[1] Euseb. l. V. c. 5.

[2] L. c. l. VII. c. 9.

[3] Eum qui quomodocunque foris (without the church,) baptizatur, mente et fide sua baptismi gratiam consequi. The opinion of the Roman church is by no means to be so apprehended, as if the employment of the correct formula of baptism, even of such a baptism as departed in all respects wholly from the original institution, could render it valid. That the question related to a baptism which in other respects was administered in the right way, was presupposed on both sides. Had the opponents found it in their power to charge any fault upon Stephanus and his party in this respect, they would hardly have omitted the opportunity. Moreover, Dionysius of Alexandria, in the question which he proposed to the Roman bishop, Euseb. l. VII. c. 9, proceeds on the supposition that they were both agreed on that point.

baptized by heretics, can much more receive the Holy Spirit, which Christ has sent.—As if Christ could be put on without the Spirit, or the Spirit could be separated from Christ."[1]

The other party maintained, on the other hand, that no baptism could be valid, unless administered in the true church, where alone the efficacious influence of the Holy Spirit is exerted. If by this was understood merely an outward being in the church, an outward connection with it, the decision of the question would be easy. But what Cyprian really meant here, was an inward subjective connection with the true church by faith and disposition of heart. He took it for granted that the officiating priest himself, by virtue of his faith, must be an organ of the Holy Spirit, and enabled by the magical influence of his priestly office, duly to perform the sacramental acts, to communicate, for example, to the water its supernatural, sanctifying power.[2] But when the matter took this shape,— was made thus *to depend on the subjective character of the priest*,— it became difficult, in many cases, to decide as to the validity of a baptism, which must be the occasion of much perplexity and doubt;—for who could look into the heart of the officiating priest ?[3]

But the Roman party went still farther in their defence of the objective significancy of the formula of baptism. Even a baptism where the complete form was not employed, but administered simply in the name of Christ, they declared to be objectively valid.[4] Cyprian main-

[1] Cyprian, ep. 74.

[2] L. c. ep. 70: Quomodo sanctificare aquam potest, qui ipse immundus est et apud quem Spiritus Sanctus non est? Sed et pro baptizato quam precem facere potest sacerdos sacrilegus et peccator? Ep. 76: Quando hæc in ecclesia fiunt, ubi sit et accipientis et dantis fides integra.

[3] The author of the book de rebaptismate, which stands among the works of Cyprian, could therefore make the objection: Quid dicturus es de his, qui plerumque ab episcopis pessimæ conversationis baptizantur? by those who afterwards, when their vices came to be known, were deposed. Aut quid statues de eis, qui ab episcopis prave sentientibus aut imperitioribus fuerint baptizati?

[4] From Cyprian's letters, and from the book de rebaptismate, it is clear beyond all controversy, that the Roman party maintained this. If Firmilian, in the 75 ep. Cyprian, speaks only of the formula of baptism in the *name of the trinitas*, it does not follow, that the opponents had spoken barely *of this* Firmilian gives prominence only to *that* point against which he meant *particularly* to direct his polemics, the principle, that the baptismal formula gave to baptism an objective validity; and hence he does not distinguish, what would have to be distinguished in exhibiting the opinion of his opponents. Yet we see also the other position of his opponents, which must have floated before his mind, discovering itself, when he says: *Non omnes autem, qui nomen Christi invocant*, audiri, &c. The tract de rebaptismate, a work of some acuteness, I have thought myself undoubtedly authorized to cite as belonging to this period. I cannot adopt the opinion, that it is the one which, according to Gennadius, de script. eccles., Ursinus, a monk, is said to have written, not till the close of the fourth century, or still later. The writer discourses like a man who lived in the midst of these controversies, in the time of the persecutions; all which is inconceivable of an author belonging to a later period. When he says, these controversies were to produce no other fruit, nisi ut unus homo, quicunque ille est, magnæ prudentiæ et constantiæ esse, apud quosdam leves homines inani gloria prædicetur, we see very clearly that Cyprian is here meant, and only a contemporary could so speak of him. The expression relative to an ancient apostolic tradition, "post tot seculorum tantam seriem," seems, it is true, unbefitting in the mouth of a man who wrote in the middle of the third century. But this expression would in any case continue still to be very hyperbolical. although employed by a writer at the end of the fourth century; and it is the fact generally, that strong hyperboles are not unusual in the writers belonging to the African church.

tained, on the other hand, that the formula of baptism had no longer significancy, when not in the full form instituted by Christ. We perceive here the more liberal Christian spirit of the anti-Cyprian party. The thought hovered vaguely before their minds, that everything that pertains to Christianity is properly embraced in the faith in Christ.[1]

Cyprian himself, however, did not venture to limit God's grace by such outward things in cases where converted heretics had already been admitted without a new baptism, and had enjoyed the fellowship of the church, or died in it. "God," he observes, "is great in his mercy, to show indulgence and not exclude from the benefits of the church, those who have been received into it informally, and thus fallen asleep."[2] A remarkable case of this sort is narrated by Dionysius of Alexandria.[3] There was in the church of Alexandria a converted heretic, who lived as a member of the church for many years, and participated in the various acts of worship. Happening once to be present at a baptism of catechumens, he remembered that the baptism which he himself had received *in the sect* from which he was converted, probably a Gnostic sect, bore no resemblance whatever to the one he now witnessed. Had he been aware that whoever possesses Christ in faith, possesses all that is necessary to his growth in grace and to the salvation of his soul, this circumstance could not have given him so much uneasiness. But as this was not so clear to him, he doubted as to his title to consider himself a real Christian, and fell into the greatest distress and anxiety, believing himself to be without baptism and the grace of baptism. In tears, he threw himself at the bishop's feet, and besought him for baptism. The bishop endeavored to quiet his fears; he assured him that he could not, at this late period, after he had so long partaken of the body and blood of the Lord, be baptized anew. It was sufficient that he had lived for so long a time in the fellowship of the church, and all he had to do was to approach the holy supper with unwavering faith and a good conscience. But the disquieted man found it impossible to overcome his scruples and regain his tranquillity. So destructive to peace of conscience were the effects of such tenacious adherence to outward things, of not knowing how to rise with freedom to those things of the spirit, which the inward man apprehends by faith!

We proceed now to the second holy symbol which Christ instituted for his church, — *the Lord's supper*.

The last supper which Christ held with his disciples on earth, must, from the nature of the case, have been full of meaning, as the parting meal of *him* who was about to give up his life for *their* salvation, and for *that of all mankind;* and who afterwards, although no longer *vis-*

[1] In the book de rebaptismate: Invocatio hæc nominis Jesu, quasi initium quoddam mysterii dominici, commune nobis et cæteris omnibus, quod possit post modum residuis rebus impleri. The party of Stephanus not badly appealed to the fact, that Paul testified his joy in knowing that Christ was preached, even though it were not done in the right way, as was the case with regard to those judaizing Christians, Philip. 1: 16. Cyprian, who wanted to deprive them of the use of this text, does not understand it so well, ep. 73.

[2] Ep. 70.

[3] Euseb. l. VII. c. 9.

ibie among them as at this meal, yet quite as really, and with a more powerful divine efficacy and a richer blessing, would manifest among them his spiritual presence, impart to them himself and all his heavenly treasures. Besides, this meal was to take the place of the paschal supper, which Christ could no longer celebrate on earth. The feast in celebration of the foundation and covenant of the *Mosaic religious constitution*, was now, in accordance with the order of development of the theocratic economy, to exchange its earthly for a heavenly import, and to assume a relation analogous to the new shaping of the theocracy. The Jewish passover was a festival of thanks for the favor which the Almighty Creator of nature, who had caused its fruits to grow for the service of men, showed the people whom he honored with his *especial guidance*, when he delivered them from the Egyptian bondage. The father of the family, who kept the passover with his household and distributed wine and bread among the guests, praised God, who had bestowed these fruits of the earth on man, for the favor he had shown *his own* people. Hence, the cup of wine over which this giving of thanks was pronounced, was called the cup of praise or thanksgiving.[1] On the present occasion, then, Christ pronounced the blessing as the master of the household; a blessing, however, which, in its relation to the theocracy, must receive a new application, to denote deliverance from the guilt and punishment of sin; release from the dominion of sin; the bestowment of true moral freedom through the sacrifice of Christ for mankind; the preparation for entrance into a heavenly country; — and this was the foundation of the kingdom of God, which is laid in the forgiveness of sins, and deliverance from sin, for all humanity. Hence Christ said, when he distributed wine and bread among his disciples, that this bread and this wine *were to be to them*, — and consequently to all the faithful of all times, — his body and his blood; — the body which he offered for the forgiveness of their sins, for their salvation, for the establishment of the new theocratic relation; and as these outward symbols represented to them his body and his blood, so would he himself be hereafter spiritually present with them, just as truly as he was now visibly among them; and as they now sensibly partook of these corporeal means of sustenance, which represented to them his body and his blood, so should they receive him, the Saviour, present in divine power, wholly within them for the nourishment of their souls; they should spiritually eat his flesh and drink his blood, (John 6,) should make his flesh and blood their own, and cause their whole nature to be more and more penetrated by that divine principle of life which they were to receive through their communion with him. Thus, to praise the effects of his sufferings for mankind, to celebrate their intimate life-giving communion with him as members of one spiritual body under one Great Head, they were to keep their feast together till at length, in the actual possession of that heavenly country, they should enjoy, in its full extent, the blessedness which had been ob

[1] כּוֹס הַבְּרָכָה, ποτήριον εὐλογίας = εὐχαριστίας

tained for them by his sufferings, without being separated from him, and should, even in open vision, be united with him in his kingdom.

After the example of the Jewish passover, and of the original institution, the Lord's supper was accordingly at first united with a *social meal*. Both constituted a whole, representing the communion of the faithful with their Lord, and their brotherly communion with one another; both together were called the supper of the Lord, (*δεῖπνον τοῦ κυρίου, δεῖπνον κυριακόν,*) the supper of love, (*ἀγάπη.*[1]) There was a daily celebration of this Christian communion in the first church at Jerusalem; the phrase *κλᾶν ἄρτον*, breaking of bread, in Acts 2: 46, is most probably to be understood of them both together. In like manner we find them both united in the first church at Corinth; and so it probably was with the innocent, simple meal of the Christians of which Pliny speaks, in his report to the emperor Trajan.[2] On the contrary, in the description given by Justin Martyr, we find the celebration of the supper entirely separated from those feasts of brotherly love, if indeed they still continued to exist in those churches which he had in view. This separation was occasioned partly by similar irregularities to those which had arisen in the Corinthian church, when the spirit that prevailed in these feasts became unsuited to the holy rite which followed, and partly by local circumstances, which prevented generally the institution of such social meals. In truth, these meals were especially calculated to excite the jealousy of the heathens, and gave birth to the strangest and most malicious reports;[3] and this may have led to the less frequent observance or abolition of the Agapæ.

We now speak first of these feasts of brotherly love, as they were afterwards, when, separated from the supper of the Lord, they went under the particular name of agapæ, (*ἀγάπαι.*) At these, all distinctions of earthly condition and rank were to disappear in Christ. All were to be one in the Lord; rich and poor, high and low, masters and servants, were to eat together at a common table. We have the description of such a feast of agape by Tertullian.[4] "Our supper," he says, "shows its character by its name; it bears the Greek name of love; and however great may be the expense of it, still it is gain to make expense in the name of piety, for we give joy to all the poor by this refreshment. The cause of the supper being a worthy one, estimate accordingly the propriety with which it is managed, as its religious end demands. It admits of no vulgarity, nothing unbeseeming. No one approaches the table, till prayer has first been offered to God; as much is eaten as is necessary to satisfy the demands of hunger, as much is drunk as consists with sobriety; every one remembering that the night also remains consecrated to the worship of God. The conversation is such as might be expected of men who are fully conscious that God hears them. The supper being ended, and all having washed their

[1] See my History of the Planting, &c., Vol. I. p. 30.

[2] See above, p. 98.

[3] Tertullian on the hindrances which a Christian woman meets with when married to a heathen. Ad uxorem l. II. c. 4 Quis ad convivium illud dominicum, quod infamant, sine sua suspicione dimittet?

[4] Apologet. c. 39.

hands, lights are brought in; then each is invited to sing as he is able, either from the holy scripture or from the prompting of his own spirit, a song of praise to God for the common edification. It then appears how he has drunken. The feast is concluded with prayer." These *agapæ* lost by degrees their true original significancy, which it was impossible for them to retain except under the first simple relations of the communities. They became often a lifeless form, no longer animated by the original spirit of brotherly love, which removed all distinctions between men and united together all hearts as one. Many abuses crept into them, which furnished occasion for the maliciously disposed to present the whole solemnity in the most unfavorable light. As usually happens in such cases, some attributed undue importance to the dead form, as an opus operatum; others unjustly condemned the whole custom, without distinguishing the right use of it from its abuse; neither party being any longer capable of appreciating the simple, childlike spirit in which this festival had originated. Wealthy individuals of the church provided agapæ of this sort, and imagined they had done something peculiarly meritorious; and here, where all should be on a level, attention began to be paid to distinction of ranks, and the clergy, who should have set an example of humility to all, allowed themselves to be distinguished by outward preferences unworthy of their calling.[1] An ungentle, morose, ascetic spirit condemned these *agapæ* altogether, and eagerly caught at every particular instance of abuse on these occasions, which was set out in exaggerated colors, for the purpose of bringing into discredit the whole custom. Such was the course of Tertullian after he became a Montanist.[2] Clement of Alexandria expresses himself with greater moderation;[3] although he declares his opposition to those who imagined they could purchase with banquets the promises of God, and who seemed to degrade the heavenly name of love, by such a particular appropriation of it to these banquets. "Love," says he, "is indeed a heavenly food. In heaven this heavenly feast truly exists; the earthly one is indeed given by love, yet the feast is not love itself, but only the proof of a benevolence ready to communicate. Take care, therefore, that your treasure be not misrepresented; for the kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. He who shares in this latter feast, attains to the most glorious of all possessions, the kingdom of God, while he strives to belong, even in the present world, to that holy community of love, the church in heaven. *Love* is the divine thing itself, pure and worthy of God; to communicate *is a work of love.*"

[1] A double portion was set before ecclesiastics, in accordance with a grossly perverted and sensual interpretation of the text, 1 Timoth. 5: 17. Tertullian, when a Montanist, de jejuniis, c. 17: Ad elogium gulæ tuæ pertinet, quod duplex apud te præsidentibus honos binis partibus deputatur. Comp. Apostol. Constitut. l. II. c. 28, where that which Tertullian very properly censures, is prescribed as a law. Clement, Stromat. l. VII. f. 759, respecting the Gnostic sects: Ἡ συμποτικὴ διὰ τῆς ψευδωνύμου ἀγάπης πρωτοκλισία.

[2] De jejuniis, c. 17: Apud te agape in cacabis fervet. Major est agape, quia per hanc adolescentes tui cum sororibus dormiunt. So passionate an accuser appears of course not worthy of credit.

[3] Pædagod. l. II. f. 142.

So long as the *agapæ* and the Lord's supper were united together, the celebration of the latter formed no part of the divine service. This service was held early in the morning, and not till towards evening did the church re-assemble at the common love-feast and for the celebration of the supper. At this celebration, as may be easily concluded, no one could be present who was not a member of the Christian church, and incorporated into it by the rite of baptism. But there was no reason for excluding unbelieving or unbaptized persons from participating in the worship held in the morning.[1] It is clear from 1 Cor. 14 : 23 — 25, that in the age of the apostles, no stranger was withheld from visiting those assemblies ; that, on the contrary, such visits were regarded with pleasure, because the salutary impressions which were thus made on them, might tend to their conversion. The Apostle Paul desired, that divine service should be so arranged as to exert an influence in this manner on such persons. We see no reason to justify a deviation from this practice. There needed to be no fear of spies. The extravagant reports spread abroad concerning the Christians, could be best refuted by ocular demonstration Publicity was the best witness of the innocence of the Christians. To this, moreover, Tertullian appeals, that each one could have convinced himself of the untruth of those stories, as the churches were so often surprised in their meetings, and it must thus have been observed what was transacted in them.[2] If then the pagans themselves were challenged to testify what they had seen done in the Christian assemblies when thus surprised, there certainly was no reason for repelling all visits of strangers for fear of spies.

But now, when the celebration of the supper was disjoined from the agapæ and united with the other parts of divine service, it might happen on this very account, that men would believe it necessary to confine the participation of unbelievers to those other parts ; that at this celebration and the preparation which went before, they should be dismissed, because these celebrations, from their very nature, were designed only for the members of the church, and originally all who were present partook in the communion of the holy supper. Marcion, the defender of apostolical simplicity in church life, the warm opponent of all Jewish, hierarchical peculiarities, combated the new separation made between catechumens and the baptized entitled to communion, and this dismissal of them at certain church prayers united with the

[1] Dr. Rothe, in the acute and ingenious dissertation which has already been referred to, de disciplina arcani, maintains the opinion, that the admission of unbelievers and catechumens to the first portion of the service was a later arrangement ; and that it was the change which took place in the catechumenal instruction, (see above, p. 305,) and the introduction of a class of catechumens into the church assemblies, in which hitherto none but those that had been baptized, took a part, which first led to the comparing of the Christian worship with the Grecian mysteries, and to the distinguishing of a missa catechumenorum, and a missa fidelium. But I cannot be persuaded that the suppositions on which this opinion rests are sufficiently well grounded, although I confess, there is a want of precise data for a certain determination of the disputed questions. The reasons for my opposite views, and against Rothe, lie in my development of the matter itself.

[2] Apologet. c. 7 : Quotidie obsidemur, quotidie prodimur, in ipsis plurimum cœtibus et congregationibus nostris opprimimur.

supper, as an innovation alien from the original spirit of the apostolic, or as he said, Pauline church.[1] He would have the catechumens take part in all the prayers of the church.[2] He would see nothing offensive even were they present also at the celebration of the holy supper, without participating in it. Tertullian, on the other hand, objected to the heretics, — by whom he seems particularly to have had in his mind the Marcionite party, — that in their assemblies, it was impossible to distinguish who were catechumens, and who were believers, (baptized;) that all entered in alike or at once, and took part in the same prayers; that moreover, when pagans came in, the holy, such as it was, was thrown to dogs and the pearls before swine,— viz. the celebration of the supper was exposed before the eyes of the profane; although, in truth, no Lord's supper,— Tertullian proceeding on the assumption that, among heretics, there could be neither a true baptism, nor a true Lord's supper.[3] From this passage it is perfectly clear, not that the pagans assisted in the divine service, but that they could be present at the whole without distinction. This was what offended Tertullian. He demanded that pagans, catechumens and baptized persons should, in the divine service, take their several places; that certain holy rites should be performed only in the presence of the last, but remain concealed from the gaze of the profane. It was the new arrangement combated by the Marcionites, by virtue of which the divine service was divided into two portions, the acts in which catechumens and unbelievers might take part, and those in which only the baptized could take part. Here the comparison with the mysteries of the Greeks, of which we have already spoken above, found place; although we cannot assert that this division proceeded originally out of a comparison with the Greek mysteries. For those only who had been consecrated by baptism, could the veil be removed from the hidden sanctuary.[4] Thus it came about, that while Justin Martyr did not scruple to sketch out a description of the administration of baptism and of the celebration of the sup-

[1] In reference to the position held by such, Tertullian, præscript. hæret. c. 41: Simplicitatem volunt esse prostrationem disciplinæ, cujus penes nos curam lenocinium, (a corruption of the primitive unity,) vocant.

[2] See Jerome on the epist. Galat. 6, 6: Marcion hunc locum ita interpretatus est, ut putaret fideles et catechumenos simul orare debere, et magistrum communicare in oratione discipulis.

[3] Tertullian, præscript. hæret. c. 41: In primis, quis catechumenus, quis fidelis, incertum est; pariter adeunt, pariter orant, etiam ethnici si supervenerint. A different sense presents itself, according as we take these words with what precedes or with what follows them. In the first case, the whole would be a continuation of the same thought, and by the sanctum we should have to understand the church prayers. In the second case, the sense expressed by me in the translation would answer to the original.

[4] I cannot concur with Rothe in respect to all the passages in which he is disposed to find an allusion to the Greek mysteries, or an affectation of secrecy in imitation of them. In particular, in the language of Athenagoras, Legat. pro Christianis, f. 37, ed. Colon., I can find no trace whatever of concealment and mystery as to certain sacred rites. Athenagoras speaks of the fact, that the Christians, who distinguished themselves for their zeal in behalf of strict morality, must expect to be accused by the pagans, who were slaves to every lust, of the same unnatural debauchery which they found existing among themselves, and in this connection he says: "Ὡ τί ἂν εἴποιμι τὰ ἀπόῤῥητα;" "What shall I say of that concerning which one would prefer to be silent?" Indigna dictu. Not a word here respecting the mysteries of the Greeks, nor respecting the sacraments of the Christians

per for the use of pagans, it was thought, on the other hand, after this transferring of the conception of the mysteries to the holy supper, that one ought not to speak of these holy things before the uninitiated. And this revolution coincides with the time when that great revolution of the Christian views took place respecting the priesthood. To the inner connection which here presents itself, it is unnecessary to direct the attention of our readers.

Already in the third century, it became customary, before the prayer of the church which prepared the way for the celebration of the supper, for the clergyman who presided at this celebration, to admonish the church to silent devotion, calling upon them *to lift up their souls to heaven*, and the church thereupon responded,— *Yea, to the Lord we have lifted them up.*[1]

It has already been remarked, that the prayer of praise and thanks had passed over to the Christian celebration of the supper from the Jewish passover. This prayer of praise and thanks was, moreover, always considered as constituting an essential part of the solemnity: hence the Lord's supper obtained its name of *the eucharist* (*εὐχαριστία.*[2]) The presiding officer of the church, taking up the bread and wine from the table that stood before him, gave thanks to God, in the name of the whole church, that he had created the *things of nature*, which were here represented by the most essential means of sustenance, for the use of man; and that he, the Lord of nature, had also, for the sake of man, given his Son to appear and suffer in human nature. Both the thanksgiving for the gifts of nature and the thanksgiving for the blessings of grace were in fact intimately connected; since it is not until man, redeemed, returns back to his filial relation with the Heavenly Father, that he truly perceives how all had been bestowed on him by the love of his Heavenly Father; then every earthly gift acquires for him a new and higher significancy, as the pledge of an eternal love, imparting blessings to men of far higher worth than these. All nature, which before had been desecrated by him, in his servitude to sin, in his condition of estrangement from God, was now sanctified and re-

[1] Cyprian, de oratione dominica: Sacerdos ante orationem præfatione præmissa parat fratrum mentes dicendo: *sursum corda*, ut dum respondet plebs: *habemus ad Dominum*, admoneatur, nihil aliud se quam Dominum cogitare debere. And Commodian, c. 76, in rebuking the female practice of talking in the church, says:

Sacerdos Domini cum sursum corda præcepit;
In prece fienda ut fiant silentia vestra,
Limpide respondes nec temperas quoque promissis.

Thus we find already the first traces of the liturgy, which we become acquainted with in the fourth century.

[2] The term "*εὐχαριστία*" is used metonymically, resembling in all respects the phrase, "*ποτήριον εὐλογίας, ὁ εὐλόγουμεν*," in St. Paul = "*ὁ εὐχαριστηθεὶς ἄρτος καὶ οἶνος*," in Justin Martyr, — the bread and wine over which the prayer of thanksgiving *has been pronounced.* The latter says expressly, that immediately after the presiding officer of the church has pronounced this prayer of thanksgiving over the bread and wine, and the church joined in it with their Amen, the sacramental elements were distributed. He mentions no other consecration. He says: 'Η *δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ (του Χριστοῦ) εὐχαριστηθεῖσα τροφή*. This cannot be a prayer which came verbally from Christ, for they had no such prayer; but it is rather the prayer of thanks generally, instituted by him, which, after his example, was to be offered at this celebration. It may be that the words of the institution were introduced into this prayer. In the language used by Firmilian, Cyprian, ep. 75: "invocatione non contemtibili sanctificare panem et eucharistiam facere," lies probably the idea of a consecration, whereby the ordinary bread became the sacrament of the supper.

stored back to him as a redeemed creature; and in the Lord's supper, the earthly, the natural was to become transfigured into a symbol or vehicle of the heavenly, the divine. With the bodily food, thus sanctified by the prayer of thanksgiving, was now to be connected, by the power of the same God who had caused this earthly means of sustenance to grow for the use of men, a higher, heavenly food for the life of the inward man. (We shall say nothing at present of the different notions concerning the relations of the signs to the thing represented.)

This connection of ideas was quite familiar to the early Christians; they often made use of it in their polemics against the contempt for nature affected by the Gnostics. Attached to this, moreover, was the allusion to a *peculiar custom* of the church at this period; the members of the community themselves offered the wine and the bread as a free gift, and from these were taken the elements for the celebration of the Lord's supper.[1] These gifts were regarded as the spiritual thank-offering of the Christians. The presiding officer of the church, in taking from these gifts the elements of the supper and consecrating them to God with praise and thanksgiving, represented the whole community as one priestly race, as one in the Lord, and as ready to consecrate again to the service of God all that they had received from Him. This thank-offering of the Christians, considered as a spiritual offering of the heart, as a free expression of childlike love and gratitude, was opposed to the sacrificial worship of the pagans and Jews. In part, these gifts of the Christians; in part, the prayer of thanks of the presiding church officer, with which they were consecrated to God; in part, finally, the entire celebration of the Lord's supper, was called, at first only in *this* sense, an offering or sacrifice, προσφορά, θυσία.[2] In allusion to this, Justin Martyr says:[3] "The prayers and thanksgivings offered by worthy men are the only true sacrifices, well-pleasing to God; these *alone* have the Christians learned to offer, and particularly in remembrance of their bodily nourishment, which consists of the dry and the moist, by which they are reminded also of the sufferings which Christ endured on their account." He regards this as a proof of the high-priestly lineage of the Christians; since God receives offerings from none but his priests. In this sense Irenæus, contrasting those spiritual offerings with every species of ceremonial connected with a sacrificial worship, observes: "It is not the *offering* that sanctifies the man, but it is the conscience of the offerer that sanctifies this offering, if it be pure, and induces God to receive it as from a friend.[4] Accordingly, the idea of a sacrifice in the supper of the Lord was at first barely symbolical; and originally this idea did not even have reference to the sacrifice of Christ. The

[1] This usage, which is already plainly presupposed by the allusions of Justin Martyr, of Irenæus, is mentioned in express terms by Cyprian, de opere et eleemosynis, where he rebukes the rich woman, who came to the communion without bringing with her a gift of charity for the necessities of the church. Locuples et dives es, et dominicum sine sacrificio venis, quæ *partem de sacrificio*, quod pauper obtulit, sumis?

[2] Hence the expression which occurs so frequently in Cyprian: oblationem alicujus accipere, offerre. To receive such gifts from any one for the church, to take from them the elements of the supper, and consecrate them, was evidence that he was considered to be a *regular* member of the church.

[3] Dial. c. Tryph. Jud. f. 345

[4] Iren. l. IV. c. 18.

only thing originally had in view was the spiritual thank-offering of the Christians, of which the presentation of the bread and wine, the first fruits of nature's gifts, served as a symbol; while no doubt the consciousness of the new relation to God, in which the redeemed were placed by the sufferings of Christ, lay at the basis of the whole transaction."[1] Afterwards, the reference to the death of Christ was made more prominent, yet so that it continued still to be no more than the idea of a commemorative or symbolical representation of this sacrifice. But as one error begets another, it was quite natural that the false notion of a particular priesthood in the Christian church, corresponding to that in the Old Testament, should give birth to the erroneous notion of a sacrificial worship which should stand in the same relation of correspondence to that of the Old Testament; and so it came about that the whole idea of sacrifice in the Lord's supper, which in the first instance was simply symbolical, took a direction altogether wide of its true import, and bearing towards the magical; the earliest indications of which we find in Cyprian.

The ordinary bread presented by the church was used for the Lord's supper. Justin Martyr calls it expressly common bread, (κοινὸς ἄρτος;) those who went on the supposition that Christ kept the passover a day earlier than it was usually observed, had no occasion to take other than common bread for the celebration of the ordinance; but even those who entertained the contrary opinion did not consider the use of unleavened bread as an essential thing in the institution of the supper. We meet with but one exception, in a class of Judaizing Christians,[2] — an exception, however, which in this case explains itself. These Christians celebrated the Lord's supper, in remembrance of that last supper of Christ, but once in the year, at the feast of the passover; hence they were bound, as Christians who still continued to observe the Jewish ceremonial law, to use unleavened bread.[3] As among the ancients, and particularly in the East, it was not customary to drink at their meals pure wine unmingled with water, it was taken for granted that Christ also, at the institution of the supper, made use of mingled wine. The taste for higher mystical interpretations could not be satisfied, however, with this simple, but, as it seemed, too trivial explanation of the prevail-

[1] A single passage in Irenæus, l. IV. c. 18, § 4, seems to speak a different language: "verbum quod offertur Deo;" therefore the Logos himself, Christ, is offered up in the sacrament of the supper. But even if there were no other reading, yet *this* could not be the right one; for such a form of expression would not only stand in manifest contradiction to the whole chain and connection of ideas *elsewhere* so luminously exhibited in Irenæus, but also be unsuited to what immediately precedes. He had in fact just before said, "offertur Deo ex creatura ejus," (thus the offering is referred to the bread and wine,) and in the preceding chapter, § 6, it is said: "per Christum offert ecclesia." Beyond question, therefore, the reading of other manuscripts at this place — "per quod offertur," must be recognized as the correct one. It is precisely the reference to Christ, the high priest, which gives as well to this spiritual thank-offering, as to the entire Christian life, the right consecration. This is the meaning of Irenæus.

[2] Epiphanius says respecting the Ebionites of his time, that they annually celebrated the communion with unleavened bread and with water, (the latter, because their ascetic principles allowed not the use of wine.) hæres. 30, § 16.

[3] See what is to be said hereafter of the Ebionites.

ing custom. The mingling of water with the wine was said to denote the union of the church with Christ.[1]

As we have already remarked, the celebration of the Lord's supper was still held to constitute an essential part of divine worship on every Sunday, as appears from Justin Martyr; and the whole church partook of the communion, after they had joined in the Amen of the preceding prayer. The deacons carried the bread and wine to every one present, in order. It was held to be necessary, that all the Christians in the place should, by participating in this communion, maintain their union with the Lord and with his church; hence the deacons carried a portion of the consecrated bread and wine to strangers, to the sick, to prisoners, and all who were prevented from being present at the assembly.[2]

In some of the churches, however, as for example in the church of North Africa, the daily enjoyment of the communion continued to be held necessary; since it was considered the daily bond of union betwixt the Lord and the church, the daily means of strength, life and salvation to Christians. Hence Tertullian and Cyprian give a *spiritual* explication of the petition for our daily bread, as a petition for an uninterrupted, sanctifying union with the body of Christ through the Lord's supper. But when the daily service and celebration of the Lord's supper ceased, the only means left was, to take home a portion of the consecrated bread, which, in this case of necessity, was to be substituted for the whole communion — the first trace of the practice, introduced through error and abuse, of receiving the Lord's supper under *one* kind. Thus every Christian, with his family, after the morning devotions, and before engaging in his daily business, partook of the communion at home, that the life of the whole ensuing day might be sanctified by fellowship with the Lord. We recognize here the ideas at bottom, lying in the depth of the Christian consciousness; but also the same spirit of externality, disturbing the Christian consciousness, which we have met with in so many different forms, and which was ever prone to ascribe a magic power of making holy to the sensible elements.[3]

But other countries, perhaps, even as early as this, acted upon the

[1] Quando in calice vino aqua miscetur, Christo populus adunatur. Cyprian, ep. 63.

[2] In the description of the rite by Justin and by Irenæus cited in Eusebius, l. V. c. 24: Πέμπειν εὐχαριστίαν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν παροικιῶν παροῦσιν, where the author is speaking of the Roman bishops. Thus arose first the custom of communicating with elements previously consecrated, (the προηγιασμένα, as they were afterwards called.) The idea at bottom was, that a communion could properly have its right significance only in the midst of a church; the communion of persons absent, of individuals, was to be considered therefore as only a continuation of that communion of the whole body of the church. But when in Cyprian mention is made of *presbyteris* apud confessores *offerentibus*, the meaning probably is, that the elements were first consecrated by the presbyters on the spot.

[3] To this custom the following passages refer. Tertullian, speaking of the suspicion of the pagan husband towards his Christian wife, Ad uxorem, l. II. c. 5: Non sciet maritus, quid secreto ante omnem cibum gustes? Et si scierit panem, non illum credit esse, qui dicitur. — De orat. c. 19, (in the piece discovered by Muratori,) Accepto corpore Domini et reservato, (respecting a Christian mistress of a family,) arca sua, in qua Domini sanctum fuit. Cyprian, de lapsis, p. 189, ed. Baluz. — In the work ascribed to Cyprian, de spectaculis, respecting one who runs from the church to the theatre: Festinans ad spectaculum, dimissus e dominico et adhuc gerens secum, ut assolet, eucharistiam.

principle that men ought never to partake of the holy thing except after a very especial preparation of the heart, and therefore only at stated seasons chosen according to each one's necessities. The learned Hippolytus, who lived in the first half of the third century, wrote thus early a discussion on the question, "whether the communion should be received daily or only at stated seasons."[1]

As the church of *North Africa* was the first to bring prominently into notice the necessity of infant baptism, so in connection with this they introduced also the *communion of infants;* for as they neglected to distinguish with sufficient clearness between the sign and the divine thing which it signified, and as they understood all that is said in the sixth chapter of John's gospel concerning the eating of the flesh and drinking the blood of Christ to refer to the outward participation of the Lord's supper, they concluded that this, from the very first, was absolutely necessary to the attainment of salvation.[2]

The celebration of the Lord's supper became the seal of all religious consecration; it was thus used at the conclusion of a marriage,[3] thus at the solemnities in commemoration of the dead. Of the latter, we will here take occasion to speak somewhat more at large.

As Christianity in its general influence did not tend to suppress but only to ennoble the natural feelings of man; as it opposed itself generally, as well to the *perverted education* which would crush these natural feelings, as to the unrestrained expression of them in the rude state of nature; the same was its influence also in relation to mourning for the dead. From the first, Christianity condemned the wild, and at the same time hypocritical expressions of grief with which the funeral procession was accompanied, those wailings of women who had been hired for the occasion, (mulieres præficæ;) yet it required no stoic resignation and apathy, but mitigated and refined the anguish of sorrow by the spirit of faith and hope, and of childlike resignation to that eternal love, which takes, in order to restore what it has taken under a more glorious form; which separates for the moment, in order to re-unite the separated in a glorified state through eternity. When multitudes at Carthage were swept away by a desolating pestilence, Cyprian said to his church: — "We ought not to mourn for those who are delivered from the world by the call of the Lord, since we know they are not lost, but sent before us; that they have taken their leave of us in order to precede us. We may long after *them* as we do for those who have sailed on a distant voyage, but not lament them. We may not here below put on *dark* robes of mourning, when *they* above have already put on the *white* robes of glory; we may not give the heathens any just occasion to accuse us of weeping for those as lost and extinct, of whom we say that *they live with God*, and of failing to prove by the witness of our hearts the faith we confess with our lips. We, who live in hope,

[1] See Hieronym. ep. 71, ad Lucin.

[2] And so it came about, that to children who were not yet able to eat bread, they gave *wine*. Cfr. Cyprian, de lapsis. Once more an example, how a superstitious abuse, contrary to the institution, led to a separation of the elements of the supper.

[3] Oblatio pro matrimonio. As to what is to be understood by this, see above.

who believe in God, and trust that Christ has suffered for us and risen again; we, who abide in Christ, who through him and in him rise again, — why do we not ourselves wish to depart out of this world; or why do we lament for the friends who have been *separated* from us, as if they were lost, when Christ, our Lord and God, exhorts us, saying, 'I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die?' Why are we not in haste to see our country and home, to greet our elders? There await us a multitude of those whom we love, fathers, brothers and children, who are secure already of their own salvation and concerned only for ours. What mutual joy to them and to us, when we come into their presence and into their embrace!"[1] Out of this direction of the feelings arose the Christian custom which required that the memory of departed friends should be celebrated by their relations, husbands, or wives, on the anniversary of their death, in a manner suited to the spirit of the Christian faith and of the Christian hope. It was usual on this day to partake of the communion, under a sense of the inseparable fellowship with those who had died in the Lord; a gift was laid on the altar in their name, as if they were still living members of the church; and in return for this, the petition for peace to the souls of the departed was introduced into the prayer of the church which preceded the communion.[2]

But when the ideas of the priesthood and sacrifice took another shape, this circumstance also would necessarily react on those Christian memorial observances connected with the holy rite. We meet with the first indications of this false tendency as early as the times of Cyprian.

While individual Christians and Christian families celebrated in this manner the memory of those departed ones who were especially near to them by the ties of kindred, *whole communities* celebrated the memory of those who, without belonging to their own particular community, had died as witnesses for the Lord.[3] The anniversary of the death of such individuals was looked upon as their birth-day to a nobler existence. Great care was bestowed in providing for their funeral obsequies, and the repose of their bodies, as the sanctified organs of holy souls, which were one day to be awakened from the dead and restored to their use under a more glorious form. On every returning anniversary of their birth-day, (in the sense which has been explained,) the people gathered round their graves, where the story was rehearsed of their confession and sufferings, and the communion was celebrated in the consciousness of a continued fellowship with them, now that they were united with him for whom, by their sufferings, they had witnessed a good confession.[4] The simple Christian character of these celebra-

[1] Cyprian, de mortalitate.

[2] Oblationes pro defunctis annua die faciemus. Tertullian, de corona milit. c. 3, as an ancient tradition. The same writer says to a widower, in reference to his deceased wife: Pro cujus spiritu postulas, pro qua oblationes annuas reddis. Commendabis per sacerdotem etc. De exhortatione castitat. c. 11.

[3] The dies natales, natalitia martyrum, γενέθλια τῶν μαρτύρων.

[4] The oblationes, sacrificia pro martyribus, presupposed originally that the martyrs were like *other sinful men*, who might well stand in need of the intercessions of Christians. This usage was, in its *original sense*, in collision with the extravagant veneration of the martyrs; and this circumstance ac

tions is evinced by the manner in which the church at Smyrna, in their report of the martyrdom of Polycarp, their bishop, answered the reproach of the heathens, who refused to give up the remains of the martyr, lest the Christians should abandon the *crucified*, and begin to worship *him*.[1] "They are not aware," writes the church, "that we can neither forsake that Christ who has suffered for the salvation of the whole world of the redeemed, nor worship another. Him we *adore*, as the Son of God; but the martyrs we *love*, as they deserved for their unconquerable love to their King and Master, and because we also wish to become their companions and fellow disciples."[2] The church then proceeds to say, — "We gathered up his bones, which are more precious than gold or jewels, and deposited them in a suitable place; and God will grant us to assemble there in joy and festivity, and celebrate the birth-day of his martyrdom, in remembrance of the departed champion, and for the purpose of exercising and arming those whom the conflict is still awaiting."[3] Yet it cannot be denied that as early as the time of Cyprian, or even earlier, (for Tertullian, when a Montanist, combated this error,) the germ began to show itself of an excessive veneration for the martyrs. So uniformly is man inclined to *place an undue value on the human agent*, to *deify the instrument*, which should simply point to Him who employs it; and the false element once existing in the germ, it soon unfolds and spreads, unless repressed by a mightier reaction of the sense of truth.

cordingly must have afterwards led to a different interpretation of the ancient custom.

[1] Euseb. l. IV. c. 15. See above, p. 109.

[2] Τοῦτον μὲν γὰρ, υἱὸν ὄντα τοῦ θεοῦ προσκυνοῦμεν· τοὺς δὲ μάρτυρας, ὡς μαθητὰς καὶ μιμητὰς ἀγαπῶμεν, ἀξίων ἕνεκα εὐνοίας ἂν ὑπερβλήτου τῆς εἰς τὸν ἴδιον βασιλέα καὶ διδάσκαλον.

[3] Εἰς τε τῶν προηθληκότων μνήμην, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἄσκησιν τε καὶ ἑτοιμασίαν.

SECTION FOURTH.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY, APPREHENDED AND DEVELOPED AS A SYSTEM OF DOCTRINES.

1. General Introductory Remarks.

The same law according to which, as we have seen in the preceding sections, Christianity proceeded to unfold and shape itself in the outward life from within, will again offer itself to our notice in the present section, where it is our purpose to trace the progressive development of *Christian doctrine*. It is the law expressed in the words we have prefixed as the motto to this volume,— words employed by our Lord himself to describe the manner in which his kingdom should be developed here on the earth. As the fragment of leaven cast into the large mass of meal brings on a process of fermentation, and by its own inherent virtue, working through the mass, assimilates the whole to itself; so Christianity,— the heavenly leaven,— by the power of a divine life, created a ferment in human nature, which, from the hidden depths, the inmost recesses of that nature, extended its influence as well to the faculties of thought as to the outward life, striving to assimilate, to transform and fashion the whole to its own likeness; — an effect which could only be brought about by a gradual process of development, and which presupposed manifold conflicts with the alien forces it was necessary to overcome. To exhibit the workings of Christianity, now that they have been contemplated in the phenomena of *life*, as they are seen in the development of *thought* and of *knowledge*, is the problem before us.

As it is one essential characteristic of Christianity, that it did not deliver a new law in a distinct set of formal precepts, nor found a new society, organized from without in certain fixed and invariable external forms; so it is another, that it did not communicate a rigid system of doctrines, settled and determined once for all in certain ready made conceptions. In both these respects, the word of the quickening Spirit was to find its way outward from within,— just as in the external shaping of the life, so also in the coining of its doctrines into distinct conceptions for the understanding. The divine revelation was so delivered and so calculated, that its substantial contents might be elaborated and evolved, through the divinely enlightened reason of man, actuated by the new divine life, in the same proportion as he became more fully penetrated by it, and with the free activity befitting its own proper essence. It was not something engrafted on the different individualities of human character and still remaining foreign to them; but the divine matter, suited to all the individualities of human character, and in which these individualities were to find, not their destruction, but their completion, was designed for the very end of being appropriated by

each in its own way, and of being developed by each in the form most nearly corresponding to its own stamp. As Christ, the second man, the prototype of the new regenerated humanity, is exalted above all antagonisms of human individuality, comprising in himself the original elements of them all harmoniously combined; so what in him is *one*, must, in the ennobled human nature proceeding from him, become individualized. The various peculiarities of character, destined, when animated by his life, to present different phases of himself, were to coöperate, each supplying what the others might lack, to give a perfect exhibition of the fullness of Christ in the course of history.[1] And this law was verified at the very outset, in the case of those who formed the necessary connecting links between himself and the next succeeding evolution of the church; — those organs and vehicles of his Spirit to all subsequent ages. Hence the mode of apprehending and presenting that divine truth, which is one in essence, must, at this point, be immediately separated into four grand particular directions, constituting all together the fullness of Christ; as will be evident by comparing the different characters of James and Peter, Paul and John. The spirit of Christ exercised too mighty an influence over these individualities of character, attracted and animated as they were by one and the same power, to leave it possible for them to unfold themselves in such opposite ways as to exclude one another. Hence whatever was diverse in them still remained subordinate to a higher unity, in which they were one. And so on in the future; — it rested on the natural diversities of human character to decide, by which of these grand tendencies in the original presentation of Christianity each man should be chiefly attracted; and on which side, in what form of it, each could appropriate it to himself.

But when, in the after course of development, the power of Christ's spirit, which thus subordinated the human element to itself, no longer predominated, but the human individuality asserted its own importance, then partial systems arose, running counter to each other, which, in one way and another, did great injury to the cause of divine truth; and it only remained that the progressive movement and purification of the church should cause that unity to be once more clearly apprehended and restored out of these conflicting elements.

In the sections which have gone before, we saw Christianity pressing into the conflict with the religious principles of the earlier world — with those of paganism and Judaism; and the strife was not barely one of open war, but those principles entered into the mode of apprehending Christianity itself, threatening its corruption by lowering it down to

[1] I cannot deny myself the pleasure of referring here to those beautiful words of Schleiermacher, which express so profound an understanding as well of the historical development of Christianity as of the essential character of Christ. "If we contemplate Christendom in its full and complete sense, if we can but for a moment so fill the mind's eye with light and so kindle the fire of love in the heart, that the differences shall no longer shock and repel us, we shall not only find in them all, taken together, the fullness of Christ, as well as the fullness of the undivided Spirit of God, but we shall also see therein the Father who has revealed himself in his Son, and take in at a glance all these different broken rays of divine light as they proceed from one central point." Schleiermacher's Predigten, neue Ausgabe, B. III. p. 590.

their own standard and becoming themselves blended with it. The same thing we shall have to observe in the process of the development of doctrines. Just as in the progressive evolution of Christian life, we saw Jewish and pagan elements entering in with a corrupting influence, while yet the Christian principle preserved itself pure in the conflict with both; so we must observe the same thing again in the history of doctrines, and perceive the intimate connection between the development of the Christian principle in doctrine and in life, in dogmatics and in ethics, both having sprung from a common root. Now wherever the religious tendencies of the old world, which at first presented themselves in outward hostility to Christianity, became so mixed in with its inner development as to lame the foundation of the Christian faith itself, by appropriating to themselves only a part of the whole, those appearances arose which were designated by the name of heresies;[1] though in later times this name was often applied in a very different manner, being employed by some one dominant sect, — that refused to recognize the manifold phases necessarily presenting themselves in the healthy development of Christian truth, and would substitute in place of the unity, exhibiting itself in these manifold forms, a uniformity that suppressed the healthy process of development, — to brand as a morbid appearance every deviation from a mode of apprehending Christianity which claimed to be the only valid one.

The multiform and grand phenomena of the heresies which arose in this period, where we may observe Jewish and Oriental-Greek elements of culture in various combination, exhibit to us, on one side, the chaotic heavings of a dismembered world, on the point of either plunging into dissolution or rising in some new creation called forth out of the chaos; while on another, they bear witness to the mighty attractive power which the appearance of Christ exerted on the elements of this chaos, the powerful impression which it produced, both attractive and repulsive. Suppose the case that nothing had come down to us save the knowledge of these phenomena; that we knew nothing about the causes by which they were produced; yet any mind, of more than ordinary reflection, would feel constrained to recognize, in these mighty afterworkings, some still greater phenomenon that had preceded them; and doubtless it would be possible, from studying the one, to arrive at some probable conclusion with regard to the character of the other.

[1] The word *αἵρεσις*, in its original signification, grounded on its etymology, has, as is well known, no bad meaning attached to it; but in the philosophical *usus loquendi*, denotes the choice of certain principles for the whole regulation of life, — some particular conviction determining the character of the life. Hence it was used to designate the different schools of philosophy, which were divided each from the other by their difference in respect to such convictions. Thus Sextus Empiricus gives as the most general definition of the word: *λόγῳ τινὶ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀκολουθοῦσα ἐγωνὴ*. But where the question turns not on the different opinions of men with regard to important subjects, but on truth communicated by divine revelation, whereby the foundation is to be laid of a fellowship and unity of religious conviction, of an all-embracing church, the word *αἵρεσις* as opposed to this postulate, as denoting the preponderance of the subjective side whereby that higher fellowship and unity are violated, takes in the associated idea of arbitrary human opinion, through which divine truth becomes corrupted; and with such an associated bad meaning the term seems to be employed even in the usus loquendi of the New Testament.

Since we must perceive in these heresies the reaction of different fundamental principles, prevailing in the ancient world, which had found their way into Christianity itself and strove to maintain themselves along with it; it is evident that they must have subserved this important end; namely, that the Christian mind, while engaged in repelling such a reaction, must, in this opposition, still more clearly develope and express itself, than it could have done if these fundamental principles had merely been brought to assail Christianity from without. These conflicts could not fail to result in a conscious knowledge, more clearly developed and more sharply defined, of the distinguishing essence of Christianity generally, and of the substantial contents of its several doctrines.

In contemplating the oppositions most distinctly marked in the heresies of this period and the process of development whereby the Christian consciousness, which was thus more clearly unfolded, came forth triumphant from these conflicts, we see those words of the Christian philosopher, which we selected as a motto for the first volume of this history, remarkably verified, that all oppositions find themselves resolved and reconciled in Christ.

Since, then, the process of the development of Christian doctrine can be rightly understood only by taking into view its conflict with the heresies, we must first turn our attention to the consideration of these phenomena.

Heretical Tendencies.

What the two most important tendencies of the heretical spirit were, will appear as soon as we consider the relation of Christianity to the previous religious development of mankind. Christianity was the new creation, that pushed its way out of the envelope of Judaism. In common with Judaism, it possessed the character of a revealed religion, as opposed to the nature-religion of heathenism; — it possessed the groundwork of the theocracy, and yet was something entirely new — a principle which aimed at the transformation of everything already extant. The least among those who shared in the new creation was to be greater than the greatest among the prophets. It was the dissolution and the fulfilment of Judaism. Hence it was important to a right apprehension of Christianity, that both these relations should be rightly seized; that it should be seen how Judaism was to meet with its fulfilment in Christianity, but how, at the same time, united with this fulfilment, was the dissolution of the distinct religious ground which Judaism had, till now, maintained. It behooved that Christianity should be rightly understood, both in its connection with the preparatory elements in Judaism, and also in its opposition to Judaism itself. Hence there could arise contrary tendencies of error, according as either the opposition was lost sight of in the intimate connection, or the intimate connection was overlooked in the opposition. And in these main directions of the heretical spirit, we shall easily be able to trace the influence of two elements of culture directly opposed to each other, which were attracted by Christianity, — the opposition of the Jewish and of the Hellenic mind.

As the new spirit which Christ introduced into humanity was at first covered up and hidden under the old forms of Judaism, from which it was afterwards to burst free by virtue of its own inherent power; as the Jews, from their previous religious point of view, could come to the knowledge of Jesus as the Messiah promised in the Old Testament, it came about, that the doctrine of Christ was wholly blended by them with their previous Judaism, that they were for holding fast, as of perpetual validity, what was to be only a transient moment, — that stage of the development of Christianity in which it first appeared clothed under the forms of Judaism. The free Grecian spirit, on the other hand, which struggled hardest against the yoke of the law, being most strongly attracted by that particular phase in the appearance of Christ and in Christianity which was most directly opposed to the restraints of Judaism, would most naturally apprehend Christianity simply as a religion opposed to Judaism; would be disposed to deny the fact of their common divine foundation; to explain the connection between them as a thing merely accidental, and to overlook the more profound and necessary inner connection, the higher unity which existed between the two religions. Indeed we may perceive the germ of the opposition just described as early as the time of Paul,— the opposition, that is, between those who held to the exclusive authority of the apostles of Palestine, and those who attached themselves exclusively to the Apostle Paul, — between those who remained in bondage to the Jewish law, and those who gloried in their Christian freedom and higher knowledge.[1] The same opposition appeared still more strongly developed in the age of John;[2] and hence arose afterwards the opposition between the Jewish and the Gnostic understanding of Christianity. Where this opposition reaches its full and complete development, it is the one which of all others affects most deeply the entire apprehension of Christianity, extending alike to all its ethical and all its dogmatic elements. The first of these spiritual tendencies cleaves to the temporal, earthly form of manifestation alone, without divining the higher spirit which it embodies and conceals; the other disdains that temporal form of manifestation, which is the necessary medium for the appropriation of the spirit, and would have the spirit without this medium. The one sticks fast by the letter, beyond which it cannot penetrate to the revelation of the spirit; the other believes itself competent to grasp the spirit without the letter. The one perceives nothing in Christ but the Son of man; the other, nothing but the Son of God; — and so the one would have only the human element in Christianity, without the divine; the other, only the divine, without the human. The last antithesis is of the utmost importance, on account of its bearing on the essence of Christian morality. For as this presupposes the oneness of the Son of God and the Son of man in Christ, so the refinement of the entire man, as a form for the manifestation of the divine life, is its principle, flowing directly from this presupposition.

Of these two main tendencies, we shall now proceed to consider, first, the one which exhibited itself in the Judaizing sects.

[1] See my Apostol. Zeitalter, Bd. I. S. 314, ff. [2] Id. Bd. II. S. 532, ff.

1. *The Judaizing Sects.*

This main heretical tendency, as may be gathered from what has been said, is the oldest which entered as a disturbing influence into the developing process of Christianity. It fixed itself on Christianity at the very spot of its birth; for it had a slow and gradual growth, — exhibiting itself first, when that which, in its crudeness and imperfection, constituted the first necessary link in the chain of development, set itself in hostile opposition to the progressive movement which Christ aimed at and promised; next, when that which was in its right place at the beginning, gave itself forth as the end, and asserted its own validity against the free development of the spirit bursting from the covering in which it had been previously confined; finally, when the same fleshly and contracted Jewish sense which showed its hostility to Christianity at first in decided unbelief, received Christianity, but received it after its own fashion, that is, the shell instead of the kernel; when the same fleshly sense to which our Saviour's exalted language had so often been a stone of stumbling, believed his words in part, it is true, but again betrayed itself by misconstruing their meaning, — taking them according to the sensuous letter, and not according to their spirit. But still we must carefully distinguish the different gradations in this tendency, which varied from a merely imperfect and subordinate stage of Christian knowledge, to that which may properly be called heresy.

Let us recollect that the faith in Jesus as the promised Messiah was the fundamental doctrine, on which the whole structure of the church arose. Accordingly, the first Christian community was formed of very heterogeneous materials. It was composed of such as differed from other Jews only by the acknowledging of Jesus as the Messiah — of such as still continued bound to the same contracted Jewish notions which they had entertained before; and of such as, by coming to know Jesus more and more as the Messiah in the higher spiritual sense, by surrendering themselves with docility to the spirit of Christ, would, by the inworking of that spirit, be ever growing in their Christian knowledge, and becoming more completely freed from their besetting errors. The heterogeneous elements, which, in the first communities formed among the Jews, were thus outwardly rather than inwardly combined, must now, in the course of the progressive development, be thrown apart from each other. The sifting process of history must effect a separation between those who had really been brought in contact with the spirit of Christianity and those who still belonged more truly to Judaism. To this necessary separation in the course of history, the words of Paul, 1 Corinth. 11: 19, and of 1 John, 2: 19, properly apply.

As Christ himself had faithfully observed the Mosaic law, so the faithful observance of it was adhered to at first by all believers, and was held to be a necessary condition of participating in the Messiah's kingdom. After the preparatory labors of Stephen, the martyr, and other men of Hellenistic origin and education, and of Peter, — that which Christ intended, when he said that he was not come to destroy the law but

to fulfil it, and when he called himself the Lord of the Sabbath; that which he meant by the worship of God, confined no longer to particular times or places, but in spirit and in truth, the essence of the new spiritual creation, which is grounded in the resurrection of Christ,[1] was clearly conceived and expressed by the Apostle Paul, and a self-subsisting Christian church, wholly independent of Judaism, formed among the pagans. Already a schism threatened to break out between the two elements of which the Christian church was composed, — the prevailing notion of Christianity in Palestine, which was characterized by a decided leaning to the Old Testament, and which suffered the new spirit to remain enveloped in the old forms of Judaism; and the independent Pauline development of Christianity among the pagans. By the compromise entered into between the two parties at Jerusalem,[2] this opposition was harmoniously reconciled; and it was the triumph of the idea of a catholic church, whose unity, grounded on the faith in Jesus as the one Saviour and Lord of all, was to outweigh all subordinate differences of Jewish and Hellenic forms of culture. But the more deep seated opposition could not be overcome and set aside by this reconciliation, brought about by outward concessions. The power of the Apostle Paul in establishing the principles of the more expanded view of Christianity, and his successful and rapidly extending labors among the pagans, which excited the jealousy of the pharisaic party among the Jewish Christians, soon caused it to break forth anew. In opposition to Paul, whom they refused to acknowledge as an apostle, whom they accused of corrupting the doctrines of Christ, arose that party of Jewish Christians, — zealots according to the pharisaic spirit, — which was not until afterwards distinguished by a common name. At the time when this opposition had become most violent, Paul was removed from his earthly field of labor. Then followed the conciliating element of the Apostle John's labors in Asia Minor, by which many of the points of difficulty were removed; — but still the opposition, in those respects in which it had been most strongly marked, could not be wholly suppressed.

About the middle of the second century we still find, among the Christians of Jewish descent, the two parties which existed in the apostolic age. This is evident from a passage in the dialogue of Justin Martyr with Trypho.[3] Two classes are here mentioned, — they who in their own practice united with the faith in Christ the observance of the Mosaic law, but without requiring the same observance of believing pagans, whom they acknowledged rather as genuine Christian brethren and accounted worthy of all brotherly fellowship, notwithstanding that they maintained their original Christian freedom,[4] — and they who

[1] Following the Pauline train of thought. As Christ the risen possesses a life exempted from the dominion of nature, from the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κοσμοῦ, so too the spiritual life of those who are spiritually risen with him is exempted from the dominion of nature, their religion is a religion emancipated from the elements of the world, altogether free, and thenceforth bound to no outward circumstances whatever.

[2] See on this subject, my Apostol. Zeitalter, Bd. I. S. 169, ff.

[3] Ed. Colon. f. 266, to which, in many respects, important passage, we shall have occasion to advert again hereafter.

[4] As Justin reports of them in the pas

were not content with observing the Mosaic law themselves, but were for forcing the pagan believers universally to the same observance, and who refused otherwise to have fellowship with them; thus proceeding on the assumption, that the *believing* pagans, like all others, were *unclean*, and that without the observance of the Mosaic law no man could be just before God.[1] The former were the genuinely apostolic, Jewish Christians, who had remained true to the pledge of agreement made at Jerusalem; the latter belonged to that party with whose influence the Apostle Paul had so often to struggle among the communities of the pagan Christians.

As the destruction of Jerusalem and the abolition of the Temple worship could not shake the faith of the Jews at large in the perpetual validity of their religious laws, so neither can it be said that the attachment of those Jews to the Mosaic law, who embraced Christianity, was thereby diminished. They regarded these events, doubtless, as a divine punishment, sent upon the mass of the people, who were hostile to Christ, and whose wicked disposition had caused his death; and many among them were expecting a glorious restoration of the city and of the temple to the faithful of the nation. Those that were not finally drawn by their Jewish way of thinking, on which had been merely grafted a superficial faith in Jesus as the Messiah, to fall wholly back again into Judaism,[2] — the *more genuine class* of Jewish Christians, who were at Jerusalem at the breaking out of the Roman war, could have no sympathy with the fanaticism which this war brought along with it; and when reminded of the admonitory, warning and threatening words of Christ, could hardly fail to foresee, in the issue of this war, the divine punishment of their perverse nation which he had predicted. It may have been the case, perhaps, that as the prophetic voice was still occasionally heard in the Christian assemblies, some pious men felt constrained to warn the assembled communities of the approaching destruction, and to call upon them to remove from the midst of the ruined people, and repair to one of the ten cities in Peræa, on the eastern bank of the Jordan, known under the collective name of Decapolis.[3] At a later period this community is said to have returned to Jerusalem. Until the time of the emperor Hadrian, it was wholly composed of Christians of Jewish descent, who were distinguished from pagan Christians by their strict observance of the Mosaic law; though

sage above referred to: *Αἱροῦνται συζῆν τοῖς Χριστιανοῖς καὶ πιστοῖς, μὴ πείθοντες αὐτοὺς μήτε περιτέμνεσθαι ὁμοίως αὐτοῖς, μήτε σαββατίζειν, μήτε ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτά ἐστι τηρεῖν.*

[1] Justin's words: *Ἐὰν δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους τοῦ ὑμετέρου* (the race of the Jews) *πιστεύειν λέγοντες ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν Χριστὸν, ἐκ παντός κατὰ τὸν διὰ Μωσέως διαταχθέντα νόμον ἀναγκάζωσι ζῆν τοὺς ἐξ ἐθνῶν πιστεύοντας ἢ μὴ κοινωνεῖν αὐτοῖς τῆς τοιαύτης συνδιαγωγῆς αἱρῶνται.*

[2] A change very easily accounted for, and one which Justin notices in the passage above referred to: *Τοὺς ὁμολογήσαντας καὶ ἐπιγνόντας τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ ἠτιωμένους αἰτίᾳ μεταβάντας ἐπὶ τὴν ἔννομον πολιτείαν, ἀρνησαμένους ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός.*

[3] Eusebius, l. III. c. 5; *Κατά τινα χρησμὸν τοῖς αὐτόθι δοκίμοις δι' ἀποκαλύψεως ἐκδοθέντα.* In Epiphanius, (de mensur. et pond. c. 15,) an exaggerating tradition has already converted this prophetic utterance into a revelation delivered by an angel. Without doubt, this whole account springs from some earlier source; perhaps a statement of Hegesippus. We have no sufficient reason for calling in question its truth.

we have no reason to infer from this, that there existed among them no other diversities of religious tendency and of religious opinion. Under Hadrian a change was for the first time produced by outward causes, which led to the substitution of another community of an altered shape in place of that original Christian church. That emperor was induced by the insurrection of the Jews under Barcochba, to exclude them entirely from the city of Jerusalem and its circumjacent territory. This prohibition must have extended to all native Jews, who had not, by their whole manner of life, utterly renounced their nation. The community could no longer subsist, then, in its ancient form, in this place. Thus there was formed at first in the pagan colonial city, Ælia Capitolina, which had been founded in the place of the ancient Jerusalem, a church in which no further trace was to be found of the observance of the Mosaic law; in which Christians of pagan descent, and liberal-minded Jewish Christians who did not hesitate to put the pagans on an equal footing with themselves in respect to all matters of outward life, were mingled together. This community had for their presiding elder a Christian of pagan descent, whose name was Marcus.[1] But this change had no influence on the other Jewish Christians; and those who perseveringly distinguished themselves, by a strict observance of the law, from the Christians of pagan origin, and avoided all intercourse with them, would thus naturally become more widely known, as a distinct sect by themselves. If the story, already alluded to, concerning the return of the original community from Pella to Jerusalem, is a correct one, or if a great majority of them, at least, did not remain behind at Pella, the event just mentioned would naturally lead those who held tenaciously to the Mosaic law, to separate themselves from the mixed community and repair once more to Pella, where a strictly Jewish Christian church maintained its existence down to the fifth century. Now it might easily happen that, from a superficial knowledge or consideration of the facts, some might be led to place together in the same class all these Jewish Christians who agreed in observing the Mosaic law, without any regard to the differences existing among them. Accordingly, from the time of Irenæus, who first mentions the name, they all came to be designated by the common appellation of *Ebionites*.

In respect, first, to the origin and the meaning of this appellation, the opinion certainly must be rejected that it is a proper name, derived from the founder of the sect. This hypothesis appears first in the writings of the (inaccurate) Tertullian, who, in his ignorance of the Hebrew, and of the signification of the word in that language, took it for a proper name; and as other sects were named after their founders, supposed the same must be true of this sect also. Epiphanius, who possessed the advantage over Tertullian, it is true, of being acquainted

[1] Eusebius, l. IV. c. 6. See also the remarkable words of Sulpicius Severus, who, after citing the prohibition of the Emperor Hadrian, goes on to say, (hist. sacr. l. II. c. 31:) Quod quidem christianæ fidei proficiebat, quia tum pæne omnes Christum Deum sub legis observatione credebant. Nimirum id, Domino ordinante, dispositum, ut legis servitus a libertate fidei atque ecclesiæ tolleretur; where this writer has perhaps attributed too much importance to the event.

with the Hebrew language, but was however no less inaccurate, followed the same opinion without further inquiry; although he himself proposes another derivation of the word, quite inconsistent with this hypothesis, taken from its etymological Hebrew signification, with which he was doubtless acquainted. Since the character of the party designated by this name was of so general a nature, and the party itself embraced in it so many different shades of the Jewish Christian principle which they held in common; since, as appears from what has been said, such a general ground-tendency as the one denoted by this name could hardly fail, in the historical course of development, to pass over from Judaism into Christianity, — the origin of this party from any single individual should seem to be a thing quite improbable. We might suppose, indeed, that this name was applied first to a distinct sect belonging to this general class, and founded by a man who had some peculiar views of his own; and that, at some later period, it received a more general application. But we have no warrant whatever for any such supposition. No tradition respecting the founder of a sect by the name of Ebion is supported on grounds of authentic history. The more accurately informed authorities, such as Irenæus and Origen, nowhere mention such a person; and all that we find anywhere said respecting the pretended Ebion, is of that vague and indefinite character which sounds suspicious. Origen was the first to give the correct derivation of this name, from the Hebrew word אֶבְיוֹן, *poor*. These Jewish Christians, then, were called the poor; but the question now arises, *in what sense* was this appellation originally applied to them? And with this is connected another, — by whom first was this appellation given them? Upon the resolution of these questions it must depend, whether the appellation is to be understood as a term of reproach or of praise. Now it appears evident, it is true, from an explanation which Epiphanius cites from the mouths of the very people in question,[1] that, in his time, the Ebionites regarded it as an epithet which they had bestowed on themselves. But although the Ebionites did actually appropriate and sanction the name, it might nevertheless be true and wholly consistent with this fact, that the epithet was originally bestowed on them by their adversaries; while they might afterwards apply it to themselves, either in the same or a different sense; since what was considered by their opponents a term of reproach, might be regarded, from their own point of view, as an honorable title.

Origen, who, as we have said, first presented the correct explanation of the word, applies the designation, "poor," to the meagre religious system, the poverty of faith, that characterized this party.[2] In this sense, the term may have been applied to them by pagan Christians; but it cannot be supposed that pagan Christians would have chosen a Hebrew word to express this character. It is far more natural to sup-

[1] Hæres. 30.

[2] Orig. in Matth. T. XVI. c. 12: Τῷ ἐβιωνείῳ καὶ πτωχεύοντι περὶ τὴν εἰς Ἰησοῦν πίστιν. It was hardly Origen's intention in *this* place, to give an etymological explanation; he merely alludes, *after his usual way*, to the meaning of the name. Yet, (c. Cels. l. II. c. 1,) he says expressly: Ἐπώνυμοι τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐκδοχὴν πτωχείας τοῦ νόμου.

pose that the inventors of this name were Jews; and at the particular position of these Jews, it might be used and understood to denote a poor, meagre way of thinking, especially if this notion be defined according to the acute and ingenious suggestion of a distinguished modern inquirer in this department of learning;[1] namely, that in the mouth of those Jews who were expecting a Messiah in *visible glory*, it would designate such as could believe in a *poor*, *abject*, *crucified Messiah*, like Jesus. Yet even this explanation, taken by itself, seems not the most simple and natural; and, indeed, the author of it himself joins it with the other, about to be mentioned. What objection is there to understand this word in the literal and obvious sense, as a designation of the *poorer* class among the people of the nation? We know, in fact, what reproach was cast upon the Christian faith by the hierarchical party among the Jews, because none but those belonging to the ignorant and poorer class of the people would openly profess it, (John 7 : 49;) and the like objection was made to Christianity by the pagans.[2] Thus it may be explained, how the Christians among the Jews came to be designated as the poor; and this name, which was employed by them to designate the Christians generally, would afterwards naturally be employed by the pagan Christians, without any knowledge of the meaning of the name, to designate that portion of believers who were distinguished from the rest by their observance of the Mosaic law. When we observe that the same thing happened in the case of another name which was originally a common appellation for all Christians among the Jews, the name "Nazarenes," it may serve to confirm the above supposition.

When Ebionitism was looked at as it appeared in its extreme form, and as it may have been exhibited among the great mass of believing Jews, it might be said of it, perhaps with justice, as Origen expresses himself,[3] that there was little to distinguish its adherents from the common Jews, who were fettered to the mere letter. We see in them the natural descendants of those fierce antagonists of the Apostle Paul, who never ceased to calumniate him as an apostate from the law.[4] They disseminated false and malicious reports respecting the life of this apostle, in order to attribute his abandonment of Judaism to unworthy motives. Later Ebionites at least do not scruple to assert, that he was a proselyte of heathenish descent.[5] In Christianity, they saw at best but a perfecting of Judaism by the addition of a few isolated precepts; and it was in this sense, probably, they explained to themselves, what is to be rightly understood only in its connection with the whole of

[1] Dr. Gieseler in the Archiv für alte und neue Kirchengeschichte von Stäudlin und Tzschirner, Bd. IV., 2tes Stück, S. 307.

[2] See the first section.

[3] In Matth. T. XI. § 12: Οἱ σωματικοὶ Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ οἱ ὀλίγῳ διαφέροντες αὐτῶν Ἐβιωναῖοι.

[4] Origen, (Hom. XVIII. in Jerem. § 12,) says: Καὶ μέχρι νῦν Ἐβιωναῖοι τύπτουσι τὸν ἀπόστολον Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγοις δυσφήμοις.

[5] Vid. Epiphan. hæres. 30, § 25. Perhaps these Ebionites followed, in this respect also, the example of their predecessors, with whom Paul had to contend; perhaps it is to some such malicious perversion of facts this apostle has reference, when, in speaking of various events in his earlier life, he protests to the truth of what he utters, and when he places so much emphasis on the fact of his Jewish origin, and his education in the Pharisaic schools.

Christianity, the sermon on the Mount. Their views respecting the work and character of Christ, the essence of Christianity, and the person of its author, are closely connected with each other.

In both respects, the Ebionites seem to have remained within the contracted range of the ordinary Jewish point of view. As they could not understand the specific difference between Judaism and Christianity, so neither could they understand what it was, that distinguished the author of Christianity from Moses and the Prophets, and from the founders of other religions. Looking upon him not as the Redeemer of all mankind, by whom every other means of justification and expiation had been rendered null and superfluous, not as the author of a new creation of the divine life, but only as the supreme Law-giver, Teacher and King, they did not feel themselves constrained to admit any higher views of Christ's person. They were precluded, therefore, on this side, from the possibility of understanding his discourses. They held firmly to the chasm, not to be filled up, betwixt God and his creation, which the stern monotheistic system of legal Judaism taught in opposition to the polytheistic and pantheistic principles of nature-religion. To Jesus they simply transferred the notion of the Messiah which most widely prevailed among the Jews, and most perfectly agreed with this common principle of the Jewish system, — that he was a man distinguished above all others for legal piety, — who, for this very reason, was deemed worthy of being chosen as the Messiah, — who knew nothing at all of any special call to the Messiahship, as others, too, were far from divining any such thing of him, until Elias re-appeared, and revealed to him and to others his election to the high office, when he was filled with divine power for the exercise of his mission as the Messiah, and thus enabled to work miracles.[1] What was generally believed of the Elias, these Ebionites transferred to John the Baptist. It was first when Jesus came, with all the others, to John, to receive baptism from him, that the miraculous phenomenon occurred, by which the fact of his election to the Messiahship was revealed, and along with which, the divine power which he required in order to fulfil his mission, descended on him. An abrupt antithesis was thus formed between two portions of the life of Jesus, — the period before and that after his consecration to the Messiahship; so that while the mere human nature, to the entire exclusion of everything supernatural, was placed in the first portion, the sudden entrance of the supernatural and sensuously objective element was made prominent in the event which took place at the very beginning of the second portion. The fact of Christ's supernatural birth was particularly opposed to this view of the matter; and indeed this fact was directly at variance with that Jewish ground of doctrine generally, wearing to the Jews a certain pagan aspect, and being placed by them in the same class with the heathen myths concerning the sons

[1] The Jew Trypho in Justin, — Dial. c. Tryph. f. 291, ed. Colon. — expresses this common Jewish point of view, where he requires of the Christians to prove concerning Jesus: Ὅτι αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς, διὰ τὸ ἐννόμως καὶ τελείως πολιτεύεσθαι αὐτὸν κατηξιῶσθαι τοῦ ἐκλεγῆναι εἰς Χριστόν. Respecting the appearance of Elias, whereby the Messiah was first to be made known as such to himself and t others, see f. 968 compared with 336.

of the gods.[1] Even in the well known passage of the 7th chapter of Isaiah, the Ebionites could not find announced the birth from a virgin. In the Ebionitic revision of the gospel history, which sprang from one of the main branches to be traced back to the Apostle Matthew, the appearance at Christ's baptism is represented as an altogether outward, sensible event, connected with the descent of the Holy Ghost upon Christ; and the appearance is supposed to be designed as well to lead himself to the consciousness of his call to the Messiahship, as to reveal this fact to the Baptist. This phenomenon is decked out with miraculous events; light shone over the place, fire burst forth from the river Jordan.[3] Jerusalem, in the estimation of the Ebionites, was still the city of God, the central point of the Theocracy.[4] They lived in expectation of Christ's speedy return, to restore this city of God, and to re-establish the Theocracy there in surpassing splendor. All the Jewish notions respecting the millenial kingdom of the Messiah they transferred to this event.[5]

We have remarked already, that among the Ebionites, if we consider this name as a general appellation for Jewish Christians, there must have existed different forms and shades of opinion, arising out of the various combination of Jewish and Christian points of view. Irenæus was not aware of the existence of any such differences. But Origen, who was more skilled in the accurate investigation of relationships and differences, and who had himself been a longer time resident in Palestine, distinguishes two classes of Ebionites, a class which denied the supernatural birth of Jesus, and another which admitted it.[6] If we duly consider how obstinately the ordinary Jewish spirit must have struggled against the acknowledgment of such a fact, we must conclude from Origen's statement, that connected with this deviation from the common bent of the Jewish mind, there were also other differences; that those who could be induced to admit the fact above mentioned, must have been more deeply affected by the spirit of the new creation. It seems implied that they did not, like the others, in accordance with the common Jewish views, separate the divine from the human nature

[1] See what the Jew Tryphon, (in Justin M. f. 291,) says against this doctrine: Μὴ τερατολογεῖν τολμᾶτε, ὅπως μήτε ὁμοίως τοῖς Ἕλλησι μωραίνειν ἐλέγχησθε.

[2] The position assumed by the Ebionites led to a dispute about the interpretation of this and several other prophetic passages. Where men were usually satisfied by allegorical interpretation, the Ebionites, following the Jewish doctrines, may have entered more deeply into the use of language, into the connection, and the historical allusions, and may have sought to show how many things which were referred by Christian teachers to the history of Christ, had been already accomplished in the facts and appearances of earlier history. We may hence explain, perhaps, what Irenæus objects to them, (lib. I. c. 26:) Quæ autem sunt prophetica, curiosius (περιεργοτέρως) exponere nituntur.

[3] See the fragment of the gospel of the Hebrews, in Epiphan. Hæres 30, § 13, and Justin. Dial. c. Tryph. f. 315, ed. Colon.

[4] Hierosolymam adorant, quasi domus sit Dei. Iren. l. I. c. 26, § 2.

[5] See, in the Jewish-Christian work, the Testament of the twelve patriarchs, (Testament IV. of Judah, § 23,) the return of the scattered Jews from their captivity; and in Testament VII. of Dan. § 5: "Jerusalem shall then suffer desolation no more, and Israel no more be carried into captivity; for the Lord shall dwell in the midst of Jerusalem, and walk with men."

[6] Orig. c. Cels. l. V. c. 61, where he employs the name Ebionites to designate generally all Jewish Christians observing the Mosaic law: Οἱ διττοὶ Ἐβιωναῖοι, ἤτοι ἐκ παρθένου ὁμολογοῦντες, ὁμοίως ἡμῖν, τὸν Ἰησοῦν, ἢ οὐχ' οὕτω γεγεννῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ὡς τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους.

in Christ, and suppose merely a sudden commencement of the actuating power of the Holy Spirit upon him, but that they conceived of a certain coöperation of the divine and human elements in Christ, whereby he differed in kind from other prophets, — a certain original actuation of the divine Spirit, under whose influences the human nature in Christ began as well as continued to develope itself. Being less fettered in this respect by the Jewish spirit, they may have been so much the more free also in their judgment respecting the continued obligation of the Mosaic law, insomuch as to make a distinction between the position of the native Jews and that of believers from among the Gentiles. Thus we perceive that they must have been the same Jewish Christians, followers of the apostolic principles, whom we saw described by Justin Martyr, as a class of these latter that still remained. To the same class belonged also the people about whom Jerome took pains to obtain more accurate information, during his residence in those countries, near the close of the fourth century. They then dwelt at Berœa, in Syria,[1] and passed by the name of Nazarenes. This name, like that of the Ebionites, was in the first place, perhaps, a common appellation for all Christians among the Jews, so called as sects that sprang out of Nazareth, and still more common than the former one, as appears from Acts 24: 5, and from the fact that in still later times all Christians were condemned under this name in the Jewish synagogues.[2]

The distinctive trait of these Nazarenes was their decided antipharisaic tendency. They denounced the maxims of the scribes and Pharisees, who caused the people to err by their traditions, and who had hindered them from believing in Jesus.[3] In explaining Isaiah 8: 23, (9: 1,) they held, that by the preaching of Christ in Galilee, the Jews had been first delivered from the errors of the Scribes and Pharisees, and from the burthensome yoke of the Jewish traditions; and they interpreted chaper 9: 1, (9: 2,) as referring to the preaching of the gospel, by the Apostle Paul, to all pagan nations.[4] Thus it is clear, that they differed entirely from those Ebionites who were hostile to this apostle; that they acknowledged his call to be an apostle to the Gentiles, and so were not disposed to enforce on these latter the observance of the Mosaic law. Accordingly we find that Jerome actually makes a distinction between the Ebionites and the Ebionitarum socii, who considered all this to be permanently obligatory only on such as had descended from a Jewish stock.[5] They lamented the condition of their unbelieving people, and earnestly longed for the time when these also should turn to believe in the Lord and in his apostles. Then they would put aside all their idols, which had led them into the devious ways of sin. Then every obstacle which Satan had set up to hinder the progress of God's kingdom, would be removed, not by human might, but by the power of God; and all who had been hitherto trust-

[1] Vid. Hieronym. de viris illustrib. c. 3.
[2] Ejusd. commentar. in Isai. l, II. c. 5 to 5, 18.
[3] Vid. Hieronym. commentar. in Isai. l. IX. c. 29, v. 13, ed. Vallarsi. T. IV. p. 398.
[4] See Jerome's remarks on those passages, l. c. p. 130, ed. Vallarsi.
[5] L, c. l. I. c. I, p. 21.

ing to their own wisdom, would become converted to the Lord. They believed that they found this promised in Isaiah 21 : 7, 8.[1]

The view of Christ which, as we were led to suppose, prevailed among those whom Origen refers to the second class of Ebionites, we should, perhaps, be warranted to ascribe also to *these* Nazarenes; for that they did not suppose the divine element in Christ had its first beginning with his inauguration into the Messiahship, seems evident from the fact, that the recension of the Hebrew gospel which Jerome received from them and translated into Latin, did not, like the gospel of the other party, commence with the inauguration of Christ into his office as Messiah, by John the Baptist, but had adopted besides the first chapters, which treat of the birth of Christ.[2] He is described by them as the one towards whom the progressive movement of the Theocracy tended from the beginning; — as the end and aim of all the earlier divine revelations. In him, the Holy Spirit, from whom, down to this time, only isolated revelations and excitations had proceeded, first found an abiding place of rest, a permanent abode. Inasmuch as the Holy Spirit was the productive principle of his entire nature, and it was first from him that the efficiency of the Spirit, in shaping the entire life of humanity and forming other organs of action, could proceed, he is called the First born of the Holy Spirit; — as the Holy Spirit is also denominated his Mother.[3] Where this gospel describes how the whole fountain of the Holy Spirit descended on Christ at his baptism and abode permanently with him, the following words of salutation are ascribed to the former: "My Son, in all the prophets I expected thee, that thou shouldest come, and I might find in thee a place of rest; for thou art my resting place, thou art my first born Son, who reignest forever."[4] Assuredly, in this representation, we perceive a more profound Christian consciousness, rising above the limited views of the common Ebionitism. And the appellation, given to the Holy Spirit, of Mother of Christ, may perhaps, in some way, stand connected with the idea of his supernatural generation.

It appears evident, from what has been said, that although sternly pronounced Ebionitism excluded all speculations concerning the divine

[1] See Jerome's remarks on this passage, l. c. p. 425. In the edition of Martianay, T. III. — the places p. 79, 83, 250 and 261.

[2] As appears evident from Jerome's commentary on the gospel of Matthew, chapter 2d, at the beginning; where by the ipsum hebraicum is doubtless to be understood, according to the connection, the Hebrew gospel of the Nazarenes; — also from the words which he cites from this gospel in his work de viris illustrib. c. 3.

[3] See the passages cited by Jerome, in Micham l. II. c. 7, T. VI. p. 520; and by Origen, T. II. Joh. § 6, in which Christ says: Ἄρτι ἔλαβέ με ἡ μήτηρ μου, τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, ἐν μιᾷ τῶν τριχῶν μου, καὶ ἀπένεγκέ με εἰς τὸ ὄρος τὸ μέγα Θαβώρ; where it may be a question, whether the thought is merely expressed in a poetic form, that Christ repaired thither by the impulse of the Holy Spirit, which animated him in all things, or whether a supernatural conveyance is meant. That the passage is to be understood in the former way, and not literally, appears probable when we compare it with the similar figurative modes of expression in an oriental writer. In Taberistanensis annales regum atque legatorum Dei, Vol. II. Pars I Gryph., 1835, page 103, it is said by those whom God had converted from being enemies of Mahomet into zealous advocates of his cause, (in Kosegarten's Latin translation from the Arabic original:) "Denique Deus cordibus cincinnisque nostris prehensis, per eum in viam rectam ita nos direxit, ut eum sequeremur."

[4] Vid. Hieronym. in Isai. l. IV. c. 11. T IV. p. 156.

nature in Christ, yet still, where it assumed a milder and more liberal form, as it did in the case we have just described, such speculations might perhaps also be united with it. Again, we must not forget, — what we have more carefully considered in the general introduction, — that, at this period, Judaism had become decomposed into manifold and even conflicting elements; — and these had become blended with many tendencies foreign from original Judaism. These, now, might easily be attracted also by Christianity, and might seek to appropriate it to themselves, after their own way. If, at first, Pharisaic views became mixed with the apprehension of Christianity, they were afterwards followed by such as were more nearly related to Essenism, or to the system of the Alexandrian Jews. The Apostle Paul having been suddenly removed from the circle of labors, in which his commanding influence opposed an invincible bulwark to all corruptions of Christian truth, there began to be formed, first in Asia Minor, such mixtures of doctrine, the earliest example of which we find in the church of Colosse, in Phrygia. Similar appearances we recognize once more in a great deal which Epiphanius embraces under the general name of Ebionitism; — appearances which are wholly distinct from the Ebionitism that sprang out of the common Pharisaic elements, and the origin of which would assuredly carry us back to an earlier period than that in which Epiphanius wrote. Among the Ebionites described by Epiphanius, there were those who started from that common Ebionitic view of Jesus as a man, first raised to the dignity of Messiah on account of his legal piety; — but then, whilst others affirmed, that the whole power of the Holy Spirit descended on him at his consecration to the Messiahship by the baptism of John, they substituted, in place of the Holy Spirit, the highest of the spirits created by God, — a spirit exalted above all the angels,[1] — and the latter was then considered the true revealer of God, the Messiah in the highest sense. By means of such a separation of the divine and human natures in Christ, the Ebionitic element might pass over to the Gnostic. Others placed in connection with Christianity, that idea which exhibits itself to us under so many different forms, on which sometimes the Oriental, sometimes the Hellenic stamp predominates, the idea of a heavenly man, Adam Kadmon, the primal man. The Spirit, which is the pure efflux of the divine Spirit, which appeared first in Adam and afterwards returned under manifold shapes, to reveal God to his fallen children, — this same Spirit re-appeared in Christ, to deliver the last revelation to humanity.

We should not be warranted to suppose, in the case of all the tendencies which were designated under the common name of Ebionitism, the same degree of adhesion to the law of Moses. There had, in truth, been evolved among the Jews themselves, out of the opposition to the traditional element of Pharisaism, as we saw in the example of Saddu-

[1] So says Epiphanius: Οὐ φάσκουσιν ἐκ θεοῦ πατὸς αὐτὸν γεγενῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐκτίσθαι, ὡς ἕνα τῶν ἀρχαγγέλων, μείζονα δὲ αὐτῶν ὄντα, αὐτὸν δὲ κυριεύειν τῶν ἀγγέλων καὶ πάντων ὑπὸ τοῦ παντοκράτορος πεποιημένων. So Philo describes the Logos as an ἀρχάγγελος. Cons. the Jewish apocryphal work, Ἰωσὴφ προσευχή: Πρωτόγονος παντὸς ζῶου ζωούμένου ὑπὸ θεοῦ.

ceism, tendencies whose aim was to distinguish the original religion of Moses from later additions. This distinction, however, might assume different forms, as it happened to proceed from different tendencies of mind. An entirely different character from that which it presented among the Sadducees, it must have assumed in those cases where it started from some mystico-ascetic bias, which, alien from the original Hebraism, had formed itself out of that which was the essential element of Judaism as opposed to Pharisaism and Sadduceism, and under the influence of an Oriental spirit. Out of this sprung next the idea of a more spiritual, primitive religion, which had been corrupted at some later period by the importation of foreign elements; and among these corruptions was reckoned everything that was at variance with this mystico-ascetic tendency. There was an Ebionite sect, as we learn from Epiphanius,[1] which, rejecting as well the eating of flesh as the offerings of animals, explained the entire sacrificial worship as a thing foreign from primitive Judaism, and as a corruption. Christianity, contemplated from this point of view, must have been considered as a restoration of the original Judaism. From this sect proceeds a book under the name of Jacob, *ἀναβαθμοὶ Ἰακώβου*, Steps of Jacob, (probably intended to denote the steps of initiation, with reference to the true Gnosis,) in which the patriarch is introduced discoursing against the sacrificial and Temple worship. With this ascetic tendency stood connected the rule which required a total renunciation of earthly goods, complete poverty, as an essential part of religious perfection; — whether such a tendency had already, before the appearance of Christianity, sprung up among the Jews, in opposition to the worldly spirit in Judaism, — just as the societies of spiritual paupers (the apostolici, the pauperes de Lugduno) sprung up, during the middle age, from an opposition of this sort, — or whether this tendency was first called forth by a partial and imperfect apprehension of the Christian principle.[2] The Jewish spirit — although in a way foreign from the original Hebraism — yet nevertheless manifested itself in the whole outward character which it gave to the opposition betwixt the kingdom of the Messiah and the kingdom of Satan, as if the two were outwardly divided in the world, and the *present* earthly world belonged wholly to Satan, whilst the future had been committed to Christ. Hence those who would participate in the future kingdom of the Messiah, must look upon all the goods of this world as alien from them, and renounce every earthly possession. The members of this sect were *willing* to call themselves Ebionites, as the poor in spirit, and they traced back this inherited name to the circumstance, that their fathers, who formed the first church at Jerusalem, renounced all rights of private property, and lived in an unconditional community of goods.[3]

[1] Whether, as Epiphanius alleges, a person otherwise unknown, by the name of Elxai, had so great influence in bringing about this modification of Ebionitism, we must leave undetermined. In the formation of a religious tendency of this kind, very little depends, in any case, on the personality of an individual.

[2] See above, page 276.

[3] This laudatory sense of the epithet אֶבְיוֹן, is referred to also in the words of Testamentum VII. in the Testaments of the twelve patriarchs, (c. 5,) where it is said respecting the form of government in the perfected kingdom of the Messiah: *Ἅγιος Ἰσραὴλ βασιλεύων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἐν ταπεινώσει καὶ ἐν πτωχείᾳ.*

The question, whether this is the correct explanation of the name, depends on another, whether the name was employed originally to designate only a smaller portion of the Ebionites, and afterwards obtained a more general application, or whether that more general application, of which we have spoken, was the earlier one, and this interpretation of it first introduced at the stage of the above described peculiar modification of the Ebionite spirit.

But with this ascetic tendency, however, we see a reaction of the original Hebraism manifesting itself in the fact, that this sect combatted the over-valuation of celibacy; that they were inclined to prefer early marriage, according to the prevalent custom of the Jews, as being a preservative against unchastity. This party must therefore have been polemically opposed to those ascetic tendencies in the Christian church which favored the life of celibacy.[1]

The peculiar Ebionitic tendency here described,[2] appears in a very remarkable apocryphal book, called the Clementines, or the eighteen Homilies,[3] in which, as it is pretended, Clement, descended from a noble family in Rome, and afterwards bishop of the church in that city, gives an account of his conversion and of the discourses and disputes of the Apostle Peter.[4] It is somewhat difficult, indeed, to separate here what belongs to the general tendency of that particular sect of the Ebionites which we last described, and that which must be reckoned to the peculiarities of the author, as they developed themselves amid the conflicting opinions of the second century. At all events, it may be easily seen, how a religious tendency and a work of this description might be called forth in some connection with these conflicting opinions. When the Jews, Judaizing Christians and Christians of pagan descent were standing in stern opposition to each other, when Judaism, attacked in various ways by the Gnostics, was placed in the most unfavorable light, the thought occurred to some individual of this particular Ebionitic tendency, to compose a work that might serve to reconcile those opposite views, — a work of an apologetic and conciliatory tendency, — a noticeable phenomenon in the ferment of that chaotic period, to which a new breath of life, setting everything in motion, had been communicated by Christianity, and in which the most heterogeneous elements could be fused together, what was really profound meeting and mingling with what was altogether fantastic. The fundamental idea of the apologetic and conciliatory aims of this work, is the idea of a simple and original

[1] So we may remark a similar opposition, proceeding from the same spiritual bent, among the Sabaeans, or deciples of John.

[2] Epiphanius speaks of these Ebionites as a party still existing in his own time. It is certain that he had derived the information he gives us concerning them, partly from his own personal intercourse with the sect, and partly from other works of theirs besides the Clementines. The Clementines presuppose the existence of such a sect, — not that the writer of that work should be regarded as the author of such a system.

[3] Ὁμιλίαι.

[4] I cannot deny myself the pleasure of directing the attention of the theological public to a work which we are soon to expect from one of the most distinguished of our young theologians, the candidate Adolph Schliemann of Rostock, — containing a thorough investigation into the origin, the end, the peculiar religious bent of mind, and the composition of this remarkable book; and intended also to embrace a complete critical examination of all that has been said till now on this subject, which of late has been so much discussed.

religion, proceeding from divine revelation, as the common foundation of Judaism and Christianity. The supranaturalist element of Judaism is here presented in peculiar strength. In contemplating so many restless spirits, ever on the search for truth and tortured with doubts,[1] so many conflicting systems of the philosophers, the author is convinced of the necessity of a divine revelation; without which, man is certain of nothing but the most general principles of morality, — the consciousness that, as no one is willing to suffer wrong from others, so no one should do wrong to others.[2] Whoever *seeks* the truth, evinces by this very fact, that he is in need of some higher source, from which to derive the knowledge of it. He needs a criterion to enable him to distinguish the truth; he holds that to be true which flatters his inclinations: — hence so many opposite systems. "He only who is under no necessity of seeking the truth, he who has no doubts, he who knows the truth by means of a higher spirit dwelling within himself, which is superior to all uncertainty and all doubt, obtains the knowledge of the truth, and can reveal it to others." Thus the author arrives at the conception of the true prophet, from whose revelations all religious truth is to be derived.[3] "Looking away from all others, men should entrust themselves to the prophet of truth alone, whom all, however ignorant they may be, can know as a prophet. God, who provides for the necessities of all, has made it easy for all, among both Greeks and barbarians, to recognize the person of such a revealer." "The first prophet was Adam, in whom, if in any one, formed as he was immediately by the creative hand of God, that which is the immediate efflux of the divine Spirit, dwelt." The doctrine of the fall of the first man, is one which the author of the Clementines felt constrained to combat,[4] as blasphemy against God.[5] "On the man created after his own image, God, the alone good, bestowed everything. Full of the divinity of his Creator, and as a true prophet knowing all things, he revealed to his children an eternal law, which has neither been destroyed by wars, nor corrupted by godless power, nor hidden in any particular place, but may be read of all men."[6] In reference to this general revelation of God, it was consistent with the system, in the Clementines to affirm, "that the appearance neither of Jesus, nor of Moses, would have been necessary, if men had been willing, of themselves, to come to the

[1] See Vol. I. p. 8.

[2] Hom. II. c. 6: Ἀληθείας κρατεῖν οὐ δυνατὸς ἔσται, πλὴν πολιτείας μόνης, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνης τῆς διὰ τὸ εὔλογον γνωρισθῆναι δυναμένης, ἥτις ἑκάστῳ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ θέλειν ἀδικεῖσθαι, τοῦ μὴ δεῖν ἄλλον ἀδικεῖν τὴν γνῶσιν παρίστησιν.

[3] Hom. II. c. 9.

[4] Hom. III. c. 20 and 42.

[5] We should have better means of judging in what sort of connection this view stood with earlier Jewish doctrines, if a Jewish work were made known, which has been cited by Eisenmenger. (Theil. I. Kap. 8, S. 336:) זְכוּת אָדָם, the *purity, innocence* of Adam, in which it was likewise asserted, that Adam never sinned.

[6] Hom. VIII. c. 10: Νόμον αἰώνιον ὥρισεν, ὅλοις, (perhaps we should read ὅλως,) μήτε ὑπὸ πολέμων ἐμπρησθῆναι δυνάμενον, μηδ' ὑπὸ ἀσεβοῦς τινὸς ὑπονοθευόμενον, μήτε ἐνὶ τόπῳ ἀποκεκρυμμένον, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἀναγνωσθῆναι δυνάμενον. Without doubt it was the author's design to oppose this original, universal, eternal law, springing from the revelation of God's Spirit in the first man, to the Mosaic law recorded in the letter of scripture, which, as he endeavors to show in this work, must be liable to all those defects from which that higher law was exempt.

knowledge of what is right, (of what they must do, in order to obtain God's favor; for everything depends on works.[1]) "But since this original revelation, which should have been transmitted, by the living word, from generation to generation, was corrupted over and over by impure additions, proceeding from an evil principle, (a notion which in this book stands closely connected with its pervading doctrine, concerning the antithesis of the good and the evil principle in the whole history of the world,) new revelations were requisite to counteract these corruptions, and restore the matter of that original revelation; and it was always that primal Spirit of humanity, the Spirit of God in Adam, which, in manifold forms, and under various *names*, re-appeared;[2] — where we have presented that view of the matter — falling in with the eclectic bent of the period, but in the East ever recurring from the oldest time — which regarded all religions as different forms of the manifestation of one divine principle, or of one fundamental truth. Thus, Moses constitutes one of these forms of manifestation; and the religious law proceeding from him is one of the new revelations, intended to restore the primitive truth. The author of the Clementines joined himself to that party of the Jews who exalted the Pentateuch above all the other books of the Old Testament. The Pentateuch alone passed with him as a book coming from divine revelation; yet he was far from acknowleding it as such in its whole extent. We see in him the first who disputed the genuineness of the Pentateuch, — being in this, as in many other respects, a forerunner of far later appearances; being the first, indeed, who availed himself of many of the arguments, which were afterwards again brought forward, independently of him, by later disputers of the genuineness of this work. He maintained, for instance, that the Mosaic doctrine, which was to be transmitted only by the living word, was re-written many times over; and that, until the Pentateuch reached its latest form, various foreign elements, conflicting with the truth revealed by Moses, were introduced, through the influence of the principle which ever seeks to corrupt the revelation of the godlike. Thus he could explain away as interpolations everything which contradicted his own ascetic tendency, and which was made use of against it by the opponents of Judaism among the pagans and the Gnostics. In those cases where the Jewish theologians of the Alexandrian school sought to relieve a difficulty by explaining that the letter was the mere envelope of an idea allegorically represented, the author of the Clementines would remove such a stone of stumbling entirely away, by the application of his expurgatory criticism. Thus he was forced to do by his chosen position; for he was opposed to all allegorical shifts. He required of the prophet, that he should express everything clearly; without ambiguity; simply and comprehensively. Such, as it appeared to him, was the character of the discourses of Christ,[3] — though for

[1] Hom. VIII. c. 5: Οὔτε γὰρ ἂν Μωϋσέως, οὔτε τῆς τοῦ Ἰησοῦ παρουσίας χρεία ἦν, εἴπερ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν τὸ εὔλογον νοεῖν ἐβούλοντο.

[2] Hom. III. c. 20: Ὃς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αἰῶνος, ἅμα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν μορφὰς ἀλλάσσων, τὸν αἰῶνα τρέχει.

[3] Hom. III. c. 26: Ῥητὰ προφητεύει, σαφῆ λέγει.

the rest, he indulges himself in extremely violent and tortuous interpretations, with a view to favor his own peculiar opinions.

Since the author of the Clementines required of the prophet, that he should announce the truth in calmness of spirit, and in simple, clear, and unambiguous language, with this requisition must correspond also the notion he formed to himself of inspiration, and of the prophet's mental state. He rejected the Platonic notion of an ἐνθουσιασμός corresponding to the μανία, — of an ecstatic state of the prophet, such as occurs in the Jewish theology of the Alexandrian school, and lies at bottom of the legend respecting the origin of the Alexandrian version. In the case of the *true* prophet, he would not allow that there was any such state of ecstasy, in which, borne onward by the might of a higher actuating spirit, the prophet announced greater things than he could himself comprehend. Such a state, he supposed, did not agree with the nature of the divine Spirit, — for this is a Spirit of quiet and of order, — but corresponded to the character of the demoniacal spirit, which is a spirit of confusion. Such states as might occur in pagan divination, and at the pagan oracles, ought not to be transferred to the true prophet. If a person is impelled, sometimes by this and at other times by that spirit, announces sometimes what the divine Spirit, and at other times what his own spirit suggests to him, then the criterion is wanting, by which to separate, in his discourse, the true from the false. The prophet, who appeared for the restoration of the true religion, and from whom men were to learn to distinguish the genuine from the spurious, in the earlier records of religion, would himself make it necessary to repeat the same separation over again. The author of the Clementines had a true perception of the fact, that nothing analogous to the ecstasy is to be observed in the case of Christ; that the whole style in which he expresses himself, testifies of a calm consciousness, always clear as to its own meaning, always self-possessed. But as it was the peculiar bent of *many*, in this period, to be looking for the full and complete everywhere alike, to allow of no gradual transitions and intermediate steps, so the author of the Clementines requires in all manifestations of the prophetic gift, what corresponds to this complete conception of prophecy, as it was fulfilled in Christ; and all else he sets down as belonging to false prophecy. The true prophet must be ever, like Christ, one with himself; must have with him the divine Spirit at all times alike.[1] Now, as he could not apply this notion of prophecy to the prophets of the Old Testament; as he found in them a great deal that was obscure, a great deal expressed respecting the Messiah and his kingdom, which, literally understood, — as everything announced by divine revelation should be understood, — did by no means agree with the appearance and conduct of Jesus as the Messiah; so he looked upon all this as a mark of the spurious prophetic spirit, which was calculated to deceive. And so the Jews did, in fact, suffer themselves to be led astray, by this ambiguous or false matter in the prophets, when they were looking for a worldly Messiah,[2] and a worldly kingdom of

[1] Hom. VIII. c. 11 and 12. [2] L. c. c. 22 and 23.

the Messiah; when they expected in the Messiah, the son of David, not the Son of God,[1] and hence did not acknowledge *Jesus* as the Messiah.

We may well presume that, when men of the peculiar spiritual bent which characterized the Essenes, became possessed of the idea of the Messiah, they would show themselves to be opposed, on this side also, to the common Pharisaic notions, and would shape the idea in accordance with their own mystico-ascetic spirit. Such a peculiar shaping forms the ground-work of the Clementines. That Ebionite idea of spiritual poverty, of which we have spoken above; that striving after emancipation from the world, which was opposed to the secular direction of the religious sentiment among the great body of the Jews, and the traces of which we perceive also in the Clementines as the product of such a shaping of the Ebionite spirit, would lead to a corresponding mode of apprehending the idea of the Messiah and of his kingdom. Opposition to the secular and political element entering into the notion of the Messiah,— to the views of the Chiliasts, would necessarily spring out of it; and so we find the case to be in the Clementines. Now as the author was incapable of understanding the organic historical connection, following the law of constant progress, in the successive steps of revelation,— the gradual emerging of the idea, unfolding itself, under the actuation of God's Holy Spirit, out of its temporal envelope, — as he was incapable of understanding this, he sees of course in everything that borders on that secular form of the idea respecting the Messiah, and on which the false expectation of the Jews had fastened, the pseudo-prophetic element.[2]

From these two opposite shapings of Ebionitism, which may be succinctly denominated the Pharisaic and the Essenian,[3] there would arise, in the next place, two opposite ways of contemplating the gospel history, — of which the one would seek to get rid of all incipient appearances of the supernatural in the history of Christ's childhood, and of everything that would lead to the recognition of a higher nature and dignity there; the other would endeavor to expunge everything which represented him as the son of David, — the *potentiated* David.[4] While

[1] Thus in Hom. XVIII. c. 13, the passage Matth. 11: 27, is explained as spoken in opposition to the Jews, who in the Messiah saw the son of David, and not the son of God.

[2] Hom. III. c. 22, 23, etc., where the contrast between true and false prophets is seized with reference to this point.

[3] By employing which term, however, we would not be understood to maintain, that this particular shaping of Ebionitism proceeded directly from the sect of the Essenes; but we regard Essenism as being only one particular manifestation of a religious bent of mind which extended still farther. See Vol. I. p. 43, f.

[4] The author of the Clementines probably belonged to that class of the Ebionites who acknowledged the supernatural birth of Christ: for in opposing those who acknowledged the prophets of the Old Testament, but did not reckon Adam among the prophets, he says, (Hom. III. c. 20:) "If one cannot discern the holy spirit of the Messiah in the man produced immediately by God's creative hand, (*τῷ ὑπὸ χειρῶν θεοῦ κνοφορηθέντι ἀνθρώπῳ,*) πῶς ἑτέρῳ τινὶ ἐκ μυσαρας σταγόνος γεγενημένῳ διδοὺς ἔχειν, *οὐ τὰ μέγιστα ἀσεβεῖ?*" It seems implied here, that in the last form of manifestation of the Adam-spirit, there must have been something analogous to the immediate exercise of God's creative power, as contradistinguished from ordinary birth, *ἐκ μυσαρᾶς σταγόνος*, (the way in which the false prophets came into existence.) It is true, the question arises then, how he represented to himself the origin of others, whom he regarded no less as forms of manifestation of the primal spirit.

the great mass of worldly minded Jews were unwilling to acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah, because they did not find realized in him every feature of the Messiah's image presented to them in the prophets; while the Christian church teachers, without distinguishing the peculiar positions held by the prophets, in the development of the Theocracy, from the more advanced position of Christianity, contrived by allegorical shifts to introduce the fully developed Christian scheme into the prophets; while the opponents of Judaism among the Gnostics laid hold of the discrepancy between the appearance of Christ and the idea of the Messiah contained in the letter of the prophetic writings, to prove that an absolute opposition existed betwixt Judaism and Christianity; — the author of the Clementines opposed to all this another view of the idea of inspiration and of the prophetic gift, by which, while the divine character of the Mosaic religion was upheld, the writings of the prophets were represented not as constituting any part which belonged to the progressive completion of that religion, but as something wholly alien from it. He may have attached himself to a sect among the Jews which exalted Moses far above the prophets, and which placed the writings of the prophets, to say the least, far below the Pentateuch.[1]

This view of the corruption of the original truth by becoming intermixed with foreign elements in the records of revelation, stands connected with a remarkable idea concerning the process of the development of religious faith, and the law observed by the revelations of God to mankind. That intermixture was designed, for instance, for the special purpose of trying the godlike temper in man. The consciousness of God, love to God, should be so strongly developed in the man of piety, as to reject at once as spurious all those declarations at variance with it, which have become incorporated into the records of religion. The criterion, accordingly, in this case, was in the disposition; — every thing was to depend on the cherishing of a disposition in which genuine faith had become rooted.[2] "The Holy Scriptures do not lead men into error, but only cause the hidden disposition of every one to be made manifest. Thus each man finds a God in the Holy Scriptures such as he would have him to be."[3] In another recension of this work, the Recognitions of Clement, which are known to us only in the shape given to them by the version of Rufinus, this idea is also applied to God's mode of revealing himself in the works of nature and in the entire life of humanity; "that which may create doubt every where ac-

[1] Epiphanius knew of an Ebionite party, who received the Pentateuch alone as the divine book of the Old Testament, yet did not admit the authority even of this in its whole extent, and who acknowledged Christ alone as a true prophet, and represented the prophets of the Old Testament as prophets endowed merely with human insight, *συνέσεως προφήτας, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθείας.* Hæres. 30 c. 15 et 18. A depreciation of the prophets springing out of some such Ebionite principle, we find described also in the words of Methodius, who wrote in the beginning of the 4th century: *Ἐξ ἰδίας κατανήσεως τοὺς προφήτας λελαληκέναι.* In Combefis. bibliothecæ græcor. patr. auctarium novissimum Pars I. f. 113. Paris, 1672.

[2] As to the end which the introduction of those false declarations, (*τῶν βλασφήμων περικοπῶν*) were to subserve, the Homilies say: *Τοῦτο γέγονεν λόγῳ καὶ κρίσει, ὅπως ἐλεγχθῶσιν, τίνες τολμῶσιν τὰ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν γραφέντα φιλικῶς ἔχειν, τίνες τε στοργῇ τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὰ κατ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενα μὴ μόνον ἀπιστεῖν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀκούειν ἀνέχεσθαι.* Hom. II. c. 38.

[3] Hom. XVI. c. 10.

companying that which leads to faith in a divine providence."[1] It is interesting to observe, how the author of the Clementines was led by his peculiar cosmological and theological system to express, for the first time, that great and fruitful idea which the profound Pascal, from an entirely different point of view, has so beautifully unfolded in his apologetic "Thoughts;" — the idea in which various difficulties, standing in the way of religious faith, first meet their solution, and which points to the true connection between believing piety and liberal science.

Strongly prominent as the conception of outward revelation, of the authority of a true prophet, is made in the Clementines, no less carefully notwithstanding is the author of this work on his guard, as is evident from what has been said, against giving a one-sided *outwardness* to the supranaturalist principle. The universal revelation proceeding from Adam becomes, — as we see, — at the same time, an inward one in the conscience. Every new revelation, by which the matter of the first was to be restored to its original purity, is calculated with reference to the inward state of recipiency, the inner consciousness of God and of truth. The good man dares to believe nothing, on whatever authority it may be presented, which stands in contradiction with God (the general idea of God) and with God's creation. The nature related to God is the spot where the inner revelation of God takes place. In the truth, implanted by God in the depths of the human mind, all other truth is contained; — the revelation of the Divine Spirit does but bring this up to consciousness.[2] This revelation of God, coming forth from within, is something higher and more trust-worthy than any revelation by visions and dreams, which, after all, is something without the man, and pre-supposes in him an estrangement from the God, who stands to him in so outward a relation.[3]

According to the doctrine of this work, then, the first father of the human race was moved by the love of his children, scattered throughout the world, to appear once more on the earth in the person of Jesus himself, for the purpose of purifying the original religion from the additions which distorted it. This purpose of his appearance is intimated by him, when he says, Matth. 5: 17, "Think not I am come to destroy the law,[4] but to fulfil." What he has destroyed, then, cannot possibly belong to what he calls the law, to that primitive religion.[5] He appeared particularly for the purpose of extending his blessings to his other children, to the Gentiles, and of delivering to them also that pure, primitive religion, which had been constantly handed down by a consecrated few among the *Jewish people*.[6] Hence the doctrine of Christ is altogether one with the pure and original doctrine of Moses. The Jewish mystic, the Essenian or any person of that class, who embraced Chris-

[1] Nihil omnino est, quod fidem providentiæ faciat, et non habeat e contrario aliud ad infidelitatem paratum. Recognition. l. VIII. c. 53.

[2] Ἐν τῇ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐκ θεοῦ τεθείσῃ σπερματικῶς πᾶσα ἔνεστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια, θεοῦ δὲ χειρὶ σκέπεται καὶ ἀποκαλύπτεται.

[3] Hom. XVII. § 18: Τὰ τῆς ὀργῆς δι' ὁραμάτων καὶ ἐνυπνίων, τὰ δὲ πρὸς φίλον στόμα κατὰ στόμα.

[4] The words "τοὺς προφήτας" are arbitrarily omitted here, because the prophets were not recognized by the author.

[5] Hom. III. § 51.

[6] Τὰ ἀπ' αἰῶνος ἐν κρυπτῷ ἀξίοις παραδιδόμενα κηρύσσων.

tianity, was not obliged to adopt a new doctrine; the doctrine of Christ was for him but a confirmation of this earlier religious belief; he only rejoiced to behold that secret doctrine now made the common property of mankind, — a thing which before seemed to him impracticable. In Jesus he witnessed a new appearance of that Adam, whom he had constantly reverenced as the source of all that is true and godlike in humanity. "None but the father could so love his own children, as Jesus loved men. His greatest sorrow was, that he must be striven against by those in their ignorance, for whom he strove as his children; and yet he loved them that hated him, yet he wept over the disobedient, yet he blessed them that blasphemed him, yet he prayed for his enemies; and these things he not only did *himself*, as a father, but also taught his disciples to pursue the same course of conduct towards men as their brethren."[1]

Hence, then, the conclusion — "that the same primitive religion is to be found in the pure doctrine of Moses, and in Christianity; — he who possesses the former, may dispense with the latter; and he who possesses the latter, with the former: — provided the Jew does not blaspheme *Christ*, whom he knows not, nor the *Christian*, Moses, whom he knows not. But he who is counted worthy of attaining to the knowledge of both, to find in the doctrine announced by both but one and the same truth, is to be esteemed as a man rich in God, — one who has found in the old that which has become new, and in the new, that which is old; — an allusion, doubtless, to the passage in Matth. 13: 52.[2] The Jew and the Christian owe it entirely to the grace of God, that they have been led by these revelations of the primal man, — repeated under different forms, one by Moses, another by Christ, — to the knowledge of the Divine will. After they have obtained this, then, without any help from themselves, that which now does depend on themselves is, to carry out in their conduct all that is prescribed by Moses or by Christ. It is in this way, too, they entitle themselves to a reward."

Now if we must recognize, in the author of the Clementines, after this exposition of his system, the representative of some Jewish principle of doctrine, peculiarly modified by a way of thinking closely allied to Essenism, a principle according to which the *work* of Christ is not prominently set forth as the main point, but Christ is considered simply in the light of a teacher and lawgiver, the revealer of the truth which had been previously taught and transmitted as a secret doctrine; — then it becomes evident in what sort of relation, or rather opposition, he must have stood to the teachings of the Apostle Paul. The Jewish principle, apprehended in this exclusive and one-sided manner, was wont to express a peculiar hostility to this Apostle; we may expect, therefore, to find the same hostile relation existing in the case before us. It is true, Paul is nowhere mentioned by name; but the author may have

[1] Hom. III. § 19.

[2] Hom. VIII. § 7; Πλὴν ἤ τις καταξιωθείη τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους ἐπιγνῶναι, ὡς μιᾶς διδασκαλίας ὑπ' αὐτῶν κεκηρυγμένης, οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἐν θεῷ πλούσιος κατηρίθμηται, τά τε ἀρχαῖα νέα τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τὰ καινὰ παλαιὰ νενοηκώς.

had his reasons for preferring to attack the principles of the Apostle, without introducing his name; and this is the course actually taken in the epistle of Peter to James, prefixed to the Clementines;[1] where, by the unknown enemy, who corrupted the doctrine harmonizing with the Mosaic law, which was preached by Peter, no other person can be understood than Paul.[2] If it was of any consequence to the author of the Clementines to carry out the idea of his work in a consistent manner, without playing his part falsely, he could allow nothing to be seen in the present but the germ of the future; and was obliged to represent *those* tendencies of his own time, which he really meant to combat, as though they had been already attacked in their principle by the Apostle Peter. Accordingly he assails several of the tendencies which first began to appear in the bud during the second century, such as Gnosticism, perhaps also Montanism; but he transfers them all to the contemporary of the Apostle Peter, Simon Magus, who, on account of the opinion entertained of him in the first centuries, was very generally regarded as the representative and forerunner of all the heretical tendencies of later times. As Peter is the representative of the pure doctrine of revelation; so in his view every thing conspired in the person of Simon Magus to denote the blending together of all erroneous tendencies in one image, wherein the analogies to individual appearances in later times cannot be distinguished with certainty. In the sense of the author, the Pauline doctrine concerning the relation of the gospel to the law belonged, without any doubt, among the number of these. And the remark is, in all probability, aimed against the Apostle Paul, when Peter says to Simon Magus, "Why should Christ have remained with his disciples and instructed them an entire year,[3] if one might be formed

[1] This perhaps did not proceed from the same author as the Clementines. So we might conclude from the fact, that he differs from the Clementines in his view of the Old Testament prophets, inasmuch as their divine authority is presupposed, and only the necessity of having a key to the right understanding of them argued from the ambiguity of their language.

[2] It is very evident that Peter alludes to what is related in the epistle of Paul to the Galatians, when he says: "I see already the beginning of the evil; for some of the Gentiles have rejected the doctrines taught by me, which are in harmony with the law, having adopted an anti-legal and fabulous doctrine from the man who is my enemy, (*τοῦ ἐχθροῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀνομόν τινα καὶ φλυαρώδη προσηκάμενοι διδασκαλίαν.*) And this is what some have undertaken to do even during my life-time, wresting my words by various false interpretations, to the subversion of the law, as if I also were really, though I did not openly express it, of the same opinion."

[3] A supposition, of which we find many traces even in writers belonging to the first century, and which might have easily originated in the defective chronological arrangement of events in the gospel history, as we find it the synoptical writers. Had the author known, however, from the gospel of John, that the ministry of Christ lasted *several years*, he assuredly had special good reason for putting down *several* years instead of one. We shall find it probable, therefore, that he made no use of John's gospel. Yet there are to be found in the Clementines declarations of Christ, which bear a close resemblance to the altogether peculiar type of Christ's discourses as exhibited in this gospel, and which appear so nearly the same with particular sayings of Christ, which are nowhere to be met with but in this gospel, that we cannot avoid perceiving them to be essentially identical. We must either suppose, then, that these sayings came to the knowledge of the author through some other collection or narrative drawn from the gospel of John, or that he found in his *εὐαγγέλιον καθ' Ἑβραίους* such words of Christ taken from tradition, which John has communicated in the original connection in which they were spoken. The latter will appear to have been the true state of the case, if we compare the form of these

into a teacher by a vision? If, however, thou hast been made an apostle after having been instructed by him in a momentary appearance, then preach his words, love his apostles, and fight not against me, who have lived in his society." [1] There appears also to be some allusion to the reaction of the Jewish Christian scheme against the Pauline type of doctrine, which took place at the close of the age of St. Paul, when Peter lays it down as a law, that, as the appearance of falsehood must uniformly precede the revelation of the truth, — Simon Magus having preceded Peter, — so the false gospel must first be spread by a teacher of error, (Paul,) and then, after the destruction of the temple, the true gospel must be secretly disseminated, for the rectification of the subsequent heresies, (in accordance with that taste for mystery which characterized a tendency so closely allied to Essenism;)[2] and so likewise at the end of all, the Antichrist would precede the appearance of Christ.

It must have proved difficult, it is true, for that rigid Ebionitism which maintained the perpetual validity of the Mosaic law, when the Christian church had once established itself on an independent footing among the pagans, to make proselytes from among the members of that body; but it seems to follow, notwithstanding, from the words of Justin Martyr, which have been cited above, that such attempts still continued to be made in his time, and not always without success; for he speaks of Pagan Christians, who had been induced to unite the observance of the Mosaic law with the Christian faith.[3]

As it would appear, then, from the exposition which has been given, that there were various grades of difference amongst those who were inclined to the Ebionite way of thinking, so there were also such grades of difference amongst the Pagan Christians in their relation to the Ebionites; from a mild and tolerant, intermediate tendency, to downright opposition. In *these* diversities, too, we meet once more with those various shades which had already begun to appear in the apostolic age. On both sides, error could find some point of union. That tendency which strove to reconcile the differences between Jewish and Pagan Christians, might be led wrong by the habit of surrendering itself too much to the influence of the Jewish spirit; the more repulsive tenden-

sayings, as they occur in the Clementines, with the form in which we find them in the gospel according to John.

[1] Hom. XVII. § 19.

[2] Hom. II. c. 17: Πρῶτον ψευδὲς δεῖ ἐλθεῖν εὐαγγέλιον ὑπο πλάνου τινὸς, καὶ ἔθ' οὕτως, μετὰ καθαίρεσιν τοῦ ἁγίου τόπου, εὐαγγέλιον ἀληθὲς κρύφα διαπεμφθῆναι.

[3] Justin's words are, (l. c. f. 266:) Τοὺς δὲ πειθομένους αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἔννομον πολιτείαν μετὰ τοῦ φυλάσσειν τὴν εἰς τὸν Χριστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ὁμολογίαν καὶ σωθήσεσθαι ἴσως ὑπολαμβάνω. We take it for granted, in the view of the matter which we have given in the text, that the author is here speaking not of Jews but of pagans. On the other hand, the Diaconus C. Semisch in his Monograph on Justin Martyr, (Theil II. S. 236, Anm. 1,) a work distinguished for profound, extensive and candid inquiry, seems to understand the author as alluding in this case also to Jews. But since, in the preceding passage, those Jewish Christians have been described who were for constraining the pagans to observe the Mosaic law, I do not see how we can suppose that Jews are meant again by "those who followed them, and passed over to the observance of the law." The latter must necessarily be a different class from the former, and therefore pagan Christians only can be meant. It is evident, moreover, that Justin does not express himself with the same mildness in speaking of the latter, as in speaking of the former; for with regard to one class he simply testifies his disapprobation, but with regard to the others he says doubtfully, "he believes they would *perhaps* be saved."

cy might in this way be pushed onward to an ultra Paulinism, breaking loose from the connection of all the other types of apostolic doctrine, and gradually passing over into the province of Gnosticism. These more rigid Pagan Christians, who by no means adhered to the genuine principles of St. Paul, we find represented by that class of whom Justin says, that they pronounced the like sentence of condemnation on all who still observed the Mosaic law, even those who were not wishing to obtrude it on the Gentile Christians; maintained that such could not be saved; and renounced all Christian fellowship and all manner of intercourse with them.[1] The *milder* tendency of the Pagan Christian party is presented to us, on the other hand, in the person of Justin Martyr himself. He is ready to extend the right hand of fellowship to those Jewish Christians, who, although they observed the Mosaic law for themselves, yet were not for obliging the Gentiles to do the same. He knew how to overlook the weakness of a subordinate position,[2] which must present itself in the interval between Judaism and Gentilism; to distinguish an inferior and still defective stage of Christian knowledge, from the heretical element. But even on those Jewish Christians who, while they maintained the *absolute* validity of the Mosaic law, yet united with it faith in Christ, he pronounced no anathema, excluding them from salvation, but simply witnessed that he could not agree with them. And, what is still more, even from the less excusable Gentile Christians, who had allowed themselves to be drawn away, by the deceptive representations of Judaizing proselyte makers, to adopt the Mosaic law, even from these he ventures not to exclude all hope of salvation; he says, they may perhaps be saved by their faith in Jesus as their Saviour. He is ever true to the principle of the apostolic church, that faith in Jesus as the Messiah is the sole ground of salvation; and this faith he still acknowledges to exist, even where it is accompanied with all defective Christian knowledge. So mildly did he judge respecting those who were still entangled in that error; although he must have known, without doubt, that they were far removed, not only in their views of the Mosaic law, but also in their opinion concerning the person of Christ, from what he considered to be Christian truth. He speaks expressly, also, of those who recognized Christ barely as a man born of men,[3] and without adding any harsher word, he simply says, he does not agree with them,[4] because he held only to the doctrine of Christ and of the prophets. He was under the necessity of speaking with

[1] Μηδὲ κοινωνεῖν ὁμιλίας ἢ ἑστίας τοῖς τοιούτοις τολμῶντες.

[2] Διὰ τοῦ ἀσθενὲς τῆς γνώμης, as he expresses it.

[3] Ed. Colon. f. 267. It is the Ebionites, without doubt, whom he has particularly in view here; although other Christians of similar views may be meant at the same time, if we may assume that the reading of the manuscript is correct: "Τινὲς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου γένους." Yet taking into consideration, that the phrase "ὑμέτερον γένος" is a designation of the Jews, and that it was observed just before, that the doctrine of a preëxisting divine nature of the Messiah was one peculiarly foreign to *those of their race*, viz. the *Jewish*, we might be led to conjecture, that Justin expressed himself thus: "Hence there are many of your race, (of Jewish descent,) who do indeed acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah, but hold him to be a mere man." We do not venture, however, to pronounce the reading "ὑμετέρου" to be the one necessarily required by the context.

[4] Οἷς οὐ συντίθεμαι.

more sharpness against the Gnostics, since by these, as will hereafter be shown, the fundamental doctrine itself of the historical Christ was attacked.

This mild tone of judgment with regard to the Ebionites by no means warrants us, then, to suppose that Justin himself was inclined to Ebionitism.[1] The very manner in which he expresses himself with regard to the Judaizing Christians, as parties with whom he had no sympathy, is sufficient evidence to the contrary, — as well as the Pauline element of his Theology,[2] respecting which there can be no mistake. Indeed, how could that man be possibly inclined to Ebionitism, who could assert that Christians of a more genuine stamp sprang from the midst of the pagans, than from the midst of the Jews,[3] — who gave it to be understood that the genuine and full understanding of Christianity must first proceed from the pagans.

Such mildness in passing judgment on the different stages of development in Christianity did not, indeed, last for any length of time. It is only among the Alexandrian church teachers that the traces of such mildness once more make their appearance; and indeed this was a peculiarity which stood connected with their whole tendency of mind, hereafter to be described. Thus Origen[4] again recognizes in these Ebionites weak brethren, whom Christ notwithstanding did not reject; for he was even to them the Messiah, from whom they expected all their help, although they acknowledged in him only the Son of David, not the Son of God. In his fine allegorical exposition of the story of Bartimeus, Mark 10: 46, he represents the blind man who accosted Jesus as the Ebionite, and the many who bid him to be silent, as the *believers* from among the heathen, who for the most part have higher views of the person of Jesus. "But," he continues, "although the many bid him be silent, he cries still the more, since he believes on Jesus, although he believes on him rather after the human manner,[5] and says, Son of David, have mercy on me." [6]

From Ebionitism, however, we must distinguish[7] certain elements, possessing some affinity with Ebionitism, but involving a grossly material view of Christianity, since they adhered to the sensuous envelope of the letter, and failed of penetrating to its spirit; that materialist element of the religious spirit, in affinity with the Jewish position, which betrayed itself, for example, in the anthropo-morphism and anthropo-pa-

[1] As is maintained by many in modern times. For the history and also a thorough refutation of this opinion, consult the above cited work of Semisch, (Th. II. p. 233.)

[2] That he never quotes St. Paul by name, can be no evidence to the contrary; although we should not be inclined, with Semisch, to account for this silence on the ground that the Dialogue cum Tryphone was written expressly with reference to the Jews. We find elements derived from the apostle John also in the same work, although John is nowhere named; and in general, with the exception of the scriptures of the Old Testament, no writing is cited by name but the *Commentaries* of the Apostles.

[3] See above, Vol. I. p. 63.

[4] Matth. T. XVI. c. 12.

[5] Πιστεύων μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰησοῦν, ἀνθρωπικώτερον δὲ πιστεύων.

[6] Οἵτινες παρ' ὀλίγους ἅπαντες πεπιστεύκασιν αὐτὸν ἐκ παρθένου γεγενῆσθαι.

This theory, in the germ, is to be found in Clement of Alexandria: Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ υἱὲ Δαβὶδ ἐλέησόν με ἔλεγον, ὀλίγοι δὲ υἱὸν ἐγίγνωσκον τοῦ θεοῦ. Strom. l. VI. ĭ. 680.

[7] The neglect of this distinction, and the too indiscriminate application of the term Ebionitism, have, in recent times, given occasion to many arbitrary historical combinations and hypotheses.

thism of the doctrine concerning God; in the low, worldly views of the kingdom to be founded by Christ on earth; in Chiliasm. A tendency of this kind might easily take its rise also in paganism, since it found a ready point of union in the sensuous element of spiritual culture generally; and this would, of itself, stand forth prominently as the first stage of evolution, until the influence of Christianity, like the leaven, had more fully penetrated the entire mode of thinking. Although we find among Jewish tendencies the first traces of an intermixture of the theocratic principles of the Old and New Testaments, and hence the transference of the Old Testament priesthood into the Christian church,[1] yet it by no means follows, that this corruption of the great Christian principle, concerning which we have spoken in the history of the church constitution, is to be traced ultimately and every where to such a source. We see the opposite case to this in the Roman church, where the development of the Christian life, which proceeded in the first place from a Pauline, Gentile Christian principle,[2] could afterwards, through that outward and formal notion of the church which found its point of attachment in the political element of the Roman spirit, make open room for the reaction of the Jewish element that had been vanquished by Paul.

This new intermixture of Jewish and Christian principles contributed to call forth the reaction of that opposite tendency of mind, already described as to its great features in the introductory remarks to the present section, — we mean the Gnostic tendency, — which at length must bring about a total separation of Christianity from its organic connection with Judaism. But Gnosticism is one link of a greater series of phenomena peculiar to this period, originating in the vast interchange among nations which this age witnessed, the contact of the East with the West, and the intermingling of the Eastern and Western spirit, — such a series of events as occurs in history only at rare intervals.

We see how Christianity announces itself to the East and the West as a new power in the history of the world; how oriental and occidental minds are attracted by it, and peculiar combinations of both are formed under the influence of Christianity; a proof of the great energy with which it begins to operate on the spiritual life of the Eastern and Western nations. A transient, though stupendous phenomenon indeed, but premonitory of the enduring influence which Christianity was to produce in more distant future times. This series of phenomena we now propose more distinctly to consider.

Sects which originated in the blending of Christianity with ancient Oriental Views.

The list of these commences with the great family of the Gnostic sects, in which this intermingling of the old oriental spirit with Christianity made its earliest appearance. We shall speak first therefore of the

[1] On this ground, we find asserted already, (in Testament. IV. of Judas, c. 21,) Hildebrand's principle of the subordination of the kingdom to the priesthood: Ὡς ὑπερέχει οὐρανὸς τῆς γῆς, οὕτως ὑπερέχει θεοῦ ἱερατεία τῆς ἐπὶ γῆς βασιλείας.

[2] See the evidence in favor of this origin of the Roman church, in my Apostol. Zeitalter, Bd. I. S. 384 ff. We shall return to the subject once more in another connection.

Gnostic Sects.

General Remarks on the Origin and Character of these Sects, on their Common Characteristics and the Specific Differences constituting the Grounds of their Subdivision.

To appreciate rightly the historical importance of this great phenomenon, we must contemplate it from several different points of view. We perceive in it, in the first place, the reaction of the aristocratic spirit, ruling supreme in the life and making itself felt in the religion and philosophy of the old world, against the Christian principle by which it was overthrown, against the recognition of one religious faith whereby all the distinctions hitherto subsisting among men in relation to the higher life were to be abolished, and all united together in one higher fellowship of life. As the aristocracy of knowledge and culture had at first spurned this faith with contempt, and set itself in hostile opposition to it, so afterwards, when Christianity had found its way among the educated men and seekers after wisdom, the same principle was attracted itself on many sides by Christianity, and sought to incorporate itself with it. To such a tendency the very name employed to designate this phenomenon, the Gnosis, refers, which denotes the religion of knowledge and of one who knows, as opposed to the faith of the multitude (*πίστις τῶν πολλῶν.*) We have seen[1] how already among the Alexandrian Jews such a philosophic system of religion had been formed under the influence of Platonism, which would exalt itself above, or set itself up in opposition to, the common religious faith. Such a tendency now found its way into Christianity. But in the present case, Orientalism was added to Hellenism, — the Oriental *Theosophy* to the Platonic *philosophy*. As on the practical side, in church life, the old distinction between priesthood and laity had insinuated itself into the development of Christianity, so here we perceive a similar reaction of the ante-christian principle on the theoretic side. As we find there the antithesis between priesthood and laity, so here we find the antithesis between knowers and believers, — a hierarchy of another kind. Beside that practical distinction between the spiritual and the secular class, the other distinction established itself, which had grown up in the theoretical domain, — the distinction between the privileged natures, the men of intellect, whose vocation it was to know, the *πνευματικοί*, and the rude mass of the *ψυχικοί*, who could not rise above blind and implicit faith. We may observe uniformly, that all reactions against the Christian principle are first called forth by occasion of some defective or discolored view of that principle, and are directed against this: and we cannot fail to see, that it was so in the present instance. If greater prominence had been given in the church to the genuine Pauline conception of faith, this reaction, originating in an over valuation of knowledge, (that which Paul himself designated by the phrase *σοφίαν ζητεῖν,*) might have arisen indeed; yet the elevation of mind which is grounded in

[1] See the account of the Alexandrian theology in the general Introduction.

the essence of faith as thus understood, would not have been so easily overlooked. But this conception had now become generally very much obscured; and instead of it there was to be found only the notion of faith, in the sense of trust on outward authority, which by itself alone could not obtain the reward of eternal life, but must have added to it besides, good works actuated by love. Such a faith might with good reason be characterized as a subordinate position of the Christian life, something which was more truly Jewish than Christian; and this furnished Gnosticism with a plausible reason for its depreciation of faith.[1] Again, it cannot be denied that faith, taken according to that outward view of it, often placed itself in direct opposition to the striving after knowledge; holding fast on every thing as *positive*, as given from *without*, as an aggregate of separate, positive doctrines and precepts. But in Christianity, while faith was the starting point, inasmuch as it is the principle of completion for all that is purely human; so the craving after knowledge in religion was, without overstepping the limits of a strict conformity to nature, also to find its satisfaction. It was necessary, when Christianity entered into the spiritual life, that out of it should grow the craving to arrive at some clear consciousness of the connection between the truths communicated by revelation and the already existing mental possessions of mankind, — as also of the internal harmony existing within the sphere of Christian truth itself as an organic whole. But wherever such a craving, instead of being met and satisfied, must be violently suppressed, the one-sided tendency of the Gnosis found in this some ground of justification. An exclusively theoretical tendency opposed itself to an exclusively practical one, and the deficiency of the latter tended to introduce the former.[2]

The nature of Gnosticism, as a reaction of the antique principle in religion against the Christian, stands closely connected with another point. The opposition both between an esoteric sacerdotal doctrine and an exoteric religion of the people, and between a philosophic relig-

[1] The late Dr. Möhler made Gnosticism a precursor of Protestantism, and in endeavoring to carry out his position, made use of many arguments partially grounded in truth. Among these half truths belongs the following: that Gnosticism, so far as its polemical attitude to the dominant church is concerned, did undoubtedly agree with Protestantism. But there was this difference; that the opposition in the two tendencies sprang out of an altogether different positive principle. In Gnosticism it originated in a purely theoretical principle, a conception of the Gnosis which was foreign from the ground-position of Christianity; — in Protestantism, on the other hand, it sprang out of the Pauline conception of faith, once more restored and reinstated in its rights. Marcion alone constitutes an exception, and he may with *more propriety* be styled a precursor of Protestantism. Thus at the basis of this whole theory of Möhler lies the truth, that Gnosticism, in so far as it was a reaction against the Jewish element that had become mixed in with Christianity, was a precursor of Protestantism; to which, however, it must be added, that as this reaction in Gnosticism proceeded from a different principle, so it was carried to an extreme which led to error of another kind. Marcion constitutes an exception in the first respect, not in the last. But as a Jewish element mixed in with Christianity is perceived in Catholicism, when considered from the Protestant point of view, so on the other hand, Gnostic elements might be naturally expected to manifest themselves in Protestantism, as viewed from the Catholic position.

[2] Thus Origen told his friend Ambrosius he had been conducted to a false Gnosis: Ἀπορίᾳ τῶν πρεσβευόντων τὰ κρείττονα, μὴ φέρων τὴν ἄλογον καὶ ἰδιωτικὴν πίστιν. Orig. T. V. in Joann. § 4. T. I. p. 172, ed Lommatzsch.

ion and a mythical, popular faith, has its necessary ground in the fact, that antiquity was destitute of any independent means, adapted alike to all the stages of human culture, for satisfying the religious want. Such a means was supplied for all in the faith in great historical facts, on which the religious consciousness of all men alike was to depend. The emancipation of religion, as well from all dependence on the elements of the world, of which emancipation we have spoken in the history of worship, as from dependence on the wisdom of the world, which knew not God *in his wisdom*, was thereby secured. Now, as in the history of worship we observed a reaction of the earlier principle, which would force back religion once more under the yoke of the elements of the world; so in the Gnosis we observe a reaction of this kind, whereby religion was to forfeit on another side the freedom achieved for it by Christ, and to be made again dependent on human speculation. Christianity gave a simple, universally comprehensible word for the solution of all the enigmas which had occupied all thinking minds; — a practical answer to all the questions, with the answering of which speculation had busied itself in vain. It disposed the heart to a tone of feeling, by virtue of which, doubts which could not be resolved or got rid of by the efforts of speculative reason, were to be practically vanquished. But Gnosticism would make the system of religion depend once more on a speculative solution of all these questions; would in this manner first lay for it a firm foundation and provide for the correct understanding of it, so that men were in this way first to learn to comprehend Christianity, first to attain that true firmness of conviction, which no longer depended on any external fact.

Now, with regard to the speculative element in these systems, we may remark that it is not the product of reason divorced from history, and resolving to draw the whole out of its own depths. As we noticed in the general Introduction, men had turned back again from the rationalist principle, with which the bloom and vigor of the ancient history ended, into which Greek and Roman culture finally resolved itself, and had begun to search after the vestiges of the revelation of divine things *in history*. The empty void into which a mere negative philosophy merges, had taught the human spirit, craving after the real by virtue of an instinctive necessity, to seek again after a more positive philosophy. We have seen how, in this way, the efforts of a revived Platonism to explore and compare together the *theologumena* of ancient peoples, had arisen. The example of a Plutarch has shown us how this tendency, proceeding out of Platonism itself, led to the fountains of the ancient East. Platonism aimed to *incorporate itself*, it is true, with every thing else; as this indeed resulted from the peculiar character of the Grecian mind; but itself procured an entrance thereby for the Oriental spirit, and the latter now revolted against all dominion of the Grecian spirit. It was for subjecting the Grecian element to its own sway, and in its lofty flights soared far beyond the limits within which the Platonic philosophy had caused reason, confined wholly within itself, to remain contented. The profound Plotinus felt himself called upon afterwards to restore the original Platonism, as *he* believed it

should be systematically understood, to its purity and independence. He must seek to release the Grecian spirit from the dominion of the Oriental; must stand forth as the defender of the old Hellenic philosophy against the haughtiness and pride of the Oriental spirit, as he saw it exhibited in the Gnostics.[1]

Accordingly we may trace, in the Gnostic systems, different elements, although not blended together after the same manner in all, — elements of Platonic philosophy, of Jewish theology, and of old Oriental theosophy; and a more enlarged acquaintance with the different religious systems of interior Asia might perhaps furnish many new particulars, throwing light on the connection of these systems; but at the same time, great caution should doubtless be employed, lest, from an agreement which might spring from an inner ground, from the same essential tendencies of human nature, which result in like phenomena under like circumstances, the conclusion should be directly drawn that there had been some inter-communication from without. This Gnosis arrayed itself against Judaism, as a religion too material, too earthly, too confined, too little theosophic; — for how devoid of spirituality, how bald, how diminutive and empty must Judaism have appeared indeed, to men of this intellectual bent, compared with the old, colossal religious systems of Asia; although, to him who understands the great purpose which religion is designed to answer in behalf of mankind, this same comparison which led *them* to despise Judaism, first discloses its full worth in relation to the religious development of humanity. Those ancient religions seemed, in their enigmatical shapes, where man is inclined to look for lofty wisdom much more than in what is simple, to promise them far greater insight into *the questions* which excited their inquiries.

Among the old Oriental systems of religion, Parsism, or the doctrines of Zoroaster, had particularly, by means of the intercourse of nations through many ages, and the power of the Dualistic element, which found a point of sympathy and union in the prevailing tone of the minds of this period, acquired great credit and influence, — of which the Gnostic systems are themselves an evidence. Yet this doctrine appears here not to have been seized in a way suited to the original spirit of Parsism; for this was a practical spirit. According to Parsism, the creation of the good principle uniformly comes first; powers of the kingdom of light are everywhere at work in the world; — Ahriman is but the disturbing and destructive principle. While the votary of this system exercises an active and formative influence on nature, governs and directs its wild energies and sets limits to destruction, he acts as a warrior in the service of Ormuzd for the overthrow of Ahriman. But in the Gnostic systems, though not in all alike, this practical element, this love of nature, retreats farther into the background. Another spirit has here pervaded and remodeled this scheme. The power of the ungodly principle in the world appears greater; and hence arises the tendency to represent the spirit in affinity with God as

[1] See Ennead. II. l. IX.

abstaining from nature, which is alien from it, rather than as exerting upon it a shaping and formative influence. We recognize in the Gnostic systems, considered on this side, rather the spirit of Brahmanism, and especially of Buddhism, — that longing of the soul for release from the bonds of matter, (the world of Sansara,) of nature; — for reunion with the primal spirit, from whom all life has flowed; that striving after entire estrangement from human passions, and from all sublunary things, which strove to pass beyond the limits of finite existence. Though there is no need of looking after causes in the shape of external influences, to account for such a direction of minds, which might easily take this peculiar tone from inward causes, without any impulse whatever from without; and although even such external influences themselves could not well be comprehended in their significancy, without that point of union in the inner development of the spiritual world, which has just been referred to, yet we have reason, notwithstanding, to suppose an influence also of tendencies and ideas originating in those remote countries of the East. New investigations and discoveries have pointed out the way through which Buddhism might spread its influence, even to districts within the compass of the Roman empire.

Although the Gnostic systems contain elements which had been derived from various ancient systems of religion, yet they will never admit of being explained as resulting simply from the mixture or combination of such elements; — it is *a living principle peculiar to themselves*, which animates most of these combinations. In the first place, the age in which they were produced, stamped them with an altogether peculiar character; for we may often observe that, in times of great excitement, certain tendencies are imparted to a whole series of intellectual phenomena resulting from such times, even where they stand in no outward contact or connection with one another. There are certain tendencies and ideas which exercise a wonderful power over everything belonging to such periods. At the present time, it was the power of the Dualistic principle, which harmonized with the prevailing temper of the age, and in which the latter saw itself reflected.[1] The ground-tone in many of the more serious minds of this period, was a consciousness of the power of evil, a feeling of dissatisfaction with the existing state of things, aspiration after something beyond the limits of this earth, the felt necessity of some new and higher order of things. This fundamental tone also pervades the Gnostic systems; but upon this feeling Christianity exerted an altogether peculiar influence, without which the greater part of the Gnostic systems would have come to an entirely different result. It was the idea constituting the peculiar essence of Christianity, the idea of *redemption*, which modified this fundamental tone of those systems; although they were capable of seizing this idea only on a single side, and not in its whole compass and with all the consequences resulting from it. When, in the Gnostic sys-

[1] Just as the progressive movement in our own time enables us to explain the power which the Pantheistic principle has acquired, so the progressive movement in the period of which we are speaking, explains the power of the Dualistic principle.

tems, the amazing impression is described, which the appearance of Christ produced in the kingdom of the Demiurge, as revealing a new and mighty principle which had entered the precincts of this lower world, this was but a reflex image of the powerful impression which the contemplation of the life of Christ, and of his deeply working influence on humanity, had left on the minds of the founders of these systems. It is evident how all earlier institutions seemed to them, in comparison with Christianity, as nothing; how the latter appeared to them as the commencement of a *great* revolution in the life of the race. The ideas of the restoration of a disturbed harmony of the universe; of the conducting of a fallen creation back to its original source; of the reunion of the earth with heaven; of the revelation of a higher, godlike life in humanity, a life transcending the limits of mere human nature; of a new process of development which had entered into the whole earthly system of the world,— these and such were the ideas which, from this time onward, formed the central point of these systems. The peculiar and distinguishing aim of these Gnostics is, to grasp the appearance of Christ, and the creation proceeding from him, in their connection with the whole evolution of the universe. In that *theogonic* and *cosmogonic* process of theirs, in which they go back to the original ground of all existence, everything is referred backwards and forwards to the fact of Christ's appearance. What the Apostle Paul says respecting the connection of the redemption with the creation, they made the central point of a speculative system, and endeavored to understand speculatively.

As it respects the particular class to which their speculations belong, these Gnostics are *Oriental Theosophists;* — men with whom, for the most part at least, the Oriental element had far the preponderance over the Grecian. They differed radically from the thinkers of the West. They moved rather amidst *intuitions* and *symbols* than *conceptions.* Where the Western thinker would have framed to himself an abstract conception, there stood before the soul of the Gnostic a *living appearance, a living personality in vivid intuition.* The conception seemed to him to be a thing without life. In the eye of the Gnostic everything became hypostatized, which to the Western thinker existed only as a conception. The image, and what the image represented, were, in the Gnostic's mode of representation, often confounded together; so that the one could not be divided from the other. Hurried along, in spite of himself, from intuition to intuition, from image to image, by the ideas floating before or filling his mind, he was in no condition to evolve these ideas and place them in the clear light of consciousness. But if we take pains to sift out the fundamental thoughts lying undeveloped in their symbols, and to unfold them clearly to our consciousness, we shall see, gleaming through the surface, many ideas, which, though not understood by their contemporaries, were destined, in far later ages, to be seized upon once more, and to be more fully carried out by a science regenerated through the influence of faith.[1] Intuition,

[1] We mean, e. g., the ideas lying at the root of the systems of those Gnostics who attached themselves to Judaism, respecting the connection of the Old with the New

anticipating the lapse of ages, here grasped in an immediate way, what the process of logical analysis was to master only after long and various wanderings beyond and short of the truth.

The questions about which they especially busied themselves were these: how to explain the transition from the infinite to the finite? — how to conceive the beginning of the creation? — how to conceive of God as the author of a material world, so alien from his own essence? — whence, if God is perfect, the imperfections of this world? — whence the destructive powers in nature? — whence is moral evil, if a Holy God is man's creator? — whence the great diversity of natures existing among men themselves, varying from minds which may properly be called godlike, to those which appear to be utterly abandoned to blind passions and without the vestige of a rational and moral nature?

Here Christianity separated entirely what belongs to the province of religion, from what belongs to speculation and to a merely speculative interest. And just by so doing, Christianity preserved religion from the danger of confounding things divine with the things of this world, — the intuition of God with that of nature. It directed the eye of the mind beyond that whole series of the phenomena of the world, where, in the chain of causes and effects, one thing ever evolves itself out of another, to that almighty creative Word of God, by which the worlds were framed; so that things which are seen were *not* made of things which do appear. Hebr. 11 : 3. The creation was here apprehended, as an incomprehensible fact, by the upward gaze of faith, which rose above the position of the understanding, the faculty which would derive all things from one another, which would explain everything, and hence denies all immediate truth. This one practically important truth, the church was for holding fast in the doctrine of the creation from nothing; — taking her stand in opposition to the *ancient view*, which would condition God's act of creation by a previously existing matter; and which, in an anthropopathic manner, conceived of Him, not as the free, self-sufficient Author of all existence, but as the fashioner of a material already extant. The *Gnosis* would not acknowledge any such limits to speculation. It would explain — clear up to the mental vision — how God is the source and ground of all existence. It was thus obliged to place in the essence of God himself a process of development, through which God is the ground and source of all existence. From overlooking the *negative* sense of the doctrine concerning the creation from nothing, it was led to oppose against it the old principle, "Nothing can come out of nothing." It substituted in place of this doctrine, the intuitive idea of an eflux of all existence out of the supreme being of the Deity. This idea of an emanation admits of being presented under a great variety of images; under the symbol of an evolution of numbers out of an original unity; of an eradiation of light from an original light; of a development of spiritual powers or ideas, acquiring self-subsistence;

Testament; respecting the relation of the prophetic element in the Old Testament to Christianity; respecting inspiration, and the organic connection in history generally.

of an expression in a series of syllables and tones, dying away gradually to an echo.

The idea of such an emanation answers to an obscure presentiment, — deeply seated in the human soul, — of the *positive* element lying at the root of the *negative* definition of the creation from nothing; and in this presentiment it found a foot-hold; but at the same time it gave occasion for a host of speculations, by which men would easily be led further astray from, and in effect, would entirely lose sight of, the practically important ends of religious faith.

According to this view, God was represented as the self-included, incomprehensible and original source of all perfection.[1] From this incomprehensible essence of God to finite things, it is impossible to conceive of an immediate transition. *Self-limitation* is the starting point, whence a communication of life on the part of God — the first passing into manifestation of the hidden Deity — begins; and from this proceeds all further self-developing manifestation of the divine essence.[2] Now, from this first link in the chain of life are, in the first place, evolved the manifold powers or attributes, dwelling in the divine essence, which, until that first self-affirmation, were all hidden in the abyss of that essence; each of which attributes presents, on one particular side, the whole divine essence, and *to* each of which, in this view, are applied the appropriate titles of God.[3] These divine powers, evolving themselves to self-subsistent being, are hence the germs and principles of all further evolution of life. The life contained in them developes and individualizes itself more and more; and in such a way, that the successive grades of this evolution of life are ever sinking lower, the spirits ever becoming feebler, the further they are removed from the first link in the series. Here, we must admit, the Gnosis, in attempting to explain the incomprehensible, falls continually into anthropopathism, and, without being aware of it, transfers to the eternal the relations of time.

But supposing the origin of a purely spiritual world in affinity with God might thus admit of being explained, that the evolution of different grades of perfection in the spiritual world might thus be made clear to the imagination; — yet how explain, by an emanation from God, the starting into existence of the *sensible world;* how account for the origin of evil? Even with regard to this last mentioned problem, the rock on which speculation has so often split, injuring in no slight measure the attribute of God's holiness and the freedom of rational, accountable beings, the Gnosis was for giving speculation an unbounded range. If God has bestowed on man a free will, and if this free will is

[1] The Unfathomable Abyss, (*βύθος,*) according to Valentine, exalted above all possibility of designation, — of whom, properly speaking, nothing can be predicated; — the *ἀκατονόμαστος* of Basilides, the *ὄν* of Philo.

[2] A *πρώτη κατάληψις ἑαυτοῦ*, the *πρῶτον καταληπτὸν τοῦ θεοῦ*, hypostatically represented in a *νοῦς* or *λόγος*.

[3] Hence the different meanings given by the Gnostics to the word *αἰών*, which, besides its primitive signification, *eternity*, is used by them to denote sometimes the *Eternal*, as a distinguishing attribute of the Supreme Essence, sometimes those original divine powers above described, sometimes the whole emanation-world = *πλήρωμα*, as contradistinguished from the *temporal* world. In the last mentioned sense it is employed by Heracleon. Orig. T. XIII. in Joann. c. 11.

the cause of evil,—said the Gnostics,—its cause reverts back *to God himself*. They would not allow of any distinction between permission and causality on the part of God.[1] We see, in fact, how it is, that if speculation is not content to acknowledge evil as a fact, as the act of the creaturely will forsaking its natural dependence on God, and to be explained from no other cause or quarter; if speculation must *explain* evil or its origin; then it must be driven either to violate God's holiness and deprive the opposition between good and evil of its objective significancy, thus undermining the ideas of moral good and evil as to their essence, by tracing back the causality of the latter to God, which doctrine does indeed lie involved in Pantheism; — or else it will limit God's almighty power, by supposing an absolute evil, an independent ground of it beyond the divine control; which is done by Dualism. Yet Dualism is driven, notwithstanding, to the very thing which it chiefly labors to avoid. The idea of evil, which it would firmly maintain, it must really sap at the root, inasmuch as it imputes it to an outward cause, and makes of it a self-subsistent nature, working with necessity; and thus it must, at the same time, involve itself in the contradiction of supposing an independent existence out of God; therefore, since absolute independence (aseity) can be predicated only of God, a God who is not *God*, not *good*. In avoiding the first of these rocks, the Gnostics foundered on the last.

They deemed it necessary to unite with the doctrine of emanation that of Dualism, and sought to explain by the commixture of two hostile kingdoms, by the products of two opposite principles, the origin of a world not answering to the divine idea, with all the defects cleaving to it, all the evils it contains. And this hypothesis opened a wide field for their speculations and their fanciful images. At this point were evolved two different modes of contemplation, which still, however, in these times of religious and philosophical eclecticism, do not stand so directly opposed to each other, but often come in contact and commingle at various intermediate points; — and in the end they are found to be based on the same fundamental idea, though conceived on the one side under a more speculative, on the other, under a more mythical form. In one of these general schemes, the element of Grecian speculation, in the other that of Oriental intuition, chiefly predominates; and hence these different modes give rise to the distinction of an *Alexandrian* and of a *Syrian* Gnosis (which latter was particularly modified by the influence of Parsism),—in so far as these two forms of Gnosis may be opposed to each other in abstracto, without any reference to the cases where, in the varied phenomena of these times, they are found to intermingle. *In the former, the Platonic notion of the ὕλη predominates.* This is the dead, the unsubstantial,—the boundary that limits from without the evolution of life, in that step-wise progression whereby the perfect is ever evolving itself into the less perfect. This ὕλη, again, is represented under various images,—as the darkness that exists along with the light; as the void (κένωμα, κενόν) in opposition to the fulness

[1] Τὸ μὴ κωλυον, αἴτιόν ἐστιν, their usual motto in opposing the doctrine of the church.

of the divine life; as the shadow that accompanies the light; as the chaos, the stagnant, dark water. This matter, dead in itself, possesses by its own nature no active power, no *nisus*. As life of every sort is foreign to it, itself makes no encroachment on the divine. But since the divine evolutions of life (the essences developing themselves out of the progressive emanation) become feebler the further they are removed from the first link in the series; since their connection with the first becomes more loose at each successive step, hence, out of the last step of the evolution proceeds an imperfect, defective product, which cannot retain its connection with the divine chain of life, and sinks from the world of Æons down into the chaos; — or — which is the same notion somewhat differently expressed — a drop from the fulness of the divine life spills over into the bordering void.[1] Now first, the dead matter, by commixture with the living, which it wanted, receives animation. But at the same time also, the divine living particle becomes corrupted by mingling with the chaotic mass. Existence becomes multiform; there springs up a subordinate, defective life. The foundation is laid for a new world; a creation starts into being beyond the confines of the world of emanation. But since now, on the other hand, the chaotic principle of matter has acquired a sort of life, hence there arises a pure active opposition to the godlike,— a barely negative, blind, ungodly nature-power, which obstinately resists all plastic influence of the divine element: hence, as products of the spirit of the ὕλη, (of the πνεῦμα ὑλικόν,) Satan, malignant spirits, wicked men, in all of whom no reasonable, no moral principle, no principle of a rational will, but blind passions only have the ascendancy. There is the same conflict here as in the scheme of Platonism, between the soul under the guidance of divine reason, the νοῦς, and the soul blindly resisting reason,[2] — between the προνοία and the ἀνάγκη, the divine principle and the natural.

As *Monism* contradicts what every man should know immediately — the laws and facts of his moral consciousness; so Dualism contradicts the essence of reason which demands unity. *Monism*, shrinking from itself, leads to Dualism; and Dualism, springing from the desire to comprehend everything, is forced by its very striving after this, through the constraint of reason, which demands unity, to refer back the duality to a prior unity, and resolve it into this latter. Thus was the Gnosis forced out of its Dualism, and obliged to affirm the same which the Cabbala and the New Platonism taught; namely, *that matter is nothing else than the necessary bounds*[3] *between being and not-being*, which can be conceived as having a subsistence for itself only by abstraction,[4]— as the opposite to existence, which, in case of an evolution of life from God, must arise as its necessary limitation.[5] In some such way, this Dualism could resolve itself into an absolute Monism, and so into Pantheism.

[1] According to the schemes of the Ophites and of Bardesanes.

[2] See Plato leg. lib. X. p. 87 – 91, v. IX.; ed. Bipont. Plutarch. Quæstt. Platonicæ, qu. IV.

[3] As it were the outer shell of existence, קְלִיפָּה.

[4] By a λόγος νόθος, according to the New Platonists.

[5] Thus the Gnostics in Irenæus, Lib. II. c. 4, are careful to defend themselves against the charge of Dualism: Continere omnia patrem omnium, et extra Pleroma esse nihil; et id, quod extra et quod intus, dicere eos

The other scheme accommodated itself more to the Parsic doctrine concerning Ahriman and his kingdom; — a doctrine which it would be natural, especially for those Gnostic sects which originated in Syria, to appropriate to themselves. This theory assumed the existence of an *active*, *turbulent* kingdom of evil, or of darkness, which, by its encroachments on the kingdom of light, brought about a commixture of the light with the darkness, of the godlike with the ungodlike. Different as these two modes of contemplation may appear in description, yet we may recognize in them both the same fundamental idea. In all cases where the latter mode of contemplation becomes somewhat more speculative, it passes into the former; as will be seen in Manicheism, which, more than any other Gnostic system, wears the stamp of the Parsic religion; and in all cases where the former mode of conception assumes a more poetic dress, strives to present itself more vividly to the imagination, it passes imperceptibly into the latter;[1] and this it might do sometimes with the distinct consciousness, that the whole was but a symbolical dress, whereby abstract conceptions were to be rendered more vivid to the imagination. We have an example of this kind in the profound thinker, Plotinus, who was very far from being inclined to substitute a conflict of principles beginning at a certain point, in the place of a development going on with immanent necessity, from first to last, even to the extreme bounds of all existence.

Even among the Platonists there were those who supposed, that along with an unorganized, inert matter, the substance of the *corporeal world*, there existed from the beginning a *blind*, *lawless motive power*, an ungodlike soul, as its original moving and active principle. As the inorganic substance was organized into a corporeal world by the plastic power of the Deity, so by the same power, law and reason were communicated to that turbulent, irrational soul. Thus the chaos of the ὕλη was transformed into an *organized world*, and that blind soul into a rational principle,— a mundane soul, animating the universe. As from the latter of these proceeds all rational, spiritual life in humanity; so from the former proceeds all that is irrational, all that is under the blind sway of passion and appetite — all malignant spirits are its progeny. It is easy to see how the idea of this ψυχὴ ἄλογος, brooding over chaos, would coincide with the idea of a Satan originally presiding over the kingdom of darkness.[2]

In the system of the Sabæans, or disciples of John,[3] which was allied,

secundum agnitionem et ignorantiam, sed non secundum localem distantiam. The lower creation was comprehended in the Pleroma, velut in *tunica* maculam.

[1] As, for example, when Plotinus represents matter as being seized with a longing after light or the soul, and describes how it darkens the light in attempting to embrace it. Plotin. in Enneas I. lib. VIII. c. 14: Ὕλη παροῦσα προσαιτεῖ, καὶ οἷον ἐνοχλεῖ, καὶ εἰς τὸ εἴσω παρελθεῖν ἐθέλει, τὴν δὲ ἔλλαμψιν καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖθεν φῶς ἐσκότωσε τῇ μίξει.

[2] See Plutarch. de animæ Procreat. e Timæo, particularly c. 9. Opera ed. Hutten. T. XIII. page 296.

[3] This sect of the Sabæans, (βαπτισταί, from צבע,) Nazareans, Mandeans, (according to Norberg, from ידע, μαθηταί or γνωστικοί,) evidently took its origin from those disciples of John the Baptist, who, contrary to the spirit and intention of their master, adopted, after his martyrdom, a course hostile to Christianity. We find traces of them, mixed up with fabulous matter, in the Clementines and in the Recognitiones Clementis, perhaps also in the ἡμεροβαπτισταῖς

beyond doubt, by derivation, with the Syrian Gnosis, there does appear, indeed, to have been an independent kingdom of darkness, with its own powers; but this has no influence on the higher kingdom of light. The thought conceived by one of the genii belonging to the world of light, of separating himself from the great primal Fountain, for whose glory all creatures should exist, and of establishing a separate and independent world in chaos — was the original cause of the intermingling of the two kingdoms,— the beginning of the visible world, which is founded on territory won from the kingdom of darkness, from chaos; and which now the powers of darkness, impatient of any encroachment on their province, seek either to wrest away and bring into their own possession, or else to destroy. When the genius who belongs to the third grade in the evolution of life, when *Abatur* reflects himself on the dark water of chaos, there springs up from his image an imperfect genius, formed out of the mixture of this light-nature with the substance of darkness, and destined to a gradual transfiguration. This is *Fetahil*, the world-builder, from whose awkwardness results all the imperfections of this world.[1] Also in the system of the Syrian Bardesanes, matter is represented as being the genitor of Satan.

Thus it is evident enough here, how the modes of conception peculiar to the Syrian and to the Alexandrian Gnosis pass, on this side, over into each other. It might also admit of a question, perhaps, whether we can properly speak of a Gnosis *originally Alexandrian;* whether *Syria* is not the common home of *everything* that goes under this name, — whence it was merely transplanted to Alexandria, in which latter place it received a peculiar stamp from the Hellenic, Platonizing tendency which there prevailed. At Alexandria, such a Gnosis could easily find many points on which to attach itself, in a certain Jewish, ideal philosophy of religion already existing there; but in this, however, the Platonic and Western element, which confined itself more strictly to the pure ideal position, and did not directly hypostatize the idea into intuitions, too strongly predominated to admit the possibility of its resulting, without the influence of the pure Orientalism from Syria, in the peculiar character of the Gnosis.

It might be thought, that this two-fold theory would have resulted in a corresponding difference of *practical spirit.* As the *Syrian* theory supposed an active kingdom of evil, which was one and the same with the kingdom of matter, we might conclude from this, that it made the renunciation of this hated matter and its hostile productions, the great point in its system of morals. Since, on the other hand, the *Alexan-*

and *γαλιλαίους* of Hegisippus; see F. Walch. de Sabæis comment. Soc. Reg. Gott. T. IV. Part. philol. From this sprung up afterwards a sect, whose system, formed out of the elements of an older eastern theosophy, has an important connection with the history of the Gnosis. A critical examination of their most important religious book, published by Norberg, the Liber Adami, may furnish much additional information on this subject. See a review of this work by Gesenius, in the Jenaischen Literatur-Zeitung, J. 1817, No. 48–51, and (Kleuker's?) review in the Göttingschen Anzeigen.

[1] The idea here may be compared wholly with the Ophitic idea of the Ophiomorphus, (see below,) although the latter, in the Ophitic system, appears possessed of a malignant nature; and yet the Ophitic system, so far as it concerns its speculative ideas, is in very many respects nearly related to the Alexandrian system of Valentinus.

drian Gnosis considered matter in the light of an unorganized substance, and the *divine* as the forming *principle* of matter, we might suppose that it would adopt no such *negative* theory of morals, but be inclined rather to make the active melioration of the world, by the power of the divine element, the principle of its moral system. This conjecture would be rendered still more probable, by comparing several of the *Alexandrian* with the Syrian systems.

But we must see, as we enter more deeply into the matter, that the difference of practical tendencies is not so much grounded in the difference of these principles, as it is true that a different shaping and application is given to the principles themselves, by virtue of the diversity of intellectual bents; and that all the principles derived from other quarters receive, through the general, intellectual bent which appropriates them to itself and the peculiar spiritual temperament of this period, an application which needed not necessarily to flow from them, by themselves considered. We have seen,[1] indeed, how Dualism, in its primitive form among the Persians, by no means carried along with it the tendency to an ascetic, inactive renunciation of the world; but how an active life, and the exercise of a plastic influence on the outward world, in the conflict for the kingdom of light, developed itself therefrom. And yet the same principle received, through the influence of the prevailing tone of mind in this period, another application. But in Platonism, two points of view were proposed, and its practical influence was conditioned by the predominance of the one or the other. On the one side, Platonism represented the soul as the plastic power in the world; — it made the ideas actualize themselves in becoming, stamp themselves in the ὕλη. The self-manifestation of these ideas, striving to overpower the ὕλη, should press forward to meet their kindred spirit, in its contemplation of the world in all its aspects, — in all appearances of the beautiful and good. Through the symbols — though inadequate to the original type — of the ideal harmony of the universe in the sensible world, the recollection of the original Former himself was to be called up in the spirit that belonged to the higher world, and the craving after this awakened within it; — by means of this contemplation, the soul was to become gradually winged. But on the other side, Platonism taught that there was a resistance of the ὕλη against these ideas, which was not to be entirely vanquished; it presented to consciousness that opposition between the idea and the manifestation, which could never be overcome. According to this view, evil is, in this world, a necessary antithesis to good. This is inseparable from the relation of the idea to the ὕλη; and hence it is only by contemplation, rising to the spiritual world of ideas, that one can soar above this opposition, which must always necessarily continue to exist in this lower region. At all events, it was from this position that the aristocratic principle of the ancient world, of which we have before spoken, took that direction, by virtue of which the contemplative life was exalted far above the practical; as in like manner, this defect — though more or less

[1] See above, p. 376.

tempered, in proportion to the greater or less reaction of the Christian principle — cleaves to the Gnostic systems generally. Now in proportion as the one or the other of these sides of the Platonic theory predominated, there came to be united with Platonism, either a more practical, esthetico-artistic, or an ascetic, contemplative tendency. Platonism contains within it, considered on that first side, the genuine principle for the construction of the system of ethics; but in order to the actualization of what lies within it, it is requisite, that the other side should retreat into the back-ground. This Dualism must be practically annulled; a means must be given of reconciling the opposition between the idea and the manifestation, and this could be mediated only by the fact of a redemption of mankind. Thus Platonism points away to Christianity, through which alone the ethical problems grounded in the Platonic ideas could be actually realized.

Now the spiritual tone of this period, which lies at the root of all those Gnostic systems, out of which sprung hatred and contempt of the world, the predominant Oriental principle of utter estrangement from the world and from all human affections, tended to give prominence to one of those sides and to repress the other; and the same thing, indeed, is manifested in the ethics peculiar to the later Platonism generally, if we except Plotinus. One of these Gnostics, Marcion, united, in fact, as we shall see, with the doctrine of the ὕλη, a tendency in other respects altogether foreign from Platonism.

The most essential difference between the Gnostic systems, and the one which is best suited also to be made the basis of their distribution, is that which arises from their different degrees of divergence, in respect to what constitutes the peculiarity of the Gnostic view of the universe, from the purely Christian view. It is the Dualistic element carried out; — by virtue of which those oppositions, — which Christianity exhibits as conflicting with the original unity in creation, as having first originated in the fall of the creature, and only to be removed by the redemption, — these oppositions are considered as original, grounded in the very principles of existence; — hence, also, as being of such a kind that they could not be overcome by the redemption itself; — the oppositions between a temporal, earthly, and a higher, invisible order of things; between the natural, the purely human, and the divine. This opposition, so apprehended, must be extended moreover to the relation of Christianity to the creation, to nature and history. Where this opposition generally was seized in its most sharp and decided form, nothing less could be supposed than an absolute opposition also between Christianity and the creation,— between nature and history. Christianity must make its appearance as an altogether sudden thing, as a fragment disconnected from everything else, as something coming in wholly without expectation. According to this view, no gradual development of the Theocracy, as an organically connected whole, could be admitted. The connection, also, must be broken between Christianity and Judaism. And all this becomes concentrated in the form of relation in which the Demiurge was conceived to stand to the Supreme, perfect God, and the world of Æons. Everything depends,

then, on the circumstance, whether an absolute opposition was made to exist here, or room was still left for some sort of mediation. It is manifest, how deeply this difference must affect everything that pertains to the province of morals and religion.

In the following respect, *all* these Gnostics agree; they *all* held, as we remarked above, to a world consisting of the pure emanation of life from God, a creation evolved directly out of the divine essence,[1] far exalted above the outward creation produced by God's plastic power, and conditioned by a preëxisting matter. They agree moreover in *this*, that they did not admit the Father of *that higher* world of emanation, to be the immediate author of *this lower* world, but maintained that the lower creation proceeded from the World-former, (δημιουργός,) a being of kindred nature with the universe formed and governed by him, and far inferior to that higher system and the Father of it. But here arose a difference among them; for while they all maintained the fact of such a subordination, they did not agree in their conceptions as to the particular mode of its existence. Some, taking their departure from ideas which had long prevailed among certain Jews of Alexandria, (as appears from comparing the Alexandrian version of the Old Testament, and from Philo,) supposed that the Supreme God created and governed the world by ministering spirits, by the angels. At the head of these angels stood one, who had the direction and control of all; hence called the opificer and governor of the world. This Demiurge they compared with the plastic, animating, mundane spirit of Plato and the Platonicians,[2] which, too, according to the Timæus of Plato, strives to represent the ideas of the Divine Reason, in that which is *becoming* and temporal. This angel is a representative of the Supreme God on this lower stage of existence. He acts, not independently, but merely according to the ideas inspired in him by the Supreme God; just as the plastic, mundane soul of the Platonists creates all things after the pattern of the ideas communicated by the Supreme Reason, (νοῦς.[3]) But these ideas transcend the powers of his own limited nature; he cannot understand them; he is merely their unconscious organ; and hence is unable himself to comprehend the whole scope and meaning of the work which he performs. As an organ under the guidance of a higher inspiration, he reveals what exceeds his own power of conception. And here also they fall in with the current ideas of the Jews, in supposing that the Supreme God had revealed himself to their Fathers through the angels, who served as ministers of his will. From them proceeded the giving of the law by Moses. In the following respect, also, they considered the Demiurge to be a representative of the Supreme God; — as the other nations of the earth are portioned out under the guidance of the other angels, so the Jewish people, considered as the peculiar people of God, are committed to the especial care of the Demiurge, as his representative.[4] He revealed

[1] עוֹלָם אֲצִילוּת.

[2] The δεύτερος θεός, the θεὸς γενητός.

[3] The ὃ ἔστι ζῶον, — an antithesis to the γενητόν, the θεὸς γενητός of Plato, — the παράδειγμα of the Divine Reason hypostatized.

[4] According to the Alexandrine version of Deuteron. 32: 8, 9: Ὅτε διεμέριζεν ὁ

also among them, in their religious polity, as in the creation of the world, those higher ideas, which himself could not understand in their true significancy. The *Old Testament*, like the whole creation, *was the veiled symbol of a higher mundane system, the veiled type of Christianity.*

Among the Jewish people themselves, however, they carefully distinguished, after the example of the Alexandrians, between the great mass, who are barely a representative type of the people of God, (the Israelites according to the flesh, the *Ἰσραὴλ αἰσθητός, κατὰ σάρκα*,) and the smaller number, who became really conscious of their destination as the people of God, (the soul of this mass, the spiritual men of Philo; the *Ἰσραὴλ πνευματικός, νοητός*; the truly consecrated race, living in the contemplation of God; the *ἀνὴρ ὁρῶν τὸν θεόν*; the *πνευματικοί, γνωστικοί*, as contradistinguished from the *ψυχικοί, πιστικοί*.) The latter, with their sensual minds, adhered to the outward form, perceived not that *this* was barely a symbol, and therefore entered not into the meaning of the symbol.[1] Thus those sensual-minded Jews knew not the angel by whom God *revealed* himself in all the *Theophanies* of the Old Testament; knew not the Demiurge in his true relation to the hidden, Supreme God, who never *reveals himself* in the sensible world. Here, too, they confounded type and archetype, symbol and idea. They rose no higher than to this *Demiurge;* they held him for the *Supreme God himself*. Those spiritual men, on the contrary, clearly perceived, or at least divined, the ideas veiled under Judaism; they rose above the *Demiurge*, to the *knowledge* of the Supreme God; they are, therefore, properly his *true worshippers*, (*θεραπεῦται*.) The religion of the former was grounded barely on a faith of authority; the latter live in *the contemplation of divine things. The former* needed to be schooled and disciplined by the Demiurge,—by rewards, punishments, and threats; *the latter* need no such means of discipline; they rise by the buoyancy of their own minds to the Supreme God, who is only a fountain of blessedness to those that are fitted for communion with him; they love him for his own sake.[2]

When now these Jewish theosophists of Alexandria had come over to Christianity, and with this new religion had united their previous ideas, they saw the spirit of the Old Testament completely unveiled by Christianity, and the highest idea of the whole creation brought clearly to light. The scope and end of the whole creation, and of all human development, now for the first time became clear. As far as the Supreme *Æon*,[3] who appeared in the person of Christ, is exalted above the angels and the Demiurge, so far does Christianity transcend Juda-

ὕψιστος ἔθνη, ἔστησεν ὅρια ἐθνῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀγγέλων θεοῦ, καὶ ἐγενήθη μερὶς κυρίου λαὸς αὐτοῦ Ἰακώβ.

[1] Thus in *the epistle ascribed to Barnabas*, it is asserted by a moderate Gnostic, who had as yet by no means attained to that higher Gnosis which resulted from the mixture of the Alexandrian idealism with Syrian theosophy, that the Jews had altogether misunderstood the ceremonial law, in observing it outwardly, instead of seeing in it an allegorical representation of universal religion and moral truths. The Gnosis furnished the key which first unlocked this its true meaning.

[2] See above, Part I. p. 56, etc., respecting the two religious positions according to Philo.

[3] *Νοῦς* or *λόγος*.

ism and the whole earthly creation. The Demiurge himself now perceives entering into his province a revelation of a higher system of things, and serves henceforth as its self-conscious organ.

If the law was called by Jewish theologians a law dispensed by angels, with a view to mark, in this way, its divine, as opposed to a merely human, origin,— this designation is, on the other hand, employed in the apostolic letters, for the purpose of clearly setting forth the superiority of Christianity to Judaism, — of exhibiting the former as the absolute religion, for which all the earlier fragmentary revelations of the divine councils only served to prepare the way. The all-embracing revelation of God in the Son, through whom God himself enters immediately into fellowship with the creature, is opposed to the revelation mediated by the instrumentality of individual angels,— individual godlike powers. By the manifestation of the comprehending whole, everything partial is rendered superfluous.[1] The inventions of the Gnostics, in which the whole matter is spun out into a mythical form, turn on this profound idea.

In what the Gnostics who adopt this point of view say about the relation of the Demiurge, of his creation, of his previous dominion, to the appearance of Christ and of Christianity, we have a glimpse of ideas, in themselves profound. They endeavor to express how the whole was, at least in idea, in the germ, implanted in the original creation, which was to be actually realized and fulfilled only by Christianity ; — how reason, attaining first through Christianity to the full and clear consciousness of the ideas incorporated in and stamped upon creation, was to express these in an actual manifestation ; — a great and fruitful thought, which, obscurely divined by the Gnosis, waited to receive its clear and discreet exposition from a future science, striking root in Christianity. The Gnosis bore within it the germ, first presented as a poetic intuition, of a true philosophy of history.

The *other party* of the Gnostics consisted mainly of such as, before their coming over to Christianity, had not been followers of the *Mosaic* religion, but had already, at an earlier period, framed to themselves an *Oriental* Gnosis, opposed as well to *Judaism* as to all *popular religions*, like that of which we find the remains in the books of the Sabæans, and of which examples may still be found in the East, among the Persians and the Hindoos. They regarded the Demiurge with his angels, not simply, like the former class, as a subordinate, limited being, but as one absolutely hostile to the Supreme God. The Demiurge and his angels are for establishing their independence within their limited sphere. They would tolerate no foreign dominion within their province. Whatever higher existence has descended into their kingdom, they seek to hold imprisoned there, so that it may not ascend again above their narrow precincts. Probably, in this system, the kingdom of the world-forming angels coincided, for the most part, with the kingdom of the deceitful star-spirits, who seek to rob man of his freedom, to beguile him by various arts of deception, — and who exercise a tyrannical sway

[1] See Heb. 2. Ephes. 3 : 10, and the words of Christ to Nathanael.

over the things of this world.[1] The Demiurge is a limited and limiting being; proud, jealous, revengeful; and this his character expresses itself in the Old Testament, which proceeded from him.

Believing that they found in the Old Testament so many qualities attributed to God which were anthropopathic,— so much which was at variance with the Christian idea of God and with moral perfection, it would indeed have been natural for these Gnostics, had they lived in a different spiritual atmosphere, to consider all this as the result of human error, whereby the true idea of God had become vitiated. But to refer this to a subjective cause, and explain it psychologically, lay altogether remote from their habit of contemplation. To them Judaism no less than paganism appeared, as opposed to Christianity, something too positively *real* to admit of being satisfactorily explained in any such way as this. They fancied that, in the life of nations, they could trace the influence of self-subsistent spiritual powers, who controlled the general consciousness. What St. Paul says of the principalities and powers, (ἀρχαῖς and ἐξουσίαις,) they referred to these agents. As in paganism they saw the kingdom of the demons, so in Judaism they saw the kingdom of the Demiurge. And so while they acknowledged the history of the Old Testament to be true, they were led to transfer whatever appeared to them defective in the idea of God in the Old Testament, to the Demiurge himself. The reflected image of this being, they saw in the character and in the conceptions of the people devoted to his service. Even in nature, where they beheld the dominion of an iron necessity, governing by invariable laws and sparing nothing, they believed the God of holy love, revealed through Christ, was not to be found. They saw, manifesting itself there, a plastic power indeed, but inadequate to master its material, to subdue the destructive agencies which resisted its efforts. They beheld the old chaos once more breaking loose; the wild energy of the ὕλη, revolting without control against the dominion which the formative Power would exercise over it, — casting off the yoke imposed on it, and destroying the work he had begun. Thus they recognized here a powerful, indeed, but not all-powerful Demiurge, against whose supremacy the ὕλη, which he sought to subject to his will, was ever rebelling. The same jealous being, limited in his power, ruling with despotic sway, whom they found in the Old Testament, they imagined they saw in nature. At the bottom of these peculiar views lay the truth, that even on the foundation of the Old Testament, religion could not as yet be wholly emancipated from the principle which ruled in the ancient world; although a higher, theistic element was here revealed in opposition to that principle. This could be brought about only by the redeeming power of the gospel. These Gnostics judged thus: — the supreme God, the God of holiness and love, who has no connection whatever with the sensible world, has re-

[1] Accordingly, in the system of these Sabæans, the seven star-spirits and the twelve star-spirits of the zodiac, who sprung from an irregular connection between the cheated Fetahil and the spirit of darkness, play an important part in everything that is bad. To their deceptive arts, the Sabæans traced the origin of those detested religions, Judaism and Christianity.

vealed himself in this earthly creation only by certain divine seeds of life, scattered among men, the germination of which the Demiurge strives to check and suppress. The perfect God is, at most, known and worshipped in mysteries alone by a few spiritual men. Now this God, through his highest Æon, let himself down at once, without any forgoing preparation, to this inferior system, for the purpose of drawing upward to himself those higher and kindred spiritual natures which are here held in bondage. Christianity finds nowhere in the whole creation a point of entrance, except in those theosophic schools where a higher wisdom, in the form of secret doctrines, has been handed down from age to age.

This difference between the Gnostic systems was one of great importance, both in a theoretical and a practical point of view. The Gnostics of the first class, who looked upon the Demiurge as an organ of the supreme God, and his representative, the fashioner of nature according to his ideas, the guiding spring of the historical evolution of God's kingdom, might, consistently with their peculiar principles, expect to find the manifestation of the divine element in nature and in history. They were not necessarily driven to an unchristian hatred of the world. They could admit that the divine element might be revealed even in earthly relations; that everything of the earth was capable of being refined and ennobled by its influence. They could therefore be quite moderate in their ascetic notions, as we find the case actually to have been with regard to many of this class; although their notion of the ὕλη continually tended to the practically mischievous result of tracing evil exclusively to the world of sense; and although their over valuation of a contemplative Gnosis might easily prove unfavorable to the spirit of active charity. On the contrary, the other kind of Gnosis, which represented the Creator of the world as a nature directly opposed to the supreme God and his higher system, would necessarily lead to a wildly fanatical and morose hatred of the world, wholly at war with the spirit of Christianity. This expressed itself in two ways; among the nobler and more sensible class, by an excessively rigid asceticism, by an anxious concern to shun all contact with the world — though to fashion and mould that world constitutes a part of the Christian vocation. The morality, in this case, to make the best of it, could be only negative, only a preparatory step of purification in order to the contemplative state. But the same eccentric hatred of the world, coupled with pride and arrogance, might also lead to wild enthusiasm and a bold contempt for all moral obligations. The principle once started upon, that the whole of this world is the work of a finite, ungodlike spirit; that it is not susceptible of any revelation of divine things; that the loftier natures who belong to a far higher world, are here held in bondage; these Gnostics easily came to the conclusion, that everything external is a matter of perfect indifference to the inner man, — nothing of a loftier nature can there be expressed; the outward man may indulge in every lust, provided only that the tranquillity of the inner man is not thereby disturbed in its meditation. The most direct way of showing contempt and defiance of this wretched, hostile

world was, not to allow the mind to be affected by it in any situation. Men should mortify sense by braving every lust, and still preserving the tranquillity of the mind unruffled. "We must conquer lust by indulgence, — said these *bold spirits* — for it is no great thing for a man to abstain from lust who knows nothing about it by experience. The greatness lies in not being overcome by it, when clasped in its embrace."[1] Though the reports of enemies ought not be used without great caution and distrust, and we should never forget that such witnesses were liable, by unfriendly inferences or the misconstruction of terms, to impute to such sects a great deal that was false; yet the characteristic maxims quoted from their own lips, and the coincident testimony of such men as Irenæus and Epiphanius, and of those still more unprejudiced and careful inquirers, the Alexandrians, places it beyond all reasonable doubt, that they not merely expressed, but even practised, such principles of conduct. Besides, that enemy of Christianity, the Neo-Platonic philosopher Porphyry, corroborates this testimony by citing from the mouth of these persons maxims of a similar import.[2] "A little standing pool," said they, "may be defiled, when some impure substance drops into it; not so the *ocean*, which, conscious of its own immensity, admits everything. So little men are overcome by eating; but he who is an ocean of *strength* (ἐξουσία, probably a cant term of theirs, founded on a misinterpretation of St. Paul's language, 1 Corinth. 8: 9; 6: 12) takes everything and is not defiled." Not only in the history of Christian sects of earlier and more recent times, but also among the sects of the Hindoos, and even among the rude islanders of Australia, instances may be found of such tendencies which defied all moral obligations — tendencies that have arisen from speculative or mystical elements, or it may be from some subjective caprice setting itself in opposition to all positive law. In the connection of the present period, the false striving of the subjective spirit after emancipation, after breaking loose from all the bonds, holy or unholy, whereby the world had been hitherto kept together, is quite apparent. And this aim and tendency might seem to have found a point of union in that unshackling of the spirit, so radical ly different in its character, which Christianity brought along with it.

This difference shows itself, again, in the views entertained of *particular moral relations* The Gnostics of the last-mentioned class either enjoined the life of celibacy, and expressed their abhorrence of marriage as being an impure and profane connection, or else — on the principle that whatever pertained to sense was indifferent, and that men needed but to defy the Demiurge by despising his stringent laws — they justified the gratifying of every lust. Those of the first class, on the contrary, honored marriage, as a holy estate; and on this subject also, found in Christianity the complete fulfilment of a relation introduced into the Demiurge's world, as the type of a higher order of things; and the Valentinian Gnosis, which invariably regarded the lower world as a symbol and mirror of the higher, which sought to trace the manifestation of the same supreme law in various gradations, at different

[1] Clemens Stromat. lib. II. f. 411.

[2] De abstinentia carn. lib. I. § 40, et seq

stages of existence, saw in the relation of marriage, as elsewhere, the type of a higher relation pervading every stage and degree of existence, from the highest link of the chain downwards. We may here observe in the Valentinian Gnosis, the first attempt, originating in the influence of Christianity, to understand in a scientific way the true significance of marriage, in its connection with the laws of the universe,— a point which the mind of Plato was striving to reach in the *Symposium;* but which could not be truly reached and adequately presented until Christianity had led men to recognize the unity of God's image in both the sexes, and their relation to each other, and to the common type of humanity residing in that unity.

The difference between these two tendencies of the Gnostic principle was strongly manifested, again, in the different ways of contemplating Christ's person. All Gnostics, it is true, were in a sense agreed in this respect; that as they distinguished the God of heaven from the God of nature, and hence, too, separated beyond necessity the invisible from the visible world, the divine from the human, — so they could not acknowledge the unity of the human and divine natures in *the person of Christ.* Yet as in the first of these cases we remarked an important difference between the two predominant tendencies of the Gnostic systems, so we may observe an important difference, too, in the case last mentioned. We find here an essential gradation in the views entertained of the relation of the divine and human natures in Christ. Some regarded the humanity of Christ as real, and as possessed of a certain dignity of its own; yet, as they made two Gods of the one God of heaven and of nature, and represented the creator of the latter to be nothing more than the organ of the former; so they divided the one Christ into two Christs,— a higher and a lower, a heavenly and an earthly Christ,— the latter serving merely as the organ of the former; and this, not by an original and inseparable union with him, but in such sense that the former first united himself with the latter at his baptism in the Jordan. But the *other species* of Gnosis, denying, as it did, all connection of Christianity with Judaism, and all progressive development of the kingdom of God among men; representing, as it did, the God of Christ and of the gospel as a different being from the God of nature and of history, must necessarily do away the connection of Christ's appearance with nature and with history. The notion, so pleasing to the fantastic taste of the East,[1] and which had long obtained currency among the Jews, that a higher spirit has the faculty of representing himself to the outward eye in various forms, deceiving the senses, though in themselves without substance, was applied to Christ. One entire and important part of his earthly existence and of his personal being was criticized away; his whole *humanity* was denied, and whatever appertained to Christ's human appearance represented as a mere deceptive show, *a mere vision.*[2] Yet we can in nowise agree with those who hold that *Docetism* was only one form in which a decided tendency to idealism

[1] We have only to think of the Hindoo Maia, and the host of Indian myths.

[2] Just as Philo's idea of the Old Testament theophanies led to the views entertained by one Jewish sect respecting the angelophanies, noticed in Justin M. Dial. c. Tryph. See vol. I. p. 42.

and rationalism manifested itself,—a form peculiarly modified by the prevailing notions of the age; so that the *Docetæ*, had they lived at some other period, would have substituted in place of the historical Christ a mere ideal one. We should be careful to distinguish the proper essence of the heretical tendency from the symptoms through which it expressed itself. Docetism may be the result of very different tendencies of mind,—a tendency to supranaturalism, or a tendency to rationalism. There might be united with it, an interest at bottom to give all possible prominence to this supernatural and real element in Christ's appearance. Docetism, at this point, supposed a real, though not sensible Christ; and a real impartation of Christ to humanity. Christ gave himself, according to this view, to humanity, as a source of divine life. He presented himself sensibly to the eyes of men, not in his true, divine nature, but only so as to be perceived by them, yet without coming himself into any contact with matter, in an unreal veil of sense. His appearance was something truly objective; but the sensible form in which this was apparent to men was merely subjective. This was the only possible way in which men, under the dominion of sense, could come into any contact with a nature so divine. A mode of apprehension turned exclusively in the direction of supranaturalism, might lead in this case to a total denial of the reality of the natural element in Christ. But under this form of Docetism might be lurking, also, a tendency which would have resulted in an entire evaporation of Christianity, in turning the life of Christ into a mere symbol of a spiritual communication from God, in substituting the idea of God's redeeming power in place of the historical Redeemer; in a word, there might eventually spring out of a tendency of this sort an opposition to historical Christianity,—and that this did actually come about, will be shown hereafter by specific examples.

When these Gnostics, with their system ready made, looked into the scriptures of the New Testament, they had no difficulty in finding it all there, since they were only on the search for points of coincidence. Trusting to the inner light of their higher spiritual nature, which was to make all things clear to them, they gave themselves but little concern about the letter of the religious records. In all cases, they were for explaining outward things from within,—that is, from their intuitions, which were above all doubt. They disdained the helps necessary to unfold the spirit contained under the cover of the word; they despised the laws of thought and of language,[1] and were thus exposed, in interpreting the records of religion, to all manner of delusion; while they had power also to charm others, as ignorant of those laws as they were themselves, within the circle of their intuitions and symbolical representations. Understanding, for instance, the term "world," wherever it occurs in the New Testament, in one and the same sense, neither distinguishing nor separating the objective from the subjective world, they could easily demonstrate the position, that the whole earthly

[1] Origen, in Philocal. c. 14, shows how much the Gnostics were strengthened in their errors in biblical interpretation by the *ἀγνοία τῶν λογικῶν*.

creation betrays defects, and could not have proceeded from the Supreme and perfect God. The parables, for whose simplicity and profound practical meaning they seem to have been endowed with no sense, were specially welcomed by them, because in these, when the point of comparison was once dropped, an arbitrary interpretation had the fullest scope. The controversy excited, however, by this arbitrary biblical interpretation of the Gnostics, had one good effect, in turning the attention of their opponents to the necessity of a sober, grammatical method of scriptural interpretation, and leading them to establish the first hermeneutical canons; as may be seen from numerous examples in Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement, and Origen.

As the opinion that falsehood was allowable and might even be necessary to guide the multitude, was a principle inbred into the aristocratic spirit of the old world; and as the justification of falsehood, therefore, could not be wholly cut off, and the unconditional obligation of truthfulness, arising from the fact that all are alike rational, all created alike in the image of God, could not be brought home to the general consciousness of mankind except by means of Christianity; so it was ever found to be a consequence of the reaction of that old aristocratic spirit with which Gnosticism was connected, that the principle, Falsehood is lawful for a good purpose, once more slipped in. By means of the opposition which the Gnostics set up between psychical and spiritual men, they could defend the practice of descending from one of these positions to the other, and of saying what was false to men of the lower stage, because they were not prepared to receive the pure truth. This principle influenced their interpretation of the New Testament; and they were the inventors of the exegetical theory of accommodation. Many among them asserted that Christ and the apostles expressed themselves differently, according to the different standing of those whom they addressed. They accommodated themselves to these different positions; — to the natural men, (the ψυχικοί,) those who stood on the ground of blind, unconscious faith — faith on outward authority and on miracles, (those who were tied down to Jewish prejudices,) they spoke only of a Demiurge, for in truth the limited capacities of these men were unfitted for anything higher. The higher truths from the world of Æons, and relating to that world, they had communicated to none but a small circle of the initiated, who by virtue of their higher, spiritual nature, (πνευματικοί,) were capable of understanding such truths. But in all other cases, they had simply hinted at these truths in isolated figures and symbols, intelligible to such natures alone. That higher wisdom they had spoken, as Paul declared, 1 Corinth. 2: 6, only in the living word, among such as were perfect; and it was only by the living word, within the circle of the initiated, that it was to be continually handed down. The knowledge of this secret tradition, therefore, was the only true key to the more profound exposition of scripture. Though other church teachers, whom the spirit of Platonism had too strongly influenced, were not wholly exempt from that aristocratic element, yet the clear and earnest Christian spirit of Irenæus took a

bold and decided stand against it. "The apostles," he said,[1] "who were sent forth to reclaim the erring, to restore sight to the blind, to heal the sick, assuredly did not accommodate themselves to the existing opinions of their hearers; but spoke to them according to the revelation of truth. What physician who desires to heal the sick, will yield to the whims of his patient, instead of prescribing to him so as to effect his cure? The apostles, those disciples of truth, are strangers to all deception, because deception has nothing in common with truth, any more than darkness has with light. Our Lord, who is himself the truth, for that very reason could not deceive."

Others, relying on the principles of their Gnosis, ventured to subject the whole New Testament to the boldest criticism, affirming it to be impossible, from the instructions of the apostles alone, to get at the pure doctrines of Christ; for, said they, the apostles themselves were still somewhat fettered, with the rest, by *psychical* or Jewish opinions. The spiritual man (the Pneumaticus) must sift the "natural" from the "spiritual" in their writings. Or they even went so far as to distinguish in Christ's discourses, what had been spoken by the natural Christ, under the inspiration of the Demiurge; what had been expressed through him by the divine "Wisdom," which had not yet reached its full development, but still fluctuated between the province of the Demiurge and the "Pleroma;"[2] and what had been spoken through him by the supreme Nus out of the Pleroma.[3]

It is easy to see, that under this theosophic style of intuition and expression is veiled a completely rationalistic mode of thinking, which strives to soar above the Christ and the Christianity of history. The view of a certain opposition betwixt the idea and its manifestation in primitive Christianity itself,— of a perfectibility of Christianity, by reason of which it was to purify itself from that which, in its first form of manifestation, checked and vitiated the pure evolution of the idea,— is here lying at bottom. In the person of Christ himself, a distinction is made between what belongs to the idea, and what belongs to the vitiating element of the temporal appearance; between the truth which he uttered by immediate inspiration, and what he spoke from the inferior standing ground of reflection disturbed by temporal ideas.

These Gnostics, or at least a portion of them, were not at all disposed to separate themselves from the rest of the church, and establish distinct communities of their own. They were satisfied that the psychical natures were unable, from their lower station, to understand Christianity otherwise than in the form which had been given to it by the church; that they could reach nothing higher than the blind faith on authority; that they were utterly destitute of a faculty for the higher spiritual intuition; — they were not for disturbing, therefore, these common followers of the church in their quiet faith;[4] they were for uniting with the ordinary congregations, and establishing, in connection with them, certain theosophic schools, certain *Christian mysteries*, into

[1] Lib. III. c. 5.
[2] The Sophia, Achamoth; see below.
[3] Vid. Iren. lib. III. c. 2.
[4] Τοὺς κοινοὺς ἐκκλησιαστικούς.

which all those persons should be admitted, in whom they discovered that higher faculty which was not bestowed on all. They complained, that they were refused admission to the fellowship of the church, and that they were called heretics, though they concurred in everything which the church taught.[1]

But what would have become of the church, had they succeeded in their design of introducing within it such a distinction of two different positions in religion? The essence of the church, which admits no such opposition, which rests on the fact of a common faith uniting all hearts in the same fellowship of a higher life, the peculiar character of Christianity itself, would have been thereby destroyed. Christianity, as we have seen, could let itself down again to a more Jewish position of the mind, it could wrap itself in a Jewish dress, and could be thus propagated in the consciousness of men who must be trained to Christian freedom by a gradual process. The essentials of the church would still be retained, though in a form inadequate and coming from the reaction of an earlier stage of religious development. But had the church allowed room for the introduction within its bosom of such an opposition, it must have forfeited its very essence and existence. Hence the spirit, which throws off what it finds no way of digesting and assimilating to its own nature, united together men of the most opposite theological tendencies in a common resistance against this reaction, which threatened directly the very life of the church itself.

Gnosticism had a two-fold conflict to sustain; a conflict with the Christian principle asserting its own independence, and another with Platonism. Plotinus, who in no part of his works openly attacks Christianity, felt himself under the necessity of standing forth as an opponent of the Gnostics, since in their speculations they pretended to outstrip Plato and the old Greek philosophy.[2] He evidently does them injustice when he asserts, that what they taught consisted partly in ideas borrowed from Plato, and partly in new inventions, hatched up for the purpose of forming a system of their own, but destitute of truth.[3] Their opposition to Platonism was in no sense, assuredly, a capricious, far-sought thing, a mere striving to out-do antiquity; but it was one necessarily grounded in the religious and philosophical principles from which they started, — as indeed Plotinus himself evinces by his mode of combating them. On those principles, whether regarded on the side of the Christian or of the Oriental theosophic element entering into them, the Gnostics were compelled to believe that they found in Plato intimations of the truth indeed, but not the true light

[1] Quæruntur de nobis, quod, cum similia nobiscum sentiant, sine causa abstineamus nos a communicatione eorum, et, cum eadem dicant et eandem habeant doctrinam, vocemus illos hæreticos. Iren. lib. III. c. 15.

[2] He accuses them of perverting Plato's doctrines, and of seeking to place them in an unfavorable light: Ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν κατανενοηκότες, ἐκείνου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν μή. They should not ἐν τῷ τοὺς Ἕλληνας διασύρειν καὶ ὑβρίζειν τὰ αὐτῶν ἐν συστάσει παρὰ τοῖς ἀκούουσι ποιεῖν. Ennead. II. l. IX. See also Porphyry's life of Plotinus, c. 16.

[3] Ὅλως γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰ μὲν παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἴληπται, τὰ δὲ ὅσα καινοτομοῦσιν, ἵνα ἰδίαν φιλοσοφίαν ὦσιν, ταῦτα ἔξω τῆς ἀληθείας εὕρηται.

which could explain the history of the universe. To Plotinus, beyond question, this new tendency, regarded from his own point of view as a Greek philosopher, must have seemed, both in respect to what was true and what was false in it, a declension from the old healthy culture, a doctrine wholly at variance with the sober discipline of the Greeks. He looked upon it as a contagious, fanatical turn of thinking, which had taken possession of men's minds and rendered them incapable of appreciating arguments from reason.[1] On one side, the opposition of the Platonic principle to the Gnosis, in Plotinus, is directed against Christianity itself, against the *Christian* element admitted by the Gnostics; on the other hand, it is coincident with the opposition which would arise out of the Christian principle itself against the Gnosis; and it is interesting to compare what Plotinus says, from this point of view, with the similar strictures made by Christian antagonists of the Gnostic heresy.

In respect to the former of these cases, it is necessary to notice, first of all, his opposition to the *teleological point of view*. Though this might have found its place in the original Platonism, which was not rigidly pursued out to all its consequences, yet by the more severe and systematic deduction of the Neo-Platonic Monism,[2] it is wholly excluded. Nothing is admitted here but the immanent necessity of the conception, in its evolution from the Absolute to the extreme limit of all being. The teleological element in the action of spiritual powers, which the Gnosis introduced, as well as the substitution of this transitive action in place of the immanent necessity of a process of development, could not but appear to Plotinus an anthropopathic vitiation of the *νοητά*, inasmuch as it transferred the notion of the end and the thereby determined beginning of an action, taken from human and temporal relations, to an order of things placed above and beyond these categories.[3] Accordingly, it seemed ridiculous to him that they should transfer to the Demiurge the relation of the human artist to his work, and say he created the world for his own glory.[4] But those Gnostics whom we described as belonging to the first class, would by no means spurn such a comparison and analogy. They understood how

[1] When Plotinus says, — that the ancients have advanced many better things on spiritual matters, will be readily seen by such as have not been carried away by the delusion now spreading among men, (*τοῖς μὴ ἐξαπατωμένοις τὴν ἐπιθέουσαν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπάτην,*) the question comes up, whether by this *ἀπάτη* is to be understood the spreading Gnosis, or the still more widely spreading Christianity. If the latter, then this would be the only passage in which he attacks Christianity; and it is singular that he should do so but once, and then in a manner so vague and indefinite. We should have to ascribe it to his indulgence towards a religious conviction which may have had its followers among his immediate friends. Polemical allusions, bearing against Christianity generally, have been found also by Creuzer in his review of the edition of Heigl, in the Studien und Kritiken, 1834, II., and by Baur, in his investigations of this book of Plotinus, in his work on the Gnosis, p. 418, etc. Yet I cannot agree with the latter, in believing that all the passages contain such allusions in which he would trace them.

[2] So I think I may call the system of Plotinus, notwithstanding his doctrine of the *ὕλη*, which, however, has no positive existence, but only forms the boundary of all being.

[3] *Τὸ δὲ διὰ τί ἐποίησε κόσμον, ταὐτὸν τῷ διὰ τί ἐστι ψυχή; Καὶ διὰ τί ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐποίησεν; Ὃ πρῶτον μὲν ἀρχὴν λαμβανόντων ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀεί.*

[4] *Γελοῖον τὸ ἵνα τιμῷτο, καὶ μεταφερόντων ἀπο τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν τῶν ἐνταῦθα.*

to make a very good use of them on the principles of their own scheme, by which they sought to show how the highest stage of being symbolized itself in all the succeeding steps.

Again, to Plotinus, who had assumed the immanent necessity of the process of cosmical evolution, in which every thing occupied the precise place which belonged to it as a part, the great question on which the Gnostics bestowed so much labor, — how to account for what is defective, how to account for evil — appeared quite as absurd as the answers which they gave to that question. The Christian doctrine of the fall must have appeared to him in the same light, on the principles of his own *monistic* scheme of the universe.

He says of the Gnostics, that they strove to rise above reason, and on that very account fell into *un*-reason;[1] — a proposition, however, which, understood according to the fundamental principle of Plotinus, strikes not barely against the fantastic speculation of the Gnostics, but also against the Christian notion of revelation, and against the Christian idea of divine grace.

In the following case, too, Plotinus' objection to the Gnostic principle would bear also against the Christian doctrine. He represents it as a very absurd thing in the Gnostics, that they presumed to exalt themselves above the great heavenly bodies, — that they called *their own* souls and those of the worst men immortal and divine; — while in the stars, whose regular courses manifested the presence of a soul acting without disturbance according to invariable laws, they could see nothing but perishable matter.[2] To Plotinus the soul of *man* appeared vastly inferior to the soul, always like itself and exalted above all change and all passion, which resided in those great heavenly bodies.

Though the charge of pride, which Plotinus brought against the Gnostics, was, in one view of it, the same which was urged on the side of paganism generally against the entire Christian scheme, yet in another view, where he complained of the arrogance and superciliousness of the Gnostics, and found in them nothing like humility, he might coincide with the Christian principle itself. "Men without understanding," says he, "follow after such discourses, in which they are told all at once, You shall be not only better than all men, but even than all gods; for pride is a mighty principle in men, and he who before thought meanly of himself, and took his place with ordinary mortals,[3] begins to be elated, when he hears it said, You are a son of God, but the others, whom you admire, are not such. What they have received from the fathers, what they reverence, is not the right doctrine. But you are higher than the very heavens, and that although you have

[1] Τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔξω νοῦ πεσεῖν.

[2] Οὐδὲ τὴν μὲν αὐτῶν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον καὶ θείαν λέγειν καὶ τὴν τῶν φαυλοτάτων ἀνθρώπων, τὸν δὲ οὐρανὸν πάντα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄστρα μὴ τῆς ἀθανάτου κεκοινωνηκέναι.

[3] Ὁ πρότερον ταπεινὸς καὶ μέτριος καὶ ἰδιώτης ἀνήρ. In virtue of this combination of homogeneous predicates, it seems to me that the ταπεινός refers here to meanness of condition, and that this passage cannot be reckoned with those in which a hit is intended against the Christian notion of humility.

done nothing at all."[1] In this charge of arrogance against the Gnostics, in boasting of their loftier *pneumatic* origin and nature, Irenæus also agreed, when he says of them,[2] "Whoever gives himself into their hands, is puffed up at once; thinks himself neither in heaven nor on earth, but to belong already to the Pleroma, and struts about full of pride." We see here the unspeculative church father and the pagan philosopher perfectly agreed in attacking the spiritual pride of the Gnostics. Yet it may be asked, whether Plotinus would not be obliged, on his own position, to judge precisely in the same way of the Christians, who gloried in having become, through grace, the children of God, and despised the religion and culture handed down to them from the fathers; — whether, in writing that passage, he was not thinking at the same time, of the Christians as a body.

Plotinus, who does not distinguish the several parties of the Gnostics,[3] thinking of those among them that held to the doctrine of an absolute opposition between the Demiurge and the Supreme God, and between the two orders of world, says their doctrine led to the same practical result as did the principles of the Epicurean school, which denied everything divine, and made pleasure the highest good. For were it true that this world is utterly estranged from everything godlike, so that the latter cannot reveal or realize itself in it, men might safely conclude that they had nothing else to do but to make the best they could out of pleasure and profit;[4] and so they would, did not their own moral nature teach them better than such a system.[5] To these fundamental principles, too, he very justly traces the great defect in all their systems, that they had nothing to say on the subject of morality,[6] — and he sums up with these remarks: "To say, 'Look away to God,' is nothing to the purpose, unless you are taught how you may be able to look away to him; for what hinders one, you might say, from looking to God, though one should neither abstain from pleasure, nor moderate one's anger; since surely men may think of God's name, at the same time that they abandon themselves to their passions. Virtue, which goes right forward to its end and dwells in the soul with wisdom,

[1] Κρείττων καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οὐδὲν πονήσας.

[2] Lib. III. c. 15.

[3] Baur has acknowledged this. See his work, just mentioned, p. 446. In respect to the theoretical part, the speculative view of the universe, the majority of the allusions in this book are doubtless to the great Valentinian branch of the Gnostic system. In this I agree with Baur. In respect to the practical part, the attack seems to be directed for the most part against the sheer *Dualistic* and antinomian views. In fact, Porphyry, the disciple of Plotinus, combats this tendency in his work on "Abstinence from animal food." I can find nothing in the book which may not be sufficiently well explained on this hypothesis, — nothing which, as Baur supposes, could refer directly to the sect of Marcion. In reference to the latter, Plotinus would not have passed over without any notice the strictly moral spirit which pervaded the sect. The pre-eminently practical tendency of Marcion was in no sense calculated to bring on any collision between this school and the New Platonists. But it is noticeable that Porphyry names no one of the Gnostics who is known to us, but others who are quite unknown. Of the works, too, which are said to have been the fruit of immense labor on the part of the Gnostics mentioned by him, we know nothing. Perhaps we might obtain more accurate information about an ante Christian Gnosis, if these works were in our hands.

[4] Ἵνα μηδὲν καλὸν ἐνταῦθα δὴ ὀφθείη ὑπάρχον.

[5] Εἰ μήτις τῇ φύσει τῇ αὐτοῦ κρείττων εἴη τῶν λόγων τούτων.

[6] Μηδένα λόγον περὶ ἀρετῆς πεποιῆσθαι

this enables one to see God. But when, without true virtue, God is named, it is only an empty name."

The most convenient basis which can be adopted for a classification of the Gnostic sects, is suggested by what has been said respecting the most important difference which obtained among them; that is, they may be referred to different classes, according as they were given to a sterner or a milder form of Dualism; according as they represented the Demiurge as a being altogether alien from and opposed to the Supreme God, or only as subordinate to him and acting even in the antechristian period as his unconscious organ; according as they acknowledged the connection subsisting between the visible and invisible worlds, between God's revelation in nature, in history and Christianity, — the union of the Old and New Testaments as belonging to the same whole of the theocratic development, or denied all this, and admitted of nothing but an opposition in these several respects. In short, we may divide the Gnostic sects into two classes; one attached, the other opposed to Judaism. If we may not always find the antithesis so sharply defined in fact as it is presented in our conception of it, but shall observe many shades of transition from the stiff and rigid to the more pliable and flowing forms of doctrine, yet we must remember that this is precisely what might be expected in such a time of ferment and confusion,— the same thing, in fact, which occurs in other well-founded instances of opposition. It furnishes no ground of objection, therefore, against the correctness of our division.

As the first oppositions in the mode of apprehending Christianity arose from its birth-place in Judaism, the same was true also of the Gnosis; though subsequently the latter developed itself into a tendency directly opposed to Judaism. We observed, in fact, among the Judaizing sects themselves, Gnostic elements which were to be traced to mystical, theosophic and speculative tendencies existing among the Jews. Hence many phenomena may present themselves, which would leave us at a loss whether we ought to reckon them to Judaizing or to Gnostic sects; and as they are phenomena belonging to the boundaries of both, and constituting transition points between them, we may be in one sense right, whether we consider them as belonging to the end of the development of the Judaizing sects, or to the beginning of the development of the Gnostic sects. But wherever a phenomenon presents itself, which in spirit and character belongs to a fundamentally Jewish mode of thinking, though it may be seen to contain individual elements of Gnosticism, yet we shall be obliged, notwithstanding, to refer it to the former system. Wherever certain tendencies or ideas predominate in the spiritual atmosphere of a period, they without fail become mixed up with everything which in any way presents a possible point of union for them, even though in other respects of a quite opposite tendency. This holds good of the religious tendency which shows itself in the Clementines.[1] Although it must be conceded, that indi-

[1] I must explain myself on this point, where I differ from Dr. Baur. The way *in which* we differ in our distribution of the Gnostic sects, is connected, indeed, with the difference existing between us in the mode of apprehending the entire system of Gnosti-

vidual ideas, closely related to Gnosticism, are to be found in this work, yet the striving after a simplification of the doctrine of faith; the doctrine of a primitive religion, simply restored by Moses and Christ; the purely Jewish conception of πίστις; the prominence given to outward works, the assertion of their meritoriousness, and the predominant tendency to the outward and practical life, — all which the Gnostic himself would ascribe to a psychical temperament, incapable of receiving the Gnosis, — all this is too characteristically distinctive of the Jewish fundamental position as opposed to the Gnosis, to leave it a moment doubtful, in which category we have to place this phenomenon, while at the same time the work itself assumes a polemical attitude against Gnosticism, of which Simon Magus appears in this work as the representative. We must place the tendency of the Clementines, as not belonging itself to Gnosticism, but as representing the extreme Jewish position, over against the system of Marcion. The extreme point of Judaism, most directly opposed to the Marcionitic heresy, we consider to be this: the Clementines recognize in Christianity *nothing that is new;* Christianity is only a restoration of the pure religion of Moses. So far as the main question in the Clementines relates to the restoration of a simple, monotheistic, primitive religion, and Judaism is stript entirely of its prophetic element, we see in it rather a precursor of Mohammedanism, than a form of the manifestation of Gnosticism.

But while we are constrained to adopt this division of the Gnostics into two main classes, we may at the same time conceive of a two-fold modification of the second anti-Judaistic tendency. Either, e. g. Christianity was presented in direct opposition to Judaism; but, in compensation, brought into so much the closer connection with Paganism, though not with the mythological, but speculative element of Hellenism; or else Christianity was severed from all connection whatever with earlier systems, so that it might appear in its complete elevation, its eclipsing glory, above all that went before it, — so that it might be free from all liability to corruption by elements from a preceding stage of culture. The first mentioned modification of Gnosticism, inasmuch as it brings Christianity into union with Paganism much more than with Judaism, must lose sight of the theistic principle itself as opposed to that of nature-religion, and hence must prove most injurious to the character of the Christian element. The second modification, on the other hand, comes into collision with the spirit of Gnosticism itself, by which it is on one side attracted, through the purely Christian interest, although misapprehended, which animates it.[1]

After these general remarks, we now proceed to consider the several Gnostic sects in detail; and following the classification which appeared

cism; and this difference, again, with the fundamental difference in our theological principles. I have not thought it proper to enter any farther into the polemics of the question, inasmuch as the grounds for my own development of the subject lie in that development itself.

[1] I readily acknowledge, with thanks, that I should, perhaps, not have come to this new modification of the division offered in my genetic development, and in the first edition of my Church History, without the impulse given me by the strictures on my classification by Dr. Baur.

to us the most proper one, we shall speak first of those *Gnostic sects, which, attaching themselves to Judaism, held to a gradual development of the Theocracy among mankind from an original foundation of it in the race.*

Particular Sects.

1. *Gnostic Sects attaching themselves to Judaism.*

CERINTHUS. — Cerinthus is best entitled to be considered as the intermediate link between the Judaizing and the Gnostic sects. To him the remark just made applies in all its force, that it may be disputed, whether he ought to be placed in the former or latter class of these sects; since in him, as has been shown already, elements of Ebionitism and of Gnosticism are both found united. Hence even among the ancients, opposite reports from opposite points of view could arise respecting his doctrine, according as men gave prominence only to the Gnostic or only to the Judaizing element;[1] and hence the dispute on this point could be kept up even to modern times. In point of chronology, too, Cerinthus is the one who may be regarded as representing the principle in its transition from Judaism to Gnosticism; for he made his appearance in Asia Minor, near the extreme close of the apostolic age, when the tendencies allied to Essenism were now following out the Pharisaic Judaism which first mixed itself in with Christianity. As in the epistles which St. Paul wrote during his first imprisonment, we already find indications of the first appearance of such a phenomenon, we have no reason whatever to call in question the tradition, which can be traced back to disciples of the Apostle John himself, on the credit of which Irenæus certifies that Cerinth was a contemporary of this apostle, and was combated by him. There is nothing improbable in what Theodoretus reports,[2] that he began in Alexandria, received his first impulse from the theology of the Alexandrian Jews, drew from thence the germs of his doctrine, and made his appearance in Asia Minor only at a somewhat later time.

We detect the Jewish principle in Cerinth, when he places a boundless chasm between God and the world; and here comes in the hypothesis of numberless intermediate beings, or angels, — lower and higher orders of spirits, — to fill up this chasm. In truth, the doctrine about the different classes of angels assumed in the later Jewish theology, a very important place. By the instrumentality of such angels, he taught, God created this world; — for it seemed to him beneath the dignity of the Supreme God that he should come into any immediate contact with a world so foreign from his essence.[3] At the head of these

[1] To the Gnostic, by Irenæus, in whose account, however, the Judaizing element occasionally shines through; — to the Judaizing element, by the presbyter Caius, at Rome, and Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, in their reports preserved to us by Eusebius.

[2] Hæret. fab. II. 3.

[3] Philo, too, thought it necessary to distinguish, in the nature of man, the higher element, proceeding immediately from God, and the lower, which was formed by inferior spirits, — vid. de mundi opificio, § 24; and this notion finds something to fix itself on in Plato, (Timæus. T. IX. p. 326, ed. Bipont.,) where he says the eternal, the godlike in man proceeds from the Supreme God himself, the mortal from the subordinate gods, — to them was to be ascribed the *ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνειν.* The doctrine, too, afterwards further prosecuted and matured by the Gnostics, as we shall see,

angels he placed *one*, who, in his whole activity at this stage of existence, in his relation to this lower world, was to represent the Supreme God, and without knowing him, serve as an instrument of his will.[1] Cerinth held to the representation that the Mosaic law was given by the ministry of angels; and this representation he employed in the way already noticed, to explain, consistently with the divine origin of Judaism, its subordinate character. The angel who stood at the head of the rest, he may have regarded, perhaps, distinctively, as the ruler of the Jewish people, and the being through whom the Supreme God revealed himself to them. Above him, the Jewish people, at least as a body, never could rise; although a small number of enlightened persons, the spiritual nucleus of the Israelitish people, formed an exception. Men believed they possessed and worshipped in him, the Supreme God himself. A like distinction, indeed, had been also made by Philo. From the great mass of the Jews, who were destined to represent objectively the type of God's people, but who possessed only an indirect knowledge of God as he presented himself in outward revelation and in his works generally, or in his Logos; or who considered the Logos to be the Supreme God himself, and whose God *was* the Logos, — from this common mass of the Jews, he distinguished those who had soared beyond all that is indirect and positive, to the region where the spirit comes into immediate contact with the Absolute, the ὤν or the ὄν itself, — in other words, those whose God is the Supreme God himself.[2] In those passages of the Old Testament where, after an angel had spoken, God is introduced as speaking himself, Gen. 31: 13, Philo supposed he found presented that subordinate position or stage of religious development, at which the angel, through whom God reveals himself, is considered to be God himself; or to which, rather, God, revealing himself in the form of an angel, lets himself down; — since in becoming all things to all, he becomes a man to men, exhibits himself in the likeness of man in condescending to meet them at their own position. These are the ones who confound God as he manifests himself in his works, with God as he is in himself, in his essence; like persons who imagine that in the reflected image of the sun, they have its essential nature itself.[3] In such representations the Gnostic theories may have originated; although, by holding fast to the

respecting the different elements in human nature, which sprang in part from the Supreme God, and partly from the Demiurge, might lean on the same basis.

[1] Thus we understand the doctrine of Cerinth, as exhibited by Irenæus, lib. I. c. 26: "Non a primo Deo factum esse mundum docuit, sed a virtute quadam valde separata et distante ab ea principalitate quæ est super universa, et ignorante eum, qui est super omnia, Deum." It is possible, indeed, that Irenæus transferred to the doctrines of Cerinth, the character of the later Gnosis, with which he was more familiar, and thus attributed to Cerinth what really did not belong to him. But it is at least in perfect keeping with the whole connection of his system, and finds confirmation when we compare it with other Gnostic systems, to suppose that he conceived one of the angels to be ruler over this stage of existence, and therefore designated him particularly as the former of the world.

[2] Οὗτος (ὁ λόγος) ἡμῶν τῶν ἀτελῶν ἂν εἴη θεὸς, τῶν δὲ σοφῶν καὶ τελείων ὁ πρῶτος. Legis allegor. l. III. § 73. See above, vol. I. p. 57.

[3] Gen. 31: 13. Ὅτι τὸν ἀγγέλου τόπον ἐπέσχε, ὅσα τῷ δοκεῖν, οὐ μεταβαλὼν, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μήπω δυναμένου τὸν ἀληθῆ θεὸν ἰδεῖν ὠφέλειαν. Καθάπερ γὰρ τὴν ἀνθήλιον αὐχὴν ὡς ἥλιον οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν ἰδεῖν ὁρῶσι, οὕτως καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκόνα τὸν ἄγγελον αὐτοῦ λόγοι ὡς αὐτὸν κατανοοῦσιν. De somniis, l. I. § 41.

side of fact and reality, they differ from the common Alexandrian theology, in which the Platonic and ideal elements much more predominate.

The Christology of Cerinth is based on the common Ebionite way of thinking. His notions respecting Jesus up to the time of his inauguration to the office of Messiah, appear to have been the same as we found among that class of Ebionites who denied the supernatural conception of Christ. In common with these, he traced back all divine attributes in Christ to that descent of the Holy Spirit upon him, which accompanied his baptism. The Holy Spirit, he regarded as the Spirit of the Messiah, (the πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ,) as the true heavenly Christ himself (ὁ ἄνω Χριστός.) By this Spirit, Christ was led to the knowledge of the Supreme God, who was before unknown to him. It was the same who through Christ revealed this unknown God, and who bestowed on Christ the supernatural power of working miracles. The lower, earthly Messiah, (ὁ κάτω Χριστός,) the man Jesus, was only the vehicle and organ of that heavenly Christ, who wrought in him. If Christ, the crucified, proved a stone of stumbling to those Jews who conceived the idea of the Messiah in accordance with the common political spirit; the same Jewish spirit presents itself in Cerinth, only under another form, corresponding to the theosophical, Magian turn of his mind. Cerinth had no conception of the divinity appearing in the form of a servant, in the extreme of self-humiliation. He was for no other Messiah than one who should manifest himself in splendor; for no other than a glorified Christ. The heavenly Christ, according to the doctrine of Cerinth, is superior to all suffering; — he withdrew from the man Jesus when he was given up to the pains of death. The very fact of his suffering proves that Jesus had been forsaken by that higher spirit, superior to all pain; for had he remained united with that spirit, he could not possibly have been overcome by force, nor subjected to suffering or death. Accordingly it is probable that Cerinth attached no importance to this suffering, as connected with the work of redemption; yet possibly he may have regarded it as a proof of that piety and devotion to God, by which Jesus entitled himself to the highest reward. In consistency with his whole mode of thinking, he must now have supposed that the higher Christ united himself again with Jesus, who had shown his perfect obedience to the Supreme God under all sufferings, that by him he was awakened from death, and exalted to heaven. But we have no information as to the farther development of his ideas. According to a report of Epiphanius, he denied the resurrection of Jesus. Supposing this to have been so, the connection of his doctrines would have to be conceived, perhaps, somewhat after the following way: The higher Christ was not again to unite himself with the man Jesus, until he should establish him a victorious sovereign over the Messiah's kingdom, and with him awaken all the faithful to share in his triumph. The report of Epiphanius, however, is not to be trusted; — for as he went on the hypothesis, that the Apostle Paul had everywhere to encounter the followers of Cerinth, it is possible he may have been led, by some passages in the 15th chapter of the first epistles to the Corinthians, to impute to the latter an opinion which did not belong to him.

Cerinthus *agreed with the Ebionites*, again, in maintaining that the Mosaic law continued, in a certain sense, to be binding on Christians. He may have held, perhaps, that by the heavenly Christ, Judaism in its highest sense, which was not yet clear even to the angels who gave the law, the *Ἰουδαϊσμὸς πνευματικός* (heavenly things typified by the earthly) had been revealed first; — that the earthly shadow, however, would still continue, until the triumphant ushering in of the Messiah's kingdom, or the beginning of the new and heavenly order of things. But since Epiphanius says of him, that he adhered *in part* to Judaism, and it is not probable that Epiphanius would have invented anything precisely of that sort;[1] we may conclude that Cerinth did not look upon everything in Judaism as alike divine; but that, in some sort, like the author of the Clementines, and many of the Jewish, mystic sects, he distinguished an original Judaism from its later corruptions, and that he insisted on the continued obligation of only that part of the ceremonial law which he reckoned as belonged to the former.

As an intermediate link and point of transition between the earthly and the new, heavenly and eternal order of the world, Cerinth, in common with many of the Jewish theologians, placed a happy period of a thousand years, when Jesus, having triumphed, through the power of the heavenly Christ united with him, over every enemy, would reign in the glorified Jerusalem, the central point of the glorified earth. It was inferred from Ps. 90: 4, too literally understood, that as a thousand years is with God as one day, the world would continue in its then condition for six thousand years; and at the end of this earthly period of the world, would follow a thousand years of sabbaths (of uninterrupted blessedness) on the earth, when the righteous should be delivered from all their conflicts. It may be a question, indeed, whether he entertained such gross and sensual notions of this millenial sabbath, as Caius and Dionysius imputed to him. Such views would hardly be in keeping with his system as a whole. He spoke of a wedding feast — an image then commonly employed to signify the blessed union of the Messiah with his people;[2] but any one who was not familiar with the figurative language of the East, and who interpreted his language under the bias of unfriendly feelings, might put a wrong construction on such images. Dionysius says, that in speaking of festivals and offerings, he was only seeking to palliate his gross, sensual notions.[3] But what was his warrant for such a supposition? If Cerinth really taught such a grossly sensual Chiliasm, we should in this see something so wholly repugnant to the spirit of Gnosticism, so strongly preponderating

[1] *Προσέχειν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ ἀπὸ μέρους.* It may be affirmed with certainty, that Epiphanius meant to denote in this way a partial observance of the Mosaic rites. As it was his object here to distinguish Cerinth from Carpocrates, who rejected Judaism, the phrase might be understood of a partial recognition of Judaism as a divine institution, — partial, so far at least as he made angels, *only*, its authors.

[2] The Gnostics also described the blessedness of the *πνευματικοί*, when received into the Pleroma, under the image of a *wedding feast*, of a marriage between the *σωτήρ* and the *σοφία*, the spiritual natures and the angels, (see below.) Thus in Heracleon, "*ἀνάπαυσις ἡ ἐν γάμῳ*," cited by Orig. in Joann T. X. § 14.

[3] Euseb. hist. eccles. lib. III. c. 28.

on the side of the Jewish point of view, as to make it necessary for us to rank him with the Judaists rather than with the Gnostics.

Basilides. — From Cerinth we pass to Basilides, who lived in the first half of the second century. It is in the highest degree probable, that Alexandria was the principal seat of his activity; — the stamp of the Jewish-Alexandrian culture both in him, and in his son Isidorus,[1] — whose name denotes his Egyptian origin, — is too strongly marked to be mistaken. But the account given by Epiphanius, that Syria, the common birth-place of the Gnostic systems, was also the native land of Basilides, is not in itself improbable, though not absolutely certain. The doctrines of emanation and Dualism formed the ground-work of his system. At the head of the world of emanation he placed that unrevealed God, who is infinitely exalted above all representations and names.[2] The medium of transition between this incomprehensible first ground, and all the following evolution of life, was the unfolding of the same into its several self-individualizing powers, which are so many names of the Ineffable. Man can conceive God only after the analogy of *his own mind;* and this analogy is bottomed on an objective truth, since the mind of man is God's image. On this rests the truth lying at the root of the intellectual process through which we arrive at the formation of our conceptions of the divine attributes, and the truth lying at the bottom of these individual attributes themselves. But the Gnostic, incapable of distinguishing the objective and subjective, transferred this to the evolution of objective existence from the divine, primal essence. In order to the production of life — he conceived — it was necessary that the being who includes all perfection in himself, should unfold himself into the several attributes which express the idea of absolute perfection; and in place of abstract, notional attributes, unsuited to the Oriental taste, he substituted *living*, *self-subsistent*, *ever active*, *hypostatised powers:* first, the intellectual powers, the spirit (νοῦς,) the reason (λόγος,) the thinking power (φρόνησις,) wisdom (σοφία;) next, might (δύναμις) whereby God executes the purposes of his wisdom; and lastly the *moral attributes*, independently of which God's almighty power is never exerted: namely, *holiness* or *moral perfection* (δικαιοσύνη,) where the term is to be understood according to its Hellenistic and Hebrew meaning, — not in the more restricted sense of our word *righteousness*.[3] Next to moral perfection follows inward tranquillity, *peace* (εἰρήνη,) which, as Basilides rightly judged, can exist only in connection with holiness: — and this peace, which is the characteristic of the divine life, concludes the evolution of life within God himself.[4] The number seven was regarded by Basilides, as it was by many theosophists of this period, as a sacred number; and accordingly those seven powers (δύναμεις) together with the primal ground out of which they

[1] The name, however, is a singular one for the son of a person of Jewish descent.

[2] Ὁ ἀκατονόμαστος, ἄρρητος.

[3] It is remarkable that Basilides employed the word δικαιοσύνη, according to the Hellenistic and Hebrew usage, to denote moral perfection; while the other Gnostics, especially those of the second class, used this word to denote a moral quality only in which there was more or less of defect, — the notion of justice or righteousness in its more restricted sense. (See below.)

[4] Iren. lib. I. c. 24; lib. II. c. 16. Clem. Strom. lib IV. f. 539.

were evolved, constituted in his scheme the πρώτη ὄγδοας, the first octave, or root of all existence. From this point, the spiritual life proceeded to evolve itself farther and farther, into numberless gradations of existence, each lower one being ever the impression, the antitype (ἀντίτυπος) of the higher.

We perceive here, for the first time, that grand idea of Gnosticism, that *one* law, in different degrees and forms of application, pervades all the stages and kinds of existence, so that everything from highest to lowest is produced by a uniform law; — those general laws of the universe, after the knowledge of which science in its more profound investigations feels itself impelled to struggle, although the attainment of the end, the complete resolution of the problem, must be reserved for the intuition of a higher state of existence. It is the striving to find the unity again in the endless multeity; to gain a knowledge of the πολυποίκιλος σοφία in its ἁπλότης, from the mirror of its self-manifestation.

Might we safely judge from the opinions of later Basilideans, as they are presented by Irenæus, and from the Basilidean gems and amulets, respecting the doctrines of the original school, it would appear that Basilides, holding to seven homogeneous natures in each gradation of the spiritual world, supposed that there were three hundred and sixty-five such regions or gradations of the spiritual world, answering to the days of the year. This was expressed by the mystical watch-word ἀβράξας, formed after the Greek mode of reckoning numbers by the alphabet.[1]

Within this *emanation-world*, each was precisely what it ought to be at its own proper stage; but from the mixture of the godlike and the ungodlike arose disharmony, which must be reduced again to harmony.

It is to be regretted, that at this point, a hiatus exists in the accounts we have of the system of Basilides. The question here arises, whether he followed *the theory* which attributed this mixture to a falling down of the divine germ of life into the bordering chaos, or the one which supposed a self-active kingdom of evil, and traced the mixture to an encroachment of this kingdom on the realm of light.

After what has been said, however, in our introductory remarks, no very great importance can be attributed to this difference, so far as it would be likely to affect the particular shaping of the system. In an ancient writing of the fourth century,[2] some expressions are quoted from a work of Basilides,[3] in which the subject of discourse relates to

[1] It may be, that this term, which denotes the whole emanation-world, as an evolution of the Supreme Essence, had some other meaning besides; but every attempt to explain it would be arbitrary, since there are no certain data extant on which to proceed.

[2] The disputation of Archelaus and Mani, preserved to us in the Latin translation, c. 55. In Fabricius' edition of the works of Hippolytus, f. 193.

[3] Gieseler, it is true, in a review of his, (Studien und Kritiken, J. 1830, S. 397,) has denied that Basilides *the Gnostic* is here intended. But I must agree with Baur, who, in his work on the religious system of the Manicheans, p. 85, pronounces the arguments of Gieseler not satisfactory. The qualification, "Basilides antiquior," can hardly be understood to mean, that a different person from that Basilides who had some time before been mentioned (c. 38, f. 175) in connection with Marcion and Valentine, was intended; for the allusion to a person who had been named so far back, is too remote; it must necessarily have been more strongly marked. The "*antiquior*" may be very

a poor and a rich principle; the nature of the poor being represented as one which has supervened, obtruded itself upon things, as without root and without place.[1] These very obscure and enigmatical words are, indeed, only a fragment. But if we take into consideration, that in this whole work of Basilides, or at least in the portion to which this sentence forms the introduction, the subject relates to the antagonism of a good and evil principle, and that afterwards the manifestly Zoroastrian doctrine concerning the kingdoms of Ormuzd and of Ahriman is alluded to,[2] it will appear probable that those obscure, introductory words are only a symbolical designation of these two principles. The good principle is the rich, the evil principle the poor element. The being "without root and place," characterizes the absoluteness of the principle, that emerges all at once, and mixes itself in the evolution of existence. Probably the poor was attracted, by a craving of need, toward the riches which were presented to view, and which excited in it an irresistible longing to abstract something for itself. Probably Basilides would next proceed to cite the Persian doctrine as corroborative of his own dualistic theory. It comports with this view of the matter, if, as is stated by Clement of Alexandria, it be true, that he deduced the foreign element which united itself with the godlike nature of man, from a mixture of these principles.[3] If the charges which Clement of

well understood as referring to the age of Basilides as compared with that of Mani; and the "*quidam*," used with regard to a person who had been already named with others, does not strike me as so very singular, especially in such a style of writing. But how can such slight reasons warrant us, when everything else perfectly agrees with the Basilides known to us, to suppose another living at the same period, who also must have taught dualistic doctrines? The tractatus of Basilides here cited is probably the same work with the ἐξηγητικά, to which Clement of Alexandria refers.

[1] Per parvulam (here there is probably a false translation or a false reading) divitis et pauperis naturam, sine radice et sine loco rebus supervenientem, unde pullulaverit indicat.

[2] Quæ de bonis et malis etiam barbari inquisiverunt. Here the barbari are the Persians, for the doctrine immediately cited is evidently the pure Parsic doctrine. The same form of presentation may perhaps be recognized also in the manner in which Isidorus, the son of Basilides, refers certain enigmatical expressions of Pherecides Syrius, to a cope stretched out in the starry heavens over the realm of light, a bulwark opposed to the kingdom of darkness. Vid. Clemens Strom. l. VI. f. 621; Orig. c. Cels. l. VI. c. 42; Pherecydis fragmenta, pag. 46, ed. Sturz.

[3] Τάραχος καὶ σύγχυσις ἀοχική Clemens Strom. l. II. f. 408. Gieseler, in the review mentioned in a former note, p. 396, has preferred the signification of the word ἀρχικός, "original," — which signification, indeed, etymologically, it unquestionably admits of, — and he refers what is here said to the fall and its consequences. He supposes "that Basilides, according to his rigid theory of God's justice, could not allow that human souls were thrown into these bonds of matter without previous guilt." But neither indeed would deriving the disturbance of the divine in individuals from the fall agree with the theory of justice, apprehended in this rigid sense. According to this theory, on the contrary, each must atone for his own sin. And even if Basilides taught, as Gieseler assumes, that the divine germ of life became mixed with a dead matter, (ὕλη); yet nothing is gained in this way, which could avail any thing in carrying out the rigid theory of justice. The souls would still continue to suffer in consequence of an inevitable mischance; unless we may suppose that the first mixture of the spirit with matter was connected with guilt, and refer this mixture itself to a primitive fall in the world of spirits. But even in that case, what was at first connected with guilt, would, in its consequences, be to the souls afterwards produced, only an inherited misfortune. A theory of justice so rigid and narrow must generally, if it supposes a cosmical and historically cohering process of evolution, become involved in many difficulties and contradictions. It may be conceived, perhaps, that Basilides supposed, in the first place, an original mixture of principles as the cause of all other disturbances, and then still held fast to the prin

Alexandria brings against Basilides, that he deified the devil, might have reference to his Dualism, this would furnish a certain proof, that he adopted the doctrine about Ahriman;[1] but this accusation is not to be *so* understood. It is to be considered as merely hypothetical; the arbitrary deduction of an inference from an assertion of Basilides, which does not belong here, but of which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter.[2]

But whatever might have been the origin of this mixture of light and darkness, of the godlike and the ungodlike, it was obliged, according to this system, to subserve the purpose of the godlike, to accomplish the ideas of the divine wisdom, — of the law which regulates the entire evolution of life; since the kingdom of evil is, in itself, nothing — the godlike is the real; the element destined to triumph by its own nature.

Light, *life*, *soul*, *goodness*, on the one hand,— *darkness*, *death*, *matter*, *evil*, on the other, — these were the corresponding members of the antithesis, which, according to Basilides' system, extends through the whole progressive course of the world. Everywhere, as rust deposits itself on the surface of iron, *darkness* and *death* cleave to the fallen *seeds of light and life;* the *evil* to the *good;* the *ungodlike* to the *godlike;* — while at the same time it is impossible that the original essence should, in this way, ever be destroyed. It must only purify itself by degrees from the foreign dross, in order to gain once more its original splendor; — just as the iron needs to be cleansed from its rust, in order to recover its higher lustre.[3] Such a process of purification he considered to be the whole course of the present world — which was formed for this end, namely, to separate the godlike from all foreign mixture, and conduct it back to its kindred element, to a reunion with its original source.

ciple that all suffering is in some way or other a correlative of subjective sin.

Now though the word *ἀρχικός may* undoubtedly signify the original, yet the manner in which the words *ἀρχή*, *λόγος ἀρχικός*, *μοναρχία*, are employed in the Alexandrian use of the language, is more favorable to my own view of the sense, and the connection of the words seems to me to favor it likewise; for *σύγχυσις* signifies a confused mixture, and this requires some determination. Now *what* it is that is mixed together, the word *ἀρχική* shows, — it is a mixing together of principles. Doubtless I must admit, that the words need not necessarily designate a confusion or intermingling of the potencies of light with a self-active kingdom of Ahriman, but that they may also denote the mixture of the fallen, divine germ of life with a dead *ὕλη*. But we cannot allow there is any force in the argument of Gieseler, that if Basilides had entertained a theory closely related to the Zoroastrian Dualism, Docetism would have been the necessary result. We have already asserted, and must again repeat, that by such reasonings greater importance is ascribed to this difference than really belongs to it. Just as in the original Parsism, such a mixture of the kingdom of Ahriman with the kingdom of light might be supposed, and *this* world derived therefrom, without yet making the evil principle in the world of sense so radical a one as it is presupposed to be by Docetism; while, on the other hand, it would be possible to start from the notion of the *ὕλη*, and yet be led to Docetism, as the example of Marcion teaches.

[1] Clem. Strom. l. IV. f. 507: *Θειάζων τὸν διάβολον.*

[2] Here I must allow Gieseler to be right, and retract my former view of the matter.

[3] Basilides says this of all suffering of the fallen light-nature generally. "Pain and anxiety deposit themselves outwardly on things, like the rust on iron," (*ὁ πόνος καὶ ὁ φόβος ἐπισυμβαίνει· τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς ὁ ἰὸς τῷ σιδήρῳ.*) Strom. l. IV. f. 509, A In all this we see the spirit of the original Zoroastrian doctrine far more clearly expressed than in the gloomy Dualism of other Gnostics, where the Zoroastrian doctrines appear as if modified by a tone of mind which did not spring from that system.

In the system of Basilides, we find contradictory elements. On the one hand, there prevails in it, by virtue of the Dualism and the mixture of the two principles, the idea of a natural necessity determining the fate of souls; but, on the other hand, he takes great pains to give distinct prominence to the notion of justice, — a justice which accurately weighs the amount of merit and demerit; and to the notion of a free will, which conditions the whole development and destiny of man. As in man's life on earth, each moment stands connected with the one which preceded it, and is thereby determined, according to the different application he may give to it by his free will, so in Basilides' scheme, the life of each individual man on earth stands connected, in the great refining process of the universe, with the preceding series of existences. Each one brings evil with him out of some earlier state of existence; and has to atone for it and purify himself from it in the present life. Upon his moral conduct, again, in this earthly life, depends his condition in a subsequent state of existence. In this sense Basilides explains the words of Moses, respecting retribution until the third and fourth generation.[1] Thus it is certain that the transmigration of souls, within the sphere of humanity, occupies an important place in the system of Basilides.

But here the question arises, whether he did not extend his doctrine about the transmigration of souls still further; whether he did not suppose that the soul migrated also into the brute animal kingdom. This might seem, indeed, to jar with the *Theodicee* above noticed, which sprang out of the strict notion of justice; but the words of Basilides himself[2] express such a doctrine, when, in explaining Rom. 7 : 9, he says: "I lived once without the law; that is, before I came into this human body, I lived in a bodily shape which is not subject to the law; in a brute body." There is evidently pre-supposed *here* a transposition of the soul from the organism of the brute body, which still holds the consciousness of reason enthralled, into the organism of the human body, in which it attains to free development, and hence to the consciousness of the moral law. Such a doctrine is closely connected, too, with the fundamental ideas of Basilides. From the kingdom of evil, of darkness, nothing positive can proceed,—it is only like the rust, which deposits itself on iron. All that issues from the realm of light is life and soul. From the kingdom of darkness, which has mixed itself in with the products of the kingdom of light, that only springs which holds enthralled the light and the germs of life, — the souls everywhere scattered, — which does not suffer them to come to themselves. It is the bond of matter. Thus he was obliged to recognize also in the

[1] The proof of this is to be found in the words of the Didascal. Anatol. in Clement of Alexandria, ed. Paris, 1641, f. 794: Τὸ· *θεὸς ἀποδιδοὺς ἐπὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην γενεὰν τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι, φασὶν οἱ ἀπὸ Βασιλείδου κατὰ τὰς ἐνσωματώσεις.* It is true, the writer is here speaking only of the followers of Basilides, and among these there were some who departed far from the spirit and principles of their master. But the connection in which this doctrine stands with his principles, evinces that it must be considered as having actually originated with him.

[2] Preserved by Origen in the fifth book of his Commentary on Romans, T. IV opp. f. 549.

brute kingdom a soul oppressed and confined by elements belonging to the kingdom of darkness. And this we should have to reconcile with his principle, already stated, respecting justice and divine retribution, in the following manner. As long as the soul is kept confined in that lower kingdom of nature, it lies prostrated under the destiny of that mixture, under the power of the nature which fetters it; but when it once attains to a free development of the rational principle, or of its light-nature, or when it has once passed over into the human organism, the law of rigid justice begins to apply in deciding the destiny of the free rational beings thus produced.

According to Basilides, then, there is no such thing as a *dead* nature. What is dead, has no existence for itself; it is only that which oppresses actual life, till the reaction of the latter becomes strong enough to burst the enveloping rind. Thus, throughout all nature, he perceives a life striving after release from the bonds of matter, in a progressive movement towards freedom, from the mineral kingdom, upward through the different stages of nature to man. Accordingly the ethics of Basilides was based on his cosmogonic doctrine, when proceeding on this principle of the identity of life and soul in all things,[1] he announced the law: "Love must embrace all, because all things stand in a certain relation to all, — all things are closely akin to all."[2] And so, in the purifying and evolving process of the universe, there prevails a two-fold law; — the law of natural necessity in the evolution from below upward to man; and the progressive education, determined by the laws of the moral order of the universe, from man onward; from this point, progress and regress, bliss and wretchedness, are conditioned on free self-determination.

What we remarked concerning the place which the Demiurge occupied in the systems of the first class of Gnostic sects, applies to *that angel*, who, Basilides supposed, was set over the entire earthly course of the world, over the whole purifying process of nature and history. This being he denominates the ruler, (*ὁ ἄρχων.*) This Archon does not, according to his doctrine, act in his government of the world independently and arbitrarily; but the whole proceeds ultimately from the overruling providence of the Supreme God.

Three factors meet together in the remarkable doctrine of Basilides concerning providence; — but the factor from which everything eventually springs and on which everything depends, though through numberless intermediate agents, is the Supreme God himself. From him comes the law implanted in the nature of all beings, according to which they develope themselves, and which conditions all influences by which they are capable of being affected,— the law containing in itself the whole process of the development of the universe. The Archon does nothing more than give the impulse to the execution of that which is already grounded, so far as it concerns the inherent law and the implanted power, in the individual beings themselves. He works on all

[1] As in Buddhism.

[2] The words of Basilides, as they are found in Clement, Strom. l. IV. f. 508: *Τὸ ἠγαπηκέναι ἅπαντα, ὅτι λόγον ἀποσώζουσι πρὸς τὸ πᾶν ἅπαντα.*

in obedience to this law of nature derived from the Supreme God, and calls forth what is deposited and prepared in these laws of nature into action; — and in this guiding activity of his, he acts simply, though unconscious of it, as an instrument of the Supreme God. "Although that which we call providence," says Basilides, "begins to be put in motion by the Archon, yet it had been implanted in the nature of things at the same time with the origin of that nature, by the God of the universe."[1]

We see how Basilides endeavored to take a middle course between two opposite ways of conceiving the divine government of the world: — that which represented God as operating only in a transitive manner upon things without himself; and the other, the Neo-Platonic, which used the word providence to denote simply an eternal, immanent necessity in the universe, developing itself according to invariable laws. Although, in his language, he approaches to the Neo-Platonic view,[2] yet he adopts nothing but what can be reconciled with the theistic view of the world; and in him we find fresh confirmation of what we have before said respecting the relation of Gnosticism to the Neo-Platonic philosophy. The recognition of a personal God, whose agency is continually and everywhere concerned in the evolution of the universe, and the teleological *moment*, closely connected therewith, distinguish his fundamental position from that of Neo-Platonism. Hence, too, the communication of something higher, of something above nature and above reason, finds place in his system; while to Plotinus, on the other hand, that which is above reason must appear contrary to reason.

Closely connected with Basilides' doctrine respecting the angels, the different grades of the spiritual world, respecting the process of purification, and the training of incorporated souls, is that of his son Isidorus, which, perhaps, we may properly refer back to the father, — that every soul, on becoming incorporated in a body, is attended by an angel, possessing some affinity with its peculiar nature, to whom is committed the guidance of its particular process of purification, and of its particular training; and who, probably, after its separation from the body, was supposed to accompany it to the place of its destination conditioned by its conduct on earth,— in this sense, a guardian spirit, which everywhere accompanies its kindred soul. Such a spirit, according to Isodorus, was the demon of Socrates.[3]

[1] Clemens. Strom. l. IV. f. 509: Ἡ πρόνοια δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ (not ὑπὸ, because this impulse proceeds, indeed, from him, but is to be derived from another as the first cause,) τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ὡς φάναι, κινεῖσθαι ἄρχεται, ἀλλ' ἐγκατεσπάρη ταῖς οὐσίαις σὺν καὶ τῇ τῶν οὐσιῶν γενέσει πρὸς τοῦ τῶν ὅλων θεοῦ. It is true, Clement does not cite these words directly as the language of Basilides. But as he is treating of him in this whole passage, and as the expression ἄρχων is peculiar to Basilides, it scarcely admits of doubt, that Clement, who is bent on refuting Basilides on his own principles, makes use of his own words.

[2] Vid. Plotin Ennead. III. l. II. at the beginning: Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τό οὔποτε μὴ τῷ κόσμῳ τῷδε φαμὲν παρεῖναι, τὴν πρόνοιαν ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ ἀκόλουθος λέγοιμεν τῷ παντὶ εἶναι, τό κατὰ νοῦν αὐτὸ εἶναι.

[3] Isidorus cites, in the first book of his exposition of the prophet Parchor, so called, a doctrine of this sort taught by the ancients, as one of the loftier truths received by them: Φασὶ δὲ οἱ Ἀττικοὶ μεμηνύσθαι τινὰ Σωκράτει παρεπομένου δαίμονος αὐτῷ. Καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης δαίμοσι κεχρῆσθαι πάντας ἀνθρώπους λέγει συνομαρτοῦσιν αὐτοῖς παρὰ τόν χρόνον τῆς ἐνσωματώσεως. Without doubt, from some writing falsely attributed to Aristotle. Strom. l. VI. f. 641

It appears evident from what has been said, how far Basilides was from adopting an absolute Dualism; how far he was from countenancing an unchristian contempt or morose hatred of the world; how his system, perhaps, led those who studied it to recognize the revelation of one God in the creation, to observe the connection subsisting between divine things and natural, between grace and nature. His aim was, to make men conscious of the unity of God's revelation in nature and in history, — to lead them "*to consider the whole universe as one temple of God.*" The *Theodicee* was with him a point of the greatest importance. Faith in the goodness, holiness, and justice of Providence stood more firmly fixed in his mind, than all things else. Whenever, in contemplating the course of the world, difficulties presented themselves to his mind, leading to perplexity and doubt, his last word ever was, "I will assert anything, sooner than I will allow a complaint or a slur to be cast on Providence."[1]

From Basilides' theory of the Archon in his relation to the Supreme God, we may easily infer what his opinion was of Judaism, and of its relation to Christianity. The Jews are, it is true, in idea, and in the ideal significancy of their religion and of their national destination, that consecrated people of the Supreme God, from whom the true knowledge and worship of the Most High was one day to proceed; but in actual manifestation, they appear only as a people devoted and consecrated to the Archon, who for a while constitutes the highest potence in the history of the world. The great mass of this people regarded *him* as the Supreme and only God. It was the spiritual men alone among the Jews, they who constituted the *spiritual* Israel, that became actually conscious of that ideal significancy, and in whom it attained to its realization. These alone soared beyond the Archon himself to the presentiment of the Supreme God, revealing himself through the other, as his unconscious instrument. They only could rise to the intuition of the ideas inspired by the Supreme God in the Archon, which the latter reveals under the cover of Judaism, without comprehending them himself. These ideas, not fathomed by the Archon himself, to whom they were exhibited under a sensuous covering and drapery answering to the inferior grade of his limited nature, form the connecting link betwixt this mediated and veiled revelation of the Supreme God in the Old Testament and his immediate and unveiled self-manifestation in Christianity. Accordingly Basilides says, "Moses erected but one temple of God, and thus proclaimed one universe of God."[2] By this was hinted, as we find it somewhat similarly expressed in Philo, the universality of the reference, lying at the very foundation of Judaism. Basilides, however, did not confine himself to the canonical writings of the Old Testament alone. He made use of apocryphal scriptures besides, which are

[1] Πᾶν ἐρῶ, μᾶλλον ἢ κακὸν τό προνοῦν ἐρῶ. Strom. l. IV. f. 506.

[2] Ἕνα δ' οὖν νέων ἱδρυσάμενος τοῦ θεοῦ, μονογενῆ τε κόσμον κατήγγειλε. Strom. l. V. f. 583, D. We perceive here, both in the thought and the expression, the elements of an Alexandrian-Jewish education. Philo and Josephus, also, both consider the temple as a symbol of the world, and carry the image into further details. Philo περὶ μοναρχίας l. II.: Τὸ μὲν ἀνωτάτῳ καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἱερὸν θεοῦ νομίζειν τον σύμπαντα χρῆ κοσμὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ χειρότυητον.

unknown to us,— predictions of a certain prophet Parchor, and revelations passing under the name of the Patriarch Ham. We can hardly suppose such writings were forged by him or his school. Probably they were works handed down from more ancient times; works which he used in good faith; — monuments of some older ante-Christian source of the ideas lying at the root of the Gnosis. Perhaps he believed that in these documents he found a still clearer exposition of the loftier truth transmitted in the form of secret doctrines, than he could find in the canonical scriptures of the Old Testament. He might easily explain it to his own satisfaction, how a people who had no recipiency for such ideas, would naturally have nothing to do with the books containing this higher truth, and so rejected them.

We perceive here such an element of universality; — and with this agrees the fact, that he did not confine the tradition of the higher truth in the ante-Christian period exclusively to the Jewish people, but supposed that he found indications of the same truth *beyond the limits* of that nation. We have seen, indeed, that he cites the doctrine of Zoroaster as a testimony of the truth. The fact that he derived the tradition of the higher wisdom from Ham, not from Shem, indicates perhaps that he acknowledged the authority of a tradition which was not Hebrew. It is not improbable, that he valued the wisdom of those who by the Greeks were called barbarians, above the Greek philosophy itself.[1] Yet it is certain, as appears from a remark of Isidorus, already cited, that he sought also in the Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, whether it was in their genuine works or in spurious writings attributed to them, the vestiges of that higher wisdom. In the passage from Isidore's exposition of the prophet Parchor, which has come down to us, these vestiges of truth, to be found in the Greek philosophers, were not derived however from a common inward source, a reaction of the spiritual principle against paganism in the more eminent men, but from a source without themselves, a tradition received from another quarter. Yet the calm and considerate spirit of this school, and its more favorable judgment of the Greek philosophy, are evinced by the fact, that Isidorus does not fasten in this case on the Jewish fables respecting the fallen spirits, who had intercourse with the daughters of men, and diffused the higher kinds of knowledge in the pagan world; but upon the less fantastic, although not historical hypothesis of the Alexandrian-Jewish theology, according to which the Greek philosophers had borrowed such doctrines from the scriptures of the Old Testament, through the medium of Egypt. "And let no one believe," says Isidore, "that what we consider to be the peculiar property of the elect had been declared before by some philosophers; for it is no discovery of theirs, but they have taken it from the prophets and appropriated it to themselves, and united it with their own pretended wisdom."[2] It

[1] Giving this turn to Plato's expression, Ἕλληνες ἀεὶ παῖδες.

[2] Καὶ μή τις οἰέσθω, ὃ φαμὲν ἴδιον εἶναι τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν, τοῦτο προειρημένον ὑπάρχειν ὑπό τινων φιλοσόφων, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν εὕρημα· τῶν δε προφητῶν σφετερισάμενοι προσέθηκαν τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχοντι κατ' αὐτοὺς σοφῷ. Strom. l. VI. f. 641. I now believe the latter expression should be understood as neuter, "the wisdom which does not ex-

is clear from this, what a low estimate was placed by this school on the Hellenic philosophy as compared with the Old Testament, and even with the ancient wisdom of the East. Isidore describes the Greek philosophers as men who merely give themselves the appearance of philosophizing.[1] He acknowledged in the Greek philosophy no original, but only derivative truth, and that alloyed by foreign corruptions.

But the doctrine, above noticed, concerning a guardian angel, commissioned to attend on every soul, may, perhaps, be considered as a proof that he did not by any means consider the pagan nations to be deserted and left destitute of all divine influences and providential care. As he made a guardian angel attend on each individual soul, he would, perhaps, following the analogy of this theory, have angels placed as rulers over the several nations. In this doctrine the Basilideans of the West, with whom Irenæus became acquainted, may have rightly apprehended the opinions of their master; though they superadded something else, which did not come from him. These angels, the Elohim of other nations, he considered, probably, as national gods, just as he supposed the Archon, who stood at their head, to be the particular god of the Jewish people. It is evident that in entertaining such a theory of the Elohim, he might lean for support on several passages in the Alexandrian version of the Bible, — that he appropriated to himself an idea that had long been extant.[2]

Thus there ruled over mankind those subordinate powers, to whom men's consciousness was subjected; no one could release himself wholly from their spell, from the spell of the cosmic principle. There existed, for the most part, only an unconscious union with the Supreme God and the order of world which stood in relationship with him. The natures which bore within them the germ of a life akin to him, remained fettered and confined within the province of the Archon.

Without question, Basilides possessed a profound knowledge of the spiritual condition of mankind in the ante-Christian period, and especially the time immediately preceding the appearance of Christ; without question, he had a profound sense of that oppressive weight lying on the consciousness of mankind, and especially on the noblest natures, of that unconscious craving after a release of the spirit; and from this vantage ground, he might come to know the nature of the redemption and to perceive its necessity. If he apprehended it only on a single side, yet it had a necessary place in his system. Without it, the separation betwixt the world of the Archon and the proper divine order of the world must ever continue to exist. The spirits destined for the highest stage

ist with them," i. e. their pretended wisdom. The verb *προστιθέναι* seems to me best suited to this rendering of *σοφῷ*.

[1] *Τοὺς προσποιουμένους φιλοσοφεῖν.* — Strom. l. VI. f. 641.

[2] Besides the passage already cited on p. 380, — in the same song of Moses, Deut. 32: 43, are the words, not found in the Hebrew, which the translator has added on the ground of some such theory: *καὶ προσκυνησάτωσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι θεοῦ*, compared with v. 8. All the Elohim that presided over the other nations, are called upon to do homage to God's people. What the nations were to do, and what the powers ruling over them do, is, according to this scheme, one and the same thing. The former is derived from the latter. Comp. Ps. 97: 7, where the Alexandrians translate אֱלֹהִים by *ἄγγελοι*, and beyond question had in mind such powers as the national gods were supposed to be

of being must ever remain confined in their depressing thraldom. They might, indeed, through the progressive movement of the metempsychosis, rise from one higher step to another in the kingdom of the Archon; but they could not, in conformity with the longing implanted within them, attain, over and beyond this kingdom and the Archon himself, to fellowship with the highest order of the world, and to the clear consciousness as well as to the full and free exercise of their higher nature, unless the Supreme God himself brought his divine life near to their kindred germ of life, and thereby first set the latter into activity. And whilst, by the act of redemption, the spiritual natures were exalted to the highest position, its influence is made to extend also to the subordinate stages of existence; harmony is everywhere restored, each order of being attains to its natural destination.

But if, on the one hand, Basilides, in his mode of apprehending the doctrine of redemption, departed essentially from the Jewish position, yet on the other, like Cerinthus, he agreed entirely with the Ebionites, in supposing a sudden entrance of the Divine nature into the life of Jesus, and admitting of no such thing as a God-man, in whom from the first the divine and the human elements were inseparably united. He supposed at bottom, it is true, a redeeming God, but no redeeming God-man. The man Jesus was not in his view the Redeemer; he differed from other men only in degree. Basilides does not seem to have allowed even that he possessed *absolute* impeccability. Jesus, in his view, was merely the instrument, whom the redeeming God selected, for the purpose of revealing himself in humanity and of entering into it with an influential agency. The Redeemer, in the proper and highest sense of the term, was, as he supposed, the highest Æon,[1] sent down by the Supreme God to execute the work of redemption. This being united himself with the man Jesus at his baptism in the Jordan.

Now, although Basilides did not acknowledge Jesus of Nazareth to be the Redeemer, but held that Jesus himself stood in the need of redemption, yet he cannot be accused of holding that the redemption was simply an ideal thing, and of denying it as a great historical fact. Far indeed was it from him, as may be gathered from what has been said, to suppose that any being enthralled within the kingdom of the Archon, could release himself. There was required for this an objective fact, the actual entrance of that might from a higher world, the νοῦς, into the world of earthly manifestation, which was accomplished through the medium of the man Jesus. This, according to Basilides, was the greatest fact in the history of the created universe, from which everything that succeeded, to the final end of the perfectly restored harmony of the universe, must proceed. The manner in which he speaks of the baptism of Jesus, testifies of the impression which this fact, and the public ministry of Christ following thereupon, had left by tradition on the minds of Christians. Clement cites on this point the following words coming from the Basilidean school.[2] "When the Archon himself heard

[1] Or νοῦς, who, inasmuch as he ministers for the salvation of mankind, is called διάκονος

[2] Clemens Stromat. lib. II. f. 375.

the word of the communicated Spirit,[1] (the Spirit sent from above,) he was amazed at what he heard and at what he beheld,[2] the joyful annunciation[3] being wholly unexpected to him; and his amazement was called fear,[4] the beginning of wisdom, — of a wisdom which discriminated the different classes of men, perfected all, and restored the original harmony; for he distinguished and separated from one another not only the natures belonging to the world, (to his own kingdom,) but also the elect (the pneumatic natures superior to the Archon's kingdom) from *them*, and released them from his ban (or conducted them) to the God who is over all."[5]

Thus a new light dawns on the Archon himself. He comes to the knowledge of a higher God and a higher world, above himself. He is redeemed from his confinement. He attains to the consciousness of a superior power, which rules over all, and which he himself, without being aware of it, has always been serving. He sees himself released from the mighty task of governing the world, which until now he supposed that he supported alone, and for which his powers had not proved adequate. If it had thus far cost him so much pains, and he still could not succeed in reducing the conflicting elements in the course of the world to order, he now beholds a power adequate to overcome every obstacle, and reduce all opposites to unity. Basilides, partly from a more profound insight into the essential character of Christianity and of history, partly from those effects of Christianity which were before his own eyes and which contained the germ of the future, foresees what stuff to excite fermentation, and what separation of elements, would be introduced by it into humanity. He perceives how the recipient minds among every people, freed from the might which held their consciousness in fetters, redeemed from all creaturely dependence, and raised to communion with their original source, would become united with one another in a higher unity. All these effects pre-

[1] We may presume the word is meant which, according to the Nazarene gospel, (see above, p. 350,) the Holy Ghost is said to have spoken to Christ at the moment of his descent upon him.

[2] The glorified appearance in which Christ, when united with this exalted being, presented himself to the Archon: or the sight of the miraculous dove, which was a symbol of the Spirit, which had come down from on high; or the miraculous appearances accompanying the baptism of Christ, according to the gospel of the Ebionites.

[3] The annunciation of the Spirit being called a *εὐαγγέλιον* for the *ἄρχων*, it is evident that he did not yield to the higher power merely from constraint; but his first amazement was converted into reverential joy. The prospect of being one day released from the embarrassing government of the world, when the elect natures should have attained to their destined glory, and of entering into rest with his own, — to which expectation of the Demiurge the Gnostics referred such passages as Rom. 8: 20, 21, — Vid. Orig. T. I. in Joann. § 24, — could be no otherwise than joyful to him. Comp. Didascal. Anatol. opp. Clem. f. 796, D., where the blessing which the Demiurge pronounces on the Sabbath is adduced, to show how difficult the work was for him.

[4] Thus Ps. 111: 10, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," was interpreted.

[5] *Αὐτὸν τὸν ἄρχοντα ἐπακούσαντα τὴν φάσιν τοῦ διακονουμένου πνεύματος, ἐκπλαγῆναι τῷ θεάματι παρ' ἐλπίδας εὐαγγελισμένον, καὶ τὴν ἐκπλῆξιν αὐτοῦ φόβον κληθῆναι, ἀρχὴν γενόμενον σοφίας φυλοκρινητικῆς τε καὶ διακριτικῆς καὶ τελεωτικῆς καὶ ἀποκαταστατικῆς, οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκλογὴν διακρίνας, ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι προπέμπει,* (this then would be the *ἄρχων·*) Assuming *τῷ* to be the correct reading, I have rendered as in the text: in this case, the Supreme God must be understood to be denoted.

sented themselves to his imagination as an impression made on the Archon at the baptism of Christ.

The whole work of redemption, then, Basilides, like Cerinth, attributed to the redeeming heavenly Genius. Most probably he agreed also with the latter, in supposing that this Genius, at the time of the passion, left the man to himself, whom he before used as his instrument. The sufferings of Christ could not, according to the system of Basilides, have the least connection with the work of redemption; for according to his narrow conception of justice, the divine justice does not allow that one being should innocently suffer for another; it requires that the sin of each individual should be expiated by suffering. He regarded not only suffering in general, but also the particular sufferings of each individual, in the light of a punishment for sin. He embraced the theory which Christ (John 9 : 3; Luke 13 : 2) condemned. "Each individual suffers, either for actual sins, or for that evil in his nature, which he brought with him from an earlier state of existence, and which may not as yet have come into actual manifestation."[1] Thus it was by pointing to this latter, that he vindicated Providence in respect to the suffering of children. When pressed with an objection drawn from the suffering of *men* of *acknowledged goodness*, he might undoubtedly appeal, and with good reason, to the general fact of the sinfulness of human nature, and reply: "Whatever man you can name to me, he is still a man. God alone is holy. Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one." Job 14 : 4.

But the case was different when this proposition came to be applied to the Redeemer, who, as certainly as he *is* the Redeemer, must be pure from sin. Clement of Alexandria directly accuses Basilides of carrying the proposition even to this extent. In *those* words, which Clement cites, this surely is not *necessarily* implied. He merely says, "If, however, you let this whole investigation go, and endeavor to bring me into difficulty by adducing the case of *certain persons;* if you say, Then *he* has sinned, for *he* has suffered, &c." It might be held, that Basilides is simply speaking here of certain men who were regarded with peculiar veneration, who stood in high repute for holiness; and Clement took the liberty to draw his own conclusion. But *in the first place*, the objection which Basilides supposes to be made against his position, would lose all its force and meaning, if it were not designed to be understood precisely in the sense above given; and *next*, this wide extension of the proposition stands intimately connected with his theory concerning the relation of suffering to sin, and with his theory of the divine justice and of the process of purification to which every nature belonging to the kingdom of the Archon is subjected. The Jesus who belonged to this kingdom certainly needed redemption himself, and could only be made partaker of it by his union with that heavenly redeeming spirit. To render him worthy of being redeemed before all others that needed redemption, and of being employed as the

[1] Sufferings, — expiatory and purgative of sin, (ἁμαρτία or the ἁμαρτητικόν.) Strom l. IV. f. 506.

instrument for diffusing abroad the influences of the redeeming Genius to others, it was sufficient, if, as the most excellent and the purest of men, who had advanced the furthest in the work of purification, he possessed the *minimum* of sinfulness. Here indeed the objection might be urged against the Basilidean system, which certainly must have supposed that some proportion existed betwixt the degree of sin and the degree of punishment — how then reconcile so great suffering with the smallest degree of sinfulness? But here, probably, as we may infer from his remarks on martyrdom, he could be at no loss for an answer: "The consciousness of serving as an instrument for the highest and holiest cause of humanity, and of *suffering* in this mission, (perhaps, too, the prospect of the glory into which he was to enter through suffering,) so sweetened the pain, as entirely to remove the sense of suffering."

In accordance with the same principle, he denied the doctrine of justification in the sense of Paul. He admitted no such thing as objective justification in the sight of God, as forgiveness of sin, in the sense of deliverance from the guilt and punishment of sin. Every sin, whether committed before or after faith in the Redeemer, or baptism, must, according to his scheme, be in like manner expiated by suffering. This was a necessary law of the government of the universe, which could in no wise be dispensed with. The only exception he makes is in the case of sins of ignorance, or unintentional sins;[1] but unfortunately his explanation of expressions so vague and undefined, has not come down to us. Perhaps he intended only sins of ignorance not involving guilt, which had been committed in a state of consciousness obstructed by some involuntary confinement — analogous to the state of the rational principle held restrained in the bodies of brutes. But if, on the other hand, by justification (*δικαίωσις, δικαιοσύνη,*) is meant an inward, subjective condition of being made *just*, sanctification by the communicating of a divine life; such a doctrine had a very important and necessary place in the system of Basilides.

Among the religious and moral ideas of the *Basilidean school*, there are several other remarkable points which deserve to be particularly noticed.

What distinguishes Basilides from other Gnostics is this, — that he did not oppose the Gnosis as the highest stage in religion, to the *πίστις*, — to faith; but valued faith itself as the highest quality. Yet he distinguished in the latter a series of higher and lower degrees, corresponding to the different grades of perfection which different souls are destined to occupy in that higher spiritual world from whence they sprang. He supposed, in fact, as we have remarked, a series of grades in the higher world of spirits, of which one continually symbolized the other. Divine germs of life from all these grades had become mixed with the kingdom of darkness. Christianity is the sifting principle, whereby the spiritual natures belonging to the different grades of the spiritual world are separated, are brought to the consciousness of their

[1] Μόνας τὰς ἀκουσίους καὶ κατ' ἀγνοίαν ἀφίεσθαι. Strom. l. IV. f. 536.

own proper essence, and acquire the power of bringing it into action, and of rising to that region of the spiritual world, to which they belong by virtue of this their proper and essential being, which before had remained undeveloped. By means of Christianity, men arrive, in this manner, at the different positions for which they are fitted by their peculiar natures, each reaching the stage of perfection of which he is capable. At the entrance of the redeeming spirit into the world, the Archon, in a word, received the *σοφία φυλοκρινητική*. Now that by which this process of separation actually takes place in the different natures, and by which each individual is enabled to reach that grade of the higher world which corresponds to his spiritual essence, is faith. In this way we must understand the Basilidean school, when they taught that "faith and election, both taken together, constitute one thing, answering to each of the several grades of the spiritual world; and the faith of each individual nature in this world exactly corresponds to its supramundane election."[1]

Such being the scheme of Basilides, we may perhaps conclude, that the ordinary standard of Christian truth, as he found it existing with the majority in the church, met with more favor and experienced greater justice from him, than it usually did from other Gnostics. These ordinary believers he recognized as Christians, members of one Christian community; and he distinguished in this regard only different stages of Christian knowledge. Faith he considered the common foundation of Christian fellowship, and supposed only that besides this, which was common to all, there were different degrees of Christian consciousness. It is evident then, that he was far from ascribing the *πίστις*, considered as faith grounded on outward authority and cleaving altogether to things sensible, exclusively to the psychical class. He understood faith to be in its essence an inward principle. Faith, according to his apprehension, is a conviction that springs from the contact of the spirit with the godlike, from the attractive power exercised by the higher world over its kindred spirit. The spirit has revealed to it that higher region of existence, whence it came and to which it belongs; and it feels itself drawn towards its kindred element. Faith is an immediate fact, which renders all evidence superfluous. The spirit, in this case, grasps the truths corresponding to its own essence by an immediate intuition.[2] The soul assents to that which does not come to it through the senses, which is not presented to it under any form of sense.[3] Although the elect live on, as strangers in the world, yet, through the buoyancy of faith, they perceive the reality of the things of that higher world which beam on them from afar. But to the peculiar standing ground of each individual's faith must correspond also the peculiar standing ground of his hope,— the conviction that he shall actually enter into that higher world to which he had been

[1] *Πίστιν ἅμα καὶ ἐκλογὴν οἰκείαν εἶναι καθ' ἕκαστον διάστημα, κατ' ἐπακολούθημα δ' αὖ τῆς ἐκλογῆς τῆς ὑπερκοσμίου τὴν κοσμικὴν ἁπάσης φύσεως συνέπεσθαι πίστιν.* Strom. l. II. f. 363.

[2] *Τὰ μαθήματα ἀναποδείκτως εὑρίσκουσα καταλήψει νοητικῇ.* Strom. l. II. f. 363.

[3] Faith is a *ψυχῆς συγκατάθεσις πρός τι τῶν μὴ κινούντων αἴσθησιν διὰ τὸ μὴ παρεῖναι.* L. c. f. 371.

already united by faith; shall attain to the full possession of those blessings which faith has laid hold on.[1]

Now if we perceive something of the Pauline spirit in the peculiar prominence which Basilides gives to the idea of faith, yet presently we see him again departing widely from the Apostle Paul, inasmuch as he places the essence of faith rather in an intuitive than in a practical and ethical element; making it proceed rather from an intuition of the spirit, than from a determination of the will conditioning the direction of the heart; and it is easy to see how this difference is grounded in the very nature of his fundamental principle.

The objection which Plotinus brought against the Gnostics generally, that they neglected *ethics*, cannot be justly applied to the school of Basilides; for *Isidorus* composed a system of ethics, from which unfortunately but a very few words have been preserved to us by Clement of Alexandria.

The *moral system* of Basilides is to be gathered from his Cosmogony. Assuming a mixture of opposite principles, and considering the development of the human race as a process of purification, which was to be carried onward to its end by Christianity, he must necessarily have made the fundamental principle of his moral system to be this — namely, that the godlike nature of man should be purified from the foreign elements adhering to it, and approach continually nearer to its free development and activity. Man, according to this system, is a microcosm, — carrying within himself opposite elements from two opposite kingdoms. In the elements foreign to his higher nature,[2] are reflected the different properties of the animal, vegetable and mineral kingdoms; — hence the temperaments, desires and passions which correspond to these different properties, (for example, the mimic, sportive nature of the ape, the murderous disposition of the wolf, the hardness of the diamond, &c.;) — the collective sum of all these effluxes from the animal, vegetable and mineral worlds forms the blind, irrational soul,[3] which constantly threatens to check and disturbs the activity of man's godlike nature. The Isidorus above mentioned thought it of great importance to secure this doctrine against the objection or the misapprehension, that its tendency was to destroy moral freedom, and to furnish an excuse for all wickedness, as if it resulted from the irresistible influence of these foreign mixtures. He appeals, on the other hand, to the superior power of the godlike element. "Having, by the rational principle within us, so much the advantage, we ought to appear as conquerors over the lower creation within us."[4] "Let one but have the *will*," says he, "to do nothing but what is right, and one will acquire the *power*."[5] But this earnest will, this true love for goodness, is for the most part the only thing wanting. "We say indeed with

[1] Κατάλληλον εἶναι τῇ ἑκάστου ἐλπίδι καὶ τῆς πίστεως τὴν δωρεάν. L. c. f. 363. There is a remarkable coincidence between the definitions of faith by Basilides and Hugo a St. Victore.

[2] Appendages of matter. προσαρτήματα.

[3] The ψυχὴ προσφυὴς ἄλογος.

[4] Δεῖ δὲ τῷ λογιστικῷ κρείττονας γενομένους, τῆς ἐλάττονος ἐν ἡμῖν κτίσεως φανῆναι κρατοῦντας.

[5] Strom. l. III. f. 427: Θελησάτω μόνον ἁπαρτῆσαι τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἐπιτεύξεται.

the mouth, we will not sin. But our soul has the inclination to sin. A person in this condition is restrained only by the fear of punishment; he is destitute of love."

It might easily be inferred from the whole connection of the Basilidean system, that, in giving so high a place to the faculty of will, Isidorus would by no means ascribe to it an independent self-sufficiency, nor deny the necessity of a higher assistance of grace. By his theory of redemption, he acknowledged it, in effect, to be necessary, that the godlike in human nature should receive its true freedom and power of right action by means of its union with the higher source of divine life. How earnestly bent he was on reminding men of their need of help, is shown by the advice which he gives to a person suffering under severe trials, — words which prove at the same time how far he was from cherishing a speculative pride, that despised the ordinary means of grace enjoyed by the Christian communities. He exhorts the individual not to retire into solitude, but to ask the Christian brethren for their intercessions, to seek in *their society* the strengthening of his divine life, in order that, so strengthened, he might find confidence in fellowship with the invisible saints. He says of one in this condition, "Let him not separate himself from his brother. Let him say, I have entered into the sanctuary; I can suffer no evil."[1] If a person thus afflicted felt himself too much oppressed by the power of temptation, he should say to his Christian brother, "Lay thy hand on my head, (give me thy blessing) and he would receive spiritual and sensible assistance" (feel himself relieved in spirit and body.)[2] What importance he ascribed to prayer, is shown by the fact that he distinguishes the different moral states of the soul by the different character which prayer must assume according to those states,— that is, according as one feels constrained to thank God for the victory achieved, or to pray for new assistance for the impending conflict.[3]

The Basilideans were far from being given to extravagant ascetic notions. We have already observed how this mode of apprehending the dualistic element, which came so very near to the pure doctrine of Zoroaster, would by no means lead necessarily to a decided and morose asceticism. They allowed a value, it is true, to the unmarried life, as a means which would enable one to occupy himself undisturbed by earthly cares, solely with the affairs of the kingdom of God. But they regarded this as a thing of which all were not capable, and which was not advisable for all. They recommended marriage, as a means of subduing the sensuous impulses, to those who would otherwise have to suffer many temptations. At the ground of this view of marriage, there lies, it is true, a very low, a mere negative and sensuous notion of the institution; and hence indeed the exaggerated worth ascribed to celibacy. We do not perceive here the more profound and positive view of

[1] Οὗτος τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μὴ χωριζέσθω, λεγέτω, ὅτι εἰσελήλυθα ἐγὼ εἰς τὰ ἅγια· οὐδὲν δύναμαι παθεῖν. Strom. l. III. f. 427.

[2] Καὶ λήψεται βοήθειαν καὶ νοητὴν καὶ αἰσθητήν.

[3] This is clear from Isidore's words Ὅταν δὲ ἡ εὐχαριστία σου εἰς αἴτησιν ὑποπέζῃ.

the marriage estate, as a realization of the moral idea, or of the kingdom of God in a good of humanity: a loftier conception, which, as we have already observed, becomes faintly visible in the *Valentinian* Gnosis.

We must notice finally, one other remarkable phenomenon. In the Basilidean doctrine, there are, as we have seen, marks of a relationship with certain Ebionite elements: accordingly it agreed, in preference for the Apostle Peter, with the Christians of that party. And yet,[1] inconsistent as it may seem, Basilides acknowledges the authority also of the Apostle Paul, as is evident from the fact of his attributing so much authority to the words of this Apostle, recorded in his epistle to the Romans;[2] as well as from the influence of the Pauline ideas, so apparent in his doctrine concerning the essence of faith and concerning marriage. We hence perceive then, that these opposite elements stood by no means in such a relation to each other, as never to admit of being united in the phenomena of these times.

VALENTINE AND HIS SCHOOL.—Next after Basilides we place Valentine, who appeared nearly at the same period; though somewhat later. To judge from his Hellenistic style of expression and the Aramæan words that occur in his system, he was of Jewish descent. It is said, he was by birth an Egyptian;[3] and it may be safely presumed that he received his education likewise at Alexandria. Thence he travelled to Rome, where he seems to have spent the last years of his life; which gave him opportunity to expound and promulgate his doctrines in that part of the world. In his fundamental ideas he agrees with Basilides; but differs from him in his mode of carrying them out, and in the imaginative dress in which he clothes them. But as the doctrines of the founders of Gnostic schools, and of their later followers, from whom these doctrines received some peculiar modification, were never carefully distinguished; and as moreover many cognate doctrines, which sprang from a common source, became intermixed with the Valentinian system; it is scarcely possible to separate with certainty, from the accounts which have come down to us, those doctrines which belong properly to Valentine himself, the author of the school.

Like Basilides, Valentine placed at the summit of the chain of being the primal Essence, which he denominated the Bythos (the abyss, where the spirit is lost in contemplation.) This term, by itself, makes it evident, that he conceived under it something different from the Absolute of the Neo-Platonic philosophy, the absolutely simple. The word leads, without doubt, to the pre-supposition of an infinite fulness of life; and this same infinite, transcendent exuberance of being necessitates, in the first place, a self-conception (a καταλαμβάνειν ἑαυτόν,), a self-limitation, in case anything was to come into existence. The Neo-Platonic ὄν withdraws itself from all possibility of comprehension, on account of its absolutely simple unity; but the primal Essence of Valentine, on account

[1] The Basilideans traced back their Gnosis to Glaucias, a pretended interpreter in the service of Peter. Strom. l. VII. f. 764.

[2] See above, p. 404.

[3] According to the report of Epiphanius

of its transcendent fulness of life. The Bythos is, in a certain sense, something directly opposed to the Absolute of the Neo-Platonic philosophy. It may doubtless have happened, that with many, the former idea passed over into the latter; and indeed Valentinians are cited, who made out of the Bythos something exalted above all opposition, of which even existence could not be predicated; the Absolute, identical with Nothing.[1]

What Basilides denominates the δυνάμεις, (powers,) are in the system of Valentine the Æons.[2] The idea is peculiar to him, that as in the primal source of all existence, (the Bythos,) the fulness of all life is still undeveloped, so with the development of life from him, members were formed, standing as complements one to the other, *predominantly creative* and *predominantly receptive* Æons,[3] masculine and feminine, by whose mutual inworking the chain of unfolding life progressively advances. The feminine goes to integrate the masculine, and constitutes the Pleroma (τὸ πλήρωμα);[4] and so also the complete series of Æons, as one whole, as the fulness of the divine life flowing out from the Bythos, — which whole again constantly requires fructification, so to express it, from the same source, stands to it in the feminine relation, — was called the Pleroma. The *hidden* essence of God, no being can comprehend; it is the absolute ἀγνωστόν. He can be known only so far as he has revealed himself in the unfolding of his powers or Æons. The several Æons are various forms of manifestation, phases, names of him who in his hidden being is incomprehensible, ineffable, exalted above all possibility of conception or representation,[5] even as that first self-manifestation of the Hidden, the Monogenes, is called distinctively the *invisible name of the Bythos* (that wherein the Bythos has conceived himself, the πρῶτον κατάληπτον, the κατάληψις τοῦ ἀγενήτου.) It is a profound idea of the Valentinian system, that as all existence has its ground in the self-limitation of the Bythos, so the existence of all created beings depends on *limitation*. While each remains within the limits of its own individuality, and is that which it should be at its own proper place in the evolution of life, all things can be fitly adjusted to one another, and the true harmony be preserved in the chain of unfolding life. But as soon as any being would overstep these limits, as soon as any being, instead of striving to know God in that manifesta-

[1] Irenæus, who states the different opinions of the Valentinians respecting the Bythos, observes: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἄζυγον λέγουσιν, μήτε ἄρρενα, μήτε θήλειαν, μήτε ὅλως ὄντα τι. Iren. I. 1, at the end. The disciples of such Gnostics would soar, in their speculations, above their master, — would ascend to a primal ground still more simple. Irenæus cites one of this description, whom he not unaptly describes as ὑψηλότερον καὶ γνωστικώτερον ἐπεκτεινόμενος, who knew how to distinguish between the μονότης, the ἑνότης and the ἕν, and was in the habit of saying of every *principle*, so I name it. In this Irenæus finds good matter of ridicule: ὡμολόγηκε ὅτι αὐτὸς ὀνόματα τέθεικε τῷ πλάσματι, ὑπὸ μηδενὸς πρότερον ἄλλου τεθειμένα, § 3.

[2] For the explanation of this word, see above.

[3] As in all the rest of creation, which presents a symbol of that highest order of the universe, this two-fold series of factors may be traced.

[4] Which word these Theosophers, who assuredly never thought of adhering strictly to the grammatical signification of their terms, understood perhaps at one and the same time, in an active and passive sense: τὸ πληροῦν and τὸ πληρούμενον.

[5] The Æons are μορφαὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὀνόματα τοῦ ἀνωνομάστου.

tion of himself which God makes to him at his own proper position, boldly attempts to penetrate into his hidden essence, such a being runs the hazard of plunging into nothing. Instead of apprehending the Real, he loses himself in the Unsubstantial. Horus, (ὅρος,) the genius of limitation, of the finite, the power that fixes and guards the bounds of individual existence, restoring them wherever they have been disturbed, occupies therefore an important place in the system of Valentine; and the Gnosis here, so to speak, bears witness against itself. The ideas of *Horus* and of the *Redeemer* must of necessity be closely related in the Valentinian system; as the forming and redeeming of existence are kindred conceptions, and the principle of limitation in respect to both occupies an important place in this system. In fact, Horus was also called by many λυτρώτης and σωτήρ, Redeemer and Saviour. There are occasional intimations of a scheme, according to which the Horus was regarded as only a particular mode of the operation of one redeeming spirit; just as the Valentinian system gave different names to this power, according to the different points of his activity and his different modes of operation, extending through all the grades of existence. Others, indeed, transformed these different modes of operation into so many different hypostases.

In the Valentinian doctrines concerning this Horus, there are, lying at bottom, profound ideas on the process of development of the divine life in general and in detail; important in their bearing on Christian ethics, and the mode of contemplating the great facts of history. Valentine's school perceived that, in the process of development of the divine life, two moments must concur, a negative and a positive, both standing necessarily connected with each other, — the purification of the spiritual individuality from the foreign elements by which it had become vitiated, into which it threatened to become dissolved, — and the establishment of the purified individuality in itself, its firm and steadfast shaping, its assumption of its own nature. Two operations were ascribed to the Horus; the *negative*, by virtue of which he defines every existence within itself, separates and keeps away from it every foreign element;[1] and the *positive*, by virtue of which he fixes, moulds, and establishes in their own peculiar essence, those that have been purified from the foreign elements by which that essence was disturbed.[2] The first operation was to be designated preëminently by the name ὅρος, the second by the term σταυρός. In this latter appellation there is evidently an allusion to the significations cross, stake, palisade. Those two appellations, however, may perhaps not always have been so sharply discriminated; since σταυρός with the signification *cross* might in fact also be a symbol of the separating, destroying energy of the Horus.[3] Where Christ says, "I am not come to bring peace on the earth, but the sword," they found the description of that negative energy of the Horus, which separates from

[1] The ἐνεργεία μεριστικὴ καὶ διοριστική.

[2] The ἐνεργεία ἑδραστικὴ καὶ στηριστική.

[3] Clement of Alexandria also employs the cross as a symbol of the divine power, whereby the soul is made free from the elements of the world, from sensuous lusts. Ἀπολῦσαι καὶ ἀποστῆσαι καὶ ἀφορίσαι ὁ σταυρὸς σημαίνει, and on this is founded the ἀνάπαυσις. Strom. lib. II. f. 407.

one another the godlike and the ungodlike. And where John the Baptist announces the appearance of Christ, with the fan, and with the fire by which the chaff should be consumed, it was considered by the Valentinians as a description of this activity of the Horus as connected with the history of the world, representing how he would destroy all the ὕλη, and purify the redeemed. In the passage where Christ says, "No man can be my disciple, unless he takes up his cross and follows me," they saw a description of that divine power, symbolized by the cross, whereby each individual, becoming purified from what is foreign to him, and attaining to a self-subsistent shaping of the higher life in his own individuality and to a well-defined impression of this individuality refined by a godlike life, first becomes a true disciple of Christ.[1]

While Basilides ascribed the mixture of the divine element with matter to an encroachment of the kingdom of Darkness on the kingdom of Light, Valentine, on the other hand, attributed it to a disturbance originating in the Pleroma, and a consequent sinking down of the divine germ of life from the Pleroma into matter. Like Basilides, he acknowledged the manifestation of a divine wisdom in the world; but here also the lower is only a *symbol* of the higher. It is not the divine wisdom itself which is the soul of this world; not the Æon σοφία, but its immature birth, which, before it can reach its maturity, needs to pass through a gradual development. The idea which lies at bottom here is, that in the world we are presented with a revelation of divine wisdom going on to unfold itself; that through the appearance of Christ and through the redemption, this manifestation first attains to its end; that, contemplated in this connection, the world presents the image of the divine wisdom in its process of development. Accordingly that Æon, the Heavenly Wisdom, rejoices, — when everything has been made clear by the appearance of Christ, — to find that it has recovered its lost idea (ἐνθύμησις) — since now the manifestation corresponds to the idea, and the latter presents itself in the former to immediate vision. A symbol of this was, in his opinion, the woman who lighted a candle to seek after the lost piece of silver, and finally after the house had been swept, rejoices to find it. Luke 15: 8.

Accordingly he distinguishes an ἄνω and a κάτω σοφία, — the Achamoth.[2] This latter is the mundane soul, from whose mixture with the ὕλη springs all living existence, in numberless gradations; higher in proportion to its freedom from contact with the ὕλη, lower in proportion as it is drawn downward and affected by matter. Hence arise the *three* ranks or orders of existence. 1. The divine germs of life, superior by their nature to matter, and akin to the σοφία, to the mundane soul, and to the Pleroma, — the spiritual natures, φύσεις πνευματικαί. 2. The natures originating in the life that has been divided by the mixture of the ὕλη, the psychical natures, φύσεις ψυχικαί; with which begins an altogether new order of existence, an image of that higher mundane system, in a subordinate grade; and finally, 3. The ungodlike nature, which resists all amelioration, and whose tendency is only to destroy —

[1] Iren. lib. I. c. 3, § 5.

[2] אַכְמוֹת.

the nature of blind appetency and passion. Betwixt all those natures sprung from the evolution of the divine life, (which flows out from the Bythos through the mediation of the Æons,) — from the Pleroma down to the germs of life which have fallen into humanity, the scattered seed that is to attain to its maturity in this earthly world — there are only differences of *degree;* but betwixt those three orders of existence, there is an *essential* difference of *kind.* Hence each of these orders must have its own independent, governing principle; though every process of culture and development ultimately leads back to the Bythos, who, through the mediation of these manifold organs, corresponding to the numberless gradations of existence, influences all, and whose law alone is supreme. He can never himself, however, come into immediate contact with what is alien from his essence. Accordingly there must appear at that subordinate stage of existence which intervenes between the perfect, the godlike, and the ungodlike, the material, a being[1] — as the type of the highest — who, while believing that he acts independently, must yet subserve those general laws, from which nothing can be exempted, in realizing the highest ideas, to the bounds of matter. This being is to the psychical world what the Bythos is to the higher; — with this difference only, that he involuntarily acts as the instrument only of the latter. This is the *Demiurge* of Valentine. Moreover, the *Hyle* has its representative principle, through which its activity is exerted; but a principle which, by its nature, is not formative and creative, but only *destructive;* namely, *Satan.*[2] 1. The nature of the πνευματικόν, the spiritual order, is to be essentially in relationship with God (the ὁμοούσιον τῷ θεῷ;) hence the life of unity, the undivided, absolutely simple (οὐσία ἑνική, μονοειδής.) 2. The essence of the ψυχικοί is separation, division into multiplicity, manifoldness; but which subordinates itself to a higher unity, whence it admits of being derived, first unconsciously, then consciously. 3. The essence of Satan and of his whole kingdom is the direct opposite to all unity; separation and disunion in itself, without the least recipiency, without any point of coalescence whatever, for a unity; with the striving to dissipate all unity, to extend its own inherent disunion to everything, and to rend everything asunder.[3] This principle has no power to fix, to assert anything, but only the power to deny; it is unable to create, to produce, to form, but only to destroy, to decompose.[4] The first of these grades constitutes, by its nature, imperishable life, the essential ἀφθαρσία; the ψυχικόν, on the other hand, stands midway betwixt the imperishable and the perishable, — the soul of nature being mortal, and capable of being made immortal only through a higher informing power. The ψυχικοί attain to immortality, or they fall a natural prey to death, according as they yield themselves by the

[1] The μεσότης.

[2] As Heracleon defines him: μέρος ἓν ὅλης τῆς ὕλης. Vid. Orig. in Joann. T. XIII. § 16.

[3] The οὐσία πολυσχιδής, that seeks to assimilate every thing to itself.

[4] Thus defined by Heracleon, who says Οὐ γεννᾷ τοιαῦτά τινα τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει, φθοροποιὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀναλίσκοντα τοὺς ἐμβληθέντας εἰς αὐτά. Orig. in Joann. T. XX. § 20.

bent of their will to the godlike or to the ungodlike. The essential being of Satan, as of the ὕλη, is death itself, annihilation, the negation of all existence, — which in the end, when every existence that has been rent by it shall have developed itself to a mature individuality and become sufficiently established in itself, will be vanquished by the force of the Positive, and having attracted within its sphere all kindred ungodlike natures, resolve itself into its own nothingness. 1. The essential being of the first is the evolution of pure life from within outward; an activity, not of one thing outwardly on another, but one which has no obstacles to overcome; a life and agency exalted above the antithesis of rest and motion. 2. The essential being of the ὕλη is, in itself considered, the rest of death; but a spark of life having fallen into it, and communicated to it a certain *analogon* of life, it became a wild, self-contradictory impulse, as it is exhibited in Satan, its representative, to whom was attributed, and as well to all men akin to him by their nature, no rational consciousness, no self-determining will, but only a blind, wild impulsive nature, only desire and passion.[1] When he looked at the crimes committed among men, which filled him with abhorrence, this was the only explanation which could present itself to a man like Valentine.[2] 3. Peculiar to the *Demiurge* and his subjects the *Psychici*, is the propensity to create, to produce without themselves, — a busy activity. They would always be doing, without really understanding, as is common with such busy natures, what they are about,[3] without being really conscious to themselves of the ideas that govern them.[4]

The doctrine of redemption occupied a place no less important in the Valentinian than in the Basilidean system, forming properly its central point; as might be gathered from what has already been said concerning the relation of the notions of creation and of redemption in this scheme. It was yet more the aim and effort of this system to comprehend the doctrine of redemption in the connection of the universal process of development; — as to go back to the first germ of disharmony in the universe, so also to point out the necessity of a redemption in its primal ground. It must be allowed, this was so done, that the speculative interest was continually flying more and more beyond the practical. As a process of unfolding life pervades every region of existence, and as the *disharmony*, which, in its germ, began in the Pleroma itself, extended itself from thence still more widely; so the *whole mundane course can only then attain to its end*, when harmony has been restored, as in the Pleroma, so through all the grades of existence. What takes place in the Pleroma, must be imaged forth in all the other gradations of being. Inasmuch, then, as the work of redemption takes place in different gradations of existence, and the same law is

[1] Heracleon says: Τὸν διάβολον μὴ ἔχειν θέλημα, ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμίαν. Orig. in Joann. T. XX. § 20.

[2] Notice the remarkable manner in which a Valentinian expresses himself on this point in the dialogue on Free Will, ascribed to Methodius. Galland. Bibl. patr. T. III. f. 762. Consult, however, on this tract, the investigations in my "Genetic development of the Gnostic systems," p. 205.

[3] Φύσις πολύεργος, πολυπράγμων.

[4] For evidence, see Heracleon, Orig. in Joann. T. XIII. c. 16, 25, 30, 51, 59; T. XX. c. 20.

here carried out in different forms at different positions, so accordingly it is the same agent of the manifestation of the hidden God, the same agent through whom the life that flowed out from God is again reunited with him, who, working progressively onward to the consummation of all things, presents himself under different hypostases, according as he accomplishes his work at different stages of existence. Thus it is the same idea, which is represented in a Monogenes, a Logos, a Christ, a Soter. The Soter is the Redeemer of the entire world without the Pleroma; and hence also its former; where we must take into view what has been said already respecting the two-fold activity of the Horus. By the process of *forming*, the higher element is, in the first place, freed from its adherent matter, evolved from an unorganized, formless existence to a determinate one, with its proper organic form. By the redemption, the higher individuality first attains to mature, full development, and to clear self-consciousness. Redemption completes the process of formation. All the divine life of the Pleroma concentrates and reflects itself in the Soter, and through him works farther onward to individual shaping, to the sowing of the spiritual natures, affining to the Pleroma, in the world, and their maturation to perfected existence. The Christ of the Pleroma[1] is the working, the Soter without the Pleroma, the recipient, forming, perfecting principle.[2]

The Soter first proves his redeeming, formative power on that yet immature *mundane soul*, originating in the Pleroma; — the same power which was afterwards to be extended to the kindred, spiritual natures that sprang out from her, the common mother of the spiritual life in the lower world, (see above.) The Soter is properly the former and ruler of the world, as he is its redeemer; for the formation of the world is in truth the *first beginning* of the process of development, which can be brought to its full completion only through the redemption. The Soter, as the inward, actuating principle, inspires in the mundane soul, destined to reunion (syzygia) with him,[3] the plastic ideas; and she communicates them to the Demiurge, who conceives that he acts independently. The latter is, without knowing it, actuated and impelled by the might of these ideas in forming the world. Thus the world is a picture of the divine glory, designed by the Sophia or the Soter, as the artists, but in the execution of which the Demiurge is employed only as an instrument. Since every picture, however, is, from its nature, but an imperfect representation of the prototype, and can be really understood only by him who has the intuition of the latter, so the Demiurge with his creation is but an imperfect representa-

[1] In the *τόπος μεσότητος*.

[2] So says Heracleon of the Soter in his relation to Christ. The former, he observes, receives the divine seed, yet undeveloped, out of the Pleroma from the latter; and gives it the first shaping towards determinate, individual existence, *τὴν πρώτην μόρφωσιν, τὴν κατὰ γένεσιν, εἰς μορφὴν καὶ φωτισμὸν καὶ περιγραφὴν ἀγαγὼν καὶ ἀναδείξας*. Orig. in Joann. T. II. c. 15. To bring to light, to shape, to individualize, are, with the Gnostics, equivalent notions. The undetermined, unorganized, answers in the spiritual province to the *ὕλη*. Accordingly, in the Valentinian fragments, in Irenæus, lib. I. c. 8, § 4, — to the *προβάλλειν σπερματικῶς τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν* is opposed the *μορφοῦν, φωτίζειν, φανεροῦν*. Christ scatters the seed, the Soter gathers the harvest. Orig. in Joann. T. XIII. p. 48

[3] *Κάτω σοφία*, Achamoth.

tion of the divine glory; and he only, who has caught a glimpse of the revelation of the invisible divine essence within himself, can rightly understand the world as a symbol or picture, and the Demiurge as a prophet of the Supreme God. The inner revelation of God, which is the portion of the *πνευματικοί*, is a confirmation of the outward, a credential for the Demiurge, as God's representative. Valentine himself expresses the matter thus:[1] "As the picture falls below the living countenance, so does the world fall below the living God. Now what is the cause of the picture? The majesty of the countenance, which furnished the painter with his type, in order that it might be glorified by the revelation of its name; for no picture has been invented as a self-subsistent thing, (every picture necessarily refers back to an original type.) But as the name of that which is represented supplies the deficiencies of the picture, so the *invisible* idea of God (his invisible essence as it reveals itself in the spirit which is related to God) contributes to the verification of the copy."

Man is the being through whom the name of God was to be revealed in this world; the being who, through the invisible revelation of God *in himself*, was to mediate the connection betwixt the copy and the prototype; accordingly, to supply what was lacking to the world *in itself* towards a complete revelation of the Divine Being. That man occupies this important position in creation, belongs among the fundamental ideas of the Valentinian system. Humanity and the revelation of God are conceptions which here stand in intimate connection with each other. Hence the primal man makes his appearance as one of the Æons; and in another Valentinian representation it is expressed thus: "When God willed to reveal himself, this was called man."[2] But in respect to this point also, we must distinguish what the Demiurge intended, and what he was necessitated to do, in an unconscious manner, as the instrument of the higher order of the world. He combined with his angels in a higher ethereal region, paradise, the third or fourth heaven,[3] to create man as their common image. This being, as lord of the world, was to represent the Demiurge in it. But here also the latter acted as the instrument of a higher order of the world, according to the ideas inspired in him by the Soter and the Sophia.

[1] Strom. l. IV. f. 509: Ὁπόσον ἐλάττων ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ ζῶντος προσώπου, τοσοῦτον ἥσσων ὁ κόσμος τοῦ ζῶντος αἰῶνος, (which name, according to what we have already observed, is a distinctive appellation of the Supreme God himself.) Τίς οὖν αἰτία τῆς εἰκόνος; Μεγαλωσύνη τοῦ προσώπου, παρεσχημένου τῷ ζωγράφῳ τὸν τῦπον, ἵνα τιμηθῇ δι' ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ, (I understand this as referring to his own name, which was to be revealed by the creation,) οὐ γὰρ αὐθεντικῶς εὑρέθη μορφή· ἀλλὰ τὸ ὄνομα, (the name as it reveals itself immediately in the higher self-consciousness, or in the spiritual natures) ἐπλήρωσε τὸ ὑστέρημα ἐν πλάσει· συνέργει δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀόρατον εἰς πίστιν τοῦ πεπλασμένου. (This is without doubt the neuter = πλάσμα). It may be, that Valentine here conceived the Demiurge and the world formed by him, as constituting one image of the Supreme God, analogous to the θεὸς γενητός of Plato, in the same way as Philo, in many places, unites together the Logos and the world animated by him. Yet this does not necessarily appear from his language in this instance.

[2] Ὅτε ἠθέλησεν ἐπιδεῖξαι αὐτὸν, τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος ἐλέχθε. Iren. lib. I. c. 12, § 3.

[3] See those Gnostic excerpta of the Didascal. Anatol. or Θεοδότου ἐπιτομαί, opp. Clement. f. 797, B.: Ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ τῷ τετάρτῳ οὐρανῷ δημιουργεῖται, and Iren. lib. I. c. 5, § 2.

Unknown to himself, some of the seed of the divine life was communicated to him from the Pleroma, and this passed over from him into man.[1] Thus was revealed in the appearance of man, that prototype of the heavenly man from the Pleroma; and the being who was to represent only the crowning point of the cosmical principle, exhibited in his appearance tokens of something far higher. The Demiurge and his angels were seized with amazement, when they beheld a strange and higher power enter their kingdom; for they had not as yet attained to the conscious recognition of that higher order of the world, and to a free obedience of it. This could be brought about only by the redemption. Thus they were astounded at their own work, which threatened to exalt itself above themselves. As Valentine beheld the same law pervading every grade of existence, so he supposed he found this fact recurring in every case, where men, animated by the inspiration of lofty ideas, while endeavoring to represent them in their works, produce effects not anticipated by themselves and are astonished at their own productions; like the artist, who, having formed the image of a god, afterwards falls down and worships it. Valentine thus expresses himself on this point: "Just as fear seized the angels in the presence of that form, when it expressed something greater than was to be expected from such a creation, because a seed of the higher essence had been invisibly imparted to it, so also among the generations of men in this world, their works became objects of fear to their very authors; as statues, pictures and everything wrought by human hands with any sort of reference to the name of God; for Adam, who had been formed to represent the name of man, excited fear of the primal man, as if the latter existed in him."[2]

The cosmical principle must, then, endeavor to assert itself, in its self-subsistence and dominion, against the danger with which man, bearing witness of the supramundane essence, threatened it. The Demiurge and his powers combine to hold man in subjection, to suppress in him the consciousness of his higher nature. They plunge him from the psychical region of the third heaven into the world won from the Hyle and built on its verge, and they environ his psychical nature with a body formed out of matter.[3] But that this should so happen, did not proceed from the arbitrary will of the Demiurge. In this also he must act as the instrument of that higher wisdom; in carrying out his own

[1] Ἔσχεν ὁ Ἀδὰμ, ἀδήλως αὐτῷ, ὑπὸ τῆς σοφίας ἐνσπαρὲν, τὸ σπέρμα τὸ πνευματικόν. Didascal. Anatol. f. 797.

[2] Καὶ ὥσπερ φόβος ἐπὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ πλάσματος ὑπῆρξε τοῖς ἀγγέλοις, ὅτε μείζονα ἐφθέγξατο τῆς πλάσεως, διὰ τὸν ἀόρατον ἐν αὐτῷ σπέρμα δεδωκότα, τὴν ἄνωθεν οὐσίαν καὶ παῤῥησιαζόμενον, οὕτω, (here the apodosis begins,) καὶ ἐν ταῖς γενεαῖς τῶν κοσμικῶν ἀνθρώπων φόβοι τὰ ἔργα τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῖς ποιοῦσιν ἐγένετο, οἷον ἀνδριάντες καὶ εἰκόνες καὶ πάντων, (here an ἅ has doubtless slipped out, or πανθ' ἅ may be the reading,) αἱ χεῖρες ἀνύουσιν εἰς ὄνομα θεοῦ· εἰς γὲ ὄνομα ἀνθρώπου πλασθεὶς Ἀδὰμ φόβον παρέσχεν προόντος ἀνθρώπου, ὡς δὴ αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ καθεστῶτος. Strom. lib. II. f. 375.

[3] The coats of skin, the χιτῶνες δερμάτιναι of Genesis, which were commonly so understood by the Theosophists of this period. Thus we must supply the hiatus which has come down to us in Valentine's system, when it is said at the conclusion of the above-cited passage, "The angels would have speedily destroyed their work;" — or we must suppose that sentence was hypothetical, i. e. they would have destroyed, unless they had been prevented in an invisible manner by a higher power.

will, he must subserve the end of a higher will; the principle of divine life was to penetrate through all the grades of existence, extend itself even to the bounds of the Hyle, enter into the realms of death itself, in order to bring about its destruction. But this was the only way in which it could be done.

That which is to represent humanity at large, becomes actually realized, then, by those only who bear within them that higher germ of divine life springing from what had been invisibly communicated to the Demiurge (the higher spiritual natures.) They are the salt and light of the earth, the leaven for entire humanity. The soul (ψυχή) is but the vehicle of the πνευματικόν, to enable the latter to enter into the temporal world, in which it must unfold itself to maturity. When this end is attained, the *spirit*, which is destined only for the life of intuition, will leave behind this vehicle in the lower sphere; and every spiritual nature, as the recipient, feminine element in relation to the higher spiritual world, will be exalted to intimate union (Syzygia) with its correlative angelic nature in the Pleroma. Only the higher faculty of immediate intuition — this is Valentine's meaning — will then be active; all those powers and modes of operation of the soul which had been directed to the temporal and the finite, as the faculty of reflection, of which the ψυχή is according to Valentine's notions the comprehending sum, will then, in the Pleroma, entirely fall away.[1]

The attractive power exerted by the godlike on everything, even while those that are affected by it are unable to understand it or explain it to themselves — is a favorite idea of Valentine's. The Demiurge is attracted by the spiritual natures scattered among the Jewish people, without knowing the reason of it. Hence he made of such, prophets, priests and kings. Hence it was, that the prophets particularly were able to point forward to that higher order of things, which was first to enter into humanity through the Soter. According to the Valentinian theory, there was a four-fold principle at work in the prophets: 1. The psychical principle, the humanly limited, the soul left to itself; 2. *The inspiration* of this ψυχή, which proceeded from the Demiurge's influence upon it; 3. The πνευματικόν, or spiritual element, left to itself; 4. The pneumatic inspiration, which proceeded from the informing Sophia.[2] By this theory, and the application of these four principles, Valentine could distinguish in the writings of the prophets different utterances of higher and lower kind and import, and a different higher and lower sense of the same passages. 1. The purely human. 2. The *isolated* prophecies of events, which the Demiurge, who, though not omniscient, yet glanced through an enlarged circle of the future, could communicate, — the prediction of a Messiah, likewise proceeding from him, but still enveloped in the temporal, Jewish form; the prediction of the Messiah, as the Demiurge meant to send him, — a psychical Messiah for the psychical natures, the ruler over a kingdom of this world. 3. The ideas touching on the Christian economy, and pointing to that, — the transfigured Messianic element, set forth with more or less of purity,

[1] Comp. Aristot. de anima, lib. III. c. 5.

[2] Vid. Iren. lib. I. c. 7, § 3 et 4.

according as it had proceeded barely from the higher spiritual nature, or from the immediate influence of the Sophia. This view might lead to remarkable investigations respecting the mixture of the Divine and the Human in the prophets, and to fruitful results connected with the exposition of their writings. We here observe, emerging for the first time, a more profound apprehension of the idea of inspiration — a striving to bring the religious and scientific interests to harmonize with each other in the exposition of the Old Testament.

The question now arises, whether Valentine acknowledged the rays of higher truth to exist barely among the Jews, whether he confined the spiritual natures to the Jews alone, or whether he admitted that they were diffused also among the heathens. True, he held, according to Heracleon,[1] the Jews to belong to the kingdom of the Demiurge; the pagans, to the kingdom of matter, or of Satan; and the Christians, to the people of the Supreme God; but this does not prove, that he meant to exclude everything of a higher nature from the pagans; for he supposed there existed in Judaism — although he assigned it preëminently to the Demiurge — scattered examples of the higher pneumatic element; and although he assigned Christendom to the Supreme God, yet he saw even among Christians a large class of psychical natures. He is speaking, then, of the *predominant and prevailing* character only; and so might recognize even among the pagans, notwithstanding the predominantly *Hylic* element in paganism, a sprinkling of the Pneumatic. He was indeed compelled to do so by his own principles; since the higher, spiritual life (the πνευματικόν,) was to pass through every grade of existence to the bounds of matter, in order to prepare the way for the total destruction of the kingdom of the ὕλη. What Valentine says, in the passage above cited, respecting the power of art employed in representing the images of the gods, allows us to infer, that he judged the polytheistic system with more lenity than the ordinary Jews, who looked upon the Gentile gods only as evil spirits; that, resting on Acts 17 : 23, he believed it possible to trace even in this system indications — corrupted though they might be through the predominance of the material principle — of an unknown God, extending his uncomprehended influence over all. Accordingly, Valentine actually alludes, in the preserved fragment of a Homily,[2] to the vestiges of truth dispersed also in the writings of the pagans, wherein the inward nature of God's spiritual people, of the πνευματικοί, scattered through the human race, reveals itself: "Much of that which is written in the books of pagans, is found written in the church of God; this common truth is the word out of the heart, the law written in the heart; — it is the people of the beloved (i. e. this common higher consciousness is the sign of the Soter's scattered community, of the πνευματικοί) who are loved by him and love him in return."

The Soter, who from the beginning has directed *the whole process of development* of the spiritual life-germs that fell from the Pleroma to form a new world, *the invisible former and ruler* of this new world, —

[1] Orig in Joann. T. XIII. c. 16. [2] Clem. Strom. l. VI. f. 641.

he must now enter at last himself *immediately* into the mundane sphere, for the purpose of extending the act of redemption, — which he had originally accomplished on the mother of all spiritual life, the *world-soul*, the *Sophia*, — to all the spiritual life that has flowed from her, and thus carry the entire work to its completion. Everything, down to the Hylic element, struggling against all existence, was, *each after its own degree*, capable of being ennobled. The Soter must, therefore, in order to place everything — as well the psychical as the spiritual natures — in training for that stage of the higher life of which each is capable, enter into union with all these gradations of existence. Besides, in following the course which is in harmony with nature, he could only enter into union with the spiritual nature, and into that only in connection with a soul (ψυχή,) in this world of time.

The doctrine concerning Christ must always be conditioned by the peculiar mode of apprehending the relation of the world to God, and the doctrine concerning man. In both these respects, this system sets clearly forth the necessity of a redemption, and that too in its true import, as *a grand historical fact*, the purpose of which is to restore harmony between the different gradations of existence, to fill up the chasm which separated the world and heaven from each other, and to raise the Pneumatic natures, who never could have attained by themselves alone to the full consciousness and the full exercise of their higher nature, to fellowship with the higher world intimately related to their own essence. But still it was a consequence grounded in the separation here supposed between the kingdom of the Demiurge and that of the Supreme God, that all in this world could not be equally adapted for the benefits of redemption and equally penetrated by its principle. Certain antitheses were here assumed to exist in human nature itself, which excluded the possibility of a uniform appropriation of this nature in its completeness by the Redeemer and the redemption. In this system, the purely Human (the psychical nature) was too far separated from the properly Divine (the pneumatic nature,) the oneness of God's image in man too feebly recognized, to allow of the full and adequate apprehension of the historical Christ finding admission into the realization of the original type of Humanity. The antitheses which made their appearance in the cosmology and the anthropology, as originally given in the constitution of the world and of man, must also betray their presence once more in the Christology. We cannot allow, that the tendency of the Valentinian system bore towards the hypothesis of a merely proto-typic or ideal Christ, and towards making the Christ of history a barely accidental point of attachment for this idea; but in this respect we can say *nothing more*, than that his principles admitted only of a one-sided, mutilated apprehension, as well of the proto-typic, as of the historical Christ. The fundamental defect is to be traced, in one word, to the reaction of the great principle of the ancient world in conceiving of the *godlike*, as being the *super-human*. Though Valentine could attribute to the human element in Christ a greater significancy than Basilides, still he could never, according to those principles, recognize in him the full significancy of the human element in connection

with the divine, never understand their true union in him, nor even allow the Human itself to be altogether human, for there was still somewhat in the human that belonged only to the kingdom of the ὕλη.

The Demiurge had promised his people a Redeemer, a Messiah, who should release them from the dominion of the Hylic power, bring about the destruction of all that opposed itself to his own kingdom, rule in his name over all, and bless those that were obedient with all manner of earthly felicity. He sent this Messiah, who was the express image of the Demiurge, down from his heaven; but this exalted being could enter into no union with matter. Destined to bring about the annihilation of the material element, how could he indeed assume any part of it to himself? With the material body, he had been under the necessity of assuming also its kindred material spirit of life,[1] — that fountain of all corrupt appetites and desires; and how could he be the Redeemer, if the principle of evil were present in his own nature? The Demiurge formed, then, for the psychical Messiah, a body composed of the finest ethereal elements of the heaven from which he was sent down into this world. This body was so wonderfully constituted,[2] that it could be visible to outward sense, and submit to all sensible actions and affections, and yet in a way altogether different from that of ordinary, earthly bodies.[3] But the miraculous birth of Jesus consisted in this — that the psychical nature, descended from the heaven of the Demiurge, together with the ethereal body which it brought with it from the same region, was ushered into the light of this world through Mary, only as a channel of conveyance.[4] Yet this psychical Messiah would have been inadequate to the task of accomplishing even the work assigned him by the Demiurge. It required a higher power to vanquish the kingdom of the ὕλη. The Demiurge acted here, as in everything else, simply in unconscious subordination to the Soter. The latter had decreed on the time when he would unite himself with this psychical Messiah as his instrument, with a view to accomplish the work ordained and promised by the Demiurge, in a far higher sense than the Demiurge himself had divined; to found a kingdom of the Messiah, of a far loftier description, the true character of which had been only intimated in the sublimest descriptions of the prophets, which the Demiurge himself had been unable to understand.

The psychical Messiah, who had no presentiment of the destination that awaited him when united with the Soter, meanwhile displayed from the beginning the ideal of ascetic holiness. By virtue of the peculiar constitution of his body, he could exercise an extraordinary control over matter. He ate and drank, it is true, like others; letting himself down, in this respect, to human infirmity. But yet he did so without being subject to like affections as other men. He did everything after a godlike manner.[5]

At his baptism in the Jordan, where he was to receive from John the Baptist, the Demiurge's representative, his solemn consecration to the

[1] The ψυχὴ ἄλογος. [2] Ἐξ οἰκονομίας. [4] Ὡς διὰ σωλήνος.
[3] Σῶμα ἐκ τῆς ἀφανοῦς ψυχικῆς οὐσίας. [5] Clem. Strom. lib. III. f. 451 Theodot. Didascal. Anatol.

office of Messiah, the Soter, under whose invisible guidance everything had been so directed, entered into union with him, descending in the form of a dove. As to the question, whether the psychical Messiah possessed with his soul also a pneumatic element, so that the πνεῦμα descended at the same time with the soul as its vehicle, for the purpose of unfolding itself in this world, and then serving as an instrument of the descended Soter, or whether the Soter, on his first entrance into this world, took from the Sophia a spiritual nature as his vehicle, so that he might be capable of uniting himself with a human nature, and thus the higher pneumatic principle was first communicated to the Messiah of the Demiurge at his baptism; — as to this point — there might be a difference of opinion among the Valentinian schools themselves.[1]

According to Valentine's doctrine, as well as that of Basilides, the *appearance* of the redeeming spirit in humanity, and his union with the psychical Messiah, must constitute the principal thing in the work of redemption. He agreed with Basilides also in supposing that the Soter, at the passion, left the psychical Messiah to himself; and this passion, as it did not light on a material body, capable of suffering, but on a psychical one, could not possibly be regarded by him according to its full import. Yet it is certain, that, so far as it respects the mode of contemplating Christ's passion, the Jewish element, in the case of the Valentinian Gnosis, exercised no such important influence as in the case of the Gnosis of Basilides; and that the Valentinians were far better prepared to understand the significancy of this passion for the Christian consciousness. A power for the overcoming of evil and for the purification of the nature beset with it, was ascribed to the sufferings of the psychical Christ. We have, in fact, already become acquainted with the idea of the Valentinian system, that the *same law must be*

[1] The latter seems to be the view expressed in a passage of Heracleon, Orig. T. VI. § 23. Grabe Spiceleg. T. II. p. 89, in which passage I once supposed, (see my Genetische Entwickelung, p. 149,) though erroneously, I had found the doctrine of a proper incarnation of the Soter, and of his union with the human nature from its first development. Heracleon — on John 1 : 27 — correctly explains the sense of the passage in the first place, after his usual manner; namely, that "John acknowledged himself unworthy to perform even the meanest service for the Redeemer," — and then proceeds arbitrarily to imply, in these simple words, a higher sense, in accordance with his own theosophic ideas: Οὐκ ἐγώ εἰμι ἱκανὸς, ἵνα δι ἐμὲ κατέλθῃ ἀπὸ μεγέθους καὶ σάρκα λάβῃ, ὡς ὑπόδημα, περὶ ἧς ἐγὼ λόγον ἀποδοῦναι οὐ δύναμαι, οὐδὲ διηγήσασθαι ἢ ἐπιλῦσαι τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς οἰκονομίαν. We can hardly understand by "the flesh" here, which the Soter took on him when he descended from the higher region bordering on the πλήρωμα and the τόπος μεσότητος, the body of the psychical Messiah, formed by a special οἰκονομία; for the subject of discourse here is undoubtedly the Soter, who revealed himself to John at the baptism; and this Soter, at all events, united himself, according to the Valentinian theory, not with the *body*, but with the *psychical Messiah*, *who was clothed with* this body. Consequently John, here representing the person of the Demiurge, could not have thus expressed his wonder at this wonderful body, which had been formed by the Demiurge himself. But the Valentinians were used to denominate every *outward envelop*, *every vehicle* of a superior being that descended to a lower region of existence, a σάρξ. The Sophia gave the Soter a σπέρμα πνευματικόν, that so with this vehicle he might descend to the earth, and, through its medium, enter into union with the ψυχή. We have the evidence of this in the commencing words of the Didascal. Anatol., which are as follows: Ὁ προέβαλεν σαρκίον τῷ λόγῳ, (equivalent to the Soter,) ἡ σοφία τὸ πνευματικὸν σπέρμα, τοῦτο στολισάμενος κατῆλθεν ὁ σωτήρ. It was of this wonderful economy, then, that Heracleon was speaking.

carried into effect at the different stages of existence, in order to the *restoration of the harmony of the universe*. The cross, as we have already observed, was considered in this system a symbol of the might that purifies a nature from foreign elements, and leads it as well to self-confinement within the limits of its own proper nature, as to fixedness and constancy there. Now the crucifixion of Christ represented the activity of this power in this lower world. The manner in which the psychical Messiah was stretched on the cross, and with this, over the lower creation,—exhibited himself sharing in the sufferings of humanity,—is a symbol of that first redeeming act, where the Soter received the suffering Sophia, stretched over her the Stauros, purified her from every foreign element, and conducted back her dissipating existence within its proper confines. A similar operation is now imaged forth by this act of the psychical Christ, where that which had been already accomplished in the highest region, is brought about in the psychical world. Even considered by itself alone, this representation cannot be an idle, fruitless, barely symbolical thing, but there must be connected with it the like influence, only after a manner corresponding to this particular stage of existence. Hence Heracleon could say, that by the cross of Christ all evil was consumed,[1] and that his passion was necessary in order that the church, cleansed from the influence of the material spirits, may be converted into a house of God.[2] Accordingly he spoke of a spiritual appropriation of Christ's sufferings, through which the participation in the kingdom of the Divine life, in the marriage supper of the church, is mediated.[3] By the words, "Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit," the psychical Christ commended to the care of the Heavenly Father the *πνευματικὸν σπέρμα*, which was now forsaking him, that it might not be kept back in the kingdom of the Demiurge, but rise free to the upper region; commending to him also by the same act all spiritual natures, who were represented by the one united with himself. The psychical Messiah rises to the Demiurge, who transfers to him the sovereign power and government, to be administered in his name; and the pneumatic Messiah to the Soter, whither all the redeemed spiritual natures will follow him.

The point of chief importance, the main thing in the redemptive work, so far as it concerns spiritual natures, is the redemption of which man's nature was made to participate by its union with the Soter at the baptism in Jordan. This must be repeated in the case of each individual. Of the sanctifying effects flowing from inward communion with the Redeemer, Valentine speaks as follows: "There is one good Being, whose free manifestation is his revelation by the Son; and through *him alone* could the heart be made pure, after every malign

[1] *Ἀνηλῶσθαι καὶ ἠφανίσθαι τοὺς κυβευτὰς, ἐμπόρους*, (allusion to the narrative of Christ's expelling the changers from the temple, and without doubt meaning here the demons, or effluxes from matter, whereby God's temple in humanity became defiled,) *καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν κακίαν*. Orig. in Joann. T. X. c. 19.

[2] *Ἵνα τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κατασκευάσῃ, οὐκέτι λῃστῶν καὶ ἐμπόρων σπήλαιον, ἀλλὰ οἶκον τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ*. L. c.

[3] From the typical meaning of the paschal supper. *Δυόμενον μὲν τὸ πάθος τοῦ Σωτῆρος τὸ ἐν κόσμῳ ἐσήμαινεν, ἐσθιόμενον δὲ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν τὴν ἐν γάμῳ*. L. c. § 14.

spirit had been ejected; for many are the spirits that take up their abode in the heart, and allow it not to be pure. Each of these is busily employed in his own work, while they, all in various ways, shamefully defile it. And it seems to me to fare with such a heart much as with an inn; for the inn is worn and trodden to pieces, often filled with dirt, being the haunt of riotous, licentious men, who have no interest in the place, since it is none of their own. So is it with the heart; — until it receives the heavenly grace, it remains unclean, being the abode of many evil spirits. But when he who only is good, when the Father adopts it as his, it becomes holy and resplendent with light; and accordingly he who possesses such a heart is pronounced blessed, for he shall see God."[1]

The Valentinians were penetrated with the consciousness that Christianity even here on the earth imparts a divine life, and in this life, the fellowship with heaven. This consciousness is thus expressed in the Valentinian form of intuition: "Every pneumatic soul having its other half in the upper world of spirits (namely, its attendant angel,) with which it is destined to be united, it receives power through the Soter to enter into this union (Syzygy) spiritually even in the present life."[2]

But it is quite evident of itself, that the Valentinians must have distinguished the effects of baptism and of the redemption, in their relation to the two positions of the Pneumatici and the Psychici. The psychical man obtains forgiveness of his sins, is released from the dominion of the hylic principle, and receives power to withstand it. The pneumatical man is, through communion with the Soter, incorporated into the Pleroma, attains to a full consciousness of his nature affining to the latter and exalted above the kingdom of the Demiurge, and is empowered to develope it free from the restraints by which it was before shackled. He is released from the cramping power of the Demiurge.

The two classes differ from one another, in their way not only of arriving at Christianity, but also of appropriating and apprehending it. The psychical men must be led to the faith by causes out of themselves, by facts of the sensible world, by miracles;[3] — so the stage of progress which they never go beyond, is that of faith on grounds of historical authority. They are not capable of *the intuition of the truth* itself. It is to such Christ speaks in John 4: 48. In the case of spiritual men, on the other hand, faith does not arise out of the things of sense; they are seized immediately, in virtue of their godlike nature, by the intrinsic might of the truth itself, feel themselves immediately drawn away to that which is in affinity with their essential being;[4] and in virtue of this spiritual contact with the truth, their faith is superior to all doubt.[5] Their worship, grounded in the *knowledge* of the truth, is the true, "*reasonable service of God.*"

[1] Strom. lib. II. f. 409.

[2] Heracleon, in Origen, T. XIII. § 11: Κομίζεσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν καὶ τὴν ἀνάκρασιν πρὸς τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς.

[3] Δι' ἔρνων φύσιν ἔχοντες καὶ δι αἰσθήσεως πείθεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ λόγῳ πιστεύειν. Orig. in Joann. T. XIII. § 59.

[4] Heracleon, in Orig. l. c. c. 20, the δεκτικὴ ζωῆς διάθεσις.

[5] Ἡ ἀδιάκριτος καὶ κατάλληλος τῇ φύσει αὐτῆς πίστις. L. c. § 10.

The origin of the Christian life being thus different, the position in that life is different also. Here arises the distinction of a psychical and a pneumatical Christianity. By those of the one class, only the psychical Christ is recognized; those of the other rise to the divine Soter in him. In the one position, men rest satisfied with historical Christianity; in the other, they grasp it in its connection and coherence with the whole theogonic and cosmogonic process. While Christ is acknowledged by those that belong to the first class, only in consideration of the extraordinary works by which he was accredited as a divine teacher, and what he revealed is received on his authority; by those of the second, on the other hand, the necessity of the facts of Christianity, — the necessity grounded in that process, — is understood; and on that very basis reposes a conviction raised above all doubt. To the psychical class, Paul says that for them he knew nothing, and could preach nothing, save Christ crucified;[1] that he could not announce to them that wisdom of the perfect, which is hidden even from the Demiurge and his angels. In accordance with these different positions, Christ is presented in different ways to the Christian consciousness; — as indeed the angels themselves, on account of their different natures, do not all behold alike the countenance of the Father.[2] The recognition of a necessary difference in the mode of contemplating Christ's person and work, grounded in these different stages of religious development, is a truth lying at the root of these Valentinian doctrines.

Those spiritual men are the salt, the soul of the outward church — those by whom Christianity is propagated as the forming principle of humanity.[3] By them is the way prepared for the transfiguration of the entire earthly world, and for the final destruction of everything material and evil; — an event that shall ensue, when matter shall have been deprived of all those germs of life it had seized on, and these, purified of their dross, shall have attained to the development corresponding to their essential being. So was it necessary that the divine life should be merged in the world of death, in order that that world might be overcome. Valentine addresses these spiritual men as follows: "Ye are, from the beginning, immortal and children of eternal life; and ye were willing to apportion death among you, that you might swallow up and destroy it, and that in you and through you death might die. For if ye dissolve the world (prepare the way for the dissolution of the material world,) but are not yourselves dissolved, ye are masters and lords over the creation, and over all that is perishable."[4]

Though the Christian principle appears, in this Valentinian tendency, vitiated by a certain theosophic pride, and an element of Oriental

[1] Didascal. Anatol. concerning a two-fold mode of preaching by the apostle Paul. In reference to the psychical men: Ἐκήρυξε τὸν σωτῆρα γενητὸν καὶ παθητόν.

[2] L. c.: Ἰδίως ἕκαστος γνωρίζει τὸν κύριον, καὶ οὐχ' ὁμοίως πάντες τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ πατρὸς ὁρῶσιν οἱ ἄγγελοι.

[3] See the proof directly, where we speak of Heracleon.

[4] Ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀθάνατοί ἐστε καὶ τέκνα ζωῆς αἰωνίας· καὶ τὸν θάνατον ἠθέλετε μερίσασθαι εἰς ἑαυτούς, ἵνα δαπανήσητε αὐτὸν καὶ ἀναλώσητε, καὶ ἀποθανῇ ὁ θάνατος ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ δι' ὑμῶν. Ὅταν γὰρ τὸν μὲν κόσμον λύητε, ὑμεῖς δὲ μὴ καταλύησθε, κυριεύετε τῆς κτίσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς ἁπάσης. Strom. l. IV. f. 509, B.

austerity, yet there gleams through these words a consciousness of what Christ intended, when he called the bearers of his word and spirit the salt of the earth, — of the high calling and place in the world of those who truly displayed the image of Christ, and in whom the idea of Christianity was realized; who were to be scattered abroad in the midst of an impure world, and connected with it by numberless gradations, in order to prepare the way for its gradual purification.

When now the end for which these spiritual men prepared the way should be attained, the Soter, after the dissolution of the whole material world, should be united in one "syzygia" with the Sophia, the matured spiritual natures, paired with their respective angels, should under him enter into the Pleroma, and the psychical minds occupy under the Demiurge the last grade of the spiritual world;[1] — for they too should receive the measure of felicity answering to their peculiar nature. The Demiurge rejoices at the appearance of the Soter, through whom a higher world, to which he was before a stranger, has been revealed to him; and through whom also, relieved from his toilsome labors, he is enabled to enter into rest and enjoy an echo of the glory of the Pleroma. He is the friend of the bridegroom (the Soter,) who standeth and heareth him, and rejoiceth greatly because of the bridegroom's voice, — rejoiceth at the consummation of the espousals.[2] John the Baptist spake these words (John 3: 29,) as a representative of the Demiurge.

Distinguished Men belonging to the School of Valentine. — Among the men of Valentine's school, Heracleon was distinguished for his cool, scientific, reflective bent of mind. He wrote a commentary on the Gospel of St. John, considerable fragments of which have been preserved by Origen;[3] perhaps also, a commentary on the Gospel according to Luke. Of the latter, a single fragment only, the exposition of Luke 12: 8, has been preserved by Clement of Alexandria.[4] It may easily be conceived, that the spiritual depth and fulness of John must have been preëminently attractive to the Gnostics. To the exposition of this gospel Heracleon brought a profound, religious sense, which penetrated to the inward meaning, together with an understanding invariably clear when not led astray by theosophic speculation. But what he chiefly lacked was a faculty to appreciate the simplicity of John, and earnest application to those necessary means for evolving the spirit out of the letter, the deficiency in which among the Gnostics generally has been already made a subject of remark. Heracleon honestly intended, indeed, so far as we can see, to derive his theology from John. But he was entirely warped by his system; and with all his habits of thought and contemplation, so entangled in its mesh-work, that he could not move out of it with freedom, but spite of himself, implied its views and its ideas in the Scriptures, which he regarded as the fountain of divine wisdom.

[1] The *τόπος μεσότητος*.

[2] The union of the Soter with the Sophia, of the angels with the spiritual natures in the Pleroma.

[3] In his Tomis on John, in which he frequently has reference to the expositions of Heracleon.

[4] Strom. l. IV. f. 503.

In proof of what has been said, we will consider Heracleon's interpretation of that noble passage containing our Saviour's conversation with the woman of Samaria. With the simple facts of the history, Heracleon could not rest content; nor was he satisfied with a calm psychological contemplation of the Samaritan woman in her relation to the Saviour. His imagination immediately traced in the woman who was so attracted by the words and appearance of Christ, the type of *all* spiritual natures, that are attracted by the godlike; and hence this history must represent the entire relation of the πνευματικοί to the Soter, and to the higher, spiritual world. Hence the words of the Samaritan woman must have a double sense, — that of which she was herself conscious, and that which she expressed unconsciously, as representing the whole class of the πνευματικοί; and hence also the words of the Saviour must be taken in a two-fold sense, a higher and a lower. True, he did not fail to understand the fundamental idea contained in the Saviour's language; but he allowed himself to be drawn away from the principal point, by looking after too much in the several accompanying circumstances. "The water which our Saviour gives," says he, "is from his Spirit and his power. His grace and his gifts are something that never can be taken away, never can be exhausted, never can pass from those who have any portion in them. They that have received what is richly bestowed on them from above, communicate of the overflowing fulness which they enjoy, to the everlasting life of others also." But then he wrongly concludes, that because Christ intended the water which he would give to be understood in a symbolical sense, so too the water of Jacob's well must be understood in the same symbolical sense. It was a symbol of Judaism, inadequate to the wants of the spiritual nature,— an image of its perishable, earthly glory. The words of the woman — "Give me this water, that I thirst not, neither come hither to draw" — express the burthensome character of Judaism, the difficulty of finding in it anything wherewith to nourish the spiritual life, and the inadequacy of that nourishment when found.[1] When our Lord afterwards bade the woman call her husband, he meant by this her other half in the spiritual world, the angel belonging to her;[2] — that with him coming to the Saviour, she might from the latter receive power to become united and blended with this her destined companion. And the reason for this arbitrary interpretation is, that "Christ could not have spoken of her earthly husband, since he was aware, that she had no lawful one. In the *spiritual* sense,[3] the woman knew not her husband,[4] — she knew nothing of the angel belonging to her; in the literal sense, she was ashamed to confess that she was living in an unlawful connection." The water being the symbol of the divine life communicated by the Saviour, Heracleon went on to infer that the water-pot was the symbol of a recipient *spirit for this divine life on the part of the woman. She left her water-pot behind with him;* that is, having now a vessel of this kind with the Saviour,

[1] Τὸ ἐπίμοχθον καὶ δυσπόριστον καὶ ἄτροφον ἐκείνου τοῦ ὕδατος.
[2] Τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς. See above.
[3] Κατὰ τὸ νοούμενον.
[4] Κατὰ τὸ ἁπλοῦν.

in which to receive the living water she came for, she returned into the world to announce that Christ was come, to the psychical natures.[1]

In many of his interpretations, in which he distinguishes himself by his healthy feeling for the simple and for the depth in the simplicity, he is too simple for the artificial taste of Origen, who finds fault with him for adhering to the letter, and not penetrating more deeply into the spiritual sense.[2] Explaining the words of Christ in John 4 : 34, he says: "The Lord here calls it his meat to do the will of his Father; for this was to him his nourishment, his rest and his power. But by his Father's will he meant, that men should come to the knowledge of his Father and be blessed. And accordingly, this discourse with the Samaritan woman belonged to the meat of the Son."[3] On John 4 : 35, he says: "Christ speaks here of the sensible harvest, which was yet four months distant; while on the other hand, the harvest of which he discourses was already present in reference to the souls of the faithful."[4]

As the Gnostics took ground against the Jewish element in the doctrines of faith and morals, they uniformly set up the principle that everything spiritual must proceed from the inner life and temper, in opposition to the tendency which severed good works from this connection, and attributed value to them separately. It was such a reaction of the Christian spirit among the Gnostics that declared itself against the exaggerated estimate placed on the opus operatum of martyrdom, whereby, as we have seen, the deifying of man was promoted among the multitude, and spiritual pride and false security among the witnesses of the faith themselves. We have earlier remarked, that Basilides resisted this excessive veneration of the martyrs; and on the other hand endeavored to depreciate martyrdom, though in connection, indeed, with false premises from his system. But the way in which Heracleon attacked the wrong notions of martyrdom had no connection whatever with such errors. His only concern was to show that the witness of Christ should not be *isolated*, as a mere outward thing, but be found in connection and in unity with the entire whole of the Christian life. "The multitude," says he,[5] "regard confession before the civil authority as the only one; but without reason. This confession, hypocrites also may lay down. This is one *particular* form of confession; — it is not that *universal* confession, to be laid down by all Christians, and of which Christ is here (Luke 12 : 8) speaking; — the confession by works and actions that correspond to the faith in him. This universal confession will be followed also by that particular one, in the hour

[1] We must allow Heracleon the justice to acknowledge, that Origen wrongly accuses him here, as in many places, of contradicting himself, — for how, says Origen, could the Samaritan woman announce Christ to others, when she had left behind, with him from whom she had parted, the recipient organ of divine life? But Heracleon was perfectly consistent here: — in applying the allegory, the notion of "leaving behind," so far as space was concerned, did not, in fact, enter his mind.

[2] Ἐπὶ τῆς λέξεως ἔμεινε, μὴ οἰόμενος αὐτὴν ἀνάγεσθαι. Orig. in Joann. T. XIII. § 41.

[3] It is deserving of notice, how Origen censures Heracleon on account of this sound exposition: Ὅπερ νομίζω σαφῶς παντὶ ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ ταπεινῶς ἐξειλῆφθαι καὶ βεβιασμένως. L. c. § 38.

[4] L. c. § 41.

[5] In the fragment above cited, of his commentary on Luke.

of trial and when reason requires it. It is possible for those who so confess him in words, to deny him by their works. They only confess him in truth, who live in his confession; in whom he himself also confesses, — *having received them to himself* as *they* have received *him* to themselves.[1] For this reason, he can *never deny himself.*"[2]

We may mention further, *Ptolemæus*, who, if we may judge from the work of Irenæus, (which was aimed chiefly against *his* party,) contributed much to the spread of Valentine's principles. It may be questioned whether Tertullian is correct in saying that Ptolemæus differed from Valentine principally in representing the Æons, whom the latter regarded as powers residing in the divine essence,[3] more under the form of hypostases; — at least it may be doubted whether this was a distinction of so much importance, — since, in every case, the representations which the Gnostics framed to themselves of the Æons were at a far remove from abstract, notional attributes, and must have bordered closely on hypostases.

A very important production of Ptolemæus, which has come down to our times, — his letter to Flora, a lady whom he endeavored to win over to the Valentinian principles,[4] — shows that he was well qualified to present his views to others in the least exceptionable form.[5] As the individual to whom he wrote belonged in all probability to the catholic church, it was particularly necessary for him to remove the *offence* she could not fail to take at the *opposition between his views and the doctrine of the church*, and at the position, that neither *the Old Testament* nor *the creation of the world proceeded from the Supreme God.* To meet the first difficulty, he appeals to an apostolic tradition, which through a succession of witnesses had come down to himself, and to *the words of the Saviour*, by which all doctrine should be settled. By the tradition he meant probably an *esoteric* one, which, *being himself deceived*, he traced to some reputed disciple of the apostles; and as it regards the words of Christ, he could easily adapt them to his system by the Gnostic mode of interpretation. As to the second point, we may well suppose he would exhibit his principles in their mildest possible form, to gain admittance for them with one who was not yet among the initiated. But still we find nothing in what he advances, which is at variance with the Valentinian principles. He combats two opposite errors — the error of those who held the creation of the world and the Old Testament to be the works of an evil being, — and the error of those who held them to be the works of the Supreme God. One of these parties erred, in his opinion, because they knew the Demiurge alone, and not the Father of All, whom Christ, who alone knew him, first revealed; — the other, because they knew nothing of such an intermediate being as the Demiurge. Ptolemæus probably would say,

[1] Ἐνειλημμένος αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐχόμενος ὑπό τούτων.

[2] Which must take place, if such as stand in this connection with him, could be brought to deny him.

[3] Nominibus et numeris æonum distinctis in personales substantias, quas Valentinus in ipsa summa divinitatis, ut sensus et adfectus et motus incluserat. Adv. Valentinian, c. 4.

[4] Epiphan. hæres. 33, § 3.

[5] See note at the end of the volume.

then, that the first error was entertained by those who in Christianity continued still to be Jews; the second, by those who had passed at once, without any medium of transition, from the service of matter and Satan in paganism, to the knowledge of the Supreme God in the gospel; and from having made this immense leap in their knowledge and religion at once, supposed there was also a like chasm in the nature of things. "How can a law that forbids sin, proceed from the evil being who is at war with all moral good?" he asks; — and says he, "the man must be blind, not in the mental eye alone, but also in that of the body, who cannot discern in the world the providence of its maker."

Immovably persuaded that the world could not have sprung from an evil being, he was also firmly convinced that its author could not be the perfect God, whom the Saviour was first enabled to reveal. *His* essence is only goodness; — Christ, indeed, called him the being who alone is good. As it seems, Ptolemæus considered punitive justice to be something irreconcileable with this perfect goodness. On the other hand, he represented justice, in the more limited sense, to be the peculiar attribute of the Demiurge, as marking a stage, lying in the middle between evil and perfect goodness. He distinguished justice in *this* sense from justice in the highest sense, which coincides with perfect goodness.[1] That which is intermediate,[2] he considered as belonging to the essence of the Demiurge and his kingdom. He professes adherence to the doctrine of one primal Essence, the One Father who is without beginning, from whom all existence springs, and on whom it depends, — a being who would show himself to be greater and mightier than the evil principle. He writes Flora, to give herself no uneasiness, if it should appear strange to her, that from a perfect primal essence should proceed two alien natures, that of the perishable essence,[3] and that of the Demiurge, occupying the intermediate position, inasmuch as the good, from its very essence, must produce only what is like itself; "for," he adds, "you shall come to know the beginning and origin of this also in its proper time." If Ptolemæus was not here accommodating himself, for the occasion, to the principles of the church, or representing his own in a milder form, with a view gradually to lead on his pupil still farther, we should have to reckon him also among the Gnostics before described, who reduced Dualism back to an original Monoism; for according to this view, he must have been anxious to point out, how not only the kingdom of the Demiurge, as a subordinate stage of existence in the general process of unfolding life, but also how at length the *ὕλη* must exist as the extreme limit of all, or as an antithesis necessary to appear once and to be overcome.[4]

[1] The proof is in what Ptolemæus says concerning the Demiurge: *Ἰδίως λεχθείη ἂν δίκαιος, τῆς κατ' αὐτὸν δικαιοσύνης ὢν βραβευτὴς, καὶ ἔσται μὲν καταδέστερος τοῦ τελείου θεοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνης ἐλάττων οὗτος ὁ θεός.*

[2] The *μέσον*, answering to the *τόπος μεσότητος* in Valentine's system.

[3] The *φθορά*, the *ὕλη*.

[4] Perhaps *Secundus* also belonged to the party who supposed evil to be a necessary momentum in the process of development, if he distinguished in the first Ogdoad a *τέτρας δεξιά* and a *τέτρας ἀριστερά*, calling the first light, and the second darkness. Vid. Iren. lib. I. c. 11, § 2.

Agreeing entirely with the Valentinian notion of inspiration, according to which all was not regarded as alike divine, but a coöperation of different factors was supposed in the origination of the Old Testament, Ptolemæus distinguished several elements in the writings of the Old Testament. He divided the religious polity of Moses into three parts. 1. That which proceeded from the Demiurge. 2. That which Moses ordained under the impulse of his own reason left to itself. 3. The additions made to the Mosaic law by the elders.[1] The Saviour, as he maintained, plainly distinguished the law of Moses from the law of God (of the Demiurge,) Matth. 19: 6, &c. Yet again he excuses Moses, and endeavors to show that the contradiction between him and the Demiurge is only in appearance; — he merely yielded through constraint to the weakness of the people, in order to avoid a still greater evil. What came from the Demiurge, he divides again into three parts. 1. The purely moral portion of the law, unmixt with anything evil, which was called distinctively the law, in reference to which our Saviour says he came not to destroy the law but to fulfil; for as it contained nothing foreign from Christ's nature, it only required completion. For example, the precepts Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, were completed in the precepts which forbid anger, and impure desires. 2. The law, corrupted by the intermixture of evil, as for example, that which permitted retaliation; Levit. 24: 20; 20: 9. "Even he who retaliates wrong for wrong, is none the less guilty of injustice, since he repeats the same action, the order only being reversed." Yet he recognized here, as in the case of Moses just stated, a pædagogical element. "This command," says he, "was and perhaps still continues to be a *just* one, given in consideration of the weakness of those, who received the law, not without overstepping *the pure law*. It is alien, however, from the essence and from the goodness of the Universal Father; — perhaps agreeable to the nature of the Demiurge;[2] but more probably extorted from him. For *he* who forbids to kill in one place, and commands it in another, has allowed himself unawares to be surprized by a *sort of necessity*." The Demiurge, he would say, was not wanting in the will, but in the power to vanquish evil. This part of the law, as contradicting the essential character of the Supreme God, is now wholly abolished by the Saviour. It is plain, that Ptolemæus must have looked upon the capital punishment of the murderer as only a second murder. The state generally, according to his doctrine, which represents retributive justice as altogether foreign from the Supreme God, can belong only to the kingdom of the Demiurge. And it follows, that those who had separated from the kingdom of the Demiurge, the genuine, Gnostic Christians, must decline all offices of civil trust. We here see betrayed again, a defect in the ethical system of these Gnostics, which defect had its ground in their speculative theology;

[1] Ptolemæus assumes that the Pentateuch did not come from Moses. He supposed, probably, with the Clementines, that when the law was written down from oral tradition, many foreign additions of the elders came to be mixed in with it.

[2] I have translated according to a correction of the text, (l. c. c. 3,) which seemed to me necessary. ἴσως τούτῳ κατάλληλον. The *o* need only be altered to ῳ.

since the former could never, according to the latter, become the animating principle of a state, — the possibility was never given to this of becoming a form of manifestation for the kingdom of God. We grant there was this of truth also lying at the bottom, that no civil laws and civil constitutions can be derived immediately out of the essence of Christianity. 3. The typical, ceremonial law, which (see above) contained the figure of higher, spiritual things, — the laws concerning sacrifices, concerning circumcision, concerning the sabbath, the passover, and fasts. "All that was merely type and symbol became altered after the truth appeared. The visible and outward observance was abolished. It passed, however, into a spiritual service, in which the names are the same, but the things are altered. For it is the Saviour's command, that we also should present our offerings; not offerings, however, of beasts or burning incense, but the spiritual sacrifice of praise to God, and giving thanks to his name, — of doing good and communicating to our neighbors. It is his will also, that we be circumcised; — not however with the outward, bodily rite, but with the spiritual circumcision of the heart. He wills, moreover, that we should keep the sabbath, for he would have us rest from doing evil; also that we should fast, — not however with bodily abstinence, but with spiritual, which consists in abstaining from all sin. Yet the practice of outward fasting also is observed by our people; for it may be somewhat profitable to the soul, when performed rationally, — not from imitation of any one, not from custom, not from regard to the day, as if *one* day were specially designed for it — but to remind us of the *true* fast, that those who are as yet unable to keep the latter, may still be led to keep it in view by the outward fasting." Ptolemæus was thoroughly penetrated with a sense of the elevation of the Christian position, superior to all constraints of time and place. In the order of set fasts, and doubtless also feast days, he saw something Jewish.

Among the so called disciples of Valentine, *Marcus* and *Bardesanes* held distinguished rank. We say *so called;* for it would be more correct perhaps to express it thus, that these two drew from the same common fountain with Valentine, in Syria, the native country of the Gnosis. *Marcus* came from Palestine, probably in the latter half of the second century. That Palestine was his native land, we may gather from his frequent use of the Aramæan liturgical formula. If in the theosophy of Heracleon and Ptolemæus the *scientific* tendency of the *Alexandrian* school predominated; in that of Marcus, on the other hand, the tendency was to the *poetic* and *symbolical.* He set forth his system in a *poem*, in which he introduced the divine Æons discoursing, in liturgical forms, and with gorgeous symbols of worship, of which we shall cite some examples hereafter. In the manner of the Jewish Cabbala, he hunted after special mysteries in the numbers and position of letters. The idea of a λόγος τοῦ ὄντος, of a word manifesting the hidden divine essence in the creation, was spun out by him into the most subtle details; — the entire creation being, in his view, a continuous *utterance*, or *becoming expressed*, of the ineffable.[1] The manner in which

[1] Τὸ ἀῤῥητὸν ῥητὸν γενηθῆναι.

the germs of divine life,[1] lying shut up in the Æons, go on progressively to unfold and individualize themselves, is represented by supposing that these *names* of the Ineffable became analyzed into their separate sounds. An echo of the Pleroma falls down into the ὕλη, and becomes the forming principle of a new, lower creation.[2]

The second of these two, *Bardesanes*, who can with still less propriety be considered a disciple of Valentine, lived in Edessa of Mesopotamia. This is indicated by his name Bar Desanes, son of Daisan, from a river so called near the city of Edessa. He made himself known by his extensive learning. Many of the older writers speak of alterations in the systems of Bardesanes. According to Eusebius's account, he was at first a follower of Valentine's doctrines; but having convinced himself by more careful examination that many of them were untenable, he came over to the orthodox church. Yet he retained many of his earlier doctrines: and hence became the founder of a particular sect. According to Epiphanius, he passed over from the orthodox church to the Valentinians. But of all these changes, the learned Syrian author in the fourth century, Ephraim the Syrian, — who lived in the country of Bardesanes, wrote in his language and had read his works, — says not a word; and it admits of being easily explained, how these false reports arose. Bardesanes, like other Gnostics, was in the habit of accommodating himself, when he spoke publicly in the church, to the *prevailing* opinions; he let himself down, in this way, to the level of the *psychical natures*. He did, in many points, really agree, more than other Gnostics, with that system of doctrine. He could even write, from honest conviction, against many other Gnostic sects then spreading themselves in Syria; as for instance, against those that denied any connection between the Old and New Testaments; that derived the visible world from an *evil* being; that taught a doctrine of fatality destructive of moral freedom. In truth, the Gnostic Ptolemæus had also written against such sectarians, without prejudice to his Gnosticism.

In perfect conformity with the Valentinian system, Bardesanes recognized, in man's nature, something altogether superior to the whole world in which man's temporal consciousness is unfolded, — something above its own comprehension, — the human soul, — a germinal principle sown

[1] The σπέρματα πνευματικά.

[2] In general it is an idea peculiar to the Gnostics, that the hidden godlike *expresses* itself to an *echo*, and finally a *cessation* of *all sound*; and that again the echo increases to a *clear tone*, to a distinct *word*, for the revelation of the divine, &c. — ideas which they could turn into a great variety of shapes. Thus Heracleon says: The Saviour is the *word*, as the revealer of the godlike; all prophecy, which foretold his coming, without being distinctly conscious of the idea of the Messiah in its spiritual sense, was only an isolated *tone* that preceded the revealing word; John the Baptist, standing mid-way between the Old and New Testament economy, is the *voice*, which is already closely related to the word that expresses the thought with consciousness. The *voice* becomes *word*, by John's becoming a disciple of Christ; — the *tone* becomes *voice* when the prophets of the Demiurge, together with himself, attain to the conscious recognition of the higher order of the world which the Messiah revealed, and thenceforth serve this higher system with self-conscious freedom. Orig. T. VI. in Joann. § 12. Ὁ λόγος μὲν ὁ σωτὴρ ἐστιν, φωνὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ πᾶσα προφητικὴ τάξις, τὴν φωνὴν οἰκειοτέραν οὖσαν τῷ λόγῳ λόγον γενέσθαι. Τῷ ἤχῳ φησὶν ἔσεσθαι τὴν εἰς φωνὴν μεταβολήν, μαθητοῦ μὲν χώραν διδοὺς τῇ μεταβαλλούσῃ εἰς λόγον φωνῇ ἤ, (it should perhaps read τὴν,) δούλου δὲ τῇ ἀπὸ ἤχου εἰς φωνήν.

forth from the Pleroma — whose essence and powers, having sprung from this loftier region, hence remain hidden to itself, until it shall attain to the full consciousness and to the full exercise of them in the Pleroma.[1] According to the *Gnostic system*, *this* could properly be true, however, only in respect to the *spiritual* natures; but he must attribute also, according to that system, to the *psychical* natures a *moral freedom*, *superior* to the *constraint* of *natural influences*, or to the *constraint of the Hyle*. Hence, though, like many of this Gnostic tendency, he busied himself with astrology, he yet combated the theory which held to any such influence of the stars (εἱμαρμένη,) as determined with *necessity* the life and actions of men. Eusebius has preserved in that great store-house of literature, the προπαρασκευὴ εὐαγγελική, a considerable fragment of this remarkable production. Bardesanes here adduces, among other proofs that the stars had no such irresistible influence on the character of nations, the multitude of Christians scattered through so many different countries.[2] "*Wherever they are*," says he of the Christians, "they are neither conquered by bad laws and customs, nor constrained by the dominant constellations that presided over their birth, to practise the sin which their master has forbidden. To sickness, however, to poverty, to suffering, to that which is accounted shameful among men, they are subjected. For as our *free* man does not allow himself to be forced into servitude, but if forced, resists; so on the other hand our phenomenal man, as a man for service, cannot easily escape subjection. For if we had all power, we should be the All, — and so if we had no power, we should be the *tools of others* and not our own. But if God helps, all things are possible, and nothing can be a hindrance, for nothing can resist his will. And though it may seem to be resisted, yet this is so, *because God is good, and lets every nature retain its own individuality and its own free will*." In conformity with his system, he sought to trace the vestiges of truth among people of every nation. In India he noticed a class of sages who lived in habits of rigid asceticism, (the Brahmins, Saniahs,) and although in the midst of idolaters, kept themselves pure from idolatry and worshipped only one God.

We now pass over to the Gnostics who manifested opposition to Judaism; and in the first place, to those who, in aiming to sever Christianity from its connection with Judaism, were still more inclined to bring Christianity into union with paganism.

The Gnostic Sects in conflict with Judaism.

The Sects which, in opposing Judaism, inclined to the side of the Pagan Element.

THE OPHITES. — The Ophites will form the most natural transition to this class of the Gnostics; for we are here shown how the same ideas, by receiving a somewhat different turn, were capable of leading to entirely different results.

[1] Vid. Ephræm. Syr. opp. Syr. lat. T. II. f. 553 et 555.

[2] See Vol. I. p. 80. — Præpar. evangel. l. VI. c. 10, near the end.

In the system of these sects, as in that of the Valentinians, the predominant idea was that of a mundane soul, sprung from a feeble ray of light out of the Pleroma, which, plunged into matter, communicated life to the inert mass, being itself, however, affected by it. This mundane soul, the source of all spiritual life, which re-absorbs to itself whatever has flowed out from it — the pantheistic principle, whose germ existed already in the Valentinian system, becomes only more salient in the system of the Ophites, just as the properly Christian element retreats into the back-ground. Different modifications in this respect seem to have existed also in different branches of the Ophitic sect. The same *fundamental principles might* be seized and applied in different ways *in the same period*, — according as the *Christian*, the *purely Oriental and theosophic*, or the *Jewish element*, happened most to predominate. The Ophitic system represented the origin of the Demiurge, who is here named Ialdabaoth, in altogether the same way as the Valentinian; moreover, in the doctrine of his relation to the higher system of the world, it is easy to mark the transition-point between the two systems. The Valentinian Demiurge is a limited being, who in his limitation imagines he acts with independence. The higher system of the world is at first unknown to him; he serves as its unconscious instrument. In the phenomena, or appearances coming from that higher world, he is at first bewildered and thrown into amazement; — not, however, on account of his malignity, but his ignorance. Finally he is attracted, however, by the godlike, rises from his unconsciousness and ignorance to consciousness, and thereafter serves the higher order of the world with joy. According to the Ophitic system, on the other hand, he is not only a limited being, but altogether hostile to the higher order of world, and so remains. The higher light he is possessed of in virtue of his derivation from the Sophia, he only turns to the bad purpose of strengthening his position against the higher order of the universe, and rendering himself an independent sovereign. Hence the purpose of "Wisdom" is to deprive him of the spiritual natures that have flowed over into his kingdom, and to draw them back into itself, that so Ialdabaoth with his entire creation, stripped of every rational nature, may be given up to destruction. According to the Valentinian system, on the contrary, the Demiurge constitutes through eternity a grade of rational, moral existence, of subordinate rank indeed, but still belonging to the harmonious evolution of the great whole. Yet here again we can trace a *relationship* of ideas in the two systems; inasmuch as the Ophites represent the Demiurge as unconsciously and involuntarily subservient to Wisdom, working towards the accomplishment of its plans, and ultimately bringing about his own downfall and annihilation. But if Ialdabaoth is, without willing or knowing it, an instrument to the purposes of divine wisdom, yet this gives him no distinction, as in the Valentinian system, but in this he is even put on a level with absolute evil: — it does not proceed from the excellence of his nature, but from the almighty power of the higher order of world. Even the evil spirit — the serpent form (ὀφιόμορφος,) that sprang into existence when Ialdabaoth, full of hatred and jealousy towards man, looked down into the ὕλη and imaged himself

on its surface, must against his will serve only as an instrument to bring about the purposes of wisdom. Moreover, the doctrine concerning the origin and destination of man in this system has a great deal which is closely allied to the Valentinian theory; but a great deal also which belongs to another branch of the Gnostic system.

The empire of Ialdabaoth is the starry world. The stars are the representatives and organs of the cosmical principle, which seeks to hold man's spirit in bondage and servitude, and to environ it with all manner of delusions. Ialdabaoth and the six angels begotten by him are the spirits of the seven planets, the Sun, the Moon, Mars, Venus, Jupiter, Mercury, and Saturn.[1] It is the endeavor of Ialdabaoth to assert himself as self-subsistent Lord and Creator, to keep his six angels from deserting their subjection, and, lest they should look up and observe the higher world of light, to fix their attention upon some object in another quarter. To this end, he calls upon the six angels to create man, after their own common image, as the crowning seal of their independent, creative power.[2] Man is created; and being in their own image, is a huge corporeal mass, but without a soul. He creeps on the earth, and has not power to lift himself erect. They therefore bring the helpless creature to their Father, that he may animate it with a soul. Ialdabaoth breathed into it a living spirit,[3] and thus, unperceived by himself, the spiritual seed passed from his own being into the nature of man, whereby he was deprived himself of this higher principle of life. Thus had the Sophia ordained it. In man (i. e. those men who had received some portion of this spiritual seed) was concentrated the light, the soul, the reason of the whole creation. Ialdabaoth is now seized with amazement and wrath, when he beholds a being created by himself, and within the bounds of his own kingdom, rising both above himself and his kingdom. He strives therefore to prevent man from becoming conscious of his higher nature, and of that higher order of world to which he is now become related — to keep him in a state of blind unconsciousness, and thus of slavish submission. It was the jealousy of the contracted Ialdabaoth which issued that command to the first man; but the mundane soul employed the serpent (the ὀφιόμορφος,) as an instrument to defeat the purpose of Ialdabaoth, by tempting the first man to disobedience. According to another view, the serpent was itself a symbol or disguised appearance of the mundane soul;[4] — and in the strict sense, it is that part of the sect only that adopted *this* view, which rightly received the name of Ophites, for they actually worshipped the serpent as a holy symbol; — to which they may have been led by an analogous idea in the Egyptian religion, the serpent in the latter being looked upon as a symbol of Kneph or

[1] The religious books of the Sabians also have much to say about the manner in which these star-spirits deceive men.

[2] Thus they explained Gen. 1: 26.

[3] They supposed they found this in Genesis 2: 7.

[4] The serpent, a type of the ζωόγονος σοφία: — the winding shape of the entrails presents the form of a serpent, — a symbol of that wisdom of nature, that soul of the world, which winds in concealment through all the different grades and orders of natural life. Theodoret. hæret. fab. vol. I. 14 We perceive how the Pantheistic principle shines here more clearly through the surface.

the ἀγαθοδαίμων, who resembled the σοφία of the Ophites.[1] At all events, it was through the mundane soul, directly or indirectly, that the eyes of the first man were opened. The fall of man, — and this presents a characteristic feature of the Ophitic system, though even in this respect it was perhaps not altogether independent of the prior Valentinian theory, — the fall of man was the transition point from a state of unconscious limitation to one of conscious freedom. Man now became wise, and renounced his allegiance to Ialdabaoth. The latter, angry at this disobedience, thrusts him from the upper region of the air, where until now he had dwelt in an ethereal body, down to the dark earth, and banished him into a dark body. Man finds himself now placed in a situation, where, on the one hand, the seven planetary spirits seek to hold him under their thrall, and to suppress the higher consciousness in his soul; while on the other hand, the *wicked* and purely material spirits try to tempt him into sin and idolatry, which would expose him to the vengeance of the severe Ialdabaoth. Yet "Wisdom" never ceases to impart new strength to man's kindred nature, by fresh supplies of the higher spiritual influence; and from Seth, whom the Gnostics generally regarded as a representative of the πνευματικοί, — the contemplative natures, — she is able to preserve, through every age, a race peculiarly her own, in which the seeds of the spiritual nature are saved from destruction.

In respect to the relation of the *psychical Christ*, or Jesus, to the *Christ of the Æon world*, which latter united himself to the former at the baptism, the doctrine of the Ophites was like that of Basilides and the Valentinians. The only thing peculiar to them was, that the higher Christ, in descending through the seven heavens of the seven angels, or in wandering through the seven stars on his way to the earth, appeared in each of these heavens under a kindred form, as an angel of the same kind, thus concealing his own higher nature from those angels, while he absorbed whatever of the spiritual seed they still possessed, and crippled their power. The way in which these Gnostics endeavored to prove that the heavenly Christ first became united with Jesus at the baptism, and forsook him again at the passion, makes it clear how this entire theory may have arisen. They appealed, for instance, to the circumstance that Jesus wrought no miracle, either before his baptism or after his resurrection. This fact they imagined could be no otherwise explained than by supposing that higher being was only united with him from the time of his baptism to his death. A remarkable fact, beyond all doubt, and worthy of special notice, that Christ wrought miracles only from a certain point of time to another certain point of time; — only they gave it a false explanation.

Ialdabaoth, the God of the Jews, must see himself deceived in respect to that which he had expected from his Messiah — since the latter did not advance his kingdom, but as an instrument of the higher Christ, proclaimed the unknown Father, and threatened rather to subvert the law of Ialdabaoth, that is, Judaism. Hence he determined to

[1] Comp. Creutzer's Symbolik. Th. I. S. 312, u. 504. 2te Aufl.

get rid of him, and brought about his crucifixion. After his resurrection, Jesus remained eighteen months on the earth. He received by inspiration of the Sophia a clearer knowledge of the higher truth, which he communicated only to a few of his chosen disciples, whom he knew to be recipient of such high mysteries. Upon this he is raised by the celestial Christ to heaven, and sits at the right hand of Ialdabaoth, unobserved by him, for the purpose of drawing and receiving to himself every spiritual being that has been emancipated and purified by the redemption, when released from its sensible veil. In proportion as Jesus becomes enriched in his own spirit by this attraction to himself of his kindred natures, Ialdabaoth is deprived of all his higher virtues. The end is, to procure the enlargement of the spiritual life confined in nature, and bring it back to its original fountain, the mundane soul, from which all has flowed. Jesus is the channel through which this is accomplished. Thus the planets are at length to be deprived of all the rational existence which is to be found in them. There were some among this kind of Gnostics who carried the Pantheism through with still more consistency; — who held that the *same soul* is diffused through all living and inanimate nature; and that consequently all life, wherever it is dispersed and confined by the bonds of matter within the limits of *individual* existence, should be at length retracted through that channel and re-absorbed by the mundane soul, or the Sophia, — the original source from whence it had flowed. Such Gnostics said, "When we take things of nature for food, we absorb the souls scattered and dispersed in them into our own being, and with ourselves carry them upward to the original fountain." [1] Thus eating and drinking was for them a sort of worship. In an *apocryphal* gospel of this sect, the mundane soul or Supreme Being says therefore to the initiated: "Thou art myself, and I am thou; where thou art, I am; and I am diffused through all. Where thou pleasest thou canst gather me, but in gathering me thou gatherest thyself." [2]

Pantheism, and the confounding of the natural and the divine which results from it, can never by their very nature have any favorable influence on morals; — and where the reaction of a moral element does not oppose itself to that of the subjective temper, immorality will ever be naturally promoted by it. Pantheism, and the wildly fanatic spirit of defiance against Ialdabaoth, and his pretended, cramping ordinances, seem in truth to have led these Ophites into the most unnatural extravagances.

A statement of Origen deserves special notice, who reports that the Ophites were not Christians; and that they admitted none to their assemblies who did not curse Christ. The important inference might be drawn, that this sect sprang from a religious party which existed before the appearance of Christianity; and of which one portion afterwards appropriated to themselves some of the elements of Christianity, while another, holding fast to the traditional principles of their sect, opposed Christianity altogether. We should thus be led to the hypoth-

[1] Epiphan. hæres. 26, c. 9. [2] Chap. 3.

esis of an ante-Christian Gnosis, which afterwards in part received Christian elements into itself, and partly appeared in bitter hostility to them. In fact, Origen names, as the founder of this sect, a certain *Euphrates*, who may have lived before the birth of Christ.[1] Moreover, the striking relationship between the Ophitic system and the systems of the Sabæans and Manichæans, might be considered as pointing to some older common fountain of an ante-Christian Gnosis. But on the other side it cannot be denied that the Ophitic formulas of exorcism, which Origen cites immediately after he has made this statement, plainly contain allusions to Christian ideas. And it might be, that the opposition of the Ophites to the Christ of the church, the psychical Messiah, was to be traced to a certain peculiar turn that had been given to their principles; — that the distinction they made between the pneumatic and the psychical Christ — the light estimation in which they held the latter, may have become converted, among a portion of their sect, into a position of downright hostility to the latter, and hence to the Christ whom the majority of believers acknowledged,[2] — so that to curse the limited Messiah of the psychical natures, was finally made a mark of true discipleship to the higher Christ. We meet with something like this in the sect of the Sabæans, who transferred many things from the history of Christ to a *heavenly Genius, the messenger of life, Mando di Chaia*, whom they worshipped as the proper Christ, from whom the *true baptism* proceeded — and the rest to Jesus the anti-Christ, sent by the star-spirits to betray mankind. This Jesus corrupted the baptism of John. And we shall discover something similar to this in one variety of the Basilidean sect soon to be mentioned.

Pseudo-Basilideans. — These stand related to the original Basilideans in the same way as the Ophites to the genuine school of Valentine. The prudent and moderate spirit of the Basilidean system,[3] was here quite extinguished; the distinction between the Supreme God and the Demiurge pushed onward to an absolute Dualism, out of which had developed itself a wild defiance against the God of the world and his laws, — a bold antinomianism. According to their theory, the redeeming spirit[4] could enter into no union with the detested kingdom of the Demiurge; he only assumed an apparently sensible form. When the Jews were for crucifying him, having the power, as an exalted spirit, of clothing himself in every species of sensible form, and of presenting whatever shape he chose before the eyes of the sensuous multitude, he caused Simon of Cyrene (Mark 15) to appear to the Jews under *his own shape;* — while he himself took the form of Simon, and rose without hindrance

[1] Orig. c. Cels. lib. VI. c. 28, ff. The obscure and inaccurate Philaster, who places the Ophites at the head of the ante-Christian sects, cannot be considered any good authority.

[2] I am indebted for this last remark to the profound critique of my work on the Gnostics, by Dr. Gieseler.

[3] Unless Clement of Alexandria had spoken of precisely similar practical errors in false followers of Basilides, to those we meet with in this sect, we might be led to suspect that the so called Basilideans of Irenæus had no connection whatever with Basilides.

[4] The *νοῦς*. See above, the system of Basilides.

to his invisible kingdom, mocking the expectations of the deluded Jews. To these people the doctrine of Christ crucified was foolishness. They ridiculed all who confessed him, as confessors of a phantom, dupes to an illusion of the senses. Such men, they allowed, were no longer Jews, but neither were they Christians. They ridiculed the martyrs, as men who sacrificed their lives in the confession of a phantom. Those who were initiated into the true mysteries were well aware, that none but a few, only one in a thousand could comprehend them. Their *Nus* (νοῦς) possessed the faculty of making himself invisible to all; and they also possessed the same.[1] There was no form of sense they could not assume, no visible appearance to which they could not accommodate themselves in such a manner as to deceive the gross multitude, and escape persecution.[2]

CAINITES. — Closely related on the side of their practical bent to these Pseudo-Basilideans, were the Cainites; though, in respect to the fundamental principles of their system, they belonged to the great stock of the Ophites. Among them as well as among the Sethians, who were of the same stock, we meet with this fundamental idea — that the *Sophia* found means to preserve, through every age, in the midst of the Demiurge's world, a race bearing within them the spiritual seed which was related to her own nature. But while the Sethians, whom we must reckon with the first class of Gnostics, regarded Cain as a representative of the Hylic; Abel, of the Psychical; and Seth, who was finally to reappear in the person of the Messiah,[3] of the Pneumatic principle; the Cainites, on the other hand, singularly distinguished themselves by assigning the highest place to Cain. To such an extreme did these extravagant Antinomians carry their fanatical hatred of the Demiurge and of the Old Testament, that they made the worst characters of the Old Testament, as rebels against the laws of the Demiurge, their own Coryphæuses. They regarded them as the sons of the Sophia, and the instruments she employed in combating the Demiurge's kingdom. To these people, the apostles, without exception, appeared too narrow and restricted in their views. Judas Iscariot alone possessed, in their opinion, the true Gnosis. They held, that he procured the death of Christ from good motives; for he knew that this was the only possible way of bringing about the destruction of the Demiurge's kingdom.[4] Their principle, destruction to the works and ordinances of the Demiurge, served as a pretext to cover every species of immorality.[5] We ought not to wonder if such a sect, so audaciously perverse, so partial to the traitor Judas, should finally become hostile to Christ himself. But the language of Epiphanius, which might lead us to conjecture that such

[1] This faculty of becoming invisible, was claimed also in the Cabalistic school. We have a remarkable example of this folly in S. Maimon's life of himself, published by Moritz; — and it may be observed in general, that a great many interesting points of resemblance to Gnosticism may be traced in the later Jewish sects, which Beer has described in his instructive History of Sects among the Jews, (Brünn, 1822.)

[2] Iren. lib. I. c. 24.

[3] An idea nearly related to the doctrine of the Clementines.

[4] They had also a gospel, under the name of Judas, containing their Gnosis.

[5] Vid. Iren. lib. I. c. 31. Epiphan. hæres. 38.

was actually the case with regard to a portion of the sect, is too vague and indefinite to deserve being relied upon as a safe authority on this point.

CARPOCRATES AND EPIPHANES; PRODICIANS, ANTITACTES, NICOLAITANS, SIMONIANS.—To the class of Gnostics we have just described, whose licentious tendencies, so opposite to Christianity, could only find an accidental point of union in the ferment which it excited, belonged *Carpocrates*. He resided probably, during the reign of Hadrian, in Alexandria, — where a certain religious eclecticism or syncretism was then prevailing, which attracted the notice of that emperor himself.[1] He drew up a system of doctrines, which passed over into the hands of his son, Epiphanes. The latter, who died at the early age of seventeen, abused and expended great natural talents in the defence of a perverse tendency, most pernicious in its influence on the moral feelings. According to Clement of Alexandria, Carpocrates had busied himself with the Platonic philosophy, and taught it to his son. The Platonic ideas of the soul's preëxistence, and of that higher species of knowledge, which under the form of a reminiscence came from some earlier, heavenly state of being, gleam through the surface of this system, whose authors seem to have borrowed a great deal from Plato, particularly from the Phædrus. Their *Gnosis* consisted in the knowledge of one supreme original Being,[2] the highest unity, from whom all existence has flowed, and back to whom it strives to return. The finite spirits, ruling over the several portions of the earth, seek to counteract this universal striving after unity; and from their influence, their laws and arrangements, proceeds all that checks, disturbs, or limits the original communion lying at the root of nature, which is the outward manifestation of that highest unity. These spirits seek to retain under their dominion the souls which, emanating from the highest unity, and still partaking of its nature, have sunk down into the corporeal world, and there became imprisoned in bodies; so that after death they must migrate into other bodies, unless they are capable of rising with freedom to their original source. From these finite spirits the different popular religions had derived their origin. But the souls which, led on by the reminiscences of their former condition, soar upward to the contemplation of that higher unity, reach a state of perfect freedom and repose, which nothing afterwards is able to disturb. As examples of this sort, they named Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle among the heathens, and Jesus among the Jews. To the latter they attributed only great strength and purity of soul, which enabled him, through the reminiscences of his earlier existence, to attain the highest flight of contemplation, break free from the narrow laws of the God of the Jews, and overturn the religion which had proceeded from him, although educated in it himself. By virtue of his union with the Monad, (*μόνας*,) he was armed with a divine power, which enabled him

[1] See his letter, cited p. 102.

[2] Hence called, in Clement of Alexandria, *γνῶσις μοναδική*.

to overcome the spirits of this world, and the laws by which they govern the operations of nature, to work miracles, and to preserve the utmost composure under sufferings. By the same divine power, he was afterwards enabled to ascend in freedom, above all the powers of these spirits of the world, to the highest unity, — the ascension from the world of appearance to Nirwana, according to the system of Buddha. This sect accordingly *made no distinction* between Christ and the wise and good men among every people. They taught that any other soul which could soar to the same height of contemplation, might be regarded as standing on an equality with Christ. In the controversy against converting the religious life into a mere outward matter, they took sides with St. Paul, but on a directly opposite principle; not on the principle of faith, in the apostle's sense, but on that of an antinomian Pantheism, which looked down upon morality of life with a sort of contempt. Hence they foisted a meaning wholly alien from their true import, upon those fundamental positions of St. Paul respecting the vanity of the merit of good works, and respecting justification, not by works, but by faith alone. What they understood by faith was a mystical brooding of the mind absorbed in the original Unity. "Faith and love," said they, "constitute the essential thing; externals are of no importance. He who ascribes moral worth to these, makes himself their slave; subjects himself to those spirits of the world, from whom all religious and political ordinances have proceeded. He cannot advance, after death, beyond the circle of the Metempsychosis. But he who can abandon himself to every lust, without being affected by any, who can thus bid defiance to the laws of those mundane spirits, will after death rise to the unity of that original Monad, by union with which he was enabled, here in the present life, to break loose from every fetter that had cramped his being."[1] Epiphanes wrote a work on justification, in which he endeavored to carry out the position, that all nature manifests a striving after unity and fellowship, and that human laws which contradicted these laws of nature, and yet could not subdue the appetites implanted in human nature by the Creator himself, had first introduced sin. Accordingly he so wrested the language of the Apostle Paul respecting the inadequacy of the law to make men holy, and its design to evoke the consciousness of guilt, as to treat the Decalogue with bold contempt. This sect busied itself a good deal with the art of magic. Whoever, by union with the original Monad, was enabled to rise above the subordinate gods, who, like all things else, were subject to change, — above the finite spirits of the world, could show this superiority by his works, by producing effects transcending the laws of nature, which proceeded from those inferior spirits. Thus they explained the miracles of Christ; holding that any other person who rose to this union with the Monad, could perform similar wonders. These Carpocratian doctrines embody a great deal which bears a close relation to the Hindoo spirit.[2]

[1] Iren. lib. I. c. 25.

[2] See Colebrooke's Dissertation on the school of Sankhya. Essais sur la philosophie des Hindous par Colebrooke, traduits par G. Pauthier. Paris, 1833. Pag. 32. Although by this I do not mean to assert, that these doctrines — which, however, might well be possible in the state of inter-

and particularly to Buddhism.[1] The Carpocratians paid divine honors to an image of Christ, which, as they maintained, came originally from Pilate. The same honors they paid also to the images of pagan philosophers, who had taken their stand, like Christ, above the popular religion. In so doing, they made use of heathen ceremonies,—a practice not to be reconciled, we must allow, with the system of Carpocrates and Epiphanes, and to be imputed rather to the superstition of their followers. At Same, the principal city of the island Cephalene in the Ionian Sea, whence sprung the family of Epiphanes on his mother's side, so great is said to have been the impression made by this young man on the minds of the multitude, that a temple, a museum and altars were erected to him, and divine honors paid to his name. As we have this account from the learned Clement of Alexandria,[2] a man not given to credulity in such matters, we have no reason to question the fact, which indeed fully accords with the spirit and temper of those times. Perhaps, however, it was only from the members of his own sect, who would probably meet with a cordial reception on this island, that he enjoyed these honors, as one of the greatest among wise men.[3]

To the same class of licentious Antinomians belonged the sect of Antitactes. Their doctrine is denoted by their name. The good and gracious God, said they, created all things good. But one of his own offspring rebelled against him. This was the Demiurge, the God of the Jews. He it was that sowed the tares, engendered that principle of evil wherewith he has encompassed every one of us; by which, we must suppose, is meant the material body, constituting at once the prison-house and the fountain of all sin to the souls banished from above. Thus he has placed us at enmity with the Father, and we in turn set ourselves at enmity with him.[4] To avenge the Father on him, we do directly the reverse of what he wills and commands. As a proof that the Old Testament bore witness against itself, they appealed to Mal. 3 : 15, quoting the language of the godless as words of truth.[5]

To the same class belonged the Prodicians, who were followers of a certain Prodicus. They maintained they were sons of the Supreme God, a royal race; and therefore bound to no law, since kings were under none. They were the lords of the sabbath, the lords over all ordinances. They made the whole worship of God to consist, probably, in the inner contemplation of divine things. They rejected prayer, and perhaps all external worship, as suited to those limited minds only which were still held in bondage under the Demiurge; and they were

course between the nations at that time—were derived indirectly from such a source; since the tendency of mystic Pantheism exhibits itself in similar phenomena, even independently of all such influences; and in cases of this sort, instead of communication from without, it is sufficient to suppose an inner relationship of spirit; as in the instance of the Beghards of the middle age.

[1] See the remarks which follow, on Manicheism.

[2] Clement. Strom. l. III. f. 428.

[3] We make no mention here of the Cyrenian inscriptions, of which so much has been said in modern times; for, although conceived exactly according to the spirit of this sect, they have been proved to be not genuine.

[4] Ἀντιτασσόμεθα τούτῳ.

[5] Ἀντέστησαν τῷ θεῷ, καὶ ἐσώθησαν; where, moreover, they interpolated the word ἀναιδεῖ. By resisting the unabashed God, men are delivered from his bondage. Clem. Strom. l. III. f. 441.

in the habit of appealing to the authority of certain apocryphal books, which were attributed to Zoroaster.[1]

With this class of Antinomians belonged also the Nicolaitans,—if, indeed, the actual existence of such a sect can be proved. Irenæus takes notice of a sect of this kind which existed in his time. He traced its origin back to that Nicolaus, a deacon, whom we find mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles; and he supposed the same sect was described in the second chapter of the Revelation.[2] But it might be doubted, whether Irenæus was right in the interpretation which he has here given of the passage in the Revelation,—whether the word Nicolaitans, which occurs in this place, is in truth the proper name of a sect, and more particularly of a Gnostic sect. The passage relates simply to a class of people who were in the practice of seducing Christians to participate in the sacrificial feasts of the heathens, and in the excesses which attended them,—just as the Jews of old were led astray by the Moabites, Numb. 25. It is quite possible, too, that the name Nicolaitans is employed purely in a symbolical sense, according to the general style of the Apocalypse, and signifies corrupters, seducers of the people, like Balaam;—in this sense, Balaamites.[3] It was a favorite idea with Irenæus, that the Apostle John, even at this early period, had come into conflict with Gnostics of various descriptions;—and he was wont to search in the writings of John for allusions bearing directly upon the Gnostic heresy. Having found, then, many of the errors reproved in this passage of the Revelation to be the same that prevailed among the Gnostics of his time, he concluded that the practical errors denounced by the apostle might have sprung out of a theoretical Gnosticism; and the name suggested to him the Nicolas, mentioned in the Acts, as its probable author. The remarks relating to this sect in Irenæus are, however, really so obscure, that we have no just reason for supposing that he knew anything about it from his own personal observation. Had we no other account, therefore, than that of Irenæus, we should be obliged to allow it to be possible, at least, that the tradition about this sect had grown out of some misconstruction of the passage in the Revelation; though it might seem strange that Irenæus, without any assignable motive, should represent a man who had been chosen by the apostles themselves to a public office, as the founder of a heretical sect. But no such mistake can be supposed to have existed in the case of the learned and unprejudiced Clement of Alexandria, who in the first place was better versed in historical criticism, and next appeals to facts which could not have been fabricated. There were those who maintained the pernicious principle, already mentioned, that the lower passions were to be subdued by indulgence, without allowing the spirit to be affected by them. So should men mortify the flesh, destroy it by

[1] Strom. l. I. f. 304; l. III. f. 438; l. VII. f. 722.

[2] Iren. l. I. c. 26. Speaking of their practical errors, he says: qui indiscrete, (ἀδιαφόρως,) vivunt. I. c. l. III. c. 11, he speaks of their speculative errors; where, however, he does not so distinguish them from other Gnostics, as to make their peculiar characteristics clearly prominent.

[3] Balaam = νικόλαος,—according to the etymology from בָּלַע and עָם.

means of itself, show contempt for it. Their motto consisted of certain words to this purport which they ascribed to Nicolas the deacon.[1] In a passage which follows,[2] the same Clement speaks of another incident in the life of this Nicolas, often appealed to by the sect in justification of their extravagances. Accused by the apostles of jealousy towards his wife, to prove the groundlessness of the charge, he led her forth and said, Let him that chooses marry her. Yet Clement himself was very far from believing that the Nicolas of the Acts was the founder of this sect, although they claimed him as such. He defends the character of the man, as a member of the apostolic church; and refers to a tradition which testified that this Nicolas lived in honorable wedlock to the last, and left behind him children who led decent and pious lives. We see, then, that Irenæus was not mistaken in assuming the existence of such a sect, but only careless in examining into the truth of their pretended origin. It was the custom with such sects, as we have often observed, to attach themselves to some celebrated name or other of antiquity, in the choice of which they were not seldom influenced by circumstances quite accidental. Thus the Nicolaitans claimed Nicolas the deacon as their master, though he had done nothing to entitle him to that bad distinction. Clement supposes his words and actions had been misinterpreted, and endeavors to explain them in a milder sense; but it may be doubted whether Clement, in this case, carried his criticism far enough. Everything imputed to Nicolas by the tradition wears an apocryphal aspect. Perhaps the sect possessed a life of him drawn up by themselves or others from fabulous accounts and unauthentic traditions, in which the whole of this was embodied. If this sect was really derived from those Antinomians who were called Nicolaitans in the age of the Apostle John,— a point which cannot be absolutely decided,[3] — then possibly this very name in the Apocalypse — the Nicolaitans — may have led the more recent sect to derive their appellation from Nicolas. Belonging, as they probably did, to the anti-Judaistic party, and consequently acknowledging no other apostle than Paul, they may have seized upon what they found asserted in the Apocalypse as affording evidence of the antiquity of their sect, since it had been attacked already by the Judaizing teacher John; and the re semblance of names would naturally invite them to refer its origin back to the Nicolas mentioned in the Acts. We have noticed examples already of Gnostics choosing for their leaders persons whose characters appear in an unfavorable light in the Old or the New Testament.

We have still to mention the *Simonians*,— an eclectic sect, who can scarcely be brought, however, under any one specific class; since they seem to have accommodated themselves, sometimes to paganism, at

[1] Τό δεῖν παραχρῆσθαι τῇ σαρκί. Clem. Strom. l. II. f. 411.

[2] L. c. l. III. f. 436.

[3] Even though the name Nicolaitans in the Revelation were really the proper name of a party which owed its rise to some person by the name of Nicolas, and it was only the name, which existed before, that gave occasion to this allusion to Balaam, yet it could not be inferred thence notwithstanding, that the party then existing was a Gnostic one. See respecting this sect, my Apostol. History, vol. II. p. 533.

others to Judaism or to the religious opinions of the Samaritans, and at others again to Christianity,—sometimes to have been rigid ascetics, at others wild scoffers at all moral law, (the Entychites.) Simon Magus was their Christ, or at least a form of manifestation of the redeeming Christ, who had manifested himself also in Jesus; — whether it was that they actually derived their origin from a party founded by the sorcerer of that name mentioned in the Acts, or whether, having sprung up at some later period, they chose, of their own fancy, Simon Magus, a name so odious to the Christians, for their Coryphæus, and forged writings in his name which made pretensions to a higher wisdom. The opinion of some learned writers, that another Simon, distinct from the older Simon Magus, was the founder of the sect, and afterwards became confounded with this latter, is an arbitrary conjecture, by no means called for to explain the historical fact.[1]

Anti-Jewish Gnostics, who strove to apprehend Christianity, however, in its Purity and absolute Independence.

Strongly contrasted with these Gnostics, whom we have just been considering, and who were directed away from the ethical spirit of Christianity by their own prevailing bent, were another class, who were led to oppose Judaism through the influence of a mistaken Christian interest, and were betrayed into Gnosticism by their one-sided mode of apprehending

[1] This Simon Magus, who cannot properly claim a place even among the founders of Christian sects, acquired unmerited importance in the Christian church, by being held up as the great father of the Gnostic heresy. As the representative of the whole *theosophico-goetic* tendency, in opposition to the simple faith in revelation, he became, so to speak, a *mythical* personage, and gave occasion for many fictitious legends, such, for example, as his dispute with the Apostle Peter, and his unsuccessful experiment in the art of flying. The most ingenious version of this story is to be found in the Clementines. It is a singular fact, however, that Justin Martyr, in his second apology to the Roman Emperor, mentions a pillar erected at Rome to this Simon, on an island in the Tiber, (ἐν τῷ Τίβερι ποταμῷ, μεταξὺ τῶν δύο γεφυρῶν,) with the inscription, Simoni deo sancto. Although sorcerers of this stamp could often find their way even to persons of the highest rank, yet it is incredible, that the folly should ever be carried to such an extreme as to the erection of a statue and the passing of a decree of the senate, enrolling Simon Magus among the deos Romanos. The correctness of Justin's statement might therefore be called in question, even though it were impossible to show the reason of his mistake. But the occasion of his mistake may now, as it would seem, be explained. In the year 1574, a stone was dug up at the spot described by Justin, which appears to have served as the pedestal of a statue, and on it was the inscription, Semoni Sango Deo Fidio sacrum. True, this stone was not erected by the Roman senate, nor by the emperor, but by a certain Sextus Pompeius. But Justin, with his head full of the legends about Simon Magus, overlooked all this, and confounded the Semo Sancus, (a *Sabino-Roman* deity, probably unknown to Justin, who was better versed in the Greek than in the Roman mythology,) with the words Simo sanctus; for it is to be observed that the cognomen of that deity was sometimes written sanctus instead of sancus. Tertullian, who had a more familiar knowledge of Roman antiquities, might be expected, it is true, to know better; but even he was too prejudiced in such cases, and too ignorant of criticism, to institute any further examination with regard to the correctness of a statement which was in accordance with his taste, and which besides came to him on so respectable authority. The more critical Alexandrians take no notice of the matter. Origen's remark, (lib. I. c. Cels. c. 57,) that this Simon was not known beyond Palestine by any but Christians, who became acquainted with him from the Acts of the Apostles, would seem to imply, that he looked upon the story of the pillar erected to him in Rome, as a fiction. The Samaritan Goetæ and Heresiarchs, Dositheus and Menander, (the latter of whom is represented to have been a disciple of Simon Magus,) deserve still less to be particularly noticed in the history of Christian sects.

the ethical element in Christianity. We have observed already, in that section of the present history which relates to the Christian life, how possible it was, that there should spring up in the course of its progressive movement, a one-sided ascetic tendency, leading to a wrongly conceived opposition to the world and to nature. Now a tendency of this sort might be united with the absolute Dualism of the Gnostics, and in the latter doctrine find a speculative ground of support. Thus arose those peculiar phenomena of the Gnosis, in which the practical, ascetic element especially predominated, and which were distinguished for a certain earnestness of moral spirit, running however into the extreme of rigid asceticism.

a. SATURNIN. — The first whom we shall mention here is Saturnin, who lived at Antioch, in the time of the Emperor Hadrian. His doctrines, so far as they can be ascertained from our imperfect sources of information,[1] were as follows: At the lowest stage of the emanation world, on the boundaries between the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness, or of the ὕλη, stand the seven lowest angels, spirits of the stars. These combine together to win away from the kingdom of darkness, a territory on which to erect an independent empire of their own. Thus sprang into being this earthly world, and through its different regions these spirits of the stars dispersed themselves. At their head stands the God of the Jews. They are engaged in an incessant war with the kingdom of darkness, and with Satan its prince, who will not suffer their kingdom to grow at the expense of his own, and constantly seeks to destroy what they strive to build up. A feeble ray only gleams down to them from the higher kingdom of light. The appearance of this light from above fills them with a longing for it. They would seize it for themselves, but cannot. Whenever they would grasp it, it retires from them. Hence they enter into a combination to charm this ray of the higher light, and to fix it in their own kingdom, by means of an image fashioned after the shape of light floating above them. But the form made by the angels cannot raise itself towards heaven, cannot stand erect.[2] It is a bodily mass without a soul. At length the Supreme Father looks down with pity from the kingdom of light on the feeble being man, who has been created, however, in his own image. He infuses into him a spark of his own divine life. Man now, for the first time, becomes possessed of a soul, and can raise himself erect towards heaven. The godlike germ is destined to unfold itself, in those *human* natures where it has been implanted, to distinct personality, and to return after a determinate period to its original source. The men who, carrying within them these divine seeds, are appointed to reveal the Supreme God on earth, stand opposed to those who, possessing nothing but the hylic principle, are instruments of the kingdom of darkness. Now to destroy this empire of the planetary spirits, of the God of the Jews, which would set up itself as an independent kingdom, as well as to destroy the empire of darkness, and save those men who, through the divine seed of life, have become partakers of his own na-

[1] Irenæus and Epiphanius.

[2] See above, concerning the Ophites

ture, the Supreme God sent down his Æon Nus, (νοῦς.) But since the latter could not enter into any union with the planetary empire, or the material world, he appeared under the disguise and semblance merely of a sensible form.

It is evident of itself, how spontaneously the ascetic bent above mentioned, the excessive valuation of celibacy, would spring up out of such a system.

b. TATIAN AND THE ENCRATITES. — Tatian of Assyria lived at Rome as a rhetorician, where he was converted to Christianity by the instrumentality of Justin Martyr, who was on terms of greater intimacy with him on account of their having received the same philosophical education in the Platonic school. During the lifetime of Justin he adhered to the doctrine of the church. He composed, while still entertaining the same views, after Justin's death, an apologetic discourse,[1] which contains a good deal, however, which might be accommodated to the doctrines of Gnosticism. In this discourse, Tatian, like his teacher Justin, following the example of Philo, received into his system the entire Platonic doctrine concerning matter, inconsistent as it was with a theory in which the doctrine of the creation from nothing was still maintained. It was this Platonic doctrine which led him to adopt also the hypothesis of an ungodlike spirit of life wedded to its kindred matter, whence he derived the evil spirits, whom he describes as πνεύματα ὑλικά, — inconsistent as this hypothesis also was with the Christian doctrine concerning the nature of evil spirits, and concerning the origin of sin. In this discourse already, he advanced a theory, which, we may remark, had found its way out of some Jewish system of theology into the speculations of several of the early church teachers, — that the human soul, like everything else formed and partaking of matter,[2] is by its own nature mortal; that the first man, living in communion with God, had within him a *principle of divine life*, exalted above the nature of this soul which had been derived from matter, and that this is properly the image of God,[3] by virtue of which man became immortal. Having lost this image by sin, he fell a prey to matter and to mortality.

It is easy to see how these opinions, loosely strung together as they were in Tatian's system, would furnish a convenient foothold for the Gnostic idea of the ὕλη, and of the distinction between the ψυχικόν and the πνευματικόν, and how they would naturally result in an asceticism, striving after an absolute estrangement from the things of sense.[4] According to the report of Irenæus,[5] Tatian conceived a doctrine of Æons similar to that of the Valentinians; yet this would not suffice of itself to warrant us in concluding that *his* system bore any affinity to the Valentinian. According to Clement of Alexandria,[6] he belonged to the

[1] His λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας.
[2] A πνεῦμα ὑλικόν.
[3] Θεοῦ εἰκὼν καὶ ὁμοίωσις.
[4] According to Irenæus, Tatian was *the first* to assert the condemnatory sentence of the first man; which indeed would agree with the above-mentioned distinction between the ψυχικόν and the πνευματικόν in the nature of the first man, he having lost the latter by sin. Lib. I. c. 28.
[5] Comp. Clem. Strom. lib. III. f. 465. C.
[6] L. c. f. 460, D.

class of anti-Jewish Gnostics, and transferred St. Paul's statement of the contrariety between the old and the new man, to the relation of the Old and New Testament; — yet he might perhaps have expressed himself in this way, even according to the Valentinian Gnosis, which by no means supposed an absolute contrariety between the two economies. A remark of Tatian, which has come down to us, would seem to imply, that he was far from separating the Demiurge, the God of the Old Testament, so entirely from all connection with the higher world. He looked upon the expression in Genesis, "Let there be light," — and this may serve to illustrate his arbitrary mode of interpreting scripture, — not as the commanding, creative word, but as the language of prayer. The Demiurge, seated on the dark chaos, prays that light may shine down from above.[1] Tatian's strong leaning towards a fanatical asceticism might perhaps warrant the conclusion, however, that he drew a sharper line of distinction between the creation of the Demiurge and the higher world, and consequently between the Old Testament and the New, than could be admitted by the principles of the Valentinian school; for this practical repugnance to the creation of the Demiurge was usually connected with an opposition to it in theory.

Tatian was aware that the system of Christian morals must be derived from the contemplation of the life of Christ, and take its laws from thence. Assuming this, he wrote a work in which he endeavored to show how true perfection might be attained by the imitation of Christ.[2] He failed only in one respect; that he did not seize the life of Christ in its completeness, and in its relation to his mission as the redeemer of mankind, and the author of the new creation of divine life, which was designed to embrace and pervade all human relations only in the further course of its development from him. Paying no regard to this, he held the life of celibacy and the renunciation of all worldly possessions, after the pattern of Christ, to be the distinctive mark of Christian perfection. But to such as appealed to the life of Christ considered in this light, Clement of Alexandria replied, "The specific nature of Christ's being, as distinguished from all other men, left no room for the marriage relation. That necessity of something to complete the human nature, which is grounded in the mutual relation of the sexes, found no place in him. The only analogon to the marriage estate was, in his case, the relation he bears to the church, which is bound to him, as his bride. Nothing could issue from him, as the Son of God, but a spiritual posterity."[3] The strong bias of Tatian in this particular direction led him to understand the Apostle Paul, in 1 Corinth. 7 : 5, as teaching that marriage and unchastity were one and the same thing,— both equally the service of Satan.[4] It may be too,

[1] Theodot. Didascal. Anatol. f. 806. — Origenes de orat. c. 24.

[2] Περὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν σωτῆρα καταρτισμοῦ.

[3] Οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ μὴ γῆμαι τὸν κύριον, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἰδίαν νύμφην εἶχε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἔπειτα δὲ οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἦν κοινὸς, ἵνα καὶ βοηθοῦ τινος κατὰ σάρκα δεηθῇ, οὐδὲ τεκνοποιήσασθαι ἦν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀϊδίως μένοντι καί μόνῳ υἱῷ θεοῦ γεγονότι. Clem. Strom. lib. III. f. 446.

[4] Paul, he affirms, gives permission in this place but ostensibly, — and immediately shrinks back from what he permits, when he says that those who followed his permission would serve two masters; by mutual continence and prayer they would serve

that besides the canonical gospels, he made use of apocryphal histories, in which the image of Christ had already become modified under the influence of theosophico-ascetic habits of contemplation.[1] As the tendency to a theosophical asceticism of this kind, which sprung up in the East, had now become widely spread, it can be no wonder that there were different kinds of these *abstinents*,[2] who had no special connection with Tatian, and who belonged in part to the Jewish and partly to the anti-Jewish party.[3]

c. MARCION AND HIS SCHOOL. — In the case of the Gnostics last considered, we observe already the *dualistic* element asserting itself chiefly on the practical side, on the side of ethics, while the speculative retreats proportionally out of view. This is still more clearly apparent in the case of Marcion. He is the terminating point at which this whole development naturally ends; since he belongs with the Gnostics only in a single respect. He stands on the dividing line between Gnosticism, the prevailing tendency of which is to speculation, and a predominant practical direction of mind, diametrically opposed to speculative Gnosticism; so that, considered in this point of view, the Alexandrian theology recognized by the great

God, by incontinence they would serve unchastity and Satan. Strom. l. III. f. 460. According to Eusebius, — l. IV. c. 29, — he was accused of undertaking to garble and alter many expressions in the writings of St. Paul; but from the words of Eusebius, *τινὰς αὐτὸν μεταφράσαι φωνὰς, ὡς ἐπιδιορθούμενον αὐτῶν τὴν τῆς φράσεως σύνταξιν*, it is impossible to determine, whether the alterations were made to favor his own dogmatic and ethical principles, or whether they were changes from the Hebraistic into a purer Greek; and then the question arises, whether Tatian actually allowed himself in the practice of such an arbitrary sort of criticism, which certainly is quite possible; or whether he only had in his possession certain readings varying from the received text, which it was assumed, as a matter of course, might be regarded as intentional falsifications.

[1] We should know something more on this point, if Tatian's "*εὐαγγέλιον διὰ τεσσάρων*" were still extant. The old writers seem to have looked upon this work as a compendious harmony of the four gospels, Euseb. l. IV. c. 29; but it may be doubted whether Tatian really confined himself to our four canonical gospels, — whether he did not at least make some use of several apocryphal gospels; since according to Epiphanius' account, H. 26, — which we must allow is extremely vague, — this collection possessed some resemblance to the *εὐαγγέλιον καθ' ἑβραίους*. Theodoretus found more than two hundred copies of this work in use within his Syrian diocese, and thought it his duty to withdraw them, probably because he found them to contain a good deal of heretical matter. Theodoret. hæret. fab. I. 20. Tatian might find occasion also, on the ground of his peculiar Gnostic views concerning Christ, to leave out those parts of the gospels which contain the genealogies, and perhaps all that related to Christ's nativity.

[2] *Ἐγκρατῖται, ἀποτακτικοί, ὑδροπαραστάται*, (because they made use of water only at the communion.)

[3] Among these belonged Julius Cassianus, in whose doctrines we may recognize, perhaps, the lingering influence of the Alexandrian-Jewish theology; the *εὐαγγέλιον κατ' Αἰγυπτίους* being the source, indeed, whence he derived his knowledge of the gospel history. Regarding Adam as a symbol of the soul degraded from a heavenly condition to the corporeal world, he made it the chief duty of man to gain the mastery over matter by means of ascetic austerities, and for this reason would not admit that Christ had appeared in the corporeal world. He was considered one of the leading men of the Docetæ. In his *ἐξηγητικά*, he endeavored to introduce his doctrines into the Old Testament by means of the allegorical method of interpretation. See Clem. Strom. lib. I. f. 320; lib. III. f. 465. Furthermore, the Severians belong to a class which passes generally under the name of Encratites. They are said to have sprung from a certain Severus, and to have rejected the epistles of Paul, and the Acts of the Apostles. Theodoret. hæret. fab. I. 21. Their hostility to Paul might be considered, perhaps, as an indication of their origin from the Jewish Christian party The inference, however, is the less sure, because the peculiar spirit of their doctrine may have led them to that hostility.

body of the church contains more that is in affinity with Gnosticism, than the theology of Marcion. The *Christian* interest is more directly addressed by him than it is by the other Gnostics, because his whole being is far more thoroughly penetrated by Christianity; because the Christian element properly constituted the ground-tone of his whole inner life, his whole mode of thinking in religion and theology; while, in the case of the other Gnostics, this was only one spiritual tendency belonging to them along with several others of a foreign character, — although it was sometimes the predominant one. It is instructive to observe, how a tendency proceeding from the very heart of Christianity may be impelled, by taking a settled direction on one particular side, to allow the admission of unchristian elements. It must leave us with a sad impression of human weakness, to see, in the example of this remarkable man, in what a strange relation or want of relation the speculative system may stand to that which moves and animates the inmost life of the man,— to see how, by his own misunderstanding of himself, he could lead others, who ought to have been bound to him by the fellowship of the same higher life, to misunderstand, be deceived in, and condemn him; and those very persons too who came nearest to him in what constituted the fundamental and essential character of their spiritual bent. This world, in which we come to our knowledge neither of God, nor of ourselves, nor of each other, directly, but only through a glass in broken and refracted rays, is full of misunderstandings. What Marcion had in common with the Gnostics, and particularly with the Gnostics belonging to the last-mentioned class, consisted partly in his attempt to sunder the God of nature and of the Old Testament from the God of the gospel, — to separate generally the purely human from the divine, and partly in various speculative elements which he wrought into his religious system. At the same time, it is quite evident that he had arrived at what he had in common with them, by a method wholly different from theirs. His God he had first found in Christ, and that glory of God which was revealed to him in Christ, he could nowhere find again in nature or in history. The speculative elements which he borrowed from other Gnostics, were to him but expedients which he resorted to for the purpose of filling up the chasm necessarily left in his system, which had been formed out of a bent of mind radically different and purely *practical*. It clearly was not his object, as it was the object of other Gnostics, to supply the imagined defects of Christianity by a speculative solution of difficulties taken from other systems of doctrine; but the design he started with was simply to restore Christianity in its purity, which, in his opinion, had been corrupted by foreign additions. The one-sided position from which he started with this object in view was the occasion of most of his errors.

He did not make a secret traditional doctrine the main source of this genuine Christianity. But neither was he willing to be confined to the *general tradition of the church;* for in this, according to his opinion, foreign elements had already become mingled with the pure apostolical Christianity. Taking his stand, in the spirit of true protestantism, on the ground of positive Christianity, he would admit that nothing but

the words of Christ and of his genuine disciples ought to be considered as the fountain-head of the true gospel. We must confess, that instead of recognizing the many different phases of Christianity presented in the manifoldness of the organs chosen for its promulgation, he allowed himself to indulge an arbitrary partiality in distinguishing and separating them one from the other. His efforts in looking up the earliest records of the pure, original Christianity, led him into historical and critical investigations, lying remote from the *contemplative* direction of mind peculiar to other Gnostics. But here also he presents to us a warning example,— showing how such investigations, when guided and controlled by preconceived dogmatic opinions in which the understanding has entangled itself, must necessarily lead to disastrous results, — showing how easily an arbitrary hyper-criticism may slide into the opposite extreme, in opposing a careless facility of belief, and how readily, in combating one class of doctrinal prejudices, one may fall into others differing only in kind.

The other Gnostics united with their theosophic idealism, a mystical, allegorizing interpretation of the scriptures. The simple-hearted Marcion was decidedly opposed to this artificial method of interpretation. He was a zealous advocate, on the other hand, of the *literal interpretation* which prevailed among the antagonists of Gnosticism; and it is evident from his example, how even this method of interpretation, when not united with other hermeneutical principles, and when pushed to an extreme, must lead to many arbitrary procedures.

The opposition between πίστις and γνῶσις, between an exoteric and an esoteric Christianity, was among the marked peculiarities of the other Gnostic systems; but in Marcion's case, on the contrary, who adhered so closely to the practical Apostle Paul, no such opposition could possibly be allowed to exist. To the merely outward, and more truly Jewish than Christian notion of πίστις, which had found admission into the Christian church, he opposed — not a self-conceited Gnosis, but the conception of πίστις itself, apprehended according to the genuine sense of St. Paul. In his view, πίστις was the common fountain of the divine life for all Christians. He knew of nothing higher than the *illumination which every* Christian ought to possess. What he recognized as genuine Christianity, ought to be recognized as such by all capable of receiving Christianity in any sense. He could make no other distinction than that between the riper Christians and those that needed still to be instructed in Christian principles, (the catechumens.)

In a two-fold respect, Marcion's appearance is a fact of great significance in the history of the world. In the first place, he stands a living witness of the impression which Christianity, as something wholly new and supernaturally divine, produced on men of strong and lively feelings. We see how Christianity appeared to such a person, looking at it from the point of view which had been reached by his age, and in its relation to all that had proceeded forth out of the previous development of mankind. It is a fact, which here speaks to us. Next the great significance of Marcion's appearance consists in this: that we

perceive in him the first symptoms of a reaction necessary in the course of the historical evolution, — a reaction of the Pauline type of doctrine, reclaiming its rightful authority, against the strong leaning of the church to the side of James and Peter, — a reaction of the Christian consciousness, re-asserting the independence acquired for it by the labors of Paul, against a new combination of Jewish and Christian elements, — a reaction of the protestant spirit against the catholic element now swelling in the bud. At its first appearance, this reaction might easily be led wrong, and tend too exclusively again, to the other side of the truth. It was needful that various *momenta* should be evolved, before the reaction could be a pure one, clear in itself, and therefore certain of the victory. As Marcion gives us the picture of Paul, not in all the harmonious *many-sidedness* of his great spirit, but only in a single aspect of it, we consequently find in Marcion himself the impetuous ardor, but not the calm reflective prudence, — the practical, but not the dialectic spirit of Paul, — we find in him the acuteness and perspicacity of the apostle in discerning and setting forth opposites, but not the conciliating wisdom for which the apostle was no less distinguished. We shall now endeavor to seize the character of Marcion in its connection with that stage of development the church had arrived at in his time, — though in doing this we must be made to feel the great want under which we labor, of satisfactory information with regard to his early habits of life and education. This deficiency we must endeavor to supply by the aid of historical combination.

Marcion was born at Sinope, in Pontus, near the beginning of the second century. According to one report,[1] which is not placed, however, beyond all doubt, his father was bishop of the church in Sinope. In this country, there were beyond question families, even thus early, in which Christianity had been handed down from parents to children; so that Marcion might have been led to the Christian faith through the influence of his early education; — yet even supposing his father to have been a bishop, it would not be necessary to conclude that the fact was so. He speaks of the "ardor of his first faith,"[2] where he seems to refer to the glow of feeling experienced by a new convert.[3] Perhaps he belonged to the number of those who were first brought to the faith, not by the tradition of the church, but by their own study of the written word. And as he appropriated Christianity in a way somewhat independent of tradition, so in the after development of his Christian views he ever pursued this independent direction, and was unwilling to

[1] In Epiphanius, and in the later additions to Tertullian's Præscriptiones. It may excite some doubt to find that Tertullian has made no use of this fact against Marcion, that he had abandoned the Catholic church in which his father was a bishop. The silence of Tertullian, who had been at great pains to obtain information with regard to all the particulars of Marcion's life, on a point which he had so much occasion to speak of, must lead us to suspect the foundation of Epiphanius' report, who contrasts the heresy of the son with the orthodoxy and piety of his father. Yet it does not oblige us to reject the account.

[2] Primus calor fidei.

[3] Although we grant that this might also be said, in the first ardor of pious feeling, by a person who had been educated in Christianity, especially in this period, when the baptism of infants was not practised yet the other is the most obvious construction.

subject himself to any human tradition. Perhaps it was the majesty of Christ beaming upon him from the survey of his life and the contemplation of his words, whereby he was drawn to Christianity. And the Pauline type of doctrine, which most completely harmonized with his tone of mind, may have been the form in which he first learned to understand Christianity, and which chained his spirit once for all. In this manner, the peculiar shape which the Christian faith assumed in his case, may have been determined from the beginning.

Like many others, he felt constrained by the ardor of his first Christian love, to renounce every earthly possession. He presented to the church a considerable sum of money, and began, in a course of rigid abstinence, the life of a "continent person" or an ἀσκήτης.[1] His contempt of nature, which was at first simply *practical* and *ascetic*, proceeding from a false notion of the contrariety between the natural and the divine, would lead a man of his ardent temperament, so eager to grasp what he approved, and so bold in rejecting what he disliked, to institute a theoretic distinction and separation between the God of nature and the God of the gospel. The contemplation of this period brings to our notice minds of the most opposite stamp,— those that were for reconciling all antitheses, — for blending together elements the most heterogeneous, and those as well who would see everywhere nothing else but opposites, and know of no means to reconcile them. To this latter class belonged Marcion. The consciousness of redemption formed the ground-tone of his religious life, — the fact of redemption he regarded as the central point of Christianity. But as it is only through numberless stages of transition and intermediate points that everything can ultimately be referred to this as the central point, — as the whole development of the world in history and nature were in this to be brought into a comprehending unity, — the impatient Marcion, who was averse to all gradual measures and intermediate steps, who was for having everything alike complete and at once, could not so understand it. Tertullian has aptly characterized him, when he says, "While in the Creator's universe all things occur in the order of a gradual development, each in its proper place, with Marcion, on the other hand, everything is sudden."[2] To his *heart*, filled and glowing as it was with the image of the God of mercy and compassion, who appeared in Christ, Nature appeared as something entirely alien from the manner in which this God revealed himself to him in his soul. In history too, Marcion, who was so full of the glory of the gospel, believed he could find no trace of the God that had revealed himself to him there; and into the demon world of paganism he looked back, like so many other zealous Christians, only with shuddering aversion,—

[1] See above. Pecuniam in primo calore fidei ecclesiæ contulit. Tertullian. adv. Marcion, l. IV. c. c. It amounted to two hundred sestertia. See Tertullian. præscript. c. 30. Epiphanius, in calling Marcion a μονάζων, (recluse,) only confounds the relations of his own time with those of an earlier period. We must consider the μονάζων as equivalent to the ἀσκήτης. Ephraem Syrus accuses Marcion of acquiring by his asceticism a deceptive show of sanctity. Opp. Eph. Syr. lat. Sermo I. f. 438, seq.

[2] Sic (subito) sunt omnia apud Marcionem, quæ suum et plenum habent ordinem apud creatorem. Lib. IV. c. 11.

he saw nothing there but *Satan's kingdom*. The same tendency of spirit which made it impossible for him to find again in nature the God of the gospel, allowed him to see nothing but contrariety, no unity at bottom, in the relation of the Old Testament to the New. The jealous God of the Old Testament, in his judgment so inexorably severe, and the God of the gospel, whose essential being is only love; the Messiah of the world with his worldly kingdom, and Christ who declined all earthly power and glory, and would not found a kingdom of this world, seemed to him utterly opposed to one another. We must here consider between what opposite tendencies, none of which could satisfy his mind, Marcion found himself placed. On the one side were those uneducated Christians who were led, by their grossly literal method of interpreting the Old Testament, to frame to themselves the most unworthy notions of God;[1] on the other side were those who contrived, by artificial and allegorizing expositions, to lay into the Old Testament the whole system of Christian truth. But it belonged to the character of the simple Marcion, to be an enemy of that allegorical interpretation of the Bible, and to oppose to it a method which uniformly adhered to the literal sense.

A man so constituted in mind and spirit as was Marcion would be easily impelled, wherever he had to combat an erroneous extreme, to go to the opposite one. Thus it fared with him in the contest with that Chiliastic, material tendency of mind, confounding the Jewish with the Christian element, which he found generally diffused in Asia Minor. Here he believed it impossible to recognize genuine Christianity, as it had been preached by the Apostle Paul in the churches of Asia Minor; and hence the striving might have arisen in him to purify Christianity from the foreign Jewish elements with which it had been mixed, and to restore it once more to its primitive form. It may have been from this opposition, as the occasional cause, that he conceived a prejudice against the conciliating direction which had originated in the labors of the Apostle John in Asia Minor. Perhaps he found a foothold in some ultra-Pauline element which may already have made its appearance in opposition to the Apostle John himself.[2] Accordingly, step by step, he was driven to place the Old and the New Testament in a continually sharper opposition to each other.

This peculiar dogmatic tendency of Marcion was probably the occasion of his being excommunicated from the church at Sinope.[3] He

[1] As Origen says: *Οἱ ἀκεραιότεροι τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας αὐχούντων τυγχάνειν, τοῦ μὲν δημιουργοῦ μείζονα οὐδένα ὑπειλήφασι, τοιαῦτα δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὁποῖα οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ὁμοτάτου καὶ ἀδικωτάτου ἀνθρώπου.* De princ. l. IV. § 8.

[2] See my Age of the Apostles, vol II. p. 558.

[3] The statement in the spurious additions to Tertullian's *Prescriptions*, in Epiphanius and Esnig, that Marcion was excommunicated from the fellowship of the church on account of unchastity, is undoubtedly an invention of anti-heretical hatred. Had anything of the kind got abroad, even in the form of a rumor, in Tertullian's day, he certainly, according to his usual practice, would not have allowed it to pass without notice. But on the contrary, — what may be considered the most decided testimony against the truth of this statement, — he contrasts Marcion's disciple, Apelles, on the score of his unchastity, with his rigid master. Tertull. Præscript. c. 30. Although the Armenian Bishop Esnig, of the fifth century, whose account of Marcion has

now hoped to find in the Roman church, to which he betook himself, a better reception, both on account of its origin, which it derived from Paul, and its original Pauline character, and on account of a prevailing anti-Judaizing tendency,[1] which still existed in it on many points. If the report of Epiphanius is well founded, he proposed the question to the Roman clergy, how they would explain the passage in Matthew 9: 17, with a view to draw from their own lips the confession, that men could not pour the new wine of Christianity into the old bottle of Judaism, without spoiling it. But at Rome, too, his Dualism on the doctrine of divine revelation could only meet with contradiction, since the acknowledgment of one God, and of one divine revelation in the Old and New Testaments, belonged to the doctrines universally received by the church. Repulsed here also by the church, he was driven to the measure of shaping his anti-church tendency into an established self-consistent system, and of founding an independent church by itself. Until now, his system had only a *practical* basis; — the conviction that Christianity had made its appearance among mankind as something entirely new, unexpected, and undreamt of; that it had imparted to humanity a divine life, to which nothing in human nature, up to that time, was in affinity; that the God who appeared in Christ had earlier revealed himself neither in nature, nor in reason, nor in the Old Testament; that nothing witnessed of him; nothing was his work save Christianity alone; — this conviction was the groundwork on which Marcion proceeded to build. The God who had revealed himself in Christ was in his view one altogether diverse from the Spirit which had hitherto ruled in the world; and the latter was in all cases displaced from his throne, wherever Christianity found admittance, to make room for a higher Spirit. Accordingly Marcion was compelled to distinguish from that God hitherto unknown to the world, the God of the world and of the Old Testament, with his angels. In profoundly studying, with this direction of ideas, the epistles of his favorite Apostle, Paul, he might easily be led to believe that he found these ideas confirmed, when he read of a God of this world, of the princes of this world (ἄρχοντες τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου,) who would not have surrendered up the Lord of glory to the death of the cross, if they had known him; — of the ἀρχαῖς and ἐξουσίαις, whom Christ vanquished by his crucifixion. And it may be explained, how these ideas exercised a power over his mind, by reason of the truth lying at their root. In the Demiurge, the ruling spirit of the ante-Christian world, so far as that world was not wholly given to evil, became to Marcion's imagination objectized and personified. This being could not understand the new divine principle, which through Christ entered into the world. The hidden glory in Christ's appearance was something alien from him. He must bring death to the being who had come to destroy his kingdom; but through this very death must be brought

been made known by Prof. Neumann, in a German translation, in Ilgen's Zeitschrift für historische Theologie, Bd. IV. J. 1834, 1 St., is a more credible authority, so far as it relates to his account of Marcion's doctrines, which he may have drawn from the latter's own writings. yet in the outline of Marcion's life, he follows the less authentic narratives of the writers belonging to his own age.

[1] See above, in the history of divine worship.

about the dethronement of this spirit of the world himself. The idea of matter, as the spring of all desires and passions, belonged too to the current notions of the period. Thus it would in fact admit of being explained, how Marcion might have been led to form and gradually mature his system out of his own peculiar Christian consciousness, in the spiritual atmosphere of this period, without any connection whatever with the Gnostic sects. Yet although, for the reasons thus hinted at, we cannot consider the influence of those sects on his mode of thinking to have been so important as it has sometimes been represented, we are not disposed to deny, what the ancients are unanimous in stating, that at Rome he attached himself to a teacher from Antioch by the name of *Cerdo*, who held to the purely Dualistic Gnosis, and from him borrowed a good deal to fill up the chasms of his dogmatic system.

It lay in the essential character of Marcion's mode of thinking, that he must have labored more earnestly and assiduously than other Gnostics for the extension of his principles, — for while others believed it impossible to communicate their higher knowledge to any save a small number of Christians, the *spiritual men*, Marcion, on the other hand, was convinced that his doctrine was no other than the primitive Christian, which should come to all men. He must have felt constrained to communicate to all Christians, the light of truth which had fallen to his own share. Hence he made frequent journeys, and spent his life in an uninterrupted series of conflicts with pagans and with Christians. To be hated, and to suffer, he accounted the destination of every Christian. "Fellow-hated, and fellow-sufferers" (*συμμισούμενοι καὶ συνταλαίπωροι,*) was his common form of salutation to his brethren in the faith.[1] He was, perhaps, residing in Rome, when the aged bishop Polycarp of Smyrna came on a visit to the Roman bishop Anicetus.[2] Marcion, who probably in his youth had enjoyed the friendship of Polycarp, and now saw him again after many years, went to him and addressed him in these words: "Dost thou remember me, Polycarp?" But the old man — otherwise so amiable — could embrace within his love all but the enemies of the gospel; among whom he reckoned Marcion, unable as he was to discern the Christian element lying at the root of his very errors.[3] He is said to have replied to him: "Yes, I remember the first-born of Satan." Tertullian relates,[4] that Marcion testified at last his repentance for the schism which he had occasioned, and sought to be restored to the fellowship of the church; that this request was granted on the condition that he would bring back into the church those whom he had led astray; but that his premature death prevented the fulfilment of this condition. But the testimony of Tertullian, in matters of this sort, is not of sufficient weight to establish the truth of this report. It might easily happen with him, that he took up the story on the credit of some rumor not sufficiently well founded. It was in fact a thing too obvious not to be suggested by somebody, that the heretic should repent in the end of his defection from the church, and yearn

[1] Tertull. c. M. l. IV. c. 36; l. IV. c. 9.
[2] See vol. I. p. 299
[3] Iren. l. III. c. 3, § 4.
[4] Præscript. c. 30.

after re-admission to its bosom. But if the continuance of the breach of which he was the author was a fact testifying against this supposition, it was necessary that some legend should arise, to reconcile the discrepancy. Marcion was too clearly conscious to himself of an opposition in principles between him and the then church, to leave it possible for any one to believe this story, without any better guaranty for its truth. Meanwhile, there must have been some good and sufficient reason, why such things were said of Marcion in particular, and not of the other Gnostics. If some conciliatory word or other of Marcion's was not the occasion of it, the remote ground must at any rate be sought for in the consciousness penetrating through the blinding influence of polemical passions, that after all this man stood in quite a different relation to Christianity and to the Christian church, from that in which other Gnostics stood; that he was connected with both by a tie not to be sundered by the force of intellectual error.

It now remains, that we should enter into a detailed examination of Marcion's system, in its later and complete development. This system coincided in its fundamental principles with other Gnostic systems of the last-mentioned class, with this single difference; that in his theory it is ever gleaming through the surface, how everything had been seized by him on the *practical* rather than on the *speculative* side, and that the speculative element was to him a matter of inferior interest. He assumed three fundamental principles: 1. An ὕλη existing from eternity. 2. The infinitely perfect, almighty and holy God, — the God who is eternal love; the Good, ὁ ἀγαθός, who alone is to be denominated God in the proper sense; who, by virtue of his holy nature, is incapable of entering into any contact whatever with matter; creating, only by communication of himself, a life in affinity with himself, but forming nothing from without. 3. The Demiurge, a subordinate being of limited power, holding a middle place between good and evil, who is named God only in an improper sense, (as the divine title is also transferred to other beings in Ps. 82,[1]) who is in a constant conflict with matter, seeking to subject and to fashion it according to his own ideas, but never able wholly to overcome its resistance.[2] Matter, with regard to which he appropriated to himself the common ideas, he regarded as the stuff furnished for the creative might of the Demiurge; the passive potence in relation to the latter.[3] He described it also as the power or the essence of the earth. But out of that in it which resisted the formative might and the dominion of the Demiurge, proceeds evil, a wild, ungodlike impulse. All this became concentrated in Satan. The distinction between true moral perfection, which consists in love or goodness, whose essence it is only to communicate itself, only to bless, to make happy, to redeem, — and mere justice, which metes out everything by desert, rewards and punishes, requites good with good and evil with evil, which gives birth to mere outward discipline, can communicate no power of moral enthusiasm, — this was the great *practical* and funda-

[1] Clem. Strom. lib. III. f. 431. Tertull. c. M. lib. I c. 7–15.

[2] Ephr. Syr. Orat. XIV. f. 468, D.

[3] See Esnig, l. c. p. 72.

mental idea of Marcion, which formed the nucleus of all the rest. But between love and a justice which revealed itself in punishment, he could find no means of reconciliation. While he gave to the love of God, the revelation of which in the gospel had penetrated through his whole soul, a strong and exclusive prominence, he allowed all other notions of the divine attributes to retire out of view. Seeking to make that alone valid which belonged peculiarly to Christianity, but rending it from its connection with the Old Testament groundwork, determined to know nothing at all of a vindictive justice grounded in the holiness of God, of a holy anger of God against sin; he evaded what essentially pertains to this, in order to distinguish the theistic position of Christianity from that of the old Nature-religion. And inasmuch as he comprised in the notion of justice severed from its connection with the other divine attributes, all those marks which he believed might be derived from the Old Testament, as belonging to the character of the Demiurge, that notion itself became to him an inconsistent and self-contradictory one. The inner coherence and consistency was ever in his case more in the *heart* than in the *head*.

Vague and indefinite also, appears to us, in the accounts that are extant, the mode in which Marcion conceived the relation of the Demiurge to the perfect God,[1] in respect to his origin. As we find elsewhere among the Gnostics *Dualistic* systems only, — none in which *three principles, wholly independent in their origin*, had been assumed, it seems most natural to conclude that Marcion also would be for deriving the imperfect Demiurge through a series of evolutions from the perfect God, — a course which, as a consistent thinker, he must have felt himself constrained to adopt by his own fundamental principle. Yet it is singular, that not one of Marcion's opponents attempts to explain by what mediation it was, he connected one with the other, although this is a point which they never fail to notice in speaking of the systems of other Gnostics. We must infer, that in his writings he did not express any opinion on this subject himself. In fact, there was wanting in his system — which is another circumstance whereby he was distinguished from other Gnostics — the doctrine of emanation, necessarily pre-supposed in order to such a mediation and derivation.[2] It is from the predominating practical interest, the unspeculative and unsystematic spirit of Marcion, that we shall perhaps have to account for these *lacunæ*.

The great point of practical moment with Marcion was, next, to assert the absolute newness of the *creation* by Christianity; to sever every thread of connection between it and the world as it had subsisted before. But hence it was impossible for him to apprehend in its true significancy this new creation itself; since it can be understood only as a restoration and fulfilment of the original one. And in this lies the deficiency of his moral system.

The Demiurge of Marcion does not work after the pattern of higher

[1] The church teacher, Rhodon, (Euseb. l. V. c. 13,) says that Marcion supposed only two principles. δύο ἀρχάς. Esnig, however, ascribes to him a Triarchy.

[2] That nothing akin to the emanation-system of other Gnostics is to be found in Marcion, seems to follow from the remarks of Tertullian, c. Marcion, lib. I. c. 5.

ideas, of which, though unconsciously, or even against his will, he is the organ; but he is the absolutely independent, self-subsistent creator of an imperfect world, answering to his own limited essence. To this world Marcion reckoned also the nature of man, in which he did not acknowledge, like other Gnostics, the existence of another element besides. The Demiurge — so he taught — created man, his highest work, after his own image, to represent and reveal himself. Man's body he formed of matter, — hence evil desires; to this body he gave a soul in affinity with himself and derived from his own essence. He gave him a law, to try his obedience, with a view either to reward or to punish him, according to his desert. But the limited Demiurge had it not in his power to give man a godlike principle of life, capable of overcoming evil. Man yielded to the seductions of sinful lust, and thus became subject, with his whole race, to the dominion of matter, and of the evil spirits which sprang out of it. From the entire race of fallen humanity, the Demiurge selected only *one people*, for his special guidance; to this people, the Jews, he made a special revelation of himself, and gave a religious polity, answering to *his own* essence and character, — consisting, on the *one* hand, of a ceremonial confined to externals; on the *other*, of an imperative, deficient system of morals, without any inner godlike life, without power to sanctify the heart, without the spirit of love. Those who faithfully observed this religious law, he rewarded by conveying them at death to a state of happiness suited to their limited natures, in the society of their pious forefathers.[1] But all who suffered themselves to be seduced by the enticements of the ὕλη to disobey the Demiurge, and all who abandoned themselves to idolatry — a system to be traced to the influence of this ὕλη — he hurled down to perdition.[2]

Not powerful enough to give his people the supremacy, and to extend his kingdom over the whole earth, the Demiurge promised them a Redeemer, a Messiah, by whose means he would finally accomplish this end in the conflict with the hostile powers of the ὕλη; by whose means he would gather in all the Jews from their dispersion, bring heathens and sinners to a rigid judgment, and conduct his own people to the peaceful enjoyment of all earthly felicity in a kingdom erected over the whole world. But the perfect God, whose essence is mercy and love, could not suffer this severe sentence to be executed on men whose fall was owing to nothing but their inherent weakness. It is consonant with his character, not to wait, like the Demiurge, for merit, but out of his own free love to receive to himself those who are alienated from him, and lost; not to begin with giving a law, and making man's destiny depend on his observance or disobedience of that; but to reveal and communicate himself to those who are willing to enter into fellowship with him, as the fountain of divine life and blessedness. The appearance of Christ was the *self-manifestation*[3] of the Supreme God, till then altogether hidden to this lower creation.

According to the earlier known accounts of Marcion's doctrine, we

[1] Apud inferos, in sinu Abrahami. Tertull. c. M. lib. III. c. 24. Clem. Strom. lib. V. f. 546.

[2] See Esnig, l. c. p. 74.

[3] Tertull. c. M lib. I c. 11.

might suppose, that he represented the Supreme God himself as appearing without any mediation in the kingdom of the Demiurge, or upon the earth; and thus he might have attached himself to the theory — so widely diffused in Asia Minor — of the Patripassionists,[1] in which form he had, perhaps, from the first, become acquainted with the doctrine of Christ. This theory was exactly suited to his predominant practical tendency, to the element of Christian feeling which in his case prevailed over every other. Penetrated by the consciousness, that Christianity was nothing other than the communication of the Supreme God himself, that men have God himself immediately in Christ, the theory of subordination in the church doctrine of the Logos might be offensive to him. In this peculiar tendency of his doctrine concerning Christ, then, to simplification, he would once more differ from the other Gnostics, whose speculation tended to multiply the hypostases. The inadmissible form of representation, that God the Father appeared himself, immediately, in a human body, might then easily pass over to the other notion, that this manifestation was merely in appearance. Yet however much this supposition must have in its favor,[2] according to the accounts thus far known to us, we notwithstanding venture no longer to hold on to it, since Esnig's account has been communicated; for according to this, Marcion expressly distinguished Jesus, as the Son sent down from the heaven of the Supreme God, from the latter as his Father. And to this distinction he must, in truth, have been led also by the authority of him who passed, in Marcion's estimation, for the only apostle.

Marcion's Docetism was not grounded solely in the view he entertained of matter, but was closely connected also with the whole essence and spirit of his dogmatic system. According to this, Christianity must make its appearance of a sudden, as an unprepared-for fragment, having no connection whatever with anything else. Everything, in fact, was with him *sudden* and unexpected. His gospel began when the Son of God, in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius, descended into the city of Capernaum, and appeared at once as a public teacher.[3]

Jesus, therefore, according to the scheme of Marcion, was not the *Messiah, promised through the prophets by the Demiurge*, since, indeed, he wanted many of those marks of the Messiah contained in the prophets; while, on the other hand, what *was* peculiar in his character and conduct was in no wise to be found among the characteristic traits of the Messiah announced by the prophets. Marcion attempted to carry out in detail the contrast between Christ as he is represented in the gospel history, and the Christ of the Old Testament, — and here too it is evident, how deeply Christ's image had imprinted itself on his warm heart; but he was wrong in his very principle of requiring that the foretype presented to the prophetic vision under a temporal drapery

[1] Concerning whom we shall speak farther in the section relating to the formation of church doctrine.

[2] Even when Tertullian (lib. I. c. 19) says in the sense of Marcion, concerning Jesus: Descendit de cœlo spiritus salutaris, a distinction is implied between the redeeming Spirit and the Supreme God.

[3] Tertull. c. M. lib. IV. c. 17.

should correspond exactly to the reality of the manifestation. Hence when Jesus called himself the Messiah, it was only in *accommodation* to the Jews. He wished to find some possible point of union with their views, to gain their confidence by some well-known form, to which he could afterwards give a higher meaning.[1]

To bestow the greatest favors in vain on men who were wholly alien from him, was the great characteristic of his life. How far the Docetism of Marcion was from denying the reality of the works accomplished by Christ, is evident, when we consider what importance he attached to the miracles of Christ, as acts of succoring love, and of power over the kingdom of the Demiurge. He represents the Supreme God saying to his Son, when he sent him down to men: "Heal their wounds, bring their dead back to life, make their blind to see, accomplish among them the greatest cures without reward."[2] The characteristic mark which distinguished the miracles of Christ from those of the prophets, consisted according to Marcion in this, that no intermediate second causes, borrowed from the kingdom of the Demiurge, were needed to compass such effects, but he was able to do all by his word and his will alone,—thus evincing his superiority over the kingdom of the Demiurge.[3] Christ required no prophecies to confirm his divine mission; his self-manifestation by godlike actions, above the kingdom of the Demiurge, was an evidence which rendered all other superfluous.[4]

But as all that he required was a humble reception of the higher element which he came to bestow on men, he would meet with a readier reception among pagans, abandoned to the sense of their wretchedness, than among the men who were satisfied with their confinement in the kingdom of the Demiurge. As to the Demiurge himself, who saw in Jesus only the Messiah promised by himself, who like the Jews held him to be a man the same with other men; *he* had looked upon him as his instrument. Hence he must be the more exasperated, when he found himself deceived in his expectations, when he saw him performing works which so far exceeded his own power, and must perceive how men would be led away by this Jesus to defection from his own law; how he threatened to destroy that very kingdom, whose interests he should have subserved. He caused him to be crucified by those whom he employed to execute his purposes.

The heart of Marcion would assuredly be touched by the idea of a love that suffered, and conquered through suffering,—so great importance did he find attached, in the writings of his own Apostle Paul, to the redemptive sufferings of Christ;—and yet this did not harmonize

[1] Ut per sollenne apud eos et familiare nomen irreperet in Judæorum fidem. L. c. lib. III. c. 15.

[2] See Esnig. l. c. p. 74.

[3] In the work where Marcion treated of the opposition between the Old and New Testaments, his Antitheses, this remark occured: Helisæum materia eguisse, aquam adhibuisse, et eam septies; Christum vero verbo solo et hoc semel functum curationem statim repræsentasse. Tertull. c. M. lib. IV. c. 9. As Christ healed the ten lepers, sine tactu et sine verbo, tacita potestate et sola voluntate. L. c. c. 35.

[4] Non fuit ordo ejusmodi, (preparation by means of prophecy,) necessarius, quia statim se et filium et missum et Dei Christum rebus ipsis esset probaturus per documenta virtutum. L. c. lib. III. c. 3.

well with his Docetism. Now although he was not allowed by that theory to attribute any real suffering to Christ, yet he was prepared to show how this very delusion, designed with reference to the Demiurge, must conduce to the accomplishment of the saving purposes of the Supreme God.

While it was taught in the church, that Satan deceived himself, and saw his own power destroyed, in supposing Jesus to be subject to death, like other men, Marcion simply substituted the Demiurge in the place of Satan; and we have already remarked how he might be led to suppose that he found some confirmation of this view in the words of the Apostle Paul. Moreover, he received from universal tradition the doctrine of the descensus Christi ad inferos, and to this perhaps he referred the words in Paul's epistle to the Laodiceans (Ephesians) 4 : 9. But his aversion to the Jews and preference of the pagans led him to give to this doctrine also another turn, so as to bring it into harmony with his own system.

It was the will of the Demiurge to condemn him whom he placed in the same class with all the others that had revolted from his empire, to hell; but here also he found himself deceived. Christ descended there for the purpose of taking to himself the poor heathens, whom the Demiurge had condemned to everlasting punishment; he released them, because he found them possessed of the faith which he had not been able to find among the self-righteous Jews, from the power under which till then they had been subjected; and raised them along with himself to the Father of love in the third heaven.[1] Thus the wrath of the Demiurge was excited afresh, "he eclipsed his sun, and veiled his world in darkness," — an allusion perhaps to the phenomenon which took place at the death of Jesus.

Then Christ revealed himself to the Demiurge in his true form, in his divine essence; he compelled him to acknowledge a higher God over himself, brought him to a consciousness of guilt according to his own laws, since he had shed the blood of an innocent person, who had shown to his creatures nothing but benevolence. Thus he must bow before a higher power.

It seems, although it cannot be determined with certainty, that Marcion taught, that the Messianic predictions of the Old Testament would still be actually accomplished in behalf of the believers in the Demiurge. The Messiah promised by the Demiurge would appear, and bring to a rigid judgment those who had not been freed from his power by faith in the higher Christ; awaken the just dead of the Old Testament, and unite them all together in a millenial reign of earthly felicity. The *eternal heavenly kingdom* to which the Christians belonged, would then form the direct antithesis to this perishable, *earthly* kingdom. The souls of Christians would lay aside their gross bodies, as the bird rises out of the egg, as the kernel casts off the shell or leaves behind its husk in the earth, and lifts itself in freedom to the day-light, as the ripe fruit drops from the stem.[2] The God of love does not punish; but

[1] Vid. Iren. lib. I. c. 27, § 2; cfr. lib. I. c. 24. Esnig, l. c. p. 74.

[2] Tert. c. M. l. III. c. 3, 4 et 24; l. IV. c. 29. Ephr. Syr. Orat. CII. 6, f. 551 et 552.

those who were unwilling to receive the proffered fellowship with him, fall under the power of the Demiurge and his avenging justice.[1] But whoever, on the other hand, enters into fellowship with the Father through faith in the Son of God, becomes partaker even here on the earth of a divine life above the power of the Demiurge and of the Hyle; and for him there is no longer any judgment. Delivered from the might of the Demiurge, he stands under the special guidance of the God of love. Plotinus, in his work against the Gnostics, among others, censures those who maintained a *προνοία* of the Supreme God which extended to themselves and not to the whole world. We are not of the opinion,[2] that he had the Marcionites particularly in view here; but we must at least pre-suppose such a doctrine in Marcion. From Marcion's connection of ideas resulted the antithesis between those who were left subject to the Demiurge's government, and those who, released from his power, become objects of the providential care of the Supreme God, those whom God trains for his kingdom, those in whose behalf all things shall work together for good, serving to conduct them onward to the mark for which eternal love has destined them. Providence *general* and *special* Marcion must have attributed to the Demiurge; that providence alone which has been designated by the term providentia specialissima, could be accounted by him as the work of the Supreme God in reference to his chosen ones.

A dogmatical system like Marcion's, in which the antithesis between *law* and *gospel* was expressed in such a way, could not fail to be followed by a system of morals full of meaning; for the distinction which he made between the two amounted in fact to this; that the *former*, by its precepts, could not confer on man any true, inward sanctification, any power to obtain the victory over sin; while the *latter*, by faith, brought man into union with a fountain of divine life, a union which must necessarily manifest itself by the conquest over sin and by holiness of living. Even Marcion's warmest opponents, who sought eagerly to sum up every bad quality which could be imputed to him, and who refused to acknowledge the essential difference between his system and all other forms of Gnosticism, still could not deny, that the Marcionites differed entirely in their moral conduct from those Gnostic Antinomians; — that they came fully up, for example, to the standard of the most rigid Christians, in their abhorrence of the pagan games and pastimes.[3] While many Gnostics, who held to the doctrine of an allowable accommodation to prevailing errors, or to the principle that no importance was to be attached to externals, found no difficulty in evading the obligation to become martyrs; the Marcionites, on the other hand, felt certainly constrained to bear witness of Christianity, which was a cause enlisting the affections of their heart.[4] We have, in the previous remarks, alluded already to the necessary defect in Marcion's system of morals, grounded in his peculiar doctrine concerning the creation and the origin of man. The ascetic bent of life, which he

[1] Abjecti, ab igne creatoris deprehendentur. Tertull. c. M. l. I. c. 28.

[2] See above, p. 390, etc.

[3] Tertull. c. M. l. I. c. 28.

[4] See, e. g. Euseb. l. IV. c. 15; l. VII c. 12. De Martyr. Palæstin. c. 10.

had adopted already as a member of the catholic church, and in which, as we observed above, his system found a natural point of union, was now again still further promoted by the matured and perfected doctrines of his system. He reckoned that mode of life, which, in the catholic church, was led only by a particular class of ascetics, as belonging to the *essential being* of genuine Christianity; — Christians should lead, even here on the earth, a heavenly life, above all contaminating influence of matter. He who was not as yet capable of leading such a life, must remain in the class of catechumens, could not yet be admitted to baptism.[1]

Marcion assuredly regarded Paul as the only genuine apostle who remained true to his calling. He taught, that after Christ revealed himself in his divine character to the Demiurge, and compelled him to acknowledge a higher power, he manifested himself to Paul, (referring doubtless to that revelation of Christ to the apostle of which the latter himself testifies,) and commissioned him to preach the gospel.[2] The other scriptures of the New Testament, save Paul's epistles, he rejected; not because he supposed them interpolated at a later period, but because he did not recognize the authors of them as genuine teachers of Christianity. Besides the epistles of Paul, he made use of a pretended original gospel, which he held to be the record of the gospel history cited and used by Paul himself.[3] All the other gospels he traced to those corrupters of the evangelical truth, against whom Paul himself had warned men.[4] But we must ever keep it in mind, that Marcion regarded the older apostles themselves as such corrupters. As he presupposed everywhere in the church a corruption of the primitive truth, and the image of those Judaizing corrupters haunted him like a ghost, he thought it necessary, that even those religious records, whose authority he acknowledged in common with the church, should first be restored to their primitive condition, by a critical process of his own, designed to purge them of every element of Judaism. His pretended original gospel, used by the Apostle Paul, seems to have been a mutilated copy of the gospel according to Luke.[5] His critical expurgation was not consistently carried through, many things being allowed to remain, which could be brought into harmony with Marcion's system only by resorting to a tortuous exegesis, made possible by ignorance of the right principles of interpretation.

Marcion's Sects. — Marcion differed from other Gnostics in this respect also, that while the latter, as Clement of Alexandria said of

[1] Tertull. c. M. lib. I. c. 34: Quomodo nuptias dirimis? nec conjungens marem et feminam, nec alibi conjunctos ad sacramentum baptismatis et eucharistiæ admittens, nisi inter se conjuraverint adversus fructum nuptiarum.

[2] See Esnig, l. c. p. 75.

[3] Perhaps there had been preserved in the apostolic churches of Asia Minor the remembrance of such an evangelical collection, which St. Paul had brought with him.

[4] See Tertull. c. M. lib. IV. c. 2 et 3. Origines in Joann. T. V. § 4. V. Dialog. de recta in Deum fide in Orig. opp. ed. de la Rue. T. I. f. 807.

[5] Detailed investigations into Marcion's canon of the New Testament would be out of place here. See more on this subject in the learned and ingenious inquiries of my friends Hahn and Olshausen, and in my Genetic development of the Gnostic systems. On Marcion's gospel, consult Thilo's edition of the Apocryphal writings of the New Testament, T. I.

them, endeavored to found schools only,[1] he, on the other hand, was for establishing a church, a community. To restore the primitive church, designed by Christ, founded by the Apostle Paul, was the aim of his life. And being everywhere excluded from the catholic church, he was compelled, in preaching the pure doctrine of Christ as he understood it, to found communities of his own.[2] The universally intelligible and practical character of Marcion's doctrines, the enthusiasm with which these principles were announced, might give this sect a wider spread than any other could reach. Very soon, however, differences of opinion must begin to manifest themselves within it.

While among the other Gnostics, the arbitrary character and great variety of the speculations they indulged in, furnished occasion for the later disciples to depart in many respects from the doctrines of the earlier masters; so, on the other hand, the predominant practical tendency and the poverty of speculation in the system of Marcion compared with the other Gnostic systems, laid the foundation of changes, which his followers, not so exclusively governed as he was himself by the practical interest, undertook to introduce. Many of them endeavored to supply the defects which they thought they detected in the system, by appropriating to themselves elements from other Gnostic systems, not suited to Marcion's theory. Many, like the Marcionite Marcus,[3] espoused the doctrine of the Syrian Gnosis respecting the formation of man;[4] which was, that the Supreme God communicated to man a portion of his own divine life, (the πνεῦμα,) which man lost however by sin, — a doctrine at variance with the whole character of the Marcionite system. While Marcion probably gave himself no farther thought concerning the final destiny of the Demiurge and of the "psychical natures," the Marcionite Lucas, on the other hand, thought himself compelled to believe that everything "psychical" was perishable; that the πνευματικόν only, which participated of the divine life, was immortal.[5]

In the case of *Apelles*, who had for a while turned aside from the predominant practical tendency of Marcion, and indulged in various speculations foreign to the primitive Marcionite system, the original practical tendency finally gained once more the ascendency in a very remarkable manner. Tertullian gives an unfavorable account of the moral character of this man;[6] but Rhodon, a catholic church teacher in the beginning of the third century, whose testimony, being that of an opponent, is beyond suspicion, sufficiently exonerates him of this charge; for he describes him as a person[7] whose moral character commanded the respect of all. Probably, it was the altogether blameless intimacy subsisting between Apelles and *Philumene*, a certain female theosophist, which furnished occasion for this charge — men being ever

[1] Διατριβαί.

[2] Concerning the ecclesiæ, which were founded by Marcion or his disciples, cons. Tertull. c. M. lib. IV. c. 5.

[3] In the Dialogue de recta fide. Vid. opp. Origen, T. I.

[4] See above, in the case of the Ophites and of Saturninus.

[5] See Tertull. de resurrect. carn. c. 2. Orig. c. Cels. l. III. c. 27.

[6] Præscript. hæret. c. 30.

[7] Euseb. lib. V. c. 13.

inclined to put a false construction on the actions of one stigmatized as a heretic. The only reproach that can be brought against Philumene is, that she forgot her mission as a woman, and hence was betrayed into fanaticism; — against Apelles, that he confirmed her in this line of conduct, and looked upon the fanatic discourses that proceeded from her distempered mind, as *revelations*, which he gave himself the trouble of expounding.[1] We may make some use, however, of the report furnished by Tertullian, that the protracted residence of Apelles in Alexandria effected a change in his *Marcionite* views; since all we can gather from the scattered accounts in Tertullian, Origen, Epiphanius, and in the work of Ambrosius "De Paradiso," intimates a modification of his system through the influence of the Alexandrian Gnosis. Hence it was, that he brought the visible and the invisible orders of the world, the Demiurge and the Supreme God, the Old and the New Testaments, into closer connection with each other, than was admissible according to the spirit and system of Marcion. Starting with the principle, that the Old Testament came from different authors, partly from the inspirations of the Soter, partly from those of the Demiurge, and in part from those of the evil spirit, who corrupted the revelations of the divine things,[2] he was for everywhere holding fast the good. "I use all the scriptures of the Old Testament," said he, "gathering from them what is profitable."[3] He appealed to a saying, often cited by the ancients, which was attributed to our Saviour, perhaps in the εὐαγγέλιον καθ' Ἑβραίους: "Be skilful money-changers, ever ready to distinguish the genuine from the counterfeit, the true from the false;" (γίνεσθε δοκιμοὶ τραπεζῖται.) While Marcion, who was inclined to *objectize* everything, received all in the Old Testament as true to the letter, but ascribed it not to the Supreme God, but to the Demiurge; Apelles, on the other hand, found in the Old Testament fables wholly destitute of truth.[4] We see exemplified in this man the force of a tendency which ruled the minds of a particular age — the great difficulty which individuals, who would gladly withdraw themselves from it, must still experience in asserting their freedom. Thus Apelles felt the might of the dualistic principle, the incompatibility of which with Christianity he acknowledged, and to which, notwithstanding, he saw himself ever forced back again by the power that governed his thoughts. Accordingly he concluded his inquiries, at an advanced age, with the confession, that he could not do otherwise, but felt himself absolutely compelled to *believe* in One eternal God, the author of all existence; but scientifically to demonstrate how all existence could be traced back to one original principle, transcended his ability. The church teacher Rhodon, a stranger to such conflicts of the spirit, could not understand the confession, and bantered him for professing to be a teacher, while at the same time he avowed that he only *believed*, but was unable to *prove*,

[1] His work of φανερώσεις, which has not reached our times.

[2] He endeavored, in a work which he entitled "Conclusions," συλλογισμοί, to point out the contradictions in the Old Testament.

[3] Χρῶ ἀπὸ πάσης γραφῆς, ἀναλέγων τὰ χρήσιμα. Epiphan. hæres. 44, § 2.

[4] Μῦθος τὰ Ἰουδαίων γράμματα. Orig c. Cels. lib. V. c. 54.

what he taught. Apelles seemed now to have lost all interest in disputes on these matters. "Let every man," said he, "stand fast by his faith; for all that put their trust in Christ crucified, shall attain salvation, if they only prove their faith by their works."

APPENDIX.

Concerning the Worship or Cultus of the Gnosis.

The different tendencies of Gnosticism, which we have thus far contemplated, had great influence also on the views which they entertained of divine worship. The reaction that sprang out of Gnosticism against the confounding together of the Jewish and Christian positions, and against the conversion of religion into an outward thing, could not fail to manifest itself strongly on this particular side. Indeed we have observed this already, in the declarations of Ptolemæus respecting festivals and fasts. But that tendency, growing out of the Dualism of the Gnostics, to abstraction from the world and estrangement from all human affections, which stood opposed to the Christian principle insisting on the transfiguration of the natural and the human, must, when consistently carried out and pushed to the extreme, have led in the case of worship also to the rending asunder of what Christ, for man's benefit, had put together. And the exaggerated value placed on knowledge in religion, — the twilight knowledge which set up itself as the supreme good,—might end in a proud contempt for all those means of grace which had been furnished in aid to the Christian life: a similar tendency having in fact, at a still earlier period, grown out of the Jewish Gnosis at Alexandria. Accordingly we find those among the Christian Gnostics who said that salvation consisted in knowledge; in knowledge, man had all that he wanted. As the world of sense had sprung out of an alienation from the divine being, it was letting down the dignity of the transcendent things of God, to attempt representing them by sensuous, defective, perishable things.[1] But the same theosophic tendency might bring with it too a symbolic cultus, full of mysterious pomp and ceremony; — as we see illustrated in the case of that sect of the Marcosians,[2] from whom Irenæus derives the Idealists, mentioned farther back, who discarded all external rites of religion. By virtue of the distinction between a *psychical* and a *pneumatic* Christianity, they were led to distinguish also *two kinds of baptism*,— a baptism in the name of Jesus, the Messiah of the psychical natures, whereby believers obtained forgiveness of sin and the hope of eternal life in

[1] Their words are to be found in Irenæus, lib. I. c. 21, § 4: Μὴ δεῖν τὸ τῆς ἀῤῥήτου καὶ ἀοράτου δυνάμεως μυστήριον δι' ὁρατῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν ἐπιτελεῖσθαι κτισμάτων, καὶ τῶν ἀγεννήτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων δι' αἰσθητῶν καὶ σωματικῶν. Εἶναι δὲ τελείαν ἀπολύτρωσιν αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ ἀῤῥήτου μεγέθους. Theodoret. hæret. fab. I. c. 10. If the Caïanians, attacked by Tertullian in his work, "de Baptismo," were identical with the Gnostic Cainites, with whom they are sometimes confounded, these last must also be placed in the same class, which would agree with their general tendency. But the reasons alleged by those Caïanians against the necessity of outward baptism, have no resemblance whatever to the wild, fanatical spirit of the Cainites; and the sect generally exhibits none of the Gnostic peculiarities.

[2] Adherents of Mark.

the kingdom of the Demiurge; and pneumatic baptism, in the name of the Christ from heaven united with Jesus, whereby the spiritual nature attained to self-consciousness and to perfection, and entered into fellowship with the Pleroma. The ceremony of baptism and the baptismal formula probably differed with them, according as the candidate received the *first* or the *second* baptism, was received into the class of psychical or into that of pneumatical Christians. The latter was probably accompanied with more pomp and parade than the former. According to the Gnostic idea, (see above,) — that the baptized and redeemed pneumatic nature entered into a spiritual marriage (syzygy) with its other half in the spiritual world, with the *angel* which with it constituted one whole, — they celebrated baptism as a wedding, and decorated the room where the ceremony took place, like a bridal chamber. One baptismal formula for the Pneumatics ran thus: "In the name which is hidden from all the divinities and powers, (of the Demiurge,) the name of *truth*,[1] which Jesus of Nazareth has put on in the light-zones of Christ, the living Christ, through the Holy Ghost, for the redemption of the Angels,[2] — the name by which all things attain to perfection." The candidate then said; "I am *established* and redeemed,[3] — I am redeemed in my soul from this world, and from all that comes from it, by the name of Jehovah, who has redeemed the soul of Jesus[4] by the living Christ." The whole assembly then said, "Peace (or salvation) to all on whom this name rests." Next they bestowed on the person baptized the sign of consecration to the priestly office, by anointing with oil, customary also in the church, (see above;) but the oil in this case was a costly balsam; for the precious, far-spreading fragrance was intended to be a symbol of that transcendent bliss of the Pleroma which had been appointed for the redeemed. It is among these Marcosians we first meet with the ceremony of extreme unction. The dead were anointed with this balsam, mingled with water, and a form of prayer was pronounced over them, to the end that the souls of the departed might be able to rise, free from the Demiurge and all his powers, to their mother, the Sophia.[5] The Ophites also had similar forms of adjuration for the departed. To the same sect belonged too the well-known mystical table, (the *διαγράμμα*,) which contained a symbolic representation of their system.

The protestant, reforming tendency of Marcion shows itself also in reference to the forms of worship. His simple, practical bent kept

[1] The *ἀλήθεια*, self-manifestation of the Bythos.

[2] *Εἰς λύτρωσιν ἀγγελικήν*. To the same redemption, of which this spiritual nature, as well as the angel belonging to it, must partake, in order that both might be capable of entering into the Pleroma, which neither could do separately, but only in mutual union.

[3] *Ἐστέριγμαι καὶ λελύτρωμαι*. See above, on Horus.

[4] I suppose that in the above formula ΡΧΥ Ἰησοῦ should be read instead of *αὐτοῦ*.

[5] Iren. lib. I. c. 21. The practice of exorcism at baptism was in accordance also with the theory of the Gnostics respecting the indwelling of the various *πνεύματα ὑλικά* until redemption. *Exorcism* (*ὕδωρ ἐξορκιζόμενον*) occurs for the first time, still earlier than in the North African church, (see above,) in the Didascal. Anatol. f. 800, col. II. D. It may have been cited here, however, not as a peculiarly Gnostic custom, but as belonging to the Alexandrian church generally.

him remote from that mysticism which delights in outward pomp and show; but at the same time also from a proud, contemplative idealism. His efforts, in this matter too, were aimed to restore the worship of God to the primitive Christian form, and he attacked many of the new regulations, as corruptions of that original simplicity.[1] Thus he resisted the practice, which was now for the first time becoming common, of dividing the service into the two portions of the missa catechumenorum and the missa fidelium; since he required that the catechumens should share in all the privileges of their teachers,[2] and not be dismissed at the beginning of the prayer introductory to the celebration of the supper. He supposed the holy rite could not be profaned by their presence.

It would indeed stand in contradiction with what has just been said, if it is true, that Marcion was the author of the superstitious custom, — founded on a mistaken interpretation of 1 Corinth. 15 : 29, — of a representative baptism of the living for catechumens who had died; but it is without any reason whatever, that the introduction of such vicarious baptism is imputed to Marcion, to whose simple, evangelical spirit such a superstition was altogether unsuited. If the practice had become dominant among the Marcionites who in the fifth century had spread themselves among the country population of Syria, yet we should by no means be warranted to infer from the customs of such ignorant and uncultivated men, who were hardly capable of comprehending the spirit of Marcion, that the practice was authorized by himself.[3]

II. *Mani and the Manichæans.*

Christianity had come forth victorious out of the conflict with that reaction of the fundamental principle of the old world, which we have contemplated in the Gnostic sects. Christian Theism had vanquished Oriental Dualism. Gnosticism had accomplished its destined work. It had aroused men's minds to a self-active appropriation and digestion of Christian truth, brought to clearer consciousness the peculiar essence of Christianity, and the subject-matter of its principal doctrines. After Gnosticism had entered thus deeply into the progressive movement of Christian doctrine and theology, it retired into the back-ground; it endured only in its subsequent influences; but it was not till a later period that these received their greater significancy as reactions against the catholic, or Jewish-Christian element still further developed.

When, however, the period of Gnosticism had already passed, a new

[1] In all probability Tertullian had in view particularly the Marcionites, when he says of the heretics, (Præscript. c. 41:) *Simplicitatem* volunt esse prostrationem disciplinæ, cujus penes nos curam *lenocinium* vocant.

[2] To this point, Marcion, by his forced interpretation, applied the passage in Gal. 6 : 6. See vol. I. p. 328.

[3] Tertullian (de res. carnis c. 48, and adv. Marcion, l. V. c. 10) by no means so expresses himself, as if such a substitutive baptism was anywhere practised in his own time, but he only supposes the possibility that such a custom existed in the time of the apostle, and that the latter spoke in reference to it; and in the latter place, he considers in fact another explanation of 1 Cor. 15 : 29, as the more probable one As to Chrysostom's remarks on this passage, they can apply only to many of the ignorant Marcionites of *his own time*, but in no wise to Marcion himself, and the older Marcionites.

attempt was made by the Persian Mani or Manes, towards the close of the third century, to blend together Christianity and the religions of ancient Asia. Such attempts were called forth by the inner relation of Christianity to those ancient religions; for the facts of which the gospel witnesses — redemption, the union of God with humanity — answer to a fundamental want of the religious nature, which powerfully revealed itself in those old religions, and anticipated, in fantastic caprice, that which was destined to be given, in the fulness of the times, in the form of historical reality.[1] Superficial contemplation, or contemplation too much chained down to the position of the ancient world, might therefore, in comparing Christianity with those old religions, imagine that it had found again the same divine element, only in a more multiform shape. But all becomes a different matter, through the different notion, lying at bottom, of the Divine Being, of his relation to the world, of the creation; — since in those nature-religions, instead of the idea of the personal, living God, such as he declares himself to be in revelation, the Pantheistic view predominates. Hence the seeming resemblance must transform itself into an essential difference; and if those old religions, in consideration of such a supposed relationship, were to be transported into Christianity, it could be no otherwise effected, than by severing Christianity itself from its natural connection with the preparatory revelation of religion in Judaism, and by fusing it with a Pantheistic nature-religion, transforming it into an entirely different thing.

Manicheism differs from Gnosticism mainly in this respect, that in the former, the element of old Oriental theosophy introduces itself to a far greater extent into Christianity, appropriating it as a symbol for ideas foreign to itself, so that the Christian terms often appear here only as mere accidents. Moreover, in this system, which grew up in countries whither no influence of Platonic philosophy and of Jewish theology had penetrated, the Oriental theosophy could not become mixed up with ideas which were derived from such sources. More especially we find gleaming through the Manichean system, the Zoroastrian doctrines on the conflict of Ormuzd and Ahriman, which we have already observed in the Gnostic systems. It is not to be mistaken, that Mani made the centre of the Parsic view of religion his point of departure; that he was for reconciling with one another, for fusing together in one, the Zoroastrian and the Christian religions. But the remarks which have been already made respecting the opposition in the whole spiritual tendency between Gnosticism and the original Parsism,[2] is to be applied to Manicheism also, and indeed is here still more strongly marked. That leaning to a morose estrangement from the world, which is altogether alien from the original Parsism, constitutes a characteristic difference between the latter and Manicheism. In Manicheism, we find the aim to be perfection, the utmost possible estrangement from all that pertains to the world; in Parsism, plastic influence on the world; —

[1] It is in such resemblances of the Christian element in the old religion, that Tertullian thought he discovered the ingenia diaboli quædam de divinis affectantis

[2] See above, p. 376.

and this practical opposition stands connected with the radical difference in the whole mode of looking at things. According to the original Parsism, it is a pure creation, which proceeds from Ormuzd, into which Ahriman introduces a disturbing, destroying influence. Hence the genuine champion in the service of Ormuzd has to combat this influence. According to the Manichean theory, an evil principle is at work in the whole creation, which holds in bondage the elements springing out of the kingdom of light. Deliverance from this bondage, so that the liberated spirit may become once more united with its original fountain, is therefore the highest end to be attained. Now it is true, that to account for this radical difference, it might be deemed sufficient to suppose that by a mixture of Parsism with Christianity, and especially with Christianity apprehended after a one-sided, ascetic manner, the character of Parsism itself must have undergone great alterations. It may be conceived, that the commixture of two systems might have given birth to a third, wearing in its general aspect, and in its details, a type different from either. Yet there is a great deal in Manicheism, — as, for example, the doctrine of metempsychosis, of a fettered soul throughout the whole of nature; that reverence shown by the perfect Manichean for all life in nature, which sprang out of his belief that he saw the same spirit of heavenly origin, more or less imprisoned and confined, in all natural objects; the cautious fear, thence resulting, of injuring even the leaf of a tree, — which witnesses of a striking affinity of Manicheism with that religion, the most widely extended of all in Asia, which, through its institutions akin to the monasticism of the middle ages, and through the feelings of gentleness and of self-sacrificing benevolence which it excited, became to many tribes of people a means of transition from the wildest barbarism to semi-civilization, — we mean the Buddhist religion.[1] Add to this, that we are not merely led to such a result by comparing the inner character of the two systems, but that moreover there are quite distinct outward and historical indications, going to show that Mani attached himself to Buddhism, and visited countries where the Buddhist missionaries and pilgrims had already spread themselves.

Among the predecessors of Mani, if we may so consider one from whose writings Mani is supposed to have largely drawn, Western tradition, which grew out of many misapprehended facts, names *Buddas;* and of him it is related, that he pretended to be born miraculously of a virgin. Something similar occurs also in the tales relative to the birth of Buddha who appeared in humanity. Later Manicheans taught expressly, that Mani, Buddas, Zoroaster, Christ, and the Sun are the same;[2] — and this view agrees entirely with the Buddhist doctrine,

[1] In the first edition of my Church History, I had alluded only in a cursory way to the relationship of Manicheism and Buddhism; it is the great merit of Dr. Baur, constituting an epoch in this department of history, that in his work on the Manichean system of religion, (Tübingen, 1831,) he has more fully exhibited and unfolded this relationship, and thus opened a new path for the genetic exposition of Manicheism.

[2] Τὸν Ζαράδαν καὶ Βουδᾶν καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ τὸν Μανιχαῖον καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι. See Jacob. Tollii insignia itinerarii Italici. Traject. 1696. Pag. 134.

that Buddha presented himself on earth at different times, under different forms of human existence, true or apparent shapes, and in all these different forms of manifestation, announced the same religion.

Mani is said, moreover, to have retired to a cave in the province of Turkistan, from whence he came forth with the pretension of having received special revelations. Now sacred grottos occupied an important place among the holy things of the Buddha religion; and in modern times such monuments of Buddhism have been discovered in the districts bordering on Persia and Bactria.[1]

It is in the highest degree probable, that in the public appearances of Mani, two epochs are to be distinguished, — and this view of the matter is also confirmed by indications in the historical notices, — the first, when his aim was simply to reconcile and blend together Parsism and Christianity; the second, after he had become acquainted in his travels with Buddhism, from which a new light arose within him, and he supposed that he first attained, from this new position, to a better understanding of the truth in all the three religions. Dualism, with him, must now gradually pass over more completely into pantheistic Monism. For we cannot help considering Buddhism, although the fact has been denied by many in modern times, as one phase of the appearance of Pantheism; since indeed we must consider as such every doctrine which does not recognize God as a self-conscious, free causality of existence, acting with a view to certain purposes or ends. The Dualism of the Buddha system is of altogether another kind from that of the Parsic. It is not a positive kingdom of evil that stands opposed to the kingdom of good, and with a corrupting influence mixes into its creation; but by Dualism here nothing else is expressed, than that the Divine Being is under the necessity of passing out of itself, and over into manifestation; — and the problem then is, how to return back from this manifestation into pure being. The same may be said of this form of Dualism, in its connection with the pantheistic element, as was said of the apparent Neo-Platonic Dualism, described in a former part of this work. There are two factors, the Spirit=God, and nature, or matter. When the Spirit passes out from itself into nature, then springs into existence the phenomenal world, the world of appearance, of Sansara, — the Maia. The Spirit becomes ever more coagulated in nature, more completely estranged from itself, even to entire unconsciousness. In man, it returns back through various stages of development and purification once more to itself; till, wholly released from the bonds of natural force, after being stripped of all limited, individual existence, it becomes conscious of its oneness with the primal Spirit, from which all life has flowed, and passes over into the same. This is becoming Nirwana. The antithesis is obvious, — the Spirit, in its estrangement from itself, the world of manifestation or of appearance, (Sansara, Maia;) and the pure being of the Spirit, (the Nirwana.) It is a

[1] See the work of C. Ritter. Die Stupa's, oder die architektonischen Denkmale der indo-baktrischen Königsstrasse und die Kolosse von Bamiyan. Berlin, 1838. S. 30, u. d. f.

characteristic mark of the Buddhist mode of contemplation, and an evidence of the Monism lying at the root of this Dualism, when we find it described as the highest stage of perfection, that the Sansara and the Nirwana become one for consciousness; the Spirit is no longer affected at all by the appearance, can energize freely in connection with it, and amidst the world of appearance, recognizing this as appearance and in its necessity, holds fast only the pure being,—the entire oneness of the world *on this side*, and the world *beyond* time.[1] Thus Buddha lets himself down to the world of Sansara for the redemption of the souls therein confined, and both are one to him.

Mani adopted the Zoroastrian Dualism, in all cases where he represented his ideas in images of sense; but he introduced into these symbols Buddhist *notions*. Now we meet with diverse forms of represen tation of the Manichean system — those in which the Parsic drapery appears the more prominent, — where an active kingdom of evil is exhibited in its attacks on the kingdom of light; and those which seem to have more of a Grecian coloring, and in which the great point of discussion is the opposition between God and matter.[2] We might indeed suppose, that the latter mode of representation sprung from a transfer of Mani's doctrines into the Hellenic form of culture; but if we bear in mind the Buddhistic principles into which Mani fused the Zoroastrian ideas, we shall rather perceive here the original form of apprehension, answering to the Buddha system; and Mani himself may perhaps have expressed himself differently, according as he preferred to employ conceptions and forms of the understanding, after the manner of Buddhism, or chose the Parsic mode of representation by means of symbols.

If we consider the two systems of religion which Mani placed in combination with Christianity, in their relation to the latter, the whole matter will shape itself as follows. The religion of Zoroaster presents, in the doctrine concerning the conflict between the kingdoms of good and of evil, concerning the mission of the servants of Ormuzd to exert a plastic influence on the world, and thus to counteract the destructive influence of Ahriman; in the doctrine concerning the final victory awaiting the kingdom of light, and the regeneration of the world, which is to purify it from all disorders, and concerning the resurrection, — a point of coalescence and union with Christianity. Moreover, the cen-

[1] This difference of Sansara and Nirwana is a main position of Buddhistic wisdom; see Schmidt's Essays on the fundamental doctrines of Buddhism, in the Memoirs of the Petersburg Academy of Sciences, vol. I. 1832, pp. 223 and 235, — also, the History of the Eastern Moguls, written from the Buddhistic point of view, with a German translation by Schmidt, published at Petersburg in 1829, where on page 271 it is said of a wise man, that "he followed the doctrine of the nothingness of all things, and attained to the knowledge that there is nothing terrible either in Sansara or Nirwana." We may here compare the language of Jacob Bœhman, which, it must be allowed, admits of being understood also in another sense than that of the pantheistic Buddhism: — "He to whom eternity is as time, and time as eternity, is delivered from all strife." I have taken for the basis of my exhibition of Buddhist doctrines, particularly the essays of Schmidt just referred to, and those which are found in the same collection of Memoirs for the year 1834, vol. II.

[2] So says Alexander of Lycopolis, in his work against the Manicheans, in Combefis. Græcorum patrum auctarium novissimum. Paris, 1672, P. II. f. 4, where he says of Mani: ἀρχὰς ἐτίθετο θεὸν καὶ ὕλην.

tral idea of Christianity, the idea of redemption generally, might perhaps lend itself to the here pre-supposed need of purification; but the more determinate apprehension of the notion of redemption, the doctrine of a personal, historical Redeemer, was something foreign to this system. On the other hand, Buddhism testifies most distinctly to the consciousness of the need of a redemption, and that too of a redemption brought about through a true entrance of the divine essence into the forms of human nature, — the incarnation of the Buddha. But this resemblance between Christian and Buddhistic ideas is still only an apparent one; since the Christian notion of the redemption and of the Redeemer is conditioned by the Christian notion of that from which man is to be redeemed, the notion of sin, and of Him who is the supreme causality of the redemption, of God. But the Christian notion of sin, which is grounded on the freedom of the creature, is foreign to Buddhism. The world of appearance, the Sansara, is, in so far as it holds the spirit in oppression and confinement, the cause of all evil. Hence the tempter, in the sense of Buddhism, who answers to Satan in the Christian representation, is not an intelligence fallen from his allegiance to God, nor even, as in the Parsic system, an originally evil principle; but he is the king of the Shimnus, (Demons,) standing at the head of the third world, which is the world of sensual pleasures and of changeable forms, who, for the purpose of keeping the souls confined in the Sansara, of preventing them from rising to the Nirwana, charms and deceives them with many a delusive show; — nature personified, which seeks to retain everything within her enchanted circle, whose enticements the spirit must resist in order to attain to freedom. Redemption is therefore the release of the soul from the bonds of Sansara, from the circle through which the spirits fettered in the bonds of nature must wander, — the metempsychosis, the spirit's return to itself. The final end is the becoming Nirwana. That whereby this end is reached, is coming to the knowledge of the essence of the spirit, and of the world of appearance. And as Buddhism knows no personal God, but substitutes in place of him the general notion of spirit; it follows that it could have nothing to say on the subject of God becoming man in a determinate person, — of a redemption accomplished by this person once for all; but a multitude of Buddha manifestations are supposed, which found the beginnings of the different periods in the history of the world; and every man, by freeing himself from the bonds of the Sansara, is capable of raising himself finally to the dignity of a Buddha; for in all there existed in fact one and the same spirit. In Mani's doctrine concerning Christ, and concerning the *electis*, we shall find much which is in affinity with these views, only mixed up with Parsic and Christian ideas.

In its determination of the ultimate end to which the conflict of the kingdom of light with the kingdom of darkness is to lead, Parsism approaches nearer to Christianity than Buddhism; for what the latter considers as the ultimate end of the redemptive manifestations of Buddha is, to deprive nature of spirit, and after the spirit shall have gathered to itself every kindred element held bound under the fetters

of Sansara, its return to the original unity of the universal spirit. We shall see how Mani's doctrine agrees in this respect more with Buddhism than with Parsism. Taking the whole together, we cannot deny, that although Buddhism comprises in itself, besides the notion of redemption, insulated practical elements, such as the doctrine of self-sacrificing love, self-denial, which might properly be received into a Christian connection, yet in the main Parsism has more that is in affinity with Christianity than Buddhism, and that the predominant spirit of speculative Buddhism might easily exert an influence on the Christian doctrines brought in connection with it of such sort, as to deprive them of their true Christian substantiality; — a remark which we shall find corroborated by a closer examination of Manicheism.

When we have convinced ourselves of the fact, that an outward and inner connection exists between Manicheism and Buddhism, the result we have arrived at may also have some tendency to modify our views respecting the relation of several Gnostic systems to Buddhism. It requires, no doubt, especial caution to avoid falling into the error of tracing to such outward influences, what may be satisfactorily and sufficiently explained from inward similarity of spirit.[1] Analogies of this sort, having their origin in the mind, independent of outward influences, will be found often recurring in the historical development of Christianity, wherever corruptions of purely Christian truth have sprung up; — these will betray themselves precisely in this, that the earlier stages of religious development became once more dispersedly (sporadically) intermingled and confounded; and to this category will belong also the pantheistic element of Buddhism.[2] But now if we find in Manicheism so much that is in affinity with the earlier Gnostic systems, and the derivation of the former from the influence of Buddhism is a point settled on historical grounds, the question may arise, perhaps, whether we have not to suppose a common source, from which those earlier systems drew as well as this last?[3]

Let us now first cast a glance at the early education of Mani. Relating to his history, we possess two distinct sources of information, which agree in only a few particulars, while in all other respects they are in direct contradiction to each other, the *Greek* and the *Oriental* sources. The account of Cyril of Jerusalem, of Epiphanius, of the ecclesiastical historians in the fourth and fifth centuries, all point to one common

[1] Thus Schmidt, in his Essay on the affinity of gnostico-theosophic doctrines with the religious systems of the East, especially Buddhism, (Leipsic, 1828,) has evidently gone too far in this.

[2] When, in the legends of Buddhism, it is related of a Buddha, that he addressed himself to fishes and birds, and that these devoutly listened to him, and thus the way was prepared for the emancipation of the spirit imprisoned in these creatures from the bonds of Sansara, the story is entirely consistent with the position held by this pantheistic religious consciousness. But, on the other hand, when we find a similar story occurring in the life of St. Francis, we see in this latter case, how nearly the aberration of an eccentric religious feeling may graze on a foreign position, which refuses to enter into the connection of Christian consciousness.

[3] For example, the gradual *de-spiritualizing* of the world in the Ophitic system; the completely Buddhist idea, that he who has attained to the Nirwana in the midst of the Sansara, is lord over the Sansara, can perform all miracles; that he is even superior to the mundane deities, who are beings still subject to change, in Carpocratianism.

source;[1] — the Acts of a disputation, said to have been held with Mani, by Archelaus, bishop of Cascar.[2] But those Acts have come down to us, to say the least, in a very questionable shape. With the exception of some few fragments, which have been preserved in the Greek, they appear only in a Latin translation from the Greek document, and this Greek work is perhaps nothing more than an unfaithful version from the Syriac.[3] These Acts manifestly contain a disconnected story, savoring in no small degree of the romantic. Although there is some truth lying at bottom, — as we must allow there is much in the representation of the doctrines which wears the appearance of truth, and is confirmed also by its agreement with other representations, — yet the Greek author seems, from ignorance of Eastern languages and customs, to have introduced a great deal that is untrue, by bringing in and confounding together discordant stories, to the neglect of all criticism, and with an unsparing indulgence of exaggeration.[4] How difficult it was for a Greek to transport himself out of his own world, and to form any just conception of national peculiarities wholly foreign to his own, is what every one knows.

In some few points, we may, even with such scanty means as we possess for deciphering this historical enigma, come upon the trace of the misapprehended facts lying at the bottom of these stories. The first origin of the Manichean doctrines is to be derived from a Saracen merchant, Scythianus by name, who, it is said, by many journeys to Asia, Egypt and Greece, accumulated a large fortune, and at the same time acquired an intimate knowledge of the Oriental and of the Greek philosophies. This Scythianus lived not far from the times of the apostles, — a statement indeed which the story itself proves is an anachronism; for otherwise Mani would have lived but a few generations after the same period. The heir and disciple of Scythianus is said to have been a certain Terebinth, who afterwards called himself Buddas. We have already stated what, without any question, is to be understood here by the name Buddas.[5] Now if it is clear, that by Buddas we are not to un-

[1] Eusebius, who wrote before this source of information became known, could say nothing relative to Mani's personal history.

[2] If there is no mistake here in the name, — if it was not rather Carrhæ, (חָרָן,) in Mesopotamia, — according to what we must allow to be a very uncertain conjecture.

[3] Jerome reports, (de vir. illustr. 72,) that these Acts were written originally in Syriac; but the first oriental author who shows any acquaintance with these Acts was a church-teacher, who wrote about the year 978, Severus, bishop of Asmonina in Egypt. See Renaudot hist. Patriarch. Alex. p. 40. His account differs, however, in many respects, from the revision of the Acts which has come down to us. It is indeed much more simple; a fact which seems to show that his copy of the Acts was not the same with ours, but another of the same kind; and perhaps the original from which ours was derived. Heraclian, bishop of Chalcedon, says, (Photius, cod. 95,) that a certain Hegemonius was the compiler of those Grecian Acts.

[4] Beausobre properly rejected the Western narratives, whose want of authenticity he satisfactorily proved, and confined himself wholly to the Oriental. The objections urged by Mosheim against this course, possess but little force.

[5] It has been justly observed, that the Greek name Τερεβίνθος is perhaps only a translation of the Chaldee בוטְמָא, by which in the Targums the Hebrew word אֵלָה is rendered, which the Alexandrians translate Τερεβίνθος. Another hypothesis has been started by Ritter, in the work above referred to, p. 29, viz. that the Grecised name Terebinthos is based on a predicate of Buddha, originating in those countries where Mani became acquainted with Buddhism, — Tere-Hintu, lord of the Hindoos. It is a point on which nothing certain can be as-

derstand any historical person, the name Scythian also, as the designation of a historical individual, becomes thereby suspicious. It is very natural to take it as simply a geographical name, having reference to those populations among which Buddhism first extended itself. Meanwhile we venture not, however, to express a decided opinion on the point, as letters of Mani, addressed to a person of this name, are cited.[1]

The Oriental accounts possess a great deal more internal coherence and consistency. They are found, it is true, in historians of much more recent date than the Grecian sources; but the Oriental writers have undoubtedly made use of older records, in availing themselves of which, they were not liable to fall into the same errors with the Greeks.[2]

To understand the appearance of such a man as Mani, we must figure to ourselves the circumstances and relations under which he was educated. By birth he was a Persian; but it may be a question, whether the name of the country should be understood here in the stricter sense, or whether it refers only to *some province* belonging to the great Persian empire. In favor of the latter, might be adduced the fact that Mani composed his *works* in the Syriac language; whence we might infer that he was a native of one of those provinces of the Persian empire, where Syriac was the vernacular tongue. This fact, however, by itself, proves nothing; for even without this supposition, it would easily admit of being explained, that as the Syriac, through the intimate connection of the Persian Christians with the Syrian church, might even thus early have become the language of books among the Persian theologians, — so Mani may have been induced to employ this language, (although it was not his native tongue,) hoping by this means to promote the more general introduction of his doctrines into other countries. It is said, that he sprang from a family of the Magians, (the Persian sacerdotal caste;) that at the age of manhood he passed over to Christianity, and became presbyter of a church in Ehvaz or Ahvaz, principal city of the Persian province Huzitis; — whatever may be the accuracy of these statements. At any rate, it is quite probable that Mani was educated in the religion of Zoroaster, and embraced Christianity at some later period of life.

We are not sufficiently informed with regard to his early history to be able to determine whether, in the outset, he abandoned the religion of his fathers and embraced Christianity from honest conviction, and afterwards, repelled by the form in which the latter was presented in the church doctrine, was led to revive in his soul the fundamental ideas of his earlier religious mode of thinking, and now became satisfied that by combining it with these, he first placed Christianity in the true and proper light; or whether he had been attracted from the first only by the affinity of Christianity with many Persian ideas, without noting the

certained. Possibly Terebinth may have been a historical person, to whom many things ascribed to Buddha had been transferred.

[1] Vid. Fabricii bibl. Græc. vol. VII. f. 316.

[2] The oriental narratives in Herbelot's Bibliothèque Orientale, sub v. Mani, — in the Persian historian Mirkhond's History of the Sassanides, cited in Silvestre de Sacy Mémoires sur diverses antiquités de la Perse. Paris, 1793. In Abulpharag. and Pococke Specimen hist. Arab

essential difference between resembling ideas, according to their peculiar mode of apprehension and position in Christianity and in the Persian religion; so that from the beginning he had only been constructing for himself a religious system of his own, by the fusion together of Persian and Christian elements.

By the reëstablishment of the ancient Persian empire, after the expulsion of the Parthians, the effort had been called forth among the Persians, to restore the ancient religion of their fathers, purified from foreign elements, to its original splendor. The consequence was, that disputes arose on the question, what was to be considered the pure doctrine of Zoroaster; and particularly on several points which had been left undecided by the previous religious tradition, as for example, whether a primal essence was to be supposed, exalted above the two conflicting principles. Councils were held for the purpose of investigating the questions in dispute; and pretended prophets arose, who were for settling every difficulty by divine inspiration.[1] The religion of Zoroaster, which now acquired fresh power, and set itself to oppose all the foreign religions that had before been tolerated, was brought into collision also with Christianity, which had been suffered to make progress without disturbance under the Parthian government. Under such circumstances, the thought might shape itself, in a man of a lively and profound mind, like Mani, that he was called to be the author of such a reformation of Christianity, now corrupted by the intermixture of Judaism, as should sever it from its connection with the latter, and bring it into more intimate union with ideas of the Zoroastrian religion. Mani — as was afterwards done by Mohammed — declared himself to be the Paraclete, promised by Christ.[2] By this he in nowise understood the Holy Ghost, but a human person, an enlightened teacher promised by Christ, who was to bring out still more distinctly the religion revealed by him, in his own spirit, purify it from the corruptions of Ahriman, especially from those which had sprung from the intermingling of Judaism, and lead the faithful to the consciousness of those truths which men in the earlier times were not yet in a condition to understand. By him that *perfect* knowledge should be given, of which Paul had also spoken as a knowledge reserved for some future period, 1 Cor. 13 : 10.[3] Accordingly Mani could denominate himself at one and the same time the promised Paraclete and the apostle of Christ; as indeed he began the letter in which he designed to unfold the fundamental doctrines of his religious system (the epistola fundamenti, which was so famous among the Manicheans) with the following words: "Mani, called to be an apostle of Jesus Christ, through the election of God the Father. These are the words of salvation from the eternal and living fountain."[4]

He first made his appearance, with these pretensions, near the close

[1] See Hyde hist. relig. vet. Pers. p. 276. Mémoires sur diverses antiquités de la Perse par S. de Sacy, p. 42.

[2] See Mirkhond in Sacy, p. 294. — Tit. Bostr. c. Manich. lib. III. in Canisii lect. antiq. ed. Basnage and Galland. bibl. patr. T. V. f. 326.

[3] See Acta cum Felice Manichæo, lib. I. c. 9. Opp. Augustini, T. VIII.

[4] Augustin. c. epist. fundamenti, c. 5.

of the reign of the Persian king Shapur I., (Sapor,) about 270. To an ardent, profound mind, and lively imagination, he united various knowledge, and practical skill in the arts, of which he availed himself for the purpose of diffusing his doctrines. As a mathematician and astronomer, he is said to have been distinguished among his countrymen;[1] the fame of his talents as a painter lasted for a long time in Persia. In the outset, he succeeded in conciliating the favor of that prince; but when his heretical doctrines, as they were regarded by the Magians, came to be known, he was obliged, — if any confidence can be placed in the later legends, and the hypothesis was not invented simply to account for the different portions of which his doctrine is constituted, — to seek safety from persecution by flight. He now made distant journeys to India, and even to China; and tarried for a considerable time in the province of Turkistan. At all events, an important effect in the shaping of his system is to be ascribed to his longer residence in the last-mentioned province, where he became acquainted with Buddhism; and this acquired so great an influence on his mind, that a peculiar stamp was thereby given to his whole mode of thinking and a wider range to his aims, which now embraced in their scope the blending together of all the three religions into one. From one of the grottos consecrated to Buddhism, he issued forth, with those symbolic pictures which were designed to represent, for immediate intuition, the doctrines made known to him, as he pretended, in his retirement, by divine revelations. These emblems were long preserved in lively remembrance among the Persians, under the name of Ertenki-Mani.

After the death of Sapor, in 272, Mani returned to Persia, where he was well received, together with his pictures, by Hormuz, (Hormisdas,) Sapor's successor. The latter assigned to him, as a safe place of residence, the castle of Deskereh at Chusistan in Susiana. But this prince, after a reign of less than two complete years, was succeeded by Behram, (Varanes.) He also appeared at first favorably disposed towards Mani; but perhaps only in semblance, and with a view to lull him and his followers into security. He caused a disputation to be held betwixt Mani and the Magians, of which the result was, that Mani was pronounced a heretic. Refusing to recant, he was flayed alive,[2] and his skin stuffed and hung before the gates of the city Djondishapur in 277,[3] to terrify his followers.

Let us now proceed to unfold the Buddhist-Zoroastrian-Christian system of doctrines taught by Mani.

It is still a disputed question, whether, in the doctrine of Zoroaster, absolute Dualism is the starting-point, and the hypothesis of a common principle of derivation lying at the ground of both Ormuzd and Ahriman — time without end and without beginning, the Zervan Acarene,

[1] Who, however, possessed no *great* knowledge, doubtless, in these sciences. Yet it is highly probable that a good deal in his system stood closely connected, even when divested of its mythical dress, with a partial and defective knowledge of these sciences.

[2] A cruel mode of punishment, which was doubtless resorted to in the East.

[3] The chronology in this case is, it must be admitted, quite uncertain.

answering to the Gnostic *αἰὼν, βυθος*, to the Neo-Platonic *ὄν* — sprang first out of a speculative need of reducing the duality to a higher unity; or whether the recognition of such an original unity was the original principle, and this had only become suppressed in conscious thought through the predominant dualistic form of the religion as a practical system of living. From the proclamation, still extant,[1] of the Persian general and Grand-vizier Mihr Nerseh, after his invasion of Armenia, in 450, it is clear, that the acknowledgment of a primal essence, which existed before the antithesis pronounced in the creation, was reckoned to the Persian orthodoxy. We find here a view of the matter which is akin to that Gnostic scheme that reduced the Dualism to a Monism,[2] and supposed the antithesis of good and evil as something necessary in the evolution of life from God. The first germ of evil is here derived from the supreme essence, from the great god Zervan himself. This is the *Perhaps*, which God spake, the principle of doubt, of uncertainty, which must some time make its appearance, before everything could form itself out into a certain and stable existence.[3] The opposite doctrine of an absolute Dualism, was maintained by the Magusæian sect,[4] and the latter was the scheme followed by Mani. Thus he was able to transfer the Persian Dualism into the Buddhist opposition of spirit and matter.

He supposed accordingly two principles, absolutely opposed to each other, with their opposite creations; on the one side God, the original good, from whom nothing but good can proceed, from whom all destruction, punishment, corruption is alien, — the primal light, from whom pure light radiates; — on the other side, original evil, which can work only by destroying, decomposing, — whose essence is wild, self-conflicting uproar; matter, darkness, out of which flow powers of an altogether corresponding nature, — a world full of smoke and vapor, and at the same time full of fire that burns only without shining. These two kingdoms subsisted at first wholly separate from one another. The Supreme God was the king of the empire of light, as the original source of an emanation-world in affinity with himself; and most nearly connected with him were these Æons, the channels for the diffusion of light from that primal light, to whom, as representatives of the Supreme God, was transferred his own name; who therefore might be styled deities, without infraction of the honor due to the primal essence alone.[5] In the letter in which Mani exhibited the fundamental doctrines of his

[1] First communicated by St. Martin in his Mémoires historiques et géographiques sur l'Arménie. Paris, 1819. T. II. p. 472, — but more fully, after another recension, in the history of the religious wars between Armenia and Persia, composed by the Armenian bishop, Elisæus, and translated from the Armenian into English by Prof. Newman. London, 1830. P. 11, ff.

[2] See above, p. 375.

[3] This remarkable view is expressed in the following language. "Before heaven or earth existed, the great god Zervan prayed a thousand years, and spake: 'Was I *perhaps* to obtain a son, Vormist, (Ormuzd,) who will create heaven and earth?' and he begat two in his body, one by virtue of his prayer, the other because he said *perhaps*." The first born was Ahriman, the son of doubt, the principle, which makes everything a question. We here perceive the fountain-head of later Christian sects, in which Satan was designated as the first-born.

[4] See Shahristani, in Hyde, l. c. p. 295.

[5] Like the Amshaspands, Ized of the Parsian religion.

religion,[1] he thus describes this Supreme God enthroned in his kingdom of light:[2] "Over the kingdom of light, ruled God the Father, eternal in his sacred race, glorious in his might, the truth by his very essence, ever blessed in his own eternal being, who bears within him wisdom and the consciousness of his life, with which he embraces the twelve members of his light, that is, the transcendent riches of his own kingdom. In each of his members are hid countless, immeasurable riches. But the Father himself, glorious in his majesty, incomprehensible in his greatness, has united with himself blessed and glorious Æons, in numbers and greatness surpassing estimation, with whom this holy and most glorious Father lives, — for in his exalted kingdom, no needy or feeble being dwells. But his resplendent realms are so deeply grounded in the blessed earth of light, that no power exists by which they could ever be destroyed or shaken."[3] The powers of darkness were engaged in wild conflict with one another, till in their blind struggle they approached so near the realms of light, that a glimmer penetrated to them for the first time from that before unknown kingdom. They now forgot their mutual strifes, and attracted in spite of themselves by the splendor of the light, combined with one another to penetrate into the kingdom of light, with a view to appropriate some of this light to themselves.[4] There now seems to be something like inconsistency in Mani, when, after having ascribed to the empire of light an unshaken stability, he proceeds to speak of a danger threatening it, which rendered precautionary measures necessary, and could thus express himself: — "Then the Father of the most blessed light beholds a vast desolation rising up from the darkness, and threatening his holy Æons, unless he opposed to it an extraordinary divine power,[5] at once to conquer and destroy the race of darkness, — so that, after its destruction, the inhabitants of the light might enjoy tranquillity."[6] Simplicius and Evodius have in fact here accused him of self-contradiction; — but this charge applies rather to the mythical or symbolic form of representation, than to the train of thought which is therein embodied. The fundamental thought with Mani, as with the Gnostics, is this, — that the blind force of nature, which resists the godlike element, tamed and subdued by intermingling with it, should finally be rendered altogether powerless. And accordingly Mani conveys the Zoroastrian theory over into the Buddhist, — that nature, in degrading, disintegrating and fettering the spirit, was to bring about its own dissolution, and the final result

[1] The epistola fundamenti.

[2] Augustin. contra epist. fundamenti, c. 13.

[3] This earth of light, Mani did not conceive to be any thing distinct from the supreme, primal essence, but all to be simply a shaping of the one divine light-essence.

[4] It is easy to perceive the idea lying at bottom, — that the evil principle is in conflict with itself, and becomes one only in struggling against the good; such is the attractive power which the good exerts on evil itself; — an idea, it must be allowed, in direct contradiction with the dualistic theory of an absolute evil.

[5] Aliquod nimium ac præclarum et virtute potens nomen. In the Zoroastrian system, also, the Amshaspands are represented as armed champions for the kingdom of light.

[6] The epistola fundamenti, in the work de fide contra Manichæos, c. 11, of which Evodius, bishop of Uzala in Numidia, was perhaps the author, — to be found in the Appendix to the 8th vol. of the Benedictine edition of St. Augustin.

would be that of the unspiritualized nature, nothing would be left behind but the dead *residuum*, and this would fall a prey to utter annihilation.[1] To this last result of all, according to the Buddhistic view of the world, Mani indeed, in his doctrine of final causes, did not proceed, as we shall see.

The ruler over the kingdom of light, in order to guard its boundaries, caused to emanate from himself the *Æon*, *Mother of life*.[2] The name of this Genius denotes that it stands for the *highest mundane soul*, — that the divine life was now to separate itself from the unity of the light-kingdom, and in the conflict with the ungodlike element, resolve itself into individual existences. The mother of *life*, like the ἄνω σοφία of the Valentinian system, could not as yet be affected by the kingdom of darkness. Here too we find the distinction between the higher mundane soul belonging to the kingdom of light, and a *reflection* of it, which mixes itself with the kingdom of darkness.[3] This mother of life generates the *primitive man*, with a view to oppose him to the powers of darkness, — the same idea of the dignity of man's nature, which we observed before among the Gnostics.[4] The primitive man, in conjunction with the five pure elements, fire, light, air, water and earth, enters into the conflict. Here we recognize again the forms of intuition borrowed from Parsism, — reverence towards an originally pure nature, which had only been corrupted by the interference of Ahriman. Moreover, according to the Parsian doctrine, a life which had flowed out from the kingdom of light is acknowledged to exist in the original elements. They were summoned to act as fellow-combatants against Ahriman's destroying influences, by means of their fructifying, life-giving power. But this would be an element at variance with the Buddhistic view of nature; and we cannot fail to perceive in it the preponderant influence of the Zoroastrian spirit. Yet this is modified in Mani by the circumstance that matter does not mean the elements of *actual* nature, but the elements of a higher world, that which is itself but one radiation and form of the manifestation of the divine essence.[5] When Mani opposes to the five pure elements of the kingdom of light the five elements of the kingdom of darkness, the only question is, whether the idea, that evil is ever the distorted image and counterfeit of the good, or the idea, that from the kingdom of light forms must go forth to the conflict with the kingdom of darkness which seem like those of the latter, — is the fundamental one. At all events, it was necessary to explain, how visible nature arose out of the event that matter, or the

[1] See Schmidt's Essay on the thousand Buddhas. See the Memoirs of the St. Petersburg Academy. 1834. Vol. II. p. 66.

[2] Μήτηρ τῆς ζωῆς.

[3] Simplicius (in Epictet. f. 187, ed. Salmas.) aptly describes the Manichean doctrine in this respect: Οὔτε τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν κακύνεσθαι λέγουσιν, οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τὰ προσεχῶς αὐτῷ συνόντα, τὴν μητέρα τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν (the ζῶν πνεῦμα) καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ αἰῶνας.

[4] The πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος of Mani may be compared with the προὼν ἄνθρωπος of the Valentinians, the Adam Kadmon, and especially the Kajomorts of the Zendavista, respecting whom many similar things are there said. It is quite probable that Mani adopted this Parsian idea into his system; and we shall see hereafter, how he might find something of a kindred nature even on this side in Buddhism.

[5] Quinque elementa nihil aliud quam substantia Dei. Augustin. contra Faustum, l. XI. c. 3.

kingdom of darkness, had seized upon certain divine essences or elements of the spiritual substances; and this corresponds entirely with the Buddhistic scheme.

But the primitive man is worsted in the conflict; he is in danger of falling into the kingdom of darkness; in this strait, he prays to the ruler of the light-kingdom; and the latter, to assist him, causes the *living spirit* to emanate.[1] This Spirit raises him up once more to the kingdom of light; but meanwhile the powers of darkness had succeeded in swallowing a part of the armor of the first man, and part of his light-essence; which is the *mundane soul*, now mixed with matter.[2] Here again we perceive the affinity of Mani's ideas with those of the Gnostics; for according to the latter, too, the *κάτω σοφία* was delivered, it is true, by means of the Soter sent to her assistance, from the kingdom of the Hyle; but still a seed of the divine life had fallen down into matter, and this must now go through a process of purification and development. It must so come about, that by the magical power of the divine life, of the light of the soul, or of the spirit, the wildly tumultuous kingdom of darkness shall be tamed in spite of itself, and finally rendered powerless.[3] The subjugation of that tumultuous and blind Nature-power is in fact the end aimed at in the creation of the world. Mani, it is said, endeavored to illustrate his doctrine by the following parable. A good shepherd sees a lion plunge into the midst of his flock. He digs a pit, and casts into it a ram; the lion springs ravenously to the spot to devour his prey, but in so doing falls into the pit, from which he cannot extricate himself. The shepherd, however, finds means of delivering the ram, and keeps the lion confined in the pit, thus rendering him harmless to his flock.[4] In like manner is the kingdom of darkness rendered harmless; the souls it has devoured are finally delivered, and restored back to their native element.

After the *living spirit* had raised man once more to the kingdom of light, he made preparations for the process of purifying the souls mixed in with the kingdom of darkness; which is the final cause of the entire creation, and the end aimed at in the whole course of the world.[5] That class of souls which had not been affected by mixing with matter or the nature of darkness, he raised above this earth, and placed in the sun and the moon, that *from thence* they might send forth their influence to release and draw back again to themselves, by means of the refining processes in the evolution of vegetable and animal life, their kindred souls, which were scattered through all nature, and held in bondage by the kingdom of darkness.

[1] The *ζῶν πνεῦμα* occurs also in the Gnostic Actis Thomæ, which contain a good deal that is analogous to Manicheism. Ed. Thilo, p. 17.

[2] The *ψυχὴ ἁπάντων.*

[3] Titus of Bostra (c. Manich. lib. I. c. 12,) well describes the Manichean doctrine in the following words: *Ὁ ἀγαθὸς δύναμιν ἀποστέλλει τινὰ, φυλάξουσαν μὲν δηθὲν τοὺς ὅρους, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς δέλεαρ ἐσομένην εἰς ἀκούσιον τῇ ὕλῃ σωφρονισμόν, ἐδέθη τρόπον τινὰ ὥσπερ θηρίον.*

[4] Disputat. c. Archelao, c. 25. This parable wears every mark of genuineness; it is at least wholly in the spirit of Manicheism.

[5] As in the Valentinian system, the Soter begins to put forth his influence, after he has first lifted up the Sophia.

Conformably with his Buddhistico-Zoroastrian view of the world, Mani saw the same conflict of Ormuzd and Ahriman, of spirit and of matter, the same process of purification, going on in the physical as in the moral world. But in his manner of carrying this process through, he confounded together the physical and ethical elements, in contradiction to the essence of Christianity, which, by freeing religion entirely from the system of nature, separated these two elements from one another. As the religious system of the Persians assigned an important place to the sun and moon, in the conflict in the physical and spiritual world between Ormuzd and Ahriman, and in carrying forward the universal process of development and purification; so was it also in the system of Mani. Very nearly the same that the system of Zoroaster taught concerning Mithras, as the Genius (Ized) of the Sun, Mani transferred to his Christ, — the pure soul, sending forth its influence from the sun and from the moon. Representing the soul as having sprung from the *primitive man*, he interpreted in this sense the biblical name, "Son of man" (*υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου*,) and distinguishing between the *pure* and *free* soul, enthroned in the sun, and its kindred soul diffused throughout nature, and corrupted by its mixture with matter. So too he distinguished a son of man superior to all contact with matter and incapable of suffering, from a son of man crucified, so to speak, and suffering in matter.[1] Wherever the scattered seed pushed upward out of the dark bosom of the earth and unfolded itself in a plant, in its blossom and its fruit, Mani beheld the triumphant evolution of the principle of light, gradually working its way onward to freedom from the bondage of matter; he beheld how the living soul, which had been imprisoned in the members of the Prince of Darkness, loosens itself from the confinement, rises in freedom, and mingles with its congenial element the *pure air*, where the souls completely purified ascend to those ships of light (the sun and moon) which are ready to transport them to their native country. But whatever still bears upon it various blemishes and stains, is attracted to them gradually, and in portions, by the force of heat, and incorporates itself with all trees, with whatever is planted and sown.

This may serve as an example of his mystical philosophy of nature, which is presented sometimes in strange myths, occasionally bordering on immodesty, but containing nothing which would appear singular to the Oriental imagination, — sometimes under the disguise of Christian expressions. Thus the Manicheans could speak of a suffering son of man, hanging on every tree — of a Christ crucified in every soul; and in the entire world. They could give their own interpretation to the symbols of the suffering Son of Man in the Lord's supper. With the same, and even with still greater propriety, — for this confounding of religion with the theory of nature savored more of paganism than of Christianity, — the Manicheans could employ the pagan fables as a drapery for their ideas. Thus the boy Dionysius torn in pieces by the Titans, according to the mysteries of Bacchus, was considered by them

[1] The *υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου ἐμπαθής* and the *υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀπαθής*.

nothing else than the soul swallowed up by the powers of darkness, the divine life rent into fragments by matter.[1]

The powers of darkness were now in danger of being gradually deprived, through the influence of the spirit of the sun on the refining process of nature, of all the light and life which they held imprisoned in their members. The soul on which they had seized, striving after freedom, and attracted by its kindred Sun-spirit, gradually liberates itself and evaporates; so that at length, deprived of all its stolen light, the kingdom of darkness must soon be abandoned to its own intrinsic hatefulness and death. What was to be done? A being must be created, in whom the soul of nature, which was striving to liberate itself, might be securely charm-bound,—in whom all the scattered light and life of nature, all that the powers of darkness had held imprisoned in their members, and of which they were gradually deprived by the powers of the Sun, might converge. This is *man*, the image of that primitive man,—hence destined by his very form for dominion over nature.[2] The fact was as follows. That majestic shape of light, the primitive man (which probably also belonged to the Son of Man enthroned in the Sun)[3] shines down from the sun into the kingdom of darkness, or material nature. The powers of darkness are seized with longing after the shape of light, but at the same time with dismay. Their prince now addresses them: "What seems to you to be the great light that yonder breaks forth? Behold how it shakes the pole, how it strikes down multitudes of our powers! It behooves you, therefore, to give up to me whatever light you may have in your power; thus will I make an image of that lofty one, who appeared so glorious, through which we shall be able to rule, and one day liberate ourselves from our abode in darkness." Thus human nature is the image, in this world of darkness, of a higher existence; by which image the higher existence itself

[1] See Alex. Lycopol. c. 5.—We may insert here some peculiarly characteristic passages from Manichean writings, in proof of the exposition given above. From Mani's work entitled Thesaurus: "Viva anima, quæ earundem (adversarum potestatum) membris tenebatur, hac occasione laxata evadit, et suo purissimo aëri miscetur: ubi penitus ablutæ animæ adscendunt ad lucidas naves, quæ sibi ad evectionem atque ad suæ patriæ transfretationem sunt præparatæ. Id vero, quod adhuc adversi generis maculas portat, per æstum atque calores particulatim descendit, atque arboribus cæterisque plantationibus ac satis omnibus miscetur." Euodius de fide, c. 10 From Mani's letter to the Virgin Menoch. "Agnoscendo ex quo genere animarum emanaveris, quod est confusum omnibus corporibus et saporibus et speciebus variis cohæret." Augustini opus imperfectum contra Julian. lib. III. § 172. A passage from the Manichean *Faustus*, who lived in the first half of the fifth century, in which the Holy Spirit is represented as the quickening and fructifying power of God, exerting its influence through the air on the refining process of nature, and the doctrine of Christ's birth from the virgin, (a doctrine which the Manicheans, being Docetæ, could not admit in the proper sense,) as a symbol of the birth of that Jesus patibilis from the virgin womb of the earth, through the informing power of the Holy Spirit: "Spiritus sancti, qui est majestas tertia, aëris hunc omnem ambitum sedem fatemur ac diversorium, cujus ex viribus ac spiritali profusione terram quoque concipientem gignere patibilem Jesum, qui est vita ac salus hominum, omni suspensus ex ligno. Quapropter et nobis circa universum, (all the products of nature, as forms of the manifestation of the same divine principle suffering in the bondage of nature, of the same Jesus patibilis,) et vobis similiter erga panem et calicem par religio est." Augustin. c. Faust. lib. XX.

[2] Compare the kindred doctrine of the Ophites.

[3] Alexand. Lycopolit. c. 4: Εἰκόνα δὲ ἐν ἡλίῳ ἑωρᾶσθαι τοιαύτην, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶδος.

is to be attracted hither, and held fast in its domain. When they heard this, after long deliberation among themselves, they deemed it best to comply with the proposal, *for they had no confidence that they should be able long to retain this light among themselves.*[1] They thought it expedient, therefore, to entrust it to their prince, since they had no doubt that in this way they should be able to gain the supremacy The powers of darkness proceed now to intermarry and produce children, in whom their common powers and natures are once more represented; and all they themselves possess, of the essence of darkness and of light, is reproduced. All these, their children, the prince of darkness devours; — he thus concentrates in himself all the substance of light that had been dispersed among the several powers of darkness, — and now generates *man*, in whom therefore all the powers of the kingdom of darkness and of light which had here been mixed together, are united. Man is therefore a microcosm, — a copy of the entire world of light and darkness, a mirror of all the powers of heaven and of the earth.[2] What is here narrated *continually recurs as a fact in the course and movement of nature; — at the birth of each man, the wild forces of matter, the powers of darkness, intermingle to produce human nature, in which they mix together whatever they possess of the higher and of the lower life, in which they endeavor to bind fast the soul of nature, which is held captive by them, and which is striving to get free.*

We must here distinguish, in the Manichean doctrine, the symbolic and mythical forms of representation, running into the imagery of Parsism, from the ideas lying at bottom, which were clearly apprehended by Mani, and correspond to the doctrines of Buddhism. Mani says himself, that what then transpired, still continues to take place at the generation of each man, where the evil nature which forms the human body, matter, absorbs the powers of light, in order, by this intermingling of the powers of light and darkness, to form man.[3] From these words it is quite apparent, that in the action of the prince of darkness, as it is represented in that fiction, the operation by which man is formed in the laboratory of spirit-absorbing nature, is meant to be exhibited under certain forms of sense. It is doubtless only another mythical mode of representing the same idea, when it is said, that the powers of darkness, to escape that threatened lot of *despiritualization*, which would be their utter destruction, and to hold fast the spirit in their own region, combine to create man, probably after the image of

[1] That is the main point.

[2] Mani, in the seventh book of the work bearing the title of Thesaurus, (cited in Augustin. de natura boni, c. 46,) says: "Constrcebantur et contexebantur omnium imagines, cœlestium ac terrenarum virtutum; ut *pleni videlicet orbis* id, quod formabatur, similitudinem obtineret." We have followed the method of construing the Manichean system, disputed by Mosheim, according to which, man was formed at a later period than the rest of nature, for the very purpose of holding the fleeting soul in nature fast. In favor of this view, speak, for the most part, all the passages in our fragmentary sources of information, and the whole analogy of the Manichean system confirms it. Comp. Baur's work on the Manichean system of religion, p. 120, ff. One passage from Alexander of Lycopolis, which formerly seemed to me against this view, has been more correctly explained by Baur.

[3] Augustin. de natura boni, c. 46: Sicuti etiam nunc fieri videmus, corporum formatricem naturam mali inde vires sumentem figurare, ita etiam antedictus princeps etc.

the heavenly, primitive man, that this form might exercise an entrancing power over the soul, that strove to return to its original fountain, and the latter be thus bound to the earth;[1] just as, according to the Buddhistic doctrine, the prince of the Shimnus seeks, by various attractive and enticing objects, to hold fast the souls within his own kingdom, and to prevent them from elevating themselves to Nirwana. In all these forms of representation, we find the same fundamental idea, marking the destiny by which the spirit is held bound to nature, but is yet, through the transition-point of the human organism, conducted onward to its freedom.

While the souls dispersed and scattered in the other kingdoms of nature, or the light-essence, is prevented by the predominance of matter from becoming conscious of itself, the light-nature, on the other hand, which is concentrated in man, attains to a conscious and free evolution. The spirit, fettered by matter in the rest of nature, becomes first released from these fetters in man, comes first, in him, to itself. Here first begins the realm of consciousness and of freedom, the spirit emancipated from the bonds of natural necessity. Man, therefore, in the Manichean, as in the Buddhistic system, occupies the loftiest position; — he forms the transition-point, conditioned by the act of freedom, to the complete disenthralment of the spirit that rises wholly above the cycle of metempsychosis to a reunion with the kingdom of light. According to the Buddhistic system, he is the necessary transition-point to the becoming Nirwana.[2]

As the universal mundane soul seeks to subject to itself matter in the mass, in the great mundane bodies, so the human soul, that is of the same derivation, should govern this corporeal world in its details. "The first soul," said Mani, "which flowed from the God of light, received this structure of the body for the purpose of subduing it to its own bit."[3] The soul of the first man, as standing yet nearer to the

[1] See Titus of Bostra, in the preface to the third book of his work against the Manicheans. (in Canisii lect. antiqu. ed. Basnage, Antverp. 1725, T. I. f. 137:) Ἕκαστος τῶν τῆς ὕλης ἀρχόντων ἐμόρφωσεν ἑαυτὸν εἰς θήραμα τῆς ψυχῆς, — and of Adam, as their production, ὄργανον ἐπιθυμίας καὶ δέλαρ τῶν ἄνωθεν ψυχῶν. And that something is here represented as once beginning, which continually perpetuates itself in the generation of men, appears from what Mani says in his letter to the virgin Menoch, cited in Augustin. opus imperfect. contra Julian. l. III. c. 174: Sicut auctor animarum Deus est, ita corporum auctor per concupiscentiam diabolus est, ut in viscatorio, (analogous to that former bait whereby the souls were bound to bodies,) per concupiscentiam mulieris, unde diabolus aucupatur, etc.

[2] According to the Buddha doctrine, man is in this respect superior even to the gods, who enjoy a life of serene blessedness, enduring through many periods of the world; for, like all individual existence, so too the life of the gods must some time or other come to an end, while only in the Nirwana is to be found an eternal rest beyond all possible change. By the brief duration of his existence, and the multiform trials and sufferings which fall to his lot, man is admonished to strive after that higher end. But the gods, through default of such admonition, may easily be drawn away from that highest end, and become so fettered to their individual existence, which, however, is one of the changeable forms of the spirit, as to forget to aspire to anything beyond it. To man, in this world of trials and conflicts, various means are given of rendering himself, — by a series of meritorious works, actions conditioning destiny, — worthy of the Nirwana; but these opportunities are wanting to the gods. See Schmidt's Essays, above cited, vol. II. p. 37. 1834.

[3] Operæ pretium est, advertere, quia prima anima, quæ a Deo luminis manavit accepit fabricam istam corporis, ut eam fræno suo regeret. Mani's words, in his letter to the virgin Menoch, in August.

original fountain of the kingdom of light, was therefore endowed with preëminent faculties.

But the first man consisted, like each of his descendants, of two opposite elements, a soul still living in the full possession of its original power, springing from and akin to the kingdom of light,[1] and a body derived from the kingdom of darkness, with a soul in affinity to it, and the blind, material faculty of desire originating in the same principle — the wild power of nature that resists the godlike, (the ψυχὴ ἄλογος.[2]) This element, affining to the kingdom of darkness, supplied a channel for the introduction of its influences. The powers of darkness must now come to see how the light-nature, concentrating itself in man, became thereby more powerful; and they must resort still to the same artifices by which they sought at first to hold fast in their kingdom the element of light which had fallen down into it, in order to retain under the ban of their kingdom, this spirit concentrated in the human nature, which threatened to free itself from the bonds of matter, and to mount upward to its original fountain. Hence they must seek to draw him down, by every possible enticement, to the world. They invited man, as it is symbolically expressed, to partake of all the fruits of the trees of Paradise. Only they would hinder him from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; that is, would suppress in him the consciousness of that which is in harmony with his true nature, and of that which is in contradiction to it, — would make him worldly. Yet an angel of light, or Christ himself, (the Spirit of the sun,) counteracted their artifices. This was the truth which was found in the narrative in Genesis concerning Paradise and the forbidden fruit, considered from the Manichean point of view. They believed that in the representation of that earliest record, they saw only the influence of the evil principle, when the parts were reversed, and what should have been ascribed to the powers of darkness, was transferred to God, and what belonged to the Genius of light, applied to the serpent, the symbol of Ahriman.[3]

opus imperfect. c. Julian. lib. III. § 186. T. X. opp. ed. Benedictin. P. II. f. 1122. Paris, 1690.

[1] Quasi de primæ facta flore substantiæ, (namely, lucis Dianæ,) says Mani, in his letter to a certain Patricius. L. c.

[2] Baur has endeavored to show, that the hypothesis of two souls in man, which cannot be demonstrated from the words of Mani himself to be a Manichean doctrine, does not belong to the system. It may be, perhaps, that the expression "two souls" is something foreign to Manicheism; since, according to Mani's doctrine, soul, spirit, light, godlike, are identical notions. But the thing itself, which the opponents of Manicheism, from *their own* point of view, have designated with this name, the hypothesis of such a motive principle in affinity with matter, the fountain of sinful desires, agrees perfectly with the Manichean system.

[3] This view of the matter we must ascribe to Mani, if we may venture to consider what is cited as spoken from the Manichean point of view, in the preface to the third book of Titus of Bostra against the Manicheans, towards the end, as containing the thoughts of Mani himself. At least, I can find nothing therein, as Baur professes to do, which is incongruous with the other ideas of Mani; but as I have unfolded it, with a constant reference to Baur's objections, it seems to me to agree perfectly well with this man's spirit and train of thought; although I allow, that it forms no necessary member of the Manichean system, and that possibly some later person may have thus expounded the record in Genesis, contemplated from the Manichean point of view. Moreover, Augustin favors the supposition that this was the Manichean doctrine, (de Genesi contra Manicheos, lib. II. § 39): Sic isti credunt, quod serpens ille

When the powers of darkness saw their plots against the light-spirit concentrated in human nature, which they would hold captive by every possible charm within the bonds of nature, thus defeated, they made trial of another expedient. They seduced the first man, through his associate Eva, to abandon himself to the impulses of carnal desires, that by so doing he might prove faithless to his light-essence, and make himself a slave to nature. The consequence was, that the soul, which in its original powers should have risen to the kingdom of light, became divided by propagation, and was bound once more to a material body; so that the powers of darkness were enabled continually to repeat over what they had done in producing the first man.

Since every thing depended on man's learning how to distinguish from one another the two opposite elements of his nature, and since, according to the Manichean system, it is the doctrine of man's origin, (anthropogony,) taken in connection with that of the origin of the world, (cosmogony,) which clears up this point, Mani taught that it was of the utmost importance to obtain a right understanding of these doctrines. Accordingly, in his "epistle of the foundation," he says: "Had it been given man to perceive clearly how the matter stood in relation to the origin of Adam and Eve, they would not have been subjected to a transitory existence and to death." And hence he writes to the virgin Menoch:[1] "May our God himself enlighten thy soul, and reveal to thee his justice, that thou art the fruit of a divine stock.[2] Even thou art become light, since thou hast known what thou wert before,— from what race of souls thou art sprung; which race, intermixed with all bodies, is connected with numberless forms; for as souls are begotten of souls, so the bodily structure is composed of the corporeal nature. What is born of the flesh, then, is flesh, and what is born of the spirit is spirit. But know, that the spirit is the soul — soul from soul, flesh from flesh."[3] He appealed to the practice of infant baptism — a practice, therefore, which must have already become general in the Persian church — as a proof that Christians themselves presupposed by their practical conduct the existence of such a stain in human nature. "I ask them," says he in the letter above cited,[4] "is all sin actual sin? Why then does any individual receive the cleansing by water, before he has done a sinful act; since *in himself considered* he has contracted no guilt? But if he has contracted no guilt, and yet must be cleansed, then by this action they do of themselves bear witness to the derivation from an evil stock; — yes, those very persons do so, whose fatuity keeps them from understanding what they say or what they imply in their own acts."

Christus fuerit, et Deum, nescio quem, gentis tenebrarum, illud præceptum dedisse confingunt, tanquam invideret hominibus scientiam boni et mali.

[1] Augustin. opus imperfect. c. Julian. lib. III. § 172.

[2] The revelation consists precisely in this, that man is brought to a consciousness of his light-nature.

[3] According to his system of light-emanation, Mani could make no distinction between the Spirit of God and the spirit of man, — between spirit and soul. This again coincided entirely with the Buddhist doctrine.

[4] Augustin. opus imperfect. c. Julian. lib III. § 187.

The light-nature concentrated in Adam is the fountain-head, from which all human souls are derived; but on account of its continual division and contamination by matter, the spirit has lost much of the original power which it had when it gushed fresh from the kingdom of light. That original power of the free light-nature is what the law presupposes, in order to its being fulfilled. "The law is holy," said Mani, "but it is a holy law for *the holy soul;* the commandment is just and good, — but it is so for the *just* and *good soul.*"[1] In another place,[2] he says, "If we do good, it is not a work of the flesh, for the works of the flesh are manifest, Galat. 5 : 19; or if we do evil, it is not the work of the soul, for the fruit of the spirit is peace, joy. And the apostle to the Romans exclaims, 'The good that I would, that do I not; but the evil that I would not, that do I.' There you hear the voice of the struggling soul, defending her freedom against the slavery of lust; for she is pained that sin, that is, Satan, should work in her all manner of concupiscence. The authority of the law discovers to her its turpitude; by the authority of the law she is brought to the consciousness of evil, — since it condemns the works of lust, which the flesh admires and prizes; for all the bitterness which is felt in renouncing lust, is sweet to the soul, — it is that by which she is nurtured and grows vigorous. In fine, the soul of that man who abstains from all the pleasures of lust, is wakeful, becomes mature and progressive; but by the gratifications of lust, the soul is wont to be enfeebled."[3] Now, to procure the final deliverance of his kindred nature, the soul, from the power of darkness, to quicken it anew, to give it the complete victory over the evil principle, and raise it upward to himself, it was necessary that the same Spirit of the Sun, which had thus far conducted the whole fining-process of nature, and of the spiritual world, — both of which, according to the principles of Mani's system above explained, constituted one whole, — should reveal himself in humanity.[4]

But there can be no communion between light and darkness. "The light shines in the darkness," said Mani, explaining in accordance with his own views the words of St. John, "but the darkness comprehends it not. The Son of primeval light, the Spirit of the Sun, was incapable of entering into any union with a material body; he only clothed himself in a shadowy, sensible form, in order that he might be perceived by sensual men." "The Supreme Light," says he, in another fragment,[5] "when it placed itself on a level with its own, being among material things, assigned to itself a body, although it is all of it but one nature." In defence of his Docetism he cited the fact, explained after his own arbitrary manner, that Christ, on a certain occasion when

[1] L. c. § 186.

[2] L. c. § 177.

[3] Augustin. opus imperfect. c. Julian. lib. III. § 177.

[4] Concerning the incarnations of the sun in the old oriental systems of religion, cons. Creutzer's Symbolik, last ed., vol. II. p. 53, 207. It was wholly in accordance with the Manichean system, that the Manicheans, cited in Alexander of Lycopolis, (c. 24,) said, Christ as the νοῦς is τὰ ὄντα πάντα. So too, in the Actis Thomæ, p. 10: Κύριε, ὁ ἐν πᾶσιν ὢν, καὶ διερχόμενος διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐγκείμενος πᾶσι τοῖς ἔργοις σου, καὶ διὰ τῆς πάντων ἐνεργείας φανερούμενος.

[5] In the letter to a certain Adas or Addas. Fabricii Biblioth. græc. ed. nov. Vol. VII. f. 316.

the Jews would have stoned him, passed on untouched through the multitude; also, that Christ, at his transfiguration, appeared to the disciples in his true form of light.[1] Jesus assumed the title of Christ or Messiah only by a catachresis, in accommodation to the notions of the Jews.[2] The prince of darkness sought to bring about the crucifixion of Jesus, not being aware that he was superior to all suffering; the crucifixion was, of course, a mere semblance. This seeming transaction symbolized the crucifixion of the soul, sunk in matter, which the Spirit of the Sun would raise up to itself. As the crucifixion of that soul which was dispersed through all matter, served but to accomplish the destruction of the kingdom of darkness, so much more was this the effect of the *seeming* crucifixion of the *Supreme Soul*. Hence Mani said, "The adversary, who was hoping to crucify the Saviour, the Father of the righteous, was crucified himself. What seemed to be done in this case is one thing; what was *really* done, another."[3] The Manichean theory, which represented the doctrine of Christ as a mere symbol, is clearly set forth in an apocryphal *account of the travels of the apostles*.[4] During the agony on the cross, Christ appears to the afflicted John, and tells him that all this is done but for the sake of the lower populace[5] in Jerusalem. The human person of Christ now vanishes, and instead of it appears a cross of pure light, surrounded by a countless multitude of other forms, still representing, however, but one shape and one image, (a symbol of the various forms under which the soul manifests itself, although it is in truth but one and the same.) A divine voice, full of sweetness, issues from above the cross, saying to him, "The cross of light is, for your sakes, called sometimes the Word, sometimes Christ; sometimes the Door, sometimes the Way; sometimes the Bread, sometimes the Sun; sometimes the Resurrection, sometimes Jesus; sometimes the Father, sometimes the Spirit; sometimes the Life, sometimes the Truth; sometimes Faith, and sometimes Grace."

Siding with the advocates of an absolute Dualism among the Persians, Mani held the aim and purpose of the whole course of the world to be, not a reconciliation of the good and the evil principles, — a supposition which would have been at war with his whole theory, — but a total separation of the light from the darkness, and the reduction of the latter to utter impotence. This was in accordance also with the Buddhistic doctrine. Matter, after having been deprived of all its foreign light and life, was to be converted by fire into an inert mass.[6] All souls were capable, by means of their light-nature, of participating in the redemption; but if they voluntarily surrendered themselves to the

[1] See the fragments from Mani's letters. L. c.

[2] Ἡ τοῦ Χριστοῦ προσηγορία ὀνομά ἐστι καταχρηστικόν. L. c.

[3] From the epistola fundamenti, Euod. de fide, c. 28: Τὴν δύναμιν τὴν θείαν ἐνηρμόσθαι, ἐνεσταυρῶσθαι τῇ ὕλῃ. Alex. Lycopolit. c. 4: Christus in omni mundo et omni anima crucifixus. Secundin. ep. ad Augustin. The words of the Manichean Faustus, Augustin. c. Faustum, lib. 32: Crucis ejus mystica fixio, qua nostræ animæ passionis monstrantur vulnera.

[4] Περίοδοι ἀποστόλων. Concil. Nic. II. Actio V. ed. Mansi. T. XIII. f. 167.

[5] Τῷ κάτω ὄχλῳ.

[6] Tit. Bostr. I. c. 30. Alex. Lycopolit. c. 5.

service of sin or darkness, they would, in punishment, be banished, at the general separation of the two kingdoms, to the dead mass of matter, and stationed there as a watch over it. On this point Mani, in his epistola fundamenti, expressed himself as follows: "The souls that have allowed themselves to be drawn, by the love of the world, away from their original nature of light; that have become enemies to the holy light, openly taken up arms for the destruction of the holy elements; that have entered into the service of the fiery spirit, and by their deadly persecution of the holy church,[1] and of the elect who are found therein,[2] have oppressed the observers of the heavenly commandments, — these souls shall be precluded from the blessedness and glory of the holy earth. And since they have allowed themselves to be overcome by evil, they shall continue to abide with this race of evil; so that the peaceful earth and those realms of immortality are shut against them. This shall be their portion, because they have so devoted themselves to evil works as to become estranged from the life and freedom of the holy light. They will not be able, then, to find admittance into that kingdom of peace, but shall be chained to that frightful mass (of matter or darkness left to itself,) over which too there must needs be a watch. Thus these souls shall continue cleaving to the things they have loved, since they did not separate themselves from them when it was time."[3] It is clear, that Mani did not entirely agree, in his doctrine of the last things, either with Buddhism, or with the Zoroastrian or the Christian system, but, by the fusion of the three, formed a peculiar theory of his own.

In respect to the views of the Manicheans with regard to the *sources of religious knowledge*, they considered the revelations of the Paraclete, or Mani, as the highest and only infallible authority, whereby every thing else was to be judged. They went on the principle, that Mani's doctrine embraced the absolute truths which enlighten the reason; — whatever did not accord with them was contrary to reason, wherever it might be found. They received in part, it is true, the scriptures of the New Testament. But judging them by that standard principle which we have mentioned, they indulged in the most arbitrary criticism in applying them to points of doctrine or ethics.[4] Sometimes they asserted that the original records of the religion had been falsified by various corruptions of the prince of darkness (tares among the wheat;)[5] sometimes, that Jesus and his apostles had accommodated themselves to existing Jewish opinions, with a view to prepare men gradually for the reception of the pure truth; sometimes, that the apostles themselves, when they first appeared in the character of teachers, were entangled in various Jewish errors. Hence they concluded, that it was first by the teachings of the Paraclete, men were enabled to distinguish the true from the false matter in the New Testament. The Manichean Faustus

[1] That is, the Manichean sect.

[2] Persecution of the Bramins of the Manicheans, the Electi, was a crime of peculiar die, — wholly in accordance with the oriental ideas of the priests.

[3] De fide, c. 4.

[4] This was said of them already by Titus of Bostra, in the beginning of his third book.

[5] See, above, the similar principles of the Clementines respecting the Old Testament

lays down the principles of Manicheism on this point, as follows :[1] "Of the New Testament we take only what is said to the honor of the Son of glory, either by himself or by his apostles; and by the latter only after they had become perfect and settled in their faith. Of the rest, which was either said by the apostles in their simplicity and ignorance, while they were yet inexperienced in the truth; or inserted, with malicious design, by the enemy; or incautiously asserted by authors[2] and transmitted to posterity, — of all this we desire to know nothing. I mean, namely, such assertions as these, that he was born shamefully of a woman; that he was circumcised as a Jew; that he offered sacrifices like a heathen; that he was meanly baptized, led into the wilderness and miserably tempted of the devil." These same Manicheans, who slavishly submitted their reason to all that Mani had uttered, as if it was a divine revelation, were zealous for the rights of reason, and would have themselves regarded as the *only rational* class, inasmuch as they only knew how to separate what was consistent with, from what was repugnant to reason in the New Testament. The Manichean Faustus says, to him that believes without inquiry whatever is contained in the New Testament: "*Thou blind believer of everything, who banishest reason, that gift of nature, from humanity; who makest it a matter of conscience to decline judging between the true and the false; thou art as afraid of separating the good from its opposite, as children are of a ghost!*"[3]

The Manichean sect had a church constitution of their own, suited to the distinction of the esoteric and the exoteric in the old religions of Asia; — the two-fold mode of representation already described being, in truth, based on such a distinction existing within the sect itself. From what has been said, it is evident that Mani differed entirely from the majority of the founders of Gnostic sects. The latter wished to alter nothing in the existing Christian church; they were desirous only of introducing, in addition to the confession of faith for the ψυχικοί, a secret doctrine for the πνευματικοί. Mani, on the other hand, would have himself regarded as a man of God, endowed with divine authority for the reformation of the entire church. He was for giving the whole church, which had become wholly degenerated,[4] in his view, by the corrupt intermixture of Judaism with Christianity, a new shape. There was to be but *one true Christian church*, formed after the doctrines and principles of Mani. Within this church, there were to be two distinct grades. The great mass, consisting of the exoterics, were to constitute the *Auditors*. To them the writings of Mani might indeed be read, and his doctrines presented in their symbolical and mythical form; — but they were to receive no explanation of their inner meaning. It may be imagined, to what pitch of expectation the minds of these Auditors would be raised when these enigmatical, mysterious sounding things

[1] Apud Augustin. lib. XXXII.

[2] Namely, the authors of the gospels, who were not apostles.

[3] Augustin. c. Faust. lib. XVIII. also lib. XI.

[4] Hence he called other Christians, not Christians, but Galileans. Fabric. Bibl græc. vol. VII. f. 316

were set before them, and, as usually happens, they were hoping to find lofty wisdom in what was so obscure and unintelligible. The Esoterics were the Elect or Perfect,[1] — the sacerdotal caste, the Brahmins of the Manicheans.[2] They held a very important place, according to the Manichean doctrine, in the great refining process; they formed the link of transition between the earthly world, the circle of the metempsychosis, and the kingdom of light (between the world of Sansara and the Nirwana;) — they constituted the last stadium of the purification of the spirit in redeeming itself from the bondage of nature. Their mode of life must answer to the position which they thus held — utter estrangement from the world, in the Buddhist sense, which was applied to Christian asceticism. They were to possess no worldly property, but were bound to lead a strictly ascetic and contemplative life; to abstain from marriage, from all strong drinks, and from all animal food. They were to be distinguished for a holy innocence that shrunk from injuring any living thing, and religious reverence for the divine life which was diffused through all nature. They were not only to refrain, therefore, from destroying or harming any animal, but even from pulling up an herb, or plucking a fruit or a flower. The whole round of their austere life was marked by three particulars, the signaculum oris, the signaculum manuum, and the signaculum sinus.[3] The Auditors were to see that they should be provided with all that was necessary for their subsistence, and to reverence them as beings of a superior order. They should look upon them as their mediators, in direct communication with the kingdom of light. By their kindness to the Elect, the Auditors should enter into the companionship of their perfection; and the defects adhering to them in consequence of their less rigid life, would be made up by the merits of their superiors; — and among these defects were reckoned the neglecting to spare the life of animal or vegetable, and the eating of flesh. The harm thus done was to be repaired by their sharing their own means of subsistence with the Elect.[4] The importance attached by Buddhism to the kind offices of the pious, shown towards the Buddhas who made their appearance in humanity, was transferred by the Manicheans to the kind offices shown by the Auditors to the Elect. And it was also according to the Buddhist doctrine, that by repeated kind offices of this sort, shown in the different modes of human existence passed through by metempsychosis, one might gradually accumulate such a store of good works, as to arise at length to the dignity of a Buddha.[5]

From this sacerdotal class were chosen the presiding officers of the

[1] Τέλειον, according to Theodoretus, — a term which recurs once more among the Gnostic Manichean sects of the middle age.

[2] Faustus, quoted by Augustin, calls them the sacerdotale genus.

[3] See, e. g., Augustinus de moribus Manichæorum, c. 10, et seq. The word signaculum seems to me to denote here, not a sign, but a seal, a means of safe keeping, as a translation of the Greek σφράγις, applied, for instance, to the rite of confirmation.

[4] To this Ephræm Syrus refers, when he accuses the Manicheans of bestowing absolution in return for the bread given to them. See the extracts published by A. F. W. von Wegner. in his work de Manichæorum indulgentiis. Lips. 1827, p. 69, et seq.

[5] Comp. Schmidt's Dissertation on the thousand Buddhas, in the Memoirs of the Academy of St. Petersburg. VI. series, T. II. A. D. 1834, p. 88, etc.

entire religious society. As Mani wished to have himself regarded as the Paraclete promised by Christ, so after Christ's example, he chose twelve apostles. This institution continued to exist; and twelve such persons, with the title of Magistri, had the government of the whole sect. At the head of these, was placed a thirteenth, who, as the leader of the sect, represented Mani. Subordinate to these, there were seventy-two bishops, answering to the seventy or seventy-two disciples of Jesus;[1] and under these last were presbyters, deacons, and finally travelling preachers.[2]

As to the *mode of celebrating the sacrament of the supper* among the Manicheans, it is a matter involved in much obscurity, owing to the fact that no credible account was known to exist about a transaction which was confined to the very secret assemblies of the Elect; for as the Auditors answered to the catechumens, and the Elect to the Fideles in the dominant church, it is plain that the sacraments could be administered only among the Elect. The argument already alluded to, which Mani drew from the existing practice of infant baptism, has led some to suppose — though wrongly, as Mosheim has shown — they might infer the existence of the same practice among the Manicheans; but in that place, Mani is simply refuting his opponents by adducing their own practice in favor of a principle which that practice necessarily presupposed; yet without expressing any approbation of the practice. And it may be a question whether Mani would not object to this sign, as a Jewish rite derived from John the Baptist.[3] Perhaps from the first, no other form of initiation prevailed among the Manicheans, than the one which we afterwards meet with, in the middle age, among the kindred sect of the Catharists. But the *celebration of the Lord's supper* was an ordinance that could be easily explained in accordance

[1] According to the well-known various reading.

[2] Augustin. de hæres. c. 32.

[3] From the words of the Manichean Felix, Aug. c. Fel. lib. I. c. 19, ut quid baptizati sumus? it cannot be proved, that the Manicheans looked upon baptism as a necessary ceremony of initiation; for in this case too, the Manichean is employing rather the argumentum ad hominem; and very possibly he may have received baptism before he went over to the Manichean sect. Nor again can it in any wise be certainly inferred from the passage in the commonitorium, quomodo sit agendum cum Manichæis, (found in the Appendix to the 8th vol. of the Benedictine edition of Augustine,) where a distinction is made between those Manicheans who, on coming over to the Catholic church, were received among the catechumens, and those who, having been already baptized, were received among the Pœnitentes, that baptism was a customary rite among the Manicheans; and still less can it be inferred from the fact, that a distinction of the same kind is made between the baptized and the unbaptized among the Elect themselves, who should come over to the Catholic church, that baptism was received by *such* of the Elect as chose it of their own free will; for here too the reference may have been to such persons as, before they joined the Manicheans, had been baptized in the Catholic church. Neither does it in any wise follow from the passage in Augustin, de moribus ecclesiæ, c. 35, where he represents the Manicheans as objecting to the Catholic Christians, that the fideles et jam baptizati lived in the state of marriage, and in the family relation, possessing and managing worldly property, that there were among the Elect a certain class of persons voluntarily baptized, who were alone bound under an inviolable vow, to a strictly ascetic life; for the fideles and baptizati — both terms being exactly synonymous — answer generally here to the Electi among the Manicheans. Mosheim's distinction, therefore, between baptized and unbaptized Electis, which in itself is not a very natural one, appears to be altogether arbitrary.

with the principles of their mystical philosophy of nature.[1] Augustin, while he was a Manichean Auditor, had learned that the *Elect* celebrated the Lord's supper; but about the particular mode in which it was observed, he knew nothing.[2] It is only certain, that the Elect drank no wine. Whether, like the Encratites, the so called ὑδροπαραστάται, they used water instead of wine, or if not, what else they did, it is impossible to say. As a token of recognition, the Manicheans were used to give each other the right hand whenever they met, thus showing their common deliverance from the kingdom of darkness by the right hand of the redeeming Spirit of the Sun,— the same act having been repeated in their own case as in that of their heavenly father, the original man, when, on the point of sinking into the kingdom of darkness, he was rescued by the right hand of the living spirit.[3]

As *festivals*, the Manicheans celebrated the Sunday of every week, not on account of its reference to the resurrection of Christ, which would have been inconsistent with their Docetism, but as a day consecrated to the Sun, which was in fact their Christ.[4] On this day they fasted, — contrary to the practice of the dominant church. The Christmas festival of the church was, of course, not in harmony with the Manichean Docetism. If occasionally, as Augustin reports, they conformed to the practice of the dominant church in celebrating the *festival of Easter;* yet we may easily suppose, that this festival would be of but little interest to them, as they were unaffected by those feelings which rendered the day so sacred to other Christians. So much the greater respect did they pay to the festival in honor of the martyrdom of their master, Mani, which fell in the month of March. It was called βῆμα, (suggestus, cathedra,) the feast of the tribune or pulpit,— the feast in remembrance of the divinely enlightened teacher. A gorgeous pulpit, ascended by means of five steps, symbolizing perhaps the five elements, and decorated with costly drapery, was on this occasion placed in the hall, where they assembled. To this all the Manicheans paid obeisance, prostrating themselves on the ground after the custom of the East.[5]

As it concerns the *moral character* of the Manichean sect, it is impossible, with the scanty information we possess respecting its *early followers*, to give any just account of a matter in which the different periods in the history of a sect should be so carefully distinguished. It can only be said, that Mani aimed at a strict system of morals; but without doubt the mystical language of the sect, which occasionally verges to immodesty, might, in the case of the uneducated, tend to introduce a sensuous fanaticism dangerous to good morals.

Already, when the Manicheans began first to make progress in the Roman empire, a violent persecution broke out against them. As a sect which had sprung up in the Persian empire, then at war with the

[1] In accordance with the idea, that the fruits of the earth represented the Son of man crucified in nature. See above.

[2] Augustin. contra Fortunatum lib. I. Appendix.

[3] Disputat. Archelai. c. 7.

[4] Besides many other places, comp. Augustin. c. Faustum, lib. XVIII. c. 5: Vos in die, quem dicunt solis, solem colitis.

[5] Augustin. contra ep. fundamenti, c. 8; c. Faustum lib. XVIII. c. 5.

Romans, and in some sense allied to the Parsic religion, they were an object of peculiar hatred to the Roman government. The Emperor Diocletian, A. D. 296, issued a law against the sect (cited already in the first section of this history) condemning its leaders to the stake, and punishing its adherents, if they belonged to the common order, with decapitation and the confiscation of their property.[1]

III. *Doctrine of the Catholic Church, as it proceeded to form itself in opposition to the Sects.*

A. *Genetic Development of the Church Theology generally. Character of the several individual tendencies of the religious and dogmatic spirit, which had special influence on it.*

Having thus far considered the different tendencies of the heretical element as it grew up out of the reaction of ante-Christian principles, we now proceed to inquire how the movement of the church theology generally, and in its several particular modifications, was affected by these various forms of opposition. If it was the case in the heresies, that the unity of Christianity came to be split up into too many opposite theories, each excluding the other; the movement of the church theology was, on the other hand, distinguished, it is true, by the circumstance, that the unity of the Christian consciousness here asserted itself much more strongly, and hence men were less exposed to run into such direct oppositions of doctrine; but even here, owing to the strong propensity in man's nature to fall into one extreme or the other, the higher, comprehending unity had to resolve itself into oppositions of a subordinate kind,— oppositions which remained grounded, indeed, in the essence of Christianity, but which might approach, however, on one side or the other, either to the position of Judaism, or of its opposite, Gnosticism. When the church had once established itself on an independent footing, the less it was obliged to defend its princi-

[1] The edict contains, in its style of thought and language, every internal mark of authenticity. It is scarcely possible to imagine by whom and for what purpose such an edict could have been forged in this particular form. Had it been the intention of some Christian to fabricate an edict of this sort, with a view to excite following emperors to persecute the Manicheans, he would not have chosen Dioclesian certainly; and still less would he have put such language into his mouth. Though the later Christians had much that was analogous to the older pagan way of thinking about a dominant religion handed down from the fathers, yet a Christian would never have expressed himself after this peculiar fashion.

What is there to forbid supposing that the Manicheans had extended themselves, even thus early, to proconsular Africa, since the *Gnostics* had already paved the way for them, and it is certain that the Manicheans *early* spread themselves in these countries, and since the chronological dates connected with the early history of this sect are so uncertain? If the law reads: "si qui sane etiam honorati aut cujuslibet dignitatis vel majoris personæ ad hanc sectam se transtulerunt,"—it does not necessarily follow from this, that the Emperor had certain information of the spread of the doctrines of this sect among persons of the *highest* rank; and in the next place, it would be no singular matter, considering the prevalent rage at that time among people of rank,—a class ever prone to seize on any thing which would distinguish their religion from that of other people,—for theurgical speculations, and for searching after higher explanations respecting the world of spirits, that a mysterious and high-pretending scheme of faith like this, should meet among them with a welcome reception. The argumentum e silentio is, for the rest, very unsafe in historical criticism, unless supported by other considerations; and the fact that the older fathers make no mention of a law by Dioclesian, directed particularly against the Manicheans, may be very easily accounted for. Yet this law is referred to by the Hilary who wrote a commentary on St. Paul's epistles. In ep. II. Timoth. III. 7.

ples in the struggle with Judaism, and the more it had to assert them in the conflict with Gnosticism, the more easily might it happen that a Jewish element would be imperceptibly introduced into the theological spirit; and that too, without being communicated from without, but by spontaneously springing up within, as we observed it to do in the history of the church constitution and of Christian worship. Gnosticism, again, might be attacked in two different ways; either in a way of uncompromising hostility, which refused to recognize in it a single element of truth, and which hence would be liable itself to run into some opposite extreme of error; or in such a way as to leave room for admitting, that along with the error there was also a fundamental truth, — that there was at bottom a true spiritual need, which was only seeking its proper satisfaction, and must find it in Christianity. And, in truth, Gnosticism could be effectually vanquished only in this latter way; only by separating in it the true from the false, and presenting something whereby the spiritual need, the failure to recognize and satisfy which had called Gnosticism into existence or promoted its spread, might find itself met and answered. Yet there was at the same time great danger that, in the very effort to seize and appropriate whatever of truth there was in Gnosticism, some of its errors might also be unintentionally included.

The two main tendencies of the theological spirit here denoted, correspond to the two tendencies which necessarily belong together in the Christian process of transforming the world — but of which either one or the other is ever wont to predominate; — the world-resisting and the world-appropriating tendency of the Christian mind. The undue predominance of either one of these is, in truth, attended with its own peculiar dangers. In connection with this stands another antithesis. Christianity is based upon a supernatural revelation; but this revelation would be appropriated and understood by the organ of a reason which submits to it; since it is not destined to remain a barely outward thing to the human spirit. The supernatural element must be owned in its organic connection with the natural, which in this finds its full measure and complement. The fact of redemption has for its very aim, indeed, to do away the schism between the supernatural and the natural; — the fact of God's becoming man is in order to the humanization of the divine, and the deification of the human. Hence there will ever be springing up two tendencies of the theological spirit, corresponding, as must be evident, to the two just now described, and of which the one will feel itself impelled to understand and represent the supernatural element of Christianity in its opposition to, the other, the same element in its connection with, the natural: the one will seek to apprehend the supernatural and supra-rational element as *such;* the other will strive to apprehend the same in its harmony with reason and nature, — to present the supernatural and supra-rational to consciousness, as that which is still conformed to nature and to reason. Thus there comes to be formed a predominance of the *supernaturalist* or of the *rationalist* element, both of which should meet together in order to a sound and healthy development of Christian doctrine; while

from the predominance of the one or the other of these elements, opposite dangers arise.

It is very easy to see, that although Christian science must have its root in faith, and grow up out of the interest of faith, and although faith, which ought to receive into itself and animate all the powers of the human spirit, must seek to create a scientific understanding out of itself, yet according to the proportion in which one or the other of these interests predominates, one or the other of these tendencies will be formed; and hence we must proceed in the first place to inquire, how the matter stood in this respect under the given circumstances and conditions of the national life and intellectual culture prevailing in the period which is the subject of our consideration.

The first thing that presents itself to our notice here will be, the difference between the two great individualities of national character, out of which proceeded the civilization of those times, — the Greek and the Roman. (In the Greek predominated the activity of the intellect, — the scientific, speculative element. Greece was, in fact, the birth-place of philosophy.) (The Roman character, on the other hand, was less mobile. It was more fixed and inclined to be tenacious of old usages; — its tendency was to the practical.) Both these mental characteristics will mark the peculiar shaping of Christian doctrine and theology, — will in different circumstances operate favorably or unfavorably on the process of their development; since both these individualities of character correspond to the peculiar main tendencies above described; and it was most desirable, that they should so act as mutually to balance and check each other. Alexandria, the principal seat of philosophical culture, where a philosophy most nearly akin to the religious element, viz. the Platonic, then held the supremacy; where, at a still earlier period, we saw growing up a Jewish philosophy of religion, gave birth also in these centuries, by the blending of Grecian elements of culture with Christianity, to a tendency which sought to present the new matter given by revelation in harmony with the previous development of reason. But from the school of John, in Asia Minor, there had gone forth a tendency, which was opposed to the speculative caprice of the Gnostics, and which sought faithfully to preserve and hold fast the peculiar, fundamental doctrines of Christianity, so as to secure them against all corruptions. And this tendency it was, which Irenæus, — who had been educated in Asia Minor, in the school of those venerable presbyters, the disciples of the Apostle John, — transplanted to the West. This Father, distinguished for the sobriety of his practical, Christian spirit, possessed of a peculiarly sound and discriminating tact in determining what was of practical moment in all doctrines, profoundly penetrated with a sense of the grandeur of God's works and of the limited compass of the human understanding, perseveringly opposes the humility of knowledge to the arrogant pretensions of Gnostic speculation, and forms the link of connection betwixt the church of Asia Minor and that of Rome, — representing in himself what was common to them both. But as in the Roman spirit, the practical church interest was so absorbing as to leave no room for the scientific,

the West was in want of an organ whereby the spirit which prevailed there could scientifically express itself. Such an organ was supplied by the church of North Africa, in a man who united in himself the elements of the Roman and of the Carthaginian character,—in Tertullian. Wanting the chaste sobriety of mind for which Irenæus was distinguished, Tertullian, though a foe to speculation, yet could not resist the impulses of a profound speculative intellect; and to the devout practically Christian element he united a speculative one, — destitute, however, of the regular logical form, — which continued for a long time to operate through various intermediate agencies in the Western church, until it finally impregnated the mind of that great teacher of centuries, Augustin, in whom Tertullian once more appears under a transfigured form. A great impression was made on the peculiar temperament of Tertullian by the remarkable phenomenon which sprung out of the very midst of that spiritual tendency of Asia Minor we have already described, and which we may designate as the extreme of the anti-Gnostic position. We mean Montanism. As this forms one of the essential elements in his peculiar cast of mind, so it was by him that the principles which lie at the basis of this system were systematically determined, and thereby made to have an influence on the history of Western theology. To this important phenomenon we must now direct our attention.

We should but poorly understand this product growing out of the developing-process of the church in the second century, if we considered the personal character of the founder, by whom the first impulse was given, as the main cause of all the succeeding effects. Montanus was hardly a man of sufficient importance, to entitle him to be placed at the head of any new and grand movement. If an uneducated individual, who displays the characteristic spirit of the Phrygian race, under the impulse of a fanatical excitement, produced by his appearance great effects, yet these effects beyond question far exceeded the measure of this individual. A Tertullian, as being the person by whom such a spiritual tendency was systematically defined, would assume here a more important place. Nor were there any new spiritual elements, which were here freshly called to life; but only a nucleus was furnished for elements long before existing, — a point of attachment, around which these elements would gather. Tendencies of mind, which were scattered about through the whole church, would here converge together. Thus Montanism points out to us kindred elements existing everywhere already; and for this very reason it was that the impulse, once given, could produce such great and general movements; since the way had already been prepared for them in the course of the inner development of the church itself. Yet while we are careful not to overrate the importance of Montanus, we should also guard against the error of allowing him none at all.[1] Without the impulse given by Montanus, this whole movement, which produced such a stir and excite-

[1] As is done with a fantastic sort of exaggeration, when persons, whose real existence, though our knowledge of them is extremely deficient, is sufficiently accredited by history, are represented as mythical personifications of general tendencies.

ment in the minds of men, and which we may admit cannot be explained from his influence alone, would by no means have arisen. Let us in the first place, then, cast a glance at the process of church development to which Montanism attached itself, and at the general tendencies of mind which were grounded in and which are represented by it; and then we may proceed to a nearer examination of the person of the author, and of the effects which proceeded from him.

Christianity forced its way among mankind, in the first place, as a supernatural power; and as such a power it originally presents itself also in the character of its effects. The immediateness of inspiration was then more strongly marked than in the later times; — those gifts of supernatural healing; those gifts of speaking with tongues, of prophecy; those effects which suddenly displayed themselves after baptism — such were the signs of the new creation which had seized on human nature. But this opposition between the supernatural and the natural was not to last always, but to be overcome by the progressive development of Christianity. To bring about the harmonious union of the supernatual and the natural was its ultimate aim; as to remove the discordance which has its ground in sin, was to be the end of the redemption in its further unfolded effects. The new, divine power, which in its outward manifestations had just shown itself as an immediate one, was to enter into the circle of human instrumentality, and gradually appropriate to itself those natural organs and means which were not as yet given to it on its first appearance. The Apostle Paul had indeed alluded to such an aim, when he admonished Christians to estimate the charismata, not by the extraordinary and supernatural appearances which more prominently marked their effects, but, on the contrary, by the degree in which the natural in them was permeated by the supernatural, and in which the form of working of the supernatural was one that grew out of the natural course of development; and he distinguished above all others the charismata of Gnosis and of Didascalia, as those which were most required for the edification of the church. Accordingly, — as we remarked in the first section, — those extraordinary effects of the divine power, which was to be the dominant element of culture for human nature, continally diminished; and the existing natural culture began to be turned more and more in the direction of Christianity and to be attracted by it. Now, on the boundary between these two periods of development, sprang up a reaction, which opposed this natural change required by Christianity, and which would hold fast the form which was the first to appear in the working of Christianity, as the perfect and the abiding one. That which opposed itself to the healthy and natural course of development, must necessarily be a morbid action. The enthusiasm which surrendered itself to such a tendency, must degenerate into fanaticism.

It may be gathered from what has been said, that since Montanism opposed itself to that union and conciliation of the supernatural with the natural, which Christianity in its progressive development required and prepared the way for, it would partially hold fast to the supernatural as contradistinguished from the natural. The supernatural, the

divine, presented itself here to the religious consciousness as an irresistible agency, which left no room for the human individuality of character to thrive in free, independent development. Hence, from this point of view, the ecstatic element was reckoned as belonging to the essence of genuine prophecy; — the human consciousness must retire wholly out of the way, where the voice of the divine Spirit caused itself to be heard. The human soul was to stand to this informing Spirit only in the relation of an altogether passive organ; as Montanus characteristically remarked, God alone is awake, the man sleeps. The soul stands in the same passive relation to the divine, informing agency, as the lyre to the instrument (the plectrum) with which it is played.[1] Here, too, in what Montanism introduced, there was nothing new. This notion of inspiration had long been familiar to the Jews; as we may see in the case of the Alexandrian legend about the verbal agreement of the seventy interpreters, in their independent translations of the Old Testament. But such a form of inspiration is much better suited to the legal position of the Old Testament, which assumes this separation between the divine and the human, than to that of the New Testament, which aims at a union between the two, grounded in the redemption. But when this, however, was now prominently set forth as something belonging to the perfection of the Christian system, as something requisite for the guidance and growth of the church, a foreign element was introduced, and the natural process of development, grounded in the church itself, and the spirit which quickens it, could not thereby be promoted, but must on the contrary be disturbed and hindered. Through such workings of the Paraclete promised by Christ, such revelations of the prophets and prophetesses, uttering themselves in those states of ecstacy, the church was to be ever conducted onward in its development, till it attained to its final consummation. We should not fail to remark, that Montanism was driven to this one-sided supranaturalism, by a polemical opposition which had its ground in a genuinely Christian interest against two aberrations of the Christian spirit. Opposing itself, on the one hand, to the introduction of foreign speculations in the Gnosis, it would secure the pure Christian doctrine from this source of corruption; while, on the other hand, it resisted a petrified, traditional element, which allowed no room for any progressive development of the church life, but was for confining down everything in fixed and unalterable forms.

As it regards, however, the first designated opposition, it passed over into a tendency hostile to all culture, to all art and science. And, in virtue of this opposition to all the mediating activity of reason, the resistance also to the stiff and rigid church tendency must take a wrong direction. Montanism would tolerate no pause, no still-stand; it required a progressive development, from the foundation of that unchangeable Christianity contained in the common tradition of all the churches, to the mature age of manhood. But as it had no confidence

[1] Thus Tertullian considered the amentia, the excidere sensu, as something necessarily connected with the divina virtute obumbrari.

in the power of the spirit, regenerated and enlightened by Christianity, to unfold the contents of Christian truth to ever clearer consciousness, and to form the life more and more in accordance thereto; as it disdained the instrumentality of reason, which was appointed to administer, by its own peculiar activity, the treasure imparted to it from above, nothing else remained but to assume, that Christianity must be continually integrated and perfected by means of extraordinary revelations continually accruing from without, in relation to which the human mind was to remain in a state altogether passive. Thus, a one-sided supranaturalism, which failed duly to acknowledge the effects of the redemption in converting the mind, when restored to communion with God, once more into an organ for divine things, must be driven to deny the adequacy of the divine word bestowed on the church for its guidance in knowledge and life, because it lacked the organ requisite for understanding and for applying, for working over and digesting the included truth therein delivered. A perfectibility of Christianity was maintained, after a way which disparaged the work of Christ. Thus, one-sided supranaturalism led to the same result as one-sided rationalism.

Now, that which was to be superadded from without, in order to the perfecting of the Christian life, but did not proceed of itself from the regular development of the Christian principle, could, under the name of perfecting, really exert no other than a checking and corrupting influence. The perfection had reference to the introduction of a more rigid asceticism; and in this respect too, we see in Montanism the one-sided appearance of a tendency of the Christian life, which had long since existed, pushed to its extreme. Multiform new positive precepts were to be imposed on the church by the new revelations of the Paraclete. But Christianity does, in fact, distinguish itself from Judaism by the very circumstance, that it substitutes the law of the Spirit in place of the imperative letter, and has made an end of all positive commandments, through that love which is the fulfilling of the law. A great deal in the new precepts of Christ which the sermon on the mount contains, was, in the first centuries, less perfectly understood, because men did not refer these precepts to the one whole of the new law, grounded in love, and identical with the essence of the Christian life itself, but regarded them as isolated, positive precepts. The free development of the Christian spirit was destined continually to suppress everything positive, by the progressive identifying of it with itself (Verinnerlichung). But Montanism, on the contrary, was for holding fast the positive as something permanent, and by adding to which the church was to be perfected. Accordingly, the spirit of Montanism, by itself, without the aid of any outward influences, brought back the Jewish legal position. By this, however, we are not in the least degree warranted to suppose that Ebionitism had any influence on the development of Montanism; since the latter much rather made it a point to bring distinctly to view, and carry out, whatever there was new and peculiar, whereby Christianity differed from the Old-Testament position; and this end, the new epoch of development, introduced by the revelations of the Paraclete, was to sub-

serve. Without meaning to do so, Montanism grazed upon a Jewish element, which, with consciousness and design, it would directly combat; and, in like manner, by suppressing the Christian clearness and sobriety of understanding through the ecstatic trance, it encouraged the intermingling of excited and rapturous feelings with the development of the divine life, and thereby grazed on the Pagan position, as we shall afterwards have occasion more particularly to observe.

The movement of which we speak, took its beginning from a Phrygian by the name of Montanus, who lived in the village of Ardaban, on the boundary-line between Phrygia and Mysia. The characteristics of the old Phrygian race are displayed in his mode of conceiving Christianity, and in the shape which the zeal of the new convert assumed. In the nature-religion of the ancient Phrygians, we recognize the character of this mountain race, inclined to fanaticism and superstition, easily credulous about magic and ecstatic transports; and we cannot be surprised to find the Phrygian temperament which displayed itself in the ecstacies of the priests of Cybele and Bacchus, exhibiting itself once more in the ecstacies and somnambulisms of the Montanists.

(Montanus belonged to the class of men in whom the first glow of conversion begat an uncompromising opposition to the world.) We should remember that he lived in a country where the expectation that the church should finally enjoy on the theatre of its sufferings, the earth itself, previous to the end of all things, a millennium of victorious dominion — the expectation of a final millennial reign of Christ on earth, (the so-called Chiliasm,) particularly prevailed; and where various pictures of an enthusiastic imagination, representing the character of this approaching kingdom, were floating among the people.[1] The time in which he appeared — either during those catastrophes of nature which led to the tumultuary attacks of the populace on the Christians,[2] or during the bloody persecutions of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius[3] — was altogether suited to promote such an excitement of

[1] In Phrygia, Papias of Hierapolis had certainly lived and labored, and many passages in the Pseudo-Sibylline books contain allusions to Phrygia. There is no existing reason whatever for supposing, with Longuerue and Blondel, that Montanus or any Montanists were themselves the authors of such passages; for nothing at all is to be found in those Pseudo-Sibylline writings which belongs to the *peculiar* ideas of Montanism. We are led rather to recognize in them *the same* peculiar Phrygian spirit, of which Montanism is also the reflection. When we find the mount Ararat transferred in these writings to Phrygia, we perceive here the same partiality of the Phrygians for their own country, which they held to be the oldest in the world, as is shown by Montanus in fixing upon the village of Pepuza, in Phrygia, as the destined seat of the millennial kingdom.

[2] See Vol. I. p. 104

[3] There are no distinct and well-authenticated facts from which it is possible to form a certain conclusion as to the time of Montanus' first appearance. From the nature of the case, however, the first beginning of a movement of this kind scarcely admits of being distinctly fixed. Eusebius, in his Chronicle, states the year 171 as the time when Montanus first appeared. But, assuming that the Roman bishop who was induced by Praxeas to excommunicate the Montanists, was not Victor, but Anicetus, — the reasons for which opinion I have given in my work on Tertullian, p. 486, — it would follow, that Montanus had already made his appearance, in the life-time of the Roman bishop Anicetus, who died A. D. 161. Apollonius, cited by Eusebius, (V. 18,) and Epiphanius, both speak in favor of the earlier date. The latter fixes the appearance of Montanus in about the year 157.

feeling, and such a direction of the imagination. It was precisely at this time, that the violent controversy arose between the speculative Gnostics and the advocates of the ancient, simple doctrine. A great deal was said about the corruptions with which Christianity was threatened. All this would naturally work on the mind of the Phrygian convert, inclined already by temperament to a high-wrought enthusiasm. And we should observe, moreover, that he lived in a period which has already been more fully described as the boundary epoch between two *stadia* in the development of the Christian church.

He fell into certain states of ecstatic transport, in which, no longer master of his own consciousness, and made the blind organ, as he fancied, of a higher spirit, he foretold, in oracular, mystical expressions,[1] the approach of new persecutions; exhorted the Christians to a life of more rigid austerity, and to an undaunted confession of their faith; extolled the blessedness of the martyr's crown, and charged the faithful to stake everything in order to win it. He announced the judgments impending over the persecutors of the church, the second coming of Christ, and the approach of the millennial reign, the happiness of which he set forth in the most attractive colors. Finally, he claimed to be considered as a prophet sent of God in behalf of the whole church, as an inspired reformer of the whole church life. The Christian church was to be elevated by him to a higher stage of practical perfection. A loftier system of Christian morals, befitting its maturity, was to be revealed through him; he appealed to Christ's promise, that he would, by the Holy Ghost, make known things which the men of those times were not yet in a condition to understand. He believed himself to be called also to give new expositions of the doctrine of faith, which were to serve for the clearing up of the disputed points most agitated in those districts, and for the defence of those doctrines against the objections of heretics.

It is probable that different epochs should be distinguished in the history of Montanus. The ready sympathy with which, in that excited period, what he delivered as revelations from above was received, contributed, doubtless, to urge him continually onward, till he attributed to himself a higher mission than he may have thought of claiming in the outset; and moreover the point-blank opposition which he afterwards met with from other quarters, served to increase his enthusiasm. But our information is too inadequate, to enable us to separate and distinguish these several epochs with any degree of accuracy. In connection with Montanus, there were two women, Prisca or Priscilla, and Maximilla, who claimed also to be regarded as prophetesses.

We will now proceed to a more detailed account of Montanism, as a tendency stamped and characterized by distinct principles and doctrines. We mean that tendency of spirit, as it began with Montanus, developed itself still farther, down to the time of Tertullian, and became reduced by him to the form of a system.

[1] *Ξενοφωνίαι.* A contemporary writer cited in Eusebius, l. V. c. 16, uses the term *γλῶσσαι.* Plutarch on the ancient oracles de Pyth. orac. c. 24.

We have seen that the fundamental principle of Montanism was a one-sided supranaturalizing element, which placed the spirit in an altogether passive relation to the divine influence. This principle appeared most strongly prominent in the *first* gusts of religious feeling in Montanus and his prophetesses; and the approximation to the Old-Testament position, introduced by this principle, is more clearly discernible in the earliest Montanistic oracles, than in the later forms which Montanism assumed; for in the outset the whole discourse was of God the Almighty, not of Christ or the Holy Spirit. As the Almighty ruled alone in the prophet's soul, and his own self-consciousness retired back, God therefore spoke from the soul of the prophet, of which He took entire possession, as if in His own name. Accordingly, it is asserted, in one of these oracular sayings of Montanus: "Behold! the man is as a lyre, and I sweep over him as a plectrum. The man sleeps, and I wake. Behold! it is the Lord, who estranges the souls of men from themselves, and gives men souls."[1] So, in another oracle: "I am the Lord, the Almighty God, who take up my abode in man:[2] I am neither an angel, nor a messenger; but I am come as the Lord himself, God the Father." Also, in a prophecy of Montanus's associate, Maximilla, there is as yet no distinct mention of the Holy Spirit or the Paraclete; but the Spirit, vindicating himself from the objection that he set men beside themselves, declares, "I am chased as a wolf from the midst of the flock. I am no wolf; I am word, and spirit, and power."[3] This supranaturalizing principle, expressing itself more after a form of the Old than of the New Testament, was, to all appearance, consistently adhered to by the Montanistic tendency, as it first presented itself, in this respect also, that the new prophets did not promise a progressive development of the church, in the sense of one which was to proceed from the new revelations delivered to them; but announced that which should bring to a close the whole thread of earthly development. They hint at the near approach of a new order of things, the final separation which was to be brought about by Christ himself, and the millennial kingdom to be set up by him on the earth. Maximilla is said to have declared expressly, "After me no other prophetess shall arise, but the end shall come."[4] The God who had determined to bring about the great judgment, called on the faithful by his voice in the new prophets, to prepare themselves for it by a stricter life, so that the Lord, at his second coming, which was near at hand, might find them well provided and waiting. With this expectation of the approaching end of the world, stood intimately connected the contempt of life and of all earthly things, to which the new spirit of the prophets called men.

But though many of the predictions of the new prophets were not

[1] Ἰδοὺ, ἄνθρωπος ὡσεὶ λύρα, κἀγὼ ἴπταμαι ὡσεὶ πλῆκτρον. Ὁ ἄνθρωπος κοιμᾶται, κἀγὼ γρηγορῶ. Ἰδοὺ, κύριός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκστάνων καρδίας ἀνθρώπων καὶ διδοὺς καρδίας ἀνθρώποις. Epiphan. hæres. 48.

[2] Ἐγὼ κύριος, κύριος ὁ θεὸς, ὁ παντοκράτωρ, καταγινόμενος ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ.

[3] Ῥῆμα εἰμὶ, καὶ πνεῦμα, καὶ δύναμις. See Euseb. l. V. c. 16.

[4] The words are cited in Epiphanius Μετ' ἐμὲ προφῆτις οὐκέτι ἔσται, ἀλλὰ συντέλεια.

fulfilled, yet the principle announced by them entered mightily into the development of the Christian consciousness in this period. And as these new revelations were brought into connection with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which, in the church system of theology, was still less completely unfolded, with the doctrine of spiritual gifts, and with the promises of Christ respecting the Paraclete, the idea went forth, that there were certain seasons or epochs of the outpouring of the Holy Ghost, through which the progressive development of the church was to be promoted; a new momentum superadded to its ordinary, regular course of development, and designed to complete what was lacking in it.

In receiving this principle and looking round for arguments in support of it, Tertullian endeavored to show the necessity of some such progressive development of the church, by pointing to a law running through all the works of God in the kingdoms of nature and of grace. "In the works of grace," said he, "as in the works of nature, which proceed from the same Creator, everything unfolds itself by certain successive steps. From the seed-kernel shoots forth first the plant; then comes the blossom, and finally this becomes the fruit, which itself arrives at maturity only by degrees. So the kingdom of righteousness unfolds itself by certain stages. In the first place, there was the fear of God awakened by the voice of nature, without a revealed law (the patriarchal religion;) next followed the stage of childhood under the law and the prophets; then that of youth under the gospel; and at length the unfolding of the spiritual life to the ripeness of manhood through the new out-pouring of the Holy Ghost, connected with the appearance of Montanus — through the new instructions of the promised Paraclete.[1] How should the work of God stand still and make no progressive movement, while the kingdom of evil is continually enlarging itself and acquiring new strength?" On this ground, the Montanists denounced those who were for setting arbitrary limits to the agency of the Holy Spirit, as though his extraordinary operations had been confined to the times of the apostles alone. Thus, in a Montanistic writing of North Africa, it was said: "Faith ought not to be so weak and despondent, as to suppose that God's grace was powerful only among the ancients; since God at all times carries into effect what he has promised, as a witness to unbelievers and a blessing to the faithful."[2] The later effusions of the Holy Spirit ought rather to exceed all that had gone before.[3] The fact was appealed to, that Christ himself promised believers the revelations of the Paraclete, as the perfecter of his church, through whom he would make known what the men of those times would have been unable to comprehend. By this, it was by no means intended to deny in general, that the promise above mentioned had any reference to the apostles; — but the opinion was simply this, that the promise did not refer *exclusively* to the apostles — did not, in its application to them, become entirely fulfilled, but on the contrary

[1] Tertullian. de virgg. veland. c. 1.
[2] Acta Perpetuæ et Felicitat. Præfat.
[3] Præfat. in Acta Perpetuæ: Majora reputanda novitiora quæque ut novissimiora, secundum exuberationem gratiæ in ultima sæculi spatia decretam.

referred also to the new revelations by the prophets now awakened, — that these last were a necessary complement and enlargement of that original revelation.[1] The truth springing from the latter and transmitted by the general tradition of the church, was in the former always presupposed as an unchangeable foundation. The new prophets should distinguish themselves from false teachers, and prove their divine mission, by their agreement with this original revelation. But proceeding on such foundation, the Christian system of morals and the entire church life should be carried still further onward by these new revelations; — for the men who were first weaned from paganism and sensuality, were not as yet in a condition to understand the requisitions of Christian perfection. Moreover, by these revelations, the Christian doctrines, attacked by the ever encroaching sects of the heretics, were to be defended. As the heretics made use of arbitrary and false interpretations to explain the holy scriptures, (from which, too, they might best be refuted,) in accordance with their own notions; so by these new revelations a fixed and settled authority would be established against them. Finally, they were to supply means for resolving disputed questions on matters of faith and practice.[2] Hence the Montanist Tertullian, towards the end of his treatise on the resurrection, addressing himself to those who were willing to draw from the fountain of these new revelations, says to them, "You will thirst for no instruction; — no questions will perplex you."

Thus Montanism set over against the rigid, traditional element, one of free, progressive movement. The occupiers of this new position were better prepared to distinguish between what was changeable and what was unchangeable in the church development, since they admitted *the immutability of the doctrinal tradition alone;* — they maintained that the *regulations of the church might be altered and improved by the progressive instructions of the Paraclete, according to the exigencies of the times.*[3] While, moreover, according to the view taken by the church, the bishops were regarded as the sole organs for diffusing the influences of the Holy Spirit in the church, being the successors of the apostles and the inheritors of their spiritual power; — it was the opinion of the Montanists, on the other hand, that besides the ordinary organs of church guidance, there were still higher ones,— those extraordinary organs, the *prophets awakened* by the Paraclete. The latter only, according to the view taken by the Montanists, were the successors of the apostles in the highest sense, the inheritors of their spiritual power in full. Hence Tertullian sets over against the church consisting of the number of bishops, the church of the Spirit, which manifests *itself through men enlightened by the Holy Spirit.*[4] While it was the custom to derive the power conceded to the bishops from the power to bind and to loose conferred on Peter, the Montanist Tertullian, on the

[1] Tertullian. de pudicitia, c. 12.

[2] Tertullian. de virgg. veland. represents as the administratio Paracleti, quod disciplina dirigitur, quod scripturæ revelantur, quod intellectus reformatur.

[3] Tertullian. de corona milit. c. 3.

[4] Tertullian. de pudicitia, c. 21: Ecclesia spiritus per spiritalem hominem, non ecclesia numerus episcoporum.

other hand, maintained that these words referred only to Peter personally, and to those who, like Peter, were filled with the Holy Ghost, in directly.[1] They who followed the voice of the Holy Ghost speaking through the medium of the new prophets, being the spiritually minded, genuine Christians, (Spiritales,) constituted the church in the proper sense; while, on the other hand, the opposers of the new revelations were usually styled the carnally minded, the Psychical.

Thus Montanism set up a church of the Spirit, consisting of the spiritales homines, in opposition to the prevailing outward view of that institution. Tertullian says: "The church, in the proper and preëminent sense, is the Holy Spirit, in which the Three are One, — and next, the whole community of those who are agreed in this faith (that God the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost are one) is called, after its founder and consecrator, (the Holy Spirit,) the church."[2] The Catholic point of view expresses itself in this,— viz. that the *idea* of the church is put first, and by this very position of it, made outward; next, the agency of the Holy Spirit is represented as conditioned by, and hence derived through, this mediation.[3] Montanism, on the other hand, like Protestantism, places the Holy Spirit first, and considers the church as that which is only derived. Assuming this position, the order would be reversed: Ubi Spiritus, ibi ecclesia; et ubi ecclesia, ibi Spiritus. But the Montanistic conception does not coincide with the Protestant; for in the former it is not the *general* fact of the actuation of the Holy Spirit, as it takes place in all believers, but the above described extraordinary revelation, which is meant. Partly this latter, which is here placed as the original thing, and partly the acknowledgment of the same in its divine character, constitute, according to the Montanistic view, the essence of the true church. It is that church in which God awakes the prophets, and by which the prophets are recognized as such.

Since again, according to the Montanistic theory, prophets could be awakened from among Christians of *every* rank; since the Montanists expressly regarded it as one of the characteristics of this last epoch in the development of God's kingdom, that, according to the promises in the prophet Joel,[4] which were now passing into fulfilment, the gifts of the Spirit were to be dispensed to Christians of every condition and sex without distinction; and since requisitions in regard to the Christian walk which before had been confined wholly to the spiritual order, were extended by the new revelations to all Christians as such; they were thus led to give prominence once more to that *idea of the dignity of the universal Christian calling, of the priestly dignity of all Chris-*

[1] Secundum Petri personam, spiritalibus potestas ista conveniet, aut apostolo aut prophetæ. L. c.

[2] Nam et ecclesia proprie et principaliter ipse est Spiritus, in quo est trinitas unius divinitatis. Illam ecclesiam congregat, quam Dominus in tribus posuit, (where two or three are gathered together in his name,) atque ita exinde etiam numerus, qui in hanc fidem conspiraverint, ecclesia ab auctore et consecratore censetur. L. c.

[3] As in the well-known words of Irenæus Ubi ecclesia, ibi Spiritus; et ubi Spiritus, ibi ecclesia.

[4] Præfat. in Act. Felicit.

tians, which had been, in a measure, suppressed by the confounding together of the fundamental principles of Judaism and Christianity.[1]

But although the idea of the church and of its progressive development was in one phase of it seized by Montanism after a freer and a more spiritual manner, yet in another respect, by deriving this progressive development from new, extraordinary revelations, from a newly awakened prophetic order, it fell back upon the position of Judaism. While, according to the ordinary church principles, the Old Testament *priesthood* was transferred over to the Christian church; according to the Montanistic view, the Old Testament *order of prophets* was thus transferred. And it is noticeable, that the Catholic church, which afterwards adopted many of the views which in the beginning she censured in Montanism, seized particularly on many things asserted by the Montanists concerning the relation of the new revelations by their prophets to the ground-work of church tradition and scripture doctrine, in order to explain the relation of the decisions of general councils to both these matters. A new particular was superinduced on the church notion of tradition; — to holding fast on the original doctrine once delivered, was added the element of a progressive advancement in harmony with this doctrine, and derived from the Holy Spirit. But while this actuation of the Holy Spirit was regarded, from the Montanistic point of view, as one that proceeded from newly awakened, extraordinary organs; it was, by the principles of the church, transferred to the regular organs of the church guidance, the bishops. We must here bring in also what has already been said concerning the Montanistic notion of inspiration.[2]

But this way of considering inspiration, which, derived from the Jews, had, up to this time, chiefly prevailed also among the fathers of the church, was now gradually suppressed by the opposition to Montanism. Its violent opponents condemned the ecstatic state without reserve; considering it rather as the sign of a false prophet. Unfortunately, the work against Montanism by the Christian rhetorician Miltiades, in which this very point was set forth, that the ecstacy was a state of mind at variance with the character of a true prophet,[3] has not reached our times; — a work by which probably much light would be shed on the then interesting discussions about the notion of inspiration. Men were inclined to trace the ecstacy to an agency of the evil spirit, as a spirit of confusion and of schism; and contrasted it with the influences of the Holy Spirit, as a spirit of sober and clear self-possession. Men were for denouncing the Montanistic notion of the prophet and the prophetic office in everything, without attempting to separate what was true in it from what was false. But the more free and unbiassed spirit of the Alexandrian school is to be seen also, in its judgment on these phenom-

[1] As, for example, Tertullian de monogamia.

[2] The definition of such an ecstatic state of the Montanistic mind, is to be found in Tertullian, c. Marc. l. IV. c. 22: In spiritu homo constitutus, præsertim cum *gloriam Dei conspicit*, vel cum *per ipsum Deus loquitur*, necesse est excidat sensu, obumbratus scilicet virtute divina.

[3] Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν προφήτην ἐν ἐκστάσει λαλεῖν.

ena. It is true, Clement of Alexandria, too, represents the ecstacy as the sign of a false prophet, and of the actuation of the evil spirit, whereby the soul becomes estranged from itself;[1] but yet he declared himself opposed to those who, as he expresses it, unreservedly condemned, with a blind zeal of ignorance, everything that proceeded from these false prophets, instead of inquiring into what was said, without respect to the person, and ascertaining whether it contained any portion of truth.[2] In contradicting Montanism, men fell into the erroneous theory at the opposite extreme. Unwilling to admit that there was anything at all of an unconscious nature in the prophets of the Old Testament, they attributed to them a clear, conscious knowledge of everything included in the divine promises which they announced;[3] — a view of the matter which could not fail to obscure the right understanding of the relation between the Old and New Testaments, and to prevent an unbiassed exposition of the latter.

As we observed above, in giving the general characteristics of Montanism, it grazed closely, by vitiating the Christian principle, upon Judaism on the one side and upon paganism on the other.

States somewhat akin to what occurred in pagan divination, phenomena like the magnetic and somnambulist appearances occasionally presented in the pagan cultus, mixed in with the excitement of Christian feelings. Those Christian females who were thrown into ecstatic trances during the time of public worship, were not only consulted about remedies for bodily diseases, but also plied with questions concerning the invisible world. In Tertullian's time, there was one at Carthage, who, in her states of ecstacy, imagined herself to be in the society of Christ, and of angels. The matter of her visions corresponded to what she had just heard read from the holy scriptures, what was said in the Psalms that had been sung, or in the prayers that had been offered.[4] At the conclusion of the service and after the dismission of the church, she was made to relate her visions, from which men sought to gain information about things of the invisible world; as, for example, about the nature of the soul.

The Jewish element discovered itself in the pretended completion of the system of morals by new precepts which had particular reference to the ascetic life Thus, fasting on the dies stationum, which

[1] Strom. lib. I. f. 311, where he says of the false prophets: Τῷ ὄντι οὗτοι ἐν ἐκστάσει προεφήτευον, ὡς ἂν ἀποστάτου διάκονοι, where, without doubt, there is a play on words in the use of the terms ἔκστασις and ἀποστάτης.

[2] His words are: Οὐ μὲν διὰ τὸν λέγοντα καταγνωστέον ἀμαθῶς καὶ τῶν λεγομένων, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προφητεύειν νῦν δὴ λεγομένων παρατηρητέον· ἀλλὰ τὰ λεγόμενα σκοπητέον εἰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἔχεται. Strom. l. VI. f. 647. As we might expect from Clement a more unbiassed judgment than was commonly entertained by others, we have so much the more reason to regret the loss of the work, in which he designed to speak more fully of Montanism, — if, indeed, he ever executed that design, — viz. his book περὶ προφητείας. Vid. Strom. l. IV. f. 511.

[3] E. g. Orig. in Joann. T. VI. § 2: Προπετῶς ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ προφήτων, ὡς οὐ σοφῶν, εἰ μὴ νενοήκασι τὰ ἀπὸ ἰδίου στόματος.

[4] Tertullian. de anima, c. 9, says of her: Et videt et audit sacramenta, et quorundam corda dignoscit et medicinas desiderantibus submittit. Jam vero prout scripturæ leguntur, aut psalmi canuntur, aut allocutiones proferuntur, aut petitiones delegantur, ita inde materiæ visionibus subministrantur.

till now had been considered a voluntary thing, (see above,) was prescribed as a law for all Christians. It was also made a law, that this fast should be extended to three o'clock in the afternoon. During three weeks of the year, a meagre diet, like that adopted of free choice by the continentes or ἀσκῆται, was enjoined as a law on all Christians.[1] Against these Montanistic ordinances, the remaining spirit of evangelical freedom still nobly and emphatically declared itself: but afterwards the spirit which here expressed itself in Montanism, also passed over into the Catholic church.

From Montanism proceeded a tendency, which, instead of leading men to value the blessings of humanity according to their true relation, in the view of Christianity, to the highest good,— the kingdom of God,— led them only to place the one over against the other. And the same tendency, by the undue prominence it gave to the divine element as a power to suppress every human motive, would lead also to a quietism that crippled and discouraged human activity. On this principle, neither would the blessings of the earthly life be estimated according to their real worth, nor the use of the requisite means for securing and preserving them be acknowledged as a duty. Accordingly, Montanism tended to foster a fanatic longing after martyrdom. It set up the principle, that in submitting to the divine will, men should do nothing to avoid those persecutions,[2] which it was God's will to suspend over Christians for the trial of their faith. This spirit of Montanism characteristically expresses itself in the following oracle: "Let it not be your wish to die on your beds in the pains of child-birth, or in debilitating fever; but desire to die as martyrs, that He may be glorified, who suffered for you." The same tendency of spirit pushed Montanism, in its anxiety to avoid an accommodating disposition, which might prove injurious to faith, to the other extreme of sternly renouncing all those usages of civil and social life which could in any way be traced to a Pagan origin; of despising all those prudential maxims by which it was possible to avert the suspicion of the Pagan authorities. It seems, among other things, to have been objected to the Montanists, that, by their frequent meetings for fasting and prayer, they defied the established laws against secret assemblies.[3]

This tendency of the moral spirit led to an undue estimation of celibacy; — and the unmarried life was already particularly recommended by the Montanistic prophetess Priscilla, to the clerical order, as if it was in this way only they could be the worthy channels of holy influences, could properly render themselves capable of receiving the

[1] The so called Xerophagiæ. — *Sunday* and the *Sabbath* were excepted from these fasts. The Montanists were at difference with the Roman church in respect also to the not fasting on the Sabbath, (see above.) At the time of Jerome, when, however, the Montanists seem to have departed in many respects, as, for example, in respect to the church constitution, from their original institutions, they had three weeks of Xerophagiæ. These may be compared with Quadragesimal fasts in the later church; — and so indeed they are called by Jerome, (ep. 27, ad Marcellum): "illi tres in anno faciunt quadragesimas."

[2] See Tertullian. de fuga in persecut.

[3] De jejuniis, c. 13: Quomodo in nobis ipsam quoque unitatem jejunationum et xerophagiarum et stationum denotatis? Nisi forte in senatusconsulta et in principum mandata coitionibus opposita delinquimus.

divine gifts of the spirit.[1] Hence, we may observe another instance in which Montanism passed over into the Catholic church.

Now an ascetic spirit of this sort is elsewhere usually coupled with ignorance of the marriage state, as a form for the realization of the highest good; and this ignorance is usually based on a sensuous and barely outward conception of this relation. But Montanism united with this ascetic tendency, a conception of the marriage institution directly opposed to the one just mentioned. We see the influence of the peculiar Christian spirit manifested in Montanism, by the prominence it gives to the idea of marriage, in that view of it which was first clearly suggested by Christianity, — as a spiritual union, consecrated by Christ, of two individuals, separated by sex, in one common life. The Montanists held, therefore, that the religious consecration of such a union was a matter of the highest moment; they reckoned it as belonging to the essence of a truly Christian marriage, that it should be concluded in the church, in the name of Christ. A marriage otherwise contracted, was looked upon by them as an unlawful connection.[2] Regarding the institution in this light, it followed again, that *Montanism would allow of no second marriage, after the death of the first husband or the first wife;* for marriage being an *indissoluble union* in the spirit, not in the flesh alone, was destined to endure beyond the grave.[3] In this instance, also, the Montanists, in their legal spirit, only pushed to the extreme, a view to which others doubtless were inclined.[4] And it is clear, that in this matter too, the Montanistic element passed over into a Catholic one; for the way was thus prepared for the sacramental view of the marriage institution.

The severe legal spirit of Montanism displays itself in the zeal it manifested for the more rigid principles of penance.[5] But the Montanists, so far as they failed, like their opponents, rightly to distinguish baptism and regeneration, and rightly to understand the relation of faith and the forgiveness of sin to the entire Christian life, were involved in the same error which lay at the foundation of this whole dispute on the extension of absolution.[6] The moral zeal against that false confidence in the efficacy of absolution which tended to encourage the feeling of security in sin, expresses itself in the following exposition of Tertullian, aimed against a wrong application of the passage in 1 John

[1] The words of Rigaltius, published in Tertullian's work de exhortatione castitatis, c. 11, are: Quod sanctus minister sanctimoniam noverit ministrare. Purificantia enim concordat et visiones vident et ponentes faciem deorsum etiam voces audiunt manifestas, tam salutares quam et occultas.

[2] Tertullian. de pudicitia, c. 4: Penes nos occultæ quoque conjunctiones, id est, non prius apud ecclesiam professæ, juxta mœchiam et fornicationem judicari periclitantur, nec inde consertæ obtentu matrimonii crimen eludunt. According to the principles of Montanism, the essence of a true marriage in the Christian sense is, (de monogamia, c. 20): cum Deus jungit duos in unam carnem, aut junctos deprehendens in eadem, conjunctionem signavit. (Where to the marriage contracted by two parties while they were still pagans, the sanctifying consecration of Christianity is superadded.)

[3] See Tertullian. de monogamia and exhortat. castitatis.

[4] Athenagoras (legat. pro Christian. f 37, ed. Colon) styles the γάμος δεύτερος εὐπρεπὴς μοιχεία. Origen (Tom. in Matth. f. 363) says that Paul gave permission for a second marriage after the death of the first husband or the first wife: πρὸς τὴν σκληροκαρδίαν ἢ ἀσθενείαν.

[5] See on this controversy, vol. I. p. 217, ff

[6] L. c.

1 : 7. "John says, if we would walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin. Do we sin then, if we walk in the light, and shall we be cleansed if we sin in the light? By no means. For whosoever sins, is not in the light, but in darkness. He is showing, then, how we shall be cleansed from sin, if we walk in the *light*, in which no sin can be committed; *for such is the power of the blood of Christ*, that those whom it has cleansed from sin, it thenceforth preserves pure, if they continue to walk in the light."[1]

It is true, as we have remarked, that Montanism encouraged the fanatic enthusiasm for martyrdom; for, according to the Montanistic doctrine, the martyrs would be entitled to enter immediately after death into a higher state of blessedness, to which other believers could obtain no admittance;[2] yet the struggle to maintain a rigid penitential discipline induced the Montanist Tertullian to oppose the undue homage which in another respect was paid to the martyrs. Since many, for instance, to whom Montanism refused absolution, could obtain it, in the Catholic church, through the mediation of the confessors,[3] Tertullian was led to denounce this false confidence in the efficacy of their intercession, and to chastise the spiritual arrogance of these men. "Let it satisfy the martyrs," said he, "to have purged themselves of their own sins. It savors of ingratitude or arrogance, to pretend to bestow on others what it must be considered a great favor to have obtained for one's self. Who, but the Son of God only, has paid the debt of death for others by his own? For to this end he came, that, free from sin and perfectly holy himself, he might die for sinners. Thou, therefore, who wouldst emulate Him in procuring the forgiveness of sins, suffer for me, when thou art free from sin thyself. But if thou art a sinner, how can the oil of thy puny lamp suffice at once for me and for thyself?"[4]

In accordance with the one-sided, *supra-naturalistic* element of the scheme we have been considering, the expectations and attention of the Montanists were so directed as to observe, not how Christianity was to transform the life of humanity, by beginning from within and working outwards, but how the kingdom of Christ was to gain the dominion of the world by some outward miracle. Here full scope was given to their extravagant coloring of Chiliasm; and in this respect also, they only pushed to the furthest extreme, a way of thinking which very generally prevailed in the church.

If by *pietism* we understand that morbid direction of pious feelings where some arbitrary figment, some excrescence from without, something cast over and over in the same mould, is substituted for the natural development of the Christian life, — in other words, the reaction of a legal principle within the bosom of Christianity, — then we shall have good cause to consider Montanism as the earliest form of manifestation of what may properly be styled pietism.

[1] De pudicitia, c. 19. Which work refers generally to this dispute.

[2] The Paradise; see Tertullian, de anima. c. 56.

[3] See vol. I. p. 220–228.

[4] De pudicitia, c. 22.

What tended to further the spread of this party, was in part its relation to Christian principles long before existing, and in part the contagious influence of enthusiasm, and the manner in which spiritual pride was here nourished; since he who acknowledged the new prophets, might directly consider himself to be a truly regenerate man, a member of the select company of the spiritually minded, (Spiritales,) and despise all other Christians as carnally minded, (Psychici,) as not yet truly regenerated.

The controversy on Montanism was conducted with extreme violence, first in Asia Minor. Synods were held for the purpose of inquiring into the affair, at which many declared themselves opposed to it; the proceedings of these synods were sent to the more distant churches, and these were thus drawn into the dispute. It is to be regretted, that, owing to the want of distinct accounts, the whole of these proceedings, and hence the gradual formation of the Montanistic sects, and their relation to the rest of the church, are matters involved in great obscurity. Though the Montanists considered themselves to be the only genuine Christians, and looked upon their opponents as being Christians but in part, and as occupying an inferior position; though they thought themselves exalted above all the rest of the church, yet it does not appear that they were inclined to separate immediately from the latter, and to renounce its fellowship; they wished only to be considered the ecclesia spiritus, spiritalis, within the ecclesia made up of the psychical multitude. They introduced a similar distinction into the practical province, as the Gnostics had done into the theoretical. It is true, by this practically aristocratic spirit, the essence of the Christian church was not exposed to so much danger, as it could not fail to be by the theoretical; but yet the adherents of the new prophetic order could not be tolerated in that relation to the rest of the church in which they were continually seeking to extend themselves more widely, without great injury to the church life; for they claimed only toleration at first, in order that they might gradually establish their own supremacy.

The community at Lyons had among them, at the time of the bloody persecution which they experienced under the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, many members from Asia Minor; and they were led by their close connection with the Asiatic church, to take a lively interest in the proceedings relative to Montanism. The community wrote to Eleutherus, bishop of Rome, and the presbyter Irenæus was the bearer of their letter. Much light would be shed on the whole subject, had we more distinct information respecting the contents of this letter; but Eusebius[1] barely remarks, that the judgment on the matter expressed by the church was just and orthodox. Now, as Eusebius certainly considered the Montanistic tendency as heretical, we might infer from this remark of his, that the judgment expressed in the letter was one unfavorable to the Montanists. But in this case, the letter could not have had in view the end which Eusebius assigns to it, that of putting

[1] Lib. V. c. 3.

an end to the disputes. It would harmonize most perfectly with this end, to suppose that the letter was written in a spirit of Christian moderation, which sought to lessen the importance of the points in dispute, to refute the various exaggerated charges laid against the Montanistic churches, and, in the diversity of views respecting the worth of the new prophetic order, to inculcate the importance of Christian unanimity. On this supposition, we may explain why Eusebius should express so favorable an opinion of the contents of the letter, which he could not have done, had it breathed a decidedly Montanistic spirit. This supposition accords best, moreover, with the known character of Irenæus, a man of moderation and a lover of peace; as also with his opinions, which, without being Montanistic, were yet not wholly unfavorable to the Montanists. By this mission, Eleutherus was persuaded probably to make peace with those churches; but, soon after, Praxeas of Asia Minor, a violent opponent of Montanism, came to Rome; and partly by presenting before the Roman bishop the opposite conduct of his two predecessors, Anicetus and Soter,[1] partly by his unfavorable representations relative to the condition of the Montanistic churches, persuaded him to revoke all that he had hitherto done. The Montanists now proceeded to form and propagate themselves as a distinct sect. They were styled *Cataphrygians*, from the name of their country; also *Pepuzians*, because Montanus, it was said, taught that a place called Pepuza, in Phrygia, perhaps the first seat of the Montanistic church, was the chosen spot from which the millennial reign of Christ was destined to begin.

It might be gathered from the relation of Montanism to the prevailing spiritual tendencies in the church, that there would be various gradations and stages of transition between the latter and Montanism decidedly expressed; as also many shades of difference amongst its opponents, from those that were not disposed to overlook the Christian element in this appearance, — as for example a Clement of Alexandria, — down to those who, by their uncompromising opposition, were driven to another extreme, and to a depravation of the Christian spirit of another kind. As Montanism confounded together the Old and New Testament positions, its antagonists were led to draw with so much the greater precision the line of demarcation between them. Their current watch-word was borrowed from Matthew 11 : 13, "The prophets and the law prophesied until John the Baptist, — then they were to cease." This maxim they opposed as well to the new ascetic ordinances and to the new precepts curtailing Christian freedom, as to the new prophetic order by which the church must allow itself to be governed.[2] Tertullian remarks, of those who so applied the above passage, that they would have done better to banish the Holy Spirit entirely from the church, since his agency was so wholly dispensed with.[3] But his accu-

[1] The truth of what is here asserted depends, however, on the question whether the bishop before mentioned was Eleutherus or Victor.

[2] Tertullian replies: Palos terminales figitis Deo, sicut de gratia, ita de disciplina De jejuniis, c. 11.

[3] Superest, ut totum auferatis, quantum in vobis tam otiosum. De jejuniis, c. 11.

sation is, in this case, unjust; for both parties were agreed in believing that the church could not subsist without the continued actuation of the Holy Spirit. The only point of dispute between the two parties was the question about the form of that agency, whether it was one which lay at the ground in the whole ordinary course of the development of the church, or whether it was newly created by a divine, supernatural interposition. And it was these very antagonists of Montanism, who seem to have prominently set forth in contrast to the Old Testament view, the conception of the Holy Spirit, as the new, animating principle, both of the individualities of character and also of their harmonious combination in the communities which it actuated; — from which specific difference itself they drew their conclusion, that the church could not be made dependent on any new prophetic order. But the most decided opponents of Montanism, such as the Alogi hereafter to be mentioned, either denied the continuance of the miraculous gifts which distinguished the Apostolic church, the charismata, which, in their form, discovered something of a supernatural character; or were not ready to acknowledge the prophetic gift as a thing that pertained to the Christian economy, but considered it as belonging exclusively to the Old Testament; and hence they could not admit any prophetic book into the canon of the New Testament. It is to be regretted, that our information is so scanty respecting the party of the Alogians, so called; and that the work of Hippolytus on the charismata, which was probably written in opposition to those ultra anti-Montanists, has not reached our times. We should otherwise have been enabled to speak with more definiteness and certainty on this disputed point, and on the manner in which it was handled.

There were antagonists of Montanism, who opposed to a fanatical tendency on the side of the feelings, a negative tendency on the side of the understanding; and who, from the dread of what was fanatical, rejected much also that was genuinely Christian. It is true, as must be evident from what has been said, that Montanism formed the extreme point of the anti-Gnostic spirit; but that ultra anti-Montanistic tendency of the understanding, however, must, in order to maintain itself in its dry sobriety, so hostile to everything of a transcendent character, have been no less opposed to the speculative and mystical element in Gnosticism. And the dread of the Gnostic tendency might, precisely in the same way as the dread of the Montanistic, push men to one-sided negations. It is easy to understand how persons with some partial leaning of this sort must be struck with the peculiar element of St. John as wholly foreign from their own views; and how they would be inclined to bring up the differences between the gospel according to John, and the others, which seemed more accordant with their own opinions,[1] for the purpose of showing, that the gospel which the Montanists were chiefly in the habit of quoting in defence of their doctrine on the new revelations, was not a genuine one. Irenæus, from

[1] As, for example, according to the testimony of Epiphanius, (hæres. 51,) that the history of the temptation is omitted in John, that in the Synoptical evangelists mention is made of *one* passover, in John of *two*.

whom we have the first account of this party, certainly goes too far, when he tells us, that they rejected the gospel of John on account of the passage in it which speaks of the Paraclete.[1] That passage alone could not possibly have induced them to such a step; for in truth they needed only to limit, as was actually done by others, the promise to the apostles, in order to deprive the Montanists of this support. As it was their practice, however, when those words of Christ were adduced by those who held the Montanistic views, to pronounce the whole book which contained them a spurious one, it was a natural course, suggested by the propensity so common in theological polemics, of drawing general conclusions from partial facts, to infer that they had rejected the gospel on account of this single text alone.

Apart from the consideration that the antagonists of Montanism must reject the Apocalypse as a prophetic book, and favorable to Chiliasm, the whole drift and style of this book must in itself have possessed something alien from the spirit of this party of the sober understanding. They made sport of the seven angels and the seven trumpets of the Revelation. Yet such a prosaic tendency of the understanding as the above described, was something too foreign from this youthful age of the church, to allow of its meeting with any very general reception.

As in Montanism a tendency repellant of the existing elements of culture appeared in its most decided form; so, on the other hand, the tendency which strove to reconcile the existing culture with Christianity, and to cause it to be pervaded with the spirit of Christianity, presented itself especially in the Alexandrian school. But the question arises, from what source is this tendency to be derived, and what was its original aim, — whether perhaps it was, in the outset, merely a provision to communicate religious instruction to the *pagans*, or whether there had existed in Alexandria, from the first, a school to educate teachers for the Christian church, a sort of theological seminary for the clerical order. The notices of Eusebius[2] and of Jerome[3] are too indefinite to furnish any solution of this question; and besides, neither of these church Fathers was so situated as to be able duly to distinguish the form of this school as it existed in his *own time* from what it *originally* was. We must therefore content ourselves with what may be

[1] Irenæus, lib. III. c. 11, § 9. His words are: Ut donum spiritus frustrentur, quod in novissimis temporibus secundum placitum Patris effusum est in humanum genus, illam speciem non admittunt, quæ est secundum Joannis evangelium, in qua Paracletum se missurum Dominus promisit.

[2] Lib. VI. c. 10, that a *διδασκάλειον ἱερῶν λόγων* had existed there from ancient times, which according to the church phraseology may be most naturally interpreted as meaning a school for the expounding of the scriptures. But this does not suffice to characterize the particular mode and form under which the Alexandrian school appeared; though it is easy to bring into these words all that belonged to theological study in the sense of this school, when its condition and character are once understood. For its Gnosis was designed, without any doubt, to furnish a key for the right understanding of scripture, and was to be derived from scripture by allegorical interpretation. A distinct classification of different theological disciplines, as exegesis, dogmatics, etc., is, in this age of the church, when every thing was still in one chaotic mass, not to be thought of, — as has been very clearly pointed out by Hr. Director Hasselbach of Stettin, where he explains this phrase in his Dissertation de schola, quæ Alexandriæ floruit, catechetica, Part. I. p. 15.

[3] De vir. illustr. c. 36.

gathered from our knowledge of the labors of the individual catechists who presided over the school. Now we find in the outset at Alexandria but one man appointed by the bishop to hold the office of catechist, whose business it was to give religious instruction to the pagans, and moreover doubtless to the children of the Christians in that place.[1] The catechist *Origen* was the first to share the duties of this office with another person, when they became too multiplied to allow him an opportunity of prosecuting at the same time his works on scientific theology. The catechumens were then divided into two classes. But though the office of catechist at Alexandria differed in no respect originally from the same office in other cities, yet it could not fail to become gradually, of itself, an entirely different affair.

Men were required for this office, who possessed a perfect and exact knowledge of the Grecian religion; especially, who had received a philosophical education, and been trained in the society and amidst the discussions of those learned pagans, who, after having explored many systems, had turned their attention to Christianity. It was not enough here, as in other churches, to present the main doctrines of Christianity, according to the so-called παράδοσις: it was necessary, with the educated catechumens, to go back to the primitive sources of the religion in the scriptures themselves, and seek to initiate them into the understanding of these. They required a faith which would stand the test of scientific examination. *Clement*, who was himself one of these catechists, points to the need of a thorough method of administering the catechetical office at Alexandria, when he says:[2] "He who would gather from every quarter what would be for the profit of the catechumens, especially if they are Greeks,[3] (for the earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof,) must not, like the irrational brutes, be shy of much learning, but he must seek to collect around him every possible means of helping his hearers;" — and directly after,[4] "All culture is profitable, and particularly necessary is the study of holy scripture, to enable us to prove what we teach, and especially when our hearers come to us from the discipline of the Greeks."[5] The patience and skill which must be exercised by these Alexandrian teachers, in answering the multifarious questions which would be proposed to them, is intimated by Origen, when he requires of the Christian teachers, that they should follow Christ's example, and not show a fretful spirit, if they should be pushed with questions proposed not for the sake of learning, but for the purpose of putting them to the proof.[6]

Much care was therefore necessary in selecting these Alexandrian catechists; and the office was conferred in preference on those men of

[1] Eusebius (l. VI. c. 6) says, that Origen, when a boy, had been a pupil of Clement.

[2] Strom. l. VI. f. 659, B.

[3] To complete the thought; — he ought not to be timid in exploring the vestiges of truth even in pagan literature, and to appropriate the useful; for all comes from God, and is, as such, pure.

[4] Strom. l. VI. f. 660, C.

[5] With these remarks compare what Clement says generally with regard to those to whom the faith must be demonstrated after the manner of the Greeks.

[6] In Matth. T. XIV. § 16: Πειραζομένου τηλικούτου σωτῆρος ἡμῶν, τίς τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτοίη τεταγμένος εἰς διδασκαλίαν, ἐπὶ τῷ πειράζεσθαι ὑπό τινων καὶ πυνθανομένων οὐκ ἐκ φιλομαθείας, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ πειράζειν ἐθέλειν;

learning and of a philosophical education, who had themselves been conducted to Christianity by the way of philosophical inquiry,—such as were *Pantœnus*, the first Alexandrian catechist of whom we have any distinct knowledge, and his disciple, Clement.

The circle of studies taught by these men went on now of its own accord gradually to extend itself, and to embrace a wider range; for it was the first attempt to satisfy, on the principles of the church faith, a want deeply felt by numbers,—the want of a scientific exposition of that faith, and of a Christian science. Their school was frequented partly by those educated pagans who, after having under their instructions been converted to Christianity, were seized with the desire of devoting themselves, and all they possessed, to its service; and with this in view chose the Alexandrian catechists for their guides; and partly by young men who, standing already within the Christian pale, were only thirsting after a more profound knowledge, and aiming to prepare themselves for the office of church teachers. Thus there grew up here, in a manner perfectly spontaneous, a theological school. It was the birth-place of Christian theology in the proper sense,—theology as it sprang partly from the inward impulse of the mind thirsting after scientific knowledge, and partly from an outwardly directed apologetic interest to defend the doctrines of the church against philosophically educated Greeks, and against the Gnostics.

To form a right conception of this school in its early growth, we must consider its relation to the three different parties, in connection with, or in opposition to which, it shaped itself; and whose different tendencies it conceived the possibility of uniting together by means of a higher principle which should reconcile their antagonisms;—its relation, 1. To those seekers after wisdom, the Greeks, who despised Christianity as a blind faith, that shunned the light of reason; and who were only confirmed in their contempt of it by the gross, material views of those uneducated and sternly repulsive Christians with whom they came in contact; 2. Its relation to the Gnostics, now a numerous class in Alexandria, who likewise spoke with contempt of the blind faith of a groveling multitude, and by promising a higher, esoteric knowledge of religion, drew to them those pagans who sought after wisdom, and those Christians who were not satisfied with the ordinary religious instruction; 3. Its relation to that primitive class of church teachers, who occupied the ground of *practical Realism*, and more especially to those *zealots* among them, whom the pride and arrogance of the Gnostics had led to be suspicious of all speculation and philosophy, and whatever seemed like the striving after a Gnosis,—and who were in continual fear of the corruption of Christianity by the mixing in of foreign philosophical elements. By means of a Gnosis resulting from, and harmoniously combining with, faith,[1] the Alexandrians supposed they should be able to avoid all that was partial and false in each of these tendencies, and even find means of reconciling them together.

They differed from the Gnostics in their theory of the relation of the

[1] Γνῶσις ἀληθινή, opposed to the ψευδώνυμος.

γνῶσις to the πίστις, in that they acknowledged faith as the foundation of the higher life for *all* Christians; as the common bond, whereby all, however differing from one another in mental cultivation, are still united together in one divine community. They contrasted the unity of the catholic church, founded on this basis of faith, with the strife of the Gnostic schools, (διατριβαί.) They held that the sources of knowledge for the πίστις and for the γνῶσις were not different, but the same for both; namely, the common tradition, handed down in all the churches, concerning the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and the holy scriptures. They made it the business of the Gnosis, simply to place in the clear light of consciousness, what had been first appropriated by faith, and incorporated with the inward life; to unfold this in its full extent, and according to its internal connection; to place it on the basis and under the form of science; to prove that this was the genuine doctrine as it came from Christ; to give an account of its history, and to defend it against the objections of its enemies among pagan philosophers and heretics. Their watch-word, which seems to have been a current motto already handed down from some earlier period, and which subsequently continued to be the watch-word for marking the relation of faith to knowledge, from the time of Augustin to the establishment of the scholastic theology for which he prepared the way, was the passage in Isaiah 7: 9,—a passage, it must be allowed, which admits of the sense they ascribed to it only in the Alexandrian version, and there only when taken without any regard to the connection:[1]— "Ἐὰν μὴ πιστεύσητε, οὐδὲ μὴ συνῆτε," if ye do not believe, neither shall ye understand. These words, which were first used in the sense, He who believes not the gospel, can obtain no insight into the spirit and essence of the Old Testament, were in the next place employed in the kindred sense, that without faith in Christianity and its several doctrines, it is impossible to penetrate into the more profound knowledge of Christianity and its doctrines. According to the measure of faith will be the progress made in the understanding of the truth;—the degree of knowledge will correspond with the degree of faith.[2]

Clement of Alexandria defends the worth of faith against those pagans and Gnostics who confounded faith with opinion. "It is plain," says he, "that faith is something godlike, which can be destroyed neither by the power of any other worldly love, nor by present fear."[3] He represents faith as holding the same relation to the higher life, as the breath to the life of the body.[4] An important character, for him, in the essence of faith, is that spontaneous seizure of the godlike, anticipating

[1] Just as, in more recent times, many texts from Luther's translation of the Bible became current proof passages for propositions relating to Christian faith or practice, although this application of them was wholly inconsistent with the sense which they had in the original.

[2] Strom. l. I. f. 273, A.; l. II. f. 362, A.; l. IV. f. 528, B. and Orig. in Matth. ed. Huet. T. XVI. § 9: Ἐκ τοῦ πεπιστευκέναι κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως, τὸ συνιέναι.

[3] Θεῖόν τι εἶναι, μήτε ὑπὸ ἄλλης φιλίας κοσμικῆς διασπωμένην, μήτε ὑπὸ φόβου παρόντος διαλυομένην. Strom. l. II. f. 372.

[4] Τὴν πίστιν οὕτως ἀναγκαίαν τῷ γνωστικῷ ὑπάρχουσαν, ὡς τῷ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε βιοῦντι, πρὸς τὸ ζῆν τὸ ἀναπνεῖν.—L. c. f. 373.

conception, which proceeds from the recipient disposition of the heart. In this phase of it, so far as faith presupposes an attractive power of the godlike on the human heart, and a spontaneous yielding to that power on the part of the latter, he well understood its essential character. He supposes, in human nature, a sense correlative to truth, which is attracted by the same, and repelled by what is false.[2] Accordingly he characterizes faith as something positive, — a positive union with the godlike; and, on the other hand, unbelief as a negative quality, which, being such, presupposes the positive.[3] With faith is already given, according to this view, the highest thing of all — the divine life itself. As he elsewhere remarks:[4] "He that believes the Son, hath eternal life. If they who believe, then, have life, how can there be anything higher for them than life eternal? Faith wants nothing; it is complete in itself — self-sufficing." Clement here puts it down as the characteristic of faith, carrying in it the pledge of the future, that it antedates the future as if were present.[5] When this divine life, received by faith, permeates and cleanses the soul, it is in possession of a new sense for the discernment of divine things. So Clement remarks: "Behold I will do a new thing — says the Logos, Is. 43 : 19 — which no eye hath seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive, 1 Corinth. 2 : 9; which can be seen, heard and conceived only with a new eye, a new ear, a new heart, through faith and understanding; since the disciples of our Lord speak, conceive and act spiritually."[6]

This intimate connection between knowing and living belongs to the peculiar character of the Alexandrian Gnosis. The Gnosis was conceived by this school, not as a mere form of speculation, but as a result of the whole tendency of the new inward life growing out of faith and manifesting itself in the conduct, — as a habitus practicus animi. This is expressed in the following words of Clement: "As is the doctrine, so also must be the life; for the tree is known by its fruit, not by its blossoms or its leaves. The Gnosis comes, then, from the fruit and the life; not from the doctrine and the blossom. For we say that the Gnosis is not merely doctrine, but a divine science; — it is that light, dawning within the soul from obedience to God's commands, which makes all things clear; teaches man to know all that is contained in creation, and in himself, and instructs him how to maintain fellowship with God; for what the eye is to the body, such is the Gnosis to the mind."[7] There can be no such thing as a knowledge of divine things without that living them out, which is the fruit of faith. *Knowing and living here become one.* This unity of the theoretical and the practical ele-

[1] Ὑπόληψις ἑκούσιος καὶ πρόληψις εὐγνώμονος προκαταλήψεως. L. c. f. 371.

[2] Τὸν ἄνθρωπον, φύσει μὲν διαβεβλημένον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ψεύδους συγκατάθεσιν, ἔχοντα δὲ ἀφορμὰς πρὸς πίστιν τ' ἀληθοῦς. L. c. f. 384.

[3] Ἡ ἀπιστία ἀποσύστασις οὖσα τῆς πίστεως δυναμὴν δείκνυσι τὴν συγκατάθεσίν τε καὶ πίστιν, ἀνυπαρξία γὰρ στέρησις οὐκ ἂν γέγοιτο. Strom. l. II. f. 384.

[4] Pædagog lib. I. c. 6.

[5] Ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὸ (τῷ) πιστεῦσαι ἤδη προειληφότες ἐσόμενον, μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἀπολαμβάνομεν γενόμενον.

[6] Strom. l. II. f. 365, B.

[7] Φῶς ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγινόμενον ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς ὑπακοῆς, τὸ πάντα κατάδηλα ποιοῦν, τά τε ἐν γενέσει αὐτόν τε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἑαυτόν τε γινώσκειν παρασκευάζον, καὶ θεοῦ ἐπίβολον καθίστασθαι διδάσκον Strom. l. III. f. 444.

ment, of objective truth and the subjective state of the individual, presented itself to Clement just as it sprung out of the depths of his own Christian consciousness, — although the Neo-Platonic philosophy lent him a form for the expression of it, in what it taught concerning the identity of subject and object, — of the *νοοῦν* and the *νοητόν*, at the highest position of knowledge.[1]

This accordingly is, in the Alexandrian scheme, the *subjective* condition, and the *subjective* essence of the Gnosis. As it respects the objective source of knowledge, whence the Gnosticus should seek to derive still deeper and clearer views of the truths he has received by faith into his inner life, — this, according to Clement, is Holy Scripture. If it was the case with many, who were without the requisite training, necessary to enable them to search the scriptures for themselves, that they simply adhered to the essential and fundamental truths of faith, which, in conformity with the *Paradosis*, had been communicated to them in their earliest instruction, yet the Gnosticus must distinguish himself from these ordinary believers by his ability to prove those truths; to deduce them from a comparison of the different parts of holy scripture; and to draw from the same source the refutation of all opposite errors. Instead of a faith grounded on the authority and tradition of the church, he should possess a faith grounded on the knowledge of the Bible. Accordingly Clement says:[2] "Faith is, so to speak, the compendious knowledge of essentials; Gnosis, the incontrovertible demonstration of the things received by faith, erected on the foundation of faith, through the doctrine of our Lord, whereby faith is raised to an irrefragable scientific knowledge." The same father, in meeting the objection of Pagans and Jews, that it was impossible, owing to the multitude of sects among the Christians, to know where the truth was to be found, points them to the infallible criterion of Holy Writ, and observes: "We rely not on men, who merely give us their opinions, over against which we, in like manner, may set our own. But if it is not enough merely to give our opinion, if it is necessary to prove what we affirm, we do not wait for the testimony of men, but prove it by the word of the Lord, which is the most certain of all arguments, or rather the only one, — the form of knowing whereby those who have barely tasted of the scriptures, become *believers*, and those who have made greater progress and become accurately acquainted with the truth, are *Gnostics*."[3]

Hence Clement denominates the Gnosis which results from comparing different passages of scripture, and which deduces the conclusions that flow from the acknowledged maxims of faith, a scientific faith.[4] The Gnostic, according to him, is one who has grown grey in the study of the holy scriptures; whose life is nothing else than a series of works

[1] *Ὡς μηκέτι ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ γνῶσιν κεκτῆσθαι, (τὸν γνωστικὸν,) ἐπιστήμην δὲ εἶναι καὶ γνῶσιν.* L. c. l. IV. f. 490.

[2] *Ἡ μὲν οὖν πίστις σύντομός ἐστιν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῶν κατεπειγόντων γνῶσις, ἡ γνῶσις δὲ ἀπόδειξις τῶν διὰ πίστεως παρειλημμένων ἰσχυρὰ καὶ βέβαιος, διὰ τῆς κυριακῆς διδασκαλίας ἐποικοδομουμένη τῇ πίστει, εἰς τὸ ἀμετάπτωτον καὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης καταληπτὸν παραπέμπουσα.* Strom. l. VII. f. 732.

[3] Strom. VII. f. 757.

[4] *Ἐπιστημονικὴ πιστις.* Strom. l. II. f. 381.

and of words, corresponding with the transmitted doctrine of our Lord.[1] But it is only for the Gnostic that the holy scriptures generate such a knowledge of divine things, because it is he only who brings to them the believing recipient sense. Where this is wanting, the scriptures appear unfruitful.[2] This inner sense, however, is not sufficient of itself to deduce from the holy scriptures the truths they contain, to unfold these truths in all their bearings and form them into an organic whole, as well as to defend them against the objections of pagans and heretics, and to apply them to everything hitherto presented to man's faculty of knowledge. There is required for this a previous scientific culture, and such a culture could not be created new and at once by Christianity; but Christianity must here form a union with the scientific culture which had resulted from the previous history of mankind, in order that, as the leaven for all that pertains to humanity,[3] it may gradually pervade it, and fashion it to its own likeness.

It was here the Alexandrian Gnosis drew upon itself numerous objections from the other party, who despised the culture of the Greeks as altogether repugnant to Christianity. Against these, its advocates must defend themselves and vindicate their peculiar method on what grounds they could. Interesting is this conflict, which has so often been repeated in history. It was argued against the Alexandrians, that the prophets, and the apostles at any rate, had no concern with philosophical culture. Clement answered: "The apostles and prophets, as disciples of the Spirit, spake certainly what the Spirit communicated to them; but *we* can rely on no such guidance of the Holy Spirit superseding all human means of culture, to enable *us* to unfold the hidden sense of their words. He who would have his thoughts enlightened by the power of God, must already have accustomed himself to philosophize on spiritual things, must have already inured himself to that form of thought, which is now to be animated by a new and higher spirit. A logical cultivation of the mind is necessarily required, in order duly to distinguish the doubtful and synonymous words of scripture."[4] In answer to those who would have men satisfied with faith alone, and who rejected all science which men might wish to employ in the service of faith, he says: "It is as though they would look for the grapes at once, without having bestowed any previous culture on the vine. Under the figure of the vine our Lord is presented to us, from which we must expect the fruit to come only in proportion to the reasonable care and art of the husbandman. It is necessary to prune, to dig, and to bind up; the hook, the hoe, and other implements used in the culture of the vine, must be employed, that it may yield us the pleasant fruit."[5]

[1] Strom. l. VII. f. 762, et 763.

[2] Strom. l. VII. f. 756. Τοῖς γνωστικοῖς κεκνήκασιν αἱ γραφαί.

[3] Which similitude of the leaven Clement understood how to explain in a very beautiful manner. He calls it "the power bestowed on us by the Word, which by small means effects much in a secret, invisible manner, attracting to itself every one who has received it, and reducing his whole nature to unity." Ἡ ἰσχὺς τοῦ λόγου ἡ δοθεῖσα ἡμῖν, σύντομος οὖσα καὶ δυνατὴ, πάντα τὸν καταδεξάμενον καὶ ἐντὸς ἑαυτοῦ κτησάμενον αὐτὴν, ἐπικεκρυμμένως τε καὶ ἀφάνως πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἕλκει καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτοῦ σύστημα εἰς ἑνότητα συνάγει. Strom. lib V. f. 587.

[4] Strom. lib. I. f. 292.

[5] L. c. f. 291.

It appears, according to this, to have been considered as the proper business of the Gnosis, to unfold the included sum of the faith, to digest it, and preserve it from the intermixture of foreign elements.

Clement had to defend the Alexandrian Gnosis against the objection, that divine revelation was not allowed to be in itself the sufficient source of truth, but was represented as standing in need of additional aid and support from without itself; that such as had not enjoyed the advantage of scientific culture, were precluded from the possibility of understanding it. To this he answers:[1] "If it were necessary to draw a distinction for the sake of those who are always ready with their complaints, we might call philosophy a co-operating help in acquiring the knowledge of truth; a seeking after truth; a preparatory discipline of the Gnostic; but that which simply coöperates we make not the cause, the principal thing. We do not represent it as though the latter could not exist without philosophy; for in fact nearly every one among us, without having gone through the circle of the sciences,[2] without the Grecian philosophy, many of us without even knowing how to read or write, carried captive by that divine philosophy which came from the barbarians, have, by the power from on high, through faith, received the doctrine of God. Complete and sufficient in itself, then, is the doctrine of our Saviour, as the power and wisdom of God; and when to this is added the Grecian philosophy, it does not indeed make the truth any more powerful, but it renders futile the attacks of sophistry, and, as it wards off every fraudulent plot devised against the truth, has been properly denominated the wall and hedge of the vineyard.[3] The truth of faith is like the bread which is indispensable to life; the preparatory discipline may be compared to that which is eaten with the bread, and to the dessert."

In general, we must allow, Clement was distinguished for the mildness and moderation with which he met the opponents of the Alexandrian Gnosis. He was himself aware how their fears had been excited by the corruptions to which simple Christianity was exposed among so many sects who were inclined to mix up into the gospel what was most foreign to its spirit; he was aware how natural it is for man to confound the abuse and the right use of the same thing; but yet the zeal — often we must allow too ignorant zeal — of his opponents, and his own conviction that that grossly material and one-sided tendency was a serious hindrance to the spirit of Christianity which was striving to ennoble the whole man, and that many were thereby prevented from embracing it, seduced him into the error of expressing himself somewhat too roughly against these opponents, and of denying them the justice due to their honest zeal; as when he says:[4] "It is not unknown to me what many an ignorant brawler[5] has at his tongue's end, that faith should cling to the most necessary things, to the essential points, and pass over those foreign and superfluous matters which detain us to no

[1] Strom. lib. I. f. 318.

[2] Ἄνευ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας.

[3] What the ancients said of logic in its relation to philosophy, that it was the θριγκός, the Alexandrians applied to the relation of philosophy itself to the Christian gnosis.

[4] Strom. lib. I. f. 278.

[5] Ἀμαθῶς ψοφώδεις.

purpose on what has no concern with our great object;" and again:[1] "The multitude dread the Grecian philosophy,[2] as children do a mask, fearing it will carry them off. But if their faith is of such a sort (for knowledge I certainly could not call it) as that it may be subverted by specious words, it is always liable to be so subverted; for they confess themselves that they have not the truth; since truth is invincible, but false opinions are overthrown at any moment." We perceive here the high-hearted confidence of Clement in the might of Christian truth, which had nothing to fear from opposition, but would rather shine forth by its means with still greater lustre — although it must be allowed, this confidence leads him to bear too hard against a faith which, in the consciousness of its own weakness, is too anxiously concerned about the safety of its dearest possession. The Gnostic, according to Clement, — alluding to that saying ascribed in the apocryphal gospels to our Saviour, — "γίνεσθε δοκιμοὶ τραπεζῖται," (be ye skilful money-changers) — should in all cases be able to distinguish truth from specious error, as genuine from counterfeit coins, and therefore stand in no fear of error, however specious. He needed to be familiar with the Grecian philosophy, for the very purpose of pointing out to the philosophically educated pagans its errors and its insufficiency, of refuting them on their own position, and of conducting them from this to the knowledge of the truth. "Thus much," observes Clement,[3] "I would say to those who are so fond of complaining: if *the philosophy* is unprofitable, yet the *study* of it is profitable, if there is profit to be derived from thoroughly demonstrating that it is an unprofitable thing. Then again, we cannot condemn the heathens by merely pronouncing sentence on their dogmas; we must enter with them into the development of each in detail, until we compel them to acquiesce in our sentence; for that sort of refutation wins the most confidence, which is united with a thorough knowledge of the matter in hand." He says in another place:[4] "We must offer to the Greeks who seek after that which passes with them for wisdom, things of a kindred nature, so that they may come, as it may be expected they will, in the easiest way, through what is already familiar to them, to the belief of the truth. For I become all things to all men, says the apostle, that I may win all."

The most violent opponents of this liberal tendency, in order to a total condemnation of the study of the Greek philosophy, brought in the Jewish legend related in the apocryphal book of Enoch, which represented all the higher kinds of knowledge as having come to the heathen out of due course through the agency of fallen spirits; and they held all heathen philosophers, without distinction, to be organs of the evil spirit. They either considered the whole pagan world before Christ to be in direct opposition to Christianity; confounded what was pagan with the original and divine element, without which Paganism, which

[1] L. c. lib. VI. f. 655.

[2] Clement, Stromat. VI. 659, wittily remarks, "Most Christians treat the doctrine in a boorish manner, like the companions of Ulysses, who sought not to avoid the Syrens, but their rhythm and song, ignorantly stopping their ears; for they are conscious, if they once lend an ear to the Greek philosophy, they would be unable to make good their escape."

[3] Stromat. lib. I. f. 278.

[4] L. c. lib. V. f. 554.

only adulterated and obscured this, could not have existed at all; refused to know any point of union betwixt Christianity and that part of man's nature which, through all his corruption, intimates his relationship to God, and without which Christianity never could have been planted in the soil of heathenism; or, like the stern and fiery Tertullian, the friend of nature and all original manifestation of life, the foe of art and false cultivation, they saw in philosophy nothing but the hand of Satan, falsifying and mutilating the original form of nature. Clement endeavored to confute this party also, on their own chosen position. "Even were this view correct," says he, "yet even Satan could deceive men, only by clothing himself as an angel of light; he must be obliged to draw men by the appearance of truth, by mingling truth with falsehood; and we must still search for, and acknowledge, the truth, from whatever quarter it may come. And even this communication can take place no otherwise than according to the will of God; must therefore be included with all the rest in God's plan of education for the human race."[1]

Yet, speaking from his own position, he declares himself very strongly against such a view. "How should it not seem strange," says he, "when disorder and sin are the appropriate works of Satan, that he should be represented as the bestower of a benefit, philosophy, — for in this he would seem to have been more benevolent to the good men amongst the Greeks, than Divine Providence itself."[2]

Clement traces, on the other hand, in the progressive steps of the Greek philosophy, the working of a divine system for the education of mankind, — a sort of preparation for Christianity, suited to the peculiar character of the Greeks. It was the favorite idea of Clement, that the divine plan for the education of mankind constituted a great whole, the end of which he considered to be Christianity, and within which he included not merely the providential dealings of God with the Jewish people, but *also*, though in a different way, the providential dealings of God with the heathen world.[3] In reference to that *particularizing* conception of history, which would confine the directing agency of God in preparing the way for Christianity exclusively within the narrow compass of the Jewish nation, Clement remarks: "Every movement to that which is good, comes from God. He employs those men who are peculiarly fitted to guide and instruct others,[4] as his organs to work on the larger portions of mankind. Such were the better sort among the Greek philosophers. That philosophy which forms men to virtue, cannot be a work of evil; it remains, then, that it should be of God, whose only work is to move to that which is good. And all gifts bestowed by God are bestowed for right ends, and received for right ends. Philosophy is not found in the possession of bad men, but was given to the best men among the Greeks: it is evident, therefore, from what source it was derived, and that it is the gift of that Providence which bestows on each, whatever, under his own peculiar circumstances, it is proper he

[1] The sense of the passages in Strom. lib. VI. 647, and lib. I. 310.
[2] Strom. lib. VI. f. 693.
[3] See the General Introduction, vol. I.
[4] The ἡγεμονικοί and παιδευτικοί.

should receive. Thus we see, that to the Jews was given the law, to the Greeks philosophy, until the appearance of our Lord. From this period the universal call has gone forth for a peculiar people, who are to be made righteous through the doctrines of faith, now that the common God of both Greeks and barbarians, or rather of the entire human race, has brought all together by one common Lord.[1] Before the appearance of our Lord, philosophy was necessary to the Greeks as a *means of righteousness;* but now it is *useful* in the service of piety, as a sort of preparation for exhibiting the evidence of faith: for thy foot will not stumble when thou derivest all good from Providence, whether it belong to the heathens or to ourselves; since God is the Author of all good — partly in a special sense, as in the gift of the Old and New Testaments, partly in a more indirect sense, as in the case of philosophy. Perhaps the latter, however, was also given to the Greeks in a special sense, before our Lord called the Gentiles, since it educated the Gentiles, as the law did the Jews, for Christianity; and philosophy was a preparatory step for those who were to be conducted through Christ to perfection."[2] When Clement speaks of a righteousness to be obtained by philosophy, he does not mean that philosophy could lead men to the end of their moral destination, and qualify them for attaining to everlasting life: for this he held the redemption to be absolutely necessary; nothing else could, in his opinion, be an adequate substitute for this fact; it would all serve only as a preparation for the appropriating of this as the ultimate end. The firmness of his conviction on this point is evident indeed from the fact,— which we shall consider more minutely in another connection,— that he held to the necessity of a particular arrangement, in order to bring even those heathens whom he so mildly judged, to the conscious appropriation, after death, of the redemption. He distinguishes between a doctrine that makes man righteous, which in his view is the gospel only, and a doctrine which could do no more than prepare the way for this.[3] He distinguishes between a certain stage in the awakening of the religious moral sense, a certain stage of excitement to moral effort, of moral preconformation, and that universal complete righteousness which is the end of man's nature generally,[4] in contradistinction to that partial cultivation of human nature which belongs to a distinct period of human development. He says[5] of the Greek philosophy, that it is too weak to fulfil the precepts of our Lord; that it only serves, by ennobling the manners and by encouraging the belief in a Providence, to prepare the minds of men for the due reception of the royal doctrine.[6] "As God showed his regard for the well-being of the Jews," says Clement, "by giving them the prophets, so too he separated from the mass of common men the most eminent among the Greeks, making them appear as the prophets of that people in their own language, according to the degree in which they were

[1] Strom. lib. VI. f. 694 et 695.

[2] Strom. lib. I. f. 282.

[3] Διδασκαλία ἥ τε δικαίουσα, ἥ τε εἰς τοῦτο χειραγωγοῦσα καὶ συλλαμβάνουσα. Strom. lib. VI. f. 644.

[4] Ἡ καθόλου δικαιοσύνη. Strom. I. 319.

[5] L. c. I. f. 309.

[6] Ἀμηγέπη σωφρονίζουσα τὸ ἦθος καὶ προτυποῦσα καὶ προστύφουσα εἰς παραδοχὴν τῆς ἀληθείας τὸν πρόνοιαν δοξάζοντα.

capable of receiving his blessing. And as now, at the proper time,[1] comes the proclamation of the gospel, so at the proper time were given to the Jews the law and the prophets, and to the Greeks, philosophy, that their ears might be practised for this proclamation." [2]

In fact Clement had observed with regard to many a man of philosophical education, — perhaps he had learned from his own experience, — that the previous cultivation of philosophy might prove a transition-point to Christianity; and hence he appeals, in evidence of what he had said, to the fact, that those who received the faith were conducted alike from the discipline of the Greeks, as well as of the law, to that one family composed of the people of the redeemed.[3] "As the Pharisees, who mingled the divine law with human ordinances, came through the medium of Christianity to a right knowledge of the law, so the philosophers, who had obscured the revelation of divine truth in the mind of man by human *one-sidedness*, came through Christianity to the true philosophy." [4] To illustrate the transfiguration of philosophy by Christianity, Clement uses the comparison of the graft, a figure which had already been employed by the apostle in an analogous sense, and which happily sets forth the ennobling influence of Christianity on human nature. "The wild olive," he observes, "is not wanting in sap, but in the power of rightly digesting the sap which flows to it in abundance. In like manner the philosopher, who may be compared to the wild olive, is possessed of a great deal of crude and indigested matter, being full of an active spirit of inquiry, and of longing after the noble sap of truth; and when now he receives the divine power, through faith, he digests the nutriment which had been conveyed to him and becomes a noble olive-tree." [5] This comparison is certainly well suited to express the thought which Clement had in his mind, that as the whole wealth of human culture cannot make up for the want of the divine life, which it needs in order to be ennobled by it; so the new divine principle of life imparted by Christianity needs the whole wealth of human culture, in order to acquire shape, and to incorporate itself therein. Clement employs another happily chosen similitude, when he says, that the full, pure revelation of divine truth in Christianity stands in the same relation to the fragmentary, partial, and turbid apprehension of it in human systems, as the pure, clear rays of light beaming forth immediately from the sun, to those which are artificially collected under a burning glass.[6] Thus Clement secures the central position for a more unbiassed contemplation of the developing process of religious truth, as well in the period after, as before, Christ's appearance; as well in the Christian heresies, as in the systems of Greek philosophy which were more or less connected with a religious interest. Everywhere he finds alloyed, dissipated, and sundered from its natural

[1] Κατὰ καιρόν, i. e. when, under the previous guidance of Divine Providence, mankind had become prepared for it.

[2] Τὰς ἀκοὰς ἐθίζουσα πρὸς τὸ κήρυγμα. L. c. lib. VI. f. 636, seq.

[3] Strom. lib. VI. f. 636 et 637.

[4] L. c. f. 644.

[5] L. c. f. 672.

[6] Ἡ μὲν ἑλληνικὴ φιλοσοφία τῇ ἐκ τῆς ϑράλλιδος ἔοικε λαμπήδονι, ἣν ἀνάπτουσιν ἄνϑρωποι παρὰ ἡλίου, κλέπτοντες ἐντέχνως τὸ φῶς, κηρυχθέντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου, πᾶν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἅγιον ἐξέλαμψε φῶς. Strom. l. V f. 560; l. VI. f. 688.

and original unity, what in the primitive, pure Christianity is exhibited as a whole, uniting together all the individual *momenta* in harmonious agreement. The error arises from giving undue prominence and individuality to the moments, which only by their mutual union form the whole. In this view, Clement says:[1] "As the truth, then, is one, for falsehood only has a thousand bye-paths, — a thousand fragments, (like the Bacchantes who cut to pieces the limbs of Pentheus,) — so the sects that come from the barbarians (the Christian sects) and the sects of the Greek philosophy boast of that portion of truth which they possess, as if it were the whole truth; but by the rising of the light, everything is brought into day." "As Eternal Being," says he, "brings to view in a moment what in time is divided into past, present, and future; so truth has the power of assembling together its kindred seeds, although they may have fallen on an alien soil. The Greek and the barbarian philosophies have in some sort rent eternal truth into fragments, not as in that mythus of Bacchus, but in the divine revelation of the eternal Word. But he who brings together again what they have rent asunder, and reduces the Word to its completeness and unity, will discern the truth without any danger of mistake."[2]

Thus it was Clement, from whom first proceeded the idea of a scientific conception of history having its ground in Christianity, — the idea of a true understanding of the history of doctrines, as a developing process going forth from the Christian consciousness, exhibiting itself, with more or less of purity, in all forms, within and without the church, — an idea which, after it had first taken start, and been propagated in the Alexandrian school, compelled to yield to a one-sided dogmatic and a narrow polemic spirit, was soon lost, to rise again, and find — only after many great revolutions of the human mind in religion and science — a more congenial soil in far later times. Thus the Alexandrians knew how to distinguish, even in the heresies, a Christian truth at bottom; and to discriminate the importance of controverted questions by their different relations to the essence of Christianity.[3]

In one aspect of the case, it might seem, then, that Clement, so far from acknowledging the distinction which the Gnostics made of an esoteric and an exoteric Christianity, held to *one* life of faith in all Christians, and understood by the Gnosis nothing more nor less than the scientific knowledge and development of the included sum of doctrines contained in the faith; — and so conceived the difference between the γνῶσις and the πίστις, not as a *material*, but only as a *formal* one. But although such a view must have occurred to him, from the connection of the Christian life with Christian thinking, yet it was something too novel to be at once fully apprehended and consistently carried out. The all-

[1] L. c. I. 298.

[2] Ἥτε βάρβαρος ἥτε ἑλληνικὴ φιλοσοφία τὴν ἀΐδιον ἀλήθειαν σπαραγμόν τινα οὐ τῆς Διονύσου μυθολογίας, τῆς δὲ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ θεολογίας πεποίηται. Ὁ δὲ τὰ διηρημένα συνθεὶς αὖθις καὶ ἑνοποιήσας τέλειον τὸν λόγον, ἀκινδύνως εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι κατόψεται τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

[3] See, for example, in Strom. lib. VI. f. 675, the important distinction between Οἱ περί τινα τῶν ἐν μέρει σφαλλόμενοι and οἱ εἰς τὰ κυριώτατα παραπίπτοντες. Compare Clement's judgment on Montanism, cited above, p. 520.

pervading Christian principle, in contradistinction from the aristocratic principle of education and scientific culture among the ancients, had still to come into conflict, even in those minds to which it found access, with various reactions of the earlier systems, until an independent Christian theology and system of faith could proceed out of it; as we shall see when we come to consider the genetic development of these principles from Clement down to the revolution brought about in the Western theology by Augustin. Accordingly, we see Clement still verging again towards the Gnostic or the Platonic position. With that idea of faith, derived from the essence of Christianity, was mixed up in his conception of it, the notion that still clung to him, and which was derived from the Platonic philosophy, of the opposition between a religion of the more highly cultivated minds, to be arrived at through the medium of science, and the religion, cleaving to sense and entangled in mere opinion, (δόξα,) of the many.

He seems, if we may judge from several of his explanations, to understand by πίστις only a very subordinate position of subjective Christianity,— of the Christian life; a carnal, implicit faith, adhering to the mere letter, which was still at a very far remove from the proper spirit and essence of Christianity, answering rather to the standing ground of the law, than to that of the gospel. The Gnosis, on the other hand, is according to him an inward, living, spiritual Christianity, a divine life, similar to what the mystic opposes, as true inward Christianity, to mere historical faith. While the simple believer is impelled to that which is good by the fear of punishment and the hope of future blessedness; the Gnostic, on the other hand, is stimulated to all his efforts by the inward and free impulses of love. He requires no outward evidence to convince him of the divine character of Christianity — he lives in the consciousness, the immediate intuition, of divine truth, and feels himself to be already blessed in this. While the mere believer (πιστικός) acts from obscure feelings, and sometimes, therefore, fails of what is right, or at least fails to do what is right in the right way; the Gnostic, on the other hand, acts uniformly with clear Christian consciousness, under the guidance of an enlightened reason.[1] Clement fixes as the distinguishing characteristic of the Gnosticus, what belongs to the essence of the purely Christian position generally; — namely, that through love the future is already made present.[2] What the Stoics said of the wise man, he applied to the Gnosticus. The latter alone does right for the sake of the right end, to which the whole life should be referred, with clear consciousness. All his actions are therefore, as Clement terms them, according to the Stoic terminology, κατορθώματα. The good, on the other hand, which the πιστικός does, in a more unconscious way, — instinctively, — is a μέσον, something intermediate between good and evil.[3] This resembles what the Gnostics

[1] Strom. f. 518, 519, et 645.

[2] Ἔστιν αὐτῷ δι' ἀγάπην ἐνεστὸς ἤδη τὸ μέλλον. L. c. l. VI f. 652.

[3] Τοῦ δὲ ἁπλῶς πιστοῦ μέση πρᾶξις λέγοιτ' ἂν μηδέπω κατὰ λόγον ἐπιτελουμένη, μηδὲ τὴν κατ' ἐπίστασιν κατορθουμένη Strom. lib. VI. f. 669. With which may be compared, perhaps, what he says of the ὀρθοδοξάσταις καλουμένοις. Ἔργοις προσφέρονται καλοῖς, οὐκ εἰδότες ἃ ποιοῦσι. L. c. lib. I. f. 292.

said of the good works of the psychical natures. Hence the γνῶσις is its own end, and the highest — not a means to something else; for it is the life in the godlike itself. It would live only in the uninterrupted contemplation of the godlike, and struggles only to come in possession of itself. But the πίστις is a means, inasmuch as it is impelled to the avoidance of sin and to obedience by the fear of punishment and the hope of reward.[1] We find in Clement a remarkable exposition of the difference between intuition, knowledge, and faith, wherein he defines their relation to each other. Faith receives the fundamental doctrines, without intuition, only with a view to practical exercise; the intuition of the spirit soars immediately to what is highest; the intermediate steps of demonstration is what he calls γνῶσις and ἐπιστήμη.[2]

In speaking of the progressive steps in the divine education of man, where he represents the Logos as the θεῖος παιδαγωγός, Clement says:[3] "All men belong to him, some with consciousness of what he is to them, others as yet without it; some as friends, others as *faithful servants*, others barely as *servants*. He is their Teacher, educating the Gnostics by the revelation of mysteries, (the inward intuition of truth,) the believer by good hopes, and the hardened by corrective discipline affecting the outward sense." What Clement says, then, on the relation of the γνωστικός to the πιστικός in respect to subjective Christianity, would seem to agree entirely with what the Gnostics taught concerning the relation of the πνευματικός to the ψυχικός in the same respect: but still there is this important difference, in two particulars; first, that Clement did not derive these two several positions from an original difference of human natures, but allowed that a capacity for attaining to the highest existed equally in all; so that everything was made to depend simply on the cultivation of that capacity, conditioned on each one's own activity. Next, Clement differs from the Gnostics, in that he recognizes the same foundation of objective Christianity for both the higher and lower position of Christian knowledge and life. It might be said, that the two different positions of subjective Christianity, however, which Clement here distinguishes, actually existed at that time; and moreover, since they are grounded in human nature, are found again in other times; so that the language employed to denote these two several positions is not of so much importance; — for it can make no so great difference whether we suppose two several degrees in the development of faith and of the life in faith, or whether, like Clement in many passages of his writings, we attribute the true spiritual life of faith to the Gnosis only. Yet this distinction is by no means of such inferior importance as it might seem to be at the first glance, but is both more deeply grounded and followed by more important consequences than would at first appear. The reason why the Alexandrians conceived the matter in this way, lay partly in their predominant

[1] L. c. lib. VI. f. 663

[2] The different meanings of φρόνησις, according to the different ways of employing the conception: Ἐπειδὰν μὲν ἐπιβάλλῃ τοῖς πρώτοις αἰτίοις, νόησις καλεῖται· ὅταν δὲ ταύτην ἀποδεικτικῷ λόγῳ βεβαιώσηται, γνῶσις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ὀνομάζεται· ἐν δὲ τοῖς εὐλαβείαν συντείνουσι γενομένη, καὶ ἄνευ θεωρίας παραδεξαμένη τὸν ἀρχικὸν λόγον, κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐξεργασίας τήρησιν, πίστις λέγεται. L. c. lib. VI. f. 691

[3] L. c. lib. VII. f. 702.

intellectual tendency, and partly in the form under which faith was presented to them in the case of many of the Christians of that period.

As regards the first point, it is evident that, by their prevailing contemplative and speculative tendency of mind, their entanglement in the forms of the Platonic philosophy, the Alexandrians were hindered from acknowledging, in its full extent, the independent practical power of faith to transform the whole spiritual life from within; although, in order to arrive at this truth, Clement needed only to unfold what was already clearly involved in his own language on this subject, which we cited above.

As to the second point, we should not forget the particular shape under which faith, as many possessed it, was presented to the Alexandrians,— where it consisted of little else than a blind belief on authority, accompanied, as it would seem, with a sort of sensuous Eudemonism. They could not fail to observe, it is true, the meliorating influence of faith on the life, even where it appeared to them under this form, when they compared the condition of these men, as Christians, with what they had previously been as Pagans; and indeed, as we have already remarked, they were far from denying it: but still they thought they could see nothing here of the ennobling influence of Christianity on the whole inner nature of the man — nothing of the divine life of the spirit; and this sensuous Christianity was repugnant to their own spiritualizing mode of thought. They might be led, too, it may be supposed, by the repulsive impression which this sensuous form produced on their minds, to overlook the divine life which lay hidden under this incrustation, without being able as yet to break, through the indurated shell. And again we ought not to forget, that, when the new spiritual world first began to be formed out of Christianity, there was much still lying confused in a chaotic mass that could be separated and reduced to order only by slow degrees; — as for example, the different parts of theology, which afterwards mutually set bounds to each other and the departments of a theology which was to spring immediately out of Christianity; and of a Christian philosophy, which was to receive from Christianity its main impulse and direction. Thus a great deal that was vague and erroneous might be traced to the fact, that heterogeneous interests and wants were confounded with each other in the souls of these men; although the immediate religious interest was with them ever the predominant one. Hence, forgetting the immediate and originally practical aim of holy writ, they sought in it for the solution of questions which it was never designed to answer.

This mistake discovers itself in the answer which Clement gave to those who opposed the humility of knowledge to the Alexandrian Gnosis. "The wise man is convinced," said they, "that there are many things incomprehensible; and precisely in acknowledging the incomprehensibleness of these things consists his wisdom." But Clement replied: "This wisdom belongs as well to those also who are capable only of very narrow and limited views. The Gnosticus comprehends what to others appears incomprehensible; for he is convinced that to

the Son of God nothing is incomprehensible, and that there is nothing, therefore, concerning which he may not be taught by him; for he who suffered out of love to us, could withhold from us nothing which is necessary for our instruction in the Gnosis.[1] "

The fundamental ideas here unfolded, respecting different stages of development in Christianity, we find presented once more by *Origen*, the second great teacher of the Alexandrian school; but in such a way as leads us to recognize in him a disciple gifted with creative powers of his own; — one who, although excited by ideas received from another, or passing current in a certain circle, yet did not adopt them as a matter of tradition, but reproduced them in an independent manner out of his own Christian experience and reflection, — seized and digested them in a form peculiar to himself, and full of his own life and spirit. And here we must notice the fact, that he did not belong to that class who had been conducted by the Platonic element of philosophical culture out of the midst of paganism to Christianity, but that he came to strive after a Gnosis from the position of a well-assured faith and childlike piety. This earnest and settled faith he had received from a Christian education; and to this he ever remained true, amidst all the changes of his outward and inner life. As the fervor of his piety, when a child, had led him to seek martyrdom; so in the evening of life, when his fundamental principle in theology and dogmatics had undergone an entire change, he still displayed the same earnest zeal, which subjected him to great sufferings in the cause of his faith. Even after he had settled the principles of his Gnosis, far was it from his thoughts ever to resolve Christianity into a certain system of general ideas, and to consider the historical element as nothing but their drapery. The acknowledgment of the great facts of Christianity in their reality, — this was the presupposition which his Gnosis adopted from faith; and it was to be the aim of the former, to understand the full significance of these very facts in their connection with the whole developing process of the universe. The Gnosis was to demonstrate, that without these facts the universe could never have reached the ultimate goal of its completion. With the striving to penetrate beneath the surface into the interior of things is not united here, as might possibly happen in such a tendency, an inclination to evaporate everything into the subjective; but, on the contrary, an aim to understand the great phenomena of religion according to their objective import, and in their connection with supernatural factors. We will illustrate this position by a remarkable example. Thus, Origen seeks for the cause of the sudden conversion of entire populations or cities, not in their previous course of development, but in the impression which the appearance of Christ produced on the spiritual powers presiding over these populations; just as, in the case of the Gnostics, the effect of Christ's appearance on the spirit of humanity and of history was *objectized* into an effect on the Demiurge.[2]

[1] Strom. l. VII. f. 649.

[2] Origen, T. XIII. § 58: Ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντάς τι γίνεσθαι, μεταβαλόντας ἐπὶ τὸ βελτίον ἐν τῇ Χριστοῦ ἐπιδημίᾳ, ὥστε τινὰς ὅλας πόλεις ἢ καὶ ἔθνη οἰκειότερον πολλῶν ἐσχηκέναι τὰ πρὸς τὸν Χριστόν.

In his controversies with the Pagans, who reproached the Christians as followers of a blind faith, Origen often declares it to be the peculiarity of Christianity, as a revelation from God, who cares for the salvation of *all men*, that it has the power of attracting even the great masses of mankind, those who are incapable of scientific inquiry, and of operating, by virtue of bare faith,[1] with divine power for their sanctification. He appeals to the experience of the many thousands who could bear testimony to this power of Christianity, and also to the analogy of all life, where every course of action, that contemplates some end in the future, must proceed on the ground of faith and trust.[2] Those who had first attained to the faith only in this form, and become renewed by it, might next be led of themselves to penetrate by degrees more deeply into the sense of the holy scriptures.[3] The *Pistis* he considers to be the lowest position of Christianity, — a stage of it which must exist, "in order that the simple also, who devote themselves so far as they can to a pious life, may obtain salvation." Above this he places the position of the Gnosis and of the Sophia. The latter is a divine wisdom, communicated by divine grace to such souls as are capable of receiving it, and as seek after it by the study of the scriptures and prayer to God. Human wisdom, the wisdom of this world, is only a preparatory discipline of the soul, designed to fit it, by cultivating the powers of thought, for the attainment of that higher wisdom, which is its true end.[4] In refuting the Gnostics, who confined the faith which is awakened by miracles exclusively to the psychical natures, Origen adduced the example of the Apostle Paul, who was led to the faith by a miraculous vision.[5] In relation to the fundamental principle of the Montanists, he took the right ground; placing the gifts connected with knowledge and teaching above the gift of miracles, and appealing to the fact, that Paul assigns to them the highest place, in that passage of the second epistle to the Corinthians which treats of the relation of these gifts to each other.[6]

Like Clement, Origen, in many passages of his writings, expresses himself emphatically with regard to the essence of faith, as being a fact of the inner life, whereby man enters into a real communion with divine things; and from this living faith, he distinguishes that which clings only to outward authority. Thus in his exposition of John 8: 24,[7] he says: "Faith brings with it a spiritual communion with him in whom one believes; — hence a kindred disposition of mind,[8] which will manifest itself in works. The object of faith is taken up into the inner life, and becomes to it an informing principle. Where this is not the case, it is only a dead faith, and deserves not the name. Now as Christ

[1] Ψιλὴ πίστις, πίστις ἄλογος.

[2] Compare, e. g. c. Cels. lib. I. c. 9, and lib. VI. c. 12, seqq.

[3] Μετὰ τὴν ἁπαξ γενομένην εἰσαγωγὴν, φιλοτιμήσασθαι πρὸς τὸ καὶ βαθύτερα τῶν κεκρυμμένων νοημάτων ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς καταλαβεῖν. Philocal. c. 15.

[4] Γυμνάσιον μέν φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν, τέλος δὲ τὴν θείαν. c. Cels. l. VI. c. 13

[5] In Joann. T. XIII. § 59.

[6] Ἐπεὶ τον λόγον προετίμα τῶν τερατίων ἐνεργειῶν, διὰ τοῦτο ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων καὶ χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων ἐν τῇ κατωτέρα τίθησι χώρᾳ παρὰ τὰ λογικὰ χαρίσματα c. Cels. l. III. c. 46.

[7] In Joann. T. XIX. § 6.

[8] Διακεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ συμπεφυκέναι αὐτῷ.

presents himself to the religious consciousness as the Logos who has appeared in humanity under various relations,[1] so the faith will correspond to these various relations; and as Christ is an object of faith in these different relations, he is received as such into the inner life; — and this must be actually manifested — nothing can gain admittance into the life which conflicts with what Christ is in these several relations. Thus with the faith in Christ as the justice, the wisdom, the power of God, is given also the appropriation of that which is involved in these conceptions, — and whatever contradicts them is banished." It might be said, it is true, "that Origen is here speaking rather of an ideal than of a historical Christ. Were the latter left wholly out of the account, and those general attributes, of which Christ is here considered as the bearer, substituted in place of him, nothing would be thereby changed." But assuredly a meaning would thus be foisted into the words of the great teacher which is wholly foreign from him; for it is difficult to conceive, how he whose higher life had sprung out of faith in the Christ of history, and ever continued to be rooted in that faith, could possibly, when this Christ had certainly become all that to himself which he denoted by these conceptions, entertain the intention of separating what was so closely united in the experience of his own inner life. From the spiritual fellowship, springing out of faith, with this real Christ, all these qualities should be developed in the case of each individual — an order of connection which is grounded moreover in his ideas, hereafter to be explained, on the relation of the *ἐπιδημία νοητὴ τοῦ λόγου* to the *ἐπιδημία αἰσθητή*. And he says expressly, with the Apostle John, that whosoever denies the Son, the same hath not the Father, in any form, "neither for the Pistis nor for the Gnosis."[2] It is true, as we have just seen, that Origen acknowledged the importance of miracles as a means of awakening religious faith, and he recognizes a certain stage of faith, proceeding in the first place from the impression produced by miracles; but yet he requires that the faith should rise higher than this stage, to the *spiritual* apprehension of the truth. Accordingly he distinguishes[3] a sensuous faith in miracles from faith in the truth. He says, comparing John 8 : 43 and 45 : "Those sensuous Jews had indeed been impressed by the miracle, and believed in Jesus as a worker of miracles; but they had not the recipient temper for divine truth, and did not believe in Jesus as a revealer of the more profound truths of religion;"[4] and he adds: "We see the same thing exemplified at the present day by multitudes, who wonder at Jesus when they contemplate his history, yet believe in him no longer, when some more profound doctrine, exceeding their own power of comprehension, is unfolded; but suspect that it is false. Let us therefore take heed, lest he say to us also, 'Ye believe me not, because I tell you the truth.'"

Origen sometimes compares the relation of the *Pistis* to the *Gnosis*,

[1] The different *ἐπινοῖαι τοῦ Χριστοῦ*.

[2] In Joann. T. XIX. § 1. Ed Lommatzsch, T. II. p. 143.

[3] In Joann. T. XX. c. 25.

[4] As if Christ would have said: *Καθ' ὃ μὲν τεράστια ποιῶ, πιστεύετέ μοι, καθ' ὃ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν λέγω, οὐ πιστεύετέ μοι.*

with the relation of the present world to the future, — of that which is in part to that which is perfect, — of faith to intuition. So when he says: "They who have received the charisma of the Gnosis and of the Sophia, live no longer in faith, but in open vision; — they are the spiritually-minded, who are no longer at home in the body, but even while here below are present with the Lord. But *they* are still at home in the body, and not yet present with the Lord, who do not understand the spiritual sense of scripture, but cleave wholly to its body, (its letter, see below.) For if the Lord is the Spirit, how can *he* be otherwise than still far from the Lord, who cannot as yet seize the spirit that maketh alive and the spiritual sense of scripture? But such a person lives in faith."[1] He takes great pains here to explain, in his own sense, what Paul had said, so directly contradictory to this view, concerning the relation of faith to open vision, in the fifth chapter of the second epistle to the Corinthians; combating, not without sophistical equivocation, the position correctly maintained by most of the church fathers, that Paul spoke of himself as one who still lived in faith, and had not yet attained to open vision. He assumes that the phrases, "to be present in the body" and "in the flesh," and "to live after the flesh," are synonymous; and so arrives at the conclusion, that Paul asserted this, not of himself and all spiritually-minded men, but only of believers who were still carnally-minded.

Yet we ought not to infer too much from such a passage as the one above cited. We should wholly misapprehend Origen, if for this reason we supposed, that he placed the Gnosis of this present life on a level with the intuition of the life eternal. Far was he from this. The longing after a divine life beyond this world was too deeply seated in his lofty spirit, to find its satisfaction so easily in the self-delusion of over-strained speculations. He longed after a knowledge of divine things no longer confined by the limitations of this earthly existence. In such places as the one alluded to, he speaks only in the way of comparison, in conformity with the principles of a method of interpretation which allowed the same biblical expression to be variously explained, according to its several grades of application. Thus he might employ, in order to explain the relation of the Old Testament to the New, — the relation of the Pistis to the Gnosis, — the same expression which, in its highest and fullest sense, had reference to the relation of the present world to the world to come.[2] In other passages, he expresses himself strongly on this point, namely, that not only the knowledge of this life, as a knowledge only in part, shall vanish away, when the fulness of the eternal life appears, but that the same shall be true also of *all the goods* pertaining to the present life. He considers even the faith of this earthly life only as in part, and describes a perfect faith, which shall enter in at the same time with the perfect knowledge; of *which* faith *so denominated*, in this higher sense, *that* of course could not be

[1] In Joann. T. XIII. § 52.

[2] Τῷ ἐρχομένῳ τελείῳ καταργοῦντι τὸ ἐκ μέρους, ὅταν τὸ ὑπερέχον τῆς γνώσεως Χριστοῦ χωρῆσαι τις δυνηθῇ, οὐ συγκρίσει πάντα τὰ πρὸ τῆς τηλικαύτης καὶ τοσαύτης γνώσεως οὐ σκύβαλα τῇ ἰδίᾳ φύσει τυγχάνοντα σκύβαλα ἀναφαίνεται. In Matth. T. X. § 9

predicated, which is affirmed of the faith belonging to the "many," and which is opposed to the Gnosis.[1]

The two different stages or positions of the Pistis and of the Gnosis stand, according to this view, in the same relation to each other, as the *χριστιανισμὸς σωματικός* to the *χριστιανισμὸς πνευματικός*, the *σωματικῶς χριστιανίζειν* to the *πνευματικῶς χριστιανίζειν*. He who stands at the position of the fleshly Christianity, continues to adhere only to the letter of scripture, to the history of Christ; — he cleaves to the outward form of the manifestation of the godlike, without elevating himself in spirit to the inward essence therein revealed. He stops short at the earthly, temporal, historical appearance of the divine Logos; — he does not mount upward to the intuition of the Logos himself. He is intent upon that which is the outer shell of the doctrines of Christianity, without reaching the spiritual kernel within; he cleaves to the mere letter of scripture, in which the spirit lies bound. The spiritual Christian, on the other hand, sees in the temporal appearance and actions of Christ, a revelation and representation of the eternal acting and working of the divine Logos. The letter of scripture is for him but an envelope of the spirit; and he knows how to disentangle the spirit from this covering. Everything temporal in the form of the manifestation of divine things is for him taken up into the inner intuition of the spirit; — the sensuous gospel of the letter[2] becomes spiritualized into the revelation of the eternal, spiritual gospel;[3] and the highest problem for him is, to discern the latter in the former; to translate the former into the latter; to understand the holy scriptures as a revelation of one coherent plan of the divine Logos for the progressive education of humanity, — of his uninterrmitted activity exerted for the salvation of fallen beings — the central point of which is his appearance in humanity, (the sensible representation of his eternal, spiritual agency,[4]) and its end, the return of every fallen being to God. Since he makes everything refer *to this*, it follows, that by the gospel, as he views it, all scripture is transfigured into gospel. It is by spiritual fellowship with the divine Logos, — Origen supposes therefore, — by receiving the spirit of Christ into the inner life alone,[5] that each for himself attains to true, spiritual Christianity, and to the right, spiritual understanding of all scripture. Now as the prophets, even before *Christ's temporal appearance*, shared in the spiritual fellowship with the divine Logos, and by virtue of this fellowship were enabled to announce before-hand the whole of Christianity; — as they already possessed, therefore, the spiritual understanding of the Old Testament, and were already, even before the appear-

[1] *Ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλειον, ὅπερ ὅταν ἔλθῃ, τὸ ἐκ μέρους καταργηθήσεται, πᾶσα ἡ ἐνταῦθα πίστις ἡμῶν ὀλιγοπιστία ἐστὶ καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο οὐδέπω νοοῦμεν οἱ ἐκ μέρους γινώσκοντες.* In Matth. T. XII. § 6. *Ὅπερ ἐπὶ γνώσεως εἴρηται· ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους· τόδε καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς καλοῦ ἀκόλουθον οἶμαι λέγειν· ἐν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἡ πίστις. Διόπερ ἄρτι πιστεύω ἐκ μέρους· ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ τὸ τέλειον τῆς πίστεως, τὸ ἐκ μέρους καταργηθήσεται, τῆς διὰ εἴδους πίστεως, πολλῷ διαφερούσης τῆς, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, δι' ἐσόπτρου καὶ ἐν αἰνίγματι, ὁμοίως τῇ νῦν γνώσει, πίστεως.* In Joann. T. X. § 27.

[2] *Τὸ εὐαγγέλιον αἰσθητόν.*

[3] *Τοῦ εὐαγγελίου πνευματικοῦ, αἰωνίου.*

[4] The *ἐπιδημία αἰσθητή*, symbol of the *ἐπιδημία νοητὴ τοῦ λόγου.*

[5] The *ἐπιδημία νοητὴ τοῦ Χριστοῦ.*

ance of Christianity, in a certain sense Christians; — so, on the other hand, there are still to be found among Christians, since the appearance of Christ, men who have not as yet come to share in this spiritual fellowship with the divine Word,— men who, like the Jews of old, still cling to the outer veil, and of whom the same may be asserted, — as Paul said of the Jews who lived before the appearance of Christianity, Gal. iv.,— that they are children to whom "the time appointed of the Father" has not yet come; and that, *as* children, they are still under tutors and governors, still possessed of habits of thinking which are merely preparatory in order to fit them for receiving the true spiritual Christianity. "Every soul," says Origen, "which enters on its childhood, and finds itself on the way to maturity, needs, till its appointed time of maturity arrives, a task-master, tutor, or governor."[1]

Accordingly, Origen compares the different stages of the development of Christianity in the *same period*, with the different stages of religious development in the *succession of time*. His theory is, that as Judaism was a necessary stage preparatory to Christianity, so also there is still, in the Christian church, a Jewish mode of thinking, which forms a preparatory stage and a transition-point to the true, spiritual apprehension of Christianity; that as, under the Old Testament, we must admit, there was a spiritual revelation of Christ preceding his temporal appearance, and an anticipation of the Christ-like, so under the New again, there must be supposed to exist, in the case of the great mass of believers in a historical Christ, a stage of religious faith approaching much nearer to a Jewish than a Christian position. "We must know," says he,[2] "that Christ's spiritual presence was revealed, even before he appeared in the body, to those perfected ones who had passed their season of childhood; to those who were no longer under tutors and governors, but to whom the spiritual fulness of time had appeared; to the patriarchs, to Moses the servant of God, and to the prophets who saw Christ's glory. But as *he appeared himself*, before his visible appearance in the flesh, to those perfected ones; so too — since his predicted assumption of human nature — there have appeared, for the sake of such as are still children, being under tutors and governors, and not yet come to the fulness of time, *those precursors* of Christ, the ideas which are suited to the minds of children, and which may be said to be necessary for their education. But the *Son himself*, the divine Word, has not as yet appeared to them in his glory; since he waits for that preparation of mind which must open the way for him to those men of God who are destined to comprehend his divine dignity. And again, we should know, that as there is a law, containing the shadow of those good things to come, which are revealed by the promulgation of the true law, (in Christianity,) so too it is only the shadow of the Christian mysteries which is presented in that gospel which every common reader supposes he understands. *That* gospel, on the contrary, which John calls the

[1] Commentar. in Matth. 213. Πᾶσα ψυχὴ, ἐρχομένη εἰς νηπιότητα καὶ ὁδεύουσα ἐπὶ τὴν τελειότητα, δεῖται μέχρις ἐνστῇ αὐτῇ τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου, παιδαγωγοῦ καὶ οἰκονόμων καὶ ἐπιτρόπων.

[2] Orig. in Joann. T. I. § 9

everlasting, which may be properly called the *spiritual* gospel, sets clearly before the eyes of all who understand it, whatever pertains to the Son of God himself, the mysteries typified under his discourses, and the things of which his actions were the symbols. Accordingly, we must believe, that as there is a Jew which is one outwardly, and a circumcision which is outward in the flesh, so there is also an outward Christian, and an outward baptism."

This theory of two different positions in Christianity is, in Origen's case, closely connected with another theory of his, respecting the different forms of the revelation of Christ with reference to these different positions. While the Gnostics separated the revealing and redeeming power of God into various hypostases,[1] according to the different grades or positions which, owing to a radical difference of natures, they supposed to exist in the spiritual world; while they had their Monogenes, Logos, and Soter, their ἄνω and their κάτω Χριστός, their *pneumatical* and their *psychical* Christ; Origen, on the contrary, acknowledged the unity of essence, and of the divine and human elements in the appearance of Christ. There was for him but one Christ, who is *all;* but he appeared under different predicates, through different ways of intuition, in different relations to those to whom he revealed himself, according to their different capacities and wants, and hence, either in his godlike majesty, or in his human condescension. It is a thought often recurring in Origen, that, in a more divine sense than Paul did, the Redeemer becomes all things to all men, in order that he may win all.[2] "The Redeemer," says he, "becomes many things, perhaps even all things, according to the necessities of the whole creation capable of being redeemed by him."[3] Those predicates which belong essentially to the divine Word, as the eternal revealer of God to the whole world of spiritual being, the fountain of all truth and goodness, must be distinguished from those predicates which he has only assumed, in behalf of those fallen beings who are to be redeemed by him, and in condescension to the different positions at which they stand. "Happy are they," says Origen,[4] "who have advanced so far as to need the Son of God no longer as a healing physician, no longer as a shepherd, no longer as the redemption; but who need him only as the Truth, the Word, the Sanctification, and in whatever other relation he stands to those whose maturity enables them to comprehend what is most glorious in his character." Historical, practical Christianity, the preaching of Christ crucified, was regarded by Origen as nothing more than a subordinate position: above this, he places a certain wisdom of the perfect, which knows Christ no longer in the humble condition of a servant, but recognizes him in his exaltation, as the divine Word; although he acknowledges the former as a necessary preparation, to enable men to rise from the temporal to the eternal revelation of God, and, cleansed by faith in

[1] See part II.
[2] In Joann. T. XX. § 28.
[3] In Joann. T. I. § 22, where, as I suppose, instead of καθαρίζει we should read κατ' ἀ χρήζει αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐλευθεροῦσθαι δυναμένη πᾶσα κτίσις.
[4] In Joann. T. I. § 22.

the crucified, made holy by following the Son of God as he appeared in human nature, to become fitted for the spiritual communications of his divine essence. "When thou canst understand the difference between the divine Word," says Origen,[1] "as it is either proclaimed in the foolishness of preaching, or presented in the wisdom of the perfect, thou shalt perceive how it is, that the divine Word has for the beginners in Christianity the form of a servant; while he comes in the majesty of the Father to the perfect, who can say, We behold his glory, the glory of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth; for to the perfect, the glory of the Word appears as He is, the only-begotten of the Father, and as He is, full of grace and truth; which *he* cannot comprehend, whose faith stands in the *foolishness of preaching*." In another place,[2] he says: "To them that live in the flesh, he became flesh; but to them who no longer walk after the flesh, he appears as the divine Logos, who was in the beginning with God, and who reveals to them the Father. That stage of faith where one desires to know nothing save Christ crucified, he regarded as a subordinate one; from which however, through the sanctification there obtained, one might progressively advance to the higher, spiritual Christianity. With regard to this preparatory faith, he remarks: "If one belong to that class of the Corinthians, among whom Paul was determined not to know anything save Jesus Christ and him crucified; if he have learned only of him who for our sakes became man; yet even through the man Jesus he may be formed into the man of God, die, in the imitation of his death, unto sin, and rise, in the imitation of his resurrection, to a godlike life." Thus the *intellectualizing* mysticism of Origen did not permit him rightly to understand the meaning and force of St. Paul's determination not to know anything save Jesus the crucified. What the great apostle considered as the highest attainment, Origen regards as making a subordinate position, above which the Gnosticus is bound to rise. It is true, he stands in no real contradiction with Paul, when he asserts, under the name of the Gnosis, a wisdom of the perfect, which cannot be understood at any lower position that remains still too carnal. Yet there is this difference between what Origen has in view, and what is meant by St. Paul. According to the doctrine of the latter, it is in a practical way, by becoming more and more purified from that which resists the influences of the Divine Spirit, from the selfish nature, by becoming ennobled through the spirit of love and humility, that one attains to that higher wisdom; while Origen, still too much fettered by his Platonic *Intellectualism*, makes the progress to that higher wisdom depend especially on the stripping away of the sensuous and material elements in life and in contemplation, — on a direction of life and an effort after knowledge, aspiring to the superhuman. According to the doctrine of Paul, the *fact* of Christ's appearance as the Son of God on earth, of his passion, and of his resurrection, is the central point on which the whole of Christianity turns, and so, consequently, that

[1] In Matth. p. 290. [2] In Matth. p. 268. [3] In Joann. T. I. § 11.

wisdom of the perfect which is grounded in the more profound understanding of *historical* Christianity. According to Origen's doctrine, the Gnosis, while it acknowledges and presupposes the importance of those facts in their bearing on the salvation of fallen beings, and searches into their deeper grounds, yet strives ultimately at this, — namely, to rise from the historical Christ to the spiritual essence of the Logos, as he is in himself, and so above this to the absolute itself, the ὄν, — to attain to the understanding of the life and conduct of the historical Christ, as a symbol of the ever-enduring, controlling agency of the *Divine Logos*. From this spiritual revelation of the Logos, the Gnosticus has still more to learn than he can derive from the holy scriptures, however accurately understood; "for the latter contain, after all, but a few comparatively insignificant elements of the whole of the Gnosis, and a very brief introduction to the same."[1] We should be careful to note here, however, that Origen, like Clement, confounding the provinces of a Christian system of faith and of Christian speculation, was looking in the holy scriptures for the solution of many problems which revelation generally was never intended to solve; matters with which the wisdom of the perfect, in the Pauline sense, had not the least concern.

Yet we cannot fail, at the same time, to perceive in what Origen says, concerning the different stages of Christian development, according as the Jewish principle either mixed in again or was vanquished by the Christian spirit, a fundamental truth, fertile of results in its relation to the study of history, which, suppressed at first by the dominion of a narrow spirit in dogmatics and church life, was destined to make good its rightful claims, not till a long time after. And intimately connected with this mode of contemplation was the magnanimous toleration which distinguished Origen as well as Clement; but which in the former, as the author of a firmly established system of doctrines, shines forth the more brightly, when we find him looking after and acknowledging the Christian spirit which presented itself to him with more or less of purity in all its various stages of development. He showed himself an enemy to that pride of understanding which could wantonly injure the Christian feelings of such as appeared to entertain more narrow views, or which could treat their opinions with haughty contempt. "As Paul," says he, "could not profit those who were Jews according to the flesh, unless — where there was good reason for so doing — he caused Timothy to be circumcised, shaved his own head, presented an offering, and, in a word, became a Jew to the Jews, in order that he might win the Jews; so he who would be profitable to many persons, cannot, by means of spiritual Christianity alone, educate and advance to a higher and better stage those who still remain in the school of sensuous Christianity: hence, they must combine spiritual Christianity with the Christianity of sense.[2] And whenever it becomes

[1] Οἶμαι τῆς ὅλης γνώσεως στοιχεῖά τινα, ἐλαχίστας καὶ βραχυτάτας εἶναι εἰσαγωγὰς ὅλας γραφὰς, κἂν πάνυ νοηθῶσιν ἀκριβῶς. In Joann. T. XIII. § 5.

[2] Πνευματικῶς καὶ σωματικῶς χριστιανίζειν. In like manner, Clement, where he speaks of the οἰκονομία of the Gnosticus, Strom. l. VII. f. 730. Comp. the ideas of Philo, vol. I. p. 52, and onward.

necessary to preach the gospel of sense, by virtue of which one is determined to know nothing among sensuous-minded men save Jesus and him crucified, this must be done. But when they show themselves to be well-grounded Christians, bringing forth the fruits of the Spirit, when they have imbibed a love for the heavenly wisdom, then we should communicate to them the Word now once more exalted from its appearance in humanity to that which it was in the beginning with God.[1]" So in expounding the words of Christ in Matthew 19 : 14,[2] after having drawn from them the general doctrine, that one should become a child with children, in order to win over the children also to the kingdom of God; just as Christ himself, although in the form of God, yet became a child;—he proceeds in the following beautiful strain: "This should be rightly understood, so that we may not, out of a vain conceit of our own wisdom and superiority, as great ones in the church, despise the little ones and the children; but, remembering how it is said, that of such is the kingdom of heaven, so demean ourselves, that through our means the salvation of the children may be promoted. It is not enough that we do not stand in the way to prevent such little ones from being brought to the Saviour; we should fulfil his will, by becoming children with the children; that so when the children shall, through our means who become children, enter into bliss, we, as they who have humbled themselves, may be exalted of God." Origen is here censuring those who, like the Gnostics, were wont to despise the more ordinary teachers, such as, wanting the advantages of a high mental cultivation, presented the simple gospel in a rude, unpretending form; as though they were doing something unworthy of so great a Saviour and Master.[3] "Even after we have attained to the highest intuition of the word and of the truth, we shall still assuredly not altogether forget the *sufferings* of Christ; for to these were we indebted for our introduction to this higher life during the period of our earthly existence."[4]

It is already evident, from what has been said, that, corresponding to these two different ways of apprehending Christianity, there would also be two different modes of interpreting the sacred writings; one having reference to the literal and historical, and the other to the higher spiritual sense. The highest problem in the interpretation of scripture, for Origen, was, to translate the gospel of sense into the gospel of the spirit;[5] as it was the highest aim of Christianity, to rise from the earthly appearance of the incarnate Word to spiritual fellowship with him, and to the contemplation of his divine essence. Thus he looked upon all scripture as a letting-down of the infinitely exalted, heavenly spirit to the human form which is so incompetent to grasp it; as a condescension of the divine teacher of humanity to man's infirmities and wants; the whole of scripture being, as it were, a humaniza-

[1] In Joann. T. I. § 9.

[2] In Matth. l. c. 374, 375. Ed. Huet. or T. XV. in Matth. § 7, ed. Lommatzsch, T. III. p. 340.

[3] Βλεπέτω οὖν τις τινὰ τῶν ἐπαγγελλομένων κατήχησιν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν καὶ διδασκαλίαν, προσφέροντα τὰ μωρὰ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὰ ἐξουδενωμένα καὶ τὰ ἀγενῆ.

[4] In Joann. T. II. § 4.

[5] Τὸ μεταλαβεῖν τὸ αἰσθητὸν εὐαγγέλιον εἰς τὸ πνευματικόν.

tion of the Logos. Profound and pregnant ideas are those which Origen here expresses, — ideas which, seized and wrought over by sober, logical thought, would be prolific of results in their application to hermeneutics, exegesis, the defence of revealed religion, and doctrinal theology; though Origen was hindered from carrying them out in this manner by the cleaving defect in his fundamental principle of theology. Thus, he says:[1] "All which is here called the word of God is a revelation of the incarnate and — so far as it concerns his divine essence — self-renouncing divine Word. Hence we see the Word of God on earth, since it became man, under a human form; for, in the scriptures, the Word *continually* becomes flesh,[2] in order to dwell among us. But when we have leaned on the bosom of the incarnate Word, and are able to follow him as he goes up into the high mountain, (Matt. 17,) then we shall say, we have seen his glory, — the transfiguration of scripture, for all who, in the living fellowship with Christ, and rising above the world with him, thus learn to understand its spirit." He went upon the principle, that an analogy existed between holy scripture, as the work of God, and the whole creation, as proceeding from the same almighty hand. Thus he says:[3] "We ought not to be surprised, if the superhuman character of the thought does not, to the unlearned, immediately become obvious in every text of scripture; for even in the works of a providence which embraces the whole world, some things reveal themselves as such works of providence in the clearest manner, whilst others are so obscure as to leave room for the admission of unbelief in a God who governs all with inexpressible wisdom and power. But as we do not quarrel with providence on account of those things which we do not understand, if we are but truly convinced that such a providence exists; so neither can we doubt the divinity which pervades the whole body of the sacred scriptures, because our weakness is incompetent to trace, in each declaration, that hidden glory of the doctrines, which is veiled under the simplicity of the expression; for we have the treasure in earthen vessels." He says in another place:[4] "Whoever has once assumed the position, that these writings are the word of God, the Creator of the world, must be convinced that the same kind of difficulties which must be encountered by those who attempt to explain the creation, are to be expected also in the case of the holy scriptures. There is a great deal in the scriptures, as well as in creation, which human nature discovers with difficulty, or not at all; and yet we are not warranted, on this account, to accuse the Creator of the universe, and find fault, for example, because we know not the reason why basilisks and other venomous animals were created; for here it is becoming the modesty of true piety, that, remembering the weakness of our race, and how

[1] See Philocal. c. 15.

[2] Clement also remarks, that the character of the scriptures is parabolical, just as the whole appearance of Christ is parabolical, — the divine under an earthly veil. *Παραβολικὸς γὰρ ὁ χαρακτὴρ ὑπάρχει τῶν γραφῶν, διότι καὶ ὁ κύριος ουκ ὢν κοσμικός, ὡς κοσμικὸς εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἠλθεν.* Strom. l. VI. f. 677.

[3] Philocal. c. II, p. 10.

[4] L. c. c. 2, p. 61.

impossible it is fully to comprehend the creative wisdom of God, we should leave the knowledge of such matters with God, who will hereafter, when we shall be deemed worthy of it, reveal to us those things about which we have now piously doubted." How full he was of the faith that a divine spirit breathes through the entire scriptures; how convinced that this truth can be received only in the exercise of an humble, believing temper of mind, is beautifully expressed in the following words of Origen:[1] "We are bound to believe, that not one tittle of holy scripture is lacking in the wisdom of God; for he who said to man, 'Thou shalt not appear before me empty,' Exod. 34, will much less himself say anything that is empty; for the prophets receive what they say, out of his fulness; all therefore breathes of this fulness; and there is nothing either in the prophets, in the law, or in the gospel, which does not flow out of this fulness. That breath is to be felt by those who have eyes to perceive the revelations of the divine fulness, ears to hear them, and a sense to inhale the savour which they diffuse. But whenever in reading the scriptures thou comest upon a thought which is, so to speak, a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence to thee, lay it to thy own account; for doubt not this stone of stumbling contains important meaning, and so that shall be fulfilled which is written: 'He that believeth shall not be brought to shame.' Believe first, and thou shalt find, beneath that which thou accountest an offence, much that is profitable for holiness."

But however correct were these principles of Origen, yet, in their application, he was led wide astray from the spirit and aim of holy scripture, and of all divine revelation through the Word, by a false point of view; and this false point of view again was intimately connected with the wrong conception he had formed of the relation of the Gnosis to πίστις. In respect to both these particulars, he was led astray by the too great predominance which he gave to the speculative view of religion; by failing duly to distinguish between what belongs to a Christian creed and what belongs to a Christian philosophy; by not keeping sufficiently in view the essentially practical end of all divine revelations, and of Christianity in particular. He did not refer everything to the great end bearing upon the whole of human nature, — to redemption, regeneration, sanctification, and the blessedness resulting therefrom; but the practical end of reformation was, in his view, a subordinate one, designed especially for the great mass of believers, who were as yet incapable of anything higher and nobler. To his apprehension, the speculative end was the highest; the aim above all others was, to communicate the higher truths to the spiritual men who were competent to understand them, — to the Gnostici. These higher truths were supposed to relate chiefly to the following questions:[2] — "First, concerning God, what is the nature of his only-begotten Son, and in what sense is he the Son of God; for what reason did he condescend to enter into human nature; what effect resulted from this act, and on what beings, and when does it reach them? Secondly, concerning the higher kinds

[1] Philocal. c. 1, p. 51. [2] Philocal. c. 1, p. 28.

of rational beings who have fallen from the state of bliss, and of the causes of their fall; of the different kinds of souls, and whence these differences arise? Thirdly, concerning the world, what is it, and why created; whence the existence of so much evil on the earth, and whether it exists on the earth only, or is to be found also in other parts of the creation?" Regarding, as he did, the solution of these questions to be the main thing, many parts of scripture, if he abode simply by the natural sense, must necessarily appear to him barren as to the most essential end. The whole history of earthly events, and all legislation with regard to mere earthly relations, he therefore explained as being the symbolical veil of a higher history of the spiritual world, and of higher laws relating to a spiritual kingdom. Thus the higher and the subordinate ends of scripture were to be united; the revelation of the higher truths was to be veiled under a letter suited to the instruction of the multitude. "The mass of genuine and simple believers," says Origen, "testify to the utility even of this inferior understanding of the scriptures." Intermediate between these two senses of scripture, Origen supposed there was also another allegorical sense, suited to the capacity of those who had not yet attained to that loftier contemplation of the spirit; — an application, not so elevated and profound, to general purposes of moral instruction and edification, of those passages of scripture which relate to particular cases. Thus he refers to this class the passage 1 Cor. 9 : 9, and most of the allegorical expositions of scripture employed at that time for popular instruction. Thus the three-fold sense of scripture corresponded to the three parts of human nature as it was contemplated by the theory of Origen; to the properly godlike in man, the *spirit*, which tends to the eternal, and finds its appropriate life in the contemplation of things divine; to the *soul*, which moves within the sphere of the finite and temporal; and to the *body*. As Origen agreed with Philo in the essential features of this view, so too he labored generally to deliver objective truth from the historical letter given as an envelope of the spirit.[1] Yet he found passages where the letter seemed to him to be untenable; either because he was destitute of correct principles of interpretation and of the necessary helps thereto, or because he did not understand how to separate in scripture the human element from the divine;[2] or — which is connected with what has just been said — because, starting from exaggerated notions of inspiration, he could not suppose there were any contradictions in scripture even in unimportant matters; — and must believe therefore that the only way of relieving the difficulty was by spiritualizing the meaning.[3] And like Philo, he united to these views such reverence for the holy scriptures, as led him to say, that these things, so untenable according to the letter, — these mythical coverings of a higher sense, — are interspersed, as stones of stumbling, for the purpose of exciting men to deeper investigation.[4]

[1] Τὸ *σωματικὸν τῶν γραφῶν, τὸ ἔνδυμα τῶν πνευματικῶν.*

[2] For example, he considered the story of Uriah to be in its literal meaning untenable; because in David he saw only the inspired of God, and not the *sinful man*

[3] *Ἀναγωγὴ εἰς τὸ νοητόν.*

[4] *Σκάνδαλα, προσκόμματα.*

These principles Origen applied, not to the Old Testament alone, but also, and expressly, to the New,— expressly to the gospel history.[1] Many a difficulty, as he imagined, could be solved by supposing, that the apostles had represented what they had to say respecting a different agency of the divine Logos,[2] under the figurative dress of various sensible facts.[3] The difficulties which he would *thus* remove, were partly such as his own acute intellect, more acute than simple and healthy, had created; and in part such as really existed, but which he could have solved in a better way, and without prejudice to the historical truth, by soberly comparing the different accounts, by distinguishing the divine from the human element in the sacred scriptures, and by separating the essential from the unessential. The application here of his own profound idea respecting the humanization of the divine Logos in the holy scriptures; respecting the Word assuming, in the letter, the form of a servant; respecting the treasure contained in earthly vessels; would have led him, had he been free from the fetters of his mystical *intellectualism*, to another mode of reconciling discrepancies.

These principles of interpretation, it must be allowed, surrendered the historical facts in which Christianity is grounded, to all manner of subjective caprice; and Origen must have been aware of the danger arising from this source. He endeavored to guard against it, and never failed to insist that, in most cases, the letter and the spirit must both be adhered to, and that it was never right to give up the letter, but after the most careful examination. But what safe limits could be fixed in such a case?

We cannot deny, however, that, in the case of Origen himself, the lawless caprice growing out of these principles, which might have been so pernicious to historical Christianity, was restrained by the sincerely devout, believing temper of mind, fully penetrated with the historical truth of Christianity, by which he was actuated. Nor should we forget that, in his case, truth and error were combined together in a manner to be explained only from the personal character of the man, and his relations to a period agitated by so many various and conflicting influences. He observed how earthly-minded Jews, clinging to the letter of the Old Testament, could not attain to the faith in the gospel; how earthly-minded Christians were, in the same way, led to form the rudest notions of God and of divine things; he saw how anti-Jewish Gnostics were, by this same way of regarding the Old Testament, betrayed into the contrary error, refusing to acknowledge as the God of the gospel a being who appeared so material,— which was the fact lying at the ground of their whole system of Dualism. Origen was persuaded that all these conflicting errors could be radically removed

[1] See the passages already cited from the Philocalia;— also c. 15, p. 139.

[2] From divers communications of the *ἐπιδημία νοητὴ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*.

[3] *Προέκειτο αὐτοῖς, ὅπου μὲν ἐνεχώρει, ἀληθεύειν πνευματικῶς ἅμα καὶ σωματικῶς. ὅπου μὴ ἐνεδέχετο ἀμφοτέρως, προκρίνειν τὸ πνευματικὸν τοῦ σωματικοῦ, σωζομένου πολλάκις τοῦ ἀληθοῦς πνευματικοῦ ἐν τῷ σωματικῷ, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, ψεύδει.* In Jo ann. T. X. § 4.

only by this spiritualizing method of interpretation.[1] It was by no means his intention, in this way, to degrade the divine in the sacred scriptures to the level of the human: on the contrary, he went too far to the other extreme, of deifying the human.

Yet, beyond question, the Alexandrian tendency of mind, had it experienced no opposition, had it been allowed to take its own course, unrestrained by that pious spirit which tempered it in the case of a Clement and an Origen, would have led to an Idealism, subversive of all the historical and objective truths in Christianity; just as the mystical interpretation, much as it differed from the mythical in respect to its starting-point, and in the religious-philosophical and doctrinal principles on which it proceeded, yet produced the same results with the latter, and might run into the same mythical system. But here, as appears evident from the conflicts which the school of Origen had to undergo near the end of the present period, this tendency had to meet with a check and counterpoise in the *Realism* of the Western church; while, in turn, the latter tendency felt the spiritualizing influence of the Alexandrian school.

Having thus endeavored to present a general sketch of the different main directions of the theological spirit in their relation to each other, we shall now proceed to consider how far this original diversity went to modify the treatment of the several doctrines in detail; which will present a test of the correctness of our general view, at the same time that it furnishes evidence of the fact, that both tendencies, notwithstanding their antagonism, would still meet and blend together in the fundamental truths of Christianity.

B. *Development of the several Main Doctrines of Christianity.*

We should never forget that Christianity did not deliver to men isolated *speculative* cognitions of God and of divine things, nor furnish them with a ready-made doctrinal system in a form which was to stand; but that it announced *facts* of a communication of God to mankind, by which man was placed in an entirely new relation to his Creator, from the recognition and appropriation of which must result an entirely new direction and shaping of the religious consciousness, and whereby all that had been previously contained in this consciousness must undergo a modification. The fact of the redemption of sinful man through Christ, constitutes the central point of Christianity. It was from the influence which the reception of this fact could not fail to exert on the inward life of man, that this new shaping of the religious consciousness developed itself; and hence proceeded, in the next place, the gradual regeneration in the habits of thinking, so far as they were connected, directly or indirectly, with religion.

This influence extended itself also to the general sense of the divine existence,— the consciousness of the God in whom we live, move, and

[1] After adducing all those errors, he says, Philocal. c. 1, p. 17: Αἰτία δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς προειρημένοις ψευδοδοξιῶν καὶ ἀσεβειῶν ἡ ἰδιωτικῶν περὶ θεοῦ λόγων οὐκ ἄλλη τις εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ ἡ γραφὴ κατὰ τὰ πνευματικὰ μὴ νενοημένη, ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς ψιλὸν γράμμα ἐξειλημμένη.

have our being. *This*, too, became, in believers, a more living, a more profound sentiment. They felt more strongly and vividly the all-pervading presence of that God who made himself to be felt by them in nature, and whose existence to the spirit is undeniable. It was to this undeniable fact of consciousness, indeed, they appealed, in endeavoring to lead the Pagans away from the gods which they themselves, had made, to the acknowledgment of the only true God. This appears to us as the one common feature in the mode of expressing themselves, on this subject, which prevailed among the church fathers, amid all the differences of form between those whose education had led them through the Platonic philosophy, and such men as Tertullian, who — a stranger and an enemy to philosophical culture — witnessed, in an original manner, of that which had penetrated deeply into the vigorous but stern individuality of his character. Clement appeals to the principle, that all scientific proof supposes something which cannot be proved, which can only be seized by coming immediately in contact with the mind. To that which is highest, simple, superior to matter, he says,[1] faith only is capable of rising. He contends, therefore, that there can be no knowledge of God, except so far as he has revealed himself to man. The knowledge of God cannot be arrived at by demonstrative science; for this starts from the more original and better known; but nothing has priority to the Eternal. It only remains, therefore, to arrive at the knowledge of the Unknown by divine grace, and by the revelation of his eternal Word. He then cites the address of Paul at Athens concerning the knowledge of the unknown God.[2] In another place he says: "The great first Cause is exalted above space, time, name, and conception. Hence even Moses asks of God that he would reveal himself to him,[3] — plainly evincing that what God is, no man can teach or express, but that he only can make himself known by his own power." The same father recognizes in all men an efflux from God, a divine particle,[4] which constrains them, in despite of themselves, to acknowledge One Eternal God. What was taught in the philosophical schools concerning the recognition of an unconditioned first truth, presupposed by all demonstrative science, and grounded in the immediate consciousness of the spirit, was by him transferred, it is true, at once, and without supposing any middle step, to an immediate consciousness of the living God, derived from another source than the exercise of the thinking mind,— from God, bearing witness of himself by his own self-manifestation. In place of the undeniable Absolute of speculative reason, he substituted the God known in the universal consciousness of mankind without any mediation.[5]

[1] Strom. l. II. f. 364.
[2] L. c. l. V. f. 588.
[3] L. c. l. V. f. 582. — Ex. 33.
[4] Ἀπόῤῥοια θεϊκή. Protrept. p. 45.
[5] Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου, ἀκουσάτω, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι, and after remarking that neither τέχνη nor φρόνησις can arrive at these principles, he concludes: Πίστει οὖν ἐφικέσθαι ὡόνη οἱόντε τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς. Strom. l. II. f. 364, and l. V. f. 588: Λείπεται δὴ θεία χάριτι καὶ μόνῳ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγῳ τὸ ἀγνωστὸν νοεῖν. Compare Aristot. Ethic. Magn. I. p. 1197, ed. Bekker: Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετ' ἀποδείξεων ὄντων ἐστίν, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς. Of which, or some similar passage, what Clement says is a copy.

As Origen places the idea of one God, according to the language of philosophy, in the same class with the κοιναὶς ἐννοίας, (the ideas common to the consciousness of all mankind,)[1] so he considers the sentiment of God in man's nature to be a mark of its relationship to the Divine Being. Theophilus of Antioch recognizes a revelation of God in all the works of creation; but at the same time he supposes a recipiency to be necessary on the part of man's moral and religious nature, in order to perceive this revelation. Where the one is wanting, the other becomes unintelligible to man. To the common question of sensual-minded Pagans, "Where is your God? show him to us," — he replied, *Show me thy man, and I will show thee my God.* Show me that the eyes of thy soul see, that the ears of thy heart hear. All have eyes to see the sun, but the blind cannot see it. As the blurred mirror is incapable of receiving an image, so the impure soul is incapable of receiving the image of God. True, God has created all things for the purpose of making himself known through his works; just as the soul, though invisible, makes itself known by what it does. All life reveals Him; His breath quickens all; without it, all would sink back to nothing: but the darkness of the soul itself is the reason why it does not perceive this revelation." He therefore says to man: "Submit thyself to the physician, who can heal the eyes of thy soul; submit thyself to God."[2]

While Clement, who had been conducted to Christianity through the Platonic philosophy, would fain discover something akin to the Christian consciousness of God in the sayings of the ancient philosophers, but suffered himself also to be misled, by this effort, to interchange coins of very different value; Tertullian, on the other hand, the friend of nature, the foe of art and of scholastic wisdom, was secure against all such danger. He makes his appeal rather to the spontaneous testimony of souls, not trained in the schools, but simple, rude, and uncultivated.[3] While others rummaged the stores of ancient learning, and even spurious writings, to collect testimonies of the truth presupposed by Christianity in the religious consciousness of mankind, Tertullian contented himself with pointing to an obvious testimony, accessible to all, and of indisputable genuineness, — those sallies of the soul (eruptiones animæ) which are a tacit pledge of the inborn consciousness.[4] Marcion was the only one who, led astray by a misconceived truth, seized on but one particular side, (see above,) and by a direction of the Christian feelings not well understood and pushed to an undue extreme, denied that any testimony concerning the God of the gospel was to be found in the works of creation, or in the common consciousness of mankind. The more emphatically, therefore, does Tertullian dwell on this testimony.[5] "Never," says he, "will God be hidden, never will God be wanting to mankind; always will he be recognized, always perceived, nay, even seen when he wills it. God has for a witness of himself all that we are, and all that is around us. He proves himself to be God, and the one only God, by the very fact that He is known to

[1] C. Cels. lib. I. c. 4.
[2] Ad Autolyc. lib. I. c. 2.
[3] De testimonio animæ. See vol. I. p. 177.
[4] See place referred to in the last note.
[5] c. Marcion, lib. I. c. 10; comp. c. 18 and 19.

all; *for the existence of any other would first have to be demonstrated.* The consciousness of God is the original dowry of the soul; the same, and differing in no respect, in Egypt, in Syria, and in Pontus: for the God of the Jews is the one whom men's souls call their God."

In respect, however, to the development of the idea of God, it should be remarked, that it was only by degrees, and after overcoming a great number of obstacles, that Christianity succeeded by its spiritualizing and ennobling influence to remove the crass and sensual elements in which that idea had become smothered. When it proclaimed "God is a Spirit," it still required a new form of thought, springing from the regeneration of the power of thought itself, to develope therein what this idea involves, to enable men to understand what spirit is. By men whose habits of thought were entirely wedded to forms of sense, what was termed πνεῦμα could be conceived no otherwise than as a species of matter, though matter of a more attenuated, ethereal kind; and fancy, overruling the understanding, invented numberless ways of refining and subtilizing this notion.[1] Accordingly no single influence could effect much here; a counteracting influence was necessary, that should come from the whole general tendency of thought. Where this general spiritualization of the habits of thought had not yet taken place, the most profound and fervid religious feeling, which strove spontaneously to hold fast every thing in its reality, and to avoid all subtilization, would from its very depth and earnestness become the more easily blended with the sensuous element; as we may see illustrated in Tertullian's case, who found it impossible to conceive any thing to be real, which was not also, some way or other, corporeal.[2]

The influences which at this time contributed to spiritualize men's conceptions of the idea of God were, on the one hand, a sober and chaste practical bent of the Christian mind, springing immediately from Christianity, and which inclined the soul to elevate itself to God by the heart, rather than by speculation and fancy, and which, from the depth of the Christian consciousness, gave them assurance that the imagery of divine things was only imagery, and a feeble expression of that which by divine communication becomes the portion of each believing soul in its own inner life; — and, on the other hand, the scientifically cultivated faculty of thought, exercised in endeavoring to master the contents of Christian doctrine, as was seen in the case of Clement, Origen, and the Alexandrian school generally. The former of these tendencies we meet with in such men as Irenæus and Novatian. Irenæus says: "Whatever we predicate of God, is only by way of comparison. These attributes are but the images which love conceives, and into which feeling introduces something else, which is still greater than any thing that lies in these images considered by themselves."[3] And Novatian remarks, of God's essence:[4] "It is that which Himself only knows, which every human soul feels, although it cannot express."[5] The

[1] See Orig. in Joann. T. XIII. c. 21.

[2] Tertullian. de carne Christi, c. 11: Nihil incorporale, nisi quod non est. Adv. Praxeam, c. 7: Spiritus corpus sui generis.

[3] Dicitur quidem secundum hæc per dilectionem, sentitur supra hæc secundum magnitudinem. Lib. II. c. 13, § 4.

[4] See cap. 6 and 8.

[5] Quod mens omnis humana sentit, etsi non exprimit.

same father observes, that although Christ — owing to the necessary progress of the human mind in religious development — employed fewer *anthropomorphical* images than the Old Testament, yet even he could speak of that Being who is exalted above all human conceptions and language only in such images as still fall short of the reality itself.

From *Anthropomorphism* we distinguish *Anthropopathism*, employing both terms in the sense which seems chiefly authorized by their etymology and their historical use. The latter, so far as it denotes a morbid exercise of the mind, consists in ascribing to the Absolute Spirit the same limitations and defects which are found cleaving to the human spirit. But there is one very important respect in which this anthropopathism differs widely from anthropomorphism. For at the root of the former lies an undeniable and inner necessity; since man, being created in the image of God, being a spirit in affinity with the Father of spirits, is constrained and warranted to frame to himself the idea of God after this analogy. There is, therefore, a true as well as a false Anthropopathism; and a correct as well as an erroneous avoidance of it, according as this analogy is rightly or improperly used. We see all these tendencies manifesting themselves in the period before us. Both among Jews and among Pagans there was opposed — as we observed in the Introduction — to the crass and material humanization of the idea of God, an over-refining of that idea by the setting aside of all human analogies, which proceeded especially from the Platonic school. As Christianity presented the complete image of God in Christ, and restored it once more in human nature, so must Christianity purify in anthropopathism the true from the false, aiming not at its removal, but its transfiguration — which could be effected, however, only by a reconciliation of antagonisms in those existing tendencies of mind which were concerned also in the development of the Christian idea of God.

While Marcion opposed to the ruder conceptions of God's anger and vindictive justice, the one-sided notion of a love which excluded justice altogether; the religious element in those conceptions which he was for banishing entirely from the system of faith, found a powerful advocate in that enemy to all spiritualizing subtilty, Tertullian. He supposes he can point out an inconsistency in Marcion, inasmuch as redemption and the forgiveness of sin, which the latter acknowledged to be alone the work of his God, yet presupposed the existence of guilt in the eye of God as a holy Being.[1] He maintained, on the contrary, that there was a necessary connection between God's goodness and his justice. The latter he regarded as the principle of order, which gives each thing its due, — the principle which assigns to each thing its place and relation in the created universe, — the justitia architectonica, as it was afterwards called, — so that justice and moral evil were not necessarily correlative notions, but the notion of a vindictive justice in relation to moral evil presupposed that more general notion of justice.[2] He insists

[1] Sed et peccata dimittere an ejus possit esse, qui negetur tenere; et an ejus sit absolvere, cujus non sit etiam damnare; et an congruat eum ignoscere, in quem nihil sit admissum. c. Marcion, l. IV. c. 10.

[2] Ne justitiam de causa mali obfusces. — Omnia ut bonitas concepit, ita justitia distinxit. L. c. l. II. c. 12 et 13.

on the necessity, grounded in the very nature of the human mind itself, of the anthropopathic form of conception, which has its truth in the fact that man was created in the image of God. Hence he has, in common with God, all the attributes and agencies pertaining to the essence of spirit, — only with this difference, that everything which in man is imperfect, must be conceived in God as perfect. And this, he maintained, held good as well of those attributes which alone Marcion would ascribe to God, — goodness and love, — as of those which he wholly rejected.[1] Proceeding on the assumption that Christianity aimed at a transfigured, spiritualized anthropopathism, growing out of the restoration of God's image in man, he insisted that instead of transferring every quality to the Divine Being in the same imperfection in which it was found existing in man, the endeavor should be rather to transfigure everything in man to the true image of God, to make man truly godlike.[2] He sees in the entire revelation of God a continual condescension and humanization, — the end and goal of which is the incarnation of the Son of God. "Whatever you may bring together that is low, weak and unworthy of God, to degrade the Creator, to all this I shall give you one simple and certain answer. God can enter into no sort of contact with man, except by taking to himself human passions and modes of feeling, whereby he lets himself down and moderates the transcendent excellence of his majesty, which human weakness could not endure; — an act, in itself, indeed, not worthy of God, but necessary for man, and for this reason still worthy of God; since nothing is so worthy of him as that which conduces to man's salvation.[3] God conducted with man as with his equal, that so man might conduct with God as with his equal. God appeared in lowliness, that man might thus be exalted to the highest point of dignity. If thou art ashamed of *such* a God, I do not see how thou canst honestly believe in a God who was crucified." To be sure, this last charge of inconsistency did not touch Marcion's case, because the same principle which made him opposed to the anthropopathic God of the Old Testament, made him opposed also to the doctrine of Christ crucified. Tertullian argues further, from the nature of a graduated progress in revelation, that God's vindictive justice must predominate, before his love could prevail, — that the legal principle of the Old Testament must necessarily thus distinguish itself from the New Testament principle of redeeming love.[4]

[1] Et hæc ergo imago censenda est Dei in homine, quod eosdem motus et sensus habeat humanus animus, quos et Deus, licet non tales, quales Deus; pro substantia enim et status eorum et exitus distant. Denique contrarios eorum sensus, lenitatem dico, patientiam, misericordiam ipsamque matricem earum bonitatem, cur divina præsumitis? Nec tamen perfecte ea obtinemus, quæ solus Deus perfectus. c. Marcion, l. II. c. 16.

[2] Satis perversum est, ut in Deo potius humana constituas, quam in homine divina, et hominis imagine Deum imbuas potius, quam Dei hominem. L. c.

[3] Conversabatur Deus, ut homo divina agere doceretur; ex æquo agebat Deus cum homine, ut homo ex æquo agere cum Deo posset. Deus pusillus inventus est, ut homo maximus fieret. L. c. c. 27.

[4] Ut bonitatem suam voluerit offendere, in quibus præmiserat severitatem, quia nec mirum erat diversitas temporalis, si postea Deus mitior pro rebus edomitis, qui retro austerior pro indomitis. c. Marcion, l. II c. 29.

As to the Alexandrian church teachers, their philosophical education led them to try to exclude all material anthropopathism from the Christian system of faith; but in so doing it might easily happen, that they would incline too strongly to the opposite extreme, and draw the doctrine of the divine attributes too much over to the subjective side. As an illustration, we may take the following words of Origen, where, notwithstanding all that is so truly and beautifully said concerning the divine plan for the education of mankind, yet he betrays the inclination to give too subjective a turn to the notion of the divine anger, and fails of understanding the objective truth which it contains so clearly as does Tertullian. Availing himself of Philo's doctrine concerning God represented as man, and represented not as man,[1] he says:[2] "When the holy scriptures speak of God, in his divine majesty as God, and when they do not present the divine agency as interwoven with human circumstances and relations, they say, He is not like man, for his greatness is unsearchable, Ps. 145: 3: The Lord is a great God, a great King above all gods, Ps. 95: 2. But when the divine agency is represented as interwoven with human circumstances and relations, God assumes the feelings, the manner and language of men, just as we, conversing with a child two years old, accommodate ourselves to the child's language; since, if we preserved the dignity of riper years, and conversed with children without letting ourselves down to their language, they could not understand us. So conceive it in relation to God, when he lets himself down to the human race, and especially to that part of the race who are still at the age of infancy. Observe how we, grown-up men, in our intercourse with children, alter even the names of things; how we call bread by one particular name, and drink by another, employing a language which belongs not to those of mature age but to children. Should some one hear us so conversing with children, would he say, This old man has lost his understanding? And so God speaks also as with children. 'Behold I,' says our Saviour, 'and the children which God hath given me,' Hebr. 2: 13. When thou hearest of the wrath of God, believe not that this wrath is a passion of God. It is a condescension of language, aiming at the conversion and improvement of the child; for we ourselves assume an angry look to our children, not in accordance with the feelings of our heart, but with a feigned expression of countenance. If we expressed the friendly feeling of the soul towards the child on our countenance, and let our love be seen, without altering our looks as the good of the child required, we should spoil him. So God is described to us as angry, in order to our conversion and improvement, when in truth he is not angry. But thou wilt suffer the wrath of God, if thou art punished by his so called wrath, when thy own wickedness shall draw down upon thee sufferings hard to endure." Thus Origen expressed himself *in a sermon;* but on another occasion, in his commentary on Matthew, where he brings out the same theory, he observes:[3] "*To such as would not*

[1] See vol. I. p. 57.
[2] Homil. XVIII. in Jeremiam, § 6.
[3] Ed. Huet. f. 378. T. XV. § 1

be likely to be harmed thereby, we might say much of God's goodness, and of the overflowing fulness of his grace, which, not without good reason, he has concealed from *those who fear him*.

Here too the Alexandrians sought for the middle ground between the Gnostics and the other church teachers. While the latter ascribed to God the attribute of absolute, punitive justice, and the former abolished the whole notion of justice as incompatible with the essential being of the infinitely perfect God, opposing the attribute of justice to that of goodness; the Alexandrians, on the other hand, represented the notion of justice, which they endeavored to defend against the Gnostics as an attribute belonging to the divine perfections,[1] as wholly merged in the notion of a divine love, disciplining rational beings who had fallen, according to their various moral characters and wants.[2] Accordingly they would say, that the distinction which the Gnostics made between the just and the good God might be employed in a certain true sense; as for example when Christ (the divine Logos) — the educator and purifier of fallen beings, whose discipline is aimed to render all capable of being made recipients of the divine goodness, and thus rendered blessed — is distinctively called the just one.[3] Thus, according to this scheme, the notion of divine justice merged in that of disciplinary love — of the wisdom of love — loses its own self-subsistence. And the same is true also of the idea of punishment, which is regarded simply as a means to an outward end, as a purifying process ordained by divine love, without any reference to the idea of punishment in its relation to the moral order of the universe, and to the way in which it is to subserve that end.

Already, in the history of the heresies, we have spoken of the close connection between the doctrine of God, as the absolutely free Creator of the universe, and the whole peculiar essence of Christianity; and of the strong antithesis which this doctrine must have presented to the existing modes of thought which had been derived from antiquity. The Apostle Paul sums up the Christian Theism, as the belief in One God, from whom, by whom, and to whom, all things exist; and the threefold relation here expressed of all existing things to God, denotes, at the same time, the close connection between the Christian doctrines of creation, redemption, and sanctification, as well as the close connection between the doctrine of creation and the ethical element; — for the phrase "to him," which assigns to the Christian system of morals its province and its fundamental principle, presupposes the "from him;" and the phrase "by him" denotes the synthesis or mediation of them both. Hence, as we saw in the history of the Gnostic sects, the corruptions of the Christian doctrine of the creation which proceeded from the reaction of the spirit of the ancient world, must superinduce corruptions also of the doctrine

[1] See Orig. Comment. in Exod.; ed. Lommatzsch, T. VIII. p. 300.

[2] A *δικαιοσύνη σωτήριος*.

[3] Clem. Pædagog. lib. I. f. 118: *Καθ' ὁ μὲν πατὴρ νοεῖται ἀγαθὸς ὢν, αὐτὸ μόνον ὁ ἐστι κέκληται ἀγαθὸς, καθ' ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ὢν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ πατρί ἐστι; δίκαιος προσαγορεύεται,* — and Orig. in Joann. T. I. § 40, where he treats of the Gnostic distinction between the *θεὸς ἀγαθός* and the *δημιουργὸς δίκαιος*: *(τοῦτο δὲ) οἶμαι μετ' ἐξετάσεως ἀκριβοῦς βασανισθὲν δύνασθαι λέγεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, τοῦ μὲν υἱοῦ τυγχάνοντος δικαιοσύνης, τοῦ δὲ πατρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ υἱοῦ παιδευθέντας μετὰ τὴν Χριστοῦ βασιλείαν εὐεργετοῦντος.*

of redemption and of the system of morals. Accordingly, in the New Testament, we read of God as the positive original ground of all existence; of a God who has revealed himself in creation, — not of a creation out of nothing. In the important passage, Hebrews 11: 3, that act of the spirit denoted under the name of faith — whereby the spirit rises above the whole linked chain of causes and effects in the phenomenal world to an almighty creative word, as the ground of all existence — is opposed to the contemplation of the world by the understanding that judges by sense, and that acknowledges nothing higher than the connected chain of things in the world of appearance.[1]

But in opposition to the hypothesis of an original matter, as the condition of the creation, the positive element of this faith was negatively defined in this way, namely, that God created all things out of nothing.[2] This definition of the doctrine was a stone of stumbling, not only to the Gnostics, but to all who were still fettered by the cosmo-plastic theories of antiquity, — or in whom the speculative interest exceeded the religious, and who would set no limits to the former. To this class belonged Hermogenes, a painter at Carthage, who lived near the close of the second and the beginning of the third century. He differed essentially from the Gnostics in the decidedly Western bent of his mind; the speculative tendency of the Greeks predominating in his case over the Oriental intuition. And hence his system, which did not, like the Gnostic systems, seize such powerful hold of the imagination, obtained a much smaller number of followers. We hear of no sect called the Hermogeneans. Neither was it his wish, like the Gnostics, to set up a distinct system of esoteric religious doctrines. It was on a *single* point only, — a point, however, which beyond question would have an important influence on the whole system of religion, — that he departed from the received doctrines of the church. It was the doctrine of the Greek philosophy concerning the ὕλη, which he received into his system, and the point of union for it was furnished him by the manner in which this idea had already been appropriated by the Apologetic writers; — although it may be shown, that they were far removed from Dualism, and adopted the Platonic notion of the ὕλη merely in a formal way, making it an entirely different thing in the coherence of their system.

He was probably one of the zealous antagonists of Montanism, which was now making progress in North Africa. The artist would find as little to sympathize with in the Montanists, as the latter would find in the artist. It is a mark of the more free, artist-like turn of mind which he opposed to the stern Pietism of the Montanists, that he could see nothing which ought to give offence in employing his art on the inventions of the pagan mythology.[3] This indicates an objectiveness in the

[1] The negative of the proposition: ἐκ φαινομένων τὰ βλεπόμενα γεγονέναι.

[2] The κτίσις ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, as in Hermas.

[3] The obscure words of Tertullian, from which this account is derived, run as follows: Pingit illicite, nubit assidue, legem Dei in libidinem defendit, in artem contemnit. The first part of the sentence might be understood to mean that Tertullian regarded the art of painting itself as a pagan and sinful occupation; but even Tertullian's Montanistic hatred of art could hardly be supposed to go to such an extreme as this, and there is no evidence that it did in his writings. Neither do the words, "he de-

habits of thought, which, in the antagonism then existing between Christianity and Paganism, could hardly consist with a healthy and earnest tone of Christian feeling. We mark in him the predominance partly of a speculative and partly of an artistic tendency over the religious element of his character.

Hermogenes combated the emanation-theory of the Gnostics, because it transferred to the Divine Being the notions of sense, and because the idea of God's holiness could not be reconciled with the sinfulness of the beings which were supposed to have emanated from Him. But he combated also the doctrine of the creation out of nothing; because, if the world had no other cause than the will of God, it must have corresponded to the essence of a perfect and holy Being, and must therefore have been a perfect and holy world: nothing imperfect and evil would have found its way into it; for in a world having its ground only in God, how could there be any thing foreign from the essential character of God? Hermogenes was not less disinclined than were the Gnostics themselves, to recognize the important part which Christian Theism attributes to the free agency of the creature, in the development of the universe. In respect to moral evil, he was quite as difficult as were the Gnostics to be put by with the distinction between positive will and simple permission, on the part of the Divine Being. At the same time, however, the strength of the *moral* interest by which he was governed shows itself, when we find him rejecting the ground on which many attempted to explain the origin of evil, viz.: that it was a necessary foil, for the purpose of exhibiting moral good in its true light by the means of contrast.[1] He probably believed, that by such a *Theodicee*, the self-subsistence of the idea of goodness would be weakened, and the existence of evil, if regarded as necessary for the harmony of the universe, justified. And here, indeed, we do certainly recognize in him the victory of the Christian principle over that of the ancient world; but, at the same time, Hermogenes fell into the very error he wished to avoid, by persisting to trace the origin of evil to a natural necessity.

The imperfection and evil which are in the world have their ground, according to his theory, in the fact that God's creation is conditioned by an inorganic matter which has existed from eternity. From all eternity, there have existed two principles, the alone active, plastic principle, God; and the simply passive, in itself undetermined, formless principle, matter. The latter is a boundless mass, in constant chaotic motion, where all antagonisms meet in an undeveloped state, and

spised the law in its relation to art," favor the above sense; for we can imagine no passage of scripture which Tertullian could interpret as forbidding the art of painting generally. But it is probable that Tertullian meant by lex Dei the Old Testament, particularly the denunciations against the makers of idols, and that the sense is: He (Hermogenes) despises the authority of the Old Testament by the way in which he employs art; while, on the other hand, he would still uphold its authority for the purpose of defending repeated marriages (nubit assidue) against the Montanists, who on this point declared that the authority of the Old Testament had been annulled by Christianity, and by the new revelations of the Paraclete.

[1] Tertullian adv. Hermog. c. 15: Expugnat quorundam argumentationes, dicentium mala necessaria fuisse ad illuminationem bonorum ex contrariis intelligendorum.

flow into each other,— a mass full of wild impulses, without law or order, like water in a cauldron boiling over on all sides.[1] It was not by a single act that this endless chaos, involved in such boundless confusion, could be seized at any one point, brought to a pause, and compelled to subject itself to form and order. It was only through the relation of his own essence to the essence of matter that God could and must exert an influence over it. As the magnet attracts the iron by an inherent necessity, as beauty exerts a natural power of attraction on whatever approaches it,[2] so God, by his bare appearance, by the transcendent power of his divine essence, exerts a formative influence on matter.[3] According to these principles, he could not, if logically consistent, fix on any beginning for the creation; and in fact he seems not to have supposed any such beginning,— which is implied also in the argument he brings in support of his doctrine; namely, that if sovereignty belongs to the number of the divine attributes, then God must always have matter over which to exercise this sovereignty. Accordingly he held to an eternal exercise of the sovereignty of God over matter; which sovereignty, according to his system, consists principally in this victorious formative power. From what has been said, it follows that, according to this system, we are to conceive of the chaos, not as though it ever had any independent subsistence by itself, and as though the efficiency of this divine formative power had begun at some determinate moment; but as having a subsistence only in connection with this imparted organization, so that the two can never be separated except in conception. It was to the resistance which this endless matter, capable of being reduced to form in all its several parts only by degrees, presented to the formative power of God, that he traced the origin of all imperfection and evil. Thus the ancient chaos reveals itself in whatever is hateful in nature, and whatever is morally evil in the spiritual world.

In holding the doctrine of a progressive formation of matter in connection with the doctrine of an eternal creation, Hermogenes was guilty of an inconsistency; since it is impossible to conceive of a progressive development which has no beginning. He fell into a still stranger inconsistency if it is true, as Theodoretus reports, that he supposed the development tended to a final end. For, according to this, he held, like the Manicheans, that all evil would finally resolve itself again into the matter from which it had proceeded, and consequently that there would be a separation of that part of matter which was susceptible of organization, from that other part which obstinately resisted it.[4] Here the *teleological* and *moral* element which he had derived from Christian-

[1] Inconditus et confusus et turbulentus fuit motus, sicut ollæ undique ebullientis.

[2] We here perceive the painter.

[3] Non pertransiens materiam facit Deus mundum, sed solummodo adparens et adpropinquans ei. sicut facit qui decor, solummodo adparens (vulnerans animum) et magnes lapis solummodo adpropinquans.

[4] Theodoretus, to be sure, does not say this expressly; but such a doctrine seems to be necessarily implied in that which, according to his account, Hermogenes maintained. The passage from Theodoretus (in Hæret. fab. I. 19) is as follows: Τὸν δὲ διά βολον καὶ τοὺς δαίμονας εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἀνα χθήσεσθαι.

ity, — an element not easily combining with the heathen notion of sin as a natural evil, — rendered him inconsistent with himself.[1]

Irenæus and Tertullian maintained — the one in opposition to the Gnostics, the other to Hermogenes — the simple Christian doctrine of the creation, without indulging in any speculations on the subject.

From these church teachers Origen differed on this point, as on many others; — having a peculiar system of his own, the main features of which we must here present, so far as they are connected with the doctrine of the creation. In conformity with the general character of his Gnosis, he built on the foundation of the system of doctrine generally received in the whole church, and supposed that his speculative inquiries, extending beyond the limits of this system, might still be in perfect consistency with the same. He declared himself in favor of the doctrine of a creation from nothing, so far as that doctrine expressed, that the free act of God's almighty power was not conditioned by a preëxistent matter; and this he did, not by way of accommodation, but out of honest conviction.[2] He moreover acknowledged that the specific existing world had a specific beginning; but the question as to what was before it, seemed to him one which scripture and the faith of the church left open for the free range of speculation. It was here, then, that he supposed he found those reasons against a beginning of creation generally, which must ever strike the reflecting mind which cannot rest satisfied with simple faith in that which is incomprehensible. How is it conceivable, that if to create is agreeable to the divine essence, what is thus agreeable to the divine essence should ever be wanting? Why should not those attributes belonging to the essence of the Divine Being, his almighty power and goodness, be ever active? A transition from the state of inactivity to the act of creation is inconceivable without a change, which is incompatible with the being of God.

Origen was opposed also to the doctrine of emanation; since by this theory the distance between the Creator and the creature was annihilated; a unity of essence seemed to be supposed between the two;[3] representations of mere sense were transferred to the Almighty, and he was made subject to a kind of natural necessity.[4] All communication of life from God, he regarded not as the result of any natural process of development, but as an act of the divine will. But for reasons which have been mentioned already, he believed it necessary to sup-

[1] Theodoretus also ascribes to Hermogenes the doctrine, that Christ put off his body in the sun. It may be doubted whether Theodoretus has not here confounded the doctrine of Hermogenes with something else that resembled it; — at any rate, it is doubtful how his words are to be understood. Perhaps Hermogenes taught that Christ, in ascending to the heavenly state of existence, left behind him in the sun the outward garb he had assumed in the material world. Yet so fantastic an opinion can hardly be ascribed to Hermogenes; and, in default of authentic documents, we must leave the matter in the dark. Some interpretation of Ps. 19: 4, which was understood to apply to the Messiah, may have given rise to this opinion.

[2] See Præfat. libb. *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, f. 4; ibid. l. II. c. 1, § 4; l. III. c. 5. — Commentar. Genes. init.

[3] Where Origen has reference to the Gnostic doctrine of the *ὁμοούσιον* between the spiritual natures and the *ἀγέννητος φύσις*. In Joann. T. XIII. § 25.

[4] *Δόγματα ἀνθρώπων, μηδ' ὄναρ φύσιν ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον πεφαντασμένων οὖσαν κυρίως οὐσίαν.* In Joann. T. XX. § 16 II. *ἀρχ.* lib. I. c. 2, § 6.

pose, in connection with the glory of God, an eradiation of it in a world of spiritual beings, affining to himself, and subsisting in absolute dependence on him.[1] He maintained the idea of a continual *becoming* of this spiritual creation,[2] — a relation of cause and effect without temporal beginning,— the Platonic idea of an endless becoming, symbolizing the eternity of the divine existence.[3] What Origen says in another connection, respecting an activity of God not to be conceived under the dimensions of time, and an eternal becoming, we might apply also, in his own sense, to the relation of the spiritual world, — akin to God and deriving its essence from him, — to God as its original source.[4] He had respect, in his system, to those difficulties which present themselves, on one particular side, to the mind hampered and confined by the limitations of time, when striving to conceive a beginning of the creation; — but not to the difficulties which arise also on the other side, when it is attempted to carry out the idea of a becoming, without a beginning of created existence.

The bishop Methodius, who attacked this doctrine of Origen in his work "On the Creatures," was vastly his inferior in the genius for speculation.[5] He had not even power enough of speculative intuition to comprehend Origen's ideas; and what he could not comprehend, he represents as being senseless and atheistic. Comparing the relation of God to created things with the relation of a human architect to his work, he brings against the system of Origen objections which are altogether irrelevant. How incompetent he was to understand the great man whom in his ignorant zeal he nicknames a centaur, is shown by one of his objections against the argument of Origen; namely, that if the transition from inactivity to the act of creation supposed a change in God, so also the transition from the act of creation to the cessation of that act would imply a like change in him. But God must have ceased from creating the world, when the world was finished, and then there would consequently be a change in him. But Origen, arguing from his own position, might reply to this, that we are not to conceive of God's activity in creation as ceasing at a certain point of time, — as an action begun at a specific time, and then brought to an end. He might retort the objection of Methodius, and say that, by the comparison which the latter introduced, a self-subsistence is attributed to the creature which does not belong to it,— as though its existence were not every moment conditioned by, and grounded in, the same creative power of God, exerted for its preservation. More to the point, though aimed against an unbefitting expression rather than against the idea of Origen, was the objection, that the notion of God's perfection involves the necessity of

[1] The *μερικὰ ἀπαυγάσματα τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ* in the *λογικὴ κτίσις*. In Joann. T. XXXII. § 18.

[2] According to Methodius, a *γενητὸν ἀεὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχον*, an *ἀνάρχως κρατεῖν τοῦ τεχνήματος*.

[3] Plato in the Timæus, *εἰκὼν κινητὴ αἰῶνος, μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσα αἰώνιος εἰκών*. Comp. Plotin. III. Ennead. 7.

[4] *Ὅσον ἐστὶ τὸ φῶς ποιητικὸν τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γεννᾶται τὸ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης*. In Jerem. Hom. IX. § 3.

[5] Extracts from the work of Methodius in Photius. Cod. 235.

its being self-grounded, dependant on nothing else, conditioned by nothing else.[1]

In connection with Origen's doctrine of the creation, must be taken his peculiar way of conceiving the *doctrine of God's almighty power*. When he says, We ought not to conceive of the divine Omnipotence, if we would apprehend it in its true glory, as infinite power, without any farther modification,[2] the proposition has a meaning which, in *one* respect, is altogether true. The conception of the divine Omnipotence, as contradistinguished from the principle of Nature-religion, according to which the gods themselves were conceived as being subjected to a higher necessity, was, in fact, something entirely new, and hence possessed so much the greater significance for the Christian consciousness, in expressing its opposition to the earlier views. It was the usual answer which uneducated Christians, and those who were incapable of assigning any more distinct reason for the faith that was in them, gave, when urged with objections against that doctrine, that with God all things are possible, even those things which to men seem impossible. By this antithesis, however, of a supernatural Theism to the ancient Naturalism, many were led into the error at least of *so expressing themselves*, as if, under the idea of Omnipotence, they conceived of an infinite, arbitrary will, — whereby they laid open to those who attacked Christianity from the position of Paganism, many weak points, of which such men as Celsus were not slow to take advantage.[3] Now, in opposition to the notion of such an unlimited arbitrary will, Origen placed the idea of Omnipotence as an attribute not thus indeterminate, but standing connected with the essential being of God, as God, and with the other divine attributes, rightly defined. "God can do anything," says he, "which does not contradict his essential being as God, his goodness and wisdom,— anything by which he would not deny his own character as God, as a being of infinite goodness and wisdom."[4] If by that which is contrary to nature[5] is meant what is bad, irrational, self-contradictory, the notion of the divine Omnipotence cannot be extended to such things. But the case becomes different, when nature is understood according to its ordinary meaning, as the common course of nature.[6] The laws of nature, thus understood, are valid only for one particular point of view; and there may be something, therefore, considered from this particular point of view, *above nature*, which, in the other sense of the word, is not *contrary to nature*. In its relation to a higher, divine life, which is in its essence supernatural, the miracle, regarded as an individual effect of this higher power introduced into humanity, may be something in harmony with nature.[7] Many

[1] Τὸ *αὐτὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ ἑαυτοῦ πλήρωμα ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ μένον, τέλειον εἶναι τοῦτο μόνον δοξαστέον.*

[2] Πεπερασμένην γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ θεοῦ λεκτέον καὶ μὴ προφάσει εὐφημίας τὴν περιγραφὴν αὐτῆς περιαιρετέον. Π. ἀρχ. l. II. c. 9.

[3] See Orig. c. Cels. l. V. c. 14.

[4] Δύναται πάντα ὁ θεὸς, ἅπερ δυνάμενος τοῦ θεὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ἐξίσταται. c. Cels. l. III. c. 70, and l. V. c. 23.

[5] Τὰ παρὰ φύσιν.

[6] Ἡ κοινοτέρα νοουμένη φύσις.

[7] Ἔστι τινὰ ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν (τὴν κοινοτέραν) νοουμένην, ἃ ποιῆσαι ἂν ποτε θεὸς, ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ἀναβιβάζων τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ποιῶν αὐτὸν μεταβάλλειν ἐπὶ φύσιν κρείττονα καὶ θειοτέραν.

things may take place according to the divine reason and the divine will, which, on this very account, although they may be miraculous, or may seem to be so to many, are still not contrary to nature.[1]

But the position of Origen, that the divine Omnipotence must not be conceived as an undefined, indeterminate power, has also another meaning, in which, as in many other instances, we find him mixing up elements of Platonism with Christianity. The doctrine of the Neo-Platonic school,[2] that no consciousness can grasp an infinite series, passed with him for a demonstrated truth; and hence he inferred, that God could not create an infinite, but only a determinate, number of rational beings; — because otherwise they could not have been grasped by any consciousness, and a providence, reaching to every individual thing, could have no existence.[3] It will be seen of what importance this single point was, in its bearing on the whole system of Origen. With this was connected in his mind the peculiar shaping of his doctrine of an eternal creation, namely, that there was no such thing as a multiplication of the number of created spirits; that all manifoldness was to be derived, not from the production of new beings, but only from the changes undergone by those already brought into existence by the eternal creation; that there were no new creations, but only metamorphoses of the original ones.

Although Origen in other respects agrees, in many of his results, with those who teach that everything possible must also be actual, and who represent the divine Omnipotence as wholly expending itself in events that actually transpire, yet this principle was never expressed by him, and it is one altogether foreign from his whole philosophical and dogmatical bent;[4] — as indeed it is usually found united with a certain doctrine of determination, to which Origen's views stood directly opposed.

Even here where he errs, we cannot fail to perceive the religious interest which was uppermost in the feelings of the great teacher. He supposes it impossible, without this doctrine, to place beyond dispute the necessity of acknowledging a personal God, embracing in his consciousness everything that exists,— a truth which he considered it of vital importance to hold fast, in opposition to the Neo-Platonic theory, which assumed an impersonal ὄν, pure being without consciousness, as the highest and absolute being, while it only supposed an immanent πρόνοια.[5]

We now proceed to the doctrine in which Theism, taken in its con-

[1] c. Cels. l. V. c. 23.

[2] See e. g. Plutarch. de defectu oraculor. c. 24.

[3] Τῇ γὰρ φύσει τὸ ἄπειρον ἀπερίληπτον πεποίηκε τοίνυν τοσαῦτα, ὧν ἐδύνατο περιδράξασθαι καὶ συγκρατεῖν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ πρόνοιαν. II. ἀρχ. l. II. c. 9. Ἄπειρα τῇ φύσει οὐχ οἷόντε περιλαμβάνεσθαι τῇ περατοῦν πεφυκυίᾳ τὰ γνωσκόμενα γνώσει. In Matth. T. XIII. § 1; ed. Lommatzsch, T. III. p. 210.

[4] The opposite is expressed in the words of Origen: Οὐκ ἐμποδίζεται, τὸ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ δυνατὸν, ἑνὸς ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ὄντος τοῦ ἐσομένου. In ep. ad Rom. lib. I.; ed. Lommatzsch, T. V. p. 251.

[5] The true opposite of the Neo-Platonic ὄν is expressed in what he says of God the Father: Αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξαζόμενον, ὅτε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γινόμενος περιωπῇ ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γνώσει καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρίᾳ εὐφραίνεται ἀφατόν τινα χαράν. In Joann. T. XXII. § 18; ed. Lommatzsch, T. II. p 470.

nection with the proper and fundamental essence of Christianity, or with the doctrine of redemption, finds its ultimate completion, the *doctrine of the Trinity*. This doctrine does not belong to the fundamental articles of the Christian faith; as appears sufficiently evident from the fact, that it is expressly held forth in no one particular passage of the New Testament; — for the only one in which this is done, the passage relating to the three that bear record, (1 John 5,) is undoubtedly spurious, and in its ungenuine shape testifies to the fact, how foreign such a collocation is from the style of the New-Testament scriptures. We find in the New Testament no other fundamental article besides that of which the Apostle Paul says, that other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, the annunciation of Jesus as the Messiah; and Christ himself designates as the foundation of his religion, the faith in the only true God, and in Jesus Christ whom he hath sent, (John 17 : 3.) What Paul styles distinctively the mystery, relates in no one instance to what belongs to the hidden depths of the divine essence, but to the divine purpose of salvation which found its accomplishment in a fact. But that doctrine presupposes, in order to its being understood in its real significancy for the Christian consciousness, this fundamental article of the Christian faith; and we recognize therein the essential contents of Christianity, summed up in brief, as they come forth from the determinate form which is given to Theism by its connection with this fundamental article. It is this doctrine, by which God becomes known as the original Fountain of all existence; as he by whom the rational creation, that had become estranged from him, is brought back to the fellowship with him; and as he in the fellowship with whom it from thenceforth subsists: — the threefold relation [1] in which God stands to mankind, as primal ground, mediator and end, — Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, — in which threefold relation the whole Christian knowledge of God is completely announced. Accordingly all is herein embraced by the Apostle Paul, when he names the one God and Father of all, who is above all, and works through all and in all, (Ephes. 4 : 6;) or Him from whom are all things, through whom are all things, and to whom are all things; — when, in pronouncing the benediction, he sums up all in the formula: the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit. God, as the living God, the God of mankind, and the God of the church, can be truly known in this way only. This shape of Theism presents the perfect mean between the wholly extra-mundane God of Deism, and the God brought down to, and confounded with, the world, of Pantheism. As this mode of the knowledge of God belongs to the peculiar essence of Theism and the Theocracy, it follows, that *its* ground-work must be given with the ground-work of the latter in the Old Testament,— the doctrine of God whose agency is in the world through his Word and with his Spirit: and hence it was no accident, to be explained by the supervention of outward influences merely, that

[1] In the *παλαίος λόγος*: *Ὁ θεὸς ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μεσὰ τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων.* Plato legg. IV. Ed. Bip. vol. VIII. p. 185.

such a shaping of the consciousness of God grew out of the germs already contained in the Old Testament; — a truth which has not been duly attended to, by those who, in their account of the progressive development of doctrines, have been inclined to explain too many things by a reference to outward causes.

We must take care not to be deceived by false analogies, in comparing this doctrine with apparently kindred dogmas of other religions, or with mere speculative theories. Its connection, already pointed out, with the fundamental consciousness of Christianity, must furnish, in this case, the right standard of comparison. Aside from this, the threefold designation of the Supreme Essence, or the hypothesis of a threefold gradation in the principles of existence, can furnish only a delusive analogy, where perhaps there may be lying at bottom some theory most directly opposed to the Christian view of the world; — as the case is, indeed, with regard to the Indian Trimurti, which stands connected with a thoroughly pantheistic scheme, wholly at war with the theistic and theological principle of Christianity, — the doctrine, namely, of a divine essence, which manifests itself in a constant repetition of the same process of rising and vanishing worlds. And even within the Christian church itself, systems, consisting of a pantheistic deification of reason and of the world, have employed this doctrine, wrested from its original connection, and made to bear a sense at variance with its true import, for the purpose of giving currency to some scheme under a Christian garb, which in essence was wholly opposed to Christianity.

The doctrine of the Trinity, however, in its practical or economical import, does not preclude the reference to an inner and objective relation within the essence of the divine nature itself; since indeed in the revelation of God in his works, his essence is presented to us, though to our faculties of knowledge it appears at first, as it were in a glass, darkly, as an enigma to be solved — and since, from the contemplation of God's self-manifestation in his works, we are constrained to form our conception of the divine attributes according to the analogy of our own mind. Only we are not to forget that the practical or economical Triad, which starts from God revealed in Christ, or from the position of the Apostle Paul, that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, must ever be considered as the ground-work of the whole, — the original element from which the speculative or ontological view is derived; — a position which we shall find substantiated in tracing, as we now propose to do, the historical development of this doctrine in these first centuries. This economico-practical doctrine of the Trinity constituted from the beginning the fundamental consciousness of the Catholic church, while forming itself in its conflict with the opposite theories of the heretical sects. It is that which forms the basis of the true unity of the church and the identity of the Christian consciousness in all ages. But the intellectual process of development, by means of which the economico-practical doctrine of the Trinity was reduced to the ontological, was a gradual one, and must necessarily run through manifold opposite forms, until it issued at last in some

mode of apprehension, satisfying the demand of unity in the Christian consciousness, and in the activity of the dialectic reason.

· It is already evident, from what has been said, that the development of this doctrine must start from the reference to the person of Christ; and the original element here, which preceded all speculation, is the image which Christ himself left on the consciousness of those who received the immediate impression of his life, and were appointed to be witnesses of it. The doctrine of the divine essence dwelling in Christ grew first out of the intuition of the divine glory manifested in his life, — as it was expressed by the Apostle John, — "We beheld his glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father;" and out of the discourses, in which, from his own self-consciousness, without any connection whatever with the existing ideas of the period, but rather in opposition to those ideas, he expressed himself with regard to his relation to his heavenly Father. It is the *intuitive view* of his person, which lies at the basis of the representation of it, even where it appears less strongly developed, in the three first gospels, and which beams forth with peculiar lustre in many individual traits, Matth. 11 : 27; — 12 : 6, 42; — 16 : 16, (compared with Christ's manner of approving what was here expressed;) and when he employs the 110th Psalm, for the purpose of leading those whom he addressed to the recognition of him who was greater than the Son of David. The doctrine concerning Christ as taught by the Apostle Paul, proves that the view of Christ's person as it is presented through all the writings of John, was not one of later origin. Moreover, if we leave out the minor epistles of Paul, the genuineness of which several writers in modern times have, without any sufficient grounds, been pleased to call in doubt, and which form, notwithstanding, the necessary point of termination in the development of the Pauline theology; if, I say, we leave these aside, the same thing is implied in the designation: Him by whom are all things, (1 Corinth. 8 : 6.) In the Jewish theology, which prepared the way for Christianity, we may distinguish two different tendencies; first, in the idea of the theocratic king, who was to realize the idea of the Theocracy, — who should concentrate in himself all the rays of the divine Majesty; and from this necessarily proceeded the intuition of a person transcending the finite human nature, the image of the Son of God, as it beamed forth transfigured in the consciousness of inspired prophets; — and next, the limited apprehension of the Messiah's person, connected with the limited apprehension of his work, in the common Jewish consciousness. We have observed in the history of the Judaizing and Gnostic sects, how both these modes of apprehension proceeded to develope themselves into opposite theories, each wholly excluding the other. As to the above-mentioned prophetic element, we find it once more taken up, and still farther prosecuted, in the doctrine concerning Christ, taught by the Apostles Paul and John. That being by whom the human race, when estranged from God, was to be brought back to fellowship with him, appears as the one through whom the procession of all existence from God had been mediated from the beginning, — as the one who, being the original self-manifestation of the hidden divine

Essence, always formed the transition link between God and the creation. The same was the first-born of every creature, and the first-born of the new creation of humanity, restored to the image of God in the transfigured human nature which he exhibited after his resurrection. The same was the image of God before all existence, and the image of God in humanity; the divine fountain of light and of life, from whom all spirits were from the beginning to draw their supplies, and he who appeared as such in humanity, for the purpose of revealing in it, and of imparting to it divine life,— the original Word of God, the first act of the divine self-manifestation, (of God's self-affirmation,) which humanized itself, in order that everything pertaining to humanity might become godlike.

The title "Word of God," employed to designate this idea, the Apostle John could have arrived at within himself, independent of any outward tradition; and he would not have appropriated to his own purpose this title, which had been previously current in certain circles, had it not offered itself to him, as the befitting form of expression for that which filled his own soul. But this word itself is certainly not derived, any more than the idea originally expressed in it, from the Platonic philosophy, which could furnish no occasion whatever for the choice of this particular expression.[1] But it is the translation of the Old-Testament term דָּבָר; and it was this Old-Testament conception, moreover, which led to the New-Testament idea of the Logos. An intermediate step[2] is formed by what is said in the epistle to the Hebrews concerning a divine Word; and thus we find in the latest epistles of Paul, from the first epistle to the Corinthians and onward, in the epistle to the Hebrews, and in the gospel of John, a well-connected series of links in the progressive development of the apostolic doctrine.

If this idea of the Logos was not placed in connection with Christianity by the authority of an apostolic type of doctrine, but if it must be considered as merely the product of a fusion of Platonism, or of the Alexandrian-Jewish theology with the Christian doctrine; its wide diffusion, of which church fathers of the most opposite tendencies bear witness, could hardly be accounted for. If it could so commend itself to the teachers with whom the Platonic element of culture predominated, still the others, by whom every thing derived from that quarter was suspected, must, for this very reason, have been prejudiced against it. As the defenders of the doctrine of Christ's divinity, in the beginning of the second century,[3] could appeal, in evidence of the fact that this was the ancient doctrine of the church, to the oldest church-teachers and to the ancient Christian hymns, so this evidence is in fact confirmed by the report of Pliny, already cited on another occasion.[4]

But while, in the tradition of the church, the Logos-idea was taught and transmitted in the form which most perfectly harmonized with the habits of thought that had resulted from the previous stage of spirit-

[1] The Platonic philosophy led rather to the employment of the term *νοῦς* as a designation of the mediating principle.

[2] Respecting which, Bleek, in his masterly Commentary, has made some excellent remarks.

[3] Euseb. l. V. c. 28.

[4] See vol. I. p. 97.

ual culture; namely, as the idea of a spirit, first begotten of God and subordinate to him; there was, besides this, another view of the doctrine concerning the Trinity, which may be designated, after the customary language of this period, as that of the *Monarchians*. Although opposite tendencies are to be found among the followers of this sect, and they were drawn into still more violent disputes *with each other*, than they ever engaged in against the subordination-theory of the church; yet they were agreed with regard to everything expressed by the term Monarchianism. They felt a common interest in preserving the unity of the consciousness of God, which made them unwilling to acknowledge any other divine being besides one God, the Father. Either they disclaimed all knowledge of the Logos-doctrine generally, or they understood by the Logos simply a divine energy, the divine wisdom or reason, which illuminates the souls of the pious; — in this respect falling in with a certain modification of the Logos-idea which was adopted by one class of Jewish theologians.[1] Now it may appear singular, that precisely at this period, — when a Christian consciousness was struggling to form itself in the midst of Paganism, and surrounded by its influences, — such a strictly monotheistic interest could arise, and the hypostatical Logos-doctrine create scruples in this particular quarter.[2] But when we consider how the case really was with Christians of this age; when we call to mind, that their Christian consciousness developed itself in direct opposition to their previous Pagan mode of thinking, that the doctrine of the divine unity had been deeply impressed on their minds by the earliest catechetical instruction which they received, and that the Logos-idea did not originally belong to the primitive, simple confession of faith at baptism, (as in fact it does not occur in the so-called Apostolic Creed;) it may easily be explained how it should happen, that when afterwards this doctrine came to be set before them, they would believe it contained something in contradiction to the principle of the μοναρχία, which they had been first taught.[3]

Among these Monarchians, who were agreed in combating the doctrine of a hypostatical Logos, two classes are still to be distinguished; since, with some of them, the monarchian interest of the common religious faith, or of reason, predominated, the interest immediately connected with the person of Christ, the interest of Christian piety in the proper sense, being a quite subordinate matter; while, in the case of others, both these interests were combined, and both coöperated with equal power; and in close connection with this difference was another, that while with the one class the dialectic, critical faculty of the understanding was supreme, with the other it was the practical element and Christian feeling which predominated.[4] The former were of the

[1] Already mentioned.

[2] Orig. in Joann. T. II. § 2: Τὸ πολλοὺς φιλοθέους εἶναι εὐχομένους ταράσσον, εὐλαβουμένους δύο ἀναγορεῦσαι θεούς.

[3] This is confirmed by Tertullian, adv. Praxeam, c. 3: *Simplices* quique, ne dixerim imprudentes et *idiotæ*, *quæ major semper credentium pars est*, quoniam et *ipsa regula fidei* a pluribus Diis seculi ad unicum et verum Deum transfert, *expavescunt* ad οἰκονομίαν, (the trinity to be connected with the unity.) Monarchiam, inquiunt, tenemus.

[4] Origen clearly distinguishes these two

opinion that in the church system the distance was not sufficiently marked between Christ and the only true God. They denied that Christ was divine in every sense, and would only admit that he was divine in a certain sense. They taught, namely, that Jesus was a man like all other men; but that from the first he was actuated and guided by that power of God, the divine reason or wisdom, bestowed on him in larger measure than on any other messenger or prophet of God; and that it was precisely on this account he was to be called the Son of God. They differed from the Ebionites, properly so called, in this, that they did not believe, with them, such a union of Christ with God had first taken place at a determinate moment of his life, but regarded it as lying at the basis of his entire development; since in fact they acknowledged his miraculous conception.

But the second class consisted of those whom not merely the interest for Monotheism or Monarchianism, in which a Jew also might participate, but the interest at the same time for the faith in the true deity of Christ, made opponents of the hypostatical Logos-doctrine in the form in which it was then understood. The common notion of the Logos, that he had become man in Christ, as a being personally distinct from, and subordinate to, God the Father, although most intimately related to him, appeared to them to be too inadequate a representation of Christ. The idea of such a distinction between him and the Supreme God was revolting to their faith in Christ: he was for them the only true and supreme God himself, who had revealed himself here in humanity so as he had done nowhere else, had appeared in a human body. They regarded the names Father and Son as only two different modes of designating the same subject, the one God, who, with reference to the relations in which he had previously stood to the world, is called by the name of the Father; as with reference to *his appearance in humanity*, he is called the Son.[1] They would have in Christ only the one, undivided God; — the feeling which was uppermost with them, would admit here of no distinction or division. While the first class of Monarchians recognized nothing in Christ but the man, and banished the divine element out of view; the others saw in him nothing but the God, and the human element was, on the other hand, wholly suppressed or overlooked. The tendency of their views was to make of the human appearance simply a transient, removable veil, serving for the manifestation of God in humanity. Yet we are ignorant as to the *particular way* in which they developed their thoughts on this point. The more profound pious feeling among the laity who were without education, seems to have inclined them rather to the last-

classes; in Joann. T. II. § 2: Ἤτοι ἀρνουμένους ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς, ὁμολογοῦντας θεὸν εἶναι τὸν μέχρι ὀνόματος παρ' αὐτοῖς υἱὸν προσαγορευόμενον, (they acknowledge the divinity of Christ, but deny him a personality distinct from the Father, and call him the Son in name only, — they do not consider him as such in truth, inasmuch as they identify him with the Father; these are the Patripassians:) ἢ ἀρνουμένους τὴν θεότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ, τιθέντας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν, (an individual existence, natura certis finibus circumscripta,) τυγχάνουσαν ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρός, (the other class.) T. II. § 18; T. X. § 21; c. Cels. l. VIII c. 12.

[1] Two ἐπίνοιαι ἑνὸς ὑποκειμένου.

mentioned view; and if, as appears evident from the passages cited from Tertullian and Origen, this view had many adherents even as late as into the third century, yet this cannot be regarded as any evidence whatever against the antiquity of the Logos-doctrine, as if the latter had first made its appearance in the conflict with some mode of apprehension far older than itself; but it might easily be the case, that, while the Logos-doctrine was becoming moulded into shape in theology, the view just mentioned sprung up out of the popular consciousness. It was the reaction of the Christian consciousness among the laity, against the doctrine of the Logos, as it became more precisely defined in a subordination-system.[1] This is the class, of whom Origen says, that under the show of *aiming to honor Christ*, they teach what is untrue of him.[2] It is such whom he has in mind, when he describes, as belonging to a subordinate position, those whose God is the Logos, — who imagined that in him they possessed the whole essence of God, and who held him to be the Father himself.[3] And it is the same class, perhaps, of whom he says, that they knew nothing but Jesus the crucified; that they imagined they possessed in him who became flesh the entire Logos; that they knew Christ only according to the flesh; and as such he describes the great body of believers, over against whom he was accustomed to place the genuine Gnostics.[4] Just as Philo distinguishes those who elevate themselves to the Absolute, and those who imagine they have all in the Logos, considering the latter as the Supreme God himself; and as the Gnostics distinguish those who elevate themselves to the Supreme God, and those who held the Demiurge to be the Supreme God himself; so Origen distinguishes those who elevate themselves to God the Father himself, and those who never proceeded beyond the Son, and held him to be the Father himself.[5] These latter were usually denominated Patripassians,[6] — a

[1] Instead of being able, with Dr. Baur, (whose positions we have not neglected to consider in the statement above given,) to regard the Logos-doctrine as an attempt to strike the mean between the two classes of the Monarchians, and to account hence for its spread; we must on the contrary maintain, that it was precisely the antithesis of the Logos-doctrine in the form of subordination, which called forth Patripassianism. We discern in this last tendency the same interest, expressing itself in a purely practical way, without dialectic reasoning, which afterwards sought its satisfaction by means of dialectic reasoning, in the matured notion of the Homoüsion.

[2] In Matth. T. XVII. § 14: *Οὐ νομιστέον εἶναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοὺς τὰ ψεύδη φρονοῦντας περὶ αὐτοῦ, φαντασίᾳ τοῦ δοξάζειν αὐτὸν, ὅποιοί εἰσιν οἱ συγχέοντες πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ ἔννοιαν καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει ἕνα διδόντες εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν, τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ μόνῃ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι διαιροῦντες τὸ ἓν ὑποκείμενον.* He distinguishes such from heretics.

[3] *Ὁ λόγος τάχα τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἱστάντων τὸ πᾶν καὶ τῶν πατέρα αὐτὸν νομιζόντων ἐστὶ θεός.* In Joann. T. II. § 3.

[4] L. c.: *Οἱ μηδὲν εἰδότες, εἰ μὴ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν καὶ τοῦτον ἐσταυρωμένον, τὸν γενόμενον σάρκα λόγον τὸ πᾶν νομίσαντες εἶναι τοῦ λόγου, Χριστὸν κατὰ σάρκα μόνον γινώσκουσι· τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πεπιστευκέναι νομιζομένων.* Yet we should not omit to notice, that in the above-cited passage, Matth. T. XVII. § 14, Origen distinguishes those who, out of a mistaken wish to honor Christ, identify him with the Father, from the great mass of orthodox believers, who, though they do not consider Christ as a mere prophet, yet are far from having a sufficiently high conception of him, are unable to form to themselves any clear conception of his character. *Οἱ ὄχλοι, κἂν μὴ τῇ λέξει ὡς προφήτην αὐτὸν ἔχωσι, ὅ, τι ποτ' ἂν ἔχωσιν αὐτὸν, πολλῷ ἔλαττοι ἔχουσιν αὐτὸν οὗ ἐστιν, οὐδὲν τρανοῦντες περὶ αὐτοῦ.*

[5] *Οἱ μὲν θεὸν ἔχουσι τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεὸν, οἱ δὲ παρὰ τούτους δεύτεροι ἱστάμενοι ἐπὶ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸν Χριστὸν αὐτοῦ.* L. c

[6] Qui unam eandemque subsistentiam Patris ac Filii asseverant, unam personam duobus nominibus subjacentem, qui latine Patripassiani appellantur. Orig. fragment Commentar. in ep. ad Titum.

name which would be applied to them, however, only by those who maintained the subordination-theory of the church;[1] and on the ground that they saw it must tend to impair the superior dignity of the Father, if that was transferred to him which could only be predicated of the Logos,[2] who came into all manner of contact with the creature.

We shall now proceed to consider more in detail the several phases of Monarchianism.

As it regards the first-named class, we find the earliest traces of it in the Roman church; and since it has been found that Monarchians of the third century appeal to the agreement of the older Roman bishops with their views, modern inquirers have been led to infer from this circumstance, that the Monarchian tenet was in this church originally the prevailing one, while the doctrine of the Logos was unknown to it: and this was connected with another position, namely, that the Roman church had its origin in a Jewish element. But if this last position is an erroneous one, and the Pauline, Gentile-Christian element must be regarded much rather as the original one in this case, (as we think we have shown it must be, in another place,[3]) one of the principal arguments for such a supposition falls at once to the ground. Moreover, on such a supposition, it would be least of all possible to account for the favorable reception which the Patripassians met with at Rome; for it is evident, that there was nothing which so contradicted the fundamental principle of the *Jewish Christians*, nothing so far alien from Ebionitism, as *this* theory concerning the person of Christ. We have seen, in fact, that the two classes of the Monarchians stand in well-defined opposition to each other. Hence both cannot at one and the same time have been dominant in this church, cannot have sprung out of its original element; although one side might doubtless, by its extreme positions, have called forth the other. Now, if Patripassianism was the predominant doctrine, this would least of all have presented any foothold for the other classes of the Monarchians. These could expect nothing after this, but to meet with the warmest resistance. But if that tendency of Monarchianism which was more nearly akin to Ebionitism had its ground in the original doctrine of this church, the favorable reception which a Patripassian teacher met with here, could not be accounted for. The intimate connection, moreover, of Irenæus with the Roman church,[4] to the doctrinal tradition of which he especially appeals, testifies against the existence of such a Monarchian tendency opposed to the Logos-doctrine in this church. And it is by no means clear, that those Monarchians were at home in Rome: they came from some other quarter to the capital of the world, where was a confluence of the most heterogeneous elements from all directions. The Monarchians of the first class did in fact, from the first, meet even here with a very unfa-

[1] In a different sense from what was intended, when, at a later period, those who were accused of not duly distinguishing the divine and the human in Christ were denominated Theopaschites.

[2] See the words of Tertullian, cited above Pater philosophorum Deus.

[3] See my Apostol. Zeitalter, vol. I. p. 384.

[4] See vol. I. p. 204.

vorable reception. But as to the circumstance of their appealing to their agreement with the more ancient doctrine of the Roman church, this just as little proves that the original doctrine of the Roman church really favored them, as their appeal which they also made to the scriptures of the New Testament proves that the latter favored them.[1] The true state of the case probably was, then, that they simply took advantage of the more crude and undigested form of the doctrine in the Roman church to introduce their own.

The founder of this Monarchian party in Rome appears to have been a certain *Theodotus*, a leather-dresser (σκυτεύς) from Byzantium.[2] It is evident, from the way in which he interpreted the language of the angel, (Luke 1 : 31,)[3] that although he acknowledged nothing of an *indwelling* divine nature in Christ, he yet supposed that Christ had grown up from the beginning under the special influence of the divine Spirit. The language was not, he said, the Spirit of God shall enter into thee ; therefore the fact here denoted was not an incarnation of the divine Spirit,[4] but only a descent of the divine Spirit on Mary. Whence too it appears that he by no means denied the supernatural character of Christ's nativity ; of which therefore he is unjustly accused by Epiphanius. The Roman bishop, Victor, is said to have excommunicated him from the church, whether this took place at the end of the second or at the beginning of the third century ; yet his party continued to propagate itself, independently of the dominant church, and endeavored to get into notice by contriving to elect for its bishop Natalis, a venerated confessor. The latter seems, however, to have introduced a schism into his own breast, by departing from a conviction which had once given him strength for conflict and suffering. The disquiet of his heart manifested itself in frightful dreams and visions ; and in the end he penitently returned back to the Catholic church.[5]

There arose, independently of this Theodotus, another Monarchian sect in Rome, whose founder is called *Artemon*. It is certain that the party which derived its origin from this man did not acknowledge Theodotus as belonging to them ; and if they supposed they could appeal to their agreement in doctrine with the Roman bishop Victor, who had excommunicated Theodotus, they must either have assumed that their doctrine differed from that of Theodotus, or that the latter had been excommunicated for other reasons than his erroneous doctrines. The latter may be supposed, if the somewhat highly colored and, as we must admit, not sufficiently well-supported account,[6] that Theodotus

[1] Although we may be inclined to suppose that the Artemonites did not receive the gospel of John, yet we must admit that they acknowledged the epistles of Paul.

[2] The latter is reported by Epiphanius and Theodoretus.

[3] His words, cited by Epiphanius hæres. 54, are : Καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἔφη τῇ Μαρίᾳ· πνεῦμα κυρίου ἐπελεύσεται ἐπὶ σὲ, καὶ σύκ εἶπε· πνεῦμα κυρίου γενήσεται ἐν σοί.

[4] Whether it was, that by this divine Spirit he understood the Logos, or whether he disclaimed all knowledge of such a being. We should not forget here, that these words were in fact referred, at that time, to the incarnation of the Logos. See Justin M. Apolog. II. ed. Colon. f. 75 : Τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν παρὰ θεοῦ οὐδὲν ἄλλα νοῆσαι θέμις ἢ τὸν λόγον.

[5] If we may trust to the report of an opponent. Euseb. lib. V. c. 28.

[6] Besides being cited in Epiphanius, it may be found in the appendices to Tertullian's Præscriptions, c. 53.

was first excommunicated from the church on account of his denial of the faith under a persecution, may have some foundation of truth. The Artemonites continued to propagate themselves in Rome till far into the third century. About the middle of this century, the Roman presbyter Novatianus still considered it necessary, in his exposition of the doctrine of Christ's divinity, to notice particularly the objections of that party; and, during the later Samosatenian disputes, it was spoken of as a party still in existence.

If the Artemonites pretended that what *they* called the truth, had been preserved in the Roman church down to the time of the Roman bishop Zephyrinus, yet this, as we have remarked before, signifies nothing more here than it does in the other cases, where they cited the older church teachers generally and the apostles themselves as witnesses for the truth of their doctrine. When a man entrenches himself in some particular dogmatic interest, and makes that his central position, he can easily explain every thing in conformity with his own views, and find everywhere a reflection of *himself*. But when they asserted, that from the time of Victor's successor, Zephyrinus, the true doctrine in this church become obscured,[1] — some fact must be lying at the bottom of this assertion, which unhappily, in the absence of historical data, it is impossible at present accurately to ascertain. Perhaps by these very disputes, the Roman church was led to fix some more clearly defined doctrinal distinction or other, which was unfavorable to the interests of this party. But the Roman bishops, who, even at this early period, held so tenaciously to traditional forms, even in unimportant matters, would hardly be induced to exchange, at once, the Monarchianism received from their predecessors, for the Logos-doctrine coming to them from abroad; and such a change, moreover, did not admit of being so easily effected.

As it regards the tendency of mind in which the doctrine of these Artemonites originated, we are furnished with a very instructive hint on this subject, in one of the objections brought against them. They busied themselves a good deal with mathematics, dialectics, and criticism; with the philosophy of Aristotle and with Theophrastus. It was, then, a predominantly reflective, critical, dialectic bent of mind, which, in their case, encroached on the fervency and depth of Christian feelings. They were for a Christianity of the understanding, without any mystical element. Every thing of a transcendent character, every thing which would not adapt itself to their dialectic categories, was to be expurged from the system of faith. It is worthy of notice, that they devoted particular attention to the Aristotelean philosophy. We perceive here the different kinds of influence exerted by the systems of philosophy; the Platonic being employed to defend the doctrine of Christ's divinity, while the opposite direction of mind, tending to combat that doctrine, leaned to the side of the Aristotelean.

It was alleged against those Artemonites, that, under the pretence of emending the text of the holy scriptures, they indulged in a very ar-

[1] Ἀπὸ τε τοῦ διαδόχου αὐτοῦ Ζεφυρίνου παρακεχαράχθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Euseb. l. V. c. 28.

bitrary kind of criticism. An accusation of this sort from the mouth of opponents is in itself, it must be admitted, not entitled to much credit. There was ever a strong inclination to charge those who deviated from the church doctrine, whenever they cited other readings than those which were customarily received in the church, with interpolating and corrupting the holy scriptures so as to make them favor those opinions in which they differed from the church.[1] But the peculiar intellectual bent of these people renders it not improbable, that they did indulge in a licentious criticism, favoring the interest of their own peculiar dogmas. Their antagonists speak of the variations which were to be found in the several recensions of the text proceeding from the theologians of this party, as each was ambitious to acquire importance by his skill in criticism.[2]

Many of the Artemonites were led also by this critical bent of mind, as it would seem, to oppose the tendency to confound together the fundamental positions of the Old and New Testament; to combat the practice of implying, by means of allegorical interpretation, every Christian truth in the scriptures of the Old Testament. They were for holding the two positions more distinctly apart; for distinguishing more clearly the new, specifically Christian element from that of the Old-Testament scriptures. Possibly, also, they may have discriminated more carefully the peculiar character of the agency exerted by the Holy Spirit in the case of the New-Testament, from that in the case of the Old-Testament scriptures. To the latter they may not have ascribed the same authority as to the former.[3]

[1] Tertullian's Præscriptions: Ubi veritas disciplinæ et fidei Christianæ, illic erit veritas scripturarum et expositionum. De præscript. c. 19.

[2] There were many copies of the New Testament, inscribed with the names of the critics of the several sects from which the revision of the text proceeded. Πολλῶν (*ἀντιγραφῶν*) *ἐστιν εὑπορῆσαι, διὰ τὸ φιλοτίμως ἐγγεγράφθαι τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτῶν, τὰ ὑφ' ἑκάστου αὐτῶν, ὡς αὐτοὶ καλοῦσι, κατορθωμένα.* Euseb. l. V. c. 28.

[3] We infer this from the remarkable words in the controversial notice just cited, Euseb. l. V. c. 28: *Ἔνιοι δ' αὐτῶν οὐδὲ παράσσειν ἠξίωσαν αὐτὰς (τὰς γραφὰς) ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς ἀρνησάμενοι τόν τε νόμον καὶ τοὺς προφήτας, ἀνόμου καὶ ἀθέου διδασκαλίας* (here a word must have slipped out, for I do not feel at liberty to supply *ἕνεκα*, nor do I believe that this is the word missing. Neither can I, with Stroth, take these words as in apposition with *χάριτος*,) *προφάσει χάριτος* (under the pretext, that they would glorify the grace bestowed by the gospel) *εἰς ἔσχατον ἀπωλείας ὄλεθρον κατωλίσθησαν.* We may here compare what Origen says of the same class: Qui Spiritum Sanctum alium quidem dicant esse, qui fuit prophetis, alium autem, qui fuit in apostolis. Fragment. Commentar. in epist. ad Titum. But when I find Dr. Baur endeavoring to establish a connection between the tendency here described and the sect of Marcion, I must be allowed to say, that I see no ground whatever for any such hypothesis. If these people agreed with the school of Marcion in opposing the practice of confounding together the fundamental positions of the Old and the New Testament, (and yet they were certainly very far from proceeding to the same length in this opposition as Marcion did,) this cannot possibly be regarded as sufficient evidence of any relationship of theirs with the sect of Marcion. They were driven to this result from an entirely different starting-point, by an intellectual tendency directly opposed to that of the Marcionites. Had they stood in any sort of connection with the sect of Marcion, other Christians certainly would never have had so much to do with them, but would have repelled them, without ceremony, from their society, as notorious heretics. But neither can we believe, that it was to this party the opponents belonged, whom Tertullian combats as a Montanist, (see above, p 525, note 2;) for had it been in his power to charge these opponents with such errors as the above-described, he would assuredly not have allowed such an opportunity to pass without availing himself of it

We recognize the same tendency in the oldest opponents of John's gospel, who were connected with this party, — the so-called *Alogi*, whom we have already spoken of, as a sect that pushed the antithesis of Montanism to its farthest extreme on the other side.[1]

As to the second class of Monarchians, the *Patripassians*, the first one of the party who comes to our knowledge is the confessor *Praxeas*. He came from Asia Minor, the father-land of Monarchianism, where he had made himself known as an antagonist of Montanism; from which circumstance, however, it is by no means clear, that the peculiar direction he took with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity had any connection whatever with this opposition; especially if we consider that the prophetic spirit of the Montanists itself, as we have before pointed out, assumed in the first place an Old-Testament form, and spoke in the name of God the Father only. He afterwards travelled to Rome,[2] and by his influence induced the Roman bishop, either Eleutherus or Victor, to pronounce sentence of excommunication against the Montanists in Asia Minor. He at that time encountered no opposition on the score of his Patripassianism; whether it was that men were less disposed to examine rigidly into the creed of the confessor; or that, amidst the negotiations respecting many other important matters connected with the interests of the church, this difference in doctrine never happened to be mentioned; or that Praxeas found in the church doctrine at Rome, which as yet was not very precisely defined, a point of union for his own views, and by his zeal in behalf of the faith in Christ, as the God-man, perhaps by his hostility to the other party of the Monarchians, won over the public opinion in his favor. He next went to Carthage, where too he may have relied for support on the before-described pious interests of simple faith in the laity, which had not yet passed through any process of theological development.[3] Yet here an opponent of this doctrine presented himself, and a controversy arose. If we may believe the hostilely-disposed Tertullian, Praxeas was induced to recant his opinions.[4] Yet we should here probably distinguish between the real matter of fact, and the interpretation of the fact by an antagonist. It may be doubted whether the explanation of Praxeas, to which Tertullian alludes, may not have been simply a vindication of his doctrine against some falsely charged conclusions. Somewhat later, when Tertullian had already gone over to the Montanistic party, the controversy broke out afresh; and he had now a double motive for writing against Praxeas.

According to his representations, there were two possible ways of construing the doctrine of Praxeas: either that he denied the existence of any distinction in the being of God himself — denied the existence of any duality in God, which might seem to be presupposed by Christ's appearance, even a duality understood merely in a formal sense —

[1] See above, p. 526.

[2] For the precise time, see above, p. 513, note 3, and 525.

[3] Tertullian's words, where he is speaking of the spread of this doctrine in Carthage, are: Dormientibus multis in *simplicitate doctrinæ*. c. Praxeam, c. 1.

[4] His language is: Caverat pristinum doctor de emendatione sua et manet chirographum apud psychicos. L. c.

and applied the name Son of God to Christ simply with reference to his bodily appearance on earth;[1] or that he admitted the doctrine of a divine Logos in a certain sense. In the latter case, he would not only have applied the name Son of God to Christ with reference to his human appearance, but he would have acknowledged a distinction, from the creation of the world, between the hidden, invisible God, and him who revealed himself in the work of creation, in the Theophanies of the Old Testament, and finally in a human body, in Christ. In the last-mentioned relation, God would be called the Logos or the Son. By extending, in some sense, his activity beyond himself, and so generating the Logos, he thus made himself a Son.[2] Now Tertullian, when he expresses himself in this last way, has either failed to enter fully enough into the whole connection of his opponent's mode of thinking, has transferred to Praxeas his own way of construing the meaning of Praxeas, or else different views must have existed among Praxeas' followers, according to the degree of their intellectual culture, and according as they adhered more or less closely to the church terminology.

To *this* class of Monarchians belongs, moreover, *Noetus*, who appeared in the first half of the third century at Smyrna.[3] It is a characteristic fact, and serves to confirm what we have said before respecting the import of Patripassianism, that when Noetus was cited before an assembly of presbyters, to answer for the erroneous doctrine of which he was accused, he alleged in his defence that his doctrine tended only to honor Christ. "Of what evil am I guilty," said he, "when I glorify Christ?"[4] The unity of God and Christ, this only God,— was his motto. In proof of his doctrine he referred to Rom. 9: 5, where Christ is called God over all; — to the words of Christ, John 10: 30, "I and my Father are one;" — perhaps also[5] to the words John 14: 9, "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father." It appears, from these examples, that Patripassianism appealed to the authority of St. John's gospel, as well as to others; and it is evident, how slight are the grounds furnished by the spread of such doctrines for presuming that this gospel was either not known to exist, or not received. If, in the case of Praxeas, we were still uncertain whether he made the distinction between God hidden within himself and God in his self-manifestation, it is, on the other hand, clearly evident from the report of Theodoretus, that Noetus made a doctrine of this kind his very starting-point. There is one God, the Father, who is invisible when he pleases; and appears (manifests himself) when he pleases;

[1] See Tertullian, c. Praxeam c. 27.

[2] L. c. c. 10, 14, and 26. The objections of Baur cannot move me. The passage marked c. 14, especially, where the writer is speaking of the application of the doctrine to the Old Testament, leads necessarily to this result.

[3] Theodoretus, together with Hippolytus, furnishes the most characteristic notion of this doctrine, (vid. Hæret. fab. III. c. 3.) He correctly remarks that Noetus set forth no new doctrine invented by himself, but that others before him had already broached one of the same kind, among whom he names two individuals unknown to us, Epigonius and Cleomenes.

[4] Vid. Hippolyt. c. Noët. § 1: Τί οὖν κακὸν ποιῶ, δοξάζων τὸν Χριστόν;

[5] I say "*perhaps*," because it is not absolutely certain from the words of Hippolytus, whether he is answering an objection *actually made*, or only one which he conceived possible.

but the same, whether visible or invisible, begotten or unbegotten. Theodoretus refers this last expression to the birth of Christ; — but it may be doubted whether he has in this instance rightly taken the sense of the man; whether the latter had not in his mind the γέννησις τοῦ λόγου; and by this he could have understood here nothing else than God's activity without himself. At all events, he must have so appropriated the Logos-doctrine of John as to understand by the Logos only a designation for God proceeding forth from his hidden essence, — God revealing himself; — the same God, denominated, in different relations, ὢν and λόγος.

In the conflict with these two classes of the Monarchians, the church doctrine of the Trinity unfolded itself, — and in two different quarters, in the Western and in the Eastern church. In the latter, the doctrine of subordination became firmly established in connection with the hypostatical view of the Logos; since in the controversy with the Monarchians, who denied the distinction of hypostases, that distinction became still more prominently set forth. On the other hand, we see how the Western mind, starting from the doctrine of subordination received along with the distinction of hypostases, is ever striving to make prominent the unity of the divine essence in connection with this distinction. The designation of Christ as the Logos could have been known from the gospel of John, without any use being made of it, however, for a speculative exposition of the doctrine concerning Christ. This first took place, when a species of intellectual culture which had been formed in the schools of philosophy, particularly in the Platonic school, though after a superficial manner and more under the impulse of a religious than of a philosophical interest, came into contact with Christianity. The first author still extant, in whom this character may be discerned, is Justin Martyr.[1] He availed himself, in his speculations (as Philo, whose ideas seem to have been known to him and to have influenced him, had already done) of the ambiguity of the Greek term Logos, which denotes both reason and word. Hence the comparison of the reason, which dwells in God, (the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος,) and the revelation of this reason, appearing creatively without — the self-subsistent Word, (λόγος προφορικός, the word as it stands related to the thought,) by which the ideas of the divine reason are revealed and become actualized. Accordingly this word — so taught Justin — emanated from God before all creation, (being his self-manifestation,) as a personality derived from God's essence, and ever intimately united with him by this community of essence, — a distinction which does not arise out

[1] Justin describes the doctrine of Christ's divinity as one taught by Christ himself. Πείθεσθαι τοῖς δι' αὐτοῦ διδαχθεῖσι. Dial. Tryph. f. 267. The doctrine concerning Christ as the Son of God in that higher sense, he thought he found in the ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων, by which phrase he means the gospels, as being memorials of Christ's life. See f. 327; and when all the scattered allusions to the gospel of John, in his writings, are compared together, it is impossible to doubt that he had read this gospel, and comprised it among his apostolic commentaries; for, indeed, he describes these commentaries as having been composed partly by the apostles themselves, (Matthew and John,) and partly by their disciples, Luke and Mark. Τοῖς ἀπομνημονεύμασι, ἃ φημι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν ἐκείνοις παρακολουθησάντων συντετάχθαι. Dial. Tryph. f. 331.

of any necessity of nature, but is brought about by an act of the divine will. The idea of this Logos, as the invisible teacher of the spiritual world, from whom all goodness and truth proceed, Justin employs for the purpose of setting forth Christianity as the central point, where all the hitherto-scattered rays of the godlike in humanity converge, — the absolute religion, in which all that has been, till now, fragmentary and rent piece-meal, is brought together into a higher unity; and for the purpose of comparing the full and unalloyed revelation of the absolute, divine Logos in Christ, with the partial and fragmentary revelations — so fragmentary as to contradict each other — of truth in the human consciousness, growing from the implanted seed of the Logos, which is of one nature with that eternal, divine reason.[1] The same fundamental view we find in the other apologetic writers;[2] but we may notice, in the case of Athenagoras, how, in endeavoring to strip away everything that savors of Anthropopathism, and in contrasting the spiritually conceived idea of the Son of God with the pagan myths concerning sons of deities,[3] he is led to express himself on the unity of the divine essence, in a way which strikes a middle course between the Monarchian theory and the doctrine of the church in its later and more matured form. It is easy to see how the above-named Monarchians might avail themselves of the authority of such passages, to maintain the higher antiquity of their own form of doctrine.

Thus unfolded, this doctrine passed over into the Alexandrian school, whose philosophically cultivated minds strove from the first to remove away from it all relations of time and analogies of sense, as the analogy, for example, drawn from the expression of thoughts in words.[4] Already Clement describes the Logos as the ground-principle, without beginning and timeless, of all existence.[5] He transfers what was taught in the Neo-Platonic school concerning the relation of the second principle, the *νοῦς* living in self-contemplation, the hypostatised ideal world, to the absolute, the *ὄν*, — he transfers and applies this to the revelation of the Logos to the Father, — although, at the position he occupied, and with his mode of contemplating the universe in the light of a Christian Theism, which acknowledged a living, personal, acting God, it was still impossible for him to appropriate to his own purpose the sense in which all this was meant in the coherence of that philosophical system.[6] The specula-

[1] Which proceeds from the *ἔμφυτον παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου*, the *κατὰ λόγου μέρος*, compared with the *λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον, πάντα τὰ τοῦ λόγου ὅς ἐστι Χριστός*. Apolog. I. f. 48.

[2] In Athenagoras after the following form: The Logos, as God's indwelling reason, projects the ideas; — The Logos, as Word, emanated into self-subsistence, carries them into realization, *λόγος ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ*; — as *προελθὼν ἐνεργείᾳ*, it is that by which the organized world was formed out of chaos.

[3] The *πρῶτον γέννημα, οὐχ' ὡς γενόμενον*; for the Father had from all eternity his Logos in himself

[4] In the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικός*.

[5] *Ἄχρονος καὶ ἀναρχος ἀρχὴ, ἀπαρχὴ τῶν ὄντων*. Strom. l. VII. f. 700. *Ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ ἐπεικόνισται ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀορράτου πρώτη καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων*. L. c. l. V. f. 565. *Λόγος αἰώνιος*. L. c. l. VII. f. 708.

[6] We see this by comparing Clement, Strom. l. IV. f. 537, with Plotinus, Ennead. III. c. 7, seqq. It is true, Clement may not have taken any thing from Plotinus, who wrote some years later; but we must presuppose doctrines of the Neo-Platonic school still older than Plotinus. Clement says: *Ὁ θεὸς ἀναπόδεικτος ὢν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστημονικός*. This answers to the Neo-

tive ideas of Neo-Platonism were, in his case, mixed up with Christian intuitions. As we observed on a previous page, that Clement introduced into certain philosophical propositions a religious matter which was foreign from them, so here too we see him striving to find the idea which grew out of his own Christian consciousness and thought, — this idea of the unity of the divine life, grounded in faith, and of negation and schism as the very essence of unbelief, — striving to find this idea in the speculative maxims of the Neo-Platonic school concerning the νοῦς.[1] But the Alexandrian system, which sprang out of the germ furnished by Clement, was first carried out and moulded into its perfect shape by Origen; — and the influence of *his* exposition of the doctrine continued long to be felt in the Eastern church. The leading ideas in it were *as follows*.

There is an original source of all existence, to be called God in the absolute sense;[2] the fountain of divine life and blessedness to a world of spirits, who, as they are allied to him by nature, are also, by their communion with him, deified and raised superior to the limitations of a finite existence. In virtue of this divine life, which flows to them through their communion with the original divine essence, the more exalted spirits may be denominated, in a certain sense, divine beings, gods.[3] But as the αὐτόθεος is the original source of all existence and of all divine life, so the Logos is the necessary intermediate link through which all communication of life from him proceeds. This latter is the concentrated manifestation of God's glory, its universal, all-embracing reflection, by whom the partial eradiations of the divine glory are diffused abroad through the whole world of spirits.[4]

As there is but one original divine essence,[5] so there is but one original divine reason, the absolute reason,[6] through which alone the eternal Supreme Being reveals himself to all other existences. He is to them the source of all truth, — objective, self-subsistent truth itself. Origen considers it very important to hold fast the position, that each several rank of reasonable beings, or each several intelligence, has not its own subjective Logos, but that one absolute objective Logos, as well as one absolute objective truth, exists for all; the one truth of the divine

Platonic maxim concerning a suprarational, intellectual intuition, by which the νοῦς, rising above itself, soars to the ὄν, — so Plotinus says of the ὄν: Ὑπερβεβηκὸς τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν, τίνι ἀλίσκοιτο ἐπιβολῇ ἀφρόᾳ; What Plotinus says of the νοῦς as the ἐνέργεια πρώτη ἐν διεξόδῳ τῶν πάντων, as the ἓν πᾶν, Clement transfers to the Logos.

[1] Because the λόγος is the πάντα ἕν, — τὸ εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ πιστεῦσαι, μοναδικὸν ἐστι γίνεσθαι, ἀπερισπάστως ἐνούμενον ἐν αὐτῳ, τὸ δὲ ἀπιστῆσαι, διστάσαι ἐστὶ καὶ διαστῆναι καὶ μερισθῆναι.

[2] The ἁπλῶς θεός, αὐτόθεος.

[3] Μετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος θεοποιούμενοι. Intimately connected with this distinction, stands Origen's theory concerning the process of the development of Theism. *They* occupy the highest position, who have soared to the αὐτόθεος himself; — the second, those who believe that they possess in Christ the Supreme God himself, (see above;) the third, those who are conducted first to some notion of God, by recognizing those higher divine essences, the divine intelligences which animate the planets. Origen argues, as Philo had already done from Deut. 4: 19, a certain necessity of Polytheism, and in particular of Sabeism, in the process of the religious development of mankind, ordained by God: Τῷ τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους ἐπὶ τὴν νοητὴν ἀναδραμεῖν φύσιν, δι' αἰσθητῶν θεῶν κινουμένους περὶ θεότητος, ἀγαπητῶς κἂν ἐν τούτοις ἱστασθαι καὶ μὴ πίπτειν ἐπὶ εἴδωλα καὶ δαιμόνια. See in Joann. T. XII. § 3.

[4] In Joann. T. II. c. 2; T. XXXII. c. 18

[5] The αὐτόθεος.

[6] The αὐτόλογος.

consciousness, which binds man with all the different ranks of intelligences in the world of spirits. "Every one certainly will admit," says he, "that truth is one. None surely will venture to affirm that the truth of God is one thing; that of the angels, another; and that of men, still another; since, in the very nature of the case, there can be but one truth in regard to each one thing. But if truth is one, it rightly follows that the evolution of truth, which is wisdom, must be conceived as one, inasmuch as all false wisdom comes short of the truth, and cannot properly be called wisdom. But if there is one truth and one wisdom, then the Logos also is one, who reveals truth and wisdom to all such as are capable of receiving it." Although the Logos, however, is by his own nature the absolute one, yet he places himself in manifold forms and modes of activity, according to the different positions and the different wants of reasonable beings, to whom he becomes whatsoever is necessary for their well-being. While the Gnostics made different hypostases out of these different modes of operation of one and the same Redeeming Spirit, Origen referred back these different hypostases to different ideas and relations, (ἐπινοίας;) but while he combated these all-hypostatising Gnostics, he opposed also the Monarchians, who reduced the whole Triad simply to different relations of one and the same divine essence. He who denied the independent existence of the divine Logos, seemed to him to reduce every thing to the subjective, — to deny the existence of an absolute *objective* truth, — to make of this a bare abstract thing. There is no truth for the creaturely spirit without the revelation of the Logos, as of him through whom the consciousness of the spiritual world is united with God. "Not one of us," says Origen,[1] "is possessed of so mean an intellect as to suppose that the *essence of truth*[2] did not exist before the earthly appearance of Christ."

As Origen explained the several *designations* of the Logos to be symbolical, so he considered it to be also with the name Logos itself; and he spoke against those who, availing themselves of the comparison with the λόγος προφορικός, which seemed so inadequate to the Alexandrians, held fast to the name Logos alone, and thought they might refer to this, all passages of the Old Testament where a λόγος was spoken of.[3] The notion, which went along with this view, of an emanation of the Logos to self-subsistent existence before the creation of the world, was, like every other transfer of temporal relations to the Eternal, combated by Origen. He who fixed no beginning to the creation, but supposed it to be eternal, would far less fix any beginning here. He strove to banish all notions of time from the conception of the generation of the Logos. It was necessary here — as he thought — to conceive of a timeless present, an eternal now; and this he supposed to be intimated by the expression "to-day" in the second Psalm.[4]

In excluding all notions of time, it is also implied, in his opinion, that the generation of the Logos should not be conceived as something which

[1] c. Cels. l. VIII. c. 12.
[2] Ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας οὐσία.
[3] Ἐπεὶ συνεχῶς χρῶνται τῷ· ἐξηρεύξατο ἡ καρδία μου λόγον ἀγαθόν, ψ. 44, 1, οἰόμενοι προφορὰν πατρικὴν οἱονεὶ ἐν συλλαβαῖς κειμένην εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ.
[4] In Joann. I. 32; II. 1.

happened once and was then over. With the conception of beginning, that also of an end must be carefully excluded,—it should be conceived as a timeless, eternal act. Origen seeks to render this theogonic process clear by an analogy,—by comparing it with the process according to which the divine life developes itself in believers,—the just man not being born of God at once, by virtue of the divine life imparted to him, but being ever born anew of God; so that all the good he does, proceeds from this generation of the divine life in him.[1] With the glory of God exists also its radiation in the Son; from the light ever goes forth its radiation.[2] We should not forget here, that Origen was led into this view by his philosophical education in the Platonic school; for he only needed to apply what was taught in this school concerning the relation of the ὄν to the νοῦς, to the relation of the Father to the Logos. But here, owing to the difference between his own fundamental position and the Neo-Platonic, a question might occur to him. On the Neo-Platonic principle, all teleological considerations, all will and action of the absolute, were excluded; nothing properly had any place here but a necessity of the conception. But it was otherwise with Origen's idea of God the Father:—hence the question arises, whether, in reference to the generation of the Logos, he conceived of a necessity grounded in the divine essence, or of an act proceeding freely from the divine will. Had he been possessed of the later-developed notion of the unity of essence in the Triad, it would have resulted from this as a matter of course, that he would be led to distinguish the eternal generation of the Son, as an immanent act grounded in the divine essence, from a fiat of the divine will as the mediating cause of the creation. But the matter presented itself in a different aspect to Origen, viewed in the light of his principle of subordination, which, strictly taken, excluded such a mode of conception. And this result, to which Origen's principle would lead, he is said actually to have expressed in his disputation with the Valentinian Candidus, in which he attacked the Gnostic doctrine of emanation. He affirmed, that we are not to conceive of a natural necessity in the case of the generation of the Son of God, but, precisely as in the case of the creation, we must conceive of an act flowing from the divine will; but he must have excluded here all *temporal* succession of the different momenta.[3] From this view of the subject, Origen was

[1] Concerning Christ: Ὅτι οὐχὶ ἐγέννησεν ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ ἀπέλυσεν αὐτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ γεννᾷ αὐτόν. Concerning the just man: Οὐ γὰρ ἅπαξ ἐρῶ τὸν δίκαιον γεγεννῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ γεννᾶσθαι καθ' ἑκάστην πρᾶξιν ἀγαθὴν, ἐν ᾗ γεννᾷ τὸν δίκαιον ὁ θεός. In Jerem. Hom. IX. § 4.

[2] Ὅσον ἐστὶ τὸ φῶς ποιητικὸν τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γεννᾶται τὸ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ.

[3] Jerome says: Habetur Dialogus apud Græcos Origenis et Candidi, Valentiniani hæresis defensoris, in quo repugnat, Dei Filium vel prolatum esse vel natum, (the latter certainly he could only deny so far as it was too sensuously conceived,) ne Deus Pater dividatur in partes, sed dicit sublimem et excellentissimam creaturam *voluntate* extitisse Patris, sicut et cæteras creaturas Hieronym. T. II. contra Rufin. ed. Vallarsi T. II. p. I. p. 512. Venet. 1767, or ed. Martianay, T. IV. f. 413. It must be confessed, the source from which we obtain this is not wholly to be relied on; for we know not with what degree of care the notes of this disputation were taken down. Many expressions which are here ascribed to Origen, do not agree with his mode of thinking or style of language. *The above* definition, however, as must be evident, is well supported by Origen's system; and it is easy to see, that he would have been led to state this in so express terms, only when driven

also led to object emphatically to the notion of a generation of the Son of God from the essence of the Father, (*γέννησις ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*,) inasmuch as such a theory seemed to him to lead to the supposition of a natural necessity to which the divine essence was subjected,— to the supposition of a sensuously conceived emanation,— a severing of the divine essence.[1]

In conformity with this development of ideas, Origen held it to be quite necessary to insist on the absolute exaltation and superiority of God the Father, so far as his essence is concerned, above every other existence; just as he was accustomed, when a Platonist, to consider the highest *ὄν* as immeasurably superior to all other things, and exalted, in its essence, even above the *νοῦς* itself. It appeared to him, therefore, something like a profanation of the first and supreme essence, to suppose an equality of essence or a unity between him and any other being whatever, not excepting even the Son of God. As the Son of God and the Holy Spirit are incomparably exalted above all other existences, even in the highest ranks of the spiritual world, so high and yet higher is the Father exalted even above them.[2] To this distinction between the essence of the Son of God and that of the Father,[3] Origen was induced to give still more prominence in opposing the Monarchians. As these latter, with the distinction of essence, denied also the personal distinction, so it was with Origen a matter of practical moment, on account of the systematic connection of ideas in his philosophical system of Christianity, to maintain in opposition to these the personal independence of the Logos. Sometimes, in this controversy, he distinguishes between *unity of essence*, and personal unity, or unity of subject, in which case he was only interested to controvert the latter.[4] And this certainly was the point of greatest practical moment to him; and he must have been well aware, that many of the fathers, who contended for a *personal* distinction, held firmly at the same time to a *unity of essence*. But the internal connection of his own system required that both should stand or fall together: wherever he spoke, therefore, from the position of that system, he affirmed at one and the same time the *ἑτερότης τῆς οὐσίας* and the *ἑτερότης τῆς ὑποστάσεως* or *τοῦ ὑποκειμένου*.[5]

From this doctrine he drew the practical inference, that we are bound to pray to the Father alone, and not to the Son; whence it is apparent, what a strong practical interest the Patripassians, they whom Origen accused of knowing only the Son, without being able to elevate themselves to the Father, must have had to controvert such a system. But still Christ was, even to Origen, the way, the truth, and the life,— as

to it in opposing the doctrines of a sensuous emanation-theory, or of natural necessity.

[1] Against those who erroneously explained the passage, John 8: 42, as referring to the generation of the Logos, he says, in Joann. T. XX. § 16: *Ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ· ἐξῆλθον ἀπὸ θεοῦ, διηγήσαντο ἀντὶ τοῦ γεγέννημαι ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας φάσκειν τοῦ πατρὸς γεγεννῆσθαι τὸν υἱόν, οἱανεὶ μειουμένου καὶ λείποντος τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἢ πρότερον εἶχε, δόγματα ἀνθρώπων, μηδ' ὅναρ φύσιν ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον πεφαντασμένων.*

[2] In Joann. T. XIII. § 25.

[3] The doctrine of a *ἑτερότης τῆς οὐσίας*, in the dispute against the *ὁμοούσιον*.

[4] In Joann. T. X. against those who said, *Ἓν, οὐ μόνον οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ τυγχάνειν ἀμφοτέρους.*

[5] In Joann. T. II. § 2. De orat. c. 15: *Κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ καθ' ὑποκείμενόν ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς ἕτερος τοῦ πατρός.*

he expressed it with full conviction, even on the grounds of his own philosophical system of Christian ideas. He knew of no other way to the Father; no other source of truth; no other spring of divine life for all creatures, but him: he was the mirror, through which Paul and Peter, and all who were like them, saw God.[1] He says, the Gnostics may be allowed in a certain sense to be right, when they affirm that the Father was first revealed by Christ. Until then, men could have no other knowledge of God, than as the Creator and Lord of the world, since it was first through the Son they came to the knowledge of him as their Father; and it was by the spirit of adoption which they received from him, they were first enabled to address God as their Father.[2] He recognized him as the Mediator from whom alone Christians derive their communion with God; to whom they should constantly refer their Christian consciousness, and in whose name and through whom they should always pray to God the Father. He says, "Why may it not be expressed in the sense of him who said, Wherefore callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is God. Why prayest thou to me? Thou shouldst pray to the Father alone, to whom I also pray. As you learn from the holy scriptures, you are not to pray *to* the High Priest ordained for you by the Father, *to* him who has received it from the Father to be your Advocate and Intercessor; but you must pray *through* the High Priest and the Intercessor, through him who can be touched with your infirmities, having been tempted in all points like as ye are, yet, by the gift of God, without sin. Learn, then, what a gift you have received from my Father, when, by your new birth in me, ye have received the spirit of adoption, that ye might be called sons of God, and my own brethren."[3]

We have already remarked, that Origen unfolded and matured his doctrine of the Logos in the controversy with the two classes of the Monarchians; and the systematic foundation which he laid for this doctrine could not fail once more to call forth a reaction from the Monarchian party; for his views, as must appear evident from the exhibition of his system, were hardly suited to remove the scruples they entertained against the hypostatical Logos-doctrine, in a way which would be satisfactory to *them* at their own position. But Monarchianism, in order to support itself, now made its appearance under a new shape. Amid the strifes of the two classes, there arose a conciliatory Monarchian tendency.[4] It proceeded from those who agreed with the Monarchians in contending against the doctrine of a hypostatical, subor-

[1] In Joann. T. XIII. § 25.

[2] In Joann. T. XIX. § 1. vol. VI. f. 286, ed. de la Rue; T. II. p. 146, ed. Lommatzsch.

[3] De orat. c. 15.

[4] In opposition to Dr. Baur, who denies the existence of any such third class of Monarchians, I must once more affirm, that the phenomena presented in this portion of history could not possibly be understood without the supposition of such a conciliating tendency; and that Beryllus of Bostra, as its forerunner, must take the place which belongs to him, between the two above-named classes of the Monarchians and Sabellius. I add, that neither the strictures of Dr. Ullman, in his Hallischen Weihnachtsprogramm, v. J. 1835, in the Studien und Kritiken, J. 1836, 4tes Stück, S. 1073, nor those of Dr. Baur, in his History of the Doctrine of the Trinity, are of such force as to induce me to abandon the views which I held before.

dinate Logos; but whose *interest for Christianity* forbade them to be satisfied with the way in which the first class of the Monarchians contemplated Christ in his relation to other enlightened teachers; — who felt constrained to believe that he possessed a special divine nature; but who at the same time, as their reason could not be satisfied to remove back the difficulties by appealing to the incomprehensibleness of the subject, must have felt themselves repelled by the Patripassian hypothesis of an incarnation of God the Father himself. Accordingly there started up a new theory concerning the person of Christ, which aimed to strike a middle course between those who ascribed to him too much, and those who conceded to him too little. It was not the whole infinite essence of God the Father which dwelt in him, but a certain efflux from the divine essence; and a certain influx of the same into human nature was what constituted the personality of Christ. It was not before his temporal appearance, but only subsequently thereto, that he subsisted as a distinct person beside the Father. This personality originated in the hypostatizing of a divine power. It was not proper to suppose here, as the first class of Monarchians taught, a distinct human person like one of the prophets, placed from the beginning under a special divine influence; but this personality was itself something specifically divine, produced by a new creative communication of God to human nature, by such a letting down of the divine essence into the precincts of that nature. Hence in Christ the divine and the human are united together; hence he is the Son of God in a sense in which no other being is. As notions derived from the theory of emanation were in this period still widely diffused; as, even in the church mode of apprehending the incarnation of the Logos, the doctrine of a reasonable, human soul in Christ was still but imperfectly unfolded (it being by Origen's means, as we shall see afterwards, that this doctrine was first introduced into the general theological consciousness of the Eastern church); — so, under these circumstances, a theory which thus substituted the divine, which the Father communicated from his own essence, in place of the human soul in Christ, could gain the easier admittance. If we transport ourselves back into the midst of the process whereby the doctrines of Christianity were becoming unfolded in consciousness, into the conflict of opposite opinions in this period, we shall find it very easy to understand how a modified theory of this sort came to be formed.

It belongs also to the peculiarity of this new modification of Monarchianism, that it spoke of an ideal being of Christ, a being in the divine idea, or predestination, before his temporal appearance. Certainly they who expressed themselves *thus* did not wish to deny, that this could be said concerning the relation of God's eternal plan to everything that appears in the succession of time. But, when they gave prominence to this point in reference to Christ's appearance in particular, they must have connected with the assertion some peculiar meaning; they meant without doubt to mark thereby the important bearing which the appearance of Christ had on the execution of the divine plan of the universe, as being the end and central point of all

to mark the necessity of such an appearance, in order to the realization of the divine ideas. And by virtue of their peculiar mode of apprehending the essence and the origin of Christ's personality, they might certainly ascribe to it this significancy. To this, then, they would also refer those passages of the New Testament which speak of Christ's being with the Father before his temporal appearance.

The first who took a conciliatory position of this sort was Beryllus, bishop of Bostra, in Arabia, a man well known in his times as one of the more learned teachers of the church.[1] The peculiar modification

[1] See Euseb. l. VI. c. 20. His doctrine is described by Eusebius in the somewhat obscure passage in l. VI. c. 33: Τὸν κύριον μὴ προϋφεστάναι κατ' ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν πρὸ τῆς εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίας. In the interpretation of these words, I must agree, on one point, with Baur, and differ from Schleiermacher, in his well-known dissertation on the Monarchians, and from Ullmann, and maintain that περιγραφή certainly does not denote a circumscription of the divine essence; but, as I have already explained the same thing above, and, as I believe, proved in the first edition of this work, it can mean, in the scientific language of Origen, nothing else than a personal, individual existence, as contradistinguished from a barely ideal existence, or a mere distinction of the understanding. Compare e. g. in Joann. T. I. § 42, where the εἶναι κατ' ἰδίαν περιγραφήν is opposed to the εἶναι barely κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ἕτερον, the ἀνυπόστατον. The words mean, then, that Christ, before his appearance in humanity, had no self-subsistent, personal existence. He could thus be, before this, different from the Father only κατ' ἐπίνοιαν, or have only an ideal being. This marks the opposition to the hypostatical Logos-doctrine, but also to the doctrine of the Patripassians; for, according to the latter, there was not acknowledged to be in Christ, even when he appeared on the earth, any οὐσία κατ' ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν ἑτέρα, in relation to the essence of the Father. But we must now bring in also the second part of the description: μηδὲ μὴν θεότητα ἰδίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐμπολιτευομένην αὐτῷ μόνην τὴν πατρικήν. The explanation of this passage by Baur, who professes to adhere to the etymological and original meaning of the word πολιτεύεσθαι, I cannot but regard as somewhat arbitrary and artificial. The word denotes, according to the use of language in that period, and according to the context, certainly nothing else than the notion of *indwelling*. Now such an expression would assert too much, if it was meant to denote barely a certain *inworking* of God upon a man standing under his special influence. These words would rather characterize the view of the Patripassians; but which we cannot suppose to be expressed here, on account of the preceding proposition. We must, then, seek for a hypothesis holding the middle place between the two views above mentioned, as that does which is presented in the text. Why should Eusebius waste so many words, if he meant simply to attribute to Beryllus a theory akin to that of the Artemonites? He would doubtless have expressed himself in this case, as he did in speaking of the doctrine of Paul of Samosata, with much more heat and acrimony. I must therefore decidedly object to the view of Baur; according to which, moreover, it would be impossible to point out any difference between the doctrine of Beryllus and that of the Artemonites. We must next compare what Origen says concerning the Monarchians, in his Commentary on the Epistle of Titus, which has a striking resemblance to the above-quoted language of Eusebius; but which, unhappily, has come down to us only in the Latin version of Rufinus: Qui hominem dicunt Dominum Jesum præcognitum et prædestinatum, qui ante adventum carnalem substantialiter et proprie non exstiterit, sed quod homo natus Patris solam in se habuerit Deitatem. True, one might suppose, since the others whom he describes in the second member of the sentence are the Patripassians, (see the passages cited above, p. 578, note 6,) it would be necessary to infer that we are to conceive here of the same class of Monarchians as in the passages quoted above, (p. 576–7, note 4, beginning at line 12;) but, on the other hand, it is to be considered that Origen's expression denotes higher views of the divine element in Christ, than we can attribute to the first class of Monarchians, — that Origen would doubtless have expressed himself more strongly against these, and that he had already spoken before of those who held Christ to be a *mere man*, and therefore would not have repeated it. We find in these words, then, a confirmation of our views. And, if it may be presumed of itself, that Beryll supposed no human soul in Christ, distinct from the indwelling of the divine nature in him, I see not why we may not be warranted to place in connection with this the report of Socrates, (III. c. 7,) that the synod convened against Beryll settled the doctrine concerning a human soul in Christ. A doctrine so determined always

of the Monarchian doctrine which he presented having excited controversy, in the year 244 a synod convened for the purpose of settling the matter in dispute. The great Origen, then residing at Cæsarea Stratonis, in Palestine, was drawn into this controversy, being the most important advocate of the opposite doctrine of the Logos. He entered largely into the dispute with Beryll; and probably by his intellectual superiority, argumentative skill, and moderation, succeeded in convincing the latter of his error. True, we here follow the account of Eusebius, one of Origen's enthusiastic friends; and, as we no longer have access to the sources of information from which Eusebius drew his account, we are without the means of forming an unbiassed and independent judgment of our own. Yet we should give its due weight to the fact, that at this period, when as yet there was no *religion nor church of the state*, there existed no earthly power which *could force* Beryllus to recant; — though the authority of an episcopal collegium had great — indeed too great — power over the churches. But had it been the purpose of the bishops to crush their colleague under the weight of their numbers, they needed not to call to their aid the banished and heretical presbyter, whose only power was in his knowledge. Nor was Origen a man who would be disposed to overwhelm another by the weight of his name or the superiority of his intellect.

It is the men of the Alexandrian school alone, who furnish us the rare example of such theological conferences, which, instead of resulting in still greater divisions, created a union of feelings. Such was the influence of men who were not slaves to the mere letter, and who knew how to unite with zeal for truth, the spirit of love and moderation.

According to Jerome's account,[1] Beryllus addressed a letter of thanks to Origen for the instruction he had received from him. We have no reasons for doubting this; yet the account of Jerome is not so much to be relied on as that of Eusebius.

If the midway tendency of Beryllus was thus obliged to yield under the preponderance of the other system, yet we soon notice the appearance of a similar attempt, conceived and carried out in a still more systematic form. Sabellius of Ptolemais in Pentapolis, Africa, who proceeded still farther in the path struck out by Beryllus, appears to have been the most original and profound thinker among the Monarchians. Unhappily we have only a few fragmentary remains of his system, from which we must seek to reconstruct the whole, and among which not a little still remains doubtful or obscure. Since the time of Schleiermacher's profound dissertation on this subject, the opinion has obtained some considerable currency, that Sabellius shows, particularly in one respect, an important advance in the further development of the Monarchian theory. While, for instance, the earlier Monarchian tendencies agreed

leads us to infer its opposite as the means by which it was distinctly brought out. And since, in the case of Origen, his Logos-doctrine was so closely connected with his doctrine concerning the human soul of Christ, it becomes so much the more probable, that both were united also in his polemical efforts. Thus we must reckon Beryll with those who held Christ to be a ἓν πάντ' ἀσύνθετον. Orig. in Matth. T. XVI. § 8.

[1] De vir. illustr. c. 60

with the system of the Logos-doctrine so far as this, that they considered the name of God the Father to be a designation of the primal divine essence, and all besides this to be something derived; Sabellius, on the other hand, referred all the three names of the Triad to relations wholly coördinate. The names Father, Logos,[1] and Holy Ghost, would, according to him, be, after the same manner, designations of three different phases, under which the one divine essence reveals itself. All the three would belong together, to designate, in a manner exhausting the whole truth, the relation of God to the world. There would thus be the general antithesis between the Absolute, the essence of God in himself, the μονάς, which must be regarded as the pure designation of the Absolute, of the ὄν; and the Triad, by which would be denoted the different relations of the self-evolving μονάς to the creation. We have, it is true, several sayings of Sabellius, according to which one might suppose, that he would have distinguished God the Father, as well as the Logos and the Holy Ghost, from the μονάς in itself; as for instance, when he taught that the Monad unfolded became the Triad.[2] But, in other places, he clearly identified the Father with the μονάς, and considered him as the fundamental subject, which, when hidden within himself, was the pure Monas, (the ὄν,) and, when revealing himself, unfolded his essence to a Triad, as he expressly says: "The Father remains the same, but evolves himself in the Son and Spirit."[3] It is this only that distinguishes Sabellius from the other Monarchians; — he received the whole Triad, and, along with the rest, the doctrine on the Holy Spirit, into his Monarchian theory.

How the one divine essence comes to be called by different names, according to the different relations or modes of activity into which it enters, he sought to illustrate by various comparisons. What the Apostle Paul says about the relation of the multifarious modes of activity and gifts to one Spirit, who, persisting in his oneness, exhibits himself notwithstanding in these manifold forms, — this Sabellius transferred to the self-evolution of the Monad into the Triad.[4] That which is, in it-

[1] Or, according to Baur's view, "Son."

[2] Ἡ μονὰς πλατυνθεῖσα γέγονε τρίας. Athanas. orat. IV. c. Arian. § 13. We may especially advert to the fact, that the question occurred even to Athanasius, whether Sabellius did not distinguish the μονάς from the Father. Ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ ἡ λεγομένη παρ' αὐτῷ μονὰς ἄλλο τί ἐστι παρὰ τὸν πατέρα. — Ὥστε εἶναι μονάδα, εἶτα καὶ πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καὶ πνεῦμα. But as Athanasius, in this place, is only aiming to show Sabellius, that, conceive of the matter as he might, he must still find that he fell into absurdities, we ought not to lay too much stress on this imputation of consequences, as helping to determine the doctrine really taught by the man.

[3] Ὁ πατὴρ ὁ αὐτὸς μέν ἐστι, πλατύνεται δὲ εἰς υἱὸν καὶ πνεῦμα. Athanas. orat. IV. § 25. I do not see with what propriety it can be asserted, that Athanasius has not allowed Sabellius here to use his own language, but imputed to him a mode of expression to which he was a stranger. Even when Sabellius designates the Father as one of the πρόσωπα, it still by no means follows, as has been asserted, that he could not employ this name also to designate the μονάς. The same name which designates the ὄν in itself, serves also to distinguish it from the different phases of its self-manifestation and self-communication. In its relation to the other ἐπινοίαις under which God is conceived, the one which designates originally God's essence in itself is also the name of a particular ἐπίνοια, different from the others. When God speaks as the ὄν, this too is a πρόσωπον, in which he presents himself.

[4] Ὥσπερ διαιρέσεις χαρισμάτων εἰσὶ, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι, πλατύνεται δὲ εἰς υἱὸν καὶ πνεῦμα. Athanas. orat. IV. § 25.

self, and continues to be, one, presents itself, in its manifestation, as threefold. He is said to have made use also of the following comparison, drawn from the sun. "As in the sun we may distinguish its proper substance,[1] its round shape, and its power of communicating warmth and light, so may we distinguish in God his proper self-subsistent essence, the illuminating power of the Logos, and the power of the Holy Spirit, in diffusing the warmth and glow of life through the hearts of believers."[2] He did not scruple to make use of the church phrase, "three persons," (tres personæ, *τρία πρόσωπα*;) but he took it in another sense, as denoting different parts, or personifications, which the one divine essence assumed according to varying circumstances and occasions. According as it behooved that God should be represented acting in this or that particular way, so would the same one subject be introduced in the sacred scriptures, under different personifications,[3] as Father, Son, or Spirit.[4]

According to this theory, the self-development of the divine Essence, proceeding forth from the unity of its solitary, absolute being, is the ground and pre-supposition of the whole creation. The self-expression of the Supreme Being — the *ὄν* becoming Logos[5] — is the ground of

[1] The *ὄν*, the *μονάς*.

[2] Epiphan. hæres. 62. I leave it undetermined, whether Sabellius made use also of the comparison drawn from the *trichotomy* of man's nature, body, soul, and spirit, actually in this form. It seems to me not like his usual subtle manner.

[3] It is plain from Sabellius' language, that he attached no other sense than this to the term *πρόσωπον*. The word, however, has sometimes been taken in its signification of "countenance," and in this sense applied to explain the ideas of Sabellius; but I must object to this as wholly arbitrary and unwarranted.

[4] *Ἕνα μὲν εἶναι τῇ ὑποστάσει τὸν θεὸν, προσωποιεῖσθαι δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς γραφῆς διαφόρως, κατὰ τὸ ἰδίωμα τῆς ὑποκειμένης ἑκάστοτε χρείας, καὶ νῦν μὲν τὰς πατρικὰς ἑαυτῷ περιτιθέναι φωνὰς, ὅταν τούτου καιρὸς ᾖ τοῦ προσώπου, νῦν δὲ τὰς υἱῷ πρεπούσας, νῦν δὲ τὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑποδύεσθαι προσωπεῖον.* Basil. ep. 214, § 3. *Τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόστασιν πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστοτε παρεμπίπτουσαν χρείαν μετασχηματίζεσθαι.* Ep. 235, § 6. *Τὸν αὐτὸν θεὸν ἕνα τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντα, πρὸς τὰς ἑκάστοτε παραπιπτούσας χρείας μεταμορφούμενον, νῦν μὲν ὡς πατέρα, νῦν δὲ ὡς υἱὸν, νῦν ὡς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα διαλέγεσθαι.* Ep. 210.

[5] We may here notice the theory of Dr. Baur, who holds that Sabellius did not consider the Logos to constitute one of the *πρόσωπα* of the Triad, but conceived this notion as holding an altogether different relation to the Godhead. The Logos, according to Baur, would only denote what stood opposed to the pure being of deity in itself, — the principle which supported and maintained this being in the form of an actual, concrete existence. It was first and only in this divine being, become an actual, concrete existence, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost would constitute three coördinate designations, exhausting the whole sphere of this being, and corresponding to the three momenta, or periods of the universe, in its historical development. Hence, again, they would not subsist simultaneously, but follow one after the other; so that, when the *πρόσωπον* of the Son made its appearance in Christ, the *πρόσωπον* of the Father which belonged to the Old Testament period would disappear; and, in like manner, the Holy Spirit would take the place of the Son, when the latter disappeared. But I cannot possibly look upon this ingenious combination as one which correctly represents the theory. It were quite contrary to the whole analogy of the opinions and modes of thinking in this period to suppose, that the notion of the Logos was conceived as independent of that of the Father, and even prior to it. And in the language of Sabellius himself, all those expressions relating to a *γεννᾶν*, a *προβάλλειν* of the Logos, refer back, without any doubt, to the presupposed notion of the Father. Baur appeals, it is true, to the words of Sabellius already cited, (in note 4,) where a *διαλέγεσθαι* is attributed as well to the Father, as such, as to the other *πρόσωπα*, — is represented as common to all the three *πρόσωπα*. But manifestly this *διαλέγεσθαι* has no reference to the proper Logos-notion. The author is treating in that passage simply of the different parts or personifications under which the same divine subject is introduced in the sacred scriptures, speaking sometimes as the Father, sometimes as the Son, (which here in

all existence. Hence, says Sabellius, "God silent, is inactive, — but speaking, is active.[1] In a particular manner, he recognized the symbol of the divine Logos in the human soul. So Philo maintained, that to the ὄν, no creaturely existence can have any likeness; but that the soul was created after the image of the Logos. The condition, then, of the soul's existence was, that God broke silence,— the ὄν became Logos, or that he caused the Logos to proceed from him, — begat the Logos from himself. Hence Sabellius could say, in reference to mankind: "To the end that we might be created, the Logos came forth from God, (or was begotten;) and because he came forth from God, we exist."[2]

But when these souls, by sinning, swerved from their true destination, which is, to represent the image of the divine Logos, it became necessary for that archetypal Logos himself to descend into human nature, in order that he might perfectly realize the image of God in humanity, and redeem the souls which are akin to him. In his views relative to the person of Christ, Sabellius coincides with Beryllus. The same remarks which we made with respect to the doctrine of the latter, will apply also to that of the former. The Logos is first hypostatized in Christ, but then only in a transient form of its manifestation. The divine power of the Logos appropriated to itself a human body, and by this appropriation begat the person of Christ. We may compare this theory of Sabellius with the doctrine taught by a class of Jewish theologians, who held that God caused to proceed from himself, and then withdrew again, his power of manifestation, the Logos; as the sun does his rays: — that the Angelophanies and Theophanies of the Old Testament are nothing else than different transitory forms of manifestation of this one power of God.[3] In like manner, Sabellius conceived the Theophany in the appearance of Christ. He made use of the same image: God caused the power of the Logos to go forth from him, as a ray from the sun, and then withdrew it again into himself.[4]

Where Sabellius expressed himself strictly[5] according to his system,

deed is not, in the sense of Sabellius, identified with the Logos absolutely,) and sometimes as the Holy Spirit. The Logos, therefore, may well be regarded as one of these three πρόσωπα. Again, according to the scheme of Sabellius, the transition from the Monad to the Triad begins with the πλατύνεσθαι of the ὄν. But the πλατύνεσθαι is necessarily connected with the generation of the Logos. Here, then, a separation into the several πρόσωπα must be already supposed. And if the notion of the Logos was intended to designate the universal sphere to which all the three πρόσωπα belong, there would be an incongruity in conceiving the Logos and the Son as correlative notions, and in ascribing the incarnation to the Logos in particular.

[1] Τὸν θεὸν σιωπῶντα μὲν ἀνενέργητον, λαλοῦντα δὲ ἰσχύειν. Athanas. orat. IV. § 11.

[2] Ἵνα ἡμεῖς κτισθῶμεν, προῆλθεν ὁ λόγος, καὶ προελθόντος αὐτοῦ ἐσμεν. Athanas. orat. IV. § 25, — or: Δι' ἡμᾶς γεγέννηται, προεβλήθη. L. c. § 11. The words would give another sense, if we preferred to understand them as referring to the καινὴ κτίσις, and to the incarnation of the Logos. But taking them as they read, and as they are cited by Athanasius, the meaning above ascribed to them must still be regarded as the most natural.

[3] Dial. c. Tryph. Jud. f. 358. As the light issues from and returns back to the sun, οὕτως ὁ πατὴρ, ὅταν βούληται, δύναμιν αὐτοῦ προπηδᾷν ποιεῖ, καὶ ὅταν βούληται, πάλιν ἀναστέλλει εἰς ἑαυτόν.

[4] Ὡς ὑπὸ ἡλίου πεμφθεῖσαν ἀκτῖνα, καὶ πάλιν εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἀναδραμοῦσαν. Epiphan. hæres. 62.

[5] It was somewhat different, when, (perhaps by way of accommodation to the church terminology,) speaking of a generation of the Logos, he may have styled him the Son in a certain figurative and improper sense.

he applied the name Son of God to the personality derived from the hypostatizing of the Logos. The Logos is, in itself, only Logos; — with its humanization it first becomes the Son of God.[1] But while this was the original doctrine of Sabellius, that the name Son of God was not to be applied to the Logos in itself, but only to Christ, yet the adherents to this system, as appears from the quotations of Athanasius, had different ways of explaining themselves on this point. Either it was said, that not the Logos, but the man into whom the Logos entered, was the Son of God;[2] or both taken together, that which resulted from the union of the human nature with the Logos, was the Son of God;[3] or the Logos itself, so far as it was hypostatized in the manner described, was styled the Son of God. All these three modes of expression might doubtless flow out of one system. By reason of this connection of ideas, it might now be said again, — the Logos is called the Son of God, not in respect to essence, but only in reference to a certain relation.[4]

It may be gathered from the whole coherence of this system, that in it the personality of Christ could not be regarded as anything possessed of an eternal subsistence, but only as a transitory appearance. The ultimate end of all is defined by Sabellius to be this: that the Logos, after having conducted the souls created in his image to their perfection, would return back into his original being, into oneness with the Father,[5] — the *τρίας* would again resolve itself into the *μονάς*.[6] Whence it necessarily follows, that, when everything has reached this ultimate end, God once more withdraws into himself the power of the Logos, which had been hypostatized into a self-subsistent, personal existence; and, consequently, this personal existence itself is annihilated.

The question, however, might arise, whether it was not the opinion of Sabellius, that after Christ had accomplished his work on the earth, God did then, with his ascension to heaven, re-absorb this ray which had flowed from himself, and by which the personality of Christ was constituted. The manner in which Epiphanius represents the doctrine might seem to favor this view; namely, that, after the Son had accomplished all that was necessary for the salvation of mankind, he was conveyed up once more to heaven, like a ray of light flowing from the the sun, and returning back to it again.[7] A comparison of this with the above-mentioned doctrine of the Jewish sect respecting the Theophanies, where a similar image is employed, would seem to confirm this view. And we might suppose a connection of ideas, somewhat

[1] Ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν εἶναι λόγον ἁπλῶς· ὅτε δὲ ἐνηνθρώπησε, τότε ὠνομάσθαι υἱόν· πρὸ γὰρ τῆς ἐπιφανείας μὴ εἶναι υἱόν, ἀλλὰ λόγον μόνον· καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ὢν πρότερον σὰρξ, οὕτως ὁ λόγος υἱὸς γέγονε, οὐκ ὢν πρότερον υἱός. Athanas. orat. IV. § 22.

[2] Τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃν ἐφόρησεν ὁ λόγος, αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ — τὸν μονογενῆ, καὶ μὴ λόγον, υἱόν. L. c. § 20.

[3] Συνημμένα ἀμφότερα υἱός. L. c. § 21.

[4] Κατ' ἐπίνοιαν υἱὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν λόγον. Athanas. orat. IV. § 8.

[5] Δι' ἡμᾶς γεγέννηται, καὶ μεθ' ἡμᾶς ἀνατρέχει, ἵνα ᾖ, ὥσπερ ἦν. L. c. § 12.

[6] L. c. § 25.

[7] Πεμφθέντα τὸν υἱὸν καιρῷ ποτε, ὥσπερ ἀκτῖνα, καὶ ἐργασάμενον τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τὰ τῆς οἰκονομίας τῆς εὐαγγελικῆς καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀναληφθέντα δὲ αὖθις εἰς οὐρανὸν, ὡς ὑπὸ ἡλίου πεμφθεῖσαν ἀκτῖνα, καὶ πάλιν εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἀναδραμοῦσαν.

like the following: that, after God had withdrawn again into himself the personifying power of the Logos, the infusion of life into the distinct personalities of believers by the divine power, in the form of the Holy Spirit, was thenceforth to take the place of the former. But when we consider that Sabellius, however, seems to describe the ἐπίνοια of the Son of God, which the Logos assumed, as something permanent, something which was to end only when this entire πλατυσμός, whereby the Monad had become Triad, should cease, after the purpose which the whole was to subserve, had been attained ;[1] we might rather be inclined to think it was his opinion, that the person of Christ would cease to exist only with this final consummation. Although Epiphanius entertained a different opinion, yet this may have arisen from his not understanding what Sabellius had said respecting the ultimate purpose of the redemption, exactly according to the latter's meaning.[2] Thus it may be explained, how Sabellius could join in the anathema pronounced on such as believed not in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,[3] since he considered all the three πρόσωπα as continuing until that final consummation. But the question may still arise, how Sabellius, if he defined the evolution of the Monad to the Triad to be something which preceded the appearance of Christianity, could apply this to the Holy Spirit; since, indeed, according to his opinion, the communication of the Holy Spirit is but a consequence of the redemption accomplished by the hypostatized Logos. But we may perhaps assume that he supposed a certain actuation of the Holy Spirit, even in the ante-Christian period, particularly under the Old-Testament dispensation; and from this we might perhaps infer some such connection of ideas in his mind as the following: that the ante-Christian efficiency of the divine Spirit stood related to the efficiency of the same Spirit mediated through the personal appearance of the Son of God, or to that which is to be entitled the Holy Spirit in the stricter sense, in the same manner as the efficiency of the Logos, in itself,[4] under the Old-Testament dispensation, stood related to the efficiency of the Son of God, under the New-Testament dispensation. We may here refer to the remarks made on a former page,[5] concerning those who are said to have distinguished the Holy Spirit that actuated the apostles, from the Spirit of God in the prophets. And thus the Triad of Sabellius would possess also a historical signifi-

[1] Τῆς χρείας πληρωθείσης. Athanas. orat. IV. § 25.

[2] After this statement, we may understand why Dionysius of Alexandria (Euseb. l. VII. c. 6) accused Sabellius of many blasphemies against God the Father, (so such an expression as the *expansion* of the divine Monad into the Triad must have appeared to the Origenists,) of great unbelief with regard to the incarnation of the Logos, (inasmuch as he looked upon it only in the light of a transitory manifestation of the divine power,) and of great insensibility (ἀναισθησία) in respect to the Holy Spirit, (because he denied his reality and objectivity, and had represented him as nothing more than single transitory emanations of divine power.)

[3] According to Arnobii conflictus cum Serapione. Bibl. patr. Lugd. T. VIII.

[4] "In the Old Testament," said Sabellius, "no mention is made of the Son of God, but only of the Logos," (μὴ εἰρῆσθαι ἐν τῇ παλαιᾷ περὶ υἱοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ λόγου,) Athanas. orat. IV. § 23, which perhaps would lead us to presume also a difference in his mode of explaining passages in the Old Testament.

[5] P. 582, note 3, and the passage there quoted from Origen's Commentary on the Epistle to Titus

cancy, having some reference to the succession of events in time. At the legal stage, where a separating gulf stands between God and mankind, God reveals himself as the Father; and along with this is to be found, in the Old Testament, only the preparatory agency of the Logos and the Spirit, until the Logos, in Christ, hypostatizes himself to the Son of God; and, by virtue of this intimate union of God with humanity, the Spirit of God now becomes also a real, individual, animating principle in the human personalities of which it takes posession.[1]

The ultimate end, then, was considered by Sabellius to be the restoration of the original unity; — that God, as the absolutely one, should be all in all, — in which sense, probably, he interpreted the words in 1 Corinth. 15: 28. But in this case, what were his views respecting the continued duration of the separate creaturely existence? Did he suppose, that at length all existence, as it had been begotten from God through the mediation of the Logos, would, at the close of this mediation, return back again to God, and no existence subsist any longer out of himself? Since the Christian faith in a personal, eternal life stands on the faith in the eternal duration of the personality of Christ, we might conclude, that as Sabellius made Christ's personality to be nothing more than a transitory appearance, so he must have conceived it to be also with regard to all personal existence. And, in general, he who has not found that personal existence, by its very nature, can subsist no otherwise than for eternity; he who can make up his mind to regard *any* personal existence, and especially the most perfect of all, as being merely an ephemeral appearance, will find it a comparatively easy thing to conclude the same to be true of *all* personal existence. The pantheistic element which lies under such a mode of apprehension, may easily push him on further. Athanasius[2] understood these consequences, which might result from the system of Sabellius. But as he himself, the warm opponent of this system, signalizes this only as one of the consequences resulting from it, but by no means charges it upon Sabellius as a position actually maintained by him; so we should be the less warranted to attribute to him such a pantheistic denial of immortality, which, if it had been suspected, would have been more severely castigated by his Christian contemporaries. At the same time, this first shaping of Monarchianism, which was somewhat akin at least to a pantheistic tendency, remains a noticeable historical phenomenon.

We need, it is true, no outward ground of explanation to account for such a system, springing as it did from a mind so speculative as we must suppose that of Sabellius to have been. But as there are so many points of resemblance in this system to what we find in the Alexandrian-Jewish theology, a report of Epiphanius, who supposes Sabellius borrowed his system from an apocryphal gospel derived from the same source with the latter, the *εὐαγγέλιον κατ' Αἰγυπτίους*,[3] deserves some notice.

[1] See Theodoret. fab. hæret. II. c. 9.

[2] *Εἰ ἵνα ἡμεῖς κτισθῶμεν, προῆλθεν ὁ λόγος, καὶ προελθόντος αὐτοῦ ἐσμεν, δῆλον ὅτι ἀναχωροῦντος αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν πατέρα, οὐκέτι ἐσόμεθα.* Athanas. orat. IV. § 25. *Παλινδρομοῦντος τοῦ λόγου, οὐχ' ὑπάρξει ἡ κτίσις.* L. c. § 12.

[3] Exhibition of the gospel history according to the Egyptian (the Alexandrian) tradition.

In this gospel, Christ is said to have communicated to his disciples, as a doctrine of esoteric wisdom, some similar notions respecting the relation of the Monad to the Triad: "If the multitude, who cannot elevate themselves to the intuition of the highest, simple unity, hold God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, to be different divine beings, *they* (the disciples) should know that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are but *one*, but three different forms of the revelation of the divine essence."[1] Moreover, the Sabellian doctrine, akin to the pantheistic element, that all antitheses would finally resolve themselves to unity, seems to have been set forth in this gospel; for to the question of Salome, who asks when his kingdom should come? Christ replies: "When two shall be one, and the outer as the inner, and the male with the female; when there shall be no male and no female."

Soon after Sabellius, we see Monarchianism revived in an opposite form by *Paul of Samosata*, bishop of Antioch. Except that he received into his system the Logos-doctrine, after modifying it by that system, he had little or nothing peculiar to distinguish him from the Artemonites, with whom indeed he was usually compared by the ancient writers.[2] But it is worth while to notice the contrast which these two shapes of Monarchianism, with which the evolution of the doctrine of the Trinity in this period terminates, form, when compared to each other, both in respect to their peculiar mode of apprehending the doctrine concerning Christ, and in respect to the whole intellectual bent out of which they grew. While in Sabellianism, the human and personal element in Christ was made simply a transitory form of the manifestation of the Divine, the theory of Paul of Samosata, on the other hand, gave prominence to Christ's *human person* alone, — and the Divine appears only as something which supervenes from without. While Sabellianism tended towards a Pantheism which confounded God with the world, we discern in the theory of Paul the deistic tendency which fixes an impassable gulf betwixt God and the creation, — which admits of no community of essence and of life between God and humanity.

[1] Epiphan. hæres. 62. Concerning this gospel: Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ὡς ἐν παραβύστῳ μυστηριωδῶς ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ σωτῆρος ἀναφέρεται, ὡς αὐτοῦ δηλοῦντος τοῖς μαθηταῖς, τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι πατέρα, τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι υἱὸν, τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ἅγιον πνεῦμα. The passage in Philo, de Abrahamo f. 367, may serve to explain the sense, where it is said, that the ὄν, from which proceed the two highest δυνάμεις, the ποιητική and the βασιλική, appears according to the different positions at which the souls that are more or less purified stand, as *one* or as *threefold*. If the soul has risen above the revelation of God in the creation, to the intellectual intuition of the ὄν, then for that soul the Trinity rises to Unity, — the soul beholds *one* light, from which proceed, as it were, two shadows, God's essence, and those two modes of operation, merely shadows, which fall off from his transcendent light. Τριττὴν φαντασίαν ἑνὸς ὑποκείμένου καταλαμβάνει, τοῦ μὲν ὡς ὄντος, τοῖν δ' ἄλλοιν δυοῖν, ὡς ἂν ἀπαυγαζομένων ἀπὸ τούτου σκιῶν. Next: Παρέχει τῇ ὁρατικῇ διανοίᾳ τότε μὲν ἑνὸς, τότε δὲ τριῶν φαντασίαν; ἑνὸς μὲν, ὅταν ἄκρως καθαρθεῖσα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ μὴ μόνον τὰ πλῆθη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γείτονα μονάδος δυάδα ὑπερβᾶσα κτλ. There is also a striking resemblance between Sabellius' mode of expression and that which is peculiar to the Clementines, a work which proceeded from some Jewish-Christian Theosophist. Clementin. H. 16. c. 12: Κατὰ γὰρ ἔκτασιν καὶ συστολὴν ἡ μονὰς δυὰς εἶναι νομίζεται.

[2] Baur, who attacks me on account of this assertion, contributes, however, by his own representation of the matter, considered apart from his parenthetical remarks, to confirm the same view.

The Logos — according to Paul of Samosata — is in relation to God nothing other than reason in relation to man,[1] — the Spirit in relation to God, nothing other than the spirit in relation to men. As he controverted the doctrine of a personal Logos, so too he declared himself opposed to the theory of an incarnation of the Logos, of an indwelling of its essence in human nature. He would only concede, that the divine reason or wisdom dwelt and operated in Christ after a higher manner than in any one else.[2] To his mode of developing himself, as man, under the divine influence,[3] is to be attributed the fact that he outshone in wisdom all other messengers of God that preceded him. For this reason — because he was, in a sense in which no other prophet before him had been, an organ of the divine wisdom that revealed itself through him — he is to be styled the Son of God. This Paul is said to have employed the expression "Jesus Christ, who comes from here below," (Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς κάτωθεν,) in order to indicate that the *Logos* did not enter into a human body, but Christ, as man, was deemed worthy of being exalted to this peculiar union with God by means of such an illumination from the divine reason.[4] And hence, indeed, Paul affirmed that the divine Logos came down and imparted his influence to Christ, and then rose again to the Father.[5] Although, by this theory, Christ was regarded as a mere man, yet Paul, adopting the scriptural and church phraseology, seems to have called him God in some improper sense, not exactly defined. In this case, however, he explained, that Christ was not God by his nature, but became so by progressive development.[6] If his language was strictly consistent with his system, he certainly referred the name Son of God to Christ alone, — to the man specially distinguished by God after the manner above described; and hence he ever made it a prominent point, that Christ, as such, did not exist before his nativity; that when a being with God before all

[1] Ὥσπερ ἐν ἀνθρώπου καρδίᾳ ὁ ἴδιος λόγος. Epiphanius, hæres. 67.

[2] Ἐνοικῆσαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν σοφίαν, ὡς ἐν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ. He taught οὐ συγγεγενῆσθαι τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ τὴν σοφίαν οὐσιωδῶς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ποιότητα. Paul's words, as cited in Leontius Byzantin. c. Nest. et Eutychen; which work, till lately, had been known only in the Latin translation; but the fragment of Paul, in the original Greek, has been published from the manuscript in the Bodleian library at Oxford, in Erlich's Dissertation: de erroribus Pauli Samosat. Lips. 1745, p. 23.

[3] I must agree with Baur on this point, viz. that there is no satisfactory evidence for supposing that this Paul denied the supernatural birth of Christ.

[4] See the synodal letter in Euseb. l. VII. c. 30.

[5] Ἐλθὼν ὁ λόγος ἐνήργησε καὶ μόνον καὶ ἀνῆλθε πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, in Epiphanius.

[6] So Athanasius (de Synodis, c. 4) represents the doctrine of the Samosatians concerning Christ: Ὕστερον αὐτὸν μετὰ τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν ἐκ προκοπῆς τεθεοποιῆσθαι αὐτόν. These words might, indeed, be understood to mean, that Christ first raised himself to the divine dignity through the moral perfection which he had attained by his own human efforts. But if this were his opinion, he would doubtless have said, as the Socinians afterwards did, that Christ raised himself by what he had accomplished in his life on earth, to such divine dignity, in virtue of his glorification. But, in all the other citations from him, we find no evidence of such a separation made by Paul between that which Christ was originally, and that which he became by his own efforts and his own doings. In the system of Sabellius, what Christ was over and above all other men, is, in fact, traced to the very circumstance, that he stood from the beginning under the special influence of the divine reason or wisdom. The προκοπή forms here simply the antithesis to the κατὰ φύσιν — to the ἄνωθεν answers the κάτωθεν — and so, accommodating himself to the church phraseology, he is reported to have said: Θεὸς ἐκ τῆς παρθένου, θεὸς ἐκ Ναζαρὲθ ὀφθείς. Athanas. c. Apollinar. l. II. § 3

time is ascribed to him, this is to be understood as relating only to an ideal existence in the divine reason, in the divine predetermination.[1] Hence, when his opponents, judging rather from the connection of ideas in their own mind than in his, accused him of supposing two Sons of God, he could confidently affirm, on the contrary, that he knew of but one Son of God.[2] It may be, however, that, where it was for his interest to accommodate himself to the terminology of the church, he too spoke of a generation of the Logos in his own sense, understanding by this nothing else than the procession of the Logos to a certain outward activity, — the beginning of its creative agency, — what was usually designated by the phrase *λόγος προφορικός*.[3]

Of this man's character, the bishops and clergy, who composed the synod that condemned his doctrines, give a very unfavorable account.[4] They describe him as haughty, vain-glorious, and self-seeking — a man that eagerly entered into the cares and business of the world. It is true, the accusations of polemical opponents, especially opponents so passionate as these were, are seldom entitled to much confidence; but the charges in the present case contain so much of a specific character, that we can hardly suppose them to have been wholly without foundation; and unhappily this picture accords but too well with what we otherwise learn respecting the bishops of the large towns, like Antioch, the great capital of Roman Asia in the East.[5] These districts were then comprised under the empire of *Zenobia*,[6] Queen of Palmyra, who is said to have been friendly to Judaism.[7] Paul is accused of having sought to present the doctrine concerning Christ in a dress which would be more acceptable to the Jewish mode of thinking, expressly with a view to gain favor with this princess. But there is no

[1] In the synodal letter to Paul of Samosata, published by Turrian, cited in Mansi, (Concil. I. f. 1034,) the only credible document among those made known by him relating to these transactions, this opposite thesis is set up, viz. that the Son of God existed *πρὸ αἰώνων οὐ προγνώσει ἀλλ' οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσει*: from this we may infer, then, that Paul taught the contrary: *Τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ οὐχ' ὑποστάσει, ἀλλα προγνώσει κτλ.* Which is confirmed also by the representation of Athanasius, who says of Paul's doctrine concerning Christ: *Λόγον ἐνεργὸν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ σοφίαν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖ, τῷ μὲν προορισμῷ πρὸ αἰώνων ὄντα, τῇ δὲ ὑπάρξει ἐκ ἀναζαρὲτ ἀναδειχθέντα.* c. Apollinar. l. II. § 3.

[2] *Μὴ δύο ἐπίστασθαι υἱούς.* Leont. Byzant.

[3] This is made probable by the opposite thesis in the before-cited synodal letter: *Διὰ τοῦ λόγου ὁ πατὴρ πάντα πεποίηκεν, οὐχ' ὡς δι' ὀργάνου, οὐδ' ὡς δι' ἐπιστήμης ἀνυποστάτου, γεννήσαντος μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ὡς ζῶσαν ἐνεργείαν καὶ ἐννπόστατον.* From this it may be inferred that Paul had spoken of a *σοφία, ἐπιστήμη ἀννπόστατος*, and by the *γέννησις* of the *λόγος* understood nothing else than an *ἐνεργεία ἀνυπόστατος* of God as the Creator. From this, however, it does not certainly follow that he himself made use of the expression *γέννησις*.

[4] Euseb. l. VII. c. 30.

[5] See what Origen says in Matth. f. 420, ed. Huet., or Vol. IV. T. XVI. § 8, p. 24, ed. Lomm.: "We, who either do not understand what the teaching of Jesus here means, or who despise these express admonitions of our Saviour himself, we proceed so far in the affectation of pomp and state, as to outdo even bad rulers among the pagans; and, like the emperors, surround ourselves with a guard, that we may be feared and made difficult of approach, especially by the poor. And in many of our so-called churches, particularly in the larger towns, may be found presiding officers of the church of God, who would refuse to own even the best among the disciples of Jesus, while on earth, as their equals." *Μηδεμίαν ἰσολογίαν ἐπιτρέποντας ἐσθ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις τῶν Ἰησοῦ μαθητῶν, εἶναι πρὸς αὐτούς.*

[6] Married to the Roman commander Odenatus, who had made himself independent of the Roman empire.

[7] *Ἰουδαῖα ἦν Ζηνόβια, καὶ Παύλου προέστη τοῦ Σαμοσατέως.* Athanas. hist. Arianor ad Monachos, § 71.

evidence that this charge was well founded; the facts of the case require no such explanation; and the constancy with which Paul adhered to his convictions, even after the political circumstances were changed, suffices to vindicate him from this imputation. It were more reasonable to suppose, that his intercourse with Jews about the person of the queen, with whom Paul, being a man of the court, stood in high consideration, may have had some influence in giving this turn to his doctrinal opinions; — though we are under no *necessity* of supposing even this. It may have been, too, that his peculiar doctrinal opinions contributed to procure for him the favor of the queen. The connection once formed with this powerful patroness, he made use of it to gain influence and consideration in secular affairs, and to surround himself with state. In direct contrariety to the ecclesiastical rules which had already been publicly expressed, at least in the Western church, (see above,) he held a civil office not quite compatible with the vocation of a bishop.[1] At Antioch, the profane custom seems already to have passed over from the theatre and rhetorical schools to the church — a practice which put church teachers on the same level with actors and declaimers — that of applauding popular preachers, by the waving of handkerchiefs, exclamations of applause, and the clapping of hands. The vain-minded Paul was delighted with all this; but the bishops, his accusers, seem well aware, that it was contrary to the dignity and order becoming the house of God. The church hymns which had been in public use ever since the second century, he banished as an innovation; probably on the same principle which at a later period was advanced also by others, that in the church nothing ought to be sung but pieces taken directly from the holy scriptures. Probably, therefore, he ordered that, in place of those church hymns, *Psalms only* should be used. There is no good reason for the conjecture, that Paul did this merely out of flattery to his Jewish patroness, Zenobia. It is more probable, that, knowing what a deep impression the sentiments contained in those church hymns made on the minds of the hearers, he was hoping to banish, with those ancient songs of praise to Christ, the sentiments they contained from the hearts of men. When we are told, that the man who so carefully weighed every expression which was applied to Christ, delighted in the incense of extravagant flattery heaped on himself, under the form of odes and declamations in holy places; — and in being called, in the swollen, rhetorical language of the times, an angel come down from heaven, we are not indeed to give implicit faith to such stories from the mouths of heated opponents; nor yet have we any good reason whatever to reject them as wholly false.

It seems to have been the design of Paul of Samosata to introduce his peculiar views of Christ into the minds of his flock by degrees. To this purpose served the change which he introduced with regard to the

[1] The office of *Ducenarius procurator*, (not to be confounded with the Ducenarius judex,) so called because the pay amounted to 200 sestertia. See Sueton. Claudius, c. 24; Cyprian. ep. 68. It is possible that he was already in possession of this office when elected bishop; in this case the bishops would accuse themselves for tolerating such an infraction of the ecclesiastical laws.

use of church hymns; and he contrived, as we have seen in particular cases, to explain the church terminology in conformity with his own views. Hence it might be difficult to convict him of erroneous doctrine; and it was not till after many previous unsuccessful attempts, that the bishops finally succeeded, at a synod convened in 269, to bring him, chiefly by means of the presbyter *Malchion*, an expert dialectician, to an open avowal of his opinions.[1] He was deposed, and his office conferred on another; but as he still had a party in his favor, and was moreover patronized by Zenobia, it was impossible to carry the matter through, until the year 272, when Zenobia was conquered by the Emperor Aurelian. The latter referred the matter to the decision of the Roman bishop.[2]

But while, in the Eastern church, the struggle with this Monarchian tendency, which gave an undue prominence to the *unity* in the Triad, had an influence in causing the distinctions and gradations in it to be more precisely marked, and the subordination system, which had been reduced by Origen into a settled form, to be more decidedly pronounced, a quite different relation was gradually working itself into shape in the Western church, which we will now more closely consider.

How differently the same Christian truth may shape itself to the apprehension of minds which have been differently trained, is seen by comparing Origen with Tertullian. To Tertullian, accustomed and familiarized to material notions of the divine essence, the same difficulties would not present themselves here, as revolted the philosophical mind of Origen. He could quite clearly conceive, by the aid of his material notions of emanation, how the Godhead might cause to proceed from its own essence a being possessed of the same substance, only in an inferior degree, and standing in the same relation to the former as a ray of light to the sun. He asserted, therefore, the doctrine of *one* divine Essence, shared in a certain gradation by three persons, most intimately connected.[3]

The Son, so far as it concerns the divine essence, is not numerically distinct from the Father; the same essence of God being also in the Son; but he differs in degree, being a smaller portion of the common mass of the divine essence.[4] Thus the prevailing view in the Western church came to be this: one divine essence in the Father and Son; but, at the same time, a subordination in the relation of the Son to the Father. Here were conflicting elements. The process of development must decide which of the two should gain the preponderance. This, then, constituted the difference between the two churches: — that while, in the Eastern church, the prominence given to the distinctions in the Triad did not leave room for the consciousness of the unity; in the Western church, on the other hand, the unity of essence, once

1 From Eusebius' expressions, although Theodoretus, to whom perhaps they appeared offensive, explained them otherwise, we must infer, that this ecclesiastic, too, exercised a profession not wholly befitting his spiritual calling, that of a *rhetorician*.

2 See vol. I. p. 142.

3 Una substantia in tribus cohærentibus.

4 Deus de deo, modulo alter, non numero. Adv. Praxeam.

decidedly expressed, caused the subordination-element to retire ever more into the background.

Thus, from a difference in the process of the development of doctrine in the two churches, an opposition of views naturally arose on this subject; as we see in the case of the above-mentioned council at Antioch, in 269, which, in the heat of the polemical opposition to Monarchianism, was moved to condemn the expression "ὁμοούσιον," answering to the doctrinal formula of the West "una substantia."[1] And we see, again, in another noticeable appearance, a premonitory symptom of those doctrinal controversies which, in the fourth century, sprung out of the opposition thus prepared between the two churches.[2]

The doctrine of Sabellius, and his mode of interpreting the church terminology so as to accord with his own system, having found their way among the bishops of that district, Dionysius, the bishop of Alexandria, felt it incumbent on him, since the whole of that church diocese fell under his supervision, to issue a pastoral letter against these spreading tenets.[3] The opposition into which he was thus brought with the Sabellian denial of the hypostases, led him to express the distinction of hypostases, and hence too the doctrine of subordination, in a more stiff and decided manner than he would otherwise have done. He made use of several expressions which Arianism could afterwards fall back upon. He made it a prominent point, that the Son of God had his existence by the will of the Father; he styled the Son, in relation to the latter, a ποίημα, and employed many singular comparisons, with a view to mark his subordinate relation to the Father. He is reported to have made use of expressions, for the purpose of affirming with emphasis that the Son received his existence from the Father, which afterwards became favorite mottos of Arianism; as, for example, that he did not exist before he was begotten; there was a moment when he did not as yet exist.[4] He also declared himself opposed to the Homoousion.

Certain individuals, to whom these expressions of Dionysius appeared a disparagement of the divine dignity of Christ, laid their complaints before Dionysius, bishop of Rome; and the latter was thus led to compose a work,[5] wherein he opposed to the different tendencies of the

[1] See e. g. Athanas. de Synod. § 43; Hilar. de Synod. § 86.

[2] As this admits of being so naturally explained from the system of doctrines held in the Alexandrian school, and moreover the reasons urged by the council against this church expression answer perfectly to this system, the account is for these reasons, if there were no other, rendered probable. The Arians, from whom we receive the account, are, it is true, on this point, suspicious witnesses; but the fact that their warm opponents, Athanasius, Hilarius of Poitiers, and Basilius of Cæsarea, quote the same account from their mouth, yet without contradicting it, may be considered as a confirmation of its truth.

[3] The letter to Ammonius and Euphranor, of which fragments have been preserved in Athanasius' work on the doctrines of Dionysius.

[4] Athanas. de sententia Dionysii, § 14. For the purpose of strongly emphasizing the οὐκ ἀεὶ ἦν, he is reported to have said: Οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γεννηθῇ, ἀλλ' ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν. Being a disciple of Origen, he may have expressed himself in the latter way; perhaps to mark a beginning of existence, but no beginning in time. But, in truth, it is impossible, since Dionysius' work has not been preserved entire, to determine, with any degree of certainty, what his language really was, so as to distinguish what he actually did say, from the conclusions which men thought proper to draw from what he said.

[5] Ἀνατροπή, fragments of which work

Eastern church, that system of the unity of essence which had become already matured in the Western church, and from which every trace of subordination had been nearly obliterated.[1] Besides the Sabellians, he attacks two other tendencies. He says he had heard that many among their teachers [2] had fallen into an error directly opposed to that of Sabellianism, viz. Tritheism;[3] that they had separated the holy unity into three hypostases, totally alien and totally separated from one another. Yet we can hardly reconcile it with the general shaping of Christian thought and speculation among the Orientals, to suppose that those teachers did really hold to the existence of three essences, equally without beginning, and standing in no relation of dependence on each other. The Roman bishop here assuredly followed the reports of others, who so interpreted the explanations of those teachers. It is probable that, in marking broadly and strongly the distinction of the hypostases in the conflict with Sabellianism, they may only have so expressed themselves as to furnish some color for those complaints. The third of these erroneous views, censured by the Roman Dionysius, was precisely that one, according to which the Son of God was regarded as a creature, and a beginning assigned to his existence;—the error which some were bent on finding in Dionysius of Alexandria. Now, had the latter clung pertinaciously to the difference which did really exist on this doctrine between himself and the Roman Dionysius, had he given still greater distinctness and prominence to the differences between his own and the Roman form of doctrine, and set himself to defending these points, the signal would have been given for a controversy, which might have terminated in a separation of the two churches.

But Dionysius demeaned himself according to the spirit, so superior to dogmatic narrowness, which had descended to him from his great master Origen. The common ground-work of the Christian faith stood at a higher value with him than subordinate differences of opinion;—he was more anxious to preserve alive the consciousness of unity, than to give prominence to the dividing points of opposition. Without manifesting any resentment to his accusers, who had resorted to a foreign bishop, and one so eager to obtrude himself as a judge in the concerns of other churches; without being ruffled even by that bishop himself, who seems to have assumed the tone rather of a judge than of a colleague, he endeavored, with calmness and prudence, and without denying his own convictions, so to explain the offensive propositions, by pointing out their connection with his whole system, as to remove all scruples against them, even from those who adopted the principles of

have been preserved in Athanasius' book on the decrees of the Council of Nice.

[1] We still perceive, however, some remains of the old system of subordination, when the Father, as the *ἀρχή*, the God of the universe, is styled absolutely the Almighty. *Τὴν τριάδα εἰς ἕνα, ὥσπερ εἰς κουφήν τινα, τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκεφαλαιοῦσθαι καὶ συνάγεσθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη.* Athanas. de decretis synodi Nicenæ, § 26.

[2] His words are, l. c.: *Πέπυσμαι εἶναι τινὰς τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν κατηχούντων καὶ διδασκόντων τὸν θεῖον λόγον ταύτης ὑφηγητὰς τῆς φρονήσεως.*

[3] *Οἱ κατὰ διάμετρον ἀντίκεινται τῇ Σαβελλίου γνώμῃ.*

the Roman church. He expounded, in the manner of Origen, the notion of the eternal generation of the Logos. He was even willing to tolerate the term ὁμοούσιον, so far as it was employed to denote simply the relationship of essence between the Son of God and the Father, and to distinguish him from all created beings; though he had it to object, that it was a term not hitherto sanctioned by ecclesiastical use, and nowhere to be found in the holy scriptures, — an objection of little weight, we must allow, against a dogmatic expression, since the changes arising from the progressive development of the dogmatic spirit generally, and from the new errors which strike into it, may make it absolutely necessary to resort to new expressions; and since all that is really important here, is to see that the notion which the dogmatic term should express, is clearly deducible from the scripture doctrine. By this self-denying moderation of Dionysius, the dispute was brought to an end, and a schism avoided which might have rent the bonds of Christian fellowship.[1] It is true, this practical union had no power of enduring influence. The oppositions which had once made their appearance in the process of doctrinal development, must continually assert over again their rights within the sphere of thought, and strive on towards their reconciliation in a higher unity.

In the doctrine concerning the *Holy Spirit*, the want of correspondence between *what was contained* in the Christian consciousness and its *notional expression*, clearly manifested itself. In the first youthful age of the church, when the power of the Holy Spirit made itself to be so mightily felt in the life, as a new creative, transforming principle, it was still very far from being the case, that the consciousness of this Spirit, as one identical with the essence of God, had been thoroughly apprehended and presented in conceptions of the understanding.

If we except the Monarchians and *Lactantius*,[2] men were agreed in conceiving of the Holy Spirit as a personal being. The conception of his reality and objective essentiality coincided in the Christian thought with the conception of his personal, self-subsistent existence. But the logical consistency of their system of subordination in the Logos-doctrine, compelled the church fathers to conceive of the Holy Spirit as subordinate to the Father and the Son; the first of the beings produced by the Father through the Son; — and we shall perceive the after-influence of this tendency of thought in the Eastern church, till late into the fourth century. When, on the one hand, men felt themselves constrained, by the demands of the Christian consciousness and of the holy scriptures, to recognize in the Holy Spirit something beyond a creaturely existence, to bring him into nearer relation to the Son of God, and assign him a place in the Triad; and were driven, on the other hand, by the logical consistency of the theory of subordination, to represent him as the first being created by the Logos, through

[1] See the fragments of the second letter to the bishop Dionysius, under the title: Ἔλεγχος καὶ ἀπολογία, in Athanasius de sententia Dionysii.

[2] Who is supposed to have explained the Holy Spirit as the sanctifying energy of the Father and of the Son, eum vel ad Patrem referri vel ad Filium; et sanctificationem utriusque personæ sub ejus nomine demonstrari. Vid. Hieronym. ep. 41 ad Pamach et Oceanum.

whom God called all things into existence; — the thought, proceeding on such different assumptions, must entangle itself in contradictions, which would give an impulse to still further efforts to place the doctrine in its right shape. Thus, in Justin Martyr particularly, we may observe a wavering of this sort, between the idea of the Holy Ghost, as one of the members of the Triad, and a spirit standing in some relationship with the angels.[1] Also, in Origen, we observe the two elements coming together, — the sound *Christian* view, producing itself out of the immediate contents of the Christian consciousness, and the speculative view, standing in no sort of relation to it. On the one hand, he considers the Holy Spirit as the substance of all the gracious gifts proceeding from God, communicated through Christ,[2] the source of sanctification to believers; and then he describes him, notwithstanding, as only the first-begotten of the Father through the Son, to whom

[1] The reasons which have been presented by Catholic and Protestant theologians against my exposition of Justin's expressions respecting the Holy Spirit, cannot prevail on me to abandon it. See the literature on this dispute in a monography on Justin, remarkably full and thorough, written by Semisch, II. p. 318. If it has been attempted to show, that Justin's notions of the essence of the angels and of creatures generally were irreconcilable with that view, yet this objection is set aside by our remarks in the text. Self-contradictory momenta ought not to be considered as anything strange, when found at this stage of the development of doctrine; but unless we return back to old doctrinal prejudices, and overlook once more the essential character of the process of historical development, — the besetting sin of a certain narrow and narrowing church tendency, of which however, I cannot accuse many of my opponents, — they must appear rather as a matter of course. On the same grounds, I must protest against that which the Herr Diaconus Semisch brings as evidence against the truth of my own view of the matter, where he says: "No representation certainly clashes, so much as this, with the scriptural position and the common feeling of the ancient church." But as it concerns the scriptural position, we have nothing to do with that question here. The included contents of the divine Word must, in its process of development for the human thought, go through manifold intermediate forms. The position taken by Justin constitutes one among these historically conditioned intermediate forms. And as it respects the common Christian feeling, we do, in truth, recognize such a common feeling, by which the church in all ages is knit together; but this common feeling did not find at once its corresponding expression in the forms evolved by the understanding. Of the two passages from Justin, which we are concerned with, one is where Justin, in confronting the charge of *ἀθεότης*, enumerates the objects of religious worship among the Christians; Apol. II. f. 56: *Ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἡμᾶς ταῦτα καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἑπομένων καὶ ἐξομοιουμένων ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατὸν, πνεῦμά τε τὸ προφητικὸν σεβόμεθα καὶ προσκυνοῦμεν.* Now Semisch affirms, that it is contrary to the laws of language and of logic to refer the word *ἄλλων* to that which follows after. But the simple question is, whether, in a writer like Justin, such an instance of negligence in style may not be supposed. If, with Semisch, we take the passage in this way, — that Justin, under the term *ἄλλων*, had in mind Christ, and understood the word *ἄγγελος* at one and the same time in the more general sense (of a messenger of God) and the more limited one (of angel) — it still remains certainly a very harsh construction, not admissible in the case of any other writer For the rest, in whatever way the word *ἄλλων* might be explained,—a circumstance by no means decisive as to the whole meaning of the passage, — it still ever remains the easiest and best way, to account for what we find here associated together, by referring to the connection which existed between the notions of the Holy Spirit and of the angels. But in no case can I concede to Hr. Semisch, that by the angel of God, the might sent by Christ for our assistance, (Dial. c. Tryph. f. 344,) Justin could have understood anything else than the Holy Spirit. The reference to the passage in the 3d of Zechariah has nothing to do with the question here; but if it had, it would be rather in favor of, than against, the necessity of this interpretation. If we pay any regard to Justin's peculiar style of doctrinal language, it is quite impossible to understand this term as referring merely to the moral power bestowed by Christ.

[2] *Ὕλη τῶν χαρισμάτων, ἐνεργουμένη ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, διακονουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ.* In Joann. T. II. § 6.

not only being, but also wisdom and holiness, is first communicated by the Son; dependent on him in all these relations.[1]

It is besides worthy of notice, that, in the dispute with the Monarchians, the doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit was not touched upon at all,—a proof how little men had busied themselves as yet with the more accurate determination of this doctrine—how very far it retired into the background, compared with the significance attached to the Logos-doctrine. It altogether befitted the peculiar bent of the Patripassianists to refer everything to the undivided God, the Father in Christ; and to consider the Holy Spirit simply as his agency or influence. But when the doctrine of the Holy Spirit assumed the important place which it did in the perfected Montanistic system, the proceedings entered into with the adherents of this scheme would lead to more accurate investigations of this doctrine; as indeed we know that Clement of Alexandria, in whose writings preserved to us no speculative determination of this point is to be found, was intending, in his work on prophecy, (*περὶ προφητείας*,) which had reference to the dispute with the Montanists, to enter into a fuller development of the doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit.[2] Accordingly Sabellius was the first who received into his Monarchian scheme the notion also of the Holy Spirit. In this dogma, too, we see the element of the subordination theory more and more overcome, by the matured conception of the *one* substance in the Western church. This is particularly discernible in the letter of Dionysius, bishop of Rome, to Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, (see above.[3])

From the doctrine concerning God, (theology in the stricter sense of the word,) we pass to the *doctrine concerning human nature*, (Anthropology,)—the two doctrines being, in their peculiar Christian acceptation, most intimately connected; both deriving their peculiar Christian significancy from their particular relation to the doctrine of redemption,—the central point of Christianity. From the doctrine of God's holiness proceeded a conception of sin, entirely different from that presented in the mode of thinking of the ancient world; and this of itself had the greatest influence on Anthropology.

Again, the redemption in which entire humanity is destined to participate presupposes, on the one hand, the *need of such* a provision existing in all men,—the feeling of their own moral insufficiency, of the inner schism, the sin and guilt which separate them from God; and, on the other hand, the consciousness of a recipiency for the redemption, as a quality possessed by human nature in general, by virtue of which the redemption may find a point of union in the soul's act of free self-determination. Both are intimately connected; for it is out of the

[1] *Οὐ χρήζειν ἔοικε τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, διακονοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῇ ὑποστάσει, οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ λογικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ πᾶν ὁτιποτοῦν χρὴ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τυγχάνειν κατὰ μετοχὴν τῶν προειρημένων Χριστοῦ ἐπινοιῶν.* L. c

[2] The Holy Spirit, as something above nature, supervening to the original faculties of the soul: *Ἡμεῖς μὲν τῷ πεπιστευκότι προσεπιπνεῖσθαι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα φαμὲν,—ἀλλ' οὐχ' ὡς μέρος θεοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα· ὅλων δὲ ἡ διανομὴ αὕτη καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ ἔστι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, ἐν τοῖς περὶ προφητείας καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐπιδειχθήσεται ἡμῖν.* Strom. l. V. f. 591; l. IV. f. 511.

[3] *Ἐμφιλοχωρεῖν τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα.* De decretis Synodi Nicenæ, § 25.

recipiency that the want developes itself, and the want without the recipiency would be a self-contradiction in nature. The consciousness of sin and guilt, which answers to the need of redemption, itself presupposes also something akin to God, elevated above natural necessity, something of the essence of a free self-determination of the spirit, without which sin and guilt can have no existence. On both these sides, the position occupied by the ancient world was opposed to Christianity. On the one side was the moral self-sufficiency,[1] which exhibits itself to us at its highest point in Stoicism, — the self-feeling from which proceeded the ethical notion of a μεγαλοψυχία, (magnanimity,) and to which the Christian virtue of humility appeared to be a sort of self-degradation: on the other side, that point of view which made man dependent on natural necessity, and caused moral evil to be regarded as something having its ground in such necessity, — a point of view by which room enough was still left to admit the notion of moral imperfection, but not the conception of sin. In the stoical doctrine both are brought together, the Autonomy and *Autarchy* of the Wise man, and the necessity of evil in order to the harmony of the universe. Although, in relation to the first of these points, the opposition in which the fundamental principle of the ancient world stands to Christianity is tempered by the Platonic philosophy;[2] yet it comes forth with so much the greater strength on the other side, when all evil is here regarded as something involuntary, is traced to a deficiency of knowledge, a preponderance of the natural (of the ὕλη) over the rational element in man, by virtue of which preponderance the rational element cannot yet attain to a free development. It is true, different stages are here to be distinguished in the development of Platonism, according as the tendency predominates to apply and carry out its speculative principles with logical consistency, as in the case of Plotinus, or a prevailing interest in behalf of religion and morality operates independently of those principles, as in the case of Plutarch, who so earnestly defends moral freedom against the stoical doctrine of necessity. But even where this notion of freedom most decidedly manifested itself, as, for instance, in Aristotle, who combated the Platonic principle that evil implied the absence of freedom,[3] men must necessarily have felt embarrassed by great difficulties in endeavoring to apply the notion of freedom to life. They thought they perceived an unconquerable natural temperament of certain tribes, certain great classes among men, who had no power of elevating themselves above a very inferior grade of moral culture. But even these restrictions could not overcome the idea of freedom in such men as Aristotle. Yet they could be wholly got rid of only when the might of evil in humanity came generally to be understood to be something not original, but to be first traced itself to an original act of freedom; and when a power was introduced into

[1] The Horatian maxim, bonam mentem mihi ipse parabo.

[2] See on this relation, vol. I., Introduction.

[3] Thus he understands, that even the determinate character of a man, by which he is determined in his judgments and actions, is itself a work of freedom. Ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν, τοιούτους μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν Nicom. III. 7.

humanity, whereby those differences of nature could be equalized, and the same divine life could be imparted alike to all. It was only with the victory over the nature-principle and over the aristocratic leaning of antiquity, that the idea of moral freedom could be completely established in its rights, as a power belonging to human nature.

As Christianity, then, brought about an important revolution in the ethical and anthropological views of mankind, by the doctrine of a primitive condition and of man's loss of it by an act of his own choice; so we may add, as another weighty fact, that it placed Anthropology in connection with the doctrine concerning spirits (Pneumatology), inasmuch as it caused the essence of spirit to be known as the image of God; as the common element in man and all ranks of the spiritual world; and as lying at the basis and indicating the fact of a common destination; inasmuch as it presented to view, on the one hand, the fellowship of one divine life uniting together all spirits in the kingdom of God, and on the other, referred back the origin also of the ungodly life to the first act of the self-will of a higher intelligence. This latter fact was particularly important as opposed to the pagan nature-view of sin, and to all the tendencies which led men to regard it as something necessarily rooted in the organism of human nature, in the union of a rational with a sensuous nature.

Now, while the interests of the Christian faith require the union of the momenta here unfolded, — of all that has reference to the need of redemption, and of all that has reference to the recipiency for redemption; and the severance of these correlative momenta engenders the heretical element; yet the greater or less degree of prominence given to the one or the other of these momenta, depended partly on the oppositions, and partly on the peculiar character, of the different tendencies of the theological spirit, which we have previously described. As it respects the former, we may notice in particular the opposition of Gnosticism. Against this there was no need, as is clear from the representation of the Gnostic doctrines, to prove in the first place the existence of a schism in man's nature, and of a need of redemption grounded in that schism; but on the contrary, as an original threefold difference of human natures was asserted by the Gnostics, and a recipiency of the divine life acknowledged to exist only in one class of these natures, the capacity for the redemption and the power of moral freedom had to be demonstrated to belong in common to all. The polemical interest excited by the controversy with the Gnostics was the cause, therefore, that many extremely one-sided theories, to which men were afterwards led by separating momenta of the Christian consciousness which belong together, did not as yet make their appearance. The hypothesis of a predetermination of natures endangering moral freedom was thereby kept back. Those passages of the Old Testament, such as related for instance to the hardening of Pharaoh, which subsequently furnished a foothold for such doctrines, but which were made use of by the Gnostics as points of accusation against the God of the Old Testament, men must seek to defend against them, and to show them, that these passages contained a meaning capable of being reconciled with God's love

and justice, and man's indestructible freedom. Thus it belongs among the peculiar characteristics of the position which this period held in the evolution of the doctrines of the Christian faith, that, as a general thing, men were far from the thought of framing to themselves, out of some of the more dark and difficult passages of scripture, — like those from which, singly taken, in after times, the doctrine of absolute predestination was derived, — a system to which they would be ready to sacrifice all other religious interests and the whole analogy of Bible faith,[1] but went rather on the principle of holding fast to that which they found, by comparing different passages of scripture, was the collective doctrine lying every where at bottom. On this point, those who took the lead in the guidance of the church were uniformly agreed; and it was only ignorant, uneducated, and at the same time arrogant individuals among the laity, who were inclined to fix on such insulated passages, and run into downright extravagances of doctrine.[2]

It belongs further to the common ground assumed by all Christians in opposing Gnosticism, that while the Gnostics regarded Dualism as an original and absolute truth, and the schism as a necessary thing in the evolution of existence, necessary to appear at some period in order to be overcome, something of which the foundation was laid already in the world of Æons; — the church fathers, on the other hand, were agreed in this, that contrary to the Gnostics, they traced everything here to the freedom of the creature. The Gnostics were used to propose the dilemma; — If the first man was created perfect, how could he then sin? If he was created imperfect, we suppose God himself to be the author of sin. To this the church fathers, if we set aside what was peculiar in Origen's system, were accustomed to reply; — that a distinction should be made between what the first man was in respect to his original capacity, and what he was to become by that development of this capacity which depended on his own free will. Here we meet with a distinction, widely recognized, around which, in the subsequent evolution of the doctrines of faith, important differences clustered. The distinction between that which is denominated צֶלֶם and that which is denominated דְּמוּת in Genesis, the *εἰκών* and the *ὁμοίωσις τοῦ θεοῦ* (the image, and the likeness of God): — the first being what was laid in the original capacities of human nature, and what, inasmuch as it was grounded in its essence, was indestructible; to which were usually reckoned reason

[1] Opposed to this were the hermeneutical canons which Irenæus set up against the Gnostics; as, for example, that men should not seek to explain ænigmata per aliud majus ænigma, sed ea, quæ sunt talia, ex manifestis et consonantibus et claris accipiunt absolutiones. Lib. II. c. 10, § 1. Τὰ *φανερῶς εἰρημένα ἐπιλύσει τὰς παραβολὰς, καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λέξεων πολυφωνίας ἐν σύμφωνον μέλος ἐν ἡμῖν αἰσθήσεται.* Lib. II. c. 28, § 3.

[2] Origen, in his exposition of the passage in Ex. 10: 27, distinguishes from the Gnostics, who made use of such texts as arguments against the God of the Old Testament, and those who sought to remove the difficulty by correct interpretation, two classes among the Christians: *Οἱ μὲν φρονοῦσιν, ὡς ἄρα κατὰ ἀποκλήρωσιν ὁ θεὸς ὃν θέλει ἐλεεῖ, ὃν δὲ θέλει σκληρύνει· ἕτεροι δὲ βέλτιον παρὰ τούτους φερόμενοί φασι πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα κεκρύφθαι τῆς γραφῆς αὐτοῖς νοήματα, καὶ οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο τῆς ὑγιοῦς πίστεως τρέπεσθαι.* T. VIII. ed. Lomm. p. 299. The principle described in these last words of Origen, is the same with one which is laid down also by Irenæus: *Εἰ ἕνια τῶν ζητημάτων ἀναθησομεν τῷ θεῷ, καὶ τὴν πίστιν ἡμῶν διαφυλάξομεν καὶ ἀκίνδυνοι διαμενοῦμεν.* Lib II. c. 28, § 3.

and the power of moral freedom; — the second, the likeness to God actually realized by the right employment of these capacities, in which consists the image of God, — but in order to the realization of which, another principle, besides what is given in man's natural capacities, must supervene, — a principle partaking of the supernatural, — fellowship with God, without which human nature is inadequate to attain to its completion. The important thing here was, the recognition of an indestructible image of God in human nature, and of an original destination of man for the supernatural, the deep-founded consciousness of the essence of human nature, as one which could find the fulness of its true essence and the attainment of its end only in the fellowship with God; thus the recognition of the correlation, existing from the first, of the human and the divine — the recognition of the fact that they belonged together. This distinction, however, might be so apprehended, as to lead to a false separation of the human and the divine.[1]

In the next place, the fundamental differences of the theological tendencies which have been described by us, would have a special influence in determining the peculiar method of treating Anthropology. Those church-teachers whom we have described as representing the predominantly supranaturalist tendency, were urged by this their prevailing tendency, to set in the most prominent light the corruption of man's nature and his need of redemption, the power of renewing grace, and the contrariety between grace and nature. Montanism, which we presented as the extreme exhibition of this fundamental tendency, was in truth ever inclined to glorify the divine grace in such sense, as that the human element was entirely swallowed up by it, instead of seeking to establish the harmonious union and coöperation of both. Those church-teachers, on the other hand, who, as the antagonists of a sheer supernaturalism, strove after a union between the interest of faith and that of reason, were led by this their own peculiar tendency, to give special prominence in their treatment of Anthropology, to human freedom and self-activity; and thus, in the case of those church-teachers who otherwise held a conciliatory position in relation to the Gnostics, the polemical interest against Gnosticism could not fail very decidedly to manifest itself in the treatment of this doctrine.

It becomes very important, therefore, that on this point also, we should compare together the doctrine of the *North-African* church and that of the *Alexandrian school.*

The doctrine of the *North-African church* took its shape from Tertullian. He adopted, out of the previous doctrine of the church, the idea, that the first man, as he was created by God, possessed all the faculties necessary to reveal the image of God through his moral nature; but that these faculties lay still in a dormant, undeveloped state. Their development depended on man's free will. To the inworking of God on human nature there was, by virtue of its purity, as yet no obstacle; by fellowship with God, human nature would have become more and more ennobled and transfigured, and was made capable

[1] In the doctrine concerning the relation of the dona gratuita to the dona naturalia

of attaining to a participation in a divine, imperishable life, so as to be placed beyond the dominion of death. But by the first sin, which consisted in man's refusing to subject his own will, but setting it up in opposition to the will of God,[1] man departed from this fellowship with God, and so became subject to a sinful and a mortal nature. By the church-teachers of this period, these two are united in the notion expressed by φθορά, while the opposite term ἀφθαρσία denotes with them at once a divine, imperishable, and holy life — a connection of ideas which had an important influence on the systems of faith and morals. As the harmony between the divine and the human will resulted in harmony through all the departments of man's nature, so the schism between the divine and the human will resulted in the schism which runs through the whole of human nature. In place of that union with the divine Spirit, came the union with an ungodly spirit. The original father entailed the spirit of the world on all his posterity.[2]

Peculiar, however, to Tertullian was his theory to explain *the propagation of this original corruption* of human nature, — being connected with his theory respecting the propagation of souls. It was his opinion, namely, that our first parent bore within him the undeveloped germ of all mankind; that the soul of the first man was the fountain-head of all human souls, and that all the varieties of individual human nature are but different modifications of that one spiritual substance.[3] Hence the whole nature became corrupted in the original father of the race; and sinfulness is propagated at the same time with souls.[4]

Although this mode of apprehending the matter in Tertullian is connected with his sensuous habits of conception, yet is this by no means a necessary connection. At the root of this mode of apprehension lay a higher truth and necessity, of which Tertullian bore witness as the author of the so-called doctrine of the traduction of souls.

It is worthy of notice, that the same Tertullian, who first brought out the doctrine of inherited sin in this explicit form, exclaims, — though in a somewhat earlier work, where he takes ground against the practice of infant baptism:[5] "Wherefore should the age of innocence be in haste after the forgiveness of sin?"[6]

Tertullian was equally penetrated with the consciousness of sinfulness cleaving to man's nature, and with the consciousness of an undeniable godlike nature in man, in contrast with which it is that sin reveals itself as sin. This great church-teacher, who in many respects must be considered as the forerunner of Augustin, is to be compared with him also in this particular, — since without any doubt he had had occasion to learn from his own experience the resistance of a fiery, violent, rude nature to the godlike spirit, and so the opposition between nature and grace. Though we know less about his early development than we do about Augustin's, yet we may infer from his wholly peculiar character, as it exhibits itself to us in his writings, that it was only after

[1] Electio suæ potius quam divinæ sententiæ.

[2] Spiritum mundi universo generi suo tradidit.

[3] De anima, c. 10 and c. 19.

[4] Tradux animæ tradux peccati.

[5] See vol. I. p. 312.

[6] Quid festinat innocens ætas ad remissionem peccatorem. De bapt. c 18.

many an inward struggle he could attain to peace; — and the reaction of those deep elements of his natural character doubtless furnished occasion for many an after-conflict.[1] But equally mighty was the immediate feeling of the underlying godlike principle in his sturdy, inartificial nature. "The corruption of nature," he says,[2] "is a second nature, which has its own god and father, even the author of the corruption himself; so that goodness, however, still resides also in the soul; that original, that godlike and genuine thing, which is its proper nature. For that which is from God is not so much extinguished as obscured; for it *can* be obscured, since it is not God; but it cannot be extinguished, since it is of God. As the light, when some object is interposed, continues to exist, though it may not be transmitted, owing to the density of the object; so goodness in the soul, when suppressed by evil, as it is the peculiar nature of evil to suppress it, either remains wholly inactive, its light being hid; or else bursts through in freedom, where it is given it to do so. Thus it is that some are very good and others very bad; and yet all souls are of the same stock: thus, too, there is something good in the very worst, and something bad in the very best; since God alone is without sin, and as man, Christ alone without sin, since Christ is also God. Thus it is that the divinity of the soul, by virtue of its original goodness, breaks out in obscure presentiments, and the consciousness of God comes forth as its witness. For this reason no soul is without guilt, for none is without the seeds of goodness."

It is a characteristic trait in Tertullian, that, as he laid peculiar stress, because he was a Montanist, on the unusual psychological phenomena presented in the effects of the new divine life, on the miraculous element in the charismata;[3] so too, where he is led to speak of man's natural condition, he is fond of bringing up such eccentric appearances as the manifestation of a natural power of divination, as indications of the indestructible, godlike element in human nature.[4]

He was led still further to unfold and to defend these views, not only in his controversy with Marcion, who, as we have observed above, did not acknowledge the existence of anything originally godlike in the soul, but also in his dispute with Hermogenes. On this latter occasion, he wrote a work, which has not come down to us, on the descent of souls. Hermogenes had combated the theory of a heavenly descent of the soul, of the inbreathing into it of a divine particle, by which theory the Divine was subjected to a mar, to a stain, since it was impossible to avoid the necessity of tracing to this soul, at the same time,

[1] Thus we hear him speaking out of the fulness of his inner experience, when in his work, written in praise of the Christian virtue, *patience*, he says, c. 1: "Ita miserrimus ego semper æger caloribus impatientiæ, quam non obtineo patientiæ sanitatem, et suspirem et invocem et perorem necesse est, cum recordor et in meæ imbecillitatis contemplatione digero, bonam fidei valetudinem et dominicæ disciplinæ sanitatem, non facile cuiquam, nisi patientia adsideat, provenire."

[2] De anima, c. 41.

[3] The distinction between that natural faculty of divination and prophecy as a charisma is stated, de anima, c. 22: Divinatio interdum, sepositа, quæ per Dei gratiam obvenit ex prophetia.

[4] De censu animæ. We learn what were the contents of this book from his work de anima.

the origin of evil.[1] He thinks himself bound to suppose in matter, — that inorganic stuff lying at the ground of the creation, — not only something akin to the corporeal world which is produced out of it, but also something akin to the soul, which was likewise formed out of it. The wild motion in it, is that which it has akin to the soul, and which lies at the ground of the soul.[2] As God, by his organizing influences, produced the corporeal world out of the chaotic mass, so he formed the soul out of the chaotic principle of motion.[3] Taking his position on this ground of materialism, he hence agreed with Marcion in denying that any point of union was presented for Christianity in an original element of the human soul akin to the Divine. Evil he derived from this wild, chaotic principle of motion, not overcome; just as he would regard whatever was hateful in the corporeal world as a remnant of the ancient chaos. Also in Satan and evil spirits; he believed probably that he saw the reaction of that untamed chaotic power of motion. Souls needed the communication of a divine life really related to God, and imparted to them by the redemption and by regeneration, in order to be enabled to vanquish the evil element growing out of their origin. Tertullian defended, as he himself affirms,[4] against Hermogenes, the free will, as an original property of the soul and indestructible. We might thence infer, that Hermogenes regarded the participation in the redemption, and in the divine life originally alien from the soul, as not conditioned by the self-determination of the free will; that he did not consider faith as proceeding *from that source;* but derived everything here alike from the unconditional divine influence and election; and he would thus belong among the first advocates of the doctrine of an unconditioned predetermination, and of an unconditioned, irresistible grace. The logically consistent development of his principles might certainly lead to such results; for if the soul, by virtue of its material origin and essence, presents no point of union for grace, there seems necessarily to follow, as from the theory of an absolute corruption of human nature, such a result from these premises. Yet we are too imperfectly acquainted with the system of Hermogenes, to be able to affirm with any certainty, that such was the connection of his ideas. From the thesis we cannot argue with perfect safety to the antithesis; for it is possible that Tertullian may have been led, simply on the ground that Hermogenes denied the original existence of anything akin to God in the soul, to maintain this against him, together with all the marks and characters belonging thereto, among which he reckoned also the free will, without Hermogenes having wholly denied the freedom of the will; just as Tertullian does in fact maintain the doctrine of the

[1] Dum incredibile est, spiritum Dei in delictum et mox in judicium devenire, ex materia potius anima credatur quam ex Dei spiritu. De anima, c. 11. Tertullian contends, on the contrary, that the soul is derived, not from the spiritus Dei, but from the flatus Dei; that it was not the essence of God, but only something imparted immediately by the Spirit of God — something in affinity with that spirit, which resided in the soul.

[2] The incorporale inconditus motus materiæ. Adv. Hermogenem, c. 36.

[3] Comp. the passage from Plutarch, cited on p. 376, relative to a soul united originally with the chaos.

[4] Inesse nobis *τὸ αὐτεξούσιον* naturaliter, jam et Marcioni ostendimus et Hermogeni. De anima, c. 21.

free will against Marcion, while yet we do not know that Marcion ever denied it.[1] At all events, Hermogenes denied the natural immortality of the soul, and regarded immortality only as a consequence of the new divine life imparted by Christ: hence he considered *believers only* to be immortal. All evil — evil spirits, and men who have not become partakers of the divine life — was finally to be resolved into the matter from whence it originally sprang.[2]

Against this doctrine of Hermogenes, then, Tertullian maintained, "that the souls, sprung from that first soul which arose immediately from the breath of God, are immortal, endowed with free will, in possession of a faculty of divination: — evident signs of their heavenly origin."[3]

He considered all the parts and faculties of human nature as one and the same work of God, a work good in itself; and everything contrary to reason in it, therefore, as but a consequence of that original schism which grew out of the first sin. The division which Plato makes of the soul into the λογικόν and ἄλογον he was willing to admit; though not in respect to the original, but only in respect to the corrupted, human nature.[4]

To the Gnostic doctrine concerning the different fundamental principles of human nature, according to which they maintained that a hylic or material nature could never be converted into a pneumatic or spiritual one, and that a spiritual nature could never be converted into a material one, — to this doctrine Tertullian opposed the almighty power of grace and the mutability of the human will. When the Gnostics appealed to the declaration of Christ, that an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit, nor a good tree evil fruit, he replies to them: "If this is to be understood *so*, then God cannot raise up from the stones children to Abraham; then the generation of vipers cannot bring forth fruits to repentance; and the apostle was mistaken, when he wrote, 'Ye also were sometimes darkness,' and 'We also were once by nature the children of wrath,' and 'Ye were once among these; but now are ye washed.' But will the declarations of the holy scripture contradict one another? No; for the evil tree will not bring forth good fruit, *unless it be grafted;* and the good tree will bring forth evil fruit, unless it be cultivated; and the stones will become children of Abraham, if they be formed to the faith of Abraham; and the generation of vipers will bring forth the fruits of repentance, when they have disgorged the

[1] We must here remark, by way of supplement, that, in Marcion's system, this point still remains undecided. For the same reasons, as in the case of Hermogenes, such an hypothesis would perfectly accord with his system also, and it would moreover harmonize well with his ultra-Paulinism. But the prominent place which he gives to God's paternal love, and the manner in which he speaks of the arbitrary conduct of the God of the Old Testament, accusing him of having compassion on some, and hardening the hearts of others, leave it quite improbable, that Marcion ought to be considered as an advocate of the doctrine of absolute predestination.

[2] Vid. Theodoret. fab. hæret. I. c. 19.

[3] Animam Dei flatu natam, immortalem, liberam arbitrii dominatricem, divinatricem. De anima, c. 22.

[4] De anima, 16. Naturale enim, *rationale* credendum est, quod animæ a primordio sit ingenitum a *rationali* videlicet auctore; irrationale autem posterius intelligendum, ipsum illud transgressionis admissum atque (quod) exinde inoleverit in anima, ad instar jam naturalitatis, quia statim in naturæ primordio accedit.

poison of wickedness. These effects divine grace can produce; which, of a truth, is mightier than nature, and to which the free will within us is subjected. As this last, too, is a natural thing and susceptible of change, so the nature turns in the same direction as this turns."[1] One might understand the above remarkable passage, as if even at this early period Tertullian would attribute to grace an irresistibly attractive power over the corrupted will of man; one might say he asserted the freedom of the will only in opposition to the doctrine of a natural necessity, to the affirmation of a complete moral want of susceptibility in the case of *certain* natures; but not in respect to the soul-transforming principle of grace. Montanism might easily result in giving the utmost prominence to the overwhelming influence of the divine power, and in reducing the free will to a blind passive instrument. But we are by no means authorized by the connection to give the language such an interpretation. For Tertullian, according to the context, is only intending to prove, that grace, through its inworking agency on the corrupted nature, could, by virtue of the free will, impart to it a higher power than dwells in itself, and thus transform it to something else; and we are bound in justice to adopt that interpretation which best accords with other explanations that Tertullian gives concerning the free will. It is true, as we have before remarked, that the influence of the whole peculiar tendency lying at the root of Montanism must have been, to cause that the power of grace should be magnified; but even Montanism cannot be accused of rending asunder the momenta which belong together in Christianity, and giving supremacy to one wholly at the expense of the other. Even Montanism was far from any tendency to the doctrine of a constraining grace, operating with irresistible power on the conversion of man generally. That it did not look upon the agency of grace generally as being of this kind, may be gathered from the fact, that it regarded *this* kind of gracious agency connected with bare passivity on the part of man, as an exception to the general rule, — as an extraordinary thing; — supposed it to be confined to the prophets. Accordingly we find, even in Tertullian, a passage in which he speaks of such influences of grace, where everything depends solely on the divine influence, nothing on human conduct — such extraordinary virtues as could be regarded only in the light of free gifts of divine grace, which God imparts to each individual as he pleases.[2] But this very circumstance, of his ascribing the whole to the action of grace alone only in such extraordinary cases, may serve as a proof, that he did not consider this as the general law which governed the evolution of the Christian life. And we are by no means warranted to conclude from such a declaration of Tertullian, that he was already a Montanist when he so expressed himself; — for, in this particular reference, our general remark will find its application, that Montanism is

[1] Hæc erit vis divinæ gratiæ, potentior utique natura, habens in nobis subjacentem sibi liberam arbitrii potestatem, quæ cum sit et ipsa naturalis atque mutabilis, quoquo vertitur, natura convertitur. De anima, c. 21.

[2] Quod bonorum quorundam sicuti et malorum intolerabilis magnitudo est, ut ad capienda et præstanda ea sola gratia divinæ inspirationis operetur. Nam quod maxime bonum, id maxime penes Deum; nec alius id quam qui possidet, dispensat, ut cuique dignetur. De patientia, c. 1.

to be regarded merely as the extreme point of tendencies and modes of thinking which were already in existence.

But a directly opposite view to this resulted of itself from the process of development in the Alexandrian church. Accordingly Clement combated, without meaning to do so, the doctrine of the North-African church, having in his eye simply the Gnostic dualism, which represented birth to be a work of the evil principle. "How then," he asks, "could the children have sinned, or fallen under the curse of Adam, when they are chargeable with no actions of their own?" [1] The question here related to the explanation of those passages of the Old Testament, which in the North-African church were adduced in proof of the doctrine of inherited sin. Job 14 : 4 — Ps. 51 : 5.[2] Clement referred such and similar passages to the natural ignorance of man in reference to God and divine things, to the power of sinful habits.[3] But it by no means follows, that Clement did not believe in the doctrine of a fall from a state of moral purity. To the Gnostic dilemma,[4] above quoted, he opposed the assertion, that the first man was not created perfect, but with the capacity for virtue ;[5] so that its cultivation and application depended on himself. He yielded to the enticements of sensual pleasure in that childhood of his being, as it was for him to decide, according to his own free choice.[6] While many Gnostics made the fall to consist in this, that the first man, yielding to sensuous appetite, gave himself up to the indulgence of the sexual propensity, whereby both himself and his entire posterity came under the dominion of the ὕλη; Clement, on the other hand, regarded man's guilt to consist simply in this, that he did not wait for the suitable period appointed by God for the satisfaction of that impulse.[7] Thus he might regard that power of the sensuous appetites over the spirit as a consequence of the first disobedience,— might suppose, that by the guilt of man the sway of sense became continually stronger, while still, however, it continued to depend on man's will to resist its enticements. We perceive the influence of the ideas which had found their way into his mind through his philosophical education, in the inclination he manifests to refer back evil to the power of sense; and accordingly he must refer redemption and regeneration mainly to the end of providing a way for the soul to partake of the divine life, by being delivered from these foreign elements. "It is not without special grace," says he, "that the soul attains to this power of soaring aloft on wings, after having laid aside every weight, so as to unite itself with its kindred element." [8] This was the important thing with Clement, to recognize both the need in which the free will stood of assistance, and also the

[1] Strom. l. III. f. 453 et 469.

[2] See Cyprian's collection of proofs from the scriptures of the doctrines of faith and morals, Testimonior. l. III. c. 54.

[3] Συνηθεία ἡ ἁμαρτωλός. Τὰς πρώτας ἐκ γενέσεως ὁρμὰς, καθ' ἃς θεὸν οὐ γινώσκομεν, ἀσεβείας λέγει. Strom. l. III. f. 469.

[4] See above, p. 613.

[5] Ἐπιτήδειος πρὸς τὴν κτῆσιν ἀρετῆς. Strom. l. VI. f. 662.

[6] Παρήγετο ἐπιθυμίαις ὁ παῖς. Clement, like Philo, regarded the serpent as a symbol of ἡδονή. Protrept. f. 69.

[7] Τάχα που προλαβόντος τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ πρωτοπλάστου. Strom. l. III. f. 466. Ἐκινήθησαν θᾶττον ἢ προσῆκον ἦν ἔτι νέοι πεφυκότες, ἀπάτῃ παραχθέντες. L. c. f. 470.

[8] Οὐ χάριτος ἄνευ τῆς ἐξαιρέτου πτεροῦται τε καὶ ἀνίσταται καὶ ἄνω τῶν ὑπερκειμένων αἴρεται ἡ ψυχὴ, πᾶν τὸ βρίθον ἀποτινεμένη καὶ ἀποδιδοῦσα τῷ συγγενεῖ. L. c. l. V. f. 588.

fact that grace was conditioned on its efforts, and was designed to meet its deficiencies. On this point he thus expresses himself:[1] "When man seeks by his own efforts and practice to free himself from the power of his passions, he effects nothing. But when he manifests a true zeal and earnestness, then he gains the victory, by the accessory power of God; for God bestows his Spirit on willing souls. But when they remit their desire, the Spirit, which God bestows, also withdraws. The kingdom of heaven belongs not to the sleeping and indolent, but the violent take it by force." He was too strongly fettered to this dogmatic interest, too little capable of moving out of the circle of his subjective notions, rightly to understand, out of its own self, particularly the Pauline type of doctrine, — as appears, for example, in his remarkably tortuous interpretation of 1 Corinth. 1: 20; where the last words, according to him, are not to be taken as a question, but thus: it was not God who made the wisdom of this world foolishness, but it became foolishness through the guilt of man.[2]

Quite peculiar to himself on this subject, is also the system of Origen. We have observed, that he was attached to a spiritually conceived theory of emanation; in opposition to the Gnostics, who would account for the difference among rational creatures, partly by a natural law regulating the graduated evolution of life proceeding from God, partly by their derivation from different fundamental principles. Origen sought to trace all differences to *moral freedom.* God, as the absolute unity, he taught, can only be a source of unity. So far as all existence springs from him, the unity of his own essence must reveal itself therein. No difference, no manifoldness, can spring from him. It would, moreover, be inconsistent with his love and justice, not to bestow on all his creatures the same measure of perfection and blessedness.[3] God therefore is to be originally contemplated as the fountain of a world of spirits, allied to his own nature, blessed in their communion with him, the members of which were all homogeneous and equal. In the second book of his work περὶ ἀρχῶν, he so expresses himself, as if he considered not only all difference in the measure of powers and of blessedness, but all differences in individual existence generally, as a thing which was not original, but which resulted in the first instance from the difference

[1] Quis dives salv. c. 21.

[2] Strom. lib. I. f. 313.

[3] Ritter, in his Christlichen Philosophie, Bd I. S. 317, maintains, that, at the foundation of Origen's doctrine, lies the thought, "that created spirits in the outset did not actually partake of the good and of the perfect, but had simply received the faculty for all good. Their connate perfection consisted in this." But such a thought would certainly imply the notion of a development from a lower stage, — a progressive and graduated movement from the imperfect to the perfect; and it is evident how utterly this view clashes with the system of Origen. Origen does in truth conceive the perfect as the original state; — traces all imperfection to a fall, involving guilt because it was an act of freedom; and regards, as the final end, the restoration of the original state, and not the complete development of the capacities bestowed at the creation. This simply is the thought lying at the basis of his system, — that the rational spirit should maintain, by freedom as its property, the perfection bestowed on it already by the creation; and, having lost it, should recover it again by freedom; — that the fellowship with God, the source of all good in the rational creature, is not coercive, but can be preserved only by virtue of a free appropriation, and can be acquired again only by the same means. This is among the points, too, which essentially distinguish the doctrine of Origen from that of Clement.

in the moral bent of the will. According to this, Origen would have held the original creation to be one of beings perfectly equal and only numerically different; and would have regarded all individual peculiarities as a consequence of estrangement from God. A very narrow conception of the creation, we must allow, viewed in relation to the infinite being of God; but in a characteristic manner does Origen here show how, in opposition to the Gnosticism and Platonism, by which he was at other times governed, the Christian point of view, though but partially seized by him, predominates in his way of thinking, and how he places over against the hypothesis of a natural necessity, the moral point of view, as the highest position, by which everything else must be determined.[1]

Already in Origen's predecessor, Clement, it may be perceived how the pushing to an extreme of one Christian momentum, the doctrine of freedom, seized to the exclusion of the other, — the pushing of this doctrine to an extreme, in opposition to the Gnostic distinction of natures, could lead to such a result as that is, where he supposes it necessary to ascribe whatever there was which distinguished the apostles from other men, not to a peculiar nature bestowed on them by God, but all to the merit of the right direction of their own will. According to his opinion, they did not become such, because they were chosen to be such by God; but they were chosen to their office by God, because he foreknew what they would become by the direction of their own will. In proof of this position, Clement adduces the fact, that Judas Iscariot was also one among the apostles, that Matthias, in consideration of his worthiness, was afterwards received into the number of the apostles in place of Judas.[2] It was only necessary to carry out this one-sided view, — which was diametrically opposed to the doctrine of absolute predetermination and divine decrees, and by which the significance of any distinction of nature given by creation itself was utterly denied, and everything here derived solely from moral worth, — to its legitimate consequences, in order to be driven on from the position of Clement, to the system which Origen carried to its completion.

It may have been the case, however, that at some later period, Origen retracted this hypothesis, as he did many other immature ideas which he had brought to view in that work of speculative dogmatism. At least, he says, in a passage belonging to a later work,[3] that the Son of God is the universal brightness of God's glory, but that scattered beams of his glory were spread over the rest of the rational creation, since no created being could contain the whole of the glory of God; in which it would seem to be implied, that what in the Logos is one and the same,

[1] The importance of the free will, as connected with all spiritual development, Origen describes in the following words: Ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν σωμάτων οὐ παρὰ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους, ὁ μέν τις ἐστὶ βραχὺς καὶ μικρὸς, ὁ δὲ μέγας, ὁ δὲ μεταξύ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ψυχῶν καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε πράξεις καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἦθος τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι ἢ μικρὸν ἢ ἐν τοῖς μεταξὺ τυγχάνειν. In Matt. T. XIII. § 26.

[2] Οὐχ ὅτι ἦσαν ἐκλεκτοὶ γενόμενοι ἀποστολοι κατά τι φύσεων ἰδίωμα, ἐπεὶ ὁ Ἰούδας ἐξελέγη σὺν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' οἱοίτε ἦσαν ἀπόστολοι γενέσθαι ἐκλεγέντες πρὸς τοῦ καὶ τὰ τέλη προορωμένου. Strom. l. VI. f. 667.

[3] In Joann. T. XXXII. § 18.

unfolds itself in the rest of the world of spirits into a manifoldness of individual natures, of which each reflects and represents the glory of God in his own peculiar way, so that only the collective sum of all these individuals would correspond to the glory of God in the Logos. This must doubtless have been the case, if Origen had clearly opened out to his own mind all that is contained in the thought which he expressed; but it may be questioned, if he ever did this. He seems, in one passage of the same commentary on John from which the passage just alluded to is taken, to consider it as the final end of this evolution, that all the rational beings conducted back by the Logos to a perfect communion with God, would have but one common employment, — that of the intuition of God; and that, fashioned through the knowledge of the Father, they would know as completely what the Son is, as at present only the Son has known the Father.[1] But since, according to the system of Origen, all things are, by that final consummation,[2] to be once more restored to their original condition, it seems to follow, according to the same system, that such a state of equality and unity was the one which *originally* existed.

Origen argued still further: God alone is by his own nature good; all created beings, on the contrary, are, and continue to be, good only by virtue of their fellowship with the original fountain of all good, the Logos. As soon as the desire arises in any rational being to be something for himself, evil exists. "What has become goodness," says Origen,[3] "cannot be in like manner good as that which is goodness by its own essence. It can never be wanting, however, to him who, for its preservation, receives into himself the so-called living bread. Whoever fails of obtaining it, fails by his own fault; since he neglects to partake of the living bread and of the true water, wherewith, nourished and refreshed, the wings grow."[4] Evil is the only thing which has the ground of its existence in itself, and not in God. Which, therefore, generally, is grounded in no being, but is nothing else than an estrangement from the true being, that which has only a subjective and no objective existence, that which is in itself nothing.[5] Hence he says:

[1] In Joann. T. I. § 16. See also the passage in Matth. T. X. § 2. f. 207: "Then the righteous will no longer shine in different ways, as at the beginning; but all will shine like one sun in the kingdom of their Father." Matth. 13: 43. (Τότε μάλιστα οἱ δίκαιοι λάμψουσιν οὐκέτι διαφόρως, ὡς κατὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἀλλὰ πάντες εἰς ἥλιος.) Yet this passage of Origen could be understood as referring barely to an equality of moral condition and blessedness.

[2] The ἀποκατάστασις.

[3] c. Cels. l. VI. c. 44.

[4] An allusion to the Myth in Plato's Phœdrus respecting the wings of the soul.

[5] To Plato's metaphysical idea of μὴ ὄν (according to which, if we get a clear notion of it, evil is necessary as a limit to the evolution of life; and, consequently, the idea of evil, as to its moral import, is virtually annulled,) Origen gave more of a moral significance. The μὴ ὄν here is, according to his view, rather privative than negative. See in Joann. T. II. § 7: Οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ ὄντος, μετέχουσι δὲ οἱ ἅγιοι, εὐλόγως ἂν ὄντες χρηματίζοιεν· οἱ δὲ ἀποστραφέντες τὴν τοῦ ὄντος μετοχὴν, τῷ ἐστερῆσθαι τοῦ ὄντος, γεγόνασιν οὐκ ὄντες. Hence I cannot admit at all the correctness of what Ritter says in his Geschichte der Christlichen Philosophie. Bd. I. § 524, concerning Origen's theory: "A limitation of this sort, in which created spirits originally exist, might perhaps be regarded by Origen as an element of evil or impurity in them, since he considered evil generally to be simply a defect of goodness." Such a view is wholly at variance with the theory of Origen, who thought it of so much importance to define evil as a thing which has its ground in no natural necessity, but which is derivable only from an act of the free will. The notions of im-

"The assertion of the Gnostics, that Satan is no creature of God,[1] has some foundation in truth; namely, to this extent, that while Satan is indeed a creature of God in respect to his nature, he is not so as Satan." [2]

The will of the spirits, who were enjoying the blessedness of a divine life, having become estranged from God, the original unity was now dissolved; a disharmony arose, which could only be restored back to unity after a long process of purification and culture. The soul of the world is nothing other than the power and wisdom of God, which is able to combine these great moral differences into one living whole, and which pervades and animates the universe, subjecting all dissonances to a higher law.[3]

The corporeal world was brought into existence and constituted with a view to this end, that the spirits which had become incapable of the purely spiritual, divine life, might be brought to a consciousness of their estrangement from God, and of their culpable misery; that the craving might be awakened in them after a restoration of their fellowship with the divine Fountain of Good; that they might become more and more purified by conflict. The matter lying at the ground of the corporeal world is the undetermined element, destitute of all properties, which receives first, from the plastic hand of Omnipotence, a certain form and pressure, and that, varying according as bodies of a higher or lower order, ethereal or more gross, in manifold gradations, are formed out of it.[4] Thus arise manifold gradations, from the spiritual to the sensuous, corresponding to the different stages of fallen beings.[5] There exist intelligences, which were united in a freer man-

perfection and of moral evil are, according to his doctrine, to be carefully distinguished. God, it is true, is the holy, good being, in a sense in which no creature can be so called (see T. II. in Matth. § 10); but moral evil is not an original element, but is to be traced only to a voluntary apostacy from God. The *μὴ ὄν* is not to be considered as a defect cleaving to creaturely existence, but as a voluntary alienation from the *ὄν*.

[1] See Part II. p. 373.

[2] In Joann. T. II. § 7.

[3] Περὶ *ἀρχῶν*, l. II. c. 1.

[4] In the *ἔννλος κόσμος* is to be distinguished *ὕλη* lying at the ground, and the *λόγος ὁ κοσμῶν τὴν ὕλην*. In Joann. T. XIX. § 5.

[5] We here encounter a difficult question; viz. whether Origen supposed, that from the beginning the *ὕλη* also was brought into existence, together with the world of spirits, as a necessary limit for the creature, so that the creaturely spirit must of necessity be always provided with a material organization, which, corresponding only to the stage of moral perfection, would be of a higher or lower order; or, whether he traced the first origin of matter, and of the material world itself, to the fall. If we confined ourselves to a passage in the work περὶ *ἀρχῶν*, we should be under the necessity of considering the former position as the doctrine of Origen. The remarkable passage (l. II. c. 2. § 2) runs as follows: "Principaliter quidem creatas esse rationales naturas, materialem vero substantiam opinione quidem et intellectu solum separari ab eis et pro ipsis vel post ipsas effectam videri, sed nunquam sine ipsa eos vel vixisse vel vivere." From this, we should be led to represent the subject as Ritter understands it; namely, that the conception of matter arises simply from an abstraction of the sum total constituting the creaturely existence; that it is nothing else than the objective conception of the limit of creaturely existence, of that which forms the boundary of individual existence, — just as the Platonists taught, that the conception of matter could be apprehended only by the *λόγος νόθος*. And it is very certain, that the antithesis between body and spirit vanishes, to our apprehension, if we think of the manifold gradations in the attributes or properties stamped on the *ὕλη*, and by abstraction go back to the undetermined somewhat which lies at the ground of all these; *μένειν τὸ ὑλικὸν, τῶν ποιοτήτων μεταβαλλουσῶν εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν*. In Joann. T. XIII. § 59. This would harmonize with his doctrine concerning the transfigured organization after the resurrection, which rests doubtless

ner with an organic form of higher character, for the purpose of co-operating with and assisting the other fallen spirits, — those intelligences residing in the planets,[1] which administer a painful service of love, yearning after the time of the universal restoration, when, lightened of this burden, they should be raised once more to a state of existence, emancipated and delivered from all that is sensuous; — the earnest expectation denoted in Rom. 8: 19.[2] According to Origen's doctrine, these higher intelligences owe it to their own free will alone, to their own merit, that they occupy this elevated rank in the creation; that they are united in this freer manner with the corporeal world, and have received such an organization of higher, transfigured, more ethereal mould. The question may now arise, did Origen regard these beings as those which had no share in the first fall, but, by reason of their unalterable fidelity to the Creator, had entitled themselves to this place in the universe? In this case, he would suppose that, by virtue of the free direction of their own will, some among the rational existences had persevered in goodness, others swerved from it; but that those also who had remained steadfast must enter into some sort of connection with the corporeal world, — not as though they were bound to do so, but because they chose to subject themselves to this connection, in order to subserve the good of the other fallen beings. Hence the more do they long for that period when, the end of the universal purification having been attained, they too shall be released from this burdensome service. Or perhaps — and the doctrine set forth in the work *περὶ ἀρχῶν* is certainly more favorable to this view of the matter — Origen considered these intelligences, not as those who had remained wholly unaffected by the general defection of the creaturely existence, but simply as those which had taken the least share in it, and which

on the same general foundation, and with his doctrine concerning the transfigured, ethereal bodies of the angels; *τὰ τῶν ἀγγέλων σώματα αἰθέρια καὶ αὐγοειδὲς φῶς*. In Matth. T. XVII. § 30. And to the souls of the planets, he ascribes a *σῶμα αἰθέριον καὶ καθαρώτατον*. De orat. c. 7. In this case, we must, with Ritter, consider that mode of expression as a strictly scientific one, to which everything else in the sense of Origen should be referred. Where, on the other hand, he speaks of a production of matter which ensued at some later period, it must be explained as a case in which he descends from the strictly scientific position, and accommodates himself to a more popular mode of thinking — leaves the position of the *γνῶσις* for that of the *πίστις*. But we very much doubt, whether we are warranted to ascribe to Origen a speculative theory of this sort, so rigidly carried out, and uniformly adhered to. We cannot believe there is any good reason for explaining all his assertions belonging to a later period, and seeming to contradict what is here affirmed, according to the theory set forth in the work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*; for it is plain, how — in the case of a man in whose mode of thinking speculative elements, borrowed from other quarters, and derived from Christianity, came together — he might easily be led to retract, at some later period, many things which he had presented in this first essay at a speculative system of doctrines. In this work itself, he rather puts down the matter as problematical, than decides on it with confidence. In Joann. T. I. § 17, — where indeed he also expresses himself, not in a positive manner, but in the form: *ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιστῆσαι εἰ*, — he distinguishes from every corporeal existence, even from every free connection with an organization of transfigured mould, an *ἄϋλος πάντῃ καὶ ἀσώματος ζωή*, as the original one. And, in Joann. T. XIX. § 5, he opposes this later formed corporeal world to the *κόσμος νοητός*, subsisting alone: *Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ δεικνύμενος κόσμος ὑλικὸς γενόμενος διὰ τοὺς δεηθέντας τῆς ἐνύλου ζωῆς τόπους μὲν ἔχει διαφόρους, οἵτινες δὴ πάντες, ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὰ ἄϋλα καὶ τὰ ἀσώματα, κάτω εἰσὶν, οὐ τόσον τῷ τόπῳ ὅσον τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἀόρατα συγκρίσει*. And he says that the formation of the *κόσμος ἔνυλος* is described not without reason as a *καταβολή*

[1] See above, p. 392.

[2] See e. g. de Martyr. § 7.

then, by virtue of this their direction of will, whereby, at least, they distinguished themselves from the rest, obtained this position in the universe. But if this is his train of thought, Origen takes away from free will with one hand, what he gives to it with the other; for, in this case, the free will no longer constitutes the difference between the beings who persevered in goodness and those who fell from it, but only between those who deviated to a greater or to a less extent; and moral evil appears in this case as something necessary in the creaturely existence, — at least in a certain degree, — as a necessary point of transition.

We see before us only a fragment of the great course of the world, which embraces in it all moral diversities, together with all the consequences thence resulting, up to their entire removal at the general consummation: — hence our defective, limited Theodicee.[1]

From the doctrine of Origen it necessarily followed, that human souls were originally the same in kind with all higher spirits; that the difference between the former and the latter, and between the former compared with each other, proceeded only from a diversity in the moral bent of the will of the several individuals; that accordingly all souls are fallen heavenly beings. All consciousness in time, which moves between the antithesis of subject and object, and the understanding which is directed to things finite, only grew out of the estrangement from that unity of the divine life, which is the life of immediate intuition; and it is the soul's destination that, after having become purified, it should rise once more to that life which consists in the pure, immediate intuition of God; or, since the life of the spirit was changed to a life of the soul by the quenching of that heavenly fire, that the soul should be once more transfigured into spirit.[2]

His theory of the preëxistence of the soul is opposed to the doctrine of the *Creationists*, who taught that each individual soul is formed by an immediate creative act of God, — a doctrine which seemed to him irreconcilable with the love and the justice of God, which extend equally to all his creatures, — and also to Tertullian's traduction system, — a doctrine which he regarded as too crass and sensual. That he might hold on upon his peculiar speculative theory concerning the origin of souls without seeming to interfere with the doctrines of the church, he insisted, as he had done in defending his theory of a creation antecedent to the creation of this temporal world, that these were points which, by the church doctrine, had been left undecided.

But on the doctrine concerning an adherent corruption of human nature, he could express himself precisely after the same manner with the teachers of the North-African church; he could speak of a mystery of the birth,[1] owing to which every individual that comes into the world needs purification; and in defence of this he might appeal to the same texts of scripture which were adduced by others in support of the doc-

[1] Homil. IV. in Jes. § 1.

[2] Παρὰ τὴν ἀπόπτωσιν καὶ τὴν ψύξιν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῆν τῷ πνεύματι γέγονεν ἡ νῦν γενομένη ψυχή· νοῦς πῶς οὖν γέγονε ψυχὴ, καὶ ψυχὴ κατορθωθεῖσα γίνεται νοῦς. II. ἀρχ l. II. c. 8. Compare the similar view of the Gnostics above.

[3] Μυστήριον τῆς γενέσεως.

trine of original sin. He had only to trace this condition of human nature to another source; namely, to the personal guilt of each fallen heavenly spirit, in an earlier state of existence. And consequently this corruption could not, according to Origen's theory, be the same in all; but the degree of it depended on the degree of the earlier guilt. Although he considered Adam to be a true, historical person, yet he could regard him in no other light than as the first incarnate soul which had fallen from the heavenly state of existence. Like the Gnostics, he must give a symbolical explanation to the narrative concerning Paradise; which he represented as the symbol of a higher spiritual world, Adam being the type of mankind at large, of all fallen souls.[1]

In his work περὶ ἀρχῶν, Origen — agreeing here too with the Platonists and with many of the Gnostics — had admitted the doctrine, at least, as one which could not be directly disproved, that fallen souls might, through total degeneracy, sink down even to the bodies of brutes.[2] But as his system differed essentially from the Neo-Platonic, in giving predominance to the moral, teleological point of view peculiar to Christianity, he must have been ultimately led, as this point of view became more clearly fixed in his mind, to reject altogether the doctrine of *such* a transmigration of souls, as being inconsistent with that end of purification which presupposes the continuance of conciousness.[3] His doctrine, answering to the *ethico-teleological* point of view, concerning the process of the soul's purification *prosecuted to the result of its final restoration*, forms rather the direct opposite to the hypothesis *of a circle of metempsychoses*, which grew out of the predominant habit of judging spiritual things after the analogy of Nature.[4]

Origen, like the Gnostics, placed in man's fallen nature three principles, the σαρκικόν, the ψυχικόν, and the πνευματικόν; and also supposed three different stages or positions of human nature corresponding to these principles. But he differed from them in one essential point. As he acknowledged all human souls to be the same in kind, so he held that each and every one of them is possessed of the same principles; and consequently he represented the different stages as resulting, not from any original difference of natures, but from the predominance of some one or other of those principles occasioned by the different bent of the will. The spirit (πνεῦμα) is the highest element in man's nature, that which is immediately divine, that whereby man is connected with a higher order of things — the organ through which alone he is capable of understanding divine things. It is not liable to be affected by sin, or to be corrupted or alloyed by anything foreign. Nothing evil, nothing but what is divine, can proceed from it.[5] It can retire

[1] c. Cels. l. IV. § 40: Οὐχ οὕτως περὶ ἑνός τινος, ὡς περὶ ὅλου τοῦ γένους ταῦτα φάσκοντος τοῦ θείου λόγου. It is reconcilable with this, that Origen, in speaking of Adam on other occasions, expressed himself wholly *after the manner* of *the church*, as in Joann. T. I. § 22; T. XIII. § 34. He might understand the language in his own sense, especially in *homilies*, where the *gnosis* did not properly belong. Hom. XIV. in Jerem.

[2] See the Greek fragment π. ἀρχ. l. I. Orig. ed. de la Rue T. I. f. 76.

[3] See c. Cels. l. III. c. 76, II. 16, in Jerem. where he speaks of metempsychosis in a parabolical sense, carefully guarding against the misconception which would arise from taking his language literally.

[4] [Von vorherrschender Naturanschauung ausgehenden Annahme.]

[5] Ἀνεπίδεκτον τῶν χειρόνων τὸ πνεῦμα. In Joann. T. XXXII. § 11.

wholly out of view and become dormant only through man's guilt, — only where it is hindered from revealing itself and from acting by the predominance of sense, of the lower faculties of the soul, of the worldly temper. In what the Apostle Paul says concerning an opposition between the works of the flesh and the works of the spirit, Origen finds a confirmation of his opinion,— since he refers the latter to the spirit in man, as contra-distinguished from the flesh, — the active principle in all that is good.[1] The reaction of the inward presentiment of God and of conscience against ungodliness, he derives from this πνεῦμα. There is here revealed a commanding, judging, punishing power, superior to the soul itself.[2] Those men in whom the soul surrenders itself entirely to the guidance of this πνεῦμα, those in whom this faculty is predominant, are hence denominated spiritual men, πνευματικοί.[3] In the case of such, the true saints, the unity of the whole life is grounded on the fact of its being determined by this πνεῦμα, — this is the governing principle of their whole life. Living in the spirit, all they do and suffer proceeds from this,— it is this which gives their conduct its true import and significancy.[4] From this point of view, Origen ought to have been led to see, — for it seems to lie at the basis of all that is here said, — that it is by this unity grounded in the godlike alone, the essence, the destination of human nature can find its completion, its fulfilment, — that the true end of man consists in this very thing. Yet he says, that where Paul opposes the πνευματικός to the ψυχικός (1 Cor. 2: 14, 15,) he describes the *latter* only, and not the former, as men; — since man consists of body and soul, but the πνευματικός is more than man.[5] And this form of expression is not a mere isolated exaggeration, possessing no farther significance in relation to the fundamental principles of his theology; but it stands closely connected with that ground-tendency described by us above, by virtue of which Origen, both in theory and in practice, was inclined to regard the godlike not as the *truly* human element, but as something superhuman, — a tendency in which we recognized the reaction of a principle belonging to the old world,[6] which remained yet to be vanquished by Christianity. And connected

[1] Τὰ κάλλιστα καρποὶ λέγονται εἶναι τοῦ πνεύματος, οὐχ ὡς ἂν οἰηθείη τις, τοῦ ἁγίου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

[2] In his commentary on Romans, l. II. where Origen refers what Paul says concerning conscience to the workings of this πνεῦμα, he expresses himself, according to Jerome's translation, as follows: Quia ergo tantam ejus video libertatem, quæ in bonis quidem gestis gaudeat semper et exsultet, in malis vero non arguatur, sed ipsam animam, cui cohæret, reprehendat et arguat, arbitror, quod ipse sit spiritus, qui ab apostolo esse cum animo dicitur, velut pædagogus et quidam sociatus et rector, ut eam de melioribus moneat vel de culpis castiget et arguat. Ed. Lomm. T. VI. p. 107.

[3] Οὗ κατὰ μετοχὴν ἐπικρατοῦσαν χρηματίζει ὁ πνευματικός. In Joann. T. II. § 15.

[4] Ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἅγιος ζῇ πνεύματι, προκατάρχοντι τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ πάσης πράξεως καὶ εὐχῆς καὶ τοῦ πρὸς θεὸν ὕμνου, οὕτως πᾶν ὅ, τι ποτ' ἂν ποιῇ, ποιεῖ πνεύματι, ἀλλὰ κἂν πάσχῃ, πάσχει πνεύματι. In Joann. T. XXXII. § 11.

[5] Ἡμεῖς γὰρ οὐ μάτην αὐτόν [the Apostle Paul] φαμεν ἐπὶ τοῦ πνευματικοῦ μὴ προστεθεικέναι τὸ ἄνθρωπος, κρεῖττον γὰρ ἦ ἄνθρωπος ὁ πνευματικός, τοῦ ἤτοι ἐν ψυχῇ ἢ ἐν σώματι ἢ ἐν συναμφοτέροις χαρακτηριζομένου· οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ τούτων θειοτέρῳ πνεύματι; L. c. T. II. § 15.

[6] Thus Aristotle (Ethic. Nicomach. X. 7) places the contemplative life as the divine, answering to the godlike in man, above the practical, which he considers to be the purely human: εἰ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, and yet he says of the νοῦς: τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος.

with this severance of the πνεῦμα from the ψυχή, as the purely human element, is his doctrine, that those in whom the ψυχή surrendered itself to the guidance of the πνεῦμα, would persevere in the unity of this existence animated by the πνεῦμα, and rise in the perfected state of their essence, when thoroughly penetrated by the πνεῦμα, to a higher life after death; but those in whom the ψυχή always resisted the πνεῦμα, would after death be forsaken by the latter, which would return to God from whom it came, while they themselves, separated from the πνεῦμα, would be given up to woe;[1] — a doctrine which it is very difficult to reconcile with Origen's idea of a purifying process going on after death, and of the universal restoration as the final end of all things. For the rest, he ascribed to this πνεῦμα — as we might presume he would do, from his idea, already unfolded, respecting the relation of the rational being to God, — no autonomy, — no independent self-subsistence, but regarded it as the organ destined to receive into itself and to represent the workings of the Divine Spirit. The πνεῦμα in man can be active, according to his doctrine, only by being connected with the Divine Spirit.[2]

As Origen, then, supposed a threefold division of human nature, so he distinguished three different stages of moral development; according as the πνεῦμα, the ψυχή, or the σάρξ, predominated. The second stage, where the personal *I*, estranged from God, is uppermost, and at the same time there may be a certain dominion over sense, — where the soul follows its egoistic inclinations, — is the stage of a certain merely worldly cultivation, of an intelligent Egoism, where no enthusiasm for moral goodness impels the man, nor yet does moral evil break out into any rude expressions, — where the man, as Origen expresses it, is neither cold nor hot. This stage does, it is true, in itself considered, hold the middle place between the two others; yet it might be asked, from which point the way is easiest to attain the divine life. Origen brings up the question, whether the σαρκικός (the carnal man) might not be more easily led than the ψυχικός (the spiritual man) to conviction of sin, and thereby to true conversion.[3] Connected with this is Origen's idea, that as a wise physician will sometimes call forth the elements of disease lurking in the body, and by means of his art cause other disorders to arise, that so these elements of disease which threatened to destroy the entire organism may be expelled; so God places men in situations where the evil lurking in their nature is called forth to open activity, in order that they may be thus brought to the consciousness of their moral disorder, and of its destructive effects, and so be the more easily and radically healed.[4] In this sense, he explains the

[1] We can here cite passages only from works which have been preserved to us in Latin translations; the fidelity of which, however, on these points, we have no reason to suspect. Commentar. ep. ad Rom. l. II. c. 9, p. 108, ed. Lomm. Hic ipse spiritus est, qui cohæret animabus justorum. Si vero inobediens ei anima et contumax fuerit, dividetur ab ea post excessum. Commentar. series in Matth. c. 62, T. IV. p. 352, ed. Lomm.

[2] In Matt. T. XIII. § 2: Ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πνεῦμα, κἂν ἐν ἡμῖν ᾖ, παρὰ τὸ πνεῦμα ἑκάστου ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ; which latter he here also distinguishes from the ψυχή.

[3] Περὶ ἀρχῶν, l. III. c. 4.

[4] See de orat. c. 29, and the fragment of the commentary on Exod. c. 10: 27; in the 26th chapter of the φιλοκαλία, and in the 2d vol. ed. de la Rue, f. 111. Ὥσπερ ἐπί τινων σωματικῶν παθημάτων, εἰς βάθος τοῦ, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, κεχωρηκότος κακοῦ, ὁ ἰατρὸς εἰς τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν

scriptural expression, God hardens the heart, and others of the like import.

Regarding the self-determination of the creaturely free will as the original ground of all the diversities existing among rational beings, Origen supposed it was likewise this which conditions the whole subsequent process of purification and development, including all the stadia up to the final goal of the restoration.[1] Accordingly, it is with him an important point to define the notions of God's foreknowledge, and of predestination as contradistinguished from the doctrine of an *εἱμαρμένη*, or of an unconditional necessity. He teaches, that God arranged the plan of the universe after having taken into view all the different bents of will, and all the possibilities of which they were the condition.[2] He distinguishes, in moral evil, an objective and a subjective necessity. Although moral evil, when it once exists, must exhibit itself in certain determinate forms, yet it is not therefore necessary that this or that determinate evil should be brought about by this or that particular individual.[3]

It must be quite clear already, from the exposition of Origen's doctrine respecting the relation of the spiritual world to God, and of the spirit (*πνεῦμα*) in man to the Holy Spirit, (*πνεῦμα ἅγιον*,) how grace and free will are, in his system, made to harmonize with each other. In conformity with this, he says: "As the good thrift of husbandry requires the coming together of two factors, the husbandman's own activity and the blessing of God; so, in order to goodness in rational beings, there must be their own free will and the power of God, to uphold the good purpose.[4] But our own free will and the divine assistance are both necessary, not only to *become* good, but also in order to perseverance in virtue, when once attained; — since even the perfect man would fall, if he became proud of his goodness, and ascribed it to himself, — if he failed to give the honor which is due, to Him who bestowed on him all by which he was chiefly enabled both to attain to virtue, and to persevere in it.[5]

It may be gathered, then, from what has offered itself to our notice as the views held in common by all, in the Anthropology of this period, that not only — as was the case also among the Gnostics — the acknowledgment of a Redeemer found its point of attachment in the universally expressed need of redemption, but that also — which constituted the difference between the church and the Gnostic Anthropology — human nature was on no side supposed to be *so* beset with moral evil, as to exclude the possibility of a complete appropriation of it by the Redeemer. Hence, from the very first, the church consciousness developed itself in antagonism with Docetism under all its forms and

διά τινων φαρμάκων ἕλκει καὶ ἐπισπᾶται τὴν ὕλην, φλεγμονὰς χαλεπὰς ἐμποιῶν καὶ διοιδήσεις καί πόνους πλείονας ὧν εἴχε τις, οὕτως οἶμαι καὶ τὸν θεὸν οἰκονομεῖν τὴν κρύφιον κακίαν εἰς τὸ βάθος κεχωρηκυίαν τῆς ψυχῆς. T. VIII. p. 305, ed. Lomm.

[1] *Τὸν θεὸν ἑκάστην οἰκονομεῖν ψυχὴν, ἀφορῶντα εἰς τὴν ἀΐδιον αὐτῆς ζωὴν, ἀεὶ ἔχουσαν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον.* De orat. § 29.

[2] See the commentary on Genesis.

[3] *Ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ, ταῦτα ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη δὲ διὰ τοῦδέ τινος.* In Matth. T. XIII. § 22.

[4] *Τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ ἀγαθὸν μικτόν ἐστιν ἔκ τε τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς συμπνεούσης θείας δυνάμεως τῷ τὰ κάλλιστα προελομένῳ.*

[5] From the commentary on Ψ. IV. Philocal. c. 24. Ed. Lomm. T. XI. p. 450.

degrees. Thus this anti-Docetic tendency is strongly marked in such passages of the epistles ascribed to Ignatius, as, by their stamp of antiquity, form a decided contrast to the *prevailing* tone of these letters. It is here said of the Docetæ, in an original way: "They who would make nothing but a spectre of Christ, are themselves like spectres,— spectral men."[1] And Tertullian says to the Docetæ: "How is it, that *you* make the half of Christ a lie? He was all truth."[2] "You are offended," says he in another place,[3] "when the child is nourished and fondled in the uncleanliness of its swaddling-clothes. This reverence shown to nature you despise,— and how were you born yourself? *Christ*, at least, loved man in this condition. For his sake, he came down from above; for his sake, he submitted to every sort of degradation, to death itself. In loving man, he loved even his birth, even his flesh."

In opposition no less to Docetism, which objected to Christ in the form of a servant, which would receive only a glorified Christ, than to the esthetic Paganism, which idolized the beautiful,[4] the person of our Saviour was represented as being without form or comeliness, as that of one whose outward appearance contradicted the glory within; — a notion which was based partly on a passage in the 53d chapter of Isaiah, too literally understood, and partly on misinterpreted passages in the gospels. Tertullian says:[5] "This was the very thing which excited men's wonder as to everything else in him, when they said, Whence hath this man this wisdom and these mighty works? The exclamation comes from men who thought they might despise his form."[6]

If we here compare Tertullian with the Alexandrians, we see at once the great advantage which the former, from deriving everything solely from his own Christian consciousness, possessed over the latter, with whose notions other elements of a foreign culture had been blended. His characteristic trait was that of a vigorous, Christian realism. We have remarked already, in contemplating the Gnostic systems, what a close connection subsisted between the peculiar essence of the Christian system of morals, and the views entertained concerning the person and life of Christ. The intuition of Christ's life was destined to give birth to a new ethical standard, — from this was to proceed forth the peculiar principle of the Christian system of morals. But in those cases where the ethical principle itself was adulterated by the influence of other standards conjoined with the Christian, this corruption reacted also on the views entertained concerning the person and life of Christ; — as we have seen, indeed, in the case of the Gnostics; — and the same thing may be remarked in the case of Clement of Alexandria. Founding his judgment on that moral system which demanded an absolute estrangement from all human feelings, and which made Neo-Platonic philosophers, and other ascetics of that period, ashamed of their

[1] Αὐτοὶ τὸ δοκεῖν ὄντες ἀσώματοι καὶ δαιμονικοί. Ep. ad Smyrn. § 2.

[2] Quid dimidias mendacio Christum? Totus veritas fuit. De carne Christi, c. 5.

[3] L. c. c. 14.

[4] See vol. I. the Introduction.

[5] De carne Christi, c. 9.

[6] Nec humanæ honestatis corpus fuit, nedum cœlestis claritatis.

own bodies, he was incapable of understanding the revelation of the divine life in the purely human form, as it was presented in the person of Christ. Instead of the purely human character, he was for the superhuman. Christ was to represent the Ideal of estrangement from sense, of a life wholly independent of sense; not to be affected by sensuous impressions; by wants, as hunger and thirst, by feelings of pain, by agreeable or disagreeable sensations,—the ideal of a perfect *ἀπάθεια*. As the Logos became man, he must, in his essence, be superior to such things; and so the genuine Gnostic, in imitation of him, should strive, by the efforts of his will, to attain to a similar apathy. He says characteristically: "It would be absurd to suppose, that in the case of our Saviour, the body, as such, required the necessary services for its support; he ate, not for the body's sake, for this was preserved by a holy power."[1] Now this principle might have led him to a Docetism of his own. The contemplation of Christ, as he is presented in the gospel history, exercised, however, too great a power over him,—the historical truth was a thing of too much weight with him, to allow him to settle down on any such position as that. He would only say, that Christ was not, by any necessity of nature, subjected to those various wants and affections,—but subjected himself to them of his own free choice, out of voluntary condescension for the well-being of man;—to give a proof of the reality of his human nature, so that no room nor pretext might be left for Docetism.[2] We must, however, do Clement the justice to acknowledge, that, along with this distempered element, there was much which was sound and healthy in his ethical tendencies, as they were influenced by his contemplation of the life of Christ;[3]—as, for instance, when in another place, speaking against the ascetic contempt of the body, he says Christ would not with the health of the soul have restored that of the body also, if there ought to be any enmity between the body and the soul.[4]

With this tendency of Clement, which caused him to overlook the purely human element in Christ, the other, which led him, by his exaggerated notions of the servant-form, to imagine that Christ possessed an uncomely person, might seem to stand in direct contradiction;—and undoubtedly he never would have arrived at any such view himself; but, transmitted to him by the church tradition, he contrived to bring it into harmony with his own peculiar bent of mind and habits of thinking, by applying it in the following manner:—that, since the Godlike presents itself in this mean, uncomely shape, men should be led thereby to despise sensuous beauty, to soar by spiritual contemplation from the sensuous to the Godlike, which is exalted above all that partakes

[1] *Ἐπὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος τὸ σῶμα ἀπαιτεῖν ὡς σῶμα τὰς ἀναγκαίας ὑπηρεσίας εἰς διαμονὴν γέλως ἂν εἴη, ἔφαγεν γὰρ οὐ διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δυνάμει συνεχόμενον ἁγίᾳ.* Strom. l. VI. f. 649.

[2] Accordingly he says of Christ: *Ἅπαξ ἁπλῶς ἀπαθὴς ἦν, εἰς ὃν οὐδὲν παρεισδύεται κίνημα παθητικὸν, οὔτε ἡδονὴ οὔτε λύπη.*

[3] Compare the remarks in vol. I. p. 279, on the reaction of the Christian spirit in Clement, against a one-sided ascetic tendency.

[4] *Οὐκ ἂν δὲ, εἰ ἔχθρα ἡ σάρξ ἦν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπετείχιζεν αὐτῇ τὴν ἐχθρὰν δι ὑγιείας ἐπισκιάζων* (probably it should read, according to Hervet's emendation, *σκεπάζων*); he would not have taken the hostile *σάρξ* under his protection. Strom. l. III. f. 460.

of sense.[1] No one should be misled to admire the beautiful form, and so give less heed to the substance of Christ's discourses.[2]

This view of Christ's person, as one who appeared in the form of a servant, took a different shape with Origen, so as to harmonize with the whole connection of his system. We have stated on a former page, how his doctrine of the different stages in Christianity was connected with his idea of the different forms of manifestation of the divine Logos. The Logos becomes all things to all, in a still higher sense than that in which Paul would say this of himself; and this Origen applied also to Christ's temporal appearance. He becomes all things to all men, appears to them in different forms, suited to their recipiency. To some he reveals himself in his glory, in a celestial light which spreads from himself to his word; so that now, for the first time, after having come to the knowledge of Christ himself in this higher way, they can understand it in the plenitude of its meaning, — nay, in a light which reflects itself back even on the Old Testament, which now becomes transfigured in its relation to Christ become known in his glory. To others he appears only in the form of a servant, as one without form and comeliness, — namely, to those who are unable to elevate themselves, beyond the temporal appearance, to the contemplation of the Logos revealing himself in it.[3] Accordingly, the Christ of the transfiguration and the Christ without form or comeliness, as men were used to represent him, would be nothing other than designations of two different ways — depending on the recipiency of the subject — of contemplating one and the same Christ, whom all were not in a condition to know in his divine exaltation. Thus to him it must have appeared necessary that the mass of believers should frame to themselves the conception of Christ, as of one who appeared without form or comeliness. Their whole view of Christ and Christianity, which, at the position they occupied, could be none other than it was, reflected itself under this particular form. And accordingly he could have considered the transfiguration of Christ in no other light than as a symbol of that higher form of beholding, in which Christ presented himself to his more advanced disciples.[4] But if he regarded particular facts as symbols of universal ideas, or of a general stadium in the evolution of the spiritual life, yet he by no means denied, in so doing, the objective reality of such facts, which at the same

[1] The words of Clement respecting Christ are: *Ἐν σαρκὶ μὲν ἀειδὴς* (as the reading, beyond all doubt, should be, as may be gathered from the following context, and from the allusion to Isa. 53 : 2) *διελήλυθεν καὶ ἄμορφος, εἰς τὸ ἀειδὲς καὶ ἀσώματον τῆς θείας αἰτίας ἀποβλέπειν ἡμᾶς διδάσκων.* Strom. l. III. f. 470.

[2] *Οὐ μάτην ἠθέλησεν εὐτελεῖ χρήσασθαι σώματος μορφῇ, ἵνα μή τις τὸ ὡραῖον ἐπαινῶν καὶ τὸ κάλλος θαυμάζων, ἀφίστηται τῶν λεγομένων καὶ τοῖς καταλειπομένοις* (this latter word offers here no good sense. It can neither mean, — *what should be left behind*, nor *what has been left behind*. I have scarcely a doubt that the correct reading is *καταβλεπομένοις*. Moreover, the composition with *κατα* has a force in this connection — the looking downward to the object of sense, instead of upward — *ἄνω βλέπειν πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ*) *προσανέχων, ἀποτέμνηται τῶν νοητῶν.* Strom. l. VI. f. 690.

[3] *Ὁ σωτὴρ μᾶλλον Παύλου τοῖς πᾶσι πάντα γενόμενος, ἵνα τοὺς πάντας κερδήσῃ.* In Joann. T. XX. § 28; and, in respect to the *two-fold μορφή* in which Christ appeared, in Matt. T. XII. § 37.

[4] See c. Cels. l. IV. c. 16, where he says of those who received the account of Christ's transfiguration too literally and sensuously; *Μὴ νοήσαντες τὰς ὡς ἐν ἱστορίαις λεγομένας μεταβολὰς ἢ μεταμορφώσεις τοῦ Ἰησοῦ.*

time answered to a more universal idea; — and accordingly that more general view of the transfiguration of Christ in no wise precluded its historical reality. As Origen was prone to explain away the objective into the subjective, so, on the other hand, was he inclined to represent the subjective as something objective, — of which we have seen many examples. And thus it happened, that the profound idea of the necessarily manifold gradations in the views entertained of Christ, were objectively represented by him, as so many different forms which Christ assumed in relation to the different positions held by the men with whom he had intercourse. As the manifoldness of the forms of revelation (*μορφαί*) in which he presents himself to the spiritual world, belongs to the essential character of the Logos, so Christ mirrored forth, in this respect also, the activity of the Logos himself in his own temporal appearance. It pertains to his peculiar and essential character, that he had no unchangeable, determinate form; but appeared, according to the different characters of men, to some in the lower form of a servant; — to others, divested of this form, and in a shape of light, in affinity with his godlike nature. Thus Origen explained to himself the fact of the transfiguration, and several other appearances in the gospel history.[1] The whole view was closely connected with his notions of the stuff lying at the ground of the corporeal world, as something indeterminate, and which could run through various metamorphoses from the higher to the lower.[2]

The complete victory over Docetism implied the complete recognition of the purely human nature in Christ; and this could not be separated from the supposition that he possessed a human soul. Yet this particular point did not immediately stand forth clearly developed in the dogmatic consciousness. In the first place it was only the two conceptions, the *λόγος* in his essential divinity, and the *σάρξ*, from which all the human characteristics proceeded, which were clearly separated and distinguished. True, men must necessarily have been driven, if they were disposed to carry through the identity in Christ's person with the human nature, to ascribe to him a soul, also, with human feelings; but still all this, as we see in the example of Irenæus, was referred back simply to the *σάρξ*, the flesh taken from the earth.[3] Although this same father says, that Christ gave his own body for our body, and his own *ψυχή* for our *ψυχή*; and we are constrained, in this distinction, to

[1] c. Cels. l. VI. c. 77: Τὸ *παραλλάττον τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὁρῶσι δυνατὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χρήσιμον, τοιοῦτο φανόμενον, ὁποῖον ἔδει ἑκάστῳ βλέπεισθαι.* This is applied to the transfiguration, of which he directly says: *Ἔχει τι καὶ μυστικὸν ὁ λόγος, ἀπαγγέλλων τὰς τοῦ Ἰησοῦ διαφόρους μορφὰς ἀναφέρεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ θείου λόγου φύσιν*, in the sense already expounded. In perfect harmony with this is the passage which has been preserved to us only in the Latin translation: Quoniam non solum duæ formæ in eo fuerunt, una quidem, secundum quam omnes eum videbant, altera autem secundum quam transfiguratus est coram discipulis in monte, sed etiam unicuique apparebat secundum quod fuerat dignus. Commentar. Series in Matth. § 100. Ed. Lomm. T. IV. p. 446.

[2] *Οὐ θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσει τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ πάσης ποιότητος, ἣν ὁ τεχνίτης βούλεται δεκτικὴν ὁτὲ μὲν ἔχειν ποιότητα, καθ' ἣν λέγεται τὸ· οὐκ εἶχεν εἶδος οὐδὲ κάλλος, ὁτὲ δὲ οὕτως ἔνδοξον καὶ καταπληκτικὴν καὶ θαυμαστὴν, ὡς ἐπὶ πρόσωπον πεσεῖν τοὺς θεατάς.* c. Cels. l. VI. § 77.

[3] The emotions excited at the approach of death are classed under the *σύμβολα σαρκὸς τῆς ἀπὸ γῆς εἰλημμένης.* Lib. III. c. 22

understand by the term ψυχή, not life, but the soul;[1] yet he at least makes no farther use of this distinction, in other cases, where he speaks of Christ as man. Justin seems to have applied the common trichotomy of man's nature to Christ, with the following modification: Christ, as the God-man, consisted, like every other man, of three parts; the body, the animal soul, (the lower principle of life,) and the thinking reason; but with this difference, that in him the place of the fallible human reason, which is but a ray of the divine reason, of the λόγος,[2] was represented by the universal divine reason,[3] by the λόγος itself:[4] hence it was in Christianity alone that the universal revelation of religious truth, a revelation not disturbed by partial, one-sided representation, would be given.[5]

Tertullian was the first to express distinctly and clearly the doctrine, that Christ possessed a proper human soul; having been led to this by the views which he entertained in general concerning the relation of the soul to the body, and by the tendency of his controversial writings, relating to the doctrine of the person of Christ in particular. He did not hold, like others, to the three parts of human nature mentioned above, but supposed it to consist of only two parts. He affirmed that it was not a mere animal soul, distinct from the reasonable soul in man, which was to be considered as the animating principle of the body; but that, in all living things, there is but one animating essence, although this, in the human nature, is endued with superior powers; that the thinking soul itself, therefore, is the animating principle of the human body.[6] If Tertullian, then, conceived of but *one* soul, as the medium between the divine Logos and the body of Christ, he must necessarily have conceived of it as a reasonable human soul in the proper sense. Again, he was engaged in controversy with a Valentinian sect, who taught that Christ, instead of veiling his soul in a gross material body, so modified the ψυχή itself that it could, like the body, be visible to men under the dominion of sense. Against these he maintained, that it was necessary to distinguish, in the person of Christ, as in the case of every man, soul and body, and what belongs to both; that Christ, in order to redeem men, was under the necessity of uniting to himself a soul of that kind which belongs peculiarly to man; — and so much the more, as the soul constitutes man's proper essence.[7]

But still greater than the influence of Tertullian was that of the systematizing intellect and the conciliatory, apologetic bent of Origen, in

[1] See the words of Irenæus, l. V. c. 1. § 1: Τῷ ἰδίῳ αἵματι λυτρωσαμένου ἡμᾶς τοῦ κυρίου καὶ δόντος τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν καὶ τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀντὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων σαρκῶν. As the thought here is, that Christ surrendered to Satan — who claimed a power over man's soul and body — his own body, as a ransom for the men whom he held captive, the word here can hardly be understood otherwise than of the human soul.

[2] The σπέρμα λογικόν, the λόγος σπερματικός, the λόγος κατὰ μέρος.

[3] Λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον.

[4] Apolog. II. § 10. One might be led to suspect, however, that the words, καὶ σῶμα καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχήν, are the interpolation of a some later hand, who would make Justin orthodox on this article, since this precise definition occurs in Justin's writings nowhere else, and stands here not exactly in its proper place. But we must admit, that the first reason is of little force, and the second of none at all in the case of such a writer as Justin.

[5] Justin is, in time, before Apollinaris.

[6] De anima, c. 12.

[7] De carne Christi, c. 11, and onwards.

unfolding and establishing this doctrine in the church system of faith. He did not proceed here upon speculative principles, but upon an analogy drawn from the Christian consciousness. As the divine life in believers leads back to Christ as its original source, he endeavored to illustrate the union of the Logos with the human nature in Christ by the analogy of the union between Christ and believers. If believers, as Paul says, become of one spirit with the Lord, this is in a far higher sense the case with *that* soul which the Logos had taken into indissoluble union with himself. According to the theory of Origen, it is in truth the soul's original destination to surrender itself wholly to the Logos, and, by virtue of its communion with him, to live wholly in the divine element. Now that which, in the case of other souls, is found to be true only in the highest moments of the inner life, — namely, that they pass wholly into union with the divine Logos, lose themselves completely in the intuition of God, — was in the case of that soul a continuous and uninterrupted act, so that its entire life rose to the communion with the Logos: — it became wholly transformed into a divine being.[1]

As Origen, again, distinguished, in every man,[2] the spirit (πνεῦμα) from the soul (ψυχή) in the more limited sense of the word, so too he applied this distinction to the human nature of Christ.[3] Human nature in general attains to a moral perfection just in proportion as everything in it is determined by the spiritual principle (the πνεῦμα); but this has been completely and perfectly realized only by Christ. "If this is so in the case of every holy man, how much more must we affirm it of Jesus, the forerunner and pattern of all saints, in whose case, when he assumed the entire human nature, the πνεῦμα was the moving spring of all the rest of the man![4]

But, as we have said, it was a leading point in the system of Origen, that in the spiritual world everything depends on the moral bent of the will. To this general law in the divine order of the world, he could not allow that this highest dignity to which any soul had attained, formed any exception. That soul had merited, by the true bent of its will, by the love whereby it had remained constantly united with the divine Logos, to become, in the manner above described, wholly one with him, wholly divine.[5] He explained the words in Ps. 45: 5, as referring to such a fusion of this soul with the Logos, deserved by its bent of will.

But here arises a question of some importance in its bearing on the

[1] Οὐ μόνον κοινωνία ἀλλ' ἕνωσις καὶ ἀνάκρασις, τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος κεκοινωνηκέναι, εἰς θεὸν μεταβεβηκέναι.

[2] See above.

[3] See above.

[4] In Joann. T. XXXII. § 11: Οὐ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῷ ἀνειληφέναι αὐτὸν ὅλον ἄνθρωπον τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ διέσεισε τὰ λοιπὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπινα. A dogmatico-ethical remark; but which Origen — as often happens with him, in introducing his own doctrinal and speculative distinctions into the scriptures — would base upon a text, from which, according to the verbal sense, the remark is altogether foreign; viz. the "ἐταράχθη τῷ πνεύματι." John 13: 21.

[5] Π. ἀρχ. l. II. c. 6. c. Cels. l. II. c. 9; l. III. c. 41. In Joann. T. I. §. 30; T. XIX. § 5, where he says, quite in the Platonic manner: Ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐμπολιτευομένη τῷ ὅλῳ κόσμῳ ἐκείνῳ — the κόσμος νοητὸς, τῶν ἰδέων, synonymous with the νοῦς or the λόγος itself — καὶ πάντα αὐτὸν ἐμπεριερχομένη καὶ χειραγωγούσα ἐπ' αὐτὸν τοὺς μαθητευομένους. In Joann. T. XX. § 17; T. III. opp. ed. de la Rue, f. 226. In Matth. f. 344 et 423; T. XIII. § 26; T. XVI. § 8. Commentar. ep. ad. Rom. lib. I. T. V. p. 250, ed Lomm. In Jerem. Hom. XV. § 6.

system of Origen. Had the intelligence which was taken into such indissoluble fellowship with the Logos, been affected by the general defection and fall of the creature; and did it differ from all the intelligences which had in some way departed from that original unity, only by the circumstance that, in surrendering itself to the divine Logos, the universal Redeemer, it had become not only freed from all the consequences of that defection, but elevated to a still higher unity with God than it possessed before, a unity which precluded the possibility of any future separation? Or did this intelligence have no part whatever in the defection of the others? Was it secured against this defection by the steadfast perseverance of its fellowship with the Logos; and by the same means did the divine life, which it first received into itself by the bent of its will, pass wholly into its essence? If the latter is assumed to be according to the spirit and sense of Origen, an important consequence would follow in relation to his principle of creaturely mutability. It would be evident, that he did not hold the defection from the original unity to be an absolutely necessary transition-link in all creaturely development; for at least the example of this *one* intelligence would be evidence to the contrary.

Now when we reflect, that, according to Origen's theory, the νοῦς became ψυχή first by the fall, we see no reason, especially as he is careful to distinguish, even in Christ, between the πνεῦμα and the ψυχή, why we are not warranted, according to his theory, to apply this principle also to the soul which, by its steadfast bent of will, had attained to that indissoluble union with the Logos. We must suppose, then, that as the spirit first became soul by its defection from the original unity, and the end of the recovery is that the souls, returning back to the original unity, should once more become divested of their psychical being and thoroughly penetrated with the pure life of the spirit,[1] — so this particular soul had, before all others, and in a higher manner than all others, already attained to this end, and *hence* would become the mediatory instrument of conducting all other fallen souls to the same end. But it is nevertheless impossible to retain this view of the matter, consistently with the sense and spirit of Origen. For in this case it would all along be presupposed, that what in Christ is denominated a soul, is not a soul in the proper sense. We must all along assume, that the soul in Christ, which had returned back to the pure being of the νοῦς, had made itself like to the fallen souls, only in order to their recovery, — had appropriated to itself an outward veil of psychical being, and entered into the contracted sphere and divided being of the psychical life, for the purpose of conducting it back again to that higher unity. And in truth we might find some confirmation of this view in the language of Origen.[2] But when we have once assumed the necessity of such a pro-

[1] Οὐκέτι μένει ψυχὴ ἡ σωθεῖσα ψυχή. — ἔσται, ὅτε οὐκ ἔσται ψυχή. De princip. l. II. c. 8, § 3. So he says, as an encouragement to martyrdom: Εἰ θέλομεν ἡμῶν σῶσαι τὴν ψυχήν, ἵνα αὐτὴν ἀπολάβωμεν κρείττονα ψυχῆς, μαρτυρίῳ ἀπολέσωμεν αὐτήν. Ad Martyr. § 12.

[2] Τάχα γὰρ ἡ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ψυχὴ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῆς τυγχάνουσα τελειότητι ἐν θεῷ καὶ τῷ πληρώματι ἦν ἐκεῖθεν ἐξεληλυθυῖα, τῷ ἀπεστάλθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀνέλαβε τὸ ἐκ τῆς Μαρίας σῶμα. In Joann. T. XX. § 18.

cedure in the case of the soul of Christ, which had returned back to the pure life of the spirit, the reason grounded in the connection of Origen's ideas immediately disappears, which compelled us to suppose that the intelligence which the Logos had received into such a fellowship with himself, must also have shared in the general defection of the creature. It is evident now, that Origen might have so conceived the matter, as to suppose this intelligence to be one which from the beginning had not become a soul by falling, but which had only assimilated itself to the fallen souls by a voluntary humiliation. We should thus be forced to the other view, which in many respects would better harmonize with the system of Origen. It would now be quite consistent that this intelligence, which had ever persevered in the original unity, should, on this very account, deserve to be appropriated by the Logos, as an organ indissolubly united with himself, for the purpose of extending the redemption, which it did not need itself, to other beings who were in need of it. This view is confirmed when we find Origen distinguishing this intelligence above all others, as one which from the beginning of the creation had ever remained inseparably united with the Logos,[1] — where, to be sure, we must understand by the creation, the original one, and not that which was first occasioned by the fall. Accordingly, he could designate this spirit as one which, free from all contact with the corporeal world, ever lived in the contemplation of the intelligible world, (the *κόσμος νοητός*,) the latter being identical with the Logos;[2] for with the defection from the original unity, is also supposed, according to Origen's doctrine, some contact or other with the corporeal world. Thus Christ might be said to be without sin, in a sense in which no other creature could, since that intelligence had never been touched by evil.[3] Although, by virtue of the creaturely mutable will, it was, like all others, subject to be tempted to evil, yet since it stood this test where the others fell, it attained, by its unalterable submission to the Logos, to a divine life exalted above all temptation to evil; and what was originally the work of its free will, now became a second nature.[4] Yet Origen, in saying this, meant by no means to assert, that the soul, when arrived at such an immutable state of the divine life, dispensed with the free will belonging to its own essence; for so indeed, as must certainly have been his opinion on the principles he held, this essence would itself be annihilated. He as-

[1] Ab initio creaturæ et deinceps inseparabiliter ei inhærens. De princip. l. II. c. 5. § 3.

[2] In Joann. T. XIX. § 5; ed Lomm. T. II. p. 188.

[3] In Joann. T. XX. § 25.

[4] Quod in arbitrio erat positum, longi usus affectu jam versum in naturam. De principiis, l. II. c. 5, § 5. We may now refer also to those words of Origen, in which he expressly guards against a conclusion which possibly might be drawn from his doctrine; viz. that every rational creature *must necessarily*, at *some time* or other, succumb to the temptation to sin. Sed non continuo, quia dicimus, nullam esse creaturam, quæ non *possit* recipere malum, idcirco confirmamur, omnem naturam *recepisse* malum, id est malam effectam. L. c. l. I. c. 8, § 3. As the translation of Rufinus cannot be perfectly relied on, we should not venture to make use of these words, to determine what was the opinion of Origen, unless what we would prove from them might be gathered also from his general train and connection of thought, as it has been shown in the text that it may. But in order to make every thing in Origen harmonize, we must suppose also, that he did not always use the *ψυχή* in the same sense, but sometimes in a more general sense, to denote the spirit or intelligence generally, and sometimes in a more limited sense, in contradistinction to *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα*.

cribed to this soul, even after the incarnation of Christ, a self-determining power,[1] — though persisting in union with the πνεῦμα, and thereby with the Logos. But here, if we examine into the connection of his ideas, the question will come up, how, supposing he conceived this soul to be one which had already attained to such perfection, he could still admit of any human development in Christ, in his earthly existence — how this in his case would be anything else than a mere appearance. And yet he believed he could fully receive the entire narrative in Luke 2: 40, relating to the progressive development of the child Jesus; and he considered this progress as having its ground in the free will of Christ.[2] But there was a similar difficulty, according to Origen's doctrine, with regard to the earlier, conscious, personal existence of the soul generally, in the case of *every human* development.

We have to mention one other particular point, in which the connection between Origen's doctrine concerning man, and his doctrine concerning Christ, is very clearly exhibited. Holding it as a general principle, that the character of the instrument or organ given it as a body, corresponded exactly to the work of each soul, which stamped on it the form and pressure of its own peculiar essence, he applied the same principle to the relation between the body and soul of Christ. The most exalted of all souls was veiled in the most glorious of all bodies; — only this glory was, during its earthly existence, still hidden,— broke forth on such individuals as were capable of receiving it only at individual moments,— fore-tokening what should one day appear. By virtue of Christ's exaltation to heaven, this body, — a thought perfectly harmonizing with Origen's doctrine of matter, already described as an element in itself undetermined and capable of endless modification of form, — this body is now freed from all the defects and limitations of the earthly existence, transfigured to an ethereal character, more nearly akin to the essence of the Spirit and of the divine life.[3]

By this exposition of Origen's theory, *one* difficulty which must have struck reflecting minds in considering the doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos, though many never became conscious of it, was removed; — the difficulty, to wit, of conceiving how the divine Logos could become united with a human body; how the purely human nature could be transferred to him. This difficulty now vanished, since it was assumed, that the Logos did not directly appropriate to himself the body, but that he appropriated to himself the soul as his natural organ. Thus it was made possible, also, to conceive of everything that belongs to human nature existing in Christ unalloyed. But, in place of the former, another difficulty now arose; — namely, to conceive how the unity of Christ's person and life could be maintained, in this combination with a human soul persevering in its own individuality. We have seen in what way Origen supposed that it was possible to surmount this diffi-

[1] By the ἐφ' ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς. In Matth. T. XIII. § 26; ed. Lomm. p 257.

[2] L. c.: Ὡς γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ ἦν ἡ ἐν σοφίᾳ προκοπὴ καὶ χάριτι, οὕτως καὶ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ. By which last, Origen means the ἡλικία πνευματική.

[3] See c. Cels. l. I. c. 32; l. II. c. 23; l. III. c. 42; l. IV. c. 15; l. VI. c. 75, et seqq. On the ubiquity of the glorified body of Christ, see in Matth. T. IV. f. 887, ed. de la Rue.

culty also. Yet this view of the matter seems to have given umbrage to many, and he drew upon himself the accusation from such persons, that, like many of the Gnostics, he distinguished from each other a superior and an inferior Christ, or *a Jesus* and *a Christ;* or that he represented Jesus as a mere man, who differed from other men only in possessing a higher degree of fellowship with the Logos, and therefore only in degree.[1] Thus we see here, also, the germ of a controversy which reached into the following period.

As it regards the work of Christ as the Redeemer of mankind, we find already in the language used by the church fathers on this point, in the period under consideration, all the elements which lie at the basis of the doctrine as it afterwards came to be defined in the church — elements grounded in the Christian consciousness itself, and indicating how Christ manifested himself to the religious feelings and to the intuitions thence resulting, as a deliverer from sin and its consequences, a restorer of harmony in the moral order of the universe, a bestower of divine life to human nature. But on this point no antagonisms were as yet presented, by which men would be constrained to distinguish and separate more accurately what lay in their conceptions. We hear, for the most part, only the language of immediate religious feeling and intuition; and hence, in comparing the expressions of these church-teachers with the later doctrines of the church, men were liable to err on both sides, in ascribing to them more, and in finding in them less, than they really contained.

The doctrine of redemption has a negative and a positive moment: the former relates to the removing of the disturbance introduced into the moral order of the universe, the raising-up of humanity out of its schism with God;—the second, to the glorifying or rendering godlike of human nature when delivered from this schism. As it respects the first, there was here presented in particular a certain peculiarity in the mode of thinking, which, as we see it expressed under different modifications in men of the most diverse principles and tendencies, — in a Marcion, an Irenæus, and an Origen, — we may consider as a more general expression of the Christian consciousness of this period. It is this idea: Satan hitherto ruled mankind, over whom he had acquired a certain right, because the first man fell under the temptation to sin, and was thereby brought under servitude to the evil one. God did not deprive him of this right by force, but caused him to lose it in a way strictly conformable to law. Satan attempted to exercise the same power which he had thus far exercised over mankind, on Christ, a perfectly holy being, meaning to treat him like the others, as a man in all respects the same with them; but here his power was baffled, and he must find himself overmatched. Christ, being perfectly holy, could not remain subject to the death which Satan, by means of sin, had brought on mankind. By him, the repre-

[1] See the Apology of Pamphilus in behalf of Origen, T. IV. f. 35, and several of the passages above cited, in reference to his doctrine on the union of the Logos with the soul in Christ, — in which passages he considers it necessary to guard against any such misinterpretation of his doctrine; as, for instance, in Matth. T. XVI. § 8, towards the end, where he adds: Πλὴν σήμερον οὐ λύω τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ

sentative of human nature, the latter has been delivered, on grounds of reason and justice, from the dominion of Satan — he has no more claims upon it.[1] Marcion simply transferred, as we have seen above, that which in the church view of the matter was true of Satan, to the Demiurge. At the bottom of this whole theory, lies the idea of a real objective might, which the ungodly principle in humanity, that had made itself a slave to that power, had acquired, and of a real, objective overcoming of this might, the redemption, as a legal process in the history of the world, corresponding to the requisitions of the moral order of the universe. We ought here surely to distinguish the inadequate form, in which the idea at bottom has enveloped itself, from this idea itself.

Combined with this negative moment, we find in Irenæus the positive one, in which the original picture of humanity is represented in a perfectly holy life, and in the communication to it of a divine life, which should sanctify and refine it in all the stages of its development. His ideas, dispersed through his writings, amount, when we bring them together, to what follows: "Only the Word of the Father himself could declare to us the Father; and we could not learn from him, unless the teacher himself had appeared among us. Man must become used to receive God into himself, God must become used to dwell in humanity. The Mediator betwixt both must once more restore the union between both, by his relationship to both; he must pass through every age, in order to sanctify every age, in order to restore the perfect likeness with God, which is perfect holiness.[2] In a human nature which was like to that burdened with sin, he condemned sin, and then banished it, as a thing condemned, out of human nature, Rom. 8: 3; but he required men to become like him. Men were the prisoners of the evil one, of Satan; Christ gave himself a ransom for the prisoners. Sin reigned over us, who belonged to God; God delivered us, not by force, but in a way of justice, inasmuch as he redeemed those who were his own. If he had not, as man, overcome the adversary of man; if the enemy had not been overcome in the way of justice; and, on the other hand, if he had not, as God, bestowed the gift of salvation, we should not have that gift in a way which is secure. And if man did not become united with God, he could have no share in an imperishable life.[3] It was through the obedience of one man that many must become justified, and obtain salvation; for eternal life is the fruit of justice. The import of the declaration, that man is created in the image of God, had hitherto not been clear,[4] for the Logos was as yet invisible. Hence man, too, easily

[1] This is what Irenæus refers to, when he says (l. V. c. 1): Rationabiliter redimens nos, redemptionem semetipsum dedit pro his, qui in captivitatem ducti sunt. Et, quoniam injuste dominabatur nobis apostasia, et, cum natura essemus Dei omnipotentis, alienavit nos contra naturam, suos proprios faciens discipulos, potens in omnibus Dei verbum et non deficiens in sua justitia, juste etiam adversus ipsam conversus est apostasiam; non cum vi, sed secundum suadelam, quemadmodum illa initio dominabatur nostri; sed secundum suadelam, quemadmodum decebat Deum suadentem, et non vim inferentem, accipere quæ vellet, ut neque quod justum est confringeretur, neque antiqua plasmatio Dei depereret.

[2] See the remarks on a former page respecting the relation of the *εἰκών* to the *ὁμοίωσις τοῦ θεοῦ*.

[3] The communication of a divine life to mankind through Christ, the *ἕνωσις πρὸς ἀφθαρσίαν*.

[4] Two ideas are here to be taken together:

lost his likeness with God. But when the Logos became man, he set the seal to both. He truly revealed that image, by becoming, himself, that which was his image; and he exhibited incontestably the likeness of man to God, by making man like to God, who is invisible."[1]

In Irenæus, the sufferings of Christ are represented as having a necessary connection with the rightful deliverance of man from the power of Satan. The divine justice is here displayed, in allowing even Satan to have his due. Of satisfaction done by the sufferings of Christ to the divine justice, as yet not the slightest mention is to be found; but doubtless there is lying at bottom the idea of a perfect fulfilment of the law by Christ; of his perfect obedience to the holiness of God in its claims to satisfaction due to it from mankind. But in Justin Martyr may be recognized the idea of a satisfaction rendered by Christ through suffering, — at least lying at the bottom, if it is not clearly unfolded and held fast in the form of conscious thought; for Justin says:[2] "The law pronounced on all men the curse, because no man could fulfil it, in its whole extent (Deut. 27 : 26). Christ delivered us from this curse, in bearing it for us." His train of thought here can be no other than this: Crucifixion denotes curse, condemnation: nothing of that sort could touch Christ, the Son of God, the Holy One: in reference to himself, this was only in appearance.[3] The significancy of this curse related to mankind, who were guilty of violating the law, and hence involved in condemnation. Christ, in suffering, took this condemnation resting on mankind, upon himself, in order to free mankind from it. The *for*, in this case, passes naturally over to the *instead*. The author of the *letter to Diognetus* thus brings together the active and the passive satisfaction, yet with predominant reference to the former, when he reduces the whole to the love of God, which in itself required no reconciliation, and was itself the author of the reconciliation: "God, the Lord and Creator of the universe, is not only full of love to man, but full of long-suffering. Such he ever was and is, and such he will ever continue to be; — supremely kind, without anger, true, the alone good. He conceived a vast and ineffable counsel, which he communicated to none but his Son. So long as he reserved this as a hidden counsel in his own mind, he seemed to have no concern for us. He left us, during the ages past, to follow our lusts at will, not as though he could have any pleasure at all in our sins, but in order that we, having in the course of that time, by our own works, proved ourselves unworthy of life, might be made worthy by the grace of God; and that we, having shown our own inability to enter into the kingdom of God, might be enabled to do so by the power of God. But when the measure of our sins had become full, and it had been made

one, which we find already in Philo, that man, as the image of God, was created after the image of the Logos; the other, that God designed to represent in the person of the God-man, as the original type of humanity, the ideal of the entire human nature. Limus ille jam tum imaginem induens Christi futuri in carne, non tantum Dei opus, sed et pignus filii, qui homo futurus *certior* et *verior*. Tertull. de carne Christi, c. 6; adv. Praxeam, c. 12.

[1] Vid. Iren. l. III. c. 20, Massuet (according to others, 22); l. III. c. 18 (20), 31; l. V c. 16.

[2] Dial. c. Tryph. Jud. c. 30, f. 322. Ed. Col

[3] Δοκοῦσα κατάρα. f. 317

perfectly manifest that punishment and death were ready to be our reward, he neither hated us nor spurned us, but showed us his long-suffering. He even took upon himself our sins, he even gave his own Son a ransom for us, the Holy One for sin; for what else would cover our sins but his righteousness?"

According to the connection of ideas which has just been exhibited as peculiar to Origen, the highest end of the earthly appearance and ministry of Christ is to *represent* that divine activity of the Logos, which, without being confined to any limits of time or space, aims to purify and restore fallen beings. Accordingly, all his actions possess a higher symbolical import, to master which is the great problem of the Gnosis; but thereby, as is shown in the case of his miracles, the saving effect which they are calculated of themselves to produce, is by no means excluded; and in this way he could also appropriate to himself what was contained in the consciousness of all Christians, relative to the redeeming sufferings of Christ. We find here a great deal which he could not have been led to adopt by the general ideas of his system, unless he had been first led to such a conviction in some other way, independent of his system. To speak of a feeling of sin, a sense of being forsaken of God, in the case of the soul of Christ, which he regarded as perfectly holy, exalted above all contact with evil, is what he could find no ground or reason for in the speculative ideas of his system. But in many of the facts of the gospel history he came to perceive such a connection between Christ and the whole spiritual life of humanity estranged from God, by virtue of which connection Christ felt its trespass as his own, — and what no conception could grasp, he was enabled to construe to himself by an intuition springing out of the inmost depth of his being. Thus could he affirm of Christ, that which is intelligible only to him who is at home in, and familiar with, the world of Christian consciousness: "He bore in himself our infirmities, and carried our sorrows; the infirmities of the soul, and the sorrows of the inner man; on account of which sorrows and infirmities, which he bore away from us, he says that his soul is troubled and full of anguish;"[1] and in another place: "This man, the purest among all creatures, died for mankind; he who took on himself our sins and infirmities, because he could take on himself and destroy the sins of the whole world."[2]

Origen believed that by a hidden law, pertaining to the moral order of the universe, the self-sacrifice of a perfectly holy being must serve to cripple the power of evil, and to free therefrom the beings subjected to it. He found proof of this in the prevailing belief of mankind, that innocent individuals, by a voluntary sacrifice of themselves, had saved whole populations and cities from threatening calamities.[3] It was not to God, but to Satan, that the ransom for those held in captivity by him was paid; according to the prevailing views of this period,

[1] With reference to Isa. 53: 4, 5. *Αὐτὸς βάστασε ἀσθενείας τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ νόσους τὰς τοῦ κρυπτοῦ τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου, ὑφ' ἃς ἀσθενείας καὶ νόσους βαστάσας αὐτὰς ἀφ' ἡμῶν περίλυπον ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμολογεῖ καὶ τεταραγμένην.* In Joann. T. II. § 21.

[2] L. c. T. XXVIII. § 14.

[3] L. c. T. VI. § 34; T. XXVIII. § 14

which have been already explained. In lighting upon this holy soul, which could not be held in the bonds of death, the power of Satan must necessarily be broken.[1]

The peculiar manner of Christ's death serves to satisfy him, that it proceeded from an act wholly voluntary. He died at the precise point of time when he chose to die, not succumbing to an outward force, like those whose limbs were broken. From this circumstance, he endeavors to explain the unusual suddenness of his death.[2]

A necessary connection between redemption and sanctification was involved in the whole Christian mode of contemplating the work of redemption, and the nature of the union with Christ. We need only make clear to ourselves the relation of the conceptions which here grew out of the Christian consciousness, to perceive that this was so.

Godlike life and a holy life,— these were inseparable notions at the Christian point of view. Both were comprehended in one in the notion of *ἀφθαρσία*, immortal life. Now the Logos was regarded as the source of this life; Christ, as the appearance of the Logos in humanity; as the Mediator of this higher life to human nature; as the one through whom, in every stage of its development, it became pervaded and rendered holy by such a divine life. By the faith in Christ, by baptism, each individual became incorporated into the fellowship with Christ, and consequently penetrated by this divine life, the principle of holiness. Christ was understood to be the destroyer of Satan's kingdom, and to this kingdom was reckoned everything partaking of the nature of sin. It was by becoming united to Christ through faith, that each was bound to make this triumph of Christ over Satan's kingdom his own. Hence the Christian was converted from a miles Satanæ into a miles Christi.[3] Moreover, the idea of the universal priesthood of all Christians had its root in this conviction.

We may here introduce a few examples, to illustrate how some of the church-teachers conceived this connection between redemption and sanctification, faith and life. Clement, bishop of Rome, after having emphatically borne his testimony to the truth, that no man can be justified by his own righteousness and his own works, but that every man must be justified by the grace of God and by faith alone, goes on to say: — "What are we to do, then, my brethren? Shall we be weary in well-doing, and leave off charity? The Lord forbid that this should ever be done by us; but let us, with unremitted zeal, strive to accomplish all the good we can; for the Creator and Lord of all takes pleasure in his own works."[4] The author of the letter to Diognet remarks, after the beautiful passage above cited concerning the redemption: "With what joy wilt thou be filled, when thou hast come to the knowledge of this; and how wilt thou love Him who so much earlier loved

[1] *Τίνι ἔδωκε τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν; οὐ δὴ τῷ θεῷ· μήτι οὖν τῷ πονηρῷ; οὗτος γὰρ ἐκράτει ἡμῶν, ἕως δοθῇ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῷ λύτρον, ἡ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ψυχὴ, ἁπατηθέντι, ὡς δυναμένῳ αὐτῆς κυριεῦσαι, καὶ οὐχ ὁρῶντι ὅτι οὐ φέρει τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ κατέχειν αὐτὴν βίσανον.* In Matth. T. XVI. § 8.

[2] *Ὡς βασιλέως καταλιπόντος τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐνεργήσαντος μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐξουσίας.* In Joann. T. XIX. § 4; ed. Lomm. T. II. p. 172. In Matth. Lat. ed. Lomm. T. IV. p. 73, et seqq.

[3] See vol. I. p. 309.

[4] Vid. ep. I. ad Corinth. § 32. 33.

thee! But if thou lovest him, thou wilt be an imitator of his goodness." Irenæus thus draws the contrast between that voluntary obedience which flows from faith, and the slavish obedience under the law: "The law, which was given to bondmen, disciplined the soul by means of outward and sensible things, dragging it, as it were, with chains to the obedience of its commands; but the Word, which sets us free, inculcated a voluntary cleansing of the soul, and thereby of the body. After this has been done, the chains of bondage, to which man had become inured, must indeed be removed, and he must follow God without chains. But the requisitions of freedom must extend all the further, and obedience to the King must become a fuller obedience; so that no one should turn back again, and prove himself unworthy of his Deliverer; for he has not freed us that we might go away from him; since no one that forsakes the fountain of all good, which is with the Lord, can by himself find the food of salvation; but he has freed us for this, that the more we have obtained, the more we might love him. To follow the Saviour is the same as to partake of salvation, and to follow the light is the same as to partake of the light." [1]

But as the confounding of the Jewish with the Christian point of view, and the consequent outward and material way of conceiving spiritual things, was found to be the main cause of the corruption of the Christian consciousness generally, so the influence of this disturbing element is discernible also in the prevailing notion of faith. By degrees, that view of it which the Apostle Paul had set forth in opposition to the Jewish principle, became more and more obscured, and instead thereof appeared the Jewish notion of a certain faith on outward authority; not one which was suited to produce out of itself, through a necessary inner connection, all the fruits of the Christian life, but one which was only to draw after it, in an outward way, by means of new moral precepts and new motives addressed to the understanding, the new habits of Christian living. We have already noticed, how this notion of faith led to the undervaluing of the stage of mere faith (πίστις) among the Gnostics, and in part among the Alexandrians also; and how the reaction of Marcion tended to the re-establishment of the Pauline view. But to the material and outward conception of faith, on this side, was united also a material and outward conception of the system of morals, which was rent from its inner connection with the system of faith; whence followed, side by side with an outward system of faith, a legal system of duties and good works, in which the ascetic element had by far the ascendancy over the assimilating principle. And in connection with this, might arise the notion of a supererogatory righteousness, a perfection surpassing the requisitions of the law, which strove to fulfil the so-called counsels of Christ, (concilii evangelici,) by the renunciation of all earthly goods.[2]

A great influence to confirm this outward and material view of faith must have been especially exerted, by the manner in which the fellowship of life with Christ, instead of being considered to flow from the

[1] Lib. IV. c. 13, 14.

[2] See vol. I. p. 277

inner appropriation of Christ alone, was made to depend on the outward mediation through the church,— a point on which we have spoken already in the section relating to the church constitution. To this outward mediation of the church belonged the *sacraments*. As the essential character of the invisible and that of the visible church were not carefully discriminated, a little confusion of the divine thing and its outward sign must, from the same cause, take place in respect to the doctrine of the sacraments. This, in the case of *baptism*, is shown in the prevailing notion of a divine power which was imparted to the water, and of a sensible union, brought about by means of it, with the whole nature of Christ, for the deliverance of the entire spiritual and material nature of man. "As the dry wheat," says Irenæus, "cannot become one mass of dough and one loaf of bread without moisture, so neither can we all become one in Christ without the water which is from heaven. And as the parched earth cannot yield fruit unless it receive moisture, so neither can we, who at first are but sapless wood, ever produce living fruit, without the rain which is freely poured out from above; for *our bodies through baptism, but our souls through the Spirit*, have obtained that communion with the imperishable essence."[1] Tertullian finely remarks, concerning the effects of baptism:[2] "When the soul attains to faith, and is transformed by the regeneration of water and the power from above, the covering of the old corruption having been removed, she beholds her whole light. She is received into the communion of the Holy Spirit; and the soul which unites itself with the Holy Spirit is followed by the body, which is no longer the servant of the soul, but becomes the servant of the Spirit." But even Tertullian did not understand here how to distinguish rightly between the inward grace and the outward sign. In maintaining against a sect of the Cainites (see section second) the necessity of outward baptism, he ascribes to water a supernatural, sanctifying power. Yet we see, even in the case of Tertullian, the purely evangelical idea breaking through this confusion of the inward with the outward, and directly contradicting it; as when he says, it is *faith* which in baptism obtains the forgiveness of sin; and when, in dissuading against haste in baptism, he remarks, that true faith, wherever present, is sure of salvation.[3] Even in the spiritual Clement of Alexandria we may discern the influence of that outward and material conception of spiritual matters, when he agrees with Hermas[4] in thinking that the apostles performed in hades the rite of baptism[5] on the pious souls of the Old Testament who had not been baptized.

We have already, in the history of the forms of worship, taken notice of the injurious practical consequences which resulted from this confusion of the inward grace and the outward sign in the case of bap-

[1] Lib. III. c. 17. The divine principle of life for soul and body in Christ, the ἕνωσις πρὸς ἀφθαρσίαν.

[2] De anima, c. 41. Compare above the passage concerning the corruption of human nature

[3] Fides integra secura de salute.

[4] Lib. III. S. IX. Fabric. Cod. apocryph III. p. 1009.

[5] Strom. lib. II. f. 379.

tism. It was by confounding regeneration with baptism, and thus looking upon regeneration as a sort of charm completed at a stroke, by supposing a certain magical purification and removal of all sin in the act of baptism, that men were led to refer the forgiveness of sins obtained through Christ *only to those particular sins which had been committed previous to baptism;* instead of regarding all this as something which, with the appropriation of it by faith, must go on developing itself through the whole of life. After this was presupposed, the question must have arisen, How are we to obtain forgiveness for the sins committed after baptism? And the answer was: Although we have obtained once for all, by the merits of Christ, the means of satisfaction for the sins committed before baptism; yet, in order to make satisfaction for the sins after baptism, it is necessary that, in addition to this, we should have recourse to voluntary exercises of penitence and to good works.[1] This mode of conception is clearly exhibited in the following words of Cyprian:[2] "When our Lord came, and had healed the wounds of Adam, he gave to the restored a law, bidding him sin no more, lest a worse evil should befall him. By the injunction of innocence, we were circumscribed to a narrow circle; and the frailty of human weakness would have been at a loss what to do, unless divine grace had once more come to its aid, and, pointing out to it the works of mercy, paved the way for it to secure salvation; so that we might cleanse ourselves from all the lingering remains of impurity by the practice of alms. The forgiveness of sin having been once obtained at baptism, we earn by constant exercise in well-doing, which is, as it were, a repetition of baptism, the divine forgiveness anew." Here, if we only add what was remarked on an earlier page on the subject of the sacerdotal absolution, we have the germ of the catholic doctrine respecting the sacrament of penance.

To the *doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper*, may be applied, in general, the same remarks which have been made in relation to the doctrine concerning baptism; but with this difference, that we may observe three different grades in the outward and material conception of this ordinance. The most common representation was that which we find in Ignatius of Antioch,[3] in Justin Martyr, and in Irenæus. It is a conception of it most nearly related to that view just noticed of baptism, as the means of a spiritual-corporeal communion with Christ. It was supposed, for instance, that as the Logos in Christ became man, so here also he immediately appropriated to himself a body — this body, by virtue of the consecration, became united with the bread and

[1] See Tertullian's work, de pœnitentia. This writer, it is true, brought over with him from his legal studies, the expression, *satisfactio*, into the doctrine of repentance; yet we should not be warranted, on this account, to ascribe to his legal habits of thinking and conceiving, nay, we should not be warranted to ascribe to the ideas of any individual, so great an influence on the progress of error in the doctrinal notions of the church on this point; for, the πρῶτον ψεῦδος having been once established, all the consequences involved in it must of necessity unfold themselves, especially as these consequences find so many points of attachment in human nature.

[2] De opere et eleemosynis.

[3] Hence, in Ignatius, ep. ad Ephes. c. 20 the holy supper is called: φάρμακον ἀθανασίας, ἀντίδοτον τοῦ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν, ἀλλὰ ζῆν ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ διὰ παντός.

wine, and thus entered into the corporeal substance of those partakers of it, who thereby received into themselves a principle of imperishable life.[1] In the North-African church, on the other hand, neither Tertullian nor Cyprian seems to have entertained the notion of any penetration of this sort. Bread and wine were represented rather as symbols of the body and blood of Christ, though not as symbols without efficacy. Spiritual communion with Christ at the holy supper was made the prominent point; yet, at the same time, those that partook were supposed to come into a certain sanctifying contact with Christ's body.[2] The practice of the North-African church shows, moreover, that, according to the prevailing belief, a supernatural, sanctifying power resided in the outward signs of the supper: hence the daily communion;[3] hence also the communion of infants in connection with infant baptism.[4] The passage in John 6: 53 being incorrectly understood as referring to the outward *sensible participation* of the supper, the inference was drawn, that without this outward and sensible participation none could be saved;[5] as it had been inferred from the passage in John 3: 5, that none could be saved without outward baptism.

By the Alexandrians, especially by Origen, the distinction was clearly drawn, in the doctrine concerning the sacraments, as throughout his entire system of belief, between the inner divine thing, the invisible spiritual agency of the Logos,[6] and the sensible objects by which it is represented.[7] "Outward baptism," says he, "considered as to its highest end, is a symbol of the inward cleansing of the soul through the divine power of the Logos, which is preparatory to the universal recovery;— that commencing in the enigma and in the glass darkly, which shall afterwards be perfected in the open vision, face to face; but at the same time, by virtue of the consecration pronounced over it, there is connected with the whole act of baptism a supernatural sanctifying power; it is the commencing point of gracious influences bestowed on the faithful, although it is so only for such as are fitted, by the disposition of their hearts, for the reception of those influences."[8]

He makes the same distinction also in regard to the holy supper; separating what is called, in a figurative sense, the body of Christ,[9] from the true spiritual manducation of the Logos,[10]— *the more divine*

[1] That which distinguishes this mode of conceiving the matter from a later one, is, that the Christ who has ascended to heaven is not considered to be present here; but the Logos, in this case, directly produces for himself a body. This we find more distinctly expressed, it is true, in the next following period; but it lies at the basis of the following language of Justin: Τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφὴν, ἐξ ἧς αἷμα καὶ σάρκες κατὰ μεταβολὴν τρέφονται ἡμῶν, ἐκείνου τοῦ σαρκοποιηθέντος Ἰησοῦ καὶ σάρκα καὶ αἷμα ἐδιδάχθημεν εἶναι. Apolog. I. § 66.

[2] Tertull. c. Marc. l. IV. c. 40: corpus meum, i. e. figura corporis mei. De res. carn. c. 8: anima de Deo saginatur. De orat. c. 6: The perpetuitas in Christo, constant, spiritual fellowship with him, and individuitas a corpore ejus.

[3] See vol. I. p. 332.

[4] See Cyprian. sermo de lapsis.

[5] See Cyprian. Testimonior. l. III. c. 25.

[6] Comp. above, what is said of the ἐπιδημία αἰσθητή, and the ἐπιδημία νοητὴ Χριστοῦ, and of the redemptive sufferings of Christ.

[7] The νοητόν or πνευματικόν and the αἰσθητόν.

[8] See in Joann. T. VI. § 17; in Matth. T. XV. § 23.

[9] Τὸ σῶμα Χριστοῦ τυπικὸν καὶ συμβολικόν.

[10] The ἀληθινὴ βρῶσις τοῦ λόγου.

promise, from the common understanding of the holy supper,— adapted to the capacities of the simple.[1] The former refers to the spiritual communication of the Word made flesh, which is the true heavenly bread of the soul. Of the outward supper the worthy and the unworthy may partake alike; but not of that true heavenly bread; since otherwise, it could not have been said, that whoever eats this bread shall live for ever. Origen says therefore, that Christ in the true sense called his flesh and blood *the word*, which proceeds from the word, and the bread which proceeds from the heavenly bread — the living word of truth, by which he communicates himself to the souls of men; as the breaking of the bread and the distribution of the wine symbolize the multiplication of the word, by which the Logos communicates himself to many souls. He supposed, moreover, that with the outward supper, as with outward baptism, there was connected a higher sanctifying influence by virtue of the consecrating words; yet in the sense, that nothing divine could be united with the earthly material signs, in themselves considered; and that, as in the case of baptism, none could participate in the higher influence, unless made susceptible of it by the inward disposition of the heart. As not that which enters into the mouth defiles the man,— though by the Jews it is considered unclean; so nothing which enters into the mouth *sanctifies* the man; though by the simple, the so-called bread of the Lord is supposed to possess a sanctifying power. We neither lose anything by failing to partake of the consecrated bread, by itself considered; nor do we gain anything by the bare partaking of that bread; but the reason why one man has less and another more, is the good or bad disposition of each individual. The earthly bread is by itself in no respect different from any other food. It was Origen's design here, no doubt, to controvert particularly the erroneous notions which attached to the supper a sort of magical advantage, independent of the disposition of the heart — notions which the other fathers also were far from entertaining; but yet, at the same time, his objections applied also to every representation which attached to the outward signs any higher importance or efficacy whatever, and even to those views which were received in the North-African Church.[2]

It remains that we should speak of the prevailing ideas in this period, respecting the ultimate end of the whole earthly development of humanity. The teleological point of view was, in this regard, inseparable from the Christian mode of contemplation. The kingdom of God, and each individual life thereto pertaining, was to be conducted onward to a completion: it was this certain prospect which formed the contrast between the Christian view of life, and the Pagan notion of a circle aimlessly repeating itself by a blind law of necessity. But the intermediate links of the chain, up to that ultimate end, were still hidden from the ken of contemplation: this belonged to the prophetic ele-

[1] The *κοινοτέρα περὶ τῆς εὐχαριστίας ἐκδοχὴ τοῖς ἁπλουστέρους* and *κατὰ τὴν θειοτέραν ἐπαγγελίαν*, corresponding to the two positions of the *γνῶσις* and of the *πίστις*.

[2] Vid. Origen, Matth. T. XI. § 14; in Joann. T. XXXII. § 16; in Matth. f. 898 V. III. opp.

ment, which must ever remain obscure till its fulfilment. To the earnest expectation of the pilgrim, as he cast a glance over the windings of the way, the end appeared at first near at hand, which, the farther he advanced, retreated to a greater distance. The signs in the course of history alone would shed more light on the darkness, which the Lord himself was unwilling to clear up by his prophetic intimations.

The Christians were certainly convinced, that the church would come forth triumphant out of its conflicts, and, as it was its destination to be a world-transforming principle, would attain to the dominion of the world; but they were far from understanding at first the prophetic words of Christ intimating how the church, in its gradual evolutions, under natural conditions, was to be a salt and a leaven for all human relations. They could at first, as we have before remarked, conceive of it no otherwise than this, that the struggle between the church and the pagan state would endure till the triumph brought about from without, by the return of Christ to judgment. Now it was here that many seized hold of an image which had passed over to them from the Jews, and which seemed to adapt itself to their own present situation, — the *idea of a millennial reign*, which the Messiah was to set up on earth at the end of the whole earthly course of the world, where all the righteous of all times should live together in holy communion. As the world had been created in six days, and, according to Psalm 90 : 4, a thousand years in the sight of God is as one day, so the world was to continue in its hitherto condition for six thousand years, and end with a thousand years of blessed rest corresponding to the sabbath. In the midst of persecutions, it was a solace and a support to the Christians, to anticipate that even upon this earth, the scene of their sufferings, the church was destined to triumph in its perfected and glorified state. As the idea was held by many, it contained nothing in it which was unchristian. They framed to themselves a spiritual idea of the happiness of this period, perfectly corresponding with the essence of the gospel, conceiving under it nothing else than the universal dominion of the divine will, the undisturbed and blissful reunion of the whole community of the saints, and the restoration of harmony between a sanctified humanity and all nature transfigured into its primitive innocence.[1] But the crass images, too, under which the earthly Jewish mind had depicted to itself the blessings of the millennial reign, had in part passed over to the Christians. Phrygia, the natural home of a sensual, enthusiastic religious spirit, was inclined to the diffusion also of this grossly conceived Chiliasm. There, in the first half of the second century, lived Papias, bishop of the church in Hierapolis; a man, it is true, of sincere piety, but, as appears from the fragments of his writings, and from the accounts which we have of him, of a very narrow mind and easy credulity. He collected from oral traditions, certain narratives concerning the life and sayings of Christ and of the apostles;[2] and among these he received a great deal that was misconceived and un-

[1] So Barnabas, c. 15.

[2] In his book, λόγων κυριακῶν ἐξηγήσεις, from which a fragment on Judas Iscariot, which serves to illustrate his propensity to receive tales of the marvellous, has been published in J. A. Cramer Catena in Acta Apostolorum. Oxon. 1838, pag. 12

true. Thus by his means were diffused abroad many strange, fantastic images of the enjoyments to be expected in the thousand-years' reign. The injurious consequence of all which was, to foster among Christians the taste for a gross sensual happiness, incompatible with the spirit of the gospel, and to give birth among the educated heathens to many a prejudice against Christianity.[1]

But he who knows anything about the hidden depth of the spiritual life, in which religion has its seat and its laboratory, will be cautious how he pronounces judgment, from such appearances on the surface, against the entire religion of a certain period, in which these disturbing mixtures of a sensuous element were still to be found, when in such a man as Irenæus we find vital Christianity and an exalted idea of the blessedness of fellowship with God, united with these strange subordinate notions. The thousand-years' reign he regarded as only a preparatory step for the righteous, who were there to be trained for a more exalted heavenly existence, for the full manifestation of the divine glory.[2]

What we have just said, however, is not to be so understood as if Chiliasm had ever formed a part of the general creed of the church. Our sources of information from different parts of the church, in these early times, are too scanty, to enable us to say anything on this point with certainty and positiveness. Wherever we meet with Chiliasm, in Papias, Irenæus, Justin Martyr, everything goes to indicate that it was diffused from one country and from a single fountain-head. We perceive a difference in the case of those churches where originally an anti-Jewish tendency prevailed ; as in the church at Rome (see above.) We find subsequently in Rome an anti-Chiliast tendency. Might not this have existed from the first, and only have been called out more openly by the opposition to Montanism ? The same may be said also of an anti-Chiliast tendency which Irenæus combats, and which he expressly distinguishes from the common anti-Chiliastic tendency of Gnosticism. It was natural, however, that the zealots for Chiliasm should in the outset be disposed to represent all opposition to it as savoring of Gnosticism.[3]

Two causes coöperated to bring about the general suppression of Chiliasm: on the one hand, the opposition to Montanism; on the other, the influence of *the spirit* proceeding from the Alexandrian school. As the Montanists laid great stress upon the expectations connected with the millennium, and although their conception of it was by no means grossly sensual,[4] yet as they contributed, by their enthusiastic visions, to spread many fantastic pictures of the things which were then to happen,[5] the whole doctrine of Chiliasm by this means lost its reputation.

[1] Vid. Orig. Select. in Ψ. f. 570. T. II.

[2] Iren. l. V. c. 35: Crescentes ex visione Domini et per ipsum assuescent capere gloriam Dei et cum sanctis angelis conversationem. — Paullatim assuescent capere Deum. c. 32.

[3] Iren. l. V. c. 32: Transferuntur quorundam sententiæ ab hæreticis sermonibus.

[4] Tertullian, at least, places the happiness of the millennial reign in the enjoyment of all manner of spiritual blessings, spiritalia bona.

[5] Of the wonderful city, for instance, the heavenly Jerusalem, which should come down from above. See Tertullian.

An anti-Chiliast party, which had sprung up doubtless before, were thus presented with an opportunity of pushing home their attacks; and the more zealous opponents of Montanism seem to have combated this error in connection with the other Montanistic doctrines. Caius, a presbyter of Rome, in his controversial tract against the Montanist Proclus, endeavored to stigmatize Chiliasm as a heresy set afloat by the detested Gnostic, Cerinthus; and it is not improbable, though not wholly certain, that he considered the Apocalypse as a book which had been interpolated by the latter, for the express purpose of giving currency to this doctrine.

Next, the more intellectual and scientific direction of the Alexandrian school, which had so great an influence generally in spiritualizing the system of faith, must have contributed also to spiritualize the ideas concerning the kingdom of God and of Christ. Origen in particular was a zealous combatant of these sensual notions of the millennium, and sought after a different explanation of those passages of the Old and New Testament, on which the Chiliasts depended, and all of which they took in the most literal sense. Add to this, that the allegorical method of interpretation, peculiar to the Alexandrian school, was generally in direct opposition to the grossly literal interpretations of the Chiliasts. The moderate Alexandrians, who were no friends to expurgatory criticism, did not reject the Apocalypse at once, as an unchristian book, with a view to deprive the Chiliasts of this important support; — they only combated the literal interpretation of it. It was natural, however, that the spirit of the Alexandrian school did not so easily spread from Alexandria into the other districts of Egypt, which, in point of intellectual cultivation, fell so far behind that flourishing seat of the sciences. Nepos, a pious bishop, belonging to the nome of Arsenoe in Egypt, was a devoted friend of this sensual Chiliasm; and wrote in defence of it a book against the Alexandrian school, entitled, A Refutation of the Allegorists;[1] in which probably he set forth a theory of Chiliasm in accordance with his own anti-allegorical method of decyphering the Apocalypse. This book seems to have found great favor with the clergy and laity in the above-mentioned district. Great mysteries and disclosures of future events were supposed to be found here; and many engaged with more zeal in the study of the book and theory of Nepos, than in that of the bible and its doctrines. By their zeal for these favorite opinions, which had no connection whatever with the essence of the gospel, men were led astray, as usually happens, from that which constitutes the main element of practical Christianity, the spirit of love. They affixed the charge of heresy on those who would not embrace these opinions; and matters went so far, that whole churches separated themselves, on this account, from their communion with the mother church at Alexandria. A country priest, named Coracion, took the lead of this party, after the death of Nepos. Had the bishop Dionysius of Alexandria now been disposed to exercise his ecclesiastical authority, had he condemned the erroneous dogma by an absolute de-

[1] Ἔλεγχος τῶν ἀλληγοριστῶν.

cree, such a proceeding would have laid the foundation of a lasting schism; and Chiliasm, which it was intended to crush by words of authority, would in all probability have become only the more fanatical. But Dionysius, that worthy disciple of the great Origen, showed in this case, how charity, moderation, and the true spirit of liberty, which dwells only with love, can accomplish what exceeds the power of force or of law. Not, like others, forgetting the Christian in the bishop, he was moved by the love of souls to repair in person to those churches. He called together those of the parochial clergy who supported the opinions of Nepos, and, moreover, allowed all laymen of the churches, who were longing after instruction on these points, to be present at the interview. The book of Nepos was produced; for three days the bishop disputed with those pastors over the contents of the book from morn to eve; he patiently listened to all their objections, and endeavored to answer them from the scriptures; he entered fully into the explanation of every difficulty, taking the scriptures as his guide; and as the issue of the whole — a result which had seldom before followed theological disputations — the clergy thanked him for his instructions, and Coracion himself honestly recanted, in the presence of all, his former views, and declared himself convinced of the soundness of the opposite doctrine. This happened in the year 255.[1]

Dionysius, having thus restored the unity of faith among his own churches, wrote, for the purpose of confirming those who had been convinced by his arguments, and for the instruction of others, who still held fast to the opinions of Nepos, his work on the Promises.[2] In this instance also, the Christian gentleness and moderation with which he speaks of Nepos is well worthy of notice. "On many accounts," says he, "I esteemed and loved Nepos; — on account of his faith, his untiring diligence, his familiar acquaintance with the holy scriptures; and on account of the great number of church hymns composed by him, which to this day are the delight of many of the brethren.[3] And the more do I venerate the man, because he has already entered into his rest. But dear to me, and prized above all things else, is the truth. We must love him, and, wherever he has expressed the truth, agree with him; but we must examine and correct him in those passages of his writings where he seems to be in the wrong."

The millennial reign was regarded by Chiliasm as forming, in the grand development of the kingdom of God, an intermediate point of transition to a higher state of perfection; and, answering to this, a similar intermediate point was conceived to exist also in the development of each individual. It was here the doctrine concerning Hades, as the common receptacle of all the dead, found its point of attachment. Together with Chiliasm, *this* doctrine also had to be defended against the Gnostics; for by Hades the latter understood the kingdom of the

1 Euseb. l. VII. c. 24.

2 Περὶ ἐπαγγελιῶν.

3 Τῆς πολλῆς ψαλμῳδίας, ἣ μέχρι νῦν πολλοὶ τῶν ἀδέλφων εὐθυμοῦνται. The passage may be understood in two ways; either in the way I have rendered it, as referring to the many hymns composed by him, which perhaps is the most natural way; or as referring to the variety of church melodies introduced by him.

Demiurge, on this earth. It was to *this* kingdom Christ descended,—it was out of this he delivered those who were capable of fellowship with him, so that after death they could be received immediately to heaven. Yet, as we remarked certain indications that Chiliasm had other opponents to contend with besides the Gnostics, so the same may be said of this doctrine also, which was connected with a mode of thinking not essentially different. Here, too, we find indications of antagonists other than the Gnostics, but yet in whom their opponents might easily be led to believe they perceived a relationship to the Gnostics.[1] They were such as taught that Christ, by his descent to Hades, delivered the faithful from the necessity of passing into the intermediate state after death,[2] and opened for them an immediate entrance into heaven. According to the doctrine of the Montanist Tertullian, those only who had been thoroughly cleansed by the bloody baptism of martyrdom were to constitute an exception,—were to be raised immediately, if not to heaven, at least to an exalted state of blessedness, under the name of Paradise. All others would need to pass through that intermediate stage, in order to be freed from the defects and stains which remained still cleaving to them, and then, according to the measure of their attainments, would come sooner or later to participate in the millennial reign.[3] It is easy to see how this notion would stand connected with the opinion of which we have already pointed out the grounds, that a particular satisfaction and penance were required for sins committed after baptism. And this notion, of such an intermediate state for the purpose of purification in Hades, passed over, at a later period, into the doctrine of purgatory. This sprung in the first place out of a mixture of Persian and Jewish elements. It was the idea of a fire-current at the end of the world to purge away everything unclean;—to which we may observe some allusion in the Clementines and in the Pseudo-Sibylline writers. Thence arose the notion of a purgatory after death,[4] —the ignis purgatorius of the Westerns.[5]

The *doctrine of the resurrection*, inasmuch as it relates to the persistence and exaltation of the entire being of the individual, is most intimately connected with the peculiar essence of Christianity, and, on account of the importance which it gives to the individual existence in its totality, forms a strong contrast with the ancient pantheistic view of the world;[6] as we saw in fact very clearly exhibited in the pagan attacks on Christianity. The dignity of the body as a temple for the Holy Spirit, and the command that it should be appropriated to this

[1] As Irenæus describes them, l. V. c. 31: Quidam ex his, qui putantur recte credidisse, supergrediuntur ordinem promotionis justorum et motus meditationis ad incorruptelam ignorant, hæreticos sensus in se habentes.

[2] In hoc, inquiunt, Christus inferos adiit, ne nos adiremus. Tertullian, de anima, c. 55.

[3] Modicum quoque delictum mora resurrectionis illic luendum; where he refers to the novissimus quadrans, Matth. 5: 26, afterwards understood of the ignis purgatorius. L. c. c. 58.

[4] Τὴν διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσιν τῶν κακως βεβιωκότων. Strom. l. V. f. 549.

[5] The earliest trace of it would be found in Cyprian, ep. 52, if the words, "missum in carcerem non exire inde, donec solvat novissimum quadrantem, pro peccatis longo dolore cruciatum emundari et purgari diu igne," (instead of which another reading has diutine,) are to be understood of the state after death, which is certainly the more probable meaning, and not of penance in the present life.

[6] See vol. I. p. 11.

end, being grounded in this doctrine, there necessarily arises out of it an opposition to the Oriental, dualistic contempt of the body; and hence it was no accidental thing that the Gnostics furiously assaulted it; while, on the other hand, we may remark, in the zeal with which it was defended by the church fathers, a right Christian instinctive feeling — though not always accompanied with clear knowledge — of the connection of this doctrine with the essence of Christianity. But their cautious adherence to the letter, as well as their opposition to the Gnostics, led them not seldom to apprehend the doctrine of the resurrection in too crass and material a way, and to form too narrow and limited conceptions of the earthly body. Origen endeavored here also to strike a middle course between these opposite tendencies, making more use of what the Apostle Paul says (1 Corinth. 15) concerning the relation of the earthy to the glorified body; and distinguishing, from the mutable phenomenal form, the proper essence lying at the foundation of the body, which remains the same through all the changes of the earthly life, and which, moreover, is not destroyed at death. This proper essence lying at the foundation of the body would, by the operation of the divine power, be awakened to a nobler form, corresponding to the ennobled character of the soul; so that, as the soul had communicated its own peculiar stamp to the earthly body, it would then communicate the same to the transfigured body.[1] In proof of this he alleges, that the identity of the body in this life consists not in its momently changing phenomenal form, which had been fitly compared to a flowing stream,[2] but in the peculiar stamp which the soul impresses on the body, whereby it becomes the proper form of manifestation of this or that particular personality.[3]

Natural as it would be to the Christian feelings of those who had been converted from Heathenism, to seek — by entering more deeply into the whole connection of the work of redemption, into the spirit of the gospel, into the sense of single passages often too superficially understood — some ground of consolation with respect to the fate of their ancestors who had died without faith in the gospel; yet they were deterred from it by a mistaken adherence to the letter in the understanding of scripture, and by the stern, uncompromising opposition to Paganism. And the outward, materialized view of regeneration which arose out of the habit of confounding it with baptism, also contributed to promote these narrow views, which afterwards, carried to the extreme, issued in the notion of absolute predestination. Marcion alone did, on this side,

[1] The *εἶδος χαρακτηρίζον* in the *σῶμα πνευματικόν*, just as in the *σῶμα ψυχικόν*. To illustrate this point, he had recourse sometimes to his own doctrine concerning the *ὕλη*, in itself undetermined, but capable of receiving, through the plastic power of God, qualities of a higher or lower order; and sometimes to the doctrine of a dynamic essence, underlying the body, a *λόγος σπερματικός* (ratio ea quæ substantiam continet corporalem, quæ semper in substantia corporis salva est,) which, however, is itself also to be reduced to his doctrine of a *ὕλη* lying at the ground of the corporeal world, and susceptible of the whole manifold variety of properties. See *π. ἀρχ.* l. II. c. 10; c. Cels. l. IV. c. 57.

[2] Selecta in Psalmos: *Οὐ κακῶς ποταμὸς ὠνόμασται τὸ σῶμα, διότι ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀκριβὲς τάχα οὐδὲ δύο ἡμερῶν τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν.* T. XI. p. 388. ed. Lomm.

[3] *Ὅπερ ἐχαρακτηρίζετο ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ, τοῦτο χαρακτηρισθήσεται ἐν τῷ πνευματικῷ σώματι.*

enter more profoundly into the spirit of the evangelical doctrine; and here he was joined by the Alexandrians, who, to explain this matter, had recourse to the doctrine of a progressive development and course of purification after death, and moreover found, or supposed they found, an allusion to this in the descent of Christ to Hades. With great zeal Clement maintained this doctrine, as one necessarily grounded in the universal love and justice of God, with whom is no respect of persons. The beneficent power of our Saviour — he affirms — is not confined barely to the present life, but operates at all times and everywhere.[1] But the Alexandrians, as might be gathered from what has already been said respecting their doctrine concerning the δικαιοσύνη σωτήριος, (saving justice,) went still further, and supposed, as the ultimate end of all, a universal redemption, consisting in the annihilation of all moral evil, and a universal restoration to that original unity of the divine life out of which all had proceeded (the general ἀποκατάστασις.) Yet, in the case of Origen, this doctrine lost its full meaning, by reason of the consequences which he was pleased to connect with it. His theory concerning the necessary mutability of will in created beings, led him to infer, that evil, ever germinating afresh, would still continue to render necessary new processes of purification, and new worlds destined for the restoration of fallen beings; until all should again be brought back from manifoldness to unity; so that there was to be a constant interchange between fall and redemption, between unity and manifoldness. Into such a comfortless system was this profound thinker betrayed, by carrying through with rigid consistency his one-sided notion of creaturely freedom and mutability, and thus marring the full conception of redemption. This doctrine he had expressed with great confidence in his work περὶ ἀρχῶν; but it may be questioned whether this also was not one of those points upon which his views became changed at a later period of his life; yet traces of it are still to be found (though not so certain and distinct traces) in his later writings.[2]

IV. *Notices of the more Eminent Church Teachers.*

The ecclesiastical writers who followed next after the apostles, are the so-called Apostolic Fathers, (patres apostolici,) who lived in the age of the apostles, and are supposed to have been their disciples. A phenomenon singular in its kind, is the striking difference between the writings of the apostles and the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, who were so nearly their contemporaries. In other cases, transitions are wont to be gradual; but in this instance we observe a sudden change. There are here no gentle gradations, but all at once an abrupt transi-

[1] Οὐ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μόνον ἡ δύναμις ἡ εὐεργητικὴ φθάνει, πάντῃ δέ ἐστι καὶ ἀεὶ ἐργάζεται. Strom. l. VI. f. 638 et 639. He also makes use of the legend noticed on a former page — which legend itself perhaps grew out of the felt need of some solution of this question — that the apostles descended, like Christ, to the place of the dead, and bestowed on them baptism.

[2] Orig. π. ἀρχ. l. II. c. 4; c. Cels. l. IV c. 69, he barely says: Εἰ μετὰ τὸν ἀφανισμὸν τῆς κακίας λόγον ἔχει, τὸ πάλιν αὐτὴν ὑφίστασθαι ἢ μὴ, ἐν προηγουμένῳ λόγῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐξετασθήσεται. There is an obscure hint in Matth. f. 402. After the ἀποκατάστασις has been completed in certain Æons he speaks of πάλιν ἄλλη ἀρχή.

tion from one style of language to another; a phenomenon which should lead us to acknowledge the fact of a special agency of the Divine Spirit in the souls of the apostles. After the times of the first extraordinary operations of the Holy Ghost, followed the period of the free development of human nature in Christianity; and here, as in all other cases, the beginnings must be small and feeble, before the effects of Christianity could penetrate more widely, and bring fully under their influence the great powers of the human mind. It was to be shown first, what the divine power could effect by the foolishness of preaching.

The writings of the so-called Apostolic Fathers have unhappily, for the most part, come down to us in a condition very little worthy of confidence, partly because under the name of these men, so highly venerated in the church, writings were early forged for the purpose of giving authority to particular opinions or principles; and partly because their own writings which were extant, became interpolated in subservience to a Jewish hierarchical interest, which aimed to crush the free spirit of the gospel.

In this connection, we should have to notice first Barnabas, the well-known companion of the Apostle Paul; if a letter, which in the second century was known under his name in the Alexandrian church, and which bore the title of a catholic epistle,[1] really belonged to him. But we cannot possibly recognize in this production, the Barnabas who was deemed worthy to take part as a companion in the apostolical labors of Paul, and who had derived his name from the great power of his discourses in the churches.[2] It breathes a spirit widely different from what might be expected of such an apostolic man. We see here a Jew of the Alexandrian school, who had embraced Christianity, and was prepared by his Alexandrian training for a more spiritual conception of Christianity; but who, at the same time, attached too much importance to the Gnosis of the Alexandrian Jews — a man who sought in the mystic allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament, — more consonant with the spirit of Philo than that of Paul, or even of the epistle to the Hebrews, — a peculiar wisdom, in which he seems to take a vain sort of pleasure. We meet nowhere in this letter with those views of the Mosaic ceremonial law, as a religious means of culture adapted to a certain stage of human development, which we meet with in Paul; but such views as evince an altogether peculiar, Alexandrian turn of mind,— views which are not found to recur in the following church-teachers, and which sprang from the wildest class of idealists among the Alexandrian Jews.[3] Moses spake everything in the spirit (*ἐν πνεύματι*;) — that is, he had only presented universal, spiritual truths under a symbolical form. But the carnal Jews, instead of penetrating into the meaning of these symbols, understood and believed everything in the literal sense, and supposed they must observe the law according to the letter. Thus the entire ceremonial religion had sprung

[1] *Ἐπιστολὴ καθολική*, i. e. a letter intended for general circulation, and containing matter of general interest, — an exhortatory writing destined for several churches, — a character which answers to the contents of this epistle.

[2] *Υἱὸς παρακλήσεως, υἱὸς προφητείας.*

[3] See above, vol. I. p. 49.

out of a misconception of the carnal multitude. A bad angel, it is said,[1] had led them into this error; just as in the Clementines, and other writings of that stamp, it is a favorite hypothesis that original Judaism had been adulterated by the spurious additions of wicked spirits. The author of this epistle is even unwilling to admit, that circumcision was a seal or sign of the covenant; alleging, as evidence to the contrary, that circumcision was practised also among the Arabians, the Syrians, and the idolatrous priests (in Egypt.) But it is made out, that Abraham circumcising the 318 men, Gen. c. 17, and 14: 14, prefigured the crucifixion of Jesus; ΙΗ (18) being the initial letters of the name Jesus, and Τ (300) the sign of the cross. These characters and numerals, peculiar to the Greek language, could have occurred to no one but an Alexandrian Jew, who had lost his knowledge of, or perhaps had never been acquainted with, the Hebrew, and who was familiar only with the Alexandrian version,—certainly not to Barnabas, who could have shown no such ignorance of the Hebrew tongue, even if it were possible to suppose him guilty of such egregious trifling. Yet the trifler himself looks upon it as a remarkable discovery, as is evident from the pompous remark, which so exactly characterizes the mystery-trafficking spirit of the Alexandrian-Jewish Gnosis: "No one ever learned from me a more genuine doctrine; but I know that ye are worthy of it."[2]

The prevailing drift of the epistle is in opposition to carnal Judaism, and to Judaism in Christianity. We recognize the polemical aim against the latter, the dogmatic influence of which extended to the views entertained concerning the person of Christ, when, in chap. 12, it is emphatically observed, that Christ is not merely the Son of man and the Son of David, but also the Son of God. The epistle is all of *a piece*, and cannot possibly be separated into two parts,[3] of which Barnabas was the author of one, and somebody else of the other.

For the rest, there is no hint which intimates that the author of the epistle wished to have it supposed he was Barnabas. But his spirit and style being in accordance with the Alexandrian taste, it may have come about, that, as the author's name was unknown, and it was wished to give credit and authority to the document, the report found currency in that city, that Barnabas was the author.

Next to Barnabas we place Clement; perhaps the same whom Paul mentions in Philipp. 4: 3. About the end of the first century, he was bishop of the church at Rome. We have, under his name, *an epistle* to the church of Corinth, and the *fragment of a second*. The first of these was, in the first centuries, read at public worship in many of the churches, along with the scriptures of the New Testament. It contains an exhortation, interwoven with examples and general maxims, recommending concord to the Corinthian church, which was rent by divisions. This epistle, although genuine in the main, is still not exempt from important interpolations. We detect a palpable contradiction,

[1] Cap. 9.
[2] Οὐδεὶς γνησιώτερον ἔμαθεν ἀπ' ἐμοῦ λόγον· ἀλλὰ οἶδα ὅτι ἄξιοί ἐστε ὑμεῖς.
[3] As Schenkel has asserted.

when, for example, we observe, gleaming through the surface of the whole epistle, the simple relations of the oldest constitution of the Christian church, where bishops and presbyters were placed wholly on a level, and then in one passage, § 40 and onward, find the whole system of the Jewish priesthood transferred to the Christian church. The epistle which passes under the name of the second, is manifestly nothing but the fragment of a homily.

Under the name of this Clement, two other epistles have been preserved in the Syrian church, which were published by Wetstein, in an appendix to his edition of the New Testament. They are circular letters, addressed particularly to those Christians of both sexes who lived in the state of celibacy. The praise which these writings bestow on the unmarried life, is by no means sufficient to prove that Clement was not their author; this high estimation of celibacy[1] having become common at a very early period. There are several things in favor of the high antiquity of these epistles: they nowhere indicate the presence of a hierarchical effort; they do not, like other writings of this kind, apply the Old-Testament ideas of the priesthood to the Christian church; they make no prominent distinction between clergy and laity, nor between bishops and presbyters; they represent the gift of healing diseases, especially demoniacal possessions, as a free gift, not attached to any particular office. Still, however, these considerations do not amount to a *certain proof* of the high antiquity of the writings; the whole admitting of an easy explanation, even on the supposition of their later origin, from the tendencies peculiar to certain countries of the East.

As these epistles must have been quite agreeable to the ascetic tendency of the Western, particularly of the North-African church; as, in similar writings of a practical character, (aimed against the same abuses which are reproved in these epistles,) there was frequent occasion for alluding to them, it must appear the more singular, that they are found nowhere cited before the fourth century;[2] a fact sufficient of itself to excite suspicion with regard to their authenticity.

These epistles bear every mark of having been forged in some Eastern church, in the last times of the second or in the third century, partly with a view to exalt the merits of the unmarried life, partly to counteract the abuses which, under the show of celibacy, began to gain ground, particularly the irregular connections of the συνείσακτοι.[3]

Under the name of this Clement, various other writings were forged, subservient to some hierarchical or dogmatic interest; as, for example, the tract which relates to the history of *Clement* himself, who is represented to have been a convert of the Apostle Peter, together with his father, whom he lost and afterwards finds again;[4] *the Clementines*, whose peculiar style of thought, resembling that of the Ebionites, we

[1] See vol. I. p. 277.

[2] The first allusions to it are in Epiphanius and Jerome.

[3] Which abuse had spread in the church of Antioch, as well as of North Africa. See the synodal letter against Paul of Samosata. Euseb. l. VII. c. 30.

[4] Hence the title to one of the revisions preserved to us in the version of Rufinus ἀναγνωρισμοί, Recognitiones.

have already described; finally, the collection of apostolical constitutions, (διατάξεις or διαταγαὶ ἀποστολικαί,) and the apostolical canons, (κάνονες ἀποστολικοί.)

The origin of these two collections may be explained in the same way as that of the so-called Apostles' Creed. As men originally spoke of an apostolical tradition relating to matters of doctrine, without its ever having occurred to them that the apostles had drawn up a confession of faith; so they were accustomed to speak of an apostolical tradition relating to the constitution and usages of the church, without ever having supposed that the apostles had given any written laws on the subject. The expressions "apostolical traditions, apostolical ordinances," having thus once become familiar, a foothold was furnished for the opinion, or the pretence, that the apostles, having prepared a written confession of faith, had also drawn up a collection of ecclesiastical laws. Hence, to subserve different interests, different collections of this kind may have sprung into existence, since the one which Epiphanius cites in many places is evidently not the same with our present Apostolical Constitutions. These latter appear to have been formed gradually, in the Eastern church, out of different fragments, during a period reaching from the close of the second into the fourth century.

Hermas would follow the next in this series, were he same with the one mentioned in Paul's epistle to the Romans, chap. 16, as many among the ancients supposed. We have, under this name, a work entitled *The Shepherd*, (ποίμην;) so called, because in the second book an angel, the appointed guardian of Hermas, is introduced in the character of a shepherd.

It cannot be certainly determined whether the author had, or imagined he had, the visions which he describes; or whether he invented them to procure a more favorable reception for the doctrines, chiefly practical, which he advances. The work was written originally in Greek, but has been preserved to us, for the most part, only in a Latin translation. It stood in high repute among the Greek writers of the second century, a distinction, perhaps, to which the name of the supposed author, and his famous visions, not a little contributed. Irenæus cites the book under the title of *the scripture*. Yet it may be very much doubted whether the Hermas of the Apostle Paul was really its author; although the other tradition, also, (cited in the poem against Marcion, ascribed to Tertullian, and in the fragment on the canon of the New Testament, published by Muratori,[1]) which ascribes it to the brother of Pius, bishop of Rome, about the year 156, is no less doubtful; since it is impossible to determine how much credit is due to these two documents; and the high reputation of the book in the times of Irenæus and Clement of Alexandria, can hardly be reconciled with the hypothesis of so late an origin.[2]

Ignatius, bishop of the church at Antioch, is said, in the reign of

[1] Antiq. ital. jud. ævi, T. III.

[2] It may have been, that the Roman Bishop Pius actually had a brother of this name; and those who were desirous of destroying the authority of the book were led for this very purpose to fix on so late an author.

Trajan, to have been conveyed as a prisoner to Rome, where he was expecting to be thrown to the wild beasts. On the way, he is said to have written seven epistles; six to churches of Asia Minor, and one to Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna. These letters, it must be allowed, contain passages which at least bear throughout the stamp of antiquity. Such especially are the passages directed against Judaism and against Docetism; but even the briefer revision, which is the one most entitled to confidence, has been very much interpolated. As the account of the martyrdom of Ignatius may be justly suspected,[1] so too the letters which presuppose the correctness of this suspicious legend, do not wear at all a stamp of a distinct individuality of character, and of a man of these times addressing his last words to the churches. A hierarchical purpose is not to be mistaken.

The letter to Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, wears very much the appearance of an idle compilation That to the Roman church possesses more decided marks of originality than the others.

Of Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, we have already spoken. To him is ascribed an epistle to the church at Philippi; nor are there any sufficient reasons for doubting that he was the author of it.

Immediately after the apostolical fathers, we place the Apologists, who follow next in the order of time. The existing scientific culture would first be made subservient to the defence of Christianity under the government of Hadrian; and the Apologists, who began to appear about this period, are therefore to be considered as the earliest representatives of such a combination.

Among these, the first to be noticed is Quadratus. He was known as an *evangelist*,[2] and stood in high repute on account of his prophetic gifts. He must not be taken for the same person as a Quadratus, who, in the time of Marcus Aurelius, was bishop of the church at Athens, and with whom Jerome has confounded him. It is to be regretted, that his Apology has not come down to us. Eusebius has preserved the following remarkable passage from it: "The works of our Saviour were always to be seen, for they were real; — those that were healed, and those that were raised from the dead, were seen, not only when they were healed or raised, but they were always there; not only whilst he dwelt on the earth, but also after his departure, which they long survived; so that some of them have lived even to our own times." [3]

The second, Aristides, still retained, after he became a Christian, the philosopher's cloak, (τρίβων, pallium,) so that he might be able to present Christianity to the educated Heathen as the new philosophy from heaven.[4]

Justin Martyr is worthy of notice, as being the first among these

[1] See vol. I. p. 191. n. 2.

[2] This word is to be understood in the sense of the New Testament, i. e. as designating a teacher, not connected with any particular church, but travelling about as a missionary to preach the gospel.

[3] Euseb. l. III. c. 37; l. IV. c. 3; l. V. c. 17.

[4] Hieronym. de vir. illustr. c. 20, ep. 83, ad Magnum: Apologeticus contextus philosophorum sententiis. The traveller De la Guilletière says, that in a cloister, about twenty-four miles from Athens, they pretend still to be in possession of this Apology.

apologists whose writings have come down to our times, and the first Christian father, intimately known to us, in whom we observe Christianity in contact with the Hellenic culture, and more particularly with the Platonic philosophy; in which respect, he is the precursor of the Alexandrian church-teachers. The accounts of his life and education we must derive for the most part from his own writings; and it will be the safest course to confine ourselves in the first place to his two Apologies; inasmuch as these are the undoubted productions of Justin, and bear indubitable marks of a decided intellectual bent. As to his other writings, they must first be compared with these, before we can decide about their genuineness.

Flavius Justinus was born in the city of Flavia Neapolis, the ancient Sichem in Samaria: it was at that time a Roman-Greek colony, in which the Greek language and culture predominated. Probably it was not a decided taste for speculative inquiries, which in truth he did not possess, but the longing after some stable ground of religious conviction, that led him, with many others of his age, to the study of philosophy; and precisely for this reason the philosophy of Plato would present the most attractions for him. It was not so much true that he became a systematic follower of this philosophy, as that he adopted many of its ideas, and particularly such as were suited to meet the spirit of an age which felt the necessity of religion. But the spirit of this philosophy could not so pre-occupy his mind, as to unfit it, as it did many other minds, for other spiritual impressions. He informs us himself how he came to be a Christian.[1] "I also," says he, "was once an admirer of the doctrines of Plato; and I heard the Christians abused. But when I saw them meet death, and all that is accounted terrible among men, without dismay, I knew it to be impossible that they should live in sin and lust. I despised the opinion of the multitude; I glory in being a Christian, and take every pains to prove myself worthy of my calling."

After becoming a Christian, Justin still retained the mantle[2] which he had worn as a pagan philosopher and ascetic, availing himself of his former garb and mode of life as a means which enabled him easily to introduce, in his intercourse with men, religious and philosophical subjects, and through these to prepare the way for bringing home the gospel to their hearts. Thus he may be regarded as an itinerant preacher in the garb of a philosopher.[3] From one of his remarks in the second Apology, where, describing the Christian cultus, he says, "We conduct the convinced, after we have baptized them, to the assembled brethren," it has been too hastily inferred,[4] that he was ordained to the spiritual office. No such distinction was made, as yet, between clergy and laity, as renders it improbable that Justin expressed himself in this way on the principle of the universal Christian priesthood. But whether he

[1] Apolog. I. p. 50, 51.
[2] See vol. I. p. 275.
[3] Even if the Dialogue with Trypho were not genuine, yet on this point we might avail ourselves of the accounts it contains; since we might at least assume that the author was acquainted with the history of Justin's life.
[4] By Tillemont.

had been solemnly ordained, in the name of the church, to the office of an evangelist or not, — a question of little importance, — his gifts as a teacher would hardly be suffered to lie idle, when they could be so usefully employed, both in spreading the gospel among the Heathen, and in giving instruction to the churches themselves. If any reliance can be placed on the story of Justin's martyrdom, it would appear from this narrative, that, while he resided at Rome, a portion of the church, who understood the Greek language, were accustomed to meet and hear him discourse in his own house.

We remarked in the first section of this history,[1] that, soon after the death of the Emperor Hadrian, and at the beginning of the reign of Pius, the Christians were persecuted. It was on this occasion that Justin, who happened to be then living at Rome, felt himself called upon to present to the emperor a written defence of their cause. As the name of Marcus Aurelius with the title of Cæsar does not appear at the head of this document, it was probably written before Aurelius had been nominated to that dignity, which happened in the year 139.[2]

It is more difficult to determine at what time the work which goes by the name of the first Apology of Justin was written. The immediate occasion of his writing in defence of the Christians was an incident, which presents a striking illustration of the working of Christianity and of the persecutions. A woman of Rome, who with her husband had led an abandoned life, became a convert. She now refused to share any longer in the vices of her husband, and used all her influence to reclaim him. Being unsuccessful in this, and finding it impossible to remain connected with her husband without participating in his sins, she availed herself of the privilege allowed in such cases according to the doctrine of our Lord, and procured a divorce. In revenge, her husband accused her of being a Christian. The woman now petitioned the emperor, that she might first be allowed to arrange her domestic affairs, when she would submit the matter to a judicial investigation. The husband, perceiving that his vengeance against his wife was thus likely to be delayed, turned his malice upon her Christian teacher, whose name was Ptolemæus. The latter was seized by a centurion, and carried before the præfect of the city. Having boldly declared before the præfect that he was a Christian, he was condemned to death.

[1] See vol. I. p. 103.

[2] The superscription runs as follows: Αὐτοκράτορι Τίτῳ Αἰλίῳ Ἀδριάνῳ Ἀντωνίνῳ Εὐσεβεῖ Σεβάστῳ Καίσαρι καὶ Οὐηρισσίμῳ υἱῷ Φιλοσόφῳ καὶ Λουκίῳ φιλοσόφῳ (according to Eusebius, φιλοσόφου) καίσαρος φύσει υἱῷ καὶ Εὐσεβοῦς εἰσποιήτῳ, ἐραστῇ παιδείας, ἱερᾷ τε συγκλήτῳ καὶ δήμῳ παντὶ Ῥωμαίων. The first named is the Augustus Antoninus Pius, who had then entered upon his reign; the second, M. Antoninus Philosophus, to whom the Emperor Hadrian (at whose request Antoninus Pius adopted him) had given the name Annius Verissimus; the third, Lucius Verus Antoninus, who afterwards was co-regent with M. Aurelius. He was son of Lucius Ælius Verus, whom Trajan had adopted, and nominated Cæsar. After the early death of Lucius, he also, in compliance with the wish of Hadrian, was adopted by Antoninus Pius, who took the place of his father. The reading found in Eusebius is most probably the correct one; for it can hardly be supposed that Lucius Verus would have two epithets. The surname "philosopher" is quite incongruous applied to a youth but nine years old; while he might be styled, with perfect propriety, the ἐραστὴς παιδείας. The surname "philosopher" would sooner be given to the now deceased Ælius Verus, whom Spartianus calls "eruditus in literis."

Another Christian by the name of Lucius, on hearing this decision, said to the præfect: "Why do you condemn to death a man who is guilty neither of murder, nor theft, nor adultery, nor any other crime, but merely because he has called himself a Christian? Such a proceeding does not become the pious emperor, nor the philosopher, the emperor's son."[1] From these words, the præfect gathered that the speaker was also a Christian, and, upon his avowing that it was so, condemned him likewise to death. A third met with the same fate.

The question now arises, whether these events agree best with the reign of Antoninus Pius, or with that of Marcus Aurelius. We find nothing here which might not have happened under the reign of the former; for, as we have said,[2] the law of Trajan was in fact by no means repealed by the rescripts of Hadrian and of Antoninus Pius: the public confession of Christianity might still be punished with death, although the clemency of the emperor left it in the power of every well-disposed magistrate to exercise great indulgence. But is it *probable*, that a Christian would thus address the præfect, if the reigning emperor himself had issued a severe edict against the Christians as such?[3] Moreover, the Apology itself contains no allusion whatever to the existence of a new law against the Christians, for the repeal of which Justin was petitioning the emperor. It may be said that it is only to the times of M. Aurelius the language of Justin is applicable, where he speaks of confessions extorted by the rack from slaves, women and children, in which those popular rumors about the unnatural crimes, said to be committed in the Christian assemblies, were acknowledged to be true. Beyond question,[4] we find examples of such proceedings against the Christians first cited under the reign of M. Aurelius; but as popular fanaticism had already, from the time of Nero, set in circulation such reports against the Christians, the same fanaticism may have found many a magistrate, previous to the time of which we are speaking, disposed both to credit it and to administer to it. Besides, in the Apology which by universal consent is placed in the reign of Antoninus Pius, Justin only asks that men would cease to place reliance on the blind reports of the populace against the Christians. He says, it is true, that the things which happened at Rome in the time of Urbicus were everywhere occurring; that other governors acted in the same unreasonable manner; that generally, where an individual was reformed by Christianity, one of his most intimate relations or friends would appear as his accuser, — all which seems to agree chiefly with the times of general persecution under M. Aurelius. But in the times of Antoninus Pius also, the Christians in many districts were furiously attacked by the populace, whence the emperor was moved to publish those edicts which were designed to quiet the minds of the people. It is

[1] Οὐ *πρέποντα* Εὐσεβεῖ *αὐτοκράτορι, οὐδὲ φιλοσόφῳ* (according to Eusebius; the common reading, *φιλοσόφον*.)

[2] See vol. I. p. 105.

[3] The reasons alleged by Hr. Semisch (Studien und Kritiken, J. 1835, p. 939) against believing in the existence of any such law, are far from being satisfactory. The psychological problem is solved in the way I have shown in my account of this persecution. It might be conceded, however, that the words may possibly have been spoken before the publication of such a law

[4] See vol. I. p. 108.

singular too, that, in the above-cited titles of the reigning princes by the Christian Lucius, the surname "philosopher" should not be given to M. Aurelius, to whom it properly belonged, but should be transferred to Verus, to whom it did not belong and was never applied; while that of Antoninus Pius should be given to M. Aurelius, who in his lifetime was never known by that title.[1] Even if we rejected the reading in Eusebius, it would not help the matter; for, at the end of the Apology, the same predicates are once more subjoined to the names of the two emperors.[2] These reasons concur to show, that this Apology ought not to be placed, as it is by the common hypothesis, supported by the weighty authorities of Pagi, Tillemont, and Mosheim, in the reign of M. Aurelius; but in the times of Antoninus Pius, as is maintained by Valesius and Longuerue.

It is remarkable,[3] again, that Justin twice refers,[4] in this Apology, to something *he had said before*, which nevertheless does not occur in this Apology, but which is found in the first. He uses the same phrase, ὡς προέφημεν, which he employs elsewhere, when he refers to passages in the same document; — and this hardly admits of being reconciled with the long interval of time by which, on the other hypothesis, we must suppose the two Apologies were separated from each other.

With all this, we shall not deny that the authority of Eusebius is against us; for we must allow, that he seems to consider the first-cited Apology as the first, composed under the reign of Antoninus Pius, and to place the second under that of M. Aurelius.[5] It would be necessary, then, in retaining our own view of the matter, to suppose that the right relation of the two Apologies to each other had, in the time of Eusebius, already become confused; which assuredly is possible. But we should not omit also to remark, that, if this Apology was written in the reign of Antoninus Pius, it must seem strange that Lucius did not appeal to the laws enacted by that emperor against the popular attacks on the Christians, and favorable to their interests; since we must admit that in such laws the Christians were ever disposed to find more than they really contained.[6]

We have had occasion to speak already of Justin's peculiar idea with

[1] Comp. the reasons, certainly not without weight, which Semisch has presented in favor of the common explanation of these titles, in the Studien und Kritiken, J. 1835, S. 921.

[2] Εἰη οὖν ὑμᾶς ἀξίως εὐσεβείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας τὰ δίκαια ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν κρῖναι. That the epithet φιλόσοφος, which occurs at the beginning of the Apology of Athenagoras, whether applied to L. Verus or to Commodus, cannot serve to relieve this difficulty, is plain; since it may be easily shown, that the predicate, belonging properly to only one of the emperors, is attributed to them both in common, as the case there stands.

[3] As the Benedictine editor long ago noticed.

[4] According to the Benedictine edition, § 4, where he speaks of enmity to God; § 6, where he speaks of the incarnation of the Logos; and § 8, where he speaks of Heraclitus.

[5] By comparing II. 13 and IV. 16 (IV. 11 is less clear), and by comparing c. 17 with what precedes, we can scarce doubt that either the reading πρότερα is corrupt, or Eusebius so wrote through a mere oversight.

[6] Though I cannot think the difficulty so great as it is considered to be by Hr. Semisch (l. c. p. 920), who does not believe that a præfect under this reign would have acted in this manner; for Trajan's rescript was certainly still in full force, and a Christian who, before the civil magistrate, professed a religio illicita, and declared himself opposed to the state religion, had to be punished for his obstinacy (obstinatio.)

regard to the spermatic Word, (λόγος σπερματικός,) as related to the absolute, divine Logos, and constituting the transition-link betwixt Christianity and everything true and good in the times antecedent to Christianity — an idea which was laid hold of and prosecuted still farther by the Alexandrians. It is singular, however, that in Justin's other writings not a hint is to be found respecting this idea, so predominant in the Apologies. It might be said, indeed, Justin simply made use of this idea in accommodation to his particular purpose, which was, to render the philosophical emperor more favorably inclined to his propositions; but the supposition is an unnatural one. Forming our estimate of Justin especially from his own writings, we could hardly give him credit for possessing versatility of mind enough, to range so freely in a circle of ideas which had been merely borrowed from abroad to answer a present purpose. That more candid and liberal judgment of the Greek philosophy, and that impartial and fair statement even of opinions which he censures, we must regard rather as the expression of his real views. But in his other writings, which aimed at the conversion of the Heathens, he might beyond doubt have employed the same method with as good effect as in the Apologies. Why, then, did he not employ it? The case would appear still more singular, if we supposed, according to the common view, that Justin wrote the two Apologies in times so widely different.

We have a production, under the name of Justin, entitled an *Admonition to the Gentiles*, (παραινετικὸς πρὸς Ἕλληνας,) the design of which is to convince the Heathens of the insufficiency of their popular religion, as well as of their philosophical doctrines of religion, and of the necessity of a higher instruction from God himself. It is most probably the same treatise which we find cited by Eusebius and Photius under the title of *The Refutation*, (ἔλεγχος,) a title well suited to the contents.[1]

In this treatise, we find no trace of that milder and more liberal way of thinking which we observe in the Apologies, — no trace of that *peculiar circle* of *ideas* of which we have spoken, but rather the reverse. All true knowledge of God is here represented as derived solely from revelation. It is admitted, indeed, that among the Heathen there were many feeble though misunderstood echoes of the truth; yet these were derived from a misunderstood and corrupt tradition; — which agrees with the idea prevailing among the Alexandrian Jews, that a knowledge of the doctrines communicated by divine revelation to the Jews, had come to the Greeks through Egypt. While, in the Apologies, men are acknowledged to have existed among the Heathen, who, following the revelation of the λόγος σπερματικός, were witnesses for the truth before the appearance of Christianity, it is here asserted,[2] on the contrary: "Your own teachers have been constrained, even against their will, to say a great deal for us concerning divine providence; and particularly those of them who have resided in Egypt, and profited by the religion of Moses and his fathers."

[1] Comp. Semisch's thorough investigation respecting this writing in the first vol. of his "Monographie," p. 105, where also will be found a list of the authors on this subject.

[2] Cohortat. p. 15.

We cannot possibly suppose, that this treatise sprung from a mind of the same way of thinking, as that which produced Justin's Apologies. Yet, if we are disposed to ascribe it to him, we must at least not follow the common hypothesis, and consider it the first production of his after his conversion, but, on the contrary, one of his latest. We must suppose, that the mild and liberal way of thinking which he originally indulged, became afterwards more narrow and rigid; and that those views, resulting from the peculiar direction of his mind, and originally predominant with him, concerning the relation of the revelations of the λόγος σπερματικός to the revelation of the absolute Logos, which we find predominant in the Apologies, had at some later period been wholly suppressed by the notions which he had imbibed from the Alexandrian Jews concerning a source of outward tradition.[1] Such a change is indeed possible, and examples of the same kind are doubtless to be met with; but it may be a question, whether this treatise contains sufficiently decisive evidence of having proceeded from Justin, to make such an hypothesis necessary.

We have next, under the name of Justin, a short address to the Gentiles, (λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας,) with which indeed no title mentioned in the indexes to the writings of Justin among the ancients corresponds, but which, however, if we cannot consider it a production of Justin because it differs from the style of his writings,[2] bears at least the stamp of the same age. It is a rhetorical exhibition of the untenableness of the pagan doctrine concerning the gods, in which the finest passage is the conclusion: "The power of the Logos does not produce poets; it

[1] It is not to be denied, that these notions occur also in the Apologies; but they are kept more in the background, while the other view predominates. Apolog. II. p. 81: "All that philosophers and poets have said about the immortality of the soul, about punishments after death, about the intuition of heavenly things, or about similar doctrines, they have been enabled to know, and have unfolded, because they have been furnished with a clue to them by the prophets. Hence there seems to be one and the same sun of truth for them all; and it is plain, that they have not correctly understood it, if they contradict one another." So too, p. 92, Plato's doctrine of the creation is traced to Moses.

[2] Although I agree with Semisch in the result, yet I cannot approve the reasons which he adduces (p. 166) for deciding that the writing is not Justin's. The difference between the Admonitions and the Apologies is in fact greater than that which he makes so prominent between this writing and the other writings of Justin. What Justin says in the Apologies, respecting the motives which led him to abandon Paganism, may be easily reconciled with what he alleges here, when he speaks of his abhorrence of the immoralities in the pagan mythology; for although he had learned already, in the philosophical schools, to give another sense to the mythological narratives, yet this artificial concealment of the breach with the traditional religion could not satisfy him. He might then very justly mention this as one thing which led him to Christianity, though it was not the only one. In truth, one is not always under the necessity of expressing in full every thing that has contributed to induce a change in his convictions and mode of conduct. The manner, however, in which Christianity operated on him, he describes here not otherwise than he does in his other writings. Hr. Semisch labors under a mistake, when he supposes that in this writing he finds it made the boast of Christianity, that it does not form philosophers. *This* is not what is said; but that it makes men more than philosophers, — that it converts mortals into gods; and this, too, Justin might have said. Nor does it admit of being proved from this writing, that the author supposed no intermediate state after death, — no Hades as a transition stage; for, when he speaks of the return of redeemed souls to God, the reference is here to the ultimate end, — the final goal; and, moreover, the expression is too general and vague to furnish any grounds for deciding as to what the author's views were on this point.

does not create philosophers, nor able orators; but, by forming us anew, it makes of mortal men immortal, converts mortals into gods. It transports us from the earth beyond the limits of Olympus. Come, and submit yourselves to its influence. Become as I am, for I too was as you are: this has conquered me, the divinity of the doctrine, the power of the Logos; for as a master serpent-charmer lures out and frightens away the hideous reptile from his den, so the word drives the fearful passions of our sensual nature from the most secret recesses of the soul. And the cravings of lust having once been banished, the soul becomes calm and serene; and, delivered from the evil which had cleaved to it, returns to its Creator." [1]

The largest and most important work we have from Justin, is, next to the Apologies, his Dialogue with Trypho the Jew,—the object of which is to prove that Jesus is the Messiah promised in the Old Testament, and to refute the objections then commonly urged by the Jews against Christianity. Justin comes, probably to Ephesus, in company with Trypho a Jew, whom the war excited by Barcochba had driven from Palestine, and who was traveling about Greece; having there studied, and become enamored of the Greek philosophy. The philosopher's cloak, which Justin wore, led Trypho to accost him as he was taking a solitary walk; and a conversation arose between them about the knowledge of God, which Justin finally turns to the subject of Christianity. The conversation is supposed to be here put down in writing.

The unanimous testimony of the ancients assigns this Dialogue to Justin. The author intimates that he is the same Justin who wrote the Apologies, by citing a passage from the so-called *second* Apology, as his own production.[2] He describes himself in the introduction as one who had left Platonism for Christianity,—which applies perfectly well to Justin. No unprejudiced reader can deny, that the writing must have been composed by a contemporary of Justin, or at least by a man who lived very near to those times. Such being the case, no good reason can be imagined, why a man, who, as appears evident from this book, was by his own personal qualifications entitled to rank as high as Justin himself, should, instead of writing it in his own name, cause it to appear under that of a contemporary. Besides, the book is wholly free from those marks of studious design, so apparent in other forgeries of the same period, written for the purpose of giving spread to certain favorite opinions. The prevailing aim is a polemical one against Jews and Judaizing Christians; and here nothing was to be gained in the estimation of either party by using the name of the Samaritan pagan, and former Platonist.[3]

[1] Respecting the treatise "on the Unity of God," (*περὶ μοναρχίας*,) incorrectly ascribed to Justin, see the remarks of Semisch, l. c. p. 167.

[2] Vid. Simon Magus, Dial. Tryph. f. 349.

[3] The arguments brought against the genuineness of this book by Wetstein, Prolegomena in Nov. Test., and Semler in his edition of the same, 1764, p. 174, are drawn from the mode of citation from the Alexandrian version. Comp., on the other side, Stroth, in the Repertorium für bibl. u. morgenländ. Literatur, Bd. II. S. 74; next Roch, Justini M. Dial. c. Tryph. secundam regulas criticas examinat. et *νοθεύσεως* convictus, 1700,—a work which I have not seen; and

We may be struck, it is true, at meeting here with the same phenomena which we remarked in speaking of the "Refutation of the Gentiles;" but here the case is altered. We saw, in fact, that Justin is seeking to point out, on the one hand, the affinity of Christianity with the better sort of Greek philosophy, and, on the other, the unsatisfactory nature of that philosophy so far as it respects religion. Now, if in the Apologies, intended for the use of cultivated Pagans, particular prominence would necessarily be given to the former point of view; in a work, on the contrary, which is aimed against Jews, who sought in the Greek philosophy a supplement to the religious instruction of the Old Testament, this point of view would necessarily be kept wholly in the back ground. Yet, at the same time, there is an evident affinity of ideas between the Dialogue and the Apologies, even in that favorite thought of the Apologies relating to the λόγος σπερματικός. In like manner as in the first Apology, he says that men would have had some excuse for their sins, if the Logos had first revealed himself to mankind but a hundred and fifty years ago; if his agency had not been felt at all times among men through the medium of that λόγος σπερματικός: so, in the present treatise, he makes the same remark in reference to the moral ideas (φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι) inseparable from human nature, which force men everywhere to recognize sin as sin, and which, by the influence of the evil spirit, by bad education, manners and laws, were capable of being extinguished and suppressed rather than totally destroyed. What he says here also concerning that which had revealed itself at all times and by its own nature, as the goodness whereby alone men could please God,— in contradistinction to the ceremonial law, which was valid only as a means of discipline and culture for the Jewish hardness of heart, or as typical of the future,[1] — naturally leads to the idea of that λόγος σπερματικός, by which a moral consciousness was given to all mankind.

It is very true, that in the Apologies we find no trace of Chiliasm: but the *spiritual* ideas of eternal life and of the kingdom of Christ, which are so clearly displayed in the Apologies, stand in no manner of contradiction with this doctrine; and we should not forget that the Chiliasts themselves regarded the millennium as being but a medium of transition to a higher stage of existence. It may perhaps be explained, that this doctrine, which could not fail to be peculiarly offensive to the educated Heathen, was not mentioned by him in his Apologies, because, although important according to his own views, yet it did not belong to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, which latter, we must allow, he exhibited without the least disguise, even when they were offensive to the Heathen. In a dialogue designed to vindicate the Christian doctrine against the objections of the Jews, he had special occasion, on the contrary, to make this a prominent point, in order to show, that the Christians were orthodox in this particular, even according to the Jew-

Lange in the first vol. of his Dogmengeschichte, — an excellent refutation of Muenscher. Vid. Commentationes theologicæ, ed. Rosenmueller, Fuldner, et Maurer. T. I. P. II.

[1] Τὰ φύσει καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ ὂι ὅλου καλὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀγαθά. See f. 247, 264, 320.

ish representations. The antipathy to Gnosticism and to the doctrines of Marcion is strongly marked in both works; and with this spirit, Chiliasm at that time readily sympathized.

In respect to the doctrine of the Logos and of the Holy Spirit, we find in the Apologies and in the Dialogue a striking coincidence. Moreover, the thoughts and expressions which occur in both productions, exhibit still more evident marks of their having proceeded from the same author.[1]

We cannot determine with certainty, whether Justin actually had such a disputation with a Jew by the name of Trypho; but it is at least quite probable that various disputations with Jews furnished him an inducement to write such a Dialogue, as he had thereby acquired so intimate a knowledge of the Jewish theology of the age. He was always ready to give Jews and Gentiles the reasons of his faith. As we are not able to distinguish what is mere drapery in this Dialogue from what is fact, so neither can we find in it any sufficient marks by which to determine its exact chronology; but it is certain, from the citation out of the first Apology, that it was composed at a later period than the latter, and probably, when we take into consideration all that has been said, later than either of the Apologies.

Justin speaks of the power of the gospel, from his own experience, in the Dialogue, as well as in the Apologies. "I found in the doctrine of Christ," says he, "the only sure and salutary philosophy; for it has in it a power to awe, which restrains those who depart from the right way; and the sweetest peace is the portion of them that practise it. That this doctrine is sweeter than honey is evident; since we who have been formed by it, refuse to deny his name, even to death."

We have to regret the loss of a work which Justin wrote against all the heretical sects of his day, and of his book against Marcion. Whether the fragment of a work on the resurrection, which John of Damascus in the eighth century published under Justin's name, really belongs to him, is extremely doubtful: Eusebius, Jerome, and Photius, knew nothing of any such work. Their silence, however, is no proof that it was not his.[2]

Among the finest remains of Christian antiquity belongs the letter to Diognetus on the characteristics of the Christian worship compared with Paganism and with Judaism, which is found among the works of Justin. It contains that noble description of the Christian life, from

[1] The mystical interpretation of the Messianic passage, Gen. 49: 11. Apolog. II. p. 74: Τὸ γὰρ "πλύνων τὴν στολὴν αὐτοῦ ἐν αἵματι σταφυλῆς" προαγγελτικὸν ἦν τοῦ πάθους, οὗ πάσχειν ἐμελλε, δι' αἵματος καθαίρων τοὺς πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ· ἡ γὰρ κεκλημένη ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου πνεύματος διὰ τοῦ προφήτου στολὴ, οἱ πιστεύοντες αὐτῷ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἐν οἷς οἰκεῖ τὸ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ σπέρμα, ὁ λόγος, τὸ δὲ εἰρημένον αἷμα τῆς σταφυλῆς, σημαντικὸν τοῦ ἔχειν μὲν αἷμα τὸν φανησόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρωπείου σπέρματος, ἀλλ' ἐκ θείας δυνάμεως. Comp. with this the passage in Dial. Tryph. 273, which betrays the same author; only that, in the former passage, he makes use of expressions which were borrowed more from the Greek philosophy, as his purpose required that he should: Τὸ τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ ἀποπλύνειν μέλλειν τοὺς πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ ἐδήλου. Στολὴν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐκάλεσε τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τοὺς δι' αὐτοῦ ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν λαβόντας, ἐν οἷς ἀεὶ δυνάμει μὲν πάρεστι, καὶ ἐνεργῶς δὲ παρέσται ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ αὐτοῦ παρουσίᾳ. Τὸ δὲ αἷμα σταφυλῆς εἰπεῖν τὸν λόγον, δεδήλωκεν ὅτι αἷμα μὲν ἔχει ὁ Χριστὸς οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου σπέρματος· ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως.

[2] Comp. Semisch, l. c. I. S. 146

which we have already made a brief quotation. Its language, its thoughts, and the silence of ancient writers, prove, that the letter did not come from the hand of Justin. But the Christian simplicity which pervades it is an evidence of its high antiquity; to which may be added, that the author places Judaism and Paganism in the same category; that he seems not to consider the Jewish ritual as of divine origin, — and yet nothing properly Gnostic is to be found in the composition. Such an appearance can be explained only on the supposition of its belonging to a very early date.

The circumstance, however, that the author speaks of the Jewish sacrificial worship as an institution still in existence, would not warrant us to infer that it was written before the destruction of the temple at Jerusalem; for in a lively description, he might naturally represent as actually existing, an institution belonging to the past. Nor does he furnish us with any certain chronological mark, when he styles himself a disciple of the apostles; for so he might call himself as a follower of their writings and doctrines. There is some doubt, however, whether this passage in the beginning of the eleventh paragraph belongs to the genuine part of the letter.

What follows after this, came evidently from another hand. The remarks which here occur respecting the Jewish people, respecting the divine authority of the Old Testament, and the orthodoxy attaching itself to the decisions of the fathers, are not in harmony with the prevailing turn of spirit and mode of thinking which we find in this letter.

Justin expected, as he informs us himself in the Apology last cited, that a certain individual, Crescens by name, and a cynic by profession, — who belonged to one of the then famous classes of pretended saints, and used his great influence with the populace in stirring them up against the Christians, — would be the means of his death; for he had drawn on himself the particular hatred of that man by unmasking his hypocrisy. According to Eusebius, Crescens actually accomplished what he had threatened: but, in evidence of this, Eusebius adduces a passage from Tatian, Justin's disciple, which yet amounts to no proof;[1] for Tatian simply says that Crescens *sought* to destroy Justin, from whence certainly it does not follow that he actually accomplished his purpose.[2]

Eusebius may be right, however, in saying that Justin suffered martyrdom under the reign of Marcus Aurelius. This account agrees with a report of the martyrdom of Justin and his companions, which comes to us, it is true, through a suspected channel,[3] but yet possesses many internal marks which are more in favor of than against its authenticity.[4]

[1] § 19, orat. contra Græcos.

[2] Θανάτῳ περιβαλεῖν πραγματεύσασθαι.

[3] In the collection of the Metaphrast Symeon.

[4] The fact that no wonderful stories, nothing strained or exaggerated, occurs in it; that it contains nothing inconsistent with the simple relations existing among Christian communities in that age; that it makes no mention of Crescens, whereas we should expect, if such a tale of martyrdom had been invented by some *Græculus*, that Justin's death would be ascribed to the contrivance of Crescens, and the latter, as a principal character, be made the subject of many fables.

Next after Justin follows his disciple, Tatian of Assyria, of whom we have already spoken in our account of the Gnostic sects.[1] He has himself furnished us, in the only work of his, soon to be mentioned, which we possess, the means of tracing the history of his religious development. He was educated a Heathen; and his extensive travels afforded him an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the multifarious kinds of heathen worship which then existed in the Roman empire. Not one among them all appeared to him to be a reasonable worship. He saw religion everywhere made an instrument for the service of sin. Nor could he be satisfied with the fine-spun allegorical interpretations of the ancient fables, which represented them as symbols of a speculative system of nature; and it seemed to him dishonorable for one to join in the popular worship, who could not fall in with the common religious persuasion, nor see in the doctrine of the gods anything else than symbols of the elements and agencies of nature. The mysteries, also, into which he became initiated, seemed to him not to answer the expectations which they excited; while the conflicting systems of the philosophers furnished no certain ground of religious conviction. The contradiction which he often observed in pretended philosophers, between the affected gravity of their costume, of their looks and discourses, and the frivolity of their conduct, filled him with distrust. While in this state of mind, he happened to light upon the Old Testament, to which his attention had been drawn by what he had heard concerning the high antiquity of these writings compared with the religion of the Greeks,— as might very naturally happen to a Syrian. As to the impression made on his mind by the perusal of the Old Testament, he remarks himself: "These writings won my confidence by the simplicity of their style, the unaffected directness of the speakers, the intelligible account of the creation; by the predictions of future events, the salutary tendency of the precepts, and the prevailing doctrine of one God."[2] The impression which he received from the study of the Old Testament, seems, accordingly, to have prepared the way for his belief in the gospel.[3] Having made a visit to Rome while in this state of mind, he was there converted to Christianity through the instrumentality of Justin, of whom he speaks in terms of high veneration.

After the death of the latter, he wrote his Discourse to the Gentiles, in which he vindicates the "philosophy of the barbarians" (*φιλοσοφία τῶν βαρβάρων*) against the contempt of the Greeks, who nevertheless had received the germs of all science and arts originally from the barbarians. In the view he takes of the relation of the Greek philosophy as well as religion to Christianity, we recognize the *later* much more than the *earlier* Justin. We have remarked on a former occasion,[4] that in this work the germ already appears of that speculative and ascetic way of thinking, which he had probably brought along with him from Syria; as we

[1] See vol. I. p. 456.

[2] Tatian had therefore already been convinced of the untenableness of polytheism, and indeed become satisfied that no religion but a monotheistic one could be true.

[3] It would be very strange, then, that Tatian should subsequently become an anti-Jewish Gnostic; but we have already observed (p. 456–7) that we are by no means warranted to adopt this supposition.

[4] See p. 456.

may also perceive in it some obscurity of style which was peculiar to the Syrians. He says to the Heathens: "Wherefore would you excite the religions of the state to a conflict with us? And wherefore, if I am unwilling to follow your religious laws, should I be hated as the most impious of men? The emperor commands us to pay tribute; I am ready to pay it. The Lord commands us to serve him; I know how I am bound to serve him: for men are to be honored after the manner of men; but *that* God only is to be feared, who can be seen by no human eye, and comprehended by no human art. Only when bidden to deny *him*, shall I refuse to obey, but choose rather to die, that I may not appear both false and ungrateful."

Next after Tatian, follows Athenagoras, who addressed his Apology (πρεσβεία περὶ χριστιανῶν) to the emperor Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus.[1] Of his personal history we have no definite accounts. Only two of the ancient writers name him,—Methodius, and Philip of Sida. This Philip of Sida, the last head of the Alexandrian catechetical school, is the only individual who enters into any details respecting the life of Athenagoras;[2] but the known incredibility of this author, the discrepancy between his statements and other more authentic reports, and the suspicious condition in which his fragment has come down to us, render these details unworthy of confidence. Neither the remarks of Athenagoras concerning the second marriage, nor what he says of the ecstacy of the prophets, whom he represents as blind organs of the activity of the Holy Spirit, would suffice to prove that he was a Montanist; for, as we have remarked before, the Montanists said nothing on these points that was altogether new: they only pushed to the extreme a way of thinking on religious subjects and on ethics which was already existing.

Of this Athenagoras, we have still remaining a work in *Defence of the doctrine of the Resurrection.*

In connection with the Apologists, we may notice a certain Hermias, of whom we know nothing, save that he wrote a short satire against the heathen philosophers (διασυρμὸς τῶν ἔξω φιλοσόφων.) His aim is, to bring together a number of absurd and contradictory opinions from the Greek philosophers, without presenting anything positive of his own;—a procedure which could hardly serve any useful purpose; for, to convince those who had been philosophically educated, something more was necessary than this sort of declamation; and the uneducated needed no such precautions against the errors of the philosophers, and no such negative preparation for the reception of the gospel. We see in Hermias one of those bitter enemies to the Greek philosophy, attacked by Clement of Alexandria, who, following the idle Jewish legend, pretended that the Greek philosophy had been derived from fallen angels. In the title of his book, he is called the philosopher: perhaps before

[1] See the treatise of Mosheim concerning the time when this Apology was composed, in the first vol. of his Commentationes ad hist. eccles. pertinentes.

[2] Published by Dodwell, Dissertat. in Irenæum. He reports that Athenagoras lived in the times of Hadrian and of Antoninus Pius; that he presented his Apology to these emperors; and that he was catechist before Clement at Alexandria.

his conversion he wore the philosopher's mantle; and, after it, passed from an enthusiastic admiration of the Greek philosophy to extreme abhorrence of it. It turns on the differences of natural disposition and of the mode of conversion, whether the new Christian principle will seek after what is related to it in the earlier transition-system, or rather present itself only in stern hostility to it.

The community in the great capital of Roman Asia in the East — that flourishing seat of learning — could not fail to be supplied with church-teachers of a regular scientific education; and the contact into which these were thrown with educated Heathens, and with the Gnostics, whose native country was Syria, would naturally stimulate their literary activity. Under the emperor Marcus Aurelius, Theophilus became bishop of this community. After the death of this emperor, and in the reign of Commodus, he wrote an apologetical work in three books, addressed to Autolycus, a Heathen, whose objections against Christianity moved him to compose this treatise, in which he displays great erudition and power of thought. From this work we have already made some extracts. It is worthy of notice, that this Theophilus, who wrote against Marcion and Hermogenes, had also composed commentaries on the sacred scriptures. We may here observe the germ of that exegetical bent of the church at Antioch, of which we shall again have occasion to speak at the close of this section.[1]

We have before observed, how a tendency, antagonistic to the germinant Gnosis, grew out of the reactions of the Johannean spirit in Asia Minor,— a tendency which sought to preserve uncorrupted and in its practical significancy the historical and objective side of Christianity; but we have seen also how this tendency might be misled, by its opposition to Gnosticism, to surrender itself too much to the influence of a material Jewish element. And owing to the common interest of Christianity and the church in the struggle with Gnosticism, spiritual elements among which very important differences otherwise existed, here came to be combined. Thus might even those with whom the Jewish element more strongly predominated, find in this common opposition, which caused all other differences to be overlooked, a point of agreement; as we see, for example, in the case of Justin, who certainly was far from being inclined to Ebionitism, and yet judged far more mildly of those who bordered on this position, provided only they did not refuse to acknowledge the Gentile Christians as brethren in the faith, than he judged of the Gnostics. Thus it may be explained, why

[1] Jerome cites, c. 25 de vir. ill. a commentary of his in evangelium (which may denote the entire corpus evangeliorum) and on the Proverbs; but adds, qui mihi cum superiorum voluminum elegantia et phrasi non videntur congruere. But, in the preface to his commentary on Matthew, he cites, very distinctly, commentaries of Theophilus; and in his letter to Algasia, tom. IV. f. 197, he cites, as it seems, an explanatory harmony or synopsis of the evangelists by the same author (qui quatuor evangelistarum in unum opus dicta compingens.) It is possible, indeed, that all this refers only to one and the same work. We have nothing more of his, (as the Latin fragments which go under the name of Theophilus do not belong to the present Theophilus,) unless other fragments may still be found in the Catenæ. The examples which Jerome gives of his method of interpretation, are remote from the spirit of the later Antiochian school; for they savor of an allegorizing fancy, which, however, might be expected from his Alexandrian education, — so easy to be recognized in the first-cited work.

Hegesippus, a church-teacher, of strong Jewish coloring and Jewish origin, who lived under the reigns of the emperors Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, and from whom proceeded the first attempt to compose a church history, should show himself inclined to favor the anti-Gnostic tendency of the church. In the reign of the last-named emperor, this father — perhaps for the purpose of reconciling the differences existing between the communities which followed Jewish and those which followed Gentile customs, or to convince himself by personal observation of the agreement in essentials among all the ancient churches — undertook a journey to Rome, where he spent some considerable time. The result of his inquiries and collections was embodied in five books of ecclesiastical events (*πέντε ὑπομνήματα ἐκκλησιαστικῶν πράξεων.*) In prosecuting such a work, we may well suppose that he would adopt many corrupt traditions of Jewish origin, and be influenced by various errors growing out of the low, sensual conception of a Jewish Christian. The sketch he gives of James, who was called the brother of our Lord, is drawn quite after the Ebionitic taste.[1] From a quotation made by Stephanus Gobarus,[2] a monophysite author who lived near the close of the sixth century, we might conclude indeed, that, as a decided Ebionite, he was opposed to the Apostle Paul; for in the fifth book of his History of the Church, after citing the words in 1 Corinth. 2: 9, "What eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither has entered into the heart of man," — he remarks this is false, and those who use such language contradict the sacred scriptures and the Lord, who says, "Blessed are your eyes, that they see; and your ears, that they hear," Matth. 13: 16.[3] If we refer these words of Hegesippus to the above-cited passage from Paul, it would seem to follow, that he accused the latter of a false doctrine, or, at least, charged him with having quoted something as scripture, which is not to be found in the scriptures. But the concurrence which Hegesippus expresses in the universal tradition of the church, and his connections with the church of Rome, are against this supposition; according to which, he must necessarily have been opposed to them both.

By several critics of church history in recent times, the matter has been represented in a directly opposite way. Proceeding on the assumption that Hegesippus was given to the above-mentioned anti-Pauline Ebionitism, they have thought themselves warranted to infer from his testimony of concurrence just alluded to, that in the greater portion of the church, and in the Roman church particularly, a kindred spirit prevailed. But our opinion is, that this argument proves too much, and therefore nothing at all; for, if this result were a correct one, it would follow that we must just reverse the whole church history of the first centuries, and suppose changes, of which there is not the slightest indication, but which only would be sufficient to account for the more general recognition of the apostolical authority of Paul. That the Roman church did not take its departure from a

[1] Euseb. l. II. c. 23.
[2] In Photius, cod. 235.
[3] *Μάτην μὲν εἰρῆσθαι ταῦτα καὶ καταψεύδεσθαι τοὺς ταῦτα φαμένους τῶν τε θείων γραφῶν καὶ τοῦ κυρίου λέγοντος κτλ*

fundamental Jewish principle, we believe has been proved by our exposition of the facts. What shall we say of a method of scientific investigation, which erects a theory on some obscure, isolated passage, in conflict with the more certain results which flow from the investigation of the credible and plenteous sources of the ancient church? And as Hegesippus believed that he found the pure doctrine of Christ in the first epistle of Clement to the Corinthians,[1] where the Pauline element is not to be mistaken, he cannot have been an opponent to Paul, as he necessarily must have been, if it were really his intention, by the words above quoted, to controvert this apostle.

So far as we can judge, (without knowing in what connection those words of Hegesippus occurred,) we may rather conjecture, therefore, that he made this remark, not in opposition to Paul,[2] but, in his flaming zeal against the adversaries of the sensual Chiliasm, who doubtless might employ the above-cited passage from Paul, and others of the like character, to controvert the sensual representations of future happiness.

The controversy *respecting the time of the Easter festival*,[3] and respecting the prophetic spirit of Montanism, furnished afterwards, in addition to the disputes with the Gnostics, and the Apologies against the Gentiles, new materials for the literary activity of these church-teachers. The catalogue of the writings drawn up by Melito, bishop of Sardis, whom we have already cited as the author of an Apology addressed to the emperor Marcus Aurelius, shows on what sort of matters the attention of the church-teachers of Asia Minor was at that time employed. We find among them the following: — Rules of life, and of the prophets; of prophecy; of the Church; of the Revelation of John (writings which, collectively, may have had reference to the great point of the Montanistic controversy;) the Key (ἡ κλεις) (perhaps also referring to the same subject, and alluding to the key of the church in the disputes about penitence;) a discourse on the Lord's day (perhaps with reference to the controversies between Jewish and Gentile Christians on the observance of the Sabbath or of Sunday;) of the *corporeity* of God;[4] in defence of the material, anti-Gnostic views. The contents of the following writings might also relate to the controversy with Gnosticism: — Of the nature of man; of the creation; of the soul, whether from the body or from the spirit; of the birth of Christ; of truth; of faith; of the senses in obedience to faith.[5] The importance of these topics, which entered so deeply into the life of the church in this period, gives us the more occasion to regret the loss of such writings.[6]

[1] Euseb. l. IV. c. 22.

[2] It may be a question in fact from what source he took these words, as it is still an unsettled point from whence Paul himself made the citation.

[3] See above, vol. I. p. 298.

[4] Περὶ ἐνσωμάτου θεοῦ. These words, it is true, may be understood, — of God who appeared in the body; therefore, of God who became man: but the comparison with the account which the trustworthy Origen gives of the contents of this book (fragment. commentar. in Genes. vol. II. opp. fol. 25) compels us to adopt the interpretation given above.

[5] For the catalogue of these writings, see Euseb. l. IV. c. 26.

[6] Comp. on this point the learned and thorough disquisition of my worthy colleague and friend Prof. Piper, in the Studien und Kritiken, J. 1838, 1stes Heft. Would that the author might be induced to furnish

A contemporary of Melito was the Claudius Apollinaris, bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia, whom we have mentioned on a former occasion. His writings, although not so voluminous, treated on many of the same topics.[1]

From the school of these church-teachers of Asia Minor proceeded Irenæus, who, after the martyrdom of Pothinus, became bishop of the community at Lyons and Vienna.[2] He still remembered in his old age what he had heard in his youth from the lips of the venerable Polycarp, concerning the life and the doctrines of Christ and of the apostles. In a writing addressed to Florinus, a false teacher with whom, in his youth, he had enjoyed the society of Polycarp, he says: "These doctrines, the elders who preceded us, who associated also with the apostles, did not teach thee; for while I was yet a boy, I saw thee in company with Polycarp in Asia Minor; for I bear in remembrance what happened then, better than what happens now. What we have heard in childhood, grows along with the soul and becomes one with it; so that I can describe the place in which the blessed Polycarp sat and spake; his going in and out; his manner of life, and the shape of his person; the discourses which he delivered to the congregation; how he told of his intercourse with John and with the rest, who had seen the Lord; how he reported their sayings, and what he had heard from them respecting the Lord, his miracles and his doctrine. As he had received all from the eye-witnesses of his life, he narrated it in accordance with scripture. These things, by virtue of the grace of God imparted to me, I listened to, even then, with eagerness; and wrote them down, not on paper, but in my heart; and by the grace of God, I constantly bring them up again fresh before my memory. And I can witness before God, that if the blessed and apostolic presbyter had heard such things, he would have cried out, stopped his ears, and, according to his custom, said, 'O my good God! upon what times hast thou brought me, that I must endure this!' and he would have fled away from the place where, seated or standing, he had heard such discourses."[3] The same spirit which expresses itself here, passed over to Irenæus. Of his peculiar practical turn of mind, in his mode of conceiving and treating the doctrines of faith; of his zeal for the essentials of Christianity, and his moderation and liberality of mind in all controversies about unessential outward things, we have spoken before. We have also remarked, that he probably stood forth as a peacemaker between the Montanists and their fierce adversaries. This supposition accords most fully with the spirit of his writings; for that he held many opinions and tendencies which coincided with the spirit of Montanism, and therefore contributed also to make Tertullian especially

soon a more ample work relating to these matters, as the fruit of his zealous researches during a series of years in this wide field of the ancient fathers!

[1] If in the Catenæ — especially the Catenæ published at Leipsic, 1772, of Nicephorus on the Octateuchus — the fragments belonging to this Apollinaris were duly separated from those belonging to Apollinaris of Laodicea; and the fragments which are found in Eusebius, and in the Chronicon Paschale Alexandrinum, were compared with them, we should have better means of determining the characteristics of this church-teacher.

[2] See above, vol. I. p. 84.

[3] Euseb. l. V. c. 20

dear to him, is a circumstance which, after what has been said before respecting the relation of Montanism to the views of the church, cannot possibly serve to prove that he was a Montanist himself. If he had been a zealous Montanist, he would hardly have refrained, when touching upon any favorite theme of Montanism, to have appealed himself also to the new disclosures imparted by the Paraclete; but he uniformly appeals to the scriptures alone, or to the traditions of those elders of Asia Minor. We cannot possibly suppose indeed, that, where he speaks of the condemnation of false prophets,[1] he means by these the Montanistic prophets; for he probably cherished too high a regard for the Montanists to do that: but if he were an ardent Montanist, he would hardly have omitted in this case to mention, in connection with the false prophets, the opponents also of the true prophets, since he reckons together here all that was worthy of condemnation. Instead of this, there immediately follows a passage which marks the spirit of Irenæus,[2] as being far rather that of a lover of peace, who sought to prevent the schism between the Montanistic communities and the other churches, who even hushed the disputes in the controversy about Easter. "The Lord," he says, "will judge those also who excite divisions, who are destitute of the love of God, and seek their own profit, but not the unity of the church, — who, for slight and frivolous reasons, rend, and, so far as in them lies, destroy the great and glorious body of Christ; straining in truth at a gnat, and swallowing a camel. But all the good they can do, can never compensate the evil of schism."

Any stamp of Montanism it would be impossible to find, except in those words of Irenæus where he combats the extreme antimontanistic tendency of those adversaries of John's gospel, who have been mentioned on a previous page.[3] When he speaks with so much heat and acrimony against those who refused to acknowledge the prophetic gift in the church, but looked on everything that pretended to be prophecy as nothing but the inspiration of fanaticism or of the evil spirit, charging them with the unpardonable sin against the Holy Ghost, he departs widely indeed from that character of moderation which he uniformly displays, except where he has anything to do with the Gnostics. But this simply shows the great importance which he attached to the extraordinary phenomena of Christian inspiration, as marking the continued communication of life to the church by the Holy Spirit; a remark which is confirmed, moreover, by many expressions in his writings. In this is involved no essential character of Montanism; for on this point, too, Montanism simply exhibited, as may be gathered from what has already been said, the extreme position of a tendency of the religious spirit which had been existing long before in the church. Moreover, if Irenæus lays stress on the fact, that the prophetic spirit was poured out on women as well as men; and if he assumed and believed that

[1] Lib. IV. c. 33, § 6.

[2] From the very manner in which Tertullian, adv. Valentinian, c. 5, notices Irenæus, we may infer that he was no Montanist; otherwise Tertullian would have called him, as he does Proculus just afterwards, "noster."

[3] See above, pp. 526, 583

he found proof in 1 Corinth. 11 : 4, 5, that the prophetic calling, by an exception to the general rule, authorized women to speak in the church assemblies; even this would afford no conclusive evidence of his connection with Montanism. But he remarks, at the same time, of his opponents, that they reduced to nothing those spiritual gifts, which, by the good pleasure of the Father, had been poured out in the last times on the human race.[1] And the question now is, whether he intended here the effusion of the Holy Spirit connected with the first appearance of Christianity, or one which laid the foundation of a new special epoch in the progressive development of the church. If the latter is the case, he would thus have recognized the mission of the new prophets, but at the same time have sought to prevent a schism between the communities adhering to these prophets and the rest of the church.

The principal work of Irenæus, which, for the most part, has come down to us only in the old verbal Latin translation, together with several important fragments of the Greek original, is his *Refutation of the Gnostic System*, in five books; a work which presents us with the most faithful transcript of his mind.

Many writings of Irenæus, we know only by their names. He himself cites a work, wherein he had treated *a topic* which seems to lie remote from the direction of mind common to these church-teachers; viz., "the peculiarities of the style of Paul," his frequent use of *hyperbata*.[2] The work, as we may conjecture, did not relate *particularly* to the peculiar style and phraseology of this apostle; but the topic might be occasionally touched upon by Irenæus, in attacking the arbitrary method of the Gnostic exegesis. He attributes this peculiarity of Paul's style to the crowd of thoughts pressing for utterance from his ardent mind;[3] — an important remark in its bearing on the development of the notion of inspiration; for it in fact implies a distinction of the divine and the human element, — the consciousness that all is not to be traced in like manner to the actuation of the Holy Spirit; but that some regard is to be had also to the form, conditioned by the characteristic individuality and self-activity of the man. Such a mode of apprehending the notion of inspiration, by which the informing agency of the Holy Spirit is not conceived to preclude the natural evolution in entire harmony with psychological laws, but rather gives that evolution the form in which it works, is clearly implied also in many of the expressions of Tertullian; as when he assumes that the Apostle Paul did not always follow the same method in his apostolical work — supposes in him a progressive development of the Christian spirit — asserts that he was at first, when the life of grace began in him, stern and uncompromising; but afterwards became milder; — at first, like the Neophyte, pronounced with more emphasis his opposition to former principles; but afterwards learned to moderate this, to become all things to all

[1] Ut donum Spiritus frustrentur, quod in novissimis temporibus, secundum placitum Patris, effusum est in humanum genus.

[2] Lib. III. c. 7: Quemadmodum de multis et alibi ostendimus hyperbatis eum utentem.

[3] Propter velocitatem sermonum suorum et propter impetum, qui in ipso est, spiritus.

men.[1] Two opposite elements, that is to say, came together here in the case of these church-teachers: the exclusively supranaturalistic view of inspiration, derived from the Jews, and specially applied by them to the prophetic element of the Old Testament, — which supposed an altogether passive state of the soul; and the conception which, after the analogy of the Christian consciousness, was derived from contemplating the apostolical writings in their characteristic individuality, — a conception, however, which uttered itself only in single occasional remarks, but without attaining to any systematic and matured form. We should remark, however, that Montanism, in giving special prominence to the former notion, yet applying it only to the properly prophetic states, led the way, by this very means, to a mode of distinguishing, from this extreme point of ecstatic inspiration, lower stages in which consciousness was filled by the divine Spirit, but the human self-activity operated, as it was animated by that Spirit.[2]

Of the writings belonging to this Father, which we find noticed among the ancients, we shall mention, besides those already named, only two letters, possessing an historical importance on account of their object; for they are said to have been the means of healing certain divisions in the Roman church. One of these is addressed to Blastus, who was probably a presbyter in the church of Rome. The fact stated in the appendix to Tertullian's Prescriptions may have been not without some foundation; that Blastus had occasioned a division in the Roman church, by adhering to the custom of Asia Minor with regard to the time of holding Easter. This accords fully with the times of the Roman bishop Victor. Perhaps to this he united also several other Judaizing notions.

The other letter was addressed to Florinus, a presbyter, with whom Irenæus, in early youth, had lived in the society of the venerable Polycarp, and who, as it seems, had pushed Monarchianism, or the doctrine of one only Creator of all existence, to such an extreme, as to make God the author of evil.[3]

[1] Paulus adhuc in gratia rudis, ferventer, ut adhuc Neophytus, adversus Judaismum; postmodum et ipse usu omnibus omnia futurus, ut omnes lucraretur. c. Marcion, lib. I. c. 20.

[2] Thus Tertullian distinguishes what Paul (1 Corinth. 7) set forth, on the ground of the common principles of Christianity, as *human counsel*, and what he taught as revelation of the divine Spirit: Cum ergo, qui se fidelem dixerat, adjecit postea, Spiritum Dei se habere, quod nemo dubitaret etiam de fidelibus, idcirco id dixit, ut sibi apostoli fastigium redderet: proprie enim apostoli Spiritum Sanctum habent, in operibus prophetiæ et efficacia virtutum documentisque linguarum, non ex parte, quod cæteri. Exhortat. castitatis, c. 5.

[3] From the title of the book, as it is cited by Eusebius, l. V. c. 26, it is difficult to make out what there was peculiar in the opinions of Florinus. The title is as follows: Περὶ μοναρχίας, ἢ περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ποιητὴν κακῶν. The first part of this title may doubtless be understood to mean, that Florinus, as a Gnostic Dualist, had denied the doctrine of the *μοναρχία*: but with this, the second part does not agree; for the words cannot refer to any such fact, as that Florinus held to an absolutely evil principle, or a Demiurge, as the author of an imperfect system of the world. In this case, the title must have run thus: Περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι θεὸν τὸν ποιητὴν κακῶν. Nothing else, therefore, can be understood, than that it was the design of Irenæus to show how the Monarchian doctrine ought to be maintained, so as not to make the μία ἀρχή the ἀρχὴ τῶν κακῶν; and that Florin, therefore, had made God the author of evil, either by teaching a system of absolute predestination. — which many uneducated Christians derived from passages of the Old Testament, too literally understood, (according to Origen, Philocal. c. 1

One of Irenæus' disciples, according to Photius,[1] was Hippolytus, who took an important place among the ecclesiastical writers belonging to the first half of the third century. Of his works, however, but a few fragments still remain. True, the testimony of Photius does not suffice of itself to establish beyond a doubt, that he was a disciple of Irenæus: but since, as appears evident from his citation, he had before his eyes certain statements of Hippolytus himself respecting his relations to Irenæus; since there is nothing in this writer's theological drift, so far as we can understand it from the fragments and titles of his works, — if we may form any judgment, from these titles, of the subject-matter and tendency of his labors as an author, — which contradicts this supposition, but, on the contrary, much which favors it, we may allow the fact to have been so.

Hippolytus was a bishop. But as neither Eusebius nor Jerome was able to name the city in which he was bishop, we can say nothing more definite on the matter; and neither those later accounts, which transfer his bishopric to Arabia,[2] nor the others, which place it in the neighborhood of Rome,[3] deserve consideration. Certainly, there is much in favor of the supposition, that his field of labor was in the East; but, on the other hand, much also which seems to show that it was in the West. Both of these suppositions easily admit of being reconciled with each other, by distinguishing the different periods of his life; and the very circumstance, that his field of labor was at different times in different countries, may have been the occasion of the indefiniteness which we observe in the ancient accounts.

The complete list of his writings is obtained by comparing the testimonies in Eusebius and Jerome.; the notices of his works which are found on his statue,[4] dug up in the year 1551, near Rome, on the road to Tivoli; the accounts of Photius; and the catalogue of Ebedjesu,[5] a Nestorian author in the thirteenth century. From this list we see that he composed works on a variety of subjects, exegetical, dogmatic, polemical, and chronological; besides homilies.

We shall mention none of his writings, except those which, on account

f. 17: *Τοιαῦτα ὑπολαμβάνοντες περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁποῖα οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ὠμοτάτου καὶ ἀδικωτάτου ἀνθρώπου,*) — or by making God the creator of an absolutely evil being, whether a conscious or an unconscious one (a *ὕλη*.) Again, if Florin had barely entertained one of the common Gnostic doctrines concerning the origin of evil, Irenæus would not have said, that no other heretic had ever as yet ventured to bring forward such views. And, moreover, when Eusebius says, that Florin subsequently had allowed himself to be carried away by the doctrines of Valentine, and Irenæus had been induced by this fact to write his book, *περὶ ὀγδοάδος*, against him, (see above the account of the Gnostic systems,) it seems certainly to follow from this, that the previous doctrines of Florin were *not Gnostic*. We may conceive, then, that, when Florin perceived the untenableness of a theory which placed the cause of evil in God, he fell into the other extreme, and supposed an independent principle of evil existing out of God.

[1] Cod. 121.

[2] According to the conjecture of some authors, Portus Romanus, or Aden in Arabia; — a report which perhaps originated in a misconception of the passage in Eusebius, l. VI. c. 20.

[3] Portus Romanus, Ostia.

[4] He is represented sitting on his episcopal chair, *κάθεδρα* or *θρόνος*: under him is the Easter-cycle of sixteen years, which he prepared, *κανὼν ἐκκαιδεκαετήρινος*, upon which there is a critical essay in the second vol. of Ideler's Handbuch der Chronologie, p. 214. An engraving of the monument itself is to be found in the first vol. of Fabricius' edition of the works of Hippolytus.

[5] In Assemani Bibliotheca orientalis, T III. P I.

of the topics they discuss, are worthy of notice in an historical point of view. In respect to those of an exegetical character, Jerome signifies, that he anticipated Origen in giving the example of more full and copious expositions of scripture, and that Origen's friend Ambrosius had advised the latter to follow the same plan. He must also have somewhere met with Origen, either at Alexandria, in Palestine, or Arabia; since Jerome cites a homily of Hippolytus in praise of the Saviour, which he had pronounced in Origen's presence.[1] His exegesis, if we may judge from the few remaining fragments, was of the allegorizing kind.

In the catalogue of his writings found on the ancient monument occurs a work: *Ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ Ἰωάννην εὐαγγελίου καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως.* This can hardly be a commentary on these two books of scripture, though Jerome seems to cite a commentary of Hippolytus on the Apocalypse; but the title denotes rather a treatise in defence of these books. The title which Ebedjesu gives to the work also agrees with this supposition. We must conceive it, then, to have been the design of this treatise to defend the genuineness of these scriptural books, and to vindicate them against the objections of the *Alogi*. If, in this case, it would appear that Hippolytus was an opponent of the ultra-Antimontanists, yet with this accords the fact, also, that he had written a work on the *charismata*.[2] It might be taken into consideration, moreover, that by Stephanus Gobarus the judgments of Hippolytus and of Gregory of Nyssa, respecting the Montanists, are set one against the other; so that we may conclude the former belonged with the defenders of the Montanists. Whether the *κεφάλαια πρὸς Γαΐον*, which Ebedjesu ascribes to him, ought here to be brought also into the account, (upon the supposition, namely, that this Caius was the warm opponent of Montanism,) cannot be certainly determined.

A work *against thirty-two heresies* is cited as belonging to Hippolytus. It ends, according to Photius, with the heresy of Noetus. He stated, as Photius cites, that he had availed himself in this work of a series of discourses by Irenæus against these false teachers.[3] His treatise against Noetus, which has been preserved, and probably formed the conclusion of the work, we have alluded to on a former occasion.

We have besides from him a writing of little importance, *concerning Antichrist*, with which also Photius was acquainted. The same compiler cites from him a commentary on Daniel, from which he adduces the noticeable fact,[4] that Hippolytus set the end of the world at five hundred years after the birth of Christ. In the circumstance of his fixing on a period more remote than it was commonly represented to be in the early church, we discern the effect of the tranquil times which the church then enjoyed under Alexander Severus.

[1] Perhaps much light would be thrown on the history of the Epiphany and Christmas festivals, if these homilies had been preserved to our times.

[2] It cannot be determined with entire certainty, whether this work bore the title: *Ἀποστολικὴ παράδοσις περὶ χαρισμάτων*, or whether the work on the charismata and the exhibition of the apostolic tradition were two different productions.

[3] The words of Photius are: *Ταύτας (τὰς αἱρέσεις) δὲ φησὶν ἐλέγχοις ὑποβληθῆναι ὁμιλοῦντος Εἰρηναίου· ὧν καὶ σύνοψιν ὁ Ἱππόλυτος ποιούμενος τόδε τὸ βιβλίον φησὶ συντεταχέναι.*

[4] Cod. 202.

In the list of the writings of Hippolytus, found on the monument of which we have spoken, occurs a προτρεπτικὸν πρὸς Σεβῆρειναν. It is scarcely to be doubted, that this is the same treatise from which Theodoret, in his ἐρανίστης, quotes several passages, under the title of a letter to a queen or empress, (πρὸς βασιλίδα,) which passages Fabricius has collected in his edition of Hippolytus. The subject-matter of them corresponds with the title which the work bears on the monument. It is an exposition of the doctrines of the Christian faith for the use of a heathen lady. The Severina referred to must therefore have been a queen or empress. But the name Severina can hardly be quite correct; — it should be Severa; — and there is every reason to suppose it was Severa, the wife of the emperor Philip, the Arabian.[1]

The theological development of *the North-African Church* preserved a character altogether peculiar to itself. The theological spirit that prevailed here was continually shaping itself into a more settled form, from the time of Tertullian to that of Augustin; and afterwards, through Augustin, acquired the greatest influence over the whole Western church.

Tertullian presents special claims to attention, both as the first representative of the theological tendency in the North-African church, and as a representative of the Montanistic mode of thinking. He was a man of an ardent and profound spirit, of warm and deep feelings; inclined to give himself up, with his whole soul and strength, to the object of his love, and sternly to repel everything that was foreign from this. He possessed rich and various stores of knowledge; which had been accumulated, however, at random, and without scientific arrangement. His profoundness of thought was not united with logical clearness and sobriety: an ardent, unbridled imagination, moving in a world of sensuous images, governed him. His fiery and positive disposition, and his previous training as an advocate or rhetorician, easily impelled him, especially in controversy, to rhetorical exaggerations. When he defends a cause, of whose truth he was convinced, we often see in him the advocate, whose sole anxiety is to collect together all the arguments which can help his case, it matters not whether they are true arguments or only plausible sophisms; and in such cases the very exuberance of his wit sometimes leads him astray from the simple feeling of truth. What must render this man a phenomenon presenting special claims to the attention of the Christian historian is the fact, that Christianity is the inspiring soul of his life and thoughts; that out of Christianity an entirely new and rich inner world developed itself to his mind: but the leaven of Christianity had first to penetrate through and completely refine that fiery, bold, and withal rugged nature. We find the new wine in an old bottle; and the tang which it has contracted there, may easily embarrass the inexperienced judge. Tertullian often had more within him than he was able to express: the overflowing mind was at a loss for suitable forms of phraseology. He had to *create* a language

[1] See vol. I. p. 126.

for the new spiritual matter, — and that out of the rude Punic Latin, — without the aid of a logical and grammatical education, and as he was hurried along in the current of thoughts and feelings by his ardent nature. Hence the often difficult and obscure phraseology; but hence, too, the original and striking turns in his modes of representation. And hence this great church-teacher, who unites great gifts with great failings, has been so often misconceived by those who could form no friendship with the spirit which dwelt in so ungainly a form.

Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus was born, probably at Carthage, in the later times of the second century. His father was a centurion in the service of the proconsul at Carthage. He was, at first, an advocate, or perhaps a rhetorician; nor did he embrace Christianity until he had arrived at the age of manhood. He then obtained, if Jerome's account is correct, the office of presbyter; whether at Rome or at Carthage is, however, doubtful. The latter place is, in itself, the most probable; since in different writings, composed at different times, he discourses like one who was settled in Carthage; though the reports of Eusebius and Jerome speak for the former.[1] (Tertullian's conversion to Montanism may be satisfactorily explained from its affinity with the original bent of his mind and of his feelings.)

His writings run through the widest range of topics relating to Christian doctrine and to Christian life; and it is here particularly important to distinguish those of his works which bear the stamp of Montanism, from those in which there are no traces of that error.[2]

[1] The words of Eusebius, l. II. c. 2: τῶν μάλιστα ἐπὶ Ῥώμης λαμπρῶν, do not say directly, that when a Christian he took an important place in the Roman church; but, according to the connection, may very well mean, that, before his conversion to Christianity, he stood in high repute at Rome as a jurisconsult (for the arbitrary translation of Rufinus — "inter nostros scriptores admodum clarus" — must at all events be rejected:) but we might then, to be sure, still infer, that, if Tertullian lived at Rome when a Heathen, and enjoyed there so high a reputation, it is also probable that he was there first clothed with a spiritual office. Jerome says that he had been moved to embrace Montanism, by the envy and calumnies of the Roman clergy. But such stories, with which the ancient fathers were so apt to impose on themselves, are always very suspicious; because the inclination was but too strong to ascribe invariably to some outward cause any defection from the Catholic church to the heretics; and Jerome, in particular, although he respected the cathedra Petri in the Roman church, was yet inclined to repeat over bad stories about the Roman clergy, who had occasioned him so much annoyance during his residence in Rome, especially after the death of Damasus. He was particularly prone to accuse them of envy towards great talents.

[2] A more full investigation of this topic may be found in my Monograph on the spirit of Tertullian. I will here only add a few remarks in reference to the objections made against what I have asserted, by Dr. von Cölln. The passage concerning fasts and mortifications cannot at all be considered as an evidence of the Montanism of the author; for a voluntary ἄσκησις was certainly resorted to by many who were no Montanists. The expression, "jejunia conjungere," might, although not necessarily, be understood as referring to a — not Montanistic — *superpositio*, (continuation of fasting from Friday to *Saturday*, on which no Montanist fasted.) Besides, the whole manner in which penitence is here spoken of, the spirit of gentleness which breathes through every remark, does not savor of Montanism. As to the work *on the prescriptions*, I do not find myself led, in reviewing it, to alter my opinion of it, as not having originated in Montanism. The words, "alius libellus hunc gradum sustinebit," contr. Marcion. l. I. c. 2, Tertullian might use concerning a work written already, no matter whether by himself or by some other person, personifying it as an advocate. From the circumstance, that, in the symbol of faith, c. 13, the doctrine of creation *from nothing* is made particularly prominent, it by no means follows, that he had already had to sustain a conflict with Hermogenes; for, even in the controversy with the Gnostics,

It is a question difficult to determine, whether Tertullian always remained in the same connection with the Montanistic party, or whether, at some later period, he again inclined more to the Catholic church, and endeavored to strike out a middle path between the two parties. The reports of Augustin [1] and of Prædestinatus,[2] as well as the account given by the latter [3] of a Montanistic work of Tertullian, in which he labors to diminish the number of controverted points between the two parties, favor indeed the latter supposition; and on this hypothesis many writings of Tertullian which are moderately Montanistic, or which merely border on Montanism, might be assigned to a different period of his life. These accounts, however, are not sufficiently worthy of credit. From the disposition of Tertullian, it may easily be conceived, that he would persevere in the mode of thinking he had once shaped out for himself, and only become the more obstinate by opposition. The distinct sect of *Tertullianists*, which appears to have existed in the fifth century at Carthage, furnishes no evidence in favor of that supposition; for it is possible that this sect, holding to the peculiar opinions of Tertullian, had been formed at a later period, when separated from the correspondence with the Montanistic churches in Asia.

The study of Tertullian's writings had manifestly an important influence on the development of Cyprian as a doctrinal writer. Jerome states, after a tradition which was said to have come from a secretary of Cyprian, that the latter was in the habit of reading something daily from the writings of Tertullian, whom he was accustomed to call emphatically the *Teacher*.[4]

Concerning the character, the labors, and the most important writings of Cyprian, we have already said enough in various places. We shall only mention here a remarkable work of Cyprian's, his three books of testimonies, (testimonia,) consisting of a collection of the most important passages of the Bible, to prove that Jesus is the Messiah promised in the Old Testament, and to serve as a foundation for the scheme of Christian faith and morals. The collection was intended for the use of a certain Quirinus, who had requested the bishop to draw

this article was necessarily made a prominent point; and the connection in which the words there stand, intimates that it was the Gnostics, rather than Hermogenes, whom he had in mind. Besides, it is certain from c. 30, that, when Tertullian wrote this book, Hermogenes had already come out with his peculiar opinions; but it cannot possibly be proved, that Hermogenes might not have broached his opinions a great while before Tertullian wrote his book against him. From the cursory manner in which Tertullian speaks of him in the Prescriptions, we might conjecture, that he was then considered by him as a person of no great importance; and that it was not until the Montanistic interest was superadded to other occasions of hostility, that he was led to engage in a more detailed attack of the doctrines of Hermogenes. The way in which he speaks of the emanation of the Logos, cannot be called Montanistic; for he expresses himself after the same manner in the Apologeticus, confessedly not a Montanistic writing, c. 21. And on the passage in the book de patientia, c. 1, compare the remarks on page 619.

[1] Hæres. 86.

[2] H. 86.

[3] H. 26.

[4] Da magistrum, said he to his secretary; Jerome de viris illustribus, c. 53. To see what use he makes of Tertullian's writings, compare particularly the writings of Cyprian de oratione dominica and de patientia with Tertullian's treatises on the same subjects; and de idolorum vanitate with the Apologeticus.

up for him, as a daily exercise and aid to the memory, a short abstract of this sort, embracing the essential points of scriptural faith and practice. As Cyprian calls him "my son," it cannot have been a bishop or presbyter for whom Cyprian had prepared a collection of this sort, to be used as a guide in imparting religious instruction.[1] When we compare together the introduction to the second and to the third books, it becomes very probable, that the individual to whom Cyprian wrote was a layman of his own church, whom he would assist in making himself perfectly familiar with the practical truths and most important rules bearing on all the principal relations of the Christian life.[2] This collection, then, would serve to show the intimate connection subsisting between the bishop and those members of his flock who were solicitous about the welfare of their souls, and the anxiety he felt to bring each individual to a more familiar acquaintance with the divine word; a wish which he particularly expresses in the beautiful words at the conclusion of the preface to the first book: "More strength will be imparted to thee, and the insight of thy understanding will continually grow clearer, if thou searchest more carefully through the Old and New Testament, and diligently perusest all parts of the holy scriptures; for I have only drawn for thee a little out of the divine fountain to send thee in the mean time. Thou canst drink more copiously and satisfy thyself, when, with us, thou also approachest to the same fountain of divine fulness, to drink after the same manner."

The particular rules, which Cyprian sets forth and supports with passages from scripture, evince the deep interest which he took in counteracting the erroneous notion, that it would be possible to satisfy the demands of the gospel and to obtain salvation by a mere outward profession and observance of Christian ceremonies; but at the same time also show how important he felt it to be, that the laity should be deeply impressed with reverence for the priestly order, understood according to the principles of the Old Testament.

In the same country, not long after Cyprian, followed a writer known to us only by a production of some importance on account of its bearing on the history of Christian manners and of Christian worship, namely, Commodian.[3] His work is composed in verse, and entitled *Rules of Living* (Instructiones, exhortations and admonitions.) He describes himself in the preface as one who had formerly been devoted to Paganism, and had been led by the study of the Bible to see the

[1] As we might be led to suppose from the words at the beginning, "quibus non tam tractasse, quam tractantibus materiam præbuisse videamur." On this supposition we could only presume, that he had prepared the collection as an assistant for a deacon or a catechist, a *doctor audientium*. But the following words show, that the collection was also designed for the purpose of impressing deeply on the memory, by frequent perusal, certain important passages and doctrines of scripture. It must have been intended, then, to serve at the same time as a guide for the religious teacher, and as a manual for the catechumens. The view expressed above, however, is the most natural one.

[2] Quæ esse facilia et utilia legentibus possunt, dum in breviarum pauca digesta et velociter perleguntur et frequenter iterantur.

[3] Gennadius, (c. 15,) has nothing more to say about him, than what might be gathered by any one out of his writings.

vanity of Paganism, and to embrace the Christian faith.[1] He intimates that as he believed, with the great majority, death to be the end of man's personal existence, he was especially attracted by the promise of an eternal and divine life, which was presented to him in the scriptures.[2] He complains of himself as one who, by falling into sin after baptism, had subjected himself to the penance of the church: this he confesses in his address to the pœnitentes,[3] whom he exhorts to surrender themselves to mortification for their sins, but not to despair; to seek after the physician and the right means of cure, and not to separate themselves from the church.[4] And in encouraging his Christian brethren to the conflict, he says that he does not in self-exaltation address them as the just one.[5] Considering the extent to which the hierarchical element flourished in North Africa, it is the more remarkable to observe how he ventures, though a layman, to admonish and censure even the clergy. While avaricious teachers allowed themselves to be bribed by presents, or induced, by the respect of persons, to be silent, where they ought to have reproved sinful conduct, he felt constrained to rouse the misled laity out of their security.[6] We discern the more free spirit, incapable of bowing the knee to priestly dignity, which had passed over to him from the study of the Bible, by which he had been led to Christianity. The Christian spirit, however, in these admonitions, which evince so lively a zeal for good morals, is disturbed by a material Jewish element, a crass Chiliasm; as for example, when it is affirmed that the lordly masters of the world should in the millennium do menial service for the saints.[7]

The work was composed at a time when the church enjoyed quiet, perhaps under the reign of Gallienus, and refers to the recent persecutions, to the multitude of the lapsed, to the schisms of Felicissimus and Novatian. The author testifies himself, that he wrote in the third century.[8]

We have still to mention here, as belonging to the same church, Arnobius, although he discovers a doctrinal training more particularly his own, and the spirit of the North-African church, at least in the time when he appeared as a Christian author, seems to have exercised no influence on him; — a fact which may be accounted for, if we consider

[1] Ego similiter erravi tempore multo,
Fano prosequendo, parentibus insciis ipsis,
(His parents were Pagans, which class is denoted throughout this work by the term "insciis.")
Abstuli me tandem inde, legendo de lege.

[2] Gens et ego fui perversa mente moratus,
Et vitam istius sæculi veram esse putabam,
Mortemque similiter sicut vos judicabam adesse;
Cum semel exisset, animum periisse defunctum. N. 26.

[3] Namque, fatebor enim, unum me ex vobis adesse
Terroremque linquendum: sensi ipse ruinam.
Idcirco commoneo vulneratos cautius ire. N. 49.

[4] Pœnitens es factus, noctibus diebusque precare:
Attamen a matre noli discedere longe,
Et tibi misericors poterit altissimus esse.
Tu si vulnus habes, herbam medicumque require.

[5] Justus ego non sum, fratres, de cloaca levatus:
Nec me supertollo, sed doleo vestri. N. 61.

[6] Si quidam doctores, dum exspectant munera vestra,
Aut timent personas, laxant singula vobis;
Et ego [non] doleo, sed cogor dicere verum.
And afterwards:
Observas mandatum hominis (the clergy) et Dei devitas.
Tu fidis muneri, quo doctores ora procludunt,
Ut taceant, neque dicant tibi jussa divina.
Me vera dicente, sicut teneris, prospice Summum. N. 57.

[7] Nobilesque viri, sub antichristo devicto, (Nero, who was to burn Rome,)
Ex præcepto Dei rursum viventes in ævo
Mille quidem annis, ut serviant sanctis, et alto
Sub jugo servili, ut portent victualia collo. N. 80.

[8] Et si parvulitas sic sensit, cur annis ducentis
Fuistis infantes; numquid et semper eritis? N. 6

the free, independent manner in which he seems to have come to Christianity, through the reading of the New Testament, especially the gospels. He was a rhetorician of Sicca, in Numidia, under the reign of the emperor Diocletian.[1] His writings bear testimony of the literary acquirements considered necessary for a rhetorician in so considerable a city. Jerome narrates in his chronicle, that Arnobius, who till then had ever been an enemy to Christianity, was moved by a dream to embrace the faith; but that the bishop, to whom he applied, knowing his hostility to Christianity, would not trust him, and that hence Arnobius was led to write his apologetical work, (the septem libros disputationum adversus gentes,) to prove to him the honesty of his convictions. This story has come to be suspected as a foreign interpolation; for certainly it stands here wholly out of place. That all this should have taken place in the twentieth year of Constantine, (in the year 326,) is a manifest anachronism. Arnobius appears, moreover, like one who had been led to the faith after a long protracted examination, and not by a sudden impression from dreams. The work does not show the novice, who was still a catechumen, but a man already mature in his convictions, if he was not orthodox according to the views of the church.

At the same time, however, we are not warranted for these reasons to reject the narrative entirely. We have already had occasion to remark,[2] how, by such impressions, many were prepared for conversion. By this, indeed, it is not meant to be asserted, that his conversion was due wholly to such impressions; — his own work, we must admit, would speak against this. But if Arnobius was devoted, as it is evident from the passages about to be cited that he was, to blind heathen superstition, it is so much the less improbable, that powerful outward impressions were requisite, in order that the zealous Pagan might be induced, in the first instance, to enter upon the examination of Christianity. But, however this may have been, it seems probable that he had been convinced of the truth for some time before he offered himself for baptism; — a fact easily explained, especially when we consider the circumstances of the times. His apologetical work seems to have been written, it is true, in consequence of an impulse from within, and not by any outward occasion. But it may have been, also, that his determination to make a public profession of Christianity, and to appear as a public defender of Christianity, had been conceived at one and the same time, and that it was with this determination he proceeded to the bishop. Subsequently, the bishops were often too little disposed to mistrust those who became Christians from outward motives. But that a bishop, in these dubious times of the church, when he saw before him a man who had expressed himself with bitterness against Christianity, should fear that he had to do with a malicious spy, is not so improbable. And now, for the purpose of dispelling his doubts at once, Arnobius produces his Apology. He speaks of the change which had been wrought in himself by Christianity, in the following manner:[3] "O blind infatuation! But a short time ago, I worshipped

[1] Hieronym. de vir. illustr. c. 79. [2] See vol. I. p. 75. [3] Lib. I. c. 39

the images that had just come from the furnace of the smith, the gods that had been shaped on the anvil and by the hammer. When I saw a smooth worn stone, besmeared with oil, I addressed it, as if a living power were there, and from the senseless stone prayed for benefits to myself, thus doing foul dishonor even to the gods, whom I esteemed as such, when I supposed them to be wood, stone, or bones, or imagined that they dwelt in such things. Now that I have been led by so great a Teacher in the way of truth, I know what all that is."

As to the time when Arnobius wrote his work, he gives it himself, when he says,[1] that it was 1050 years, or not much less, since the building of Rome. This would coincide, according to the Æra Varroniana, then commonly adopted, (the building of Rome being 753 B. C.,) with the year 297 of the Christian era. But this cannot stand so; since the work contains evident allusions to those persecutions under Diocletian which first broke out in the year 303.[2] We must, therefore, either suppose, that Arnobius adopted some other era than the common one, or that the exact number did not occur to him,[3] or that he had written on the work at different times. He says to the Heathen:[4] "If you were animated by a pious zeal for your religion, you should long ago have rather burned those writings, and demolished those theatres, in which the scandal of the gods is daily made public in shameless plays. For why did our scriptures deserve to be committed to the flames, and our places of assembly to be destroyed, in which the Supreme God is worshipped, peace and blessing invoked on all who are in authority, on the army and the emperor, joy and peace on the living and those who have been liberated from the bonds of the flesh; — in which nothing else is heard, but what is calculated to make men humane, gentle, modest, and pure; ready to communicate of their substance, and to become kinsmen of all those who are united in the same bond of brotherhood?"

Moreover, the objection brought by the Heathens against Christianity, which moved Arnobius to write, (as he says himself,) indicates the point of time in which he wrote; for it was precisely the same charge which had occasioned the Dioclesian persecution; namely, the public calamities, which had arisen because the worship of the gods had been supplanted by Christianity, and because men no longer enjoyed their protection and aid. Arnobius justly replies to this: "If men, instead of relying on their own wisdom, and following their own devices, would but make the experiment of following the salutary and peace-bringing doctrines of Christ, how soon would the face of the world be changed, and iron, instead of subserving the art of war, be converted into implements of peace!"

Important as the *Roman* church became, through its outward ecclesiastical influence, and through the influence of the political element of the Roman spirit on the development of the church, yet it was from

[1] Lib. II. c. 71.
[2] See vol. I. p. 147.
[3] This is the most natural supposition; for certainly the chronology of Arnobius is not accurate. Thus, lib. I. c. 13, he says: Trecenti sunt anni ferme, minus vel plus aliquid, ex quo cœpimus esse Christiani.
[4] Lib. IV. c. 36.

the first comparatively barren in respect to all theological science. The care for the outward being of the church, which here became predominant, seems early to have suppressed the interest in theology as a science. But *two* individuals appear to have distinguished themselves as ecclesiastical authors, among the Roman clergy, neither of whom, however, could be compared perhaps with a Tertullian, a Clement, or an Origen,— the presbyter Caius, whom we have already noticed as an opponent of the Montanists, and the presbyter Novatian, who has also been mentioned. Of the writings of the former, none have come down to us. Of the latter, we have some brief expositions of the more important Christian doctrines, particularly of the doctrine of Christ's divinity, and of the Trinity. According to Jerome, (§ 70,) this work was an abstract of a larger work by Tertullian. At all events, however, this author was something more than a mere follower in the direction of some other man's mind. He shows that he had a mind of his own. Without possessing the power and depth of Tertullian, he had a more decidedly intellectual bent.[1]

Next we have from him a writing on the *Jewish laws respecting food*, consisting of a playful allegorical exposition of them, with the design to show, that they are no longer obligatory on Christians.[2] We see from this production, that it was written by a bishop, removed at a distance from his church by persecution, who was in the habit of constant correspondence with them, and sought to guard them from being led astray by Pagans, Jews, and heretics; all which suits perfectly to a Roman church, Rome being the residence of a multitude of Jews. The only difficulty is, to see how this writing could have come from a presbyter; — the author speaks as no one, at that time, but a bishop, could speak to his church. We know, moreover, from the letter of Cornelius, that, during the Decian persecution, Novatian had not removed from Rome. We must therefore call to mind the relation in which Novatian stood to the churches which acknowledged him as their bishop; and it is the most natural hypothesis, that he wrote this work under the first persecution of Valerian,[3] by which so many bishops were separated from their churches.

We may mention last, as belonging to the Roman church, a man whose felicitous and dramatic representations, seized from the life, replete with good sense, and pervaded by a lively Christian feeling, give him an important place among the Apologists of this period — Minucius Felix, who, according to Jerome, before his conversion to Christianity, had acquired reputation at Rome as an advocate. He lived, probably, in the first half of the third century, but before Cyprian, who availed himself of his writings. We have already had occasion to

[1] Novatian's adversary, the Roman bishop Cornelius, seems, in Euseb. l. VI. c. 43, manifestly to allude to this writing, when he calls Novatian: ὁ δογματιστής, ὁ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπεράσπιστής. A remark which doubtless hints also at the fact, that such a phenomenon was not so common among the clergy of *Rome*.

[2] Jerome names this work as one which came from Novatian, and also two others, on the sabbath and on circumcision, cited by Novatian as two letters that had preceded this letter to his church; in which letters he designed to show quæ sit vere circumcisio et quod verum sabbatum.

[3] See vol. I. p. 137.

make some extracts from this Apologetical Dialogue, which is entitled the *Octavius*.

We pass now to the teachers of the Alexandrian school, concerning whose relation to the progressive development of the church, we have spoken in a previous part of this history. Of the individual whom we find named as the first eminent teacher of this school, *Pantænus*, (Πανταῖνος,) the philosopher converted to Christianity, no written remains have reached us. Our only knowledge of him is through his disciple Clement.

Titus Flavius Clemens first became a Christian at the age of manhood: hence he classed himself with those who abandoned the sinful service of Paganism for faith in the Redeemer, and received from him the forgiveness of their sins.[1] He convinced himself of the truth of Christianity by free inquiry, after he had acquired an extensive knowledge of the systems of religion and the philosophy of divine things known at his time in the cultivated world.[2] This free spirit of inquiry, which had conducted him to Christianity, led him, moreover, after he had become a Christian, to seek the society of eminent Christian teachers of different tendencies of mind in different countries. He informs us,[3] that he had had various distinguished men as his teachers: an Ionian in Greece; one from Cœlo-Syria; one in Magna Grecia, (Lower Italy,) who came originally from Egypt; an Assyrian in Eastern Asia (doubtless Syria;) and one of Jewish descent, in Palestine. He finally took up his abode in Egypt, where he met with the greatest Gnosticus, who had penetrated most profoundly into the spirit of scripture. This last was doubtless none other than Pantænus. Eusebius not only explains it so, but also refers to a passage of Clement[4] in his *Hypotyposes*, where he had named him as his instructor. Perhaps when Pantænus entered on the missionary tour which has been mentioned before, Clement became his successor in the office of catechist, and at the same time, or still later, a presbyter in the Alexandrian church. The persecution under Septimius Severus, in the year 202, probably compelled him to retire from Alexandria.[5] But after this juncture the history of his life and place of his residence are involved in great obscurity. We only know, that, in the beginning of the reign of the emperor Caracalla, he was at Jerusalem, whither even at this early period many Christians, especially ecclesiastics, were accustomed to travel, partly for the purpose of surveying with their own eyes the places rendered sacred by the memorials of religion, partly for the benefit which might be derived from a more familiar knowledge of these countries, in elucidating the scriptures. Alexander, bishop of Jerusalem, who was at that time in prison on account of the faith, recommended him to the church at Antioch, whither he was travelling, by a letter, in which he called him

[1] Pædagog. lib. II. c. 8, f. 176.
[2] Πάντων ὰὰ πείρας ἐλθὼν ἀνὴρ. Euseb. Præparat. Evangel. lib. II. c. 2.
[3] Strom. lib. I. f. 274.
[4] Lib. VI. c. 13.
[5] Euseb. lib. VI. c. 1.

a virtuous and tried man, and intimated that he was already known to the Antiochians.[1]

We have *three works* from his hand, which form, as it were, a connected series; since his starting point is the idea, that the divine teacher of mankind, the Logos, first conducts the rude Heathen, sunk in sin and idolatry, to the faith; then progressively reforms their lives by moral precepts; and finally elevates those who have undergone this moral purification to the profounder knowledge of divine things, which he calls *Gnosis*. Thus the Logos appears first exhorting sinners to repentance, converting the Heathen to the faith (προτρεπτικός;) then as forming the life and conduct of the converted by his discipline (παιδαγωγός); and finally, as a teacher of the Gnosis to those who are purified.[2] This fundamental idea is the conducting thread of his three works, which still remain, — the *apologetical* or protreptic; the *ethical* or pedagogic: and the one containing *the elements of the Gnosis*, or the Stromata.[3] Clement was not a man of systematic mind. Many heterogeneous elements and ideas, which he had received in his various intercourse with different minds, were brought together in him — a fact which occasionally becomes evident in his *Stromata*, and which must have been still more clearly evinced in his *Hypotyposes*, hereafter to be noticed, if Photius rightly apprehended him. By occasional lightning flashes of mind, he operated, without doubt, to excite the minds of his disciples and readers, as we see particularly in the example of Origen. Many fragmentary ideas, sketched with masterly power, and containing the germs of a thorough, systematic theological system, lie scattered in his works, amidst a profusion of vain and hollow speculations.

As regards his Stromata, it was his express design in this work, as he testifies in many places, to bring together a chaotic assemblage of truth and error out of the Greek philosophers and the systems of the Christian sects, in connection with fragments of the true Gnosis. Each should find out for himself what suited his case; it was his aim to excite rather than to teach; and he often purposely only hinted at the truth, where he might fear to give offence to *the believers*, (πιστικοῖς,) who were as yet incapable of comprehending these ideas. The eighth book of this work is wanting; for the fragment of dialectical investigations, which at present appears under the name of the eighth book of the *Stromata*, evidently does not belong to this work. As early as the times of Photius, the eighth book was already lost.[4]

We have to regret the loss of the ὑποτυπώσεις of Clement,[5] in which he probably gave samples of dogmatic investigations and expositions on the principles of the Alexandrian Gnosis. Fragments of this work, consisting of short expositions of some of the catholic epistles, which have come down to us in the Latin translation,[6] perhaps also the frag-

[1] Euseb. lib. VI. c. 11.

[2] Καθαρὰν πρὸς γνώσεως ἐπιτηδειότητα εὐτρεπίζων τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναμένην χωρῆσαι τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τοῦ λόγου. Pædagog. l. I. c. 1.

[3] Like the similar word, κεστός, a usual designation at that time for works of miscellaneous contents.

[4] Vid. Cod. 111.

[5] Probably it should be translated: Sketches, shadings, general outlines. Rufinus translates: adumbrationes.

[6] See vol. II. of Potter's edition

ment of the ἐκλογαὶ ἐκ τῶν προφητικῶν, belong to this class. From the larger work, it was customary to make abstracts on particular parts of the sacred scriptures for common use, and several of these abstracts have been preserved to our times; which may have contributed, with other causes, to the loss of the entire work.

There is some mystery about the fragment of an abstract from the writings of Theodotus, and of the διδασκαλία ἀνατολική (that is, of the theosophic doctrine of Eastern Asia) which has been preserved among the works of Clement; — a document of the highest authority in relation to the Gnostic systems. It is perhaps the fragment of a critical collection, which Clement had drawn up for his own use, during his residence in Syria. Of Clement's work on the time of the passover;[1] of his dissertation: Τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος, which furnishes so much information relative to the history of the Christian system of morals and of his work: περὶ προφητείας, we have spoken already on a former occasion.

Origen, with the surname Adamantios,[2] was born in Alexandria in the year 185. In connection with his early culture, it is important to remark, that his father Leonides, a devoted Christian, and, as it is conjectured, a rhetorician, was in a condition to give him a good literary as well as a pious Christian education. Both had an abiding influence on the direction of his inner life: the development of mind and heart proceeded, in his case, with equal step; a striving after truth and after holiness continued ever to be the actuating tendency of his life. As we have remarked before, that the Bible at that time was not reserved exclusively for the study of the clergy, but was also the devotional book of families, so we may see from the example of Origen, that a wise use was also made of it in the business of education; and we may observe at the same time its happy effects. Leonides made his son commit daily a portion of sacred scripture to memory. The boy took great delight in his task, and already gave indications of his profoundly inquisitive mind. Not satisfied with the explanation of the literal sense, which his father gave him, he required the thoughts embodied in the passages he had committed to be fully opened out, so that Leonides frequently found himself embarrassed. The father chided, indeed, his inconsiderate curiosity, and exhorted him to be satisfied, as became his years, with the literal sense; but he secretly rejoiced in the promising talents of the youth, and with a full heart thanked God that he had given him such a son. Often, it is said, when the boy was asleep, he would uncover his breast, kissing it as a temple where the Holy Spirit designed to prepare his dwelling, and congratulated himself in possessing such a treasure.

The trait just alluded to in the early character of Origen discloses

[1] Of a kindred nature doubtless were also the contents of the writing which Eusebius cites: Κανὼν ἐκκλησιαστικὸς, ἢ πρὸς τοὺς Ἰουδαΐζοντας.

[2] In case this surname were given to him after his death, we must not follow the strained interpretation of Photius, c. 118, "because Origen's proofs resembled adamantine bonds," but rather the interpretation of Jerome: "from his iron diligence, as we commonly express it." Hence he was also called συντάκτης and χαλκέντερος. Yet Eusebius, l. VI c. 14, seems to cite this cognomen as one which Origen bore from the first.

to us already that tendency of mind, which, unevenly developed, and misled by a wrongly conceived opposition to the contrary error, betrayed him into an arbitrary allegorizing method of interpretation; but under more favorable conditions, and with the helps and appliances necessary to the harmonious education of the biblical interpreter, would have made him a thorough and profound expositor of the scriptures. By his father, this inclination was checked rather than encouraged. But if the intellectual and religious bent of Origen was determined at an early period by the influence of the theological school at Alexandria, this inclination must have soon found means of nourishment, and ripened to maturity. As we afterwards become acquainted with Origen from his writings, there is incontestable evidence of the influence which Clement had exerted on his theological development; we find once more in his works the predominant ideas of the latter, systematically unfolded. Now it is certain [1] that he was, at least when a boy, a scholar of Clement the catechist. But a youthful indiscretion of Origen (hereafter to be noticed) into which he was led by a grossly literal interpretation of sacred scripture, proves, that in his youth he was still at a far remove from the theological direction of his later years; and he says of himself, in allusion to this false step of his youth: "I, who once knew Christ, the divine Logos, only according to the flesh and the letter, now no longer know him so." [2] It is quite evident from this, that the education of his father had more influence in giving the first religious direction to the mind of Origen, than the instructions of Clement, and that the influence on him of the Alexandrian theological spirit belongs to a period of development still later in his life. We admit that a great deal of obscurity continues to rest on the history of his early training, which the poverty of our materials will not allow us to clear away. The religion of the heart was at first uppermost with Origen; and this great teacher, too, must be numbered with those in whom the early direction given to the feelings by a pious education has acted as a check on the too intellectual tendency of their later studies.

The above-mentioned persecution which befel the Christians in Egypt under the reign of Septimius Severus gave the youth of sixteen an opportunity of displaying the ardor of his faith. The example of the martyrs fired him with such enthusiasm, that he was ready to avow himself a Christian before the pagan authorities, and expose himself to certain death.

[1] According to Eusebius, l. VI. c. 6. Alexander, bishop of Jerusalem, who was either born in Alexandria, or had come there in his youth to place himself under the instructions of its catechists, seems indeed to hint in his letter to Origen, that the latter had enjoyed the society of Pantænus, although not directly, that he was his scholar: "We recognize as our fathers, those blessed men who have gone before us, Pantænus and Clement, who was my master, and has been useful to me, and whoever besides belongs to the number of these men, *through whom I became acquainted with you.* Euseb. l. VI. c. 14. Yet, alas! the earlier influence of these men on the education of Origen is involved in an obscurity, which our deficient means of information will not enable us to dispel.

[2] In Matth. T. XV. § 3, ed. Huet. f. 369: Ἡμεῖς δὲ, Χριστὸν θεοῦ, τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, κατὰ σάρκα καὶ κατὰ τὸ γράμμα ποτὲ νοήσαντες, νῦν οὐκέτι γινώσκοντες. And T. XI. § 17, where he speaks of an interpretation of the scriptures for the ἁπλοῦστεροι: Ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ εὐχόμενοι ἐξ ἀληθείας λέγειν· εἰ καὶ Χριστόν ποτε κατὰ σάρκα ἐγνώκαμεν, ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐκέτι γινώσκοντες.

Such was the zeal of the enthusiastic Christian youth: quite different was the judgment of the prudent Christian man, who better understood the nature of the Christian system of morality, from the study of that system itself, and from contemplating the life of Christ and of the apostles.[1] He acknowledges, that, on the question whether the danger ought to be evaded or met, no general rule can be laid down, but everything depends on the particular circumstances and on the call; that it requires Christian truthfulness to decide the question in each individual case. "A temptation which overtakes us without any meddling of our own," he says in reference to this subject, "we should endure with fortitude and confidence; but it is fool-hardy not to avoid it when we can."[2] And in another place, where he is speaking of Christ, who was not to be deterred by the prospect of death from making his last journey to Jerusalem, and of Paul, who was not to be hindered from going to that city by the voices which warned him of what awaited him there, he adds: "We say it behoves us neither at all times to avoid danger, nor at all times to meet it. But it needs the wisdom of a Christian philosopher to examine and decide what times require that one should withdraw himself, and what, that he should stand fast, ready for the conflict, without withdrawing himself, and still more without fleeing."[3]

When the father of Origen himself was thrown into prison, the son felt impelled, still more than before, to go and meet death along with him. Remonstrance and entreaty having been tried in vain to dissuade him from his purpose, his mother knew of no other way to detain him, than by concealing his garments. Then the love of Christ so far exceeded all other emotions, that, seeing himself prevented from sharing in his father's imprisonment and death, he wrote to him, "Look to it, that thou dost not change thy mind on our account."

Leonides died a martyr; and, as his property was confiscated, he left behind him a helpless widow, with six young children besides Origen. The latter was kindly received into the family of a rich and noble Christian lady of Alexandria. Here he characteristically displayed his steadfast adherence to that which he had recognized as the true faith, showing how much he prized it above all things else. His patroness had become devoted to a certain Paul of Antioch, one of those Gnostics who so often resorted from Syria to Alexandria, with a view to propagate their system, after having so modified it as to suit the Alexandrian taste. This man she had adopted; and he was allowed to hold his lectures at her house, which were attended, not only by the friends of Gnosticism in Alexandria, but also by others of the true faith who were curious to hear something new. But the young Origen would not be restrained, even by respect for his patroness, from freely expressing his abhorrence of the Gnostic doctrines; and nothing could induce him to attend these assemblies, because he would be obliged to join in the prayers of the Gnostic, and thereby express his fellowship with him in the faith.

He was soon enabled to free himself from this condition of depen-

[1] He refers to Matth. 14: 13; — 10: 23. [2] In Matth. T. X. § 23. [3] L. c. T. XVI. § 1

dence. His knowledge of the Greek philology and literature, which he had continued to cultivate after the death of his father, placed him at Alexandria, where such knowledge was particularly valued, in a condition to gain his own subsistence by giving instruction on these subjects.

Having, by his various attainments and gifts of mind, by his zeal for the cause of the gospel, and by his pure, exemplary life, acquired a name even among the Heathens, he was applied to, now that the office of catechist at Alexandria had been made vacant in the persecution, by a number of Heathens, who were seeking for instruction in Christianity; and, through the instrumentality of the young man, some were conducted to the faith, who afterwards became renowned as martyrs or teachers of the church. By this zeal and activity in promoting the spread of Christianity, he could not fail to draw upon himself more and more the hatred of the fanatic multitude; especially since, without regard to his own danger, he showed so much sympathy for those who were imprisoned on account of the faith, not only visiting them in their dungeons, but accompanying them to the place of execution, and in the very face of death refreshing them by the power of his faith and ardor of his love. Often was he rescued by Providence from threatening danger, when soldiers had already surrounded the place where he resided, and he was obliged to escape secretly from one house to another. At one time he was seized by a band of Pagans, who dressed him in the robes of a priest of Serapis, and conducted him, thus arrayed, to the steps of the temple. Here they placed in his hand a branch of palm, which he was bid to distribute, in the customary manner, to those who entered. Origen did as he was bidden, but said to those to whom he presented the branches, "Receive not the idol's palm, but the palm of Christ."[1]

The successful labors of Origen, in imparting religious instruction, drew on him the attention of Demetrius, bishop of Alexandria, who was induced to confer on him the office of a catechist in the Alexandrian church. To this office, however, no salary was then affixed; and as he now wished to have it in his power to devote himself wholly to the labors of his spiritual calling and to his theological studies, without being interrupted or withdrawn from them by foreign occupations, and as he did not choose to be dependent on any one for the means of subsistence, he determined to sell a collection of beautiful copies of the ancient authors, which he had been forming at great pains for his own use, to a literary amateur, who, in compensation, allowed him, for several years, four oboles a day. This was enough to satisfy the very limited wants of Origen; for he led the life of the most rigid ascetic. He was at this time, as we have said, given to the literal interpretation of the Bible; and as he now felt himself bound to aim at the ideal of holi-

[1] Vid. Epiphan. h. 64. The story may in itself seem improbable, when we reflect how likely such language would be to inflame the fanatic fury of the Alexandrian populace, and when we consider what little reliance can be placed on the authority of Epiphanius. But the first of these considerations, although it may excite doubt, yet does not disprove the fact, and Epiphanius is entitled to more credit than usual, where he repeats anything to the advantage of a man branded as a heretic.

ness presented by our Saviour; as he endeavored with conscientious fidelity to apply every word of the Saviour to his own case; he could hardly fail, in his youthful ascetic zeal, unchecked by a judicious interpretation of the scriptures, to be betrayed into many a practical error, either by taking the figurative expressions of Christ in a literal sense, or by clinging to what Christ had said with reference only to particular cases, as valid for all times and in all circumstances. The most surprising mistake of this sort, which afterwards occasioned him much vexation, was in suffering himself to be misled by a literal understanding of the passage in Matth. 19: 12,[1] to execute upon himself what he believed to be enjoined by these words on those who would be sure of entering the kingdom of heaven. It was a misconception, which might easily arise from a one-sided ascetism and from that method of scriptural interpretation, and which was fostered by many a tract then in circulation.[2] Even in this false step, however, the earnest effort, the ardent desire of the young man after holiness, — his sincere love of the Redeemer, whom he was ready literally to obey in every hint which had been given by him, shine forth conspicuously. But although such errors, arising out of what is holiest in man, should always be treated with the greatest gentleness; yet there are many at all times, who, with but one standard for everything, pronounce judgment on aberrations of this kind with so much the greater severity, as the principle from which alone even such acts of enthusiastic extravagance can proceed,

[1] The correctness of this fact has, it is true, very recently been called in question by Prof. Schnitzer, "Origines ueber die Grundlehren der Glaubenswissenschaft," and by Dr. Baur in his critique on this work, Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, Mai 1837, Nr. 85. But I must still, with Dr. Engelhardt, in the Studien und Kritiken, Jahrgang 1838, 1stes Heft, S. 157, and Dr. Redepenning, in his Monographie ueber Origenes, hold to the contrary opinion. Eusebius, whose notices concerning Origen are derived from the most authentic sources, is (l. VI. c. 8) a trustworthy witness; and his account of a matter of this sort we should not be at all warranted to put down as false, without the most weighty reasons. It is not to be conceived, that he would allow himself to be imposed upon by any rumor growing out of a wrong interpretation of facts, and the less so, as he could have no inclination whatever blindly to adopt any such rumor; for he did everything in his power to exalt Origen, and such a step, even in the opinion of Eusebius, although he seeks to give the utmost prominence to the good motive at bottom, still requires the excuse (*φρενὸς ἀτελοῦς*, as he expresses it). Origen himself says in fact, (in the passage referred to, Matth. T. XV. § 3,) that he was once inclined to the literal interpretation, out of which that misconception arose. In the fulness of detail with which he there treats this subject, — in his manner of speaking of the mischievous consequences of such a step, — we seem to hear one who speaks from his own painful experience, and holds up his own example as a warning to others. It is nothing strange if a certain delicacy of feeling restrains him from expressly avowing that this is the case. Assuredly, therefore, it cannot be inferred in the least from the words, "he would not have spent so much time on this subject, (*εἰ μὴ καὶ ἐωράκειμεν τοὺς τολμήσαντας,*)" that he had observed this only in *others*.

[2] Philo, opp. f. 186: *Ἐξεννυχισθῆναι ἄμεινον, ἢ πρὸς συνουσίας ἐκνόμους λυττᾶν.* See moreover a gnome of *Σέξτος*, 12, which was widely circulated among the Alexandrian Christians; according to the translation of Rufinus: Omne membrum corporis, quod suadet te contra pudicitiam agere, abjiciendum. These gnomes, by the way, came neither from a Roman bishop, by the name of Sextus, (whether the first or the second,) as Rufinus supposed; nor, as was the opinion of Jerome, (V. ep. ad Ctesiphon,) from a heathen Pythagorean: but they are the work of some man, who, from certain Platonic and Gnostic maxims, and expressions of scripture wrested out of their proper connection, had drawn up for himself a system of morals, the highest aim of which was the *ἀπάθεια*. They do not contain a moral system pervaded by the spirit of the gospel; but many lofty maxims, along with many perverse ones.

lies remote from their own carnal sense or tame understandings. Origen speaks from experience, when he takes notice of those who, by similar misconceptions and similar false steps, have involved themselves in disgrace, not only with the unbelieving world, but likewise with that whole class who will sooner pardon any other human frailty than those errors which spring out of a mistaken fear of God, and an immoderate longing after holiness.[1] When the bishop Demetrius first heard of the transaction, he did not overlook in the error the purity of *the motive;* though afterwards he took advantage of this false step as a means to injure Origen.

An important point would be gained, were it possible fairly to determine the precise time and manner in which Origen passed over — to speak in the Alexandrian style — from the πίστις to the γνῶσις. After what has been said above respecting Clement's peculiar bent of mind, it is impossible to doubt, that, if Origen was his immediate disciple as a theologian, he had from the first been stimulated by Clement to make himself accurately acquainted with the systems of the Greek philosophy, and of the different heretics; as indeed the liberal spirit of the Alexandrian theology required that he should do. But probably the original turn of Origen's mind was of a far more decided and determinate character. There was in his case no mutual interpenetration of the elements subsisting beside each other in his mind. The practical Christian, the ascetic, and the literary element never kindly intermingled. He says himself, that it was first by an outward occasion he was led to busy himself with the study of the Platonic philosophy, and to make himself better acquainted generally with the systems of those who differed from himself; by his intercourse, namely, with heretics and Pagans of philosophical education, who, attracted by his reputation, entered with him into discussions of religious topics, when he was compelled to give them a reason of his faith, and to refute the objections which they brought against it. He expresses himself on this point in the following manner, in a letter in which he defends himself for bestowing his time on the Greek philosophy: "When I had wholly devoted myself to the promulgation of the divine doctrines, and the fame of my skill in them began to be spread, and sometimes heretics, sometimes such as had been conversant with the Grecian sciences, and particularly men from the philosophical schools, came to visit me, it seemed to me necessary, that I should examine the doctrinal opinions of the heretics, and what the philosophers pretended to know of the truth." He proceeds to say, that he attended the lectures of the *teacher* of philosophical science, with whom Heraclas, a convert of Origen's, had already spent five years. As he here particularizes an individual known at that time in Alexandria, simply as the teacher of philosophy, chronology would naturally lead us to think of the famous Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of the profound Plotinus, from whose hand the chaotic eclecticism of the Neo-Platonists — that compound of Oriental and Grecian elements — received a more definite shape. Add to this, that Porphyry,

[1] In Matth. § 3, T. 15. f. 367

in his work against Christianity, expressly calls Origen a disciple of this Ammonius.[1]

From this time began the great change in the theological bent of Origen's mind. It now became his endeavor, to trace the vestiges of truth in all human systems; to examine all things, that he might everywhere separate the true from the false. His residence in Alexandria, where sects so widely different were brought together; his journey to Rome (in the year 211;) his journeys to and within Palestine; to Achaia, to Cappadocia; gave him opportunity, as he tells us himself,[2] of visiting those who pretended to any extraordinary knowledge, and of becoming acquainted with and examining their doctrines. He made it his principle, not to suffer himself to be governed by the traditional opinion of the multitude, but to hold fast that only as truth, which he found after unbiassed examination. This principle he expresses in a practical application of Matth. 22: 19, 20: "We here learn from our Saviour, that we are not, under the pretext of piety, to pin our faith on that which is said by the multitude, and which therefore stands in high authority; but on that which results from examination and the internal connection of truth; for it is well to remark, that when he was asked whether men should pay tribute to Cæsar or not, he not only expressed his own judgment, but, having asked them to show him a penny, he inquired whose image and superscription is this; and when they said it is Cæsar's, he answered that men should give unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and not, under the pretext of religion, deprive him of what was his own."[3] Hence the mildness with which he passed judgment on those who were wrong, an illustration of which we have in the following beautiful remark on John 13: 8: "It is clear, that although Peter said this in a good and respectful disposition towards his Teacher, yet

[1] For there can be no doubt on this point; viz. that Porphyry, in Euseb. l. VI. c. 19, meant no other person than this Ammonius, although Eusebius confounds him with the church-teacher Ammonius, who had written a Harmony of the Gospels, still extant, and a book on the agreement between Moses and Jesus. There were, at periods not far remote from each other, and in Alexandria itself, a *pagan* Ammonius, highly distinguished among the learned,—a *Christian* Ammonius,—and two *Origens*. We may here remark, that, when Porphyry says of Origen: Ἕλλην ἐν Ἕλλησι παιδευθεὶς λόγοις, πρὸς τὸ βάρβαρον ἐξώκειλε τόλμημα, (he became an apostate to the religion of the barbarians,) one part of the assertion has its truth; namely, that Origen, from the first, had been disciplined in the Greek literature; but it was a false insinuation of Porphyry, that he had been educated in Paganism. We cannot suppose that Porphyry, in this case, confounded the two persons bearing the name of Origen; for he knew them both. I must agree with Dr. Redepenning, in his Monographie ueber Origenes, that the reasons adduced by Ritter are by no means sufficient to refute the hypothesis, — that the philosopher whose lectures Origen attended was Ammonius Saccas. Although several philosophers taught at Alexandria, still the words which Origen employs: — Παρὰ τῷ διδασκάλῳ τῶν φιλοσόφων μαθημάτων, naturally suggest the famous one; and chronology points to the Ammonius in question. And even though Ammonius sprung from Christian parents, and again fell back to Paganism, yet this is no sufficient reason for maintaining that Origen must have had scruples about hearing him, — being, as he was, a famous teacher of the Platonic philosophy. And it still remains open for inquiry, whether really the descent of Ammonius from Christian parents is an ascertained fact.

[2] c. Cels. l. VI. c. 24: Πολλοὺς ἐκπεριελθόντες τόπους τῆς γῆς, καὶ τοὺς πανταχοῦ ἐπαγγελλομένους τι εἰδέναι ζητήσαντες.

[3] In Matth. T. XVII. § 26, f. 483: Μὴ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν λεγομένοις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνδόξοις φαινομένοις, προφάσει τῆς εἰς θεὸν εὐσεβείας προσέχειν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐξετάσεως καὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίας τοῦ λόγου παρισταμένοι

he said it to his own hurt. Life is full of this kind of sins, attaching to those who in their faith mean what is right, but out of ignorance say, or even do, what leads to the contrary. Such are those who say: Thou shalt not touch this, thou shalt not taste that, thou shalt not handle the other. Col. 2 : 21, 22. But what shall we say of those who, in the sects, are driven about by every wind of doctrine; who set forth that which is soul-destroying as saving doctrine; and who frame to themselves false notions of the person of Jesus, under the supposition that they honor him thereby?"[1]

By this liberality of mind, it was the happiness of Origen to bring back many heretics, with whom he fell in contact at Alexandria, particularly Gnostics, to the simple doctrine of the gospel. One remarkable example of this sort was that Ambrosius, a wealthy man in Alexandria, who, not satisfied with the manner in which Christianity had been exhibited to him in the common representations of the church-teachers, had sought, and supposed that he had found, a more spiritual conception of it among the Gnostics; until, through the influence of Origen, he was undeceived of his error, and rejoiced at now finding, through his means, the right Gnosis at the same time with the true faith.[2] He now became Origen's warmest friend, and endeavored especially to promote his literary labors for the good of the church.

If Origen, after having been taught, by his own experience, the errors resulting from a grossly literal interpretation of scripture, and the hurtful consequences to which it might lead, passed over to the other extreme of an arbitrary allegorizing method of exposition; his conscientious and zealous endeavors to avail himself of every help which could be used in restoring back to its original condition, and in rightly understanding, the literal text of scripture, deserve the greater esteem. To this end, he studied the Hebrew, after he had arrived at the age of manhood, — a task of some difficulty to a Greek. He undertook an emendation of the biblical manuscripts, by comparing them with one another: he is the creator of sacred literature among the Christians; although his arbitrary principles of interpretation prevented, in his own case, the full realization of all those results which might otherwise have been expected from it. Many pregnant ideas were scattered abroad by him, which needed only to be applied in a different way from that which his own one-sided speculative bent and his mistaken notions of inspiration allowed, to lead to fruitful results.

As the number of those who now resorted to him for religious instruction continued to increase, and at the same time his literary labors on the scriptures, which extended over a widening field, claimed more of his attention: in order to gain time, he shared the task of catechist with his friend Heraclas; giving over to the latter the preparatory religious instruction, and reserving for himself the exacter instruction of the more advanced,[3] — a division of labor which probably had reference to the two classes of catechumens of which we have formerly spoken.[4]

[1] In Joann. T. XXXII. § 5.
[2] See the words to Ambrosius, in Evang. Joann. T. V. § 4, cited on a former occasion.
[3] Euseb. lib. VI. c. 15.
[4] See vol. I. p. 305.

The division of his official labors in this department made it possible for him to enlarge the sphere of his activity as a teacher of the church, and to establish a sort of preliminary school to the Christian Gnosis, in a course of lectures on that which was reckoned by the Greeks to the *Encyclopedia*, or general circle of education, as well as on philosophy. He expounded to his pupils all the ancient philosophers in whom a moral and religious element was to be found, and sought to train them to that mental freedom which would enable them everywhere to separate truth from the mixture of falsehood; as his disciple, Gregory Thaumaturgus, has described, in the account of Origen's method of instruction, which he has given in a work hereafter to be mentioned. Thus he entitled himself to the great merit of diffusing a more liberal system of Christian and scientific education, of which the schools that resulted from his labors are the evidence. It was also his lot to conduct many, who had been drawn to him solely through the love of science, by gradual steps, to faith in the gospel; — first inspiring in them a longing after divine things; then pointing out to them the inadequacy of the Greek systems of philosophy to satisfy the religious wants of human nature; and finally exhibiting to them the doctrine of scripture concerning divine things, contrasted with the doctrines of the ancient philosophers. His course of instruction ended with his lectures on the interpretation of scripture, which, following the principles unfolded in the earlier studies, gave him an opportunity to exhibit his whole theologico-philosophical system, or his whole Gnosis, in single investigations and remarks. Many of those whom Origen was enabled thus gradually to bring to the knowledge and to the love of the gospel, became afterwards zealous and influential teachers of the church.

Ambrosius, whom we mentioned above as the friend of Origen, took special interest in his scientific labors. Origen used to call him his *work-driver* (ἐργοδιώκτης.) He not only excited him by his questions and challenges to many inquiries, but also employed his great wealth in providing him with the means of pursuing expensive investigations; such, for instance, as made indispensable the purchase and collation of manuscripts. He furnished him with seven ready scribes, who were to relieve each other as his amanuenses, besides others to transcribe everything in a fair copy. Origen says of this friend, in one of his letters:[1] "He who gave me credit for great diligence, and a great thirst after the divine word, has, by his own diligence and his own love of sacred science, convinced himself how much he was mistaken. He has so far outdone me, that I am in danger of not coming up to his requisitions. The collation of manuscripts leaves me no time to eat; and after meals I can neither go out nor enjoy a season of rest; but even at those times I am compelled to continue my philological investigations and the correction of manuscripts. Even the night is not granted me for repose, but a great part of it is claimed for these philological inquiries. I will not mention the time from early in the morning till the ninth and sometimes the tenth hour of the day;[2] for all who take pleasure in such

[1] T. I. opp. ed. de la Rue, f. 3.
[2] Till three or four o'clock, P. M. according to our reckoning

labors, employ those hours in the study of the divine word, and in reading."

Ambrosius urged Origen, by the publication of his theological labors, to give the entire church an opportunity of enjoying the benefit of them, and thus to counteract the influence of the Gnostics, who had first excited among the Christians a spirit of deeper research into the things of God, and, under the pretence of a more profound scriptural interpretation, contrived, by arbitrary allegorical expositions, to introduce their Theosophy into holy writ. The object last mentioned is one which Origen himself assigns for his labors, at the close of the fifth *Tome* of his commentary on the gospel of John, which was in part aimed against the Gnostic Heracleon. "As at present the heterodox," he says, "under cover of the Gnosis, set themselves against God's holy church, and scatter abroad works of many volumes, which promise to expound the evangelical and apostolical writings; so will they succeed, if *we* remain silent, without placing the sound and true doctrines by their side, to snatch away the hungry souls, who, for want of wholesome nourishment, hasten to that which is forbidden."

He completed at Alexandria his commentaries on Genesis, the Psalms, the Lamentation of Jeremiah, (of which writings some fragments only remain,) his five first *Tomes* on the gospel of John, his tract on the resurrection, his Stromata, and his work concerning principles.[1] The work last mentioned derived great importance from the struggle which it called forth between opposite tendencies of the theological mind, and from the influence which it had on the fortunes of Origen and of his school. Platonic philosophy and doctrines of the Christian faith were then, still more than at a later period, blended together in his mind. His wildness of speculation became afterwards moderated by the influence of the Christian spirit. Many ideas which he had thrown out in this work, (rather as problems, however, than as decisions,) he afterwards retracted; although the principles of his system always remained the same. He declared himself, in a letter subsequently written to Fabian, bishop of Rome, before whom his doctrines had probably been accused as heretical, that he had set forth many things in that book which he no longer acknowledged as true, and that his friend Ambrosius had published it against his will.[2]

Yet, as has often happened, unless there had been an outward occasion for it, an intervention of personal and unworthy passions, the conflict between Origen and the party of the church zealots would not have broken out, at least so soon; especially as Origen was far from possessing *that pride* which in other cases so readily connects itself with a theological tendency of this sort, and as he constantly evinced the utmost forbearance towards those whose religious and theological principles differed from his own. The authority of his bishop, Demetrius, was to him an important support; but this man, who was full of the hierarchical pride, which in these times we find especially rife in the bishops of

[1] Περὶ ἀρχῶν = τῶν κορυφαιοτάτων καὶ ἀρχικῶν δογμάτων, as Origen himself expresses it in Joann. T. X. § 13

[2] Vid. Hieronym. ep. 41, T. IV. opp. edd Martianay, f. 341.

the large cities, had his jealousies excited by the great reputation of Origen, and the honor which he received on particular occasions.

Especially the honor paid him by two of his friends, Alexander, bishop of Jerusalem, the friend of his youth, and Theoctistus, bishop of Cæsarea in Palestine, gave no small umbrage. The haughty Demetrius had already taken it greatly amiss of them, that they had permitted Origen, when a layman,[1] to preach in their churches.[2] Yet when, in obedience to the call of his bishop, he returned back to Alexandria, he was enabled to restore the friendly relations in which they had previously stood to each other. But in the year 288, he happened to make a journey to Greece on some ecclesiastical business of which we have no further account.[3] While upon this journey, he made a visit to his friends in Palestine; and these ordained him as a presbyter at Cæsarea.

This was a step, for which Demetrius could not forgive the two bishops, nor Origen. After the return of the latter, Demetrius convened a synod, composed of presbyters from his own diocese, and of other Egyptian bishops, and here brought against Origen that indiscreet act of his youth, by which, we must allow, according to the strict letter of the ecclesiastical canons, he was excluded from the spiritual order.[4] But it should have been duly considered, that he had since become an entirely different man; that he had long condemned the step into which his youthful zeal had betrayed him. Yet for this reason he was deprived of the presbyterial rank which had been bestowed on him, and forbidden to exercise the office of a public teacher in the Alexandrian church.[5] Having once drawn upon himself the jealousy and hatred of the pharisaical bishop, he could enjoy no further peace in Alexandria. Demetrius did not stop with the first attack upon him: he now began to stigmatize the doctrines of Origen as hereti-

[1] See vol. I. p. 197.

[2] There were, probably in the year 216, certain warlike demonstrations in Alexandria, according to Euseb. l. VI. c. 19, which made it unsafe for him to reside there any longer; perhaps when the demented Caracalla, on his way to the Parthian war, gave up this city to the rapacious and murderous lusts of his soldiers, Æl. Spartian. l. VI. c. 6. It may be supposed that the fury of the pagan soldiers would light especially on the Christians. Origen betook himself to Palestine, for the purpose of visiting his ancient friends, and, as he says himself, (in Joann. T. VI. § 24,) for the purpose of exploring the footsteps of Jesus, of his disciples, and of the prophets (*ἐπὶ ἱστορίαν τῶν ἰχνῶν Ἰησοῦ καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν προφητῶν.*)

[3] Perhaps he was called into these countries for the purpose of disputing with Gnostics who had spread there, — his skill in managing disputes of this sort being extensively known. His disputation with Candidus the Valentinian, the acts of which are cited by Jerome, might lead us to infer this.

[4] It is very probable, that the ecclesiastical law was already existing, which we find in the XVII. of the *Apostolic Canons*. It was here by no means unconditionally forbidden, after the example of the Old-Testament law, Deut. 23, that a eunuch should be chosen to the spiritual order; but expressly defined, that whoever had been subjected to such a mischance, without any fault of his own, if worthy, might become an ecclesiastic; only *ὁ ἑαυτὸν ἀκρωτηριάσας μὴ γινέσθω κληρικός.* It was simply designed to offer a check to that ascetic species of enthusiasm.

[5] Photius says, it is true, that this same synod not only forbade Origen to exercise the office of teacher, but also to remain a resident in the Alexandrian church. But it is difficult to see how a bishop at that time could enforce this. He could in fact only exclude him from the communion of the church, and this was first done in the second synod. Moreover, the words of Origen do not seem to intimate, that he had been forced to leave Alexandria.

cal — a proceeding for which, perhaps, some assertions of the latter, in his disputations with the Gnostics, had given fresh occasion.[1]

Yet from the resources of his own inner life he drew sufficient peace of mind to complete his fifth *Tome* on the gospel of John, amid the storms at Alexandria (since, as he says,[2] Jesus commanded the winds and the waves of the sea;) when he finally concluded to leave that city, and to take refuge with his friends at Cæsarea in Palestine. But the persecutions of Demetrius followed him even there. The bishop now seized on a pretext, which would enable him easily to find allies in Egypt and out of Egypt; inasmuch as the prevailing dogmatic spirit, in many parts of the church, was violently opposed to the *idealistic* tendency of Origen's school, and inasmuch as the work περὶ ἀρχῶν would furnish such abundant materials for the charge of heresy. At a more numerous synod of Egyptian bishops, Demetrius excluded Origen, as a heretic, from the communion of the church; and the synod issued against him a violent invective. To this document Origen alludes, when, in commencing once more at Cæsarea the continuation of his commentary on the gospel of John, he says: "That God who once led his people out of Egypt, had also delivered him from that land; but his enemy, in this recent letter, truly at variance with the spirit of the gospel, had assailed him with the utmost virulence, and roused against him all the winds of malice in Egypt."[3]

[1] As we might infer from the disputation with Candidus the Valentinian. Hieronym. adv. Rufin. lib. II. f. 414, vol. IV.

[2] In Joann. T. VI. § 1.

[3] We are in want of connected and trustworthy accounts respecting these events, so pregnant of consequences. We can only endeavour, by a combination of particulars, to trace the facts of the case as they really occurred. It is certain, indeed, from the intimation which Eusebius gives, and from Origen's words, which have already been cited, concerning that indiscretion of his youth, that the latter was then urged *against* him; but this could be employed only as a reason for excluding him from the clerical office. The other steps against him must have originated in some other complaint. Photius, who had read the Apology of Pamphilus in behalf of Origen, says, it is true, Cod. 118, that Demetrius accused him of having undertaken the journey to Athens without his permission, and of having caused himself, on this journey undertaken without his permission, to be ordained a presbyter, — which certainly would have been an infraction of the laws of the church on the part of Origen, as well as of the bishops. But if Demetrius brought this charge against Origen, still it may be asked, whether he had any grounds for it. We see from the citation of Jerome, de vir. illustr. c. 62, that Alexander, bishop of Jerusalem, had to allege against Demetrius, the fact that he had ordained Origen on the authority of an epistola formata, which Origen brought with him from his bishop. The church laws respecting these matters were at that time, perhaps, still so vague, that Alexander might suppose he had every right to ordain a man who belonged to another diocese; and yet Demetrius might look upon this as an invasion on the rights of his episcopal office. At any rate, however, this was no sufficient reason for excommunicating Origen. The participation of other churches in this attack upon him; the brand of heresy, which Origen continued to bear even after his death; his own language in justification of himself, in the letter already cited, addressed to the Roman bishop Fabian (as he had also written to other bishops in vindication of his orthodoxy, Euseb. l. VI. c. 36;) — all conspire to show, that his *doctrines* were the cause of his excommunication. We see also from what Jerome cites, l. II. adv. Rufin. f. 411, from the letter of Origen against Demetrius, that he was accused of errors in his system of faith; since he defends himself against the charge of having asserted that Satan would one day become holy, — although we cannot well understand how he could deny this assertion, which is necessarily grounded in his system. Rufinus cites passages from one of Origen's letters of vindication, addressed to his friends in Alexandria; from which we learn, that a forged protocol, pretending to give an account of a disputation held between him and the heretics, had excited surprise at his doctrinal positions, even among his friends in Palestine. They had despatched a messenger after him to Athens, and requested

This personal quarrel became now a conflict between the opposite doctrinal parties. The churches in Palestine, Arabia, Phœnicia, and Achaia, took the side of Origen: the church of Rome declared against him.[1] How Origen judged of those who stigmatized him as a heretic, appears from a remark,[2] which he makes after citing 1 Corinth. 1: 25: "If *I* had said," he observes, "the foolishness of God, how would the lovers of censure[3] accuse me! How should I be accused by them, even though I had said a thousand times what they themselves hold to be true, yet had not rightly said this single thing, — how should I be accused by them for saying, 'the foolishness of God'!" In his letter of vindication against the synod which had excommunicated him, he quotes some of the denunciations of the prophets against wicked priests and potentates, and then adds: "But we should far rather pity than hate them, far rather pray for them than curse them; for we are made to bless, and not to curse."[4]

The efforts of Origen's enemies only contributed to extend the sphere of his activity. His removal to Palestine was certainly important in its consequences, an opportunity being thus given him of laboring also

from him the original of the protocol. Also protocols of this sort had been dispersed as far as Rome. Vid. Rufin. de adulteratione librorum Origenis, in opp. Hieronym. T. V. f. 251, ed. Martianay. Although Rufin is not a faithful translator, yet this cannot have been a story wholly invented by himself. The disputations with the Gnostics, moreover, could not fail to furnish occasions, which would bring out prominently the peculiar religious opinions of Origen; and every opportunity of making his orthodoxy suspected in his own church must have been eagerly welcomed by those who found in him so powerful an antagonist.

[1] Hieronym. ep. 29, ad Paulum: Damnatus a Demetrio episcopo, exceptis Palæstinæ et Arabiæ et Phœniciæ atque Achaiæ sacerdotibus. In damnationem ejus consentit urbs Roma: ipsa contra hunc cogit senatum. To be sure, he adds to this: non propter dogmatum novitatem; non propter hæresin, sed quia gloriam eloquentiæ ejus et scientiæ ferre non poterant. But this is not fact; it is the subjective interpretation of motives, according to interests which Jerome at that time espoused. Compare, moreover, the remark made in the case of Tertullian.

[2] Hom. VIII. in Jerem. § 8.

[3] Οἱ φιλαίτιοι.

[4] See l. c. Hieronym. l. IV. f. 411. Comp. what Origen says against the significancy of unjust excommunication, see vol. I. p. 219. Comp. also in Matth. T. XVI. § 25, f. 445, the words in which we discern the zealous opponent of hierarchy, who was able to discover the pious disposition even when hidden under the most unpromising shapes, and, wherever it appeared, embraced it in his love. Different from this, however, was the course of those bishops who were filled with the spirit of a priestly caste and hierarchical pride, and of whom he says, applying to them the passage in Matth. 21: 16: "As these scribes and priests were censurable according to the letter of the history, so, in the spiritual application of this passage, there may be many a blame-worthy high-priest, who fails to adorn his episcopal dignity by his life, and to put on the Urim and Thummim, (the *Light* and *Right*, Exod. 28.) These, while they behold the wonderful things of God, despise the babes and sucklings in the church, who sing praises to God and his Christ. They are displeased at their spiritual progress, and complain of them to Jesus, as if they did wrong when they do no wrong. They ask Jesus, 'Hearest thou what these say?' And this we shall better understand, if we consider how often it happens, that men of ardent minds, who hazard their liberty in bold confessions before the Heathen, who despise danger, who with all constancy lead lives of the strictest continence and severest austerity, — how often such men, who are rude, however, in their expressions, (ἰδιῶται τῇ λέξει,) are calumniated by these blame-worthy high-priests as disorganizers, — how often they are accused by them before Jesus, as if they themselves behaved better than such honest and good children. But Jesus testifies in favor of the children, and on the other hand accuses the high-priests of ignorance, saying, 'Have ye not read: Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings thou hast ordained praise?'" It might well be, that Origen here had before his mind's eye, Demetrius and similar bishops, who were inclined to judge with the greatest severity, those errors which proceeded out of a pious zeal.

from that point, for the diffusion of a liberal scientific spirit in the church; and long were the traces of his activity to be discerned in these districts. Here, too, a circle of young men gathered around him, who were trained under his influence to fill the posts of theologians and church-teachers. To the number of these belongs that active and laborious preacher of the gospel, Gregory, of whom we shall speak more particularly hereafter. Here Origen prosecuted his literary undertakings. Here he composed, among other works, the treatise, already noticed, on the Utility of Prayer, and on the Exposition of the Lord's Prayer, which he addressed to his friend Ambrosius. Here he maintained an active correspondence with the most distinguished church-teachers in Cappadocia, Palestine, and Arabia; and he was often invited to assist at deliberations on the concerns of foreign churches.

During the persecution of Maximin the Thracian, in which two of Origen's friends, the presbyter Protoctetus, of Cæsarea, and Ambrosius, had much to suffer, he addressed to these confessors, who were awaiting in prison the issue of their trials, his treatise *on Martyrdom*. He exhorts them to steadfastness in confession; he fortifies their resolution by the promises of scripture, and takes pains to refute those sophisms which might be employed to palliate a denial of the faith by outward actions; as, for example, when Gnostics, who held outward things to be of no importance, and pagan statesmen, who were wont to regard everything solely from the political point of view, sought alike to persuade the Christians, that, without violating their private convictions, which no one wished to deprive them of, they might join in those merely outward ceremonies of the state religion. Although that morality, aiming at an absolute estrangement from all human passions, concerning the connection of which with Origen's whole mode of thinking we have already spoken, is everywhere to be met with in this book,[1] and also those false notions of martyrdom as an opus operatum, — which, infused into him by the prevailing spirit of the church in his time, were incorporated with several of his own peculiar ideas, — shine through the surface; yet, at the same time, the energy of his unwavering trust and of his zeal in behalf of the gospel faith, finely expresses itself in this work. Says he to the two confessors:[2] "I could wish that you, too, in the whole conflict that is before you, mindful of the great reward reserved in heaven for those who suffer persecution and reproach for the sake of righteousness and of the Son of man, might rejoice and be glad, as the apostles once rejoiced, when they were found worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Christ. But should ever anguish enter your souls, may the Spirit of Christ, that dwells within you, say, tempted though you may be on your part to disturb it, 'Why troublest thou me, my soul? and why art thou disquieted within me? Hope in God, for I shall yet praise him, who is the health of my countenance and my God,' Ps. 42: 5. May it, however, never be

[1] This is seen particularly in Origen's artificial way of explaining the words spoken by Christ in his agony; the spirit above referred to not allowing him to take them according to their natural sense. § 29.

[2] § 4.

troubled, but even before the tribunal itself, and under the naked sword aimed at your necks, be preserved by that peace of God which passeth all understanding." He says to them, in another place:[1] "Since the Word of God[2] is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart, Heb. 4 : 12; so let this divine Word, especially now, cause to reign in our souls, as he did in his apostles, that peace which passeth all understanding; but he has cast the sword between the image of the earthly and the image of the heavenly within us, that he may for the present receive our heavenly man to himself, and then, when we have attained so far as that we need to experience no more separation,[3] that he may make us altogether heavenly. And he came, not only to bring the sword, but also to send *fire* on the earth, concerning which he says: 'What would I rather, than that it be already kindled?' Luke 12 : 49. May this fire, then, be kindled even in you, and consume every earthly feeling within you, and cause you to be joyfully baptized with that baptism of which Jesus spake.[4] And thou, (Ambrosius,) who hast a wife and children, brothers and sisters, remember the words of the Lord: 'Whoever cometh unto me, and hateth not his father, mother, wife, children, brothers and sisters, cannot be my disciple.' But both of you be mindful of the words: 'If any man come unto me, and hate not even his own life, he cannot be my disciple.'"

It was, perhaps, this same persecution which induced Origen to leave for awhile the place where he had hitherto resided. The persecution at that time being merely local, it was easy to escape from it, by fleeing to other districts, where tranquillity happened to prevail. Origen repaired to Cæsarea in Cappadocia, where he visited his friend, the bishop Firmilian, with whom he had been in the habit of corresponding on scientific and theological subjects.[5]

But, perhaps, at the very time while he was there, the persecution broke out in Cappadocia,[6] which was the occasion of his retiring to the house of Juliana, a Christian virgin, who concealed and entertained him in her dwelling during the space of two years. It was here he made a discovery, which had an important bearing on his literary undertakings. He had been employed for years on *a work* which was to contribute both to the emendation of the text of the Alexandrian version of the Old Testament, — which was the translation chiefly used in the church, being regarded by many Christians, who followed the old Jewish legend, as inspired, and of which the different manuscripts varied considerably from each other in their readings, — and also to the improvement of this translation itself, by comparing it with other ancient versions, and with the original Hebrew text. Origen, who was in the constant habit of disputing with Pagans and Jews on religious

[1] § 37.
[2] He understands this of the Logos.
[3] No separation of the godlike and the ungodlike.
[4] Luke 12: 50.
[5] They occasionally visited each other for the purpose of conversing on theological topics. Euseb. l. VI. c. 27.
[6] See vol. I. p. 126.

matters, had found, as he says himself, by his own experience, how necessary was an acquaintance with the original text of the Old Testament, to avoid laying one's-self open to the Jews, who ridiculed the ignorance of those Gentile Christians that disputed with them, when they cited passages from the Alexandrian version which were not to be found in the Hebrew, or when they showed that they knew nothing of passages which were to be found in the Hebrew only.[1] He had therefore employed the wealth of his friend Ambrosius, and availed himself of his own frequent journeys, to collect various manuscripts of the Alexandrian version, and other ancient translations, which it was still possible to procure. Thus he had, for example, in ransacking every corner, found, in a cask at Jericho, an ancient translation, not before known to exist, of some books of the Old Testament. It now fell out, that this Juliana had become heiress to the writings of the Ebionite *Symmachus*, who had lived perhaps in the beginning of this century; and among these writings Origen found both his commentary on the gospel according to the Hebrews, (*εὐαγγέλιον κατὰ Ἑβραίους*,[2]) and his version of the Old Testament.[3] He was now enabled to bring to a completion the great work of collating the ancient versions still extant, and of comparing them with the Hebrew text.[4]

[1] Orig. ep. ad African. § 5.: *Τοιαύτης οὔσης ἡμῶν τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσι παρασκευῆς, οὐ καταφρονήσουσιν, οὐδ' ὡς ἔθος αὐτοῖς, γελάσονται τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐθνῶν πιστεύοντας, ὡς τ' ἀληθῆ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀναγεγραμμένα ἀγνοοῦντας.*

[2] The words of Eusebius, l. VI. c. 17, respecting the work of Symmachus, are: *Ἐν οἷς δοκεῖ πρὸς τὸ κατὰ Ματθαῖον ἀποτεινόμενος εὐαγγέλιον τὴν δεδηλωμένην αἵρεσιν (τῶν Ἐβιωναίων) κρατύνειν.* As he subsequently classes this work with the commentaries of Symmachus on the scriptures, (*ἑρμηνείας εἰς τὰς γραφάς*,) one might be led to suppose it was some writing of his, in which he expounded this gospel, or rather the Ebionitic gospel according to the Hebrews, which resembled it, and employed it to prove the Ebionitic doctrines; but the Greek phrase, *ἀποτείνεσθαι πρός τι*, connected with *κρατύνειν*, favors much rather the supposition, that a writing is here meant which attacked the gospel of Matthew by assuming the genuineness of the Ebionitic revision of the gospel according to the Hebrews.

[3] Palladius (in the beginning of the fifth century) relates, in his history of the monks, (*λαυσίακα*,) c. 147, that he had found in an old manuscript, coming from Origen, the words written in his own hand, giving the account cited in the text. True, this Palladius is a witness liable to some suspicion on account of his credulity; but in this case we have no reason to disbelieve him, especially as his testimony agrees with the narrative of Eusebius, l. VI. c. 17.

[4] The Hexapla: to say anything more concerning this work and kindred works of Origen, would be foreign from our purpose. See the Introductions to the Old Testament. We shall merely cite here the words of Origen himself respecting the comparison instituted by him between the Alexandrian version and the other ancient translations of the Old Testament. After having spoken (Commentar. in Matth. T. XV. § 14, f. 381) of the differences in the copies of the New Testament, which had arisen partly from the negligence and partly from the arbitrary criticism of the transcribers, he adds: "As regards the differences between the copies of the Old Testament, we have, with God's help, found a means of adjusting them, by using the other translations as our criterion. Wherever in the version of the Seventy anything was doubtful on account of the differences of the manuscripts, we have retained that which coincided with the other translations; and many passages, not to be found in the Hebrew text, we have marked with an *obelisk*, (the critical sign of omission,) not daring wholly to omit them. But some passages we have noted with an *asterisk*, in order to make it clear, that such passages, which are not found in the Seventy, have been added by us from the other translations coinciding with the Hebrew text; and in order that whoever *is so inclined, may receive them into the text*, (I suppose that the reading should be *προσῆται*;) but whoever takes any offence at them, may receive or not receive them, as he pleases." From these last words, we see how much Origen had to fear from those who were ready at once to accuse any one that departed from the traditional and customary route, of falsifying the sacred scriptures.

After the assassination of Maximin, and under the reign of the emperor Gordian, in the year 238, Origen was enabled to return once more to Cæsarea, and resume there his earlier labors.

Long before, while he resided at Alexandria, the church of Greece, where he enjoyed a high reputation, had sent for him to advise with them on some ecclesiastical matters: he now probably received a second invitation of the same kind. His way led him through Nicomedia in Bithynia, where he spent several days with his old friend Ambrosius, who, if the narrative of Jerome is correct, had meanwhile become deacon; whether it was that the latter had his appointment in the church of that city, or whether he had come thither for the sake of meeting Origen. There he received a letter from another friend, Julius Africanus, one of the distinguished learned Christians of that age.[1] Origen, in a conversation which took place in the presence of Africanus, had cited the story of Susanna, on the authority of the Alexandrian version, as a part of genuine scripture, belonging to the book of Daniel. In this letter, equally characterized by the moderate, respectful tone of literary controversy, and by the unbiassed freedom of criticism, Africanus expressed his surprise at what he had heard, and asked for further explanations. Origen replied in a full and elaborate letter from Nicomedia. Not so free from prejudice as Africanus, he labored to defend the authority of the Alexandrian version and collection of the sacred writings. It is well worth observing, how the free inquiring mind of Origen, out of a misconceived piety, perhaps, too, rendered timid by the convulsions which, in spite of his own will, he had occasioned in the church, took refuge in the authority of a church tradition preserved pure under the guidance of a special Providence. "But ought not that Providence," says he,[2] "which in the sacred writings has

[1] He was then a very aged man, as is evident from the fact, that he could address Origen, who was now fifty, by the title, "my son." His usual place of residence was probably the ancient and ruined city of Emmaus or Nicopolis in Palestine, (so called by the Romans after the Jewish war, and not to be confounded with the Emmaus of the New Testament, being more distant, namely, 176 stadia from Jerusalem.) The inhabitants of this ruined place chose him as their delegate to the emperor Heliogabalus, for the purpose of obtaining from that emperor the restoration of their city, a mission in which he was successful. Hieronym. de vir. illustr. c. 63. He is known as the first author of a Christian History of the world, (his *χρονογραφία* in five books, vid. Euseb. l. VI. c. 31.) This work, of which our only knowledge is derived from the use made of it by other writers, and from fragments, undoubtedly had its origin in an apologetic aim. He is known, again, on account of his letter to Aristides, on the method of reconciling the differences between the genealogies of Jesus in Matthew and Luke, of which Eusebius, Hist. lib. I. c. 7, has preserved to us a fragment. There is another remarkable fragment of the same letter, published by Routh, reliquiæ sacræ, vol. II. p. 115. He controverts here those who asserted, that these different genealogies had been given merely for the purpose of demonstrating in this way the truth, that Christ was at once King and High Priest, being descended from the royal and priestly families. And in this connection he expresses himself very strongly against the theory of "pious fraud." "God forbid," says he, "that the opinion should ever prevail in the church of Christ, that any falsething can be fabricated for Christ's glory." *Μὴ δὴ κρατοίη τοιοῦτος λόγος ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ Χριστοῦ, ὅτι ψεῦδος σύγκειται εἰς αἶνον καὶ δοξολογίαν Χριστοῦ.* Eusebius ascribes to him a work which contained a sort of literary *omniana*, after the fashion of the unscientific *Polyhistories* of those times, entitled the *κέστοι*. A great deal, however, ascribed to him in the fragments of this work, does not accord with the views and principles which should belong to this man, according to what we otherwise know of him. It were certainly the most natural hypothesis, that he wrote this work before his habits of thinking had become decidedly Christian.

[2] c. 4.

given the means of edification to all the churches of Christ, to have cared for those who are bought with a price, for whom Christ died — Christ, the Son of that God who is love, and who spared not his own Son, but gave him up for us all, that he might with him freely give us all things? Besides, consider whether it is not well to think of those words, 'Remove not the ancient landmark, which thy fathers have set.'" Prov. 22: 28. He then proceeds to say, that although he by no means neglected the other ancient translations, yet he had bestowed peculiar diligence on the Alexandrian version, that it might not seem as if he wished to introduce into the church any falsifying innovation; and that he might give no pretext to those who sought occasion for, and took delight in, accusing and calumniating the men who were universally known and held an important place in the church.[1] Origen's journey terminated at Athens, where he resided for some time, finished his commentary on Ezekiel, and began his commentary on the Song of Solomon.[2]

To the end of his life, he was occupied with theological labors. Under the reign of Philip the Arabian, with whose family he was on terms of correspondence, he wrote the work against Celsus, which has already been mentioned, his commentary on the gospel of Matthew, and other treatises. When he was sixty years of age, he now for the first time permitted his discourses to be taken down by short-hand writers. In what high consideration he stood with the churches of these countries, is evident from the fact, that on important ecclesiastical questions, where it was difficult to come at a decision, the opinion of Origen was consulted by synods of bishops. A case of this sort, in which Beryllus, the bishop of Bostra in Arabia, submitted to be taught by him, we have noticed on a former occasion. We may here mention as another instance of this kind, that a controversy had been excited by a party among the Arabian Christians, who asserted, that the human soul died with the body, and that it was to be revived only with the body at the resurrection, — an ancient Jewish notion. Perhaps, too, in these districts, whose situation brought them into frequent contact with Jews, it was no new doctrine, but the one which had prevailed there from ancient times; and perhaps it was first brought about through the influence of Origen, — in whose system the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul, which is related to God, held an important place, — that this latter doctrine now became here the more general one, and the small party who still adhered to the old opinion, appeared to be heretical; if the case really was, that the prevailing voice had expressed itself thus early against them.[3] Hence it is explained, how the convention of a *great synod* came to be thought necessary for the purpose of settling these disputes. As they could not come to an agreement,

[1] Ἵνα μή τι παραχαράττειν δοκοίημεν ταῖς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐκκλησίαις· καὶ προφάσεις δίδωμεν τοῖς ζητοῦσιν ἀφορμὰς, ἐθέλουσι τοὺς ἐν μέσῳ συκοφαντεῖν καὶ τῶν διαφαινομένων ἐν τῷ κοινῷ κατηγορεῖν.

[2] Euseb. lib. VI. c. 32.

[3] Eusebius (l. VI. c. 37) may perhaps judge concerning the controversies of these times too much according to his own subjective views and the church orthodoxy of his age, when he represents the defenders of this opinion as men generally acknowledged to be teachers of error and propagators of a new doctrine.

Origen was sent for; and it was brought about by his influence, that the opponents of the soul's natural immortality confessed and renounced their error.

Origen, who, on account of some particular opinions, was by a great part of the church stigmatized as a heretic and enemy to the evangelical scheme of faith, is said in the last days of a life consecrated to labor and conflict in behalf of that which he considered to be the cause of Christ, to have refuted by his conduct the accusations of his adversaries, and shown how he was ready to sacrifice all for the faith, — how he belonged to that number who are willing to hate even their own life for the Lord's sake.

As the fury of the enemies of Christianity, in the Decian persecution, was directed particularly against *those* men who were distinguished among the Christians for their station, their wealth, or their knowledge, and their activity in promulgating the faith,[1] it was natural that such a man as Origen should become a shining mark for fanatical cruelty. After a steadfast confession, he was thrown into prison; and here it was attempted, in conformity with the plan of the Decian persecution, to overcome the infirmity of age, by exquisite and gradually increasing tortures. But the faith which he bore at heart, sustained the weakness of old age, and gave him power to withstand every trial. After having suffered so much,[2] he wrote from his prison a letter full of consolation, of encouragement for others. The circumstances heretofore mentioned, which contributed first to moderate, and then to bring wholly to an end, this persecution, procured finally for Origin also freedom and repose. Yet the sufferings which he had undergone, served perhaps to hasten his death, which took place about the year 254,[3] in the seventieth year of his age.

The influence of Origen on theological culture was no longer connected with his person, but continued to spread independently of the man, through his writings and his scholars, not without continual conflict with the minds of the opposite tendency. The friends of Chiliasm, of the gross literal method of scriptural interpretation, and of the anthropomorphic and anthropopathic mode of representing divine things connected therewith, and the zealots for the letter of the church doctrinal tradition, were opponents to the school of Origen. The conflict between these antagonistic directions of mind presents the most important phenomena connected with the theological development at the close of this period. We shall here, in the first place, glance at the church which

[1] The personæ insignes.

[2] Euseb. l. VI. c. 39.

[3] Euseb. l. VII. c. 2. According to Photius, cod. 118, there were two different reports concerning the manner and time of Origen's death. Pamphilus, and many others who had been personally acquainted with Origen, reported that he died as a martyr, at Cæsarea, under the Decian persecution. Others reported, that he lived till the times of Gallus and Volusianus, and then died at Tyre, and was there buried; which account was confirmed also by the letters written by Origen after the persecution, concerning the genuineness of which, however, Photius was not fully convinced. But according to what Eusebius says, in the above-cited passage of his Church History, — who undoubtedly followed the account of his friend and teacher Pamphilus,—it can hardly be supposed that Pamphilus really reported any such thing. Perhaps Photius misunderstood Pamphilus, when the latter meant simply confession under torture, or perhaps was speaking of the *indirect consequences of those sufferings* to Origen.

was the original seat of Origen's activity, namely, the church of *Alexandria and of Egypt.*

Origen had here left behind him disciples, who continued to labor on in *his own* spirit, although with less of the zeal for speculation. Demetrius the bishop was, as it appears from what has been said, rather the personal enemy of Origen, than the enemy of his theological direction of mind: his attack upon the latter had probably been only a pretext. Hence he permitted the disciples of Origen to continue their labors without disturbance; and he himself died soon after the outbreak of these controversies, in the same year 231.

Heraclas, the disciple and friend of Origen, — who has already been mentioned, and who, after the departure of the latter, was placed at the head of the catechetical school, — succeeded Demetrius in the episcopal office. Heraclas was succeeded — in the year 247 — as catechist, and afterwards as bishop, by Dionysius, another worthy disciple of Origen, who always retained his love and respect for him, and when he was in prison, under the Decian persecution, addressed to him a letter of consolation. Dionysius, as he tells us himself, had come to the faith in the gospel in the way of *free examination*, — having searched impartially through all the systems; and hence he remained true to this principle, both as a Christian and a teacher of the church. He read and examined without prejudice all the writings of the heretics, and rejected their systems only after he had made himself accurately acquainted with them, and put it into his power to refute them by arguments. A presbyter of his church warned him of the injury which might accrue to his soul by the distracting occupation of perusing so many godless writings. But the Spirit of God gave him assurance, that he needed not to be disturbed by that fear. He believed that he had heard a voice, saying to him: "Read whatever falls into thy hands, for thou art capable of judging and proving all things; and from the first this has been to *thee* the occasion of faith." By this encouragement, Dionysius was confirmed in his purpose; and he found it agreeable to that direction of the Lord (in an apocryphal gospel) to the stronger Christians: "Be ye skilful money-changers," γίνεσθε δοκιμοὶ τραπεζῖται, i.e. skilful to distinguish the genuine from the counterfeit coin.[1]

We have, on several occasions, already adduced examples of the freedom of spirit and moderation of this Father, and of the happy effects thence resulting. The same Christian moderation and gentleness appear also in his letter to Basilides, an Egyptian bishop, on questions relative to matters of church discipline and worship.[2] The letter of Dionysius to his subordinate bishop concludes thus: "These questions you have not proposed to me as if you were ignorant of the subject, but to honor me, and to be assured that I am of the same mind with yourself, as indeed I am. I have laid open to you my own opinions, not as a teacher, but with all the frankness which we are bound to

[1] Dionysius, in his letter to the Roman presbyter Philemon, Euseb. l. VII. c. 7.

[2] Which letter acquired the authority of canonical law in the Greek church, as being an ἐπιστολὴ κανονική. The fragments of it which still remain were last edited by Routh, in his Reliquiæ Sacræ, vol. II.

use in our communications with each other. But it is now your business to judge of what I have said, and then write me what seems to you better than this, or whether you hold that to be right which I have advanced." [1]

The next that distinguished themselves as teachers in the Alexandrian church were Pierius and Theognostos, who lived in the last times of the third century. In the fragments of their writings, (preserved by Photius,) we recognize the peculiar doctrines of Origen.

We have observed before, that in Egypt itself there existed two opposite parties, of Origenists and anti-Origenists. We meet with them again in the fourth century, especially among the Egyptian monks, under the names of *Anthropomorphites* and *Origenists*. Perhaps this opposition among the Egyptian monks may also be traced to the times of which we are now speaking. In these times, it is true, there were as yet no monks; but, as early as the close of the third century, there existed in Egypt societies of ascetics, who lived retired in the country.[2] Among these Egyptian ascetics, appeared, at the end of this period, a man by the name of Hieracas, who, in the following times, was placed among the heretics, by those who judged him according to the standard of the church scheme of faith, as it had formed itself in the fourth century; but who could hardly have been considered as a heretic during his life-time.[3] So far as we are able to understand his spiritual bent and his doctrines from the fragmentary accounts, for which we are indebted for the most part to Epiphanius,[4] there was much in his peculiar views which savored of the school of Origen; and the fact may have been, that he came from that school: yet we find no such relationship as could be explained only in this particular way. The same tendencies may easily have sprung up in Egypt from different quarters.

Hieracas passed the life of an ascetic in the city of Leontopolis, in Egypt,[5] and, after the manner of the ascetics, earned the necessaries of life, and the means of bestowing charity, by the industry of his own hands; exercising an art that was highly esteemed and much employed in Egypt, that of *calligraphy*, which he practised with equal skill both in the Greek and in the Coptic language. He is said to have lived beyond the age of ninety, and — which may be easily accounted for from his simple habits — to have retained to the last the full exercise of his powers, so that he could pursue his art to the very end of his life. He was equally familiar with the Greek and with the Coptic literature; from which very circumstance, however, it may have resulted that he introduced many foreign elements from both these sources into

[1] A considerable fragment of the work of this Dionysius on Nature, in which he defends the belief in a Providence against the atomistic system of the Epicureans, has been preserved to us by Eusebius, in the XIV. Book of the Præparatio evangelica, introduced by Routh, l. c. vol. IV.

[2] See Athanasius' life of Antonius. We shall have occasion to say more on this point in the following period.

[3] For this reason, as we can take the notion of heresy in the present work only in its historical sense, we have not placed Hieracas, as is usually done, among the heretics.

[4] Hæres. 67.

[5] Unless he lived at the head of a community of ascetics, somewhere in the neighborhood of that city.

Christianity. He wrote commentaries on the Bible, in the Greek and in the Coptic tongue, and composed many church hymns.

He was given to the allegorical method of interpretation, which was closely connected with a certain theosophic tendency. Like Origen, he explained particularly the account of Paradise as an allegory, denying that there had ever been a material Paradise. It may be conjectured that, like Origen, he considered the Paradise as a symbol of that higher spiritual world, from which the heavenly spirit fell by an inclination to earthly matter. But as there was no general agreement of opinion as to what should be understood symbolically and what literally, in that narrative of Genesis; as, moreover, nothing was yet settled in the system of the dominant church, respecting the origin of the soul; and as the peculiar opinions of Origen had still many important advocates, particularly in the Egyptian church,—he could not on this account be generally condemned as a heretic.

From that theory of his concerning the manner in which the heavenly spirit, sunk into union with matter, became invested with a body, we may easily understand why Hieracas should contemn this earthly, material body, make its mortification the leading aim of the Christian system of morals, and oppose the doctrine that the soul, once set free, should again be incarcerated in this prison of the body by the resurrection. In reference to the latter point, however, he may, at the same time, have supposed, perhaps, that the soul would be veiled in a higher organ of ethereal matter, (a σῶμα πνευματικόν.) Even this opinion he might present under such a form as not directly to reject the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, but only to explain it according to his own sense.

In respect to the former point, he represented the abstemious unmarried life as something essential to the proper perfection of the Christian. The recommendation of the unmarried life, he made to constitute the characteristic distinction between the great moral principle of the Old, and that of the New Testament. Those false notions respecting the essence of morality, respecting the demands of the moral law on human nature, by which men were led to imagine they could so easily fulfil it, and even do more than it requires, (opera supererogationis,) discover themselves in Hieracas, when he asks: "What new thing has the doctrine of the Only-begotten introduced? Of what new benefit has he been the author to humanity? Respecting the fear of God, respecting envy, covetousness, and the like, the Old Testament has already treated. What new thing is there still remaining, unless it be the introduction of the unmarried life?" This question shows, we allow, that Hieracas had no right apprehension, either of the demands of the moral law, or, what is strictly connected therewith, of Christ as the Redeemer of mankind, and of the nature of the redemption. From the views which we here find expressed, of human nature, and of the demands of the moral law on the same, might be drawn a doctrine, teaching that man needed no Redeemer. But it is with no good reason the doctrine has, therefore, been ascribed to Hieracas, that Christ was merely the author of a perfect system of morals, and not the Re-

deemer of mankind. A zealous Montanist might have said nearly the same as Hieracas has done. Indeed, the traces of these erroneous ethical and anthropological notions may be found elsewhere, in the same period, particularly among the Alexandrians.

He endeavored to prove, by texts wrested out of their proper connection, in the seventh chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians, that Paul had permitted marriage only out of respect to human infirmity, and only for the sake of avoiding, in the case of the weak, a still greater evil. In the parable of the virgins, Matth. 25, he neglected the rule requiring that, in a comparison, we should not give weight to each individual circumstance, but only to the particular point to be illustrated; and, from the fact that none but *virgins* are here mentioned, drew the conclusion, that none but unmarried persons could have any portion in the kingdom of heaven. In the application of the passage, "Without holiness no man can see the Lord," Heb. 12: 14, he proceeded on his own principle, that the essence of holiness consists in a life of celibacy.

As Hieracas himself allows that Paul permitted marriage to the weak, it follows from this, that he by no means condemned unconditionally married Christians, and excluded them from the number of the faithful. It may have been, perhaps, that too hasty conclusions were drawn from some of his extravagant assertions in recommending the unmarried life. Or, when he said that none but those living in celibacy could enter into the kingdom of heaven, he must have understood by the kingdom of heaven, not the state of blessedness generally, but only the highest degree of that blessedness; a dogmatic use of language peculiar to himself, as seems probable from what we are about to remark.

In consequence of his ascetic bent, Hieracas was accustomed to dwell with great earnestness on the position, that every man must earn, by his own moral conflict, his own ascetic efforts, a portion in the kingdom of heaven. This circumstance, of his laying a peculiar stress on each one's own moral conflicts, was also entirely in accordance with the peculiar Alexandrian tendency. Inasmuch now as Hieracas assumed the position, that a participation in the kingdom of heaven can only be the reward of a conflict, and that he who has not fought, cannot obtain the crown; he inferred that children who die before they come to the years of understanding, do not enter into the kingdom of heaven. It can hardly be supposed, that by this he meant to pronounce on them an unconditional sentence of condemnation, but only that he excluded them from the *highest grade* of blessedness which results from communion with God, from the glorification of human nature by its union with the Godhead in Christ; for to the participation in this it was impossible to attain, except by one's own moral efforts, and by doing more than the law demands. He assumed a middle condition for these children — an hypothesis which Pelagius and many of the Orientals afterwards adopted with regard to unbaptised children. If Hieracas asserted this of all children, including those who had been baptized, it follows, that he denied the connection of any *supernatural influence*

with infant baptism. Perhaps, on this principle, he combated infant baptism itself, and represented it as a practice of more recent origin, at variance with the end of baptism, and with the essential character of Christianity. The remarks which we have here made tend to confirm also what was just before observed, that Hieracas by no means honored Christ merely as a moral Teacher. It is clearly evident, on the contrary, that he recognized him as one who had glorified human nature, and acquired for it that highest grade of blessedness, to which men could not have attained by their own powers.

From the position assumed by the later church orthodoxy, the charge was brought against Hieracas of entertaining certain errors in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. He is said to have employed the following comparison: "The Son of God emanates from the Father, as one lamp is kindled from another, or as one torch is divided into two."[1] Comparisons of this sort, drawn from sensible objects, were at variance, we admit, with the spiritual tendency of Origen; but the older church-teachers, such as Justin and Tatian, had certainly been partial to them. He affirmed again, that under the type of Melchisedec is represented the Holy Spirit, since the latter is designated, Rom. 8: 26, as an intercessor for men, consequently as a priest. *He* represents the image of the Son, being subordinate, indeed, to the Son but bearing the nearest resemblance to him of all beings; — a notion altogether conformed to Origen's theory of subordination, which long continued to maintain its place in the Eastern church.[2]

From Palestine the influence of Origen was extended, by means of his friends and disciples, even to Cappadocia and to Pontus, as the three great church-teachers of Cappadocia in the fourth century still testify. Here it is proper to mention particularly his great disciple *Gregory*, to whom the admiration of the Christians gave the surname of Wonder-worker (*Θαυματουργός.*) His original name was Theodorus. He was descended from a noble and wealthy family of Neocæsarea in Pontus. His father, a devoted Pagan, educated him in Heathenism. At the age of fourteen, however, he lost his father, and then first he was gained to Christianity; affording another illustration of the fact, that it was often through children and women the gospel first found its way into families. He was acquainted with Christianity, however, as yet only through the oral teaching of others, being himself still ignorant of the scriptures. The religious interest was with him as yet but a subordinate one, the strife after a splendid career in the world seeming to him vastly more important. His mother exerted herself to the utmost to have him taught everything which, under the existing circumstances,

[1] *Ὡς λύχνον ἀπὸ λύχνου, ἢ ὡς λάμπαδα εἰς δύο.* Arius ad Alexandr. apud Epiphan. hæres. 69, § 7. Athanas. T. I. P. II. 68.

[2] He appeals also to a passage in an apocryphal writing of some importance on account of its bearing on the history of the oldest doctrines, — the *ἀναβατικὸν Ἡσαΐου*, i. e. the account of Isaiah's ascension to the several regions of heaven, and of what he there saw. After the angel attendant of Isaiah has shown him the Son of God, sitting at the right hand of God, *ὁ ἀγαπητός*, Isaiah asks: *Καὶ τίς ἐστὶν ὁ ἄλλος, ὁ ὅμοιος αὐτῷ, ἐξ ἀριστέρων ἐλθών; καὶ εἶπε· σὺ γινώσκεις, τοῦτ' ἐστι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν σοὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς προφήταις. Καὶ ἦν, φησι, ὅμοιον τῷ ἀγαπητῷ.* This passage is found in the writing now published entire, after the old Ethiopic translation, by R. Lawrence, Oxoniæ, 1819; p. 58, 59, v. 32—36.

could contribute to the successful prosecution of his aims. He received, therefore, a good rhetorical education, in order to place him on the step of preferment as a rhetorician or an advocate; and he learnt, moreover, the language of the established government and laws, — the Latin. His teacher in the Latin language pointed out to him how very necessary to the attainment of his end was the knowledge of the Roman law. He commenced the study of this, and had already laid his plans to visit Rome, for the purpose of improving his knowledge of the Roman jurisprudence. But Providence had chosen him to be an instrument for higher ends; and, without dreaming of it or willing it, as he observes himself, in describing the remarkable vicissitudes of his life, he was to be formed for those higher purposes.

His sister's husband, who was legal adviser to the Præfect of Palestine, had been called by the duties of his office to Cæsarea. He had left his wife behind at Neocæsarea; and now she was sent for to follow him. His brother-in-law, the young Theodorus, was requested to attend her on the journey; and it was intimated, that he could thus most easily prosecute his plan of studying the Roman jurisprudence at the celebrated school of Roman law, not far distant from Cæsarea, at Berytus in Phœnicia. Theodorus accepted the invitation; but this journey had a different result from what he had anticipated. At Cæsarea he became acquainted with Origen: the latter soon observed the talents of the young man, and sought to direct them to a higher end than that which he then contemplated. Attracted, in spite of himself, by this great teacher, he forgot Rome, Berytus, and the study of law. To awaken in him the activity of his own mind, a free, unprejudiced spirit of inquiry, was, as Theodore himself describes it in his farewell discourse, the principal endeavor of Origen. After having made him search for the scattered rays of truth in the systems of the Greek philosophy, he showed him what revelation furnishes of a higher order: he led him to the study of the sacred scriptures, and expounded to him their meaning. Theodore says of Origen's exposition of scripture: "It is my firm belief that he was able so to discourse only by communion with the divine Spirit; for to be a prophet and to understand prophets requires the same power. And no man can understand the prophets, on whom the Spirit himself, from whom the prophecies came, has not bestowed the power of understanding his own language. This man had received from God that greatest of gifts, *to be to men an interpreter of the words of God;* to understand God's word, as God speaks it, and to announce it to men, as men can understand it."[1]

After he had spent *eight years* with Origen at Cæsarea, where probably he also received baptism and adopted the name *Gregorius*, he returned to his native land. With deep sorrow he took leave of the teacher to whom his whole soul was affectionately bound. He compared the tie that united them, with the bond of friendship between David and Jonathan. To Origen, and to the Providence which, without his own knowledge or will, had conducted him to such a friend, he testi-

[1] Panegyric. in Orig. c. 15

fied his thanks in the parting address, in which he describes the providential events of his own life, and Origen's method of instruction and training.[1]

In tearing himself with pain from the society of his beloved teacher, and from those sacred studies which had so long been his exclusive occupation, to engage with sorrowful heart in employment of an entirely different kind, which he must devote himself to in his native city, he exclaims: "But why grieve at this? We have, verily, a Saviour for all, even for those that are half dead and fallen among thieves — one who cares for all, is the Physician of all, the watchful Keeper of all men. We have *also* within us *that seed which we have been made conscious by thy means*, (Origen,) *that we bear within us;* and the seed which we *have received from thee*, those glorious doctrines. Having these seeds, we part, with tears indeed, for we are leaving thee, but yet taking these seeds with us. Perhaps the heavenly Keeper will accompany us and deliver us; but perhaps we shall return to thee, and from the seed bring with us also the fruits and the sheaves; and if none are ripe, (for how could that be?) yet may they be such as can thrive amidst the thorns of civil employments." And then, addressing himself directly to Origen, he proceeds: "But do thou, beloved head, stand up and dismiss us with thy prayer. As thou hast guided us[2] all the long time we have been with thee, by thy holy doctrines, to salvation; so now, when we are to leave thee, guide us to salvation by thy prayers. Give us over and commend us, or rather give us back, to that God who conducted us to thee. Thanks to him for what he has hitherto done for us; but do thou implore him also, that he would guide us in the future, that he would inspire our minds with his precepts, that he would imbue us with the fear of God, and make this our most wholesome discipline. For we shall not be able, far away, to obey him with *the freedom* with which we could obey him, so long as we were with thee. Pray him, that, to console us in our separation from thee, he would send with us a good angel to lead us. But pray to him also, that he would once more bring us back to thee; for the assurance only of this would be our greatest consolation."

After his removal, Origen still retained him in affectionate remembrance. We have preserved to us a letter which he wrote him, full of paternal love.[3] In this he assures him, that his distinguished talents fitted him for the station either of an able teacher of the Roman law, or of an eminent instructer of one of the famous philosophical schools; but it was his wish, that Gregory would make Christianity his single

[1] This discourse we have followed, as the source chiefly to be relied on for the history of the early life and education of Gregory. The narratives of Gregory of Nyssa, in his biography of this Gregory, openly contradict the autobiography of the latter; and, as Gregory of Nyssa set out with rhetorical flourishes what he had taken from incredible or inaccurate stories, it were a fruitless labor to undertake to reconcile the two contradictory accounts with each other. The Panegyric of Gregory may be found in the fourth vol. of the edition of Origen's works by de la Rue, and in the third vol. of the Bibliotheca Patrum of Galland.

[2] He speaks here in the plural, probably because he has in mind also his brother Athenodorus, who had come in company with him to Origen, and afterwards became bishop of a church in Pontus. Vid. Eusеb l. IV. c. 30.

[3] Philocal. c. 13.

aim, and employ his talents only as a means to this one great object. Following out his own principles, above exhibited, respecting the relation of the sciences, and particularly of philosophy, to Christianity, he goes on to advise him to make himself master of everything in the general circle of the sciences and in philosophy, which he could apply to any use in behalf of Christianity. By a variety of beautiful allegoric expositions of the narratives of the Old Testament, he endeavors to set clearly before him the duty of making everything subservient to the divine calling, and of sanctifying every other interest by referring it to this; instead of forgetting, as was frequently done, the divine calling itself in the crowd of foreign matters, or profaning it by letting it become mixed up and confounded with them. He then addresses him as follows: "Study, then, my son, before all things else, the sacred scriptures; but let it be to thee an earnest study; for it needs a very earnest study of the scriptures, that we may not express anything, or judge anything, too rashly respecting their sacred contents. And if thou studiest the holy scriptures with a believing temper of mind, well pleasing to God,[1] then wherever anything in them seems shut up from thee, knock, and it shall be opened to thee by the porter, of whom Jesus speaks in John 10: 3, *To him the porter openeth.* Search, with unwavering faith in God, after the sense of the sacred word, which is hidden from the great mass of readers. Let it not suffice thee, however, merely to knock and to seek; for prayer also is especially necessary to the understanding of divine things; in exhorting us to which, the Saviour has said not only: Knock, and it shall be opened unto you, and seek, and ye shall find; but also ask, and it shall be given you."

Gregory answered the hopes of his great teacher. In his native city, of which he became bishop, there were at first but *seventeen* Christians. Through his instrumentality, the majority of its inhabitants were converted, and Christianity became widely diffused in Pontus. It is to be lamented, that we have no exhibition of the labors of this remarkable man, more accurate and more worthy of credit than the legendary account of his life, set forth with so much of rhetorical ornament, which Gregory of Nyssa wrote a century afterwards. Perhaps, in following out those principles of the Alexandrian school which permitted and inculcated the practice of descending to the weakness of the multitude and held to a progressive course of religious education, he was in the habit of yielding too much, in order to increase the number of his heathen converts; perhaps he conceived, that, if they were but once introduced into the Christian church, the spirit of the gospel, and the continued labors of their teacher, would gradually conduct them onward to a more enlightened Christianity. Having observed that many of the common people remained bound to the religion of their fathers by their love for the ancient sports connected with Paganism, he deter-

[1] The Greek word *πρόληψις* hardly admits of being well rendered in the present case. Neither "prejudice" nor "prejudgment" would answer here. "Presupposition" would come nearer to the sense. Origen means to say, that the reader of the scriptures should be *fully persuaded* beforehand, that the sacred word is pervaded throughout with a divine spirit, and not allow himself to be embarrassed at particular passages, where the divine meaning does not immediately appear

mined to provide the new converts with a substitute for these. After the Decian persecution, under which numbers in this country had died as martyrs, he instituted a general festival in honor of the martyrs, and permitted the rude multitude to celebrate it with banquets similar to those which accompanied the pagan funerals (Parentalia) and other heathen festivals. He imagined that, in this way, one main obstacle to the conversion of the heathen would fall away, and, if they once became members of the Christian church, they would, by degrees, of their own accord, after their minds had become enlightened and spiritualized by Christianity, bid farewell to those sensual pleasures.[1] But he did not seem to consider what intermingling of Pagan and Christian notions and customs might result from this loose accommodation, — an issue which was afterwards realized, — nor how difficult it would be for Christianity to penetrate directly into the life, when, from the very first, it had become adulterated by such an alloy.[2]

We have from Gregory a simple and clearly written *Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes*. A confession of faith on the doctrine of the Trinity, which he is affirmed to have written by special revelation, was appealed to in the fourth century in opposition to the Arians. In attestation of its authenticity, it was said that it remained in his own hand-writing, preserved in the church of Neocæsarea. But although the first part of this confession, in which the peculiar doctrines of Origen are distinctly to be recognized, might prove genuine; yet the second part is manifestly a later addition, inasmuch as it contains distinctions wholly unknown to the school of Origen, and which arose first out of the controversy with the Arians, in the fourth century.

Among the violent opponents of the school of Origen, we have already mentioned in another place, *Methodius*, — first, bishop of Olympus in Lycia; afterwards, of Tyre, — a martyr in the persecution of Diocletian. Yet he seems not to have always stood in the same relation to this school. Eusebius of Cæsarea, in his continuation of the Apology of Pamphilus in behalf of Origen, affirms that Methodius contradicted his own earlier remarks, which had been in praise of Origen.[3] The ecclesiastical historian Socrates asserts, on the other hand,[4] that Methodius had first declared himself against Origen, and afterwards, in his dialogue called ξένων, retracted his censures, and expressed his admiration of the man. There must be some truth lying at the bottom of these two accounts. Eusebius and Socrates derived their impressions from what Methodius himself had declared in his own writings. But it seems not improbable, that these two authors determined

[1] Vita Gregor. c. 27.

[2] The canonical letter which we have from this Gregory, shows perhaps, that, in the conversion of large bodies of the people, there may have been a great deal which was barely outward and in appearance; for it relates to a class of persons who took advantage of the confusion occasioned by the devastation committed by the Goths in the country around Pontus, to make the public misfortunes a source of profit to themselves and even to rob their own countrymen. This letter furnishes, at the same time, evidence of Gregory's wakeful zeal for the morals of his people

[3] Apud Hieronym. lib. I. adv. Rufin. Hieronym. opp. ed. Martianay, T. IV. fol. 359: Quomodo ausus est Methodius nunc contra Origenem scribere, qui hæc et hæc de Origenis loquutus est dogmatibus?

[4] Lib. IV. c. 13.

the chronological order of these writings, not by any historical data, but each according to his own private conjectures; and in matters of this kind the ancients were very far from being accurate. Methodius, in his Symposium, which we shall presently notice, appears to be by no means a stickler for the letter of the church doctrine. On the contrary, the work betrays a leaning to Theosophy, a fondness for the allegorical mode of interpretation; it contains much, therefore, indicating the same general direction of mind as we find in Origen; indeed, expressions occur which at least favor the doctrine of the soul's preëxistence.[1] But it also contains much which is directly at variance with the doctrines of Origen; — for instance, a decided leaning to Chiliasm.[2] It may safely be conjectured, therefore, that Methodius, who was no systematic thinker, was in the first place drawn by many of the views and writings of Origen, which flattered his favorite opinions and pleased his taste; which only prepared him, however, to be the more strongly repelled by that in the system of Origen which went counter to his own intellectual bent and his own dogmatic principles.

The most important and authentic of the writings which remain of this Methodius is his *Banquet of the Ten Virgins*, in eleven conversations, containing a eulogy, oftentimes exaggerated, of the unmarried life.

The treatise which we have under the name of Methodius, on free-will, (*περὶ αὐτεξουσίου*,) seems to belong rather to the Christian church-teacher Maximus, who lived under the reign of Septimus Severus,[3] than to Methodius.[4] It is an attack on the Gnostic Dualism.

One who stood up for Origen against those that accused him of being a heretic was the presbyter Pamphilus of Cæsarea, in Palestine, a man distinguished for his zeal in the cause of piety and science. He founded at Cæsarea an ecclesiastical library, which contributed in no small degree to the furtherance of scientific studies even in the fourth century. Every friend of science, and in particular every one who was disposed to engage in a thorough study of the Bible, found in him all possible encouragement and support. He exerted himself to multiply,[5] to disseminate, and to correct the copies of the Bible. Many of these copies he distributed as presents; sometimes to women, whom he saw much occupied in reading the scriptures.[6] He founded a *theological school*,[7] in which the study of the sacred writings was made a special object of attention.[8] From this school probably proceeded the learned Eusebius, who owed everything to Pamphilus, and looked up to him as his

[1] Orat. II. Theophil. § 5.

[2] Orat. IX. § 5.

[3] Euseb. lib. V. c. 27. Hieronym. de vir. illustr. c. 47. This Maximus can hardly be identical with the bishop of Jerusalem, of the same name. Euseb. l. V. c. 12.

[4] See, on this point, my genetic development of the Gnostic system, p. 206.

[5] Vid. Montfaucon catalog. Mss. biblioth. Coislinian. f. 261.

[6] Eusebius says of him, in the account of his life, Hieronym. adv. Rufin. lib. I. f. 358, 359, vol. IV.: Quis studiosorum amicus non fuit Pamphili? Si quos videbat ad victum necessariis indigere, præbebat large, quæ poterat. Scripturas quoque sanctas non ad legendum tantum, sed et ad habendum tribuebat promptissime. Nec solum viris, sed et feminis, quas vidisset lectioni deditas. Unde et multos codices præparabat, ut, quum necessitas poposcisset, volentibus largiretur.

[7] Euseb. lib. VII. c. 32: *συνεστήσατο διατριβήν.*

[8] Euseb. de martyrib. Palæstinæ. c. 4.

paternal friend. Pamphilus communicated to his scholars his own reverence for Origen, as the promoter of Christian science, and exerted himself to counteract the narrow spirit that proceeded from those who accused Origen of being a heretic. As the ignorant zeal of these people, Pamphilus says, went to such an extreme, that on every one who did but occupy himself with the writings of Origen, they forthwith pronounced sentence of condemnation, — Pamphilus, while in prison under the Dioclesian persecution, in the year 309,[1] wrote a work in Origen's defence, conjointly with his disciple Eusebius;[2] which defence was addressed to the confessors who had been condemned to the mines. After the martyrdom of Pamphilus, Eusebius added to the five books of the unfinished work a supplementary sixth book. The first book of this Apology we still possess, in the arbitrary version of Rufinus, with the exception of a few fragments of the Greek.[3]

The example of this Pamphilus shows us how the comprehensive mind of Origen, which grasped and united together so many different pursuits, gave birth not only to the spirit of dogmatic speculation, but also to the thorough study of the Bible and the careful investigation of the letter of the scriptures, however much this may seem irreconcilable with his allegorizing licentiousness. Another example of the same kind probably is that of the Egyptian bishop Hesychius, who prepared a new emended revision of the text of the Alexandrian version, which became the current one in Egypt.[4] He likewise suffered martyrdom under the Dioclesian persecution, in the year 310 or 311.[5] Finally, it was also owing in part perhaps to the influence of Origen, that a new and peculiar school of theology sprung up at Antioch, which first arrived at its full development in the course of the fourth century, whence the science of hermeneutics and exegesis received a healthy direction between the extremes of the grossly literal and arbitrary allegorical methods of scriptural interpretation. Learned presbyters, attached to the church of Antioch, who took a special interest in the study of biblical interpretation, may be regarded as the progenitors of this school; particularly Dorotheus and Lucian, of whom the latter died as a martyr, in the beginning of the year 312, in the persecution under Maximin.[6]

[1] One illustration of the influence which Pamphilus had over those who lived near him, is furnished by his slave Porphyrius, a young man of eighteen years, whom he had educated with a father's love, and in promoting whose religious and intellectual culture he had spared no pains. To this young man he had imparted a glowing love for the Redeemer. When Porphyry heard the sentence of death pronounced on his beloved master, he requested that he might be allowed the privilege, after the execution of the sentence, of paying him the last tribute of affection by committing his body to the grave. This request at once excited the anger of the fanatical præfect. And, as he steadfastly confessed that he was a Christian, and refused to offer, he was subjected to the most cruel torture, and finally, after having been dreadfully lacerated, was conducted to the stake. All this he bore with the utmost constancy; only exclaiming once, when the fire reached him, — "Jesus, Son of God, help me." Euseb. de martyrib. Palæst. c. 11, f. 388.

[2] The charge of the passionate Jerome, that Rufinus had falsely ascribed such a work to Pamphilus, deserves no credit.

[3] The loss of the Life of Pamphilus, by Eusebius, is much to be regretted.

[4] Hieronym. adv. Rufin. lib. II. f. 425.

[5] Euseb. hist. eccles. lib. VIII. c. 13, f. 308.

[6] Lucian prepared a new revision of the corrected text of the Alexandrian version, and probably also of the New Testament. The codices written after this revision were

Thus the historical development of doctrine in this period terminates with the conflict of opposite tendencies, which, in order that Christianity might not be maimed and crippled by partial human views, and in order that it might be preserved as that which is destined to overcome and reconcile all human antagonisms, should act as a counterpoise to each other. And as this process of development and purification is transmitted from one generation to another, so the conclusion of this first great stadium contains in it the foretoken and presage of all the succeeding periods, which, by struggles and victories ever renewed, are to prepare the way for the last great struggle and the final victory which is to make an end of all strife.

called *λουκιανεῖα*. Hieronym. de vir. illustr. c. 77, adv. Rufin. lib. II. f. 425, vol. IV. What we are to believe concerning the earlier relation in which Lucian stood to Paul of Samosata, is a point which cannot be determined, with any certainty, from the account which has been left by Alexander bishop of Alexandria, since that account is liable to the suspicion of being colored by a polemical interest. Theodoret. hist. eccles. lib. I. c. 4.

NOTE.

NEANDER'S SUPPLEMENT TO THE SECOND EDITION.

CRITICISM, BY HERMANN ROSSEL, OF STIEREN "DE PTOLEMÆI VALENTINIANI AD FLORAM EPISTOLA."

Dr. Stieren, in his licentiate dissertation, "De Ptolemæi Valentiniani ad Floram epistola," attacks the genuineness of this Gnostic document, the only one that has been preserved to us uninjured, in two respects. In the first place, the letter must fall apart into two portions which do not belong together, c. I.–IV. and c. V.; in the second place, neither of these pieces proceeds from the author to whom they have hitherto been attributed. As an external argument against their genuineness, Dr. Stieren avails himself of the fact, that, until into the eighth century, no author, with the exception of Epiphanius, makes any mention of the letter, and we search for it in vain in the anti-heretical works of an Irenæus, Tertullian, Augustin, and others. But then this circumstance could have significance only in so far as it was shown to be probable that the writers named, in case they had known and recognized the letter, would necessarily have brought it forward in their works. But especially in need of proof is the supposition, little suited to that age, that Augustin and Theodoret, if they had distrusted the opinion of Epiphanius, would have passed it over in silence. Since the writer does not offer any such proof, the further argument, the known untrustworthiness of Epiphanius, receives weight only from the internal signs which are to testify against the authenticity of our document.

First, the alleged interpolation. In the second part of the writing, says the critic, Satan appears as evil by nature; in the second, through free will. This lies in the words, — *οὔτ' αὖ πάλιν τῇ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου ἀδικίᾳ νόμον προσαπτέον, τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἱροῦντος*, — for the alteration of *αἱροῦντος* to *ἀναιροῦντα* is arbitrary. But with this latter assertion we can by no means agree. Manifold arguments testify against *αἱροῦντος*. To mention one: we should expect for the meaning "choose" the middle voice; but setting this aside, the additional clause, "who chooses the evil," would then be quite superfluous, since in relation to the assertion, that the law, which is good, cannot be derived from the evil being, it is a matter of indifference whether this being is evil by nature, or has become so from a condition of freedom. Finally, when the writer alleges that *αἱρεῖν τὸ ἀδικεῖν* finds no application in the Gnostic Cosmocrator, neither does it by any means suit with the idea

of the devil, as found in the church; for he fell as possessed of freedom, indeed, but yet is not so conceived as if the power of choosing between good and evil remained to him even after the fall; and we must by no means refer the present αἱροῦντος to the fall itself. On the other hand, the easy emendation to ἀναιροῦντα gives a definite sense, which fits exactly into the connection, "neither must the law, as that which removes unrighteousness, be derived from the unrighteousness of the adversary."

Another argument is found in the difference of the Demiurge of the first four chapters from that of the fifth. But this difference we must deny. The description of the world-former of the first chapter is not less Gnostic than that of the last. To call him δίκαιος καὶ μισοπόνηρος is certainly conformable with the picture that Irenæus sketches of the Valentinian Demiurge. Were the latter unconcerned about good and evil, in the sense presupposed by the writer, how could Irenæus say of him, for example, that he prefers the pneumatic men to the others, as being the better. The μήτε ἀγαθός of the last chapter has, rather, a milder signification. It is opposed to the ἀγαθότης of the τέλειος θεός, who alone is ἀγαθός, and does not exclude justice, nor, consequently, the μισοπόνηρος, and, accordingly, the author goes on to say, μήτε ἄδικος, ἰδίως τε λεχθείη ἂν δίκαιος, τῆς κατ' αὐτὸν δικαιοσύνης βραβευτής; while in the first part, on the other hand, such laws are expressly ascribed to the Demiurge as stand in decided opposition to the ἀγαθότης of the supreme God. Just as unfounded is the assertion, that the foresight here ascribed to the Demiurge does not agree with the Gnostic view of him. Compare, on this point, Irenæus, I. vii. 4, where, moreover, the writer does not sufficiently regard the antithesis to the doctrine that would refer the origin of the world to the evil principle. And if now the Demiurge of this chapter is really to be so little distinguished from the supreme God as ultimately to coincide with the latter, — if the following is laid down as the proper meaning: Jesus and Moses had taught the same God, the latter according to his justice, the former according to his goodness, the proof for this could hardly come out of the letter itself. For the train of argument, that because the consciousness of God awakened under the Demiurge and that of Christianity are indeed different as thus defined, but as a consciousness of God are identical, therefore also the Demiurge is identical with the θεός καὶ πατήρ, cannot well supply this proof (quite aside from the fact, that the thought itself of such a twofold consciousness of God is arbitrarily introduced into the letter), as the writer also seems to feel, since he falls back again upon the bare assertion. If in fact the matter stood thus, — if the Demiurge were not just as truly opposed to the Supreme God, as he contains within himself, on the other hand, the type of the future, it were then impossible that an important part of his legislation should be wholly and entirely removed by the Soter, that it should be said, ἀνερέθη ὑρὸ τοῦ σωτῆρος διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, τὰ δε ἐναντία ἀλλήλων εἰσὶν ἀναιρετικά.

The last argument, drawn from the plan of the letter, is best refuted by means of the plan as sketched by the composer of it himself. In the beginning of the first chapter, it is said, ... ἀκριβῶς ἡγοῦμαι καὶ σοὶ εὐσύνοπτον ἔσεσθαι, μαθούσῃ τὰς διαφονούσας γνώμας περὶ αὐτοῦ (νόμου). These διαφονούσαι γνώμαι now follow. Then, at the end of chapter II.: Περιλείπεται δὲ ἡμῖν . . . . ἐκφῆναί σοὶ καὶ ἀκριβῶσαι αὐτόν τε τὸν νόμον, ποταπός τις εἴη, καὶ τὸν ὑφ' οὗ τέθειται, τὸν νομοθέτην. Accordingly, then, in the third and fourth chapters, the nature and doubly threefold character of the law is also discussed; the fourth chapter contains a brief summary and recapitulation of the third, with proofs from Scripture. At the beginning of the fifth, reference is again made to the two which precede. All this the critic still allows to pass, but here the letter must all at once close. Where then remains the promised explanation with regard to the νομοθέτης? According to the hitherto received opinion, we had this in the fifth chapter, Περιλείπεται δὲ ἡμῖν τί ποτέ ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ θεὸς, ὁ τὸν νόμον θέμενος, etc. This chapter the critic now finds to be *supervacaneum et cumuli instar additum.*

If the writer overlooks in what precedes, as we have represented, the antithesis between the revelation of the just, and of the good God; he appears to us to misunderstand in no less degree the mutual connection of the two, where it is really taught; and this misunderstanding is then made the ground of denying, in what follows, that either of the two pretended portions of the letter were composed by Ptolemæus. The notion of the πλήρωσις τοῦ νόμου, as the critic finds it in our writing, according to which it amounts to this, that Christ *ad vera Judaismi præcepta sua annectebat*, would indeed testify against its origin from the Valentinian school. The latter had a higher and worthier idea of the πλήρωσις. But now the conception actually in question leaves nothing to be desired; rather it forms the chief and peculiar beauty of the letter, and approves itself as the even now valid result of the application of Gnostic principles to the connection between the Old and the New Testaments. In proof of this we must refer to the last half of the third chapter. The further objection, that the spiritual fulfillment here demanded — which is at the same time, however, the abolition of the law — stands in contradiction with the Gnostic doctrine of natures, and, at the same time, with the words in Irenæus, οὕτως πάλιν τὸ πνευματικὸν . . . . ἀδύνατον φθορὰν καταδέξασθαι, κἂν ὁποίαις συγκαταγένωνται πράξεσιν, refutes itself, assuming that these words are rightly referred to Ptolemæus, by means of the distinction, that what is possible to the nature of the πνευματικοὶ, as imperishable and indestructible, is one thing; what it must and will do, when it has arrived at self-consciousness, is another. And the elevation above all possibility of ruin, and the claims of the moral law, as little exclude each other in the sense of the Gnostics, as these claims and the unconditional decree in the sense of Calvin.

All the other arguments for the spuriousness of the letter may be referred to the somewhat lifeless view of the Valentinian system entertained

by the composer. If in Irenæus the Demiurge is represented as the world-former, while in our letter is taught the dependence of all existence upon the highest God; if we find there the restoration of the Pleroma, here, of the whole universe, to the Logos,—this and the like things must testify against Ptolemæus as a writer; while it is still the characteristic peculiarity of that system to carry out at once the opposition and the connection between this and the higher order of the universe. Here then, in the letter to Flora, the effort after a more monistic mode of apprehension preponderates; and Ptolemæus closes with the problem, how the dualism, which is nevertheless held fast, only under a milder form, is reconcilable with such a mode of conception; while he reserves the solution to form the theme of further instruction.

GENERAL INDEX.

A.

Abatur, 377.
Abel, 448.
Abgarus. See Uchomo and Bar Manu.
Ἀβράξας, 401.
Absolution, 219–221, 239, 240, 522, 647.
Abstinents, 274, 458.
Abyssinia, diffusion of Christianity there, 83.
Accommodation theory, in Gnosticism, 388. Of Origen, 549, 550. (Compare Fraus pia.)
Accommodation to paganism, 70. See Vol. II.
Achamoth, 389, n. 2, 420.
Acolytes, 201.
Adam, in the Clementines, 354, 355, 357 n. 4, 359, 360. With Valentine, 425. With Julius Cassianus, 458 n. 3. With Mani, 498, 499. With Origen, 627.
Adam Kadmon, 351, 491, n. 4.
Ἀδιάφορα, 260, 261.
Ælia Capitolina, 153, 344.
Ælius Lampridius, 103, 119, n. 6.
Æons, in Gnosticism, 373, n. 3, 375, 381, 384, 388. With Valentine, 418, 421, 424. With Ptolemæus, 437. With Marcus, 440, 441. With the Ophites, 445. In Manicheism, 489–491.
Africa, diffusion of Christianity in, 83. Persecution in, 120–124.
Agapæ, 325. See Lord's Supper, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria.
Agrippinus, bishop, 318.
Ahriman in Parsism, 369, 489, n. 3.
Αἵρεσις, definition of the word, 338, n.
Ἀκατανόμαστος, of Basilides, 373, n. 1.
Ἀκροαταί, 305, and n. 2.
Alcibiades, confessor, 275.
Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, 190, n. 1, 722, n. 6.
Alexander, bishop of Jerusalem, 691, 694 n. 1, 703, 704, n. 3.
Alexander of Abonoteichus, 30, 72, 92, 104, 161.
Alexander of Lycopolis, 482, n. 2, 494, notes, 495, n. 2, 499, n. 4, 500, n. 3.
Alexander Severus, 103, 125–127, 199, 292.
Alexander the Great, 49, 50.
Alexandria, 49–60. The Evangelist Mark, 83. Religious syncretism, 102. Persecution of Christians, 130, 132, 135, 154. Ecclesia apostolica, 203. Passover festival, 299. Catechetical school, 306, 527, 528. Symbolum, 307. Confession of faith orally communicated 308. Origin of the disciplina arcani 308, n. 4. Infant baptism, 314. Baptismal rites, 316, 317. Baptism of heretics, 320, 323. Platonism there, 377. See Clement, Origen, Philo, Alexandrian.
Alexandrian Gnosis, 66, 83, 508, 527, n. 2, 529–557. See Alexandrian philosophy of religion.
Alexandrian Judaism, relation to the Essenean mysticism, 44, 47.
Alexandrian philosophy of religion, 49–58. Twofold position, 56, 64. Its relation to Christianity, 64–66, 351, 657. Gnosticism, 377, 380–382, 658.
Alexandrian school, origin and character, 527–557, 560, 563, 564. Logos doctrine, 586–591. Anthropology, 620–640. Sacraments, 648, 649. Chiliasm, 651–653. ἀποκατάστασις, 656. The individual teachers, 691–722 (364).
Alexandrian version of the Old Testament, 380, 707–710, 722, n. 6.
Allegorical interpretation of the Bible, 463. Among the Pharisees, 39, 40. Among the Essenes, 44, 47. Among the Alexandrian Jews, 53–59. Among the Therapeutæ, 61. With Julius Cassian, 458 n. 3. With Origen, 552–557. With the Alexandrian school, 652. With Hieracas, 714.
Alogi, 526, 583, 682.
Altar, 291.
Ambrosius, friend of Origen, 163, n. 1, 682, 700–702, 706–709.
Ambrosius on Apelles, 475.
Ammonius, church teacher, 699 n. 1.
Ammonius Saccas, 698, 699.
Amshaspands, in Parsism, 489, n. 5, 490 n. 5.
Anabaptists, 318.
Ἀναβαθμοὶ Ἰακώβου, 352.
Ἀναβατικὸν Ἡσαΐου, 716, n. 2.
Ἀνάγνωσται, anagnosts, 201, 303.
Angelophanies, 42, 386, n. 2, 597.
Angels, with the Gnostics, 380–382, 477. With Cerinthus, 396, 397. With Basilides, 405, 409. With Isidore, 406.
Anglo-Saxons, 86.
Anicetus, bishop of Rome, 299, 513, n. 3, 525.
Ἄνω and κάτω Χριστός, 386, 398. With Origen, 640.
Ἄνω and κάτω σοφία, 420, 423, n. 3, 491, 492.

Anointing in baptism, 315, 477. Among the Gnostics, 477.
Anthropology, 610–630. In the heretical sects, see the particular sects.
Anthropomorphism in the Alexandrian philosophy of religion, 56–58. In the Christian doctrine concerning God, 364, 560, 561.
Anthropomorphites, 713. Chiliasts, 165.
Anthropopathism, 364, 561–563, 586. Jewish, 56–58. Gnostic, 373.
Antinomians, Antimonian Gnostics, 384, 385, 447–454.
Antioch, metropolis, 79. Ecclesia apostolica, 203. Epiphany, 301, n. 2. Council (A. D. 269), 603–606.
Antiochian school, origin, 674, 722.
Antitactes, 449.
Antoninus Pius, 89, 103, 663, n. 2, 664, 665.
Ἀπάθεια, 632.
Apelles, Marcionite, 463, n. 3, 474–476.
Ἀφθαρσία, 615.
Apocalypse, 527, 652.
Apochryphal writings, 458, and n. 1, 500, 600, 712.
Ἀποκατάστασις, 623, n. 2, 625, 627, 630, 656. See Eschatology.
Apollinaris of Hierapolis, 298, n. 2, 677.
Apollinaris of Laodicea, 635, n. 5, 677 n. 1.
Apollonius, 513, n. 3.
Apollonius of Tyana, 26, 30, 31, 125, 173, 174.
Apollonius, Roman senator, 118.
Apollos of Alexandria, 83.
Apologetic direction in Paganism, 28.
Apologists, 174–178, 661–674. See the individuals.
Apostles, their relation to the communities, 183. Differences of character, 212, 337.
Apostolic Fathers, 656–661. See Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, Hermas, Barnabas, Aquilas.
Apostolical canons, 660.
Apostolical constitutions, 197, 201, 309, 660.
Apostolici (Apostolicals), 352.
Ἀποτακτικοί, 458, n. 2.
Aquilas, 290.
Arabia, spread of Christianity in, 79, 81, 82.
Aratus, quoted by Paul, 17, n. 2.
Archelaus of Cascar, 401, n. 2, 485.
Ἄρχων (Archon) in the system of Basilides, 405–412, 414.
Aristides, letter to Hadrian, 101. Apologist, 661.
Aristocratic spirit of the ancient world, 29, 366, 378, 388. In Platonism, 29. In Judaism, 58. In Christianity, 366, 388.
Aristotle, on mythology, 7, n. 1. The ταπεινόν, 19, n. 1. Slavery, 267, n. 2, 268, n. 1. Moral freedom, 611. With Basilides, 408. With the Carpocratians, 449. With the Artemonites, 581.
Arnobius, 150, n. 1, 687–689.
Arrian the Stoic, 159.
Arrius Antoninus, proconsul, 118.
Art, 291, 511.
Artemon, Artemonites, 580–582.
Asceticism, Jewish, 39, 43, 45, 47, 59–61, 64. Pagan, 275. Christian, 273–278, 645. Ebionite, 352, 353, 357. Gnostic, 384, 416, 455, 457, 458 and n. 3. With Marcion, 462, 472, 473. Manichean, 503. Montanistic, 512, 520–522. Clement on, 632.
Ascetics in Egypt, 713.
Ἀσέβεια, 97, n. 1.
Asia, spread of Christianity in, 79–83.
Asiatic church, Church of Asia Minor, Passover festival, 297–300, 680. Baptism of heretics, 317, 318. Anti-Gnostic tendency, 508. Montanism, 509, 524, 525. Monarchianism, 583. Character, 674. Teachers, 674–683.
Athanasius, on Sabellius, 595 notes, 597–600 notes, 598, 600. On Paul of Samosata, 602, n. 6, 603, n. 1. Dionysius of Alexandria and Dionysius of Rome, 606–608 notes.
Athenæus on the city of Rome, 204, n. 3.
Athenagoras on Christianity, 78, 328, n. 4. Second marriage, 522, n. 4. Logos doctrine, 586. Character and criticism, 673.
Athenodorus, brother of Gregory Thaumaturgus, 718, n. 2.
Ἀθεότης, 96, n. 3, 97, n. 1.
Atonement, doctrine of. See Redemption.
Attalus, martyr, 113. Confessor, 276.
Audientes, Auditores. See Catechumens. Among the Manicheans, 502–504.
Augustin, bishop of Hippo, 540. The old world and Christ, 77. Proverbial hatred against the Christians, 92. Porphyry, 171, n. 4. Feast of Epiphany, 301, n. 2. Committing to memory of the confession of faith, 308, n. 3. Manicheans, 487, n. 4, 490, n. 2, 494–505 notes, 505. Augustin the transfigured Tertullian, 509 (615, 683). On Tertullian, 685.
Aurelian, edict of, 108. Situation of the Christians under, 141, 142, 605.
Autun, persecution at, 114, 115.

B.

Babylas, bishop of Antioch, 126, n. 6.
Babylon, 79 n. 4.
Bactria, Christianity there, 80.
Balaam, 452, 453, n. 3.
Banianes, 82, n. 2.
Baptism, 304, 305–323. Of clinici, 238, 310. Of infants, 311–315, 498, 504. Controversies respecting, 317–323 (214, n. 5). Conditions of, 262, 264, 305. Form of, 310. Superstitious notions respecting, 252. With Valentine, 431, 432. With the Marcosians, 476, 477. Vicarious, 478. With the Montanists,

522. Doctrine of baptism, 646, 647, 655. Baptism in Hades, 646. See articles Catechumens, Catechists, Symbol, Confirmation, Gnostic Worship, Manicheism, Irenæus, Tertullian, Cyprian.
Baptismal formula, 310, 321. Compare Symbol.
Barcochba, 103, 344.
Bardesanes, with Abgar, 80. Composer of hymns, 304. Origin of Satan, 377. Himself and his doctrine, 375, n. 1, 440–442.
Bar Manu, Abgar of Edessa, 80.
Barnabas, Epistle, 66, 83, 381, n. 1. Sunday, 295. Character and criticism, 657, 658.
Bartholomew, the apostle, in Arabia, 81. In India, 82.
Basilideans, 401, 413–417, 447. Feast of Epiphany, 302. See Basilides, Gnostics, Pseudo-Basilideans.
Basilides, Egyptian bishop, 712.
Basilides, Gnostic, 373, n. 1, 400–417, 420. See Epiphanius, Clement of Alexandria, Basilideans.
Beghards, 44.
Βῆμα, Manichean festival, 505.
Benevolence, works of, 197, 255–259.
Beryllus of Bostra, 591, n. 4, 593, 594, 710.
Bible interpretation, criticism, 612, 613. Origen, 546–549, 552–557, 700. Celsus, 165. Porphyry, 171. The Clementines, 355. The Gnostics, 387–389. Valentine, 427. Marcion, 460, 463, 473. Manichean, 501, 502. Artemonites, 582. Mystical and mythical tendencies, 557. Chiliasts and Alexandrians, 652. Hieracas, 714.
Bible reading, Bible study, 307, 693. In the family, 283, n. 1, 286. In public worship, 291, 302, 303. At Alexandria, 528, 532, 533. Pamphilus, 721. Origen, 722. See Scriptures.
Bible translation, 303. Coptic, 83. Of Symmachus, 708.
Bibles burned, 148–150.
Bishops in the apostolic period, 184–186. Later, 190–195, 235. Election, 199, 200. Organs of the Holy Spirit, 207, 210, 517, 519. Confirmation, 316. Among the Manicheans, 504.
Blandina, 114.
Blastus, letter to, 680.
Brahminism, in Gnosticism, 370.
Brahmins, 442.
Breaking of bread, 325.
Britain, Christianity introduced into, 85.
Buddas, predecessor of Mani, 480, 485.
Buddha, Buddhas, 480, 481, 503.
Buddhism, 44. In Gnosticism, 370, 405, n. 1, 450, 451. Relation to Christianity, 482–484. In Manicheism, 480–486, 488, 493, 495, 496, 500, 501, 503.
Bythos, in Gnosticism, 373, n. 1, 417, 418, 421.

C.

Cabala, 375, 440.
Cæcilius of Bilta on exorcism, 310, n. 1.
Cæcilius, presbyter, 222.
Cæsarea, school at, 721.
Caïanians, 476, n. 1.
Cain, Cainites, 448, 646.
Caius, presbyter at Rome, 396, n. 1, 399, 652, 690.
Candidus, Valentinian, 589, 703, n. 3, 704, n. 1.
Canones Apostolici, 660, 703, n. 4.
Caracalla, 119, n. 6, 122, 691, 703, n. 2.
Carpocrates, Gnostic, 399, n. 1, 449–451.
Carpocratians, Carpocratianism, 292, 451, 484, n. 3.
Carthage, Christianity there, 83, 84. Persecution under Caracalla, 123, 124. Under Decius, 132, 133. Conduct of Christians there during the plague, 258. Councils (A. D. 251), 234; (A. D. 252), 313; (A. D. 255), 319; (A. D. 256) 84, 217, 308, n. 5, 310, 319. (Under Agrippinus), 318.
Cassian, Julius, 458 n. 3. See Encratites.
Cataphrygians, 525.
Catechists, catechetical school in Alexandria, 306, 527, 528, 691.
Catechumens, 305, 528.
Catharists, 504.
Cathedra Petri, 213, 214. See Rome.
Catholic church. Its formation, 207–217. Division of Felicissimus, 222, 235–237. Controversy with the Novatians, 222, 246–248. See Church, Church Divisions, Church Discipline.
Cato, 15.
Celibacy, 274, 277, 280, 659. With the Essenes, 43, 45. With the Ebionites, 353. With the Gnostics, 385, 416, 456, 457. With the Montanists, 521, 522. With Hieracas, 714, 715.
Celsus, on Hellenism, 4. On Christianity, 70, 71, 88–90. Reverence to the emperors, 91. Christianity and the state, 129. His work against Christianity, 160–170. Sibyllists, 177. Public festivals, 265. Administration of offices and military service, 272. Absence of altars, etc., 289. Catechumens, 305, n. 1. Origen against, 710. See Origen.
Celsus the Epicurean, 160, n.
Cerdo, 465.
Cerinthus, 396–400. See Irenæus, Dionysius of Alexandria, Caius, Epiphanius.
Chaldaic element in the Essenean mysticism, 44.
Chaos, 375–377. With Hermogenes, 567, 617.
Charismata, 180–183, 186, 187, 212, 510, 526, 616. See Apostles.
Children among the early Christians, 71 78, 99, and n. 3, 716.
Chiliasm, with the Ebionites, 348, 357

Of Cerinthus, 399. In Montanism, 513, 515, 523. In the church, nature and history, 650–654, 669, 670. Opposition to, 651–654. With Commodian, 687. With Methodius, 721.
Chiliasts, 78, 165, 669.
Χωρεπίσκοποι. See Country Bishops and Ἐπίσκοπος.
Chrism, 315. See Anointing.
Christ, baptism of. With Cerinthus, 398. The Ebionites, 348, 350, 351. Basilides, 410–412. Valentine, 429. The Ophites, 445.
Christ, his relation to history, 3. Oracle concerning, 172. Images of, 292, 451. Uncomeliness of, 631–633.
Christ, person of, in Gnosticism, 386, 387, 389. Doctrine of the church in the first three centuries, 571–608. (Theonas, 143.) Humanity of Christ, 630–640. Hieracas, 715, 716. See Redeemer, Redemption.
Christ, servant, form of, 291.
Christ, with Celsus, 168, 169. In the Clementines, 359, 360. With the Gnostics, 381–383, 386–389. With Cerinthus, 398, 399 With Basilides, 409–413. With Valentine, 420, 428–433. With the Ophites, 445–447. With Tatian, 457. With Marcion, 459, 462, 464. With the Manicheans, 493, 497, 500. See the articles Jesus, Irenæus.
Christian doctrine, festivals, images, morals (see Christian Life), symbols; see under Doctrine, etc.
Christian life, 249–288. In the family — marriage, 280. Festivals in honor of the dead, 333. See Asceticism, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian.
Christian love, 76, 255–258, 335.
Christian worship, 288–335. See articles, Church, Images, Sign of the Cross, Festivals, Sacraments, Baptism of Heretics, Agapæ, Worship.
Christianity, source and essence; relation to the development of human nature, 1–5. Condition of the world at the time of its appearance, and commencement of its spread, 5–68. Diffusion, limitation, persecutions, hinderances, causes and means of progress, 69–79, 138. Its propagation in particular districts, 79–86. Persecutions, their causes, 86–93. Opposition, by force, 93–156. By writings, 157–174. Apologies, 174–178. Religio illicita, 100. Religo licita, 125, 126, 140, 141, 145. Power of adapting itself, 253. Relation to the state and existing institutions, 259–274. In relation to Gnosticism, 366–372, 379–396, 506, 507. (See the particular sects.) In the Clementines, 394, 395. See Clementines. Anticipation of, 479. Relation of Parsism to, 482–484. Oppositions in, 506–508. Transforming power, 507. The Spirit and the Letter in, 512. Two stages, according to Origen, 547–556. See Christian Life, etc., Manicheism.
Christians, character of the early, 76–78, 91, 92, 97, 98, 105. Accusations against them, 92, 94, 95, 98, n. 4, 99, 109, n. 2, 128, and n. 5. Order of Claudius, 94. Popular hatred excited by public calamities, 103, 104, 119, 126, 136. Conduct under persecution, 109. Increase in numbers in spite of persecutions, 128, 137, 138. Valentine, 427.
Christmas festival, 301, 302. With the Manicheans, 505.
Chronicon paschale Alexandrinum, 677 n. 1.
Chrysippus, 22, n. 1.
Chrysostom, on the Marcionites, 478, n. 3.
Church, situation of, under the emperors, 93–156. Apostolic constitution, 179–190. Constitution after the Apostolic times, 190–217. Outward unity of the, 207–217. Novatian on the conception of the church, 246–248. Catholic idea of the church, 518. Mani, 502–505. In Montanism, 517–519. Outward mediation of the church, 645, 646. See Christianity, Christian life, etc., Tertullian, Cyprian.
Church constitution. See Church.
Church discipline, 217–221.
Church divisions, 221–248. See Cyprian, Novatus, Novatianus.
Church doctrine. See Church Theology.
Church fathers. See Church Teachers.
Church hymns. See Bardesanes, Paul of Samosata, 304.
Church offices, multiplication of, 200, 201.
Church psalmody, in the New Testament, 304.
Church teachers, their history, 656–723. See the individuals.
Church theology, 506–656. See Doctrine, Church Teachers, Montanism, Theology, Anthropology, Eschatology.
Cicero, 8, 86.
Cilicia, Christianity in, 79.
City communities, 79, 202, 203.
Claudius Albinus, 119.
Claudius Apollinaris, 677. See Apollinaris.
Cleanthes, 17, n. 2.
Clemens Romanus, 79, 184, 189. Genuineness, 196, n. 1. Clementines, 353. Sanctification, 644. Character and criticism of his writings, 658–660.
Clement of Alexandria, on persecutions, 119. Idealistic sects, 208. Hypocritical profession of Christianity, 251. Crowning, 260, n. Fraternal kiss, 262, 317. Asceticism, 278–281. Τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος, 279. Community of goods, 280. Marriage, 281. Use of wealth, 282. Prayer, 286. The church not the place, 289. Conduct in and out of church, 290. Uncomeliness of Christ, 291. Images; symbols, 292, 293. Epiph-

any, 301, 302. Searching the Scriptures, 307. Analogies sought in the pagan mysteries, 307, n. 1. Pistis and Gnosis, 308, 529–541. Infant baptism, 312, n. 1. Agapæ, 326. Bartimeus, 364, n. 6. Biblical interpretation of the Gnostics, 388. Basilides, 402, 406, n. 1, 412. Archon, 410. Isidore, 415. The cross as a symbol, 419, n. 3. Heracleon, 434. Pseudo-Basilideans, 447, n. 3. Carpocrates, 449. Epiphanes, 451. Nicolaitans, 452, 453. Tatian, 456, 457. Celibacy, 457. Marcion, 473. Prophecy in Montanism, 520. περὶ προφητείας, 520 n. 2, 610. Montanism, 525. Catechist's office, 528. Clement as representative of the Alexandrian school, 528–543. Pistis and Gnosis, 529–541. The Holy Scriptures, 532–534. Defence of science, 533–539. The education of mankind up to Christ, 536–539, 541. Conversion of heathen after death, 537. The true in heresies, 538. The Logos as θεῖος παιδαγωγός, 541. Limits of comprehension, 542. Faith and speculation, 551. Toleration, 551. Knowledge of God, 558, 559. Doctrine of the Logos, 586. Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, 610. Anthropology, 620, 622. Humanity of Christ, 631–633. Baptism of the pious men of the Old Testament in Hades, 646. Purification of the dead, and Christ's descent into Hades, 656, and n. 1. Clement's life and writings, 691–693. Origen, 694, 698.

Clementines, description of the longing in Paganism, 32. Essenes, 48. Ebionitism, and system, 353–362, 394, 395. Sabæans, 376, n. 3. Simon Magus, 454, n. Purgatorial fire, 654. Forged under the name of Clemens Romanus, 659.

Cleomenes, Patripassian, 584, n. 3.

Clergy. See Clerus.

Clerus, 195. Special object of persecution, 137–139. Engages in worldly employments, 197. Receives maintenance, 198. Retires from worldly employments, 198, 199. Election, 199.

Clinici, 238, and n. 2, 310.

Colosse, church at, 351.

Commentaries of the Apostles, 364, n. 2.

Commentaries on the Bible, 682, 702, 708, 710, 714.

Commercial intercourse, 79.

Commodian, 68, n., 198, n. 3, 228, 229, n. 1, 237, 280, 281, n. 5, 288, 303, n. 4, 329, n. 1. Character, 686, 687.

Commodus, 108, n. 3, 117–119, 674.

Communion, granted to the lapsed, 234, 235. Of infants, 333. See Lord's Supper.

Communities in the early church, 185.

Confession of faith, 306–309.

Confessors, reverence paid to, 159, 200, 228–231.

Confirmation, 321. See Imposition of Hands.

Consilia evangelica, 39. Germ, 277, 645.

Constantine, 83, 143, n. 1, 148, 153, 155 n. 1.

Constantius Chlorus, 146, 154.

Constitutiones Apostolicæ, 197, 201, 660.

Continentes, 274, 521. See Ascetics.

Coracion, 652, 653.

Corinth, 79. Ecclesia apostolica, 203. Church at, 325.

Cornelius, bishop of Rome, 136, 201, 202, 237–242, 316, n. 3, 690.

Cosmas Indicopleustes, 82.

Country bishops, 202.

Country communities, 79, 202.

Creation, doctrine of, 564–570. Christian and Gnostic, 372. Valentine, 422–425. Ptolemæus, 437, 438. Marcion, 467, 468. Origen, 621, 622.

Creationism, 344, 626.

Crescens the Cynic, 93, 671.

Cross, sign of the, 293. In baptism, 139 n. 2. The cross with Valentine, 419, 420, 431. With Mani, 500.

Culture, among the early Christians, 164.

Cultus. See Worship.

Cynics, 92, 93.

Cyprian, 84. The persecution under Decius, 131 n., 132 notes, 133. His conduct in the persecution, 134–140. Thiberitans, 136. Trial, 137. Martyrdom, 140. Relation to his presbyters, 192. Episcopacy, 192–195. De lapsis, 198. Clerus, 199, 200. Council of the church, 200. Officers of country communities, 202, n. 1. The Catholic church, 209. De unitate ecclesiæ, 210. Primacy of Peter, 212. The Roman church, 214–217. Church discipline, 220. His life, 222, 223. Character, 223, 224. Schism of Felicissimus, 222–237. Novatian controversy, 237–248. On conversion, 249. Opus operatum, 253. Libri testimoniorum, 253, 685. The Christian prisoners from Numidia, 256. Benevolence, 257. The plague in Carthage, 258. Gladiatorial shows, 263. Theatrical exhibitions, 266, 267. Profession of stage-players, 267. Virgins, 277. The Lord's prayer, 287. Silent prayer, 288. Symbol in baptism, 306, n. 4. Sprinkling in baptism, 310. Exorcism, 310, n 1. Infant baptism, 313. Anointing in baptism, 315. Confirmation, 316, n. 3. Baptism of heretics, 319–323. Idea of sacrifice in the Lord's Supper, 330 notes 1, 2, 331. The fourth petition, 332. Daily communion, 332. Sacramental bread, 332, n. 3. Mourning for the dead, 333. Sins after baptism, 647. Lord's Supper, 648. Purification after death, 654, n. 5. Supplementary remarks on his life and writings, 685, 686, 690. See Carthage, Tertullian, North African Church, Pontius.

Cyrene, gospel in, 83.

Cyrenian inscriptions, 451, n. 3.

Cyrill of Jerusalem, 484.

D.

Daily communion, 332, 648.
Damasus, 684, n. 1.
Days of fasting and penance, 274, 294, 296.
De mortibus persecutorum, 148, n. 1.
Deacons, 188, 195, 197, 316, 332. In the North African church, 233.
Deaconesses, 188, 283.
Dead, mourning for the, 333, 334. Festivals in memory of the, 333–335.
Decian persecution, 139 n. 2, 225, 227, 237, 239, 690, 711, 720. See Decius.
Decius Trajan, 130–136.
Demetrianus, 136, n. 1.
Demetrius, bishop of Alexandria, 81, 197, 696, 698, 702–704, 705, n. 4, 712.
Demiurge, 379–385, 477. See Gnosticism, Gnostic Sects.
Demonax of Cyprus, the Cynic, 10.
Demons, 28, 383. Compare Possessions. In Manicheism, 483.
Descensus Christi ad inferos, 471, 654, 656.
Διαγράμμα, 477.
Διάκονος, of Basilides, 410, n. 1.
Διατάξεις ἀποστολικαί, 660. See Constitutiones Apostolicæ.
Dichotomy of Tertullian, 635.
Διδάσκαλοι in the apostolic age, 187.
Dies natales, natalitia martyrum, 334, n. 3.
Dies stationum, 296, 520.
Δικαιοσύνη, 400, n. 3.
Dio Cassius, toleration, 87. Domitian, and the Christians, 96, notes 3, 4. Nerva, 97, n. 1.
Dio Chrysostom, 27, 86, n. 1.
Diocletian, 142–155, 291, 303, n. 3, 688, 689, 722. The Manicheans, 144, 506.
Diognetus, letter to, description of the Christians, 69, n. 1. Doctrine of redemption, 642. Sanctification, 644. Character and criticism, 670.
Dionysius, fable of, with the Manicheans, 493.
Dionysius of Alexandria, 190, n. 1. On the Decian persecution, 132, 135. Valerian, 137, and n. 1. Dionysius in exile, 138. The Novatian controversy, 241, 243. The Christians in the time of the pestilence, 257, 258. Baptism of heretics, 320, 321, n. 3, 323. Of Montanists, 320, n. 6. Cerinth, 396, n. 1, 399. Sabellius, 599, n. 2. Doctrine of the Trinity, 606–608. The Chiliasts, 652, 653. Character, 712.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, on Theophanies, 12. On popular faith, 29. Toleration, 88.
Dionysius of Paris, 84. Compare Dionysius the Areopagite, Vol. II.
Dionysius of Rome, controversy with Dionysius of Alexandria, 606–608. On the Holy Spirit, 610.
Dioscorides, 82.
Dioscurus, confessor, 132.
Disciplina arcani, 305, n. 1, 308, n. 4, 327, n. 1.
Diu Zocotara, 82, 83.
Docetism, 386, 387, 630, 631, 632. In Gnosticism, 386, 387, 402, n. 3, 458, n. 3. Of Mani, 494, n. 1, 499, 505.
Doctrine, history of Christian, 336–656. The several doctrines, 557–656.
Domitian, 96.
Domitius Ulpianus, 126.
Donatists, Epiphany, 301, n. 2.
Donatus, friend of Cyprian, 222.
Dorotheus, 722.
Dositheus, 454, n. 1.
Dragomans, 303, n. 2.
Dualism, Oriental, 15. In Parsism, 369, 378, 488, 489. In Gnosticism, 370, 374, 375, 378, 379, 394, 438. In Platonism, 378, 379. In Buddhism, 481. Manichean, 481, 489, 500.
Δύναμεις, with Basilides, 400, 418.

E.

Earlier and later stages of development, 40.
Earth of light, Mani, 490.
Easter festival, 214, n. 2, 297–300, 676. With the Manicheans, 505. Compare Passover Festival.
Eastern church, character, 508. Doctrine of the Trinity, 585–610.
Ebedjesu, 681, 682.
Ebionitarum socii, 349.
Ebionites, 331, 344–350, 577.
Ebionitic gospel, according to the Hebrews, 708, n. 2.
Ebionitism, 344–364. Elements possessing affinity with, 364, 365, 675. In Cerinthus, 398, 399. In Basilides, 410, 417. In relation to Montanism, 512. With Justin, 674.
Ecclesiæ, 185. Apostolicæ, 203, 204. Of Marcion, 474, n. 2.
Eclectic Philosophy, Eclecticism, 20, 355, 449.
Edessa, Christianity there, 80. Very early a church building there, 80, 291, n. 3.
Ἐγκρατῖται, 458, n. 2.
Egypt, gospel in, 83.
Egyptians, gospel of the, 83, 600, 601.
Electi, 483, 501, 503–505. With Basilides, 411.
Election to church offices, 189, 199, 200.
Elements, with the Manicheans, 491, 505.
Eleutherus, 85, 524, 525, 583.
Elisæus, 489, n. 1.
Elvira, council at, 198, n. 3. Recommendatory letters of the confessors, 229, n. 2. Unchristian occupations, 262, n. 4. Exclusion of Duumviri, 271, n. 4. Against marriage of priests, 277, n. 2. Subintroductæ, 277, n. 5. Against images, 293. Fasting on the Sabbath, 296, n. 5. Limitation of the Pentecost, 301 n. 1. Probation of catechumens, 305.

Elxai, 352, n. 1.
Elymas, 72.
Emanation, 372–375, 380. With Basilides, 400. With Origen, 568, 569, 621. See Gnosticism.
Emendation of biblical manuscripts, Origen, 700, 707.
Ἡμεροβαπτισταῖς, 376, n. 3.
Encratites, 456, 458, notes 2, 3, 505. See Severians.
Energumeni, 201.
England, spread of Christianity among the Britons, 85.
Enoch, book of, 535.
Eutychites, 454.
Ephesus, metropolis, 79. Ecclesia apostolica, 203.
Ephræm Syrus, — Bardesanes, 441. Marcion, 462, n. 1. Manicheans, 503, n. 4.
Epictetus, 159.
Epicureanism, 8, 15. Of Celsus, 162, 168, n. 1.
Epigonius, Patripassian, 584, n. 3.
Epiphanes, 449–451.
Epiphanius, bishop of Constantia. Interpreters, 303, n. 3. On the Ebionites, 331, n. 2, 344, 351, 352, 353, n. 2, 358, n. 1. Cerinthus, 398, 399. Basilides, 400. Valentine, 417, n. 3. Bardesanes, 441. Cainites, 448. Saturninus, 455, n. 1. Marcion, 461, n. 1, 462, n. 1, 463, n. 3. Apelles, 475. Mani, 484. Montanus, 513, n. 3. The Gospel of John, 526, n. Theodotus, 580, notes 2, 3. Sabellius, 600. Gospel of the Egyptians, 600, 601, n. 1. Hieracas, 713.
Episcopal system, 190–193.
Ἐπίσκοπος, 184, 190. See Bishops, Church Offices.
Episcopus episcoporum, 214.
Epistolæ formatæ, 205, and n. 1, 255. Communicatoriæ, 205. Clericæ, 206.
Epistola fundamenti, 487, 489, 490, 498, 501.
Epochs of transition, 29.
Equality in the church, 179–181.
Ἑρμηνευταί, 303, n. 3.
Ertenki Mani, 488.
Eschatology, or doctrine of last things, 649–656. Of Mani, 500, 501.
Esculapius, 73, 92, 145, n. 3.
Esnig, Armenian bishop. Marcion, 463 n. 3, 469.
Essenes or Esseans, 39, 43–49. Relation to the Therapeutæ, 61, 62, 64. (Compare Ebionites, 351, 357, and Gnostic sects, 396.)
Ethics, system of Isidore, 415. See Morals.
Ethiopia, 82. Diffusion of Christianity in, 83.
Εὐαγγέλιον διὰ τεσσάρων, Tatian, 458, n. 1.
Εὐαγγέλιον καθ' Αἰγυπτίους, 458 n. 3.
Εὐαγγέλιον καθ' ἑβραίους, 458, n. 1.
Eucharist, 329, and n. 2. See Lord's Supper.
Euelpistus, 270.
Euemerus, 6, 21.
Euodius of Uzala, 490, and n. 6, 494, n. 1 500, n. 3, 501, n. 3.
Euphrates, 447.
Europe, spread of Christianity in, 84–86.
Eusebius, on the Abgar Uchomo, 80. Demetrius of Alexandria, 81. Pantænus, 82. Persecution of the Christians in Thebais, 83, n. 3. Paul's journey to Spain, 85. Hadrian's rescript, 101 n. 1. Philip the Arabian, 126, n. 5. Edict of Gallienus, 140, n. 2. Marius the Martyr, 140. Aurelian, 142, n. 2. Pagan divination, 145, n. 1. Paganism and Christianity, 145, n. 3. Diocletian, 146. Edict of Constantine, 148, n. 1. Edict of Galerius, 149, n. 1. The fire of Nicomedia. 153. Constantius Chlorus, 155. Fragments of Porphyry, 171, n. 4. Church offices, 201. Images of Christ, 292, n. 2. Polycarp's journey to Rome, 299, n. 1. Cerinthus, 396, n. 1. Bardesanes, 441, 442. προπαρασκευὴ εὐαγγελικὴ, 442, (171, n. 4.) Tatian, 457, n. 4, 458, n. 1. Mani, 485, n. 1. Montanus, 513, n. 3. Letter of the Church of Lyons, 524. Alexandrian catechists, 527. Origen, 528, n. 1. Beryll of Bostra, 593, n. 1, 594. Malchion, 605, n. 1. Quadratus, 661. Apology of Justin Martyr, 663, n. 2–665. Death of Justin, 671. Apollinaris, 677, n. 1. Florinus, 680. Hippolytus, 681. Tertullian, 684. Clement, 691. Ammonius, 699, n. 1. Origen, 704, n. 3, 710, n. 2. Symmachus, 708. Julius Africanus, 709, n. Immortality of the soul, 710. Death of Origen, 711. Methodius, 720. Apology of Pamphilus, 721, 722.
Eva, 498.
Evangelists, 661, and n. 2.
Evil, origin of, in Gnosticism, 372–375. See Sin, The Fall.
Evodius. See Euodius.
Excommunication, 218. Of Origen, 703, and n. 5.
Exegesis of Origen, 552–557. See Allegorical, Bible, Interpretation.
Exorcism, exorcists, 73, 74, 201, 309. At baptism, with the Gnostics, 477, n. 5.
Exorcistæ, 201.
Extasy, in Montanism, 514, 519, n. 2, 520.

F.

Fabian, 133, 238 and n. 2, 702, 704, n. 3.
Fabius of Antioch, 238, n. 2, 243.
Fabricius, 683.
Faith, relation to the Gnosis, in Gnosticism, 366, 367. In the Clementines, 394, 395. With Basilides, 413–415. In the Alexandrian school, 529–557.
Falsehood, in the ancient world, 388.
Fasting and prayer, days of, 117, and n. 3, 274, 296.
Fasts, 256, 274, 294, 296. Ptolemæus on, 440.

Faustus the Manichean, 494, n. 1, 500, n. 3, 501, 502, 503, n. 2, 504, n. 3. See Mani, Manicheans, Manicheism.
Felicissimus, 222, 225, 233–235, 687. See Church Schisms.
Felicitas the martyr, 123, 124.
Felix, Numidian bishop, 150.
Felix, the Manichean, 504, n. 3.
Feria, 296, n. 3.
Festivals, 294–302.
Fetahil, 377, 383, n. 1.
Fidus, 313.
Firmilian of Cæsarea, Exorcists, 201, n. 3. Against Stephanus of Rome, 216. Church discipline, 220. Symbol, in baptism, 306, n. 4. Baptism of heretics, 320. Formula of baptism, 322, n. 4. Consecration of the Lord's Supper, 329, n. 2. Origen, 707.
Flora, letter of Plotemy to, 437, and n. 5, 438.
Florinus, 677, 680.
Forged writings, 176, 177.
Fortunatianus, the martyr, 152.
Fortunatus, bishop of Carthage, 225, n. 1, 235.
France, Franks, spread of Christianity thither, 84.
Francis, St., 484, n. 2.
Fraternal kiss, 255, 262, 313, 314, 317.
Freedom, doctrine, 611–614. In the North African church, 614–620. In the Alexandrian school, 620–626, 630. Basilides, 404. Bardesanes, 442.
Friday, observance of, 296, 300.
Frumentius, 83.

G.

Gaius, 289.
Galen, physician, 164, n. 1, 172, n. 2.
Galerius, Caius Maximianus, Cæsar, 144–156. Edict of toleration, 156.
Γαλιλαίοις, of Hegesippus, 376, n. 3.
Galileans, epithet applied to Christians, 100, n. 4, 159.
Gallienus, Cæsar, 137, 140, 141, 257, 687.
Gallus, Cæsar, 136, 258.
Gamaliel, 40.
Gaul, in the Diocletian persecution, 155.
Germany, diffusion of Christianity in, 84.
Geta, 124.
Gift of teaching, 186, 187, 189.
Gift of tongues, 186 n. 2.
Gladiatorial contests, 263.
Glaucias, 417 n. 1.
Gnomes, of Sextus, 697, n. 2.
Gnosis, of the Gnostics, 366–396. Alexandrian, 529–557. Compare Faith, relation to Love, with Bernard of Clairvaux, Vol. IV. p. 371.
Gnosis, with Paul, 510.
Gnosticism, 340, 351. General character of, 365–374. Speculative element in, 368–377. Practical spirit, 377–380, 385, 386. Alexandrian and Syrian Gnosis, 374–378. Classification of Gnostic systems, 379–384, 394–396. Particular sects, attaching themselves to Judaism, 396–442. Anti-Jewish, 442–476. Worship, 476–478. Opposition to, 390–394. Attitude of science within the church toward, 506–509, 564, 565. Gnosticism and Protestantism, 367 n. 1. Gnosticism and Manicheism, 478, 479. Influence of, on church doctrine, 478. Gnosticism and Christianity, 506–509. And Montanism, 511, 526. Doctrine of redemption, 612–614. Hades, 653, 654. Origen, 622, 700, 706.
Gnostics, 78, 103, 165, 317, 364, 365–478, 514. See Gnosticism.
Gnostic systems. See Gnosticism.
Γνωστικοί, 381. See Gnostics.
God, doctrine concerning, with the Neo-Platonists, 22, 23, 25–27. With the Sadducees, 42. In the Alexandrian philosophy of religion, 57. With Celsus, 163. Gnostic, 372, 373. (Basilides, 405–407, 409–411. Marcion, 466, 467.) With Mani, 489–491. Christian, 557–610. Consciousness of God, 177, 178, 557, 558. See Clement, Tertullian, Origen, Theophilus of Antioch, Marcion, Irenæus, Novatian, Alexandrian School, Creation, Trinity, Holy Spirit.
God, image of, 612, 613, 641, 642.
Goetæ, 30, 33, 67, 71, 73, 92, 145 and n. 2, 161.
Good Friday. See Friday.
Gordian, emperor, 709.
Gospel, in Hebrew, 81, 82. Of the Ebionites, 348 and n. 3, 411 notes 1, 2, 458, n. 1, 708 and n. 2. Of the Nazarenes, 350. Of the Egyptians, 83, 458 n. 3, 600. Of Judas, 448. διὰ τεσσάρων, 458, n. 1. Marcion's, 473.
Grace, with Hermogenes, 617. In Montanism, 619. With Clement, 620, 621. With Origen, 630. With Isidore, 416.
Γράμματα τετυπωμένα, κοινωνικά. See Epistolæ.
Greece, Christianity in, 79.
Greek and Roman national characters, their influence in the development of Christianity, 508.
Greek church. See Eastern Church.
Greek culture, its influence on the Jews of Alexandria, 50. With the catechists of Alexandria, Clement, 528, 533–539. Logos doctrine, 585. With Origen, 698.
Greek philosophy with the Basilideans, 408, 409.
Greeks, their relation to Christianity 4, 5–35, 529.
Gregory Nazianzen on the Apostle Thomas, 82.
Gregory of Nyssa, on Gregory Thaumaturgus, 718 n. 1, 719.
Gregory of Tours, Christianity in Gaul, 84.
Gregory Thaumaturgus, 287, 701, 706. Life and writings, 716–720.

H.

Hades, doctrine of Christ's descent into, 653, 654.
Hadrian, 101–103, 174, 343, 344, 664, 675.
Hadrian's temples, 103.
Ham, revelations of the Patriarch, 408.
Hands, imposition of, 316. See Confirmation.
Harmonies of the Gospels, Harmonists, 171, 458 n. 1, 699 n. 1.
Hebrews, Epistle to the, 83.
Hegemonius, 485, n. 3.
Hegesippus, 343, n. 3, 376, n. 3. History and character, 675, 676.
Heliogabalus, 125.
Hellenic culture, 50, 51. See Greek Culture.
Henoticon at Jerusalem, 342.
Heraclas, disciple of Origen, 698, 700, 712.
Heracleon the Gnostic, on faith, 307. πληρωμα, 373, n. 3. Satan, 421, notes 2, 4, 422, n. 1. The Demiurge, 422, n. 4. The Soter, 423, n. 2, 430, n. Valentine, 427. Pneumatici, 432, notes 2, 4, 399, n. 2. His doctrines, 434–437. Scientific tendency, 440. Origen, 702.
Heraclian, bishop of Chalcedon, 485, n. 3.
Heraclitus, 71. The Sibyls, 177.
Heraclius, governor, 115.
Heresies, distinguished from schisms, 221.
Heresies, heretical tendencies, 337–506.
Heretics, baptism of, 317–323. See the articles, Baptism, Cyprian, Tertullian, Stephanus, Dionysius of Alexandria.
Hermas, the Shepherd of, 278. Statio, 296, n. 2. Creation from nothing, 565, n. 2. Baptism in Hades, 646. Criticism, 660.
Hermes Trismegistus, 176.
Hermias, Apologist, 673.
Hermogenes, doctrine of creation, 565–568. Anthropology, 616–618. See Tertullian, Creation, Theodoretus.
Heroism, Christian, effect on Pagans, 76, 77.
Hesychius, 722.
Hetæriæ, Trajan's law against the, 97, 98, 120.
Hexapla, 708, and n. 4. See Origen.
Hieracas, Egyptian ascetic, 713–716.
Hierocles, bishop of Alexandria, 190 n. 1.
Hilarianus, the martyr, 152.
Hilary of Poictiers, edict of Diocletian, 144, n. 3, 506, n. Apostolic church constitution, 182, n. 1. Bishops and presbyters, 190, n. 1.
Hippolytus, celebration of the Sabbath, 297. The Lord's Supper, 333. On the charismata, 526. Noetus 584, n. 3. Life and writings, 681–683.
History, relation of Christianity to, 1–5. Effort at understanding, 20. Clement's views of, 539. Philosophy of History. Gnosticism, 371, n. 1, 382. Africanus, first Christian history of the world, 709 n. 1.
Holy Spirit, doctrine concerning, in the church, 608–610. With the Ebionites, 350. Cerinthus, 398. The Montanists, 511, 514–518, 525, 526, 610. The Sabellians, 599. Origen, 630.
Homoousion, 578 n. 1, 606.
Hormisdas (Hormuz), king of Persia, 488.
Horus, with Valentine, 419, 423.
House communion, 332.
Human sacrifices, under Aurelian, 141, 142.
Humility, 611.
Hyle. See Ὕλη.
Hymns, 304. Compare Church Psalmody.
Hypocritical profession of Christianity, 142, 250, 251.
Hystaspes, interpolated writings, 176.

I.

Ialdabaoth, 443–446.
Iconium, council at, 318.
Idealists, 59, 66, 476. See the article Alexandria.
Ignatius of Antioch, narrative of his death, 100 n. 4. Genuineness, 191 n. 2, 196 n. 1, 661. κλῆρος, 196 n. 1. To Polycarp, slaves, 269. Festival of Sunday, 295, 296, n. 4. Against Docetism, 631. Doctrine of the Lord's Supper, 647. Life and writings, 660, 661.
Illyricum, 80.
Image of God, 456, 613, 614, 641, n. 2.
Images of Christ, 292, 451. Of Peter and Paul, 292 n. 2. Of Pagan philosophers, 451.
Images, use of, 291–293.
Immortality, 456, 618. In Platonism, 34. With Origen, 710, 711.
Imposition of hands, 310 n. 1, 315.
India, spread of Christianity in, 81.
Infant baptism, 311–315, 504, 648. See the articles, Cyprian, Irenæus, Tertullian, Stephanus, Dionysius of Alexandria, Hieracas.
Infants, communion of, 333, 648.
Infidelity in Paganism, 33.
Inspiration, 510. Views of, among the Alexandrian Jews, 55. In the Clementines, 356. Among the Montanists, 511, 515, 519. In the Catholic church, 518, 519. Irenæus, Tertullian, 679, 680.
Interpolated writings, 176, 177, 457 n. 4.
Interpretation of Scripture. See Bible Interpretation.
Interpreters, 303.
Irenæus, miracles of the Christians, 74. Christianity in Germany, 84. Persecutions, 119. The gift of tongues, 186 n. 2. Presbyters, bishops, 192. Ecclesia apostolica at Rome, 204. Conception of the church, 209. Gladiatorial shows, 263. Christian asceticism, 274, n. 1. Dispute about the passover, 299, notes, 300. Fasts, 300. Infant baptism, 311, 312. Christ as archetype, 311. Oblations, 330, n. 1, 331 n. 1

The elements of the Supper sent to the sick, etc., 332, n. 2. Ebionites, 344, 345, 348. Gnostics, 375, n. 5. Antinomian Gnostics, 385. Biblical interpretation, 388. Doctrine of accommodation among the Gnostics, 388. Arrogance of the Gnostics, 393. Basilides, 400, n. 4. Basilideans, 409. Valentinians, 418 n. 1. Ptolemæus, 437. Pseudo-Basilideans, 447, n. 3. Nicolaitans, 452, 453. Saturnin, 455, n. 1. Tatian, 456. Marcosians, 476. Irenæus transplants the theology of Asia Minor to the West, 508. Montanistic proceedings, 524, 525. Alogi and the Gospel of John, 526, 527. Knowledge of God, 560. Doctrine of creation, 568. Monarchianism, 579. Hermeneutical canons, 613, n. 1. Soul of Christ, 634. Redemption, 640–642. Sanctification, 645. Baptism, 646. The Lord's Supper, 647. Chiliasm, 651. Life and writings, 677–680.

Isidorus, son of Basilides, 400, 402, n. 2, 408, 409, 415, 416.

Italy, Christianity in, 80, 84.

Ized, in Parsism, 493.

J.

Jacob, steps of, 352.

Jamblichus, the Neo-Platonician, 173.

James, 63.

Jerome, Thomas in Ethiopia, 82. Apollonius and his slave, 118. Bishops and presbyters, 190, n. 1. Cyprian, 222, n. 1. Marcion, 328, n. 2. Nazarenes, 349, 350, n. 1. Gospel of the Nazarenes, 350, and n. 2. Acts of Mani, 485, n. 3. Xerophagiæ, 521 n. 1. Alexandrian school, 527. Origen and Candidus, 589, n. 3, 703 n. 3. Beryll and Origen, 594. Quadratus, 661. Justin, 670. Theophilus, 674, n. 1. Hippolytus, 681, 682. Tertullian, 684. Cyprian, 685, n. 4. Arnobius, 688, and n. 1. Novatian, 690, and n. 2. Minucius Felix, 690. Origen, 693, n. 2, 703, n. 3, 704, n. 3, 705, notes 1 and 4. Gnomes of Sextus, 697 n. 2. Pamphilus, 721, n. 6. Rufinus, 722, n. 2.

Jerusalem, 65, 153. Destruction of, 38, 343. Temple at, 65, 67, 407, and n. 2. Council at, 159. Church at, 299.

Jesus, story concerning, Celsus, 162, n. 1. With Basilides, 410, 412. Sabæans, 447. Carpocratians, 449. Marcion, 469, 470. Mani, 500, 501. See Christ.

Jewish Christians, 159, 297, 302, 340–365. In Ethiopia, 83.

Jewish element in the Clementines, 360. In the Valentinian Gnosis, 430. In Montanism, 511, 512, 513, 519, 520. Paul of Samosata, 603, 604.

Jewish people, prophetic character of the, 35, 36, 52. Religious condition of the, 35–68. In the Clementines, 359. With Cerinth and Philo, 397. With Basilides, 408. With Valentine, 426, 427

Ἰουδαϊκὸς βιὸς, 97, n. 1.

Jewish principle in the church, 194, 212, 235, 257, 289, 294, 302, 338, 339, 340, 360–365, 390, 507, 645, 654. See Jewish Christians.

Jews, banished by Claudius, 94. Revolt under Barcochba, 103. See Jewish, Judaism.

Jews, God of the. See Saturnin.

John, disciples of. See Sabæans.

John Malala, 100, n. 4.

John the Apostle, 63, n. 1, 183, 337. In Asia Minor, 191, and note 2, 194, n. 1, 342. His character, 212. Peccata, 221. Passover festival, 297. His age, 340. His labors, 342. Relation of his Gospel to the Clementines, 361, n. 3. To Justin Martyr, 364, n. 2. Cerinthus, 396. Heracleon, 434. Gnostics, Nicolaitans, 452, 453. Marcion, 463. With the Anti-Montanists, 526 527. Doctrine concerning Christ, 574, 575. Logos, 575, 585. Artemonites, 580, n. 1. Noetus, 584, 585.

John the Baptist, 38, 272. With the Ebionites, 347. Sabæans, 376, n. 3. Heracleon, 430, n., 441, n. 2. Valentine, 434.

Josephus, on the infatuation of the Jews, 38. On the canon, 41, n. 1. On the three Jewish sects, 39, n. 1, 41, n. 2, 42, 43, 44, 48. The Messiah, 65. The temple, 407, n. 2.

Judaism, relation to Christianity, 3–5, 62–66, 339, 340, 382, 548. Preparatory character of, 35, 36, 548. Among the Greeks and Romans, 67. Among the Romans, religio licita, 89. Law of Severus against, 120. Jewish view of life, 273. With the Gnostics, 369, 379–383. As kingdom of the Demiurge, 382, 383. Cerinthus, 399. With Origen, 548.

Judaizing sects, 341–365, 394.

Judas, 448, 622. Gospel of, 448, n. 4.

Judas of Gamala, 37.

Julia Mammæa, 125.

Juliana of Cæsarea, 707, 708.

Julius Africanus, 709.

Julius Cassianus, 458, n. 3.

Julius Paulus, 87.

Justice, with Basilides, 404, 405. Ptolemæus, 438. Marcion, 466, 467.

Justification, with Basilides, 413.

Justin Martyr, the philosophers of his time, 9. Development of his religious experience, 34, n. 3. Jewish deniers of angels, 42, n. 2. Jewish construction of Christianity, Jewish converts, 62, 63. Proselytes, 67. Miracles of the Christians, 74. Virtues of Christians, 76. Country communities, 79. Crescens, 93. Extension of Christianity, 129. On conversion 250. Defects of Christians, 254. Magistrates, 259. Euelpistus, 270, n. 1. Philosopher's cloak, 275. Chris-

tian places of assembly, 290, 291. Divine worship, 303. Instruction of catechumens, 305, n. 1. Baptismal formula, 310. Agapæ, 325. Baptism and the Supper, 328. Consecration of the Supper, 329, n. 2. Idea of sacrifice, 330. Bread in the Lord's Supper, 331. Celebration of the Supper, 332. Two classes of Jewish Christians, 342 and n. 4, 343, notes 2, 3, 349. Gentile Christians become Jewish Christians, 362. Harsher and milder tendencies among Gentile Christians, 363. Ebionitism, 364, 674. Angelophanies, 386, n. 2. Simon Magus, 454, n. 1. Tatian, 456, 672. Logos doctrine, 585, 586. The Gospel of John, 585 n. 1. Holy Spirit, 609. Christ's humanity, 635. Satisfaction, 642. Doctrine of the Supper, 647. Chiliasm, 651. Justin's life and writings, 661–671.
Juvenal, 103 n. 1.

K.

Kajomorts, of the Zendavista, 491, n. 4.
Κάνονες ἀποστολικοί, 660.
Κένωμα, 374.
Κέστοι, 709 n. 1.
Κήρυγμα ἀποστολικόν, 306.
Κλῆρος, κληρικοί, 195, 196.

L.

Lactantius, 153, n. 1. On the Holy Spirit, 608.
Laity, permitted to teach in public assemblies, 186, 187. Participation in church government, 189, 190, 200. In the choice of church officers, 189, 199. Resistance of, to the catholic idea of the priesthood, 196. Commodian, 687.
Lapsi, controversies respecting their restoration to the fellowship of the church, 226–235, 239–246. Decision of the council of Carthage, 234.
Lectores, 201.
Legio fulminea, 115, 116.
Leonides, father of Origen, 693, 695.
Libelli pacis, 229, n. 2, 231.
Libellum, Libellatici 132, n. 1, 227, 234, n. 1, 242, 244, 245. See the article Church Divisions.
Liber Adami, 376 n. 3.
Likeness of God, 613, 614.
Limbus infantium, 715.
Literæ formatæ, 205.
Liturgy, 303, 329, n. 1, 440.
Logos, among the Alexandrian Jews, with Philo, 55, n. 1, 57, 397. With the Gnostics, 373, n. 2. Basilides, 400. Valentine, 423. Marcus, 440, 441. Clement, 541. Origen, 545, 547–553, 594, 622, 623. In the New Testament, and the oldest church teachers, 575, 584–586. In the Alexandrian school, 586–591. With the Monarchians, 576–585, 591–603. Justin, *λόγος σπερματικός*, 666–669. See Doctrine of the Trinity.
Longing in Paganism, 30, 71.
Lord's Supper, celebration and conception of in the first centuries, 304, 323–335, 647–649. Among the Manicheans, 493, 504, 505. See the articles, Agapæ, Justin, Irenæus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Epiphanius, Ignatius.
Love feast, with the Therapeutæ, 61. See Agapæ.
Lucan, Marcionite, 474.
Lucian, the opponent of Christianity, 8, 9, 10, n. 1, 13, 92, 93, n. 1, 157, 160–162.
Lucianus, founder of the Antiochian school, 722.
Lucianus, præpositus cubiculariorum, 143.
Lucianus, the confessor, 230.
Lucius Ælius Verus, 663, n. 2.
Lucius, bishop of Rome, 136.
Lucius, Christian, 664, 665.
Lucius, the British king, 85.
Lucius Verus Antoninus, 663, n. 2, 665.
Lucretius, poet, 8.
Lugdunum. See Lyons.
Lyons, introduction of Christianity there, 84. Persecution of Christians, 111–114. Connection with Asia Minor, Montanism, 524.

M.

Macrianus, 140.
Mæcenas, advice to Augustus, 87.
Magic, Celsus on, 161, 162. With the Carpocratians, 450.
Magical arts, in Paganism, 30, 33.
Magical efficacy of sacraments, 313, 314, 322, 647, 648.
Magicians. See Goetæ.
Maia, in Buddhism, 386, n. 1, 481.
Malabar, church there, 81. Jews, 82.
Malchion, presbyter, 605.
Mandeans, 376, n. 3.
Mani, 81, 314, 478–488. See Manicheism.
Manicheans, 478–506. Law of Diocletian against, 144, 506.
Manicheism, 376, 447, 479–486. System, 488–501. Sources of religious knowledge, 501, 502. Constitution, worship, moral character, persecution, 502–506.
Marcella, wife of Porphyry, 170, n. 2, 172, n. 1.
Marcellus the centurion, a martyr, 147.
Marcia, 118.
Marcion, formula of baptism, 310. Against the dismission of catechumens before the Lord's Supper, 327, 328. Forerunner of Protestantism, 367, n. 1. Marcion and his doctrine, 379, 393 n. 3, 458–473. His sects, 473–476, 582, n. 3. God's revelation in nature, 559. Against anthropopathism, 561, 562. Artemonites, 582, n. 3. Anthropology, 616, 617. Tertullian and Marcion, 616–618. Doctrine of redemption, 640, 641. Resurrection, 471, 655.

Marcionites, 473–476.
Marcionitism, opposed by the Clementines, 395.
Marcosians, 476.
Marcus Antoninus Philosophus (Annius Verissimus), 663, n. 2.
Marcus Aurelius, stoicism, 17, 159. On exorcists, 73. Alexander of Abonoteichus, 92. Persecution of Christians, 104–117, 513, 524. The legio fulminea, 115. Apology of Justin, 664, 665. Theophilus, 674.
Marcus, presiding officer of the church at Ælia, 344.
Marcus, the Gnostic, 440.
Marcus, the Marcionite, 474.
Marius, the martyr, 146.
Mark, the Evangelist, in Egypt, 83.
Marriage, among the Jews, Essenes, 45. Christian idea of, 280–284. Sanction of the church, 283. Mixed marriages, 255, 282. Views of marriage among the Gnostics, 385, 386. Basilideans, 416, 417. Montanists, 522. See Syzygies.
Martialis, Spanish bishop, 216.
Martyrdom, Basilides, 413, 436. Gnostics, 436. Montanists, 521, 523.
Martyrs, 523. Feast of the, 334, 335. With the Pseudo-Basilideans, 448. See Persecutions.
Mary, the virgin, with Valentine, 429.
Materialism, of Hermogenes, 617.
Matrices ecclesiæ, 203.
Matthew, Gospel of, 81, 708 n. 2.
Maximianus Herculius, Cæsar, 146, 147.
Maximilianus, the martyr, 146.
Maximilla, the prophetess, 514, 515.
Maximinus, Caius Galerius Valerius, 155, 722.
Maximinus, the Thracian, 126.
Maximus, bishop of Jerusalem, 721, n. 3.
Maximus, church teacher, 721.
Media, church in, 80.
Melito of Sardis, 101, n. 1, 102, notes 2, 3, 104, and n. 1, 105, 299. Character, 676.
Menander, 454 n. 1.
Menoch, Mani's letter to the virgin, 494, n. 1, 496, notes 1, 3, 498.
Mensurius, bishop of Carthage, 150, 151.
Μεσον, μεσότης, 421, n. 1, 438 and n. 2.
Messiah, idea of, in the Old Testament, misapprehension, 37, 357, 358, 574. Expectation repressed with Josephus and the Alexandrian Jews, 65. Among the proselytes, 68. Among the Jewish Christians 341–343. Among the Ebionites, 346–348, 350–352. In the Clementines, 356–358. Faith in the, 363, 364. Cerinthus, 398, 399. Valentine, 426, 429–431. Ophites, 445, 447. Marcion, 468–471. Mani, 500.
Metempsychosis, with Basilides, 410. With the Carpocratians, 450. In Manicheism, 480, 483, 496, 503. With Origen, 627. See Transmigration.
Methodius of Tyre, 358, n. 1. Against Origen's doctrine of the creation, 569. Athenagoras, 673. His writings, 422, n. 2, 720, 721.
Metropolitans, 203.
Miles Christi, 644. See Militia Christi.
Miles Satani, 644.
Militia Christi, 199, 296, 306, 307, 309.
Milk and honey, given to the newly baptized, 316.
Millennium, 649–653.
Miltiades, against the Montanists, 519.
Minucius Felix, 11, 78, n. 1, 88, n. 3. Character, 690.
Minucius Fundanus, proconsul, 101.
Miracles, means of advancing Christianity, 72–75. Philo on, 55. Justin Martyr on, 74. Celsus on, 169. Valentine, 432, 433. Carpocrates, 450. Marcion, 470. Origen, 544, 545, 570. Irenæus, 677. Of Christ, — Hierocles, Quadratus, Irenæus on the, 173, 661, 677.
Missa, catechumenorum, missa fidelium, 327, n. 1, 478.
Missions. See Christianity.
Mithras, in Parsism, 493.
Mohammed, Mohammedanism, 395, 487.
Monachism, 39.
Monad, 449, 450, 595.
Monarchians, 575–586, 590–606, 608–610.
Monarchy in the church, 183.
Monism, Platonic, 375, 391. Of Photinus, 392. In Mani, 481. In Buddhism, 482. In Parsism, 489. Compare Thomas Aquinas (Vol. IV.).
Monogenes, Valentine, 418, 423.
Monoism in Gnosticism, 375, 438, 476.
Montanism, 508–527. General characteristics, 508–513. Female prophets, 182, 514, 515, 520. Asceticism, 280, 520–523. Figures of Christ, 292, n. 3. Feasts, 294. Baptism of heretics, 318. External history, 513, 514. Views of marriage, 521, 522. Position of the church towards Montanism, 517, 519, 520, 524–527, 676. Irenæus, 677–679. Tertullian, 683–685.
Montenses, Donatists at Rome, 233, n. 3.
Moral systems, in Gnosticism, 377, 378, 384–386, 393. In Platonism, 378, 379. In Dualism, 378. Isidorus, 415. Basilides, 415, 416. Ptolemæus, 439, 440. Marcion, 472. In Manicheism, 505. In Montanism, 514, 520–523.
Morality, among the Antinomian Gnostics, 448, 450–454.
Morals, Christian, 631, 632, 644, 645.
Mosaic Law, among the Jewish Christians, 341–344, 349, 351, 352. In the Clementines, 354, n. 6, 355. Among Pagan Christians, 362. In Gnosticism, 380, 439, 440, 468.
Mother of Life, Æon, with Mani, 491.
Mourning for the dead, 333.
Mundane soul, of Plato, 376, 380. Valentine, 423. The Ophites, 443–446. Mani, 491–495. Origen, 624.
Mystic element in Christianity, 64. In

the system of the Alexandrian Jews, 64, 66.
Mysticism, 46.

N.

Natalis the Theodotian, confessor, 580,
Nature, doctrine of human. See Anthropology.
Nazareans, 376, n. 3.
Nazarenes, 346, 349, 350. See articles, Paul, Sects.
Neo-Cæsarea, council at (A. D. 314), 238, n. 1.
Neo-Platonism, 19–35, 160, 161. Two stages in religion and worship, 25–29. The Supreme Essence, idea of the Absolute, 26, 27. Mysticism, 27. Demons, 28. Relation to the multitude, 29. To Christianity, 30–35. Aristocratic spirit, 34. With Plotinus, 27, 29, 31, 390–394. With Porphyry, 170. Mundane soul, 376. In Gnosticism, 375, 406. With Clement, 532, 586. With Origen, 550, 571, 587–589.
Nepos, Egyptian bishop, Chiliast, 652, 653.
Nero, persecution under, 94–96.
Nerva, 96, 97, 99.
New Testament revisions, 582 and n. 2.
Nicolaitans, 452, 453.
Nicolaus, pretended founder of a sect, 452, 453.
Nicomedia, meeting of Diocletian and Galerius at, 147. Edict against the Christians, 148, 149, n. 1. Conflagration, 153.
Noah, seven precepts of, 67, n. 2.
Noetus, Patripassian, 584, 682.
North African church, infant baptism, 313. Milk and honey in baptism, 316. Baptism of heretics, 318–320. Daily communion; the Supper under one form, 332. Communion of infants, 333. Doctrine of human nature, 614–620. Doctrine of the Lord's Supper, 648, 649. Theology, 683–689. See articles, Carthage, Cyprian, Arnobius, Commodianus, Church Theology, Church Divisions, Persecutions.
Nous, of Plato, 575, n. 1. In Gnosticism, 373, n. 2, 375, 380, 389. The highest Æon, 381, n. 3, 410. With Basilides, 400, 410, and n. 1. Neo-Platonic, Clement, Origen, 586 and n. 6, 587–590, 637.
Novatian, 237–248. Theology, 560. Against the Artemonites, 581. Writings, 690.
Novatian schism, controversy, 222, 237–248, 687.
Novatus, exciter of the Carthaginian schism, 224, 225, 233. Participation in the Roman, 241, 242.
Numidia, church there, 84. Persecution, 150–152.
Numidicus, confessor, 133.

O.

Oath, rejected by the Essenes, 46.
Oblatio, 329–331.
Odenatus, 603, n. 6.
Οἱ καθαροί, 247.
Old and New Testament positions, 194–199, 209, 294, 365, 394, 441, 457, 463, 470, n. 3, 515, 525, 582.
Old Testament, 519. In Gnosticism, 381, 383, 407, 409, 437–440, 467, 475. Tatian, 672.
Omnipotence of God, 570, 571.
Ὁμοούσιον, 578, n. 1, 590, n. 3, 606, 608.
Ὄν, ὤν, with Philo, 373, n. 1, 397, 601, n. 1, 597. Neo-Platonic, 163, 417, 571, 586 and n. 6, 589, 590. With Sabellius, 595–597.
Ophites, 375, n. 1, 377, n. 1, 442–447, 484, n. 3.
Optatus of Mileve, 203.
Opus operatum, 62, 229, 235, 280, 314, 436, 706.
Oracles, Plutarch's defense of the, 23. Porphyry's collection, 31, 171, 172. Compare Sibylline, Montanism.
Ordo, 184, 195.
Oriental Spirit, Oriental Theosophy, 44, 47, 352, 366, 368, 371, 374, 382, 479.
Origen, Angelophanies with the Sadducees, 42, n. 2. Miracles of the Christians, 71, 72, 74. Miraculous conversions, 75. On the preaching of Christianity in the country, 79. Origen in Arabia, 81. Thomas among the Parthians, 82. Correspondence with Julia Mammæa, 125. Situation of the Christians under Philip the Arabian, 127. On the persecutions, 127. Celsus, 160, 161, 163, n. 1, 165, n. 2, 167, n. 2, 169. Humility, 167, n. 2. Preaches without ordination, 197. Exorcists, 201, n. 3. Church discipline, 219. Effects wrought by Christianity, 250. Hypocritical profession of Christianity, 251. Profit of baptism, 253. The Christian, and the heathen state, 272. Prayer, 284, 285. Prayer with the study of Scripture, 287. Posture in prayer, 288. Place of prayer, 289. Spiritual worship of God, 289. Pentecost, 300, n. 2. Feasts, 300, and n. 2, 301. Catechumens, 305. Infant baptism, 314. Ebionites, 345, 346, 348, 364. False Gnosis, 367, n. 2. Gnostic interpretation of the Bible, 387, n. 1, 388. Heracleon on John, 434, 436. Ophites, 446, 447. Simon Magus, 454, n. 1. The second marriage, 522, n. 4. Letter of the church at Lyons, 525. Origen as a catechist, 528. Isaiah, 530, n. 2. Scholar of Clement, 543. Origen as representative of the Alexandrian school, 543–557. Gnosis and Pistis, 544–551. Faith in miracles, 545. This present life "in part," 546. The eternal spiritual gospel, 547, 548. Various standing points of Christians, 547, 548,

587, n. 3. Various forms of revelation of the Logos, 549. Difference between his view and that of Paul, 550. Tolerance, 551, 552. Interpretation of Scripture, 552–557, 613, n. 2. View of the Holy Scriptures, 553, 554. Higher truths, 554, 555. Threefold sense, 555. Idea of God, 559, 560. Anthropopathism, Accommodation, 563, 564. Doctrine of Creation 568–571. Emanation, 568, 621. Omnipotence of God, Miracles, 570, 571. Monarchians, 578, 593, n. 1. Doctrine of the Logos, 587–592. Dispute with Beryll, 594. Pride of church officers, 603, n. 5. Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, 609. Anthropology, 621–631. Christ's servant form, 633. Humanity of Christ, 635, 640. The human soul of Christ, 636–640. Redemption, 640. Redemptive activity, 643. Death of Christ voluntary, 644. Baptism and the Lord's Supper, 648, 649. Against Chiliasm, 652. Resurrection, 655. Eschatology, 656. Hippolytus, 682. Clement, 692. Life and works of Origen, 693–712. Influence of Origen, 711–722. See the articles, Leonidas, Clement, Ammonius, Alexandrian Theology, Catechetical Schools.

Origen, school of. See the articles, Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Pamphilus.

Origen, the Pagan, 699, n. 1.

Origenists and their opponents, 713–722.

Original condition. Compare Image, Sin, Grace.

Original sin. See Anthropology.

Ormuzd in Parsism, 369, 489, n. 3.

Ὅρος, 419.

Ostiarii, 201.

P.

Pacianus of Barcelona, 246, n. 2.

Pagan literature, in the service of Christianity, 143, 150, 176.

Pagan world, its state among the Greeks and Romans at the appearance of Christianity, 5–35.

Paganism, its influence on Christian life and doctrine, 252, 260–262, 265, 276, 292, 337, 338. Religion of the state, 70.

Palestine, persecution in, 153, 154, 156.

Palladius, 708, n. 3.

Pamphilus, presbyter at Cæsarea, 704, n. 3, 721. Death of Origen, 711, n. 3.

Pandects, 107, n. 4.

Pantænus, in Arabia, 81. In India, 82. Catechist, 529, 691, 694, n. 1.

Pantheism, 374, 375. Of the Stoics, 17. Unity and end of heathenism, 31. In the religions of ancient Asia, 479, 573. In Gnosticism, 375, 443, 444, n. 4, 446, 450. In Sabellius, 600, 601.

Papal monarchy, germ of, 211.

Papias of Hierapolis, 513, n. 1, 650.

Paraclete, Mani, 487, 501, 504. In Montanism, 511, 512, 515–517.

Paradise, with Philo, 54, n. 2. With Origen, 627. With Tertullian, 654. In Manicheism, 497.

παράδοσις ἀποστολική, 306, 528, 532.

Parchor, the prophet, 406, n. 3, 408.

Paris, introduction of Christianity there, 84.

Parsism. Among the Pharisees, 40. Among the Essenes, 44, 47. In Gnosticism, 369, 376. With Basilides, 402, and n. 3, 403. In Manicheism, 376, 479–495, 501. Relation to Christianity, 482–484. See articles Gnosis, Gnostics, Gnostic System.

Παρθένοι, 275.

Parthia, Christianity there, 80.

Pascal, 359.

Passover, controversies with regard to the, 297–299.

Passover festival, in the East and in the West, 297–300. Jewish, 324, 325.

Paternus, the proconsul, 137.

Patripassians, 469, 576, n. 4, 578, 583–585, 610.

Paul, the apostle, 4, 17, n. 2. Pharisee, 40. Judaism and Christianity, 62, 63, 64. Power of Christianity, 72, 129, 249. Evidence of the gospel 75, 176. In Arabia, 81. In Spain, 85. Alluded to by Lucian? 158. In the early church, 159, 289, 351, 645. Universal priesthood, 180. Charismata, 180, 186, 510. In the church constitution, 182, 188, 189, 197. Earlier and later time, 187, 191. Retrogression from the position of Paul, 194, 195. At Rome, 203, 204, 213. Relation to the other apostles, 212. Church discipline, 218. Clement 262. Slavery, 269. Tertullian, 290, 294. Festivals, 294, 297, 299. Church singing, 304. Divine service, 327. Jewish and pagan Christians, 341. Labors among Gentile Christians, 342. Paul with the Ebionites, 346, 349. The Nazarenes concerning Paul, 349. In the Clementines, 360–362. Gnosis, 366, 371, 383, 385, 388. With individual Gnostics, 396, 398, 413, 415, 417, 433, 450, 453, 457, 458, n. 3, 460–464, 470, 471, 473. Origen, 544, 546, 550, 551, 695. Trinity, 572–575. With the Artemonites, 580, n. 1. Faith, 645. With Hegesippus, 675, 676. With Irenæus and Tertullian, 679, 680, and n. 2.

Paul, a martyr, 230.

Paul of Antioch, Gnostic, 695.

Paul of Samosata, 142, 304, 601–604. See articles, Monarchians, Logos, Malchion.

Pauperes de Lugduno, 352.

Pausanias, defence of the myths, 12.

Peccata venalia, mortalia, 221, 240, 244, 245.

Pella, 344.

Penitence and penance, 218–221, 237.

With the Montanists, 522, 523. See Church Schisms.
Pentateuch, with the Pharisees, 39. The Sadducees, 41, 42. The Alexandrian Jews, 53. In the Clementines, 355, 358. The Ebionites, 358 n. 1. Ptolemæus, 439, n. 1.
Pentecost, festival of, 300.
Pepuza, Pepuzians, 513 n. 1, 525.
Peræa, flight to, 343.
Peregrinus Proteus, Cynic, 158, 159.
Perfecti. See Electi.
Perfectibility of Christianity, among the Gnostics, 389. Montanists, 512. Compare Joachim, abbot, Vol. IV.
Περίοδοι ἀποστόλων, 500, n. 4.
Perpetua, the Martyr, 123, 124.
Persecutions, 83, 84, 86–156. Causes, 86–93. Occasions, 67, 76, 103, 104, 119, 126, 136, 283. Against the Manicheans, 505.
Perseverance, 630.
Persian Church, foundation, 80. Infant baptism, 314.
Pescennius Niger, 119.
Peter, the apostle, 79, n. 4, 80, 183, 341. At Rome, 203, 204. Precedence, 211. Dispute with Simon Magus, 296, n. 5. Questions in baptism, 308, n. 5. In the Clementines, 353, 361. Epistle to James in the Clementines, 361. Peter and Paul, 319, 417, 461. See Cathedra Petri.
Phædrus, of Plato, 449.
Pharisaism, influence on Christianity, 351, 352.
Pharisees, 39, 40. Relation to Christianity, 63. Two classes, 63. With the Nazarenes, 349.
Pherecides Syrius, 402, n. 2.
Philaster, 447, n. 1.
Philemon, the Roman presbyter, 712, n. 1.
Philip, of Sida, the catechist, 673.
Philip the Arabian, 126, 710.
Philo, on the Essenes, 44, 47, 48, n. 3. On unbelieving Jews, 51. On the relation of Judaism to universal history, 52. Against mysteries, 52. Paradise, 54, n, 2. As representative of the Alexandrian Judaism, 53–60, 65. On miracles, 55. On rationalists, 59. On contemplation, 59. Therapeutæ, 60, 61. Perpetuity of the temple and the Messianic period, 65. Golden age of Jerusalem, 65. Angels, 380. Theophanies, 386, n. 2. Creation, 396, n. 3. Logos, 397, 424, n. 1, 585, 597. Distinction between the masses and the enlightened few, 397, 578, (57, 58). Temple, 407, n. 2. Polytheism, 587, n. 3.
Philosophers, Christian, 275.
Philosopher's cloak, 275, 661, 662.
Philostratus, the rhetorician, 173, 174.
Philumene, 474, 475,
Photius, on Mani, 485, n. 3. On Justin's writings, 670. On Hippolytus, 681, 682. On Clement, 692. On Origen, 693, n. 2, 703, n. 5, 711, n. 3.
Φρόνησις, Basilides, 400.
Φθορά, 615.
Pierias, the Alexandrian, 713.
Pietism in Montanism, 523, 565.
Pilate, 8, 93. Compare Acta Pilati.
Πίστις. See Faith.
Plato, on the natural explanation of myths, 5. His philosophy, view of Socrates, 18. *ταπεινότης*, 19, 166. His Monotheism, 25. Prophets, 356. Timæus, 25, n. 1, 380, 569, n. 3. Symposion, 386. Plato, in Gnosticism, 390, 408. Phædrus, 449. With Tertullian, 618. *μὴ ὄν*, 623, n. 5.
Platonic philosophy, its essence, 18. Relation to Christianity, 19, 33, 34. In later Judaism, 40. In Alexandria, 51, 366, 377, 542. Relation to the Essenes, 44, 47. With Celsus, 163, 166. In Gnosticism, 366, 368, 369, 374–380, 390, 391, 456. With Clement, 540. Origen, 569. Influence in the development of doctrine, 581. With Justin, 662. See Neo-Platonism.
Πλήρωμα in Gnosticism, 373, n. 3, 375, n. 5, 389, 393, 399, n. 2, 418, 420–427, 432, 434, 441, 443, 477.
Pliny the Elder, on religion, 10, 11. On the Essenes, 43.
Pliny the Younger, report to Trajan; Hymns, 304, 575. Agapæ. 325.
Plotinus, 26, n. 4, 27, 29, 31, 170, 368, 376, and n. 1. Ethics, 379. Against the Gnostics, 390–394, 415, 472. Providence, Reason, 406, and n. 2. Clement and Plotinus, 586, n. 6. Anthropology, 611. Pupil of Ammonius Saccas, 698.
Plutarch, against foreign religious customs, 13. Superstition and infidelity, 13–15, 21, 22. Against Epicureanism, 15. Stoics, 18, n. 1. Relation of religions, 20, 21, 368. Hypocrisy of philosophers, 21. Anger of the gods, 22. The priest, 22. Natural causes, Oracles, 23, 24. 27. Demons, 28. Alexander the Great, his significance, 50. Superstition, 71. Moral freedom, 611.
Πνεῦμα, 474. See Spirit.
Πνευματικοί and *ψυχικοί*, among Gnostics, 366, 381, 388, 389. In particular systems, 411, 414, 420–434, 435, 445, 456, 502. With Origen, 628, 629.
Pneumatology, 47, 612. See Anthropology.
Pœnitentes, 219.
Polemics, 157–178. Compare Apologists.
Polybius on Roman superstitions, 6, 7.
Polycarp of Smyrna, the martyr, 109–111, 335. Dispute about the passover, 299. Meeting with Marcion, 465. Letter to the Philippians, 661. Irenæus on, 677.
Polycrates, bishop of Ephesus. The apostle John, 194, n. 1. The passover controversy, 298, 299.
Polytheism, according to the eclectic philosophy, 25.
Pompa diaboli, 264, 309.

Ponticus, the martyr, 114.
Pontius, life of Cyprian, 139, n. 2, 222, notes 2, 3, 223, n. 1, 255, n. 3.
Porphyrius, martyr, 722, n. 1.
Porphyry, Neo-Platonic mysticism, 27. Defense of image worship, 27. Demons, 28. Oracles, longing of heathenism, 31. Against Christianity, Esculapius, 92, 145, n. 3. His works against Christianity, 170–172. Antinomian Gnostics, 385, 393, n. 3.
Possession, demoniacal, 15, 73, 74, 265, n. 1.
Pothinus, of Lyons, 112, 677.
Poverty of Spirit, prerequisite to the reception of Christianity, 64.
Prædestinatus, 685.
Praxeas, against the Montanists, 513, n. 3, 525. Patripassian, 583, 584.
Prayer, 284–288. Posture in, 287, 288, 295. In the family, 286. With Basilides, 416. For the dead, 334. To Christ, 590.
Preaching, 303. Office of, 186, 197. Of laymen, 186, 187, 196, 197.
Predestination in the Holy Scripture, 613. Origen, 630.
Predetermination, 612, 617.
Preëxistence of souls, doctrine of, among the Essenes, 47. With Origen, 626, 627.
Presbyter, in the apostolic times, 184–186. After the time of the Apostles, 190–195. Sacred functions, 316.
Priesthood, 193–200, 209. Priests as a caste, 193–199, 277. Priesthood of all Christians, 180, 284, 288, 315, 518, 644.
Primal man, Primitive man, 424, 425, 491, 493.
Prisca, Priscilla, 514. Celibacy of the clergy, 521.
Proclus, Montanist, 652.
Procopius, martyr, 303, n. 3.
Procopius, the presbyter, 154.
Proculus, Christian slave, 119.
Proculus, Montanist, 678, n. 2.
Prodicus, Prodicians, 451.
Professions incompatible with Christianity, 262, 267.
Prophecy, gift of, 175, 186, n. 2. Essenes, 45. See Prophets.
Prophetic element in Judaism — paganism, 175–177.
Prophets in the Old Testament, 35, 36, 354. Christian, 343. In the Clementines, 354–359. Valentine, 426, 427. Among the Montanists, 182, 514–520.
Proselytes made by the Pharisees, 67. Of righteousness, of the gate, 67, 68. Laws against, 89.
Πρώτη ὄγδοας, 401.
Protestant spirit, Protestantism, 461, 518.
Protoctetus, the friend of Origen, 706.
Providence, doctrine of, with Basilides, 405–407. Marcion, 472.
Provincial synods, 206. See Church Constitution.
Psammon, 34, n. 2.
Pseudo-Basilideans, 447, 448.
Pseudo-Cynics, 275.
Pseudo-Paulinists, 342.
Pseudo-Petrinists, 342.
Pseudo-Sibylline writers, books, 96, n. 2, 101, n. 1, 513, n. 1, 654.
Ψυχή, Valentine, 426, 428. Ἄλογος, Mani, 497.
Ptolemæus, 437–440, 441.
Ptolemæus, Christian teacher, 663.
Public sports, 263–267.
Pudens, 102, n. 4.
Pulpitum, 291, n. 2.
Pupian, 224, n. 1, 236, 237.
Purgatory, origin of the doctrine of, 654, 656.
Pythagoras, 173, 449

Q.

Quadragesimal fast, 300.
Quadratus, bishop at Athens, 661.
Quadratus, the Apologist, 101, 661.
Quintus, 109.
Quintus, the African bishop, 319.
Quirinus, 685.

R.

Rabbinism, 54.
Rationalism, in Paganism, 8. Among the Alexandrian Jews, 55, 58. In Docetism, 387. In Gnosticism, 389.
Rationalist element, in the development of Christian doctrine, 507.
Realist tendency. See the articles, Polycarp, Papias, Melito of Sardis, Irenæus, Tertullian, Montanus.
Recognitions, of Clement, 358, 376, n. 3, 659, n. 4.
Redeemer, Redemption, doctrine of, 640–645. With Celsus, 168. In Gnosticism, 370, 371, 379, 387. With individual Gnostics, 398, 409–413, 419–432, 462. In Parsism, 483. In Buddhism, 483. With Hieracas, 714. Anthropology in its relation to Christian and heathen views of, 610–614, 630.
Regeneration, 311, 312, 620. Confounded with baptism, 646, 647, 655.
Resurrection, 654. With Celsus, 169. With Hieracas, 714. See Eschatology.
Revelation, 359, 549.
Rhodon, church teacher, on Marcion, 467, n. 1. Against Apelles, 475.
Rigaltius, 522, n. 1.
Roman bishops, arrogant claims of, 214–217.
Roman church, number of presbyters, 202, 203. Treatment of the Lapsi, 231. Passover festival, 299. Baptism of heretics, 317–322. Its character, 508. Relation to the Monarchians, 579–581. Anti-Chiliastic tendency, 651. Doctrines, 689–691.
Roman state, relation of religion to politics, 6–8, 86–89. Toleration, 88.

Romans, in their relation to Christianity, 4–16, 49.
Rome, metropolis and ecclesia apostolica, 84, 203, 204. Cathedra Petri, 211–213. Persecution there, 133, 136, 139.
Rufinus, rescript of Hadrian, 101, n. 2. Edict of Constantine, 148, n. 1. Edict of Galerius, 149, n. 1. The Apostles' Creed, 306 n. 3, 307. Recognitions of Clement, 358. Origen, De principiis, 638, n. 4. Eusebius on Tertullian, 684, n. 1. Sextus, 697, n. 2. Origen, 704, n. 3. Pamphilus, 722.

S.

Sabbath among the Essenes, 49. In Christianity, 294–297. In Montanism, 521, n. 1.
Sabellius, 591, n. 4, 594–601, 606, 610. See the articles, Monarchians, Logos, Epiphanius, Athanasius.
Sacraments, signification of, external conception, celebration, 304–335. Doctrine of, 646–649. Doctrine of the Alexandrians, 648, 649. See Baptism and the Lord's Supper.
Sacramentum militiæ Christianæ, 264, 309.
Sacred writings of the Essenes, 45.
Sacrificati, 234, 242, 244, 245.
Sacrifice in the Lord's Supper, 330.
Sadducees, 39, 40–42. Relation to Christianity, 63.
Sadduceeism, 63.
Sanctification, 644, 645.
Sansara, in Gnosticism, 270, 484, n. 3. Sansara and Nirwana in Buddhism, 481–484.
Sapor [Shapur I.], king of Persia, 149, n. 1, 488.
Σάρξ, of Christ, in the Church doctrine, 634.
Sassanides, 81.
Satan, with the Ebionites, 352. In Gnosticism, 375–377, 421, 422, 427, 455, 466. Origen, 624. Irenæus, 635, n. 1. In the doctrine of Redemption, 640–644.
Satisfaction, 220, n. 5.
Saturnin of Toulouse, martyr, 84.
Saturninus, 455. See the articles, Gnostics, Irenæus, Epiphanius.
Saturninus, martyr, 123.
Saturninus, proconsul, 122.
Scapula, proconsul, 84, 122.
Scepticism, 11, 12. See Unbelief.
Schisms. See Church Divisions.
Scillita, persecution at, 122.
Scriptures of the Old Testament. Among the Pharisees, 39, 53. Sadducees, 40–42. Essenes, 44, 45, 47. Alexandrian Jews, 53–58. Greeks, 53. See Old Testament.
Scriptures, Sacred, 143. Burned, 148–150. See Bible.
Scythianus, 485.
Sects, 208. Signification of, 221. History, 341–506. In the edict of Galerius, 156. Celsus on, 164. Clement, 164, n. 4. See the particular sects.
Secundulus, the martyr, 123.
Secundus, Numidian bishop, 150. Gnostic, 438, n. 4.
Sedes apostolicæ, 203, 215.
Self-deception, 251, 252.
Seneca on superstition, 7. On the spread of Judaism, 67.
Sensuous modes of conception, 560.
Separatism, 208, 209, 222, 236, 237.
Septimius Severus, 119 and n. 6, 174, 721. Law against change of religion, 89, 120. Persecution under, 83, 119–122, 691, 694.
Septuagint, 54, 68.
Serennius Granianus, the proconsul, 101.
Sermon. See Preaching.
Sermon on the Mount, among the Ebionites, 346, 347. In the first centuries, 512.
Servianus, consul, 102.
Seth, representative of the Pneumatici, 445, 448.
Sethians, 448.
Seven, sacred number, 400.
Severians, 458, n. 3.
Severina, or Severa, 127, n. 1, 683.
Severus. See Severians.
Severus, Alexander, 125.
Severus, bishop of Asmonina, 485, n. 3.
Severus, emperor. See Septimius.
Sextus Empiricus, definition of the word αἵρεσις, 338, n. 1.
Shimnus, in Buddhism, 483.
Sibylline oracles, 141, 176, 177. See Pseudo-Sibylline.
Sibyllists, 177.
Sign of the Cross, 145, 293.
Signaculum, 316, 503. Militiæ, 146, n. 2
Simon Magus, 66, n. 3, 72, 204, 296, n. 5, 361, 362, 395, 454.
Simon of Cyrene. See Pseudo-Basilideans and Carpocratians.
Simonians, 453, 454.
Simplicius against Mani, 490, 491, n. 3.
Sin, the fall, 354, 610–627. Compare Anthropology, Peccata.
Sixtus II., bishop of Rome, 321. Martyr, 139.
Slavery, rejected by the Essenes, 46. By the Therapeutæ, 62. And Christianity, 267–270.
Slaves, Christian, 78, 98. Testify against their masters, 92, 97, 110, 112, 118.
Smyrna, persecution of Christians at, 109–111. Church at, report of Polycarp's martyrdom, 109, 335.
Socrates, against the "rage for enlightenment," 5. His importance, 18.
Socrates, the church historian, on Porphyry, 170. Novatian, 244, 245. Methodius, 720.
Soldiers of Christ, 199,
Songs, spiritual, use of, in the family, 286. See Church Psalmody.

Son of Man, with Mani, 493, 494.
Sons of God; of the Logos, Philo, 57.
Σοφία, in Gnosticism, 389 n. 2, 399, n. 2. With individual Gnostics, 400, 414, 420, 424, 426–428, 430, 431, 434, 443, 446, 477. Origen, 544, 546.
Sophists, 5.
Soter, bishop of Rome, 299, n. 4, 525.
Σωτήρ, in Gnosticism, 399, n. 2. With Valentine, 423, 424, 426–434.
Soul, origin of the, 714.
Sozomen, historian, 299, n. 4, 303, n. 6.
Spain, spread of Christianity there, 85. Compare West Goths.
Speratus, the martyr, 122, 123.
Spirit. See πνευμά, πνευματικοί.
Spirit, doctrine of the. See Holy Spirit.
Spirits, doctrine of, Jewish-oriental, 66. Compare Demons.
Sponsors, 315.
Star spirits. See Ophites, Saturnin.
Stationes, 296. See Dies stationum.
Stauros, cross, with Valentine, 419, 420, 431.
Stephen, bishop of Rome, 214–217, 318–321.
Stephen Gobarus, 675, 682.
Stephen, martyr, 341.
Stobæus, Johannes, 10, n. 1.
Stoicism, 10. Its essence, 15–18. Of Marcus Aurelius, 105, 106. Anthropology, 611.
Strabo on mythology, 7. Moses, nature-worship, 9.
Stromata. See Clement of Alexandria.
Subdiaconi, 201.
Subintroductæ, 277, n. 5.
Subordination, 608. With Origen, 589, 605. In the Western church, 605, 607, and n. 1, 610. Hieracas, 716.
Suetonius, 94.
Sulpicius Severus, 344, n.
Sun and moon, in Manicheism, 492–494, 497, 499, 500, 505.
Sun spirit. See Sun.
Sunday, 295, 296, 298, 332. With the Manicheans, 505. Montanists, 521, n. 1.
Συνείσακτοι, 659. See Subintroductæ.
Supernatural in Christianity, 72, 510. And natural, 507.
Superstition in Paganism, 13–15, 33.
Superstitiones externæ, 89.
Supranaturalism, Jewish, 55, 58, 64. Docetic, 387. Montanistic, 511, 512.
Symbols, 292, 293. In Alexandrian Judaism, 56, 64. In Gnosticism, 376. Symbolic rites in baptism, 315.
Symbolum, 306, 307.
Symmachus, Ebionite, version of the Old Testament, 708.
Symphonian of Autun, the martyr, 115. Acts of, 108, n. 3.
Synnada, synod at, 318.
Synods, provincial synods, 206, 207.
Syria, church there, 79.
Syrian Gnosticism, 274, 377, 378.
Syro-Persian church, 81. Christians, 82.
Syzygia, 423, 426.
Syzygies, 432, 434, 477. See Valentine.

T.

Tacitus, judgment concerning the Christians, 94, n. 2, 95, notes 2, 3, 98. Nero, 95, notes 1, 4, 96, n. 1. Domitian, 112, n. 4. Roman laws regarding slaves, 268, n. 3.
Tatian, the Gnostic, 456–458. Apologist, 672, 673. Crescens, 671.
Temple. See Jerusalem.
Terebinth, 485.
Tertullian, hindrances to faith, 72. Conversion by means of extraordinary psychological phenomena, 75. Mutual love of the Christians, 76. Christian heroism, 76, 77. Diffusion of Christianity increased by persecution, 77. Universal intelligibleness of Christianity, 78. Spread of Christianity in Africa, 84. Church in Britain, 85. "*Non licet esse vos*," 88. Reverence paid to the emperors, 90. Participation in heathen festivals, de corona, 91, notes 3, 4. Tiberius favorable to Christianity, 93, 94. Domitian, 96, n. 7. Trajan's rescript, 100. To Scapula, 101, n. 2, 102, n. 4, 122. The legio fulminea, 117. Arrius Antoninus, 119, and n. 1. Proculus, 119, n. 6. Septimius Severus, 120. Extortion of money in the persecutions, 121 and notes, 122, n. 1. Situation of the Christians under Caracalla; To Scapula, 122. Universal religious rights, 175. The testimony of the soul, 177. Presbyters and bishops, 192. Summus Sacerdos, 195. Universal priestly right, 196. Lectores, 201. Synods, 206. Cathedra Petri, 213. The Lord's word concerning the rock; Montanism, 213, n. Assumption of Roman bishops, 214. Excommunication, 218. Penance, 219, 220. Church penance as *satisfactio*, 220. Cyprian's study of, 226, 227. Assumption of confessors, 229, n. 2. Baptism as *opus operatum*, and delay of, 252, 253. Deficiencies of the church, 254. The Christian matron, 255. Mixed marriages, 255, 282, 283, 325, n. 3. Payment of their tribute by the Christians, 259. Crowning, 260, n. Fabrication of idols, 262. Gladiatorial shows, 263. Spectacles, 264, 265. Pleasures of the Christians, 266. Slavery and Christian freedom, 269. Hatred towards Christianity, 269, n. 1. Civil offices, 270, 271, n. 4. Following Christ in poverty, 271. Inconceivableness of the conversion of the emperors, 272, n. 1. Civil and military service, 272, 273. Life of Christians in the world, 273. Ascetics and philosophers, 275, and n. 1. Hypocritical asceticism, 277, n. 3. Christian marriage, 281. Dress of women, 282. Consecration of mar-

riage by the church, 283, 284. Prayer, 284–288. Family devotion, 286. Times of prayer, 286. Frequent prayers, 286. The external in prayer, 288. Worship not confined to place, 289. Images, 292. Symbols of the Christians, 292, n. 3. Stated festivals, 294. Observance of Sunday, 295, 296. Stationes, 296, n. 2. Fasting on the Sabbath, 296, n. 5, 297. Pentecost, 301, n. 1. Answer at baptism, 308, n. 5. Pompa diaboli, 309, n. 1. Infant baptism, 312, 315. Anointing, 315. Baptism and confirmation, 316, and n. 1. Milk and honey, 317, n. 1. Baptism of heretics, 318. Agapæ, 325, 326. Publicity of Christian assemblies, 327. Catechumens and believers among the heretics, 328. Exclusion of unbelievers from certain parts of the service, 328. The fourth petition; daily enjoyment of the Lord's Supper, 332. Sacramental bread, 332, n. 3. Offerings and prayers for the dead, 334, n. 2. Veneration of martyrs, 335. Ebion, 344. Gnostic interpretation of the Bible, 388. Ptolemæus, 437. Simon Magus, 454, n. 1. Marcion, 461–473, notes, 462, 465, 478, n. 1. Marcionites; Apelles, 474, 475. Caïanians, 476, n. 1. Baptism by substitution, 478, n. 3. Resemblances of Christianity in the old religion, 479, n. 1. Tertullian as organ for the North African theology, 509. As a Montanist, 509. Prophetic ecstasy, 511, n. 519, n. 2, 520. The Paraclete; progressive development of the church, 516. The new revelations, 517. The church of the Spirit and that of the bishops, 517, 518. Universal priesthood, 519, n. 1. Martyrdom, 521, n. 2. Forgiveness of sin, and sanctification, 522. Absolution through confessors, 523. Against the enemies of Montanism, 525. Philosophy, 536. Inborn consciousness of God, 558–560. The real apprehended as corporeal, 560. Anger of God, Anthropopathism, graduated progress in revelation, 561, 562. Against Hermogenes. Origin of evil, 565, n. 3, 566, n. 1. Monarchians, 576, n. 3, 578, 582, n. 3. Patripassians, 579, n. 2. Praxeas, 583, 584. Trinity, 605. Anthropology, 614–620. On Docetism, Christ without comeliness, Realism, 631. Humanity of Christ, 635. Baptism, 646. Lord's Supper, 648. Chiliasm, 651, notes 4, 5. Intermediate state, 654. Irenæus, 677, 678, n. 2. Inspiration, 679, 680, notes 1, 2. Blastus, 680. Life and writings of Tertullian, 683–685.
Tertullianists, 685.
Testament of the twelve patriarchs, 194, n. 1, 348, n. 5, 352, n. 3.
Tetrarchy, 154.
Thaddeus, one of the seventy disciples, 80.
Theatre, the, 264–267.
Theism, 3, 4, 35, 40, 58, 571, 572.
Theocracy, 3, 35–38, 209, 235, 396, 572.
Theoctistus, 703.
Theodoret, fragments of Porphyry, 171, n. 4. Cerinthus, 396. Tatian's *εὐαγγέλιον διὰ τεσσάρων*, 458, n. 1. Hermogenes, 567, 568, n. 1. Noetus, 584, 585. Malchion, 605, n. 1. Hippolytus, 683.
Theodorus. See Gregory Thaumaturgus.
Theodotus, the Monarchian, 580.
Theognostus, 713.
Theology, 542. Birth of, 529. See the articles, Church Theology, God, Creation, Trinity.
Theonas, bishop of Alexandria, 143 and n. 1.
Theopaschites, 579, n. 1.
Theophanies, 386, n. 2, 597, 598.
Theophilus Indicus, 83.
Theophilus, of Antioch, Revelation, 559. Apology and commentaries, 674.
Theophrastus, 581.
Theosophic schools in Gnosticism, 389. Theosophic element in Cerinthus, 398.
Theosophists, Jewish, and Gnosticism, 381.
Theosophy, of the Pharisees, 40. Of the Essenes, 44, 45, 47, 64. Oriental, 5.
Theotecnus, bishop of Cæsarea, 141.
Therapeutæ, 60–62. Relation to Christianity, 64.
Thomas, the apostle, in India, 82.
Thoth, interpolated sayings of, 176.
Thundering legion, the, 115–117.
Θυρωροί, 201.
Tiberianus, 100, n. 4.
Tiberius in favor of Christianity, 93. Law against circumcision, 89.
Timothy, 306, n. 2.
Titus of Bostra, 492, n. 3, 496, n. 1, 497, n. 3, 500, n. 6, 501, n. 4.
Torture, 108, 112, n. 4.
Tradition, in the Catholic church, 519. With Marcion, 459, 461, 462. In Montanism, 517, 519.
Traditores, 151.
Traducianism, 615, 626.
Trajan, 97–100, 102, 107, 118, 122, 191.
Transfiguration of Christ. Origen, 633, 634.
Transmigration of souls, with Basilides, 404. Origen, 627.
Triarchy, with Marcion, 467, n. 1.
Trichotomy, of Origen, 555, 627, 629. And the Gnostics, 627. Justin, 635. With Sabellius, 596, n. 2.
Trimurti, the Indian, 573.
Trinity, doctrine of the, 571–610. With Hieracas, 716.
Tritheism, 607.
Tyre, church of, in the controversy concerning the passover, 299.

U.

Uchomo, Abgar of Edessa, 80.
Ὑδροπαραστάται, 458, n. 2, 505.

"Υλη, with Celsus, 163, 168 and n. 1. Plotinus, 391; n. 2. In Gnosticism, 374–376, 378, 379, 384. Valentine, 420–423, n. 2, 427, 429. Ptolemæus, 438. Marcus, 441. Bardesanes, 442. Saturnin, 455. Tatian, 456. Marcion, 466, 468. In the church, 565, 567. With Origen, 624, notes 4, 5.
Unbelief, in Paganism, 11–15, 20–22, 33, 71.
Unitarians of the second century, 304.
Unity of the church, 180, 181, 207–217.
Urbicus, 664.
Ursinus, a monk, 322, n. 4.

V.

Valentine, the Gnostic, 377, n. 1, 385, 386. Himself and his doctrines, 417–434, 443.
Valentinian school, 393, n. 3, 434–442, 635.
Valerian, the emperor, 136–140, 320, 321, 690.
Varanes (Behram), king of Persia, 488.
Varro, threefold theology, 7, 86, n. 1. World soul, images of the gods, Jews, 9. Sibylline books, 177, n. 3.
Verus. See Lucius.
Vespronius Candidus, 102, n. 4.
Vettius Epagatus, the martyr, 112.
Victor, bishop of Rome, arrogant claims denied, 214, 215. Dispute about the passover, 299, 300, 680. Montanists, 513, n. 3, 525, n. 1, 583. Theodotus, 580.
Victoria, the martyr, 152.
Victorinus, bishop of Petabio, 296, n. 5.
Vienna, spread of Christianity thither, 84. Persecution of Christians, 84, 112–114.
Vincentius a Thibari, 310, n. 1.
Virgines, 277. See παρθένοι.
Visions, as a means of conversion, 75. With Cyprian, 236. Among the Montanists, see Montanism, Tertullian.
Visitation, church, 232, 233.
Volusian, emperor, 136.

W.

Wednesday, observance of, 296.
Western church, doctrine of the Trinity in the, 605–608, 610. See Roman Church.
Whitsuntide, 300.
Woman of Samaria, with Heracleon, 435.
Women, in the early church, — influence in the diffusion of Christianity, 78, 172, 716, 721. In public asssemblies, 181, 182, 303, n. 4, 329, n. 1, 678, 679. Place in the church, 188, 255, 281–283. Dignity, 280, 281. Dress of, 281, 282. See the articles, Deaconesses, Marriage, Virgins, Montanists, Persecution, Blandina, Perpetua, Felicitas, Victoria, Persecution at Carthage.
Works of charity, 74, 255–258, 262, 267.
Works of supererogation, 714.
World, in Gnosticism, 387.
Worship, Christian, 288–335. Pliny's report to Trajan, 98. Of the Gnosis, 476–478. Manichean, 502–505.

X.

Xerophagiæ, 521, n. 1.

Z.

Zabians, derivation and Gnostic system, 353, n. 1, 376, 382, 383, n. 1, 444, n. 1, 447.
Zealots, Jewish, 38. Among the Jewish Christians, 342. In the Alexandrian church, 529.
Zenobia, 142, 603–605.
Zephyrinus, Roman bishop, 581.
Zervan Acarene, in Parsism, 488, 489.
Zokotara, 82, 83.
Ζῶν πνεῦμα, 492, n. 1.
Zoroaster, 369, 402, 408, 452, 501. See Parsism.

INDEX TO THE CITATIONS.

I. CITATIONS FROM SCRIPTURE.

Genesis, 1 : 26. 2 : 7, p. 444. 17. 14 : 14, p. 658. 31 : 13, p. 397. 49 : 11, p. 670.
Exodus, 10 : 27, p. 613, 629. chap. 28 : p. 705. 33 : 18, p. 558. 34 : 20, p. 554.
Leviticus, 20 : 9. 24 : 20, p. 439.
Numbers, 11 : 29, p. 179. 23 : 19, p. 57, n. chap. 25, p. 452.
Deuteronomy, 1 : 31, p. 57, n. 4 : 19, p. 587. 18, p. 195. 22 : 5, p. 267. 23, p. 703. 27 : 26, p. 642. 32 : 8, 9, p. 380. 32 : 43, p. 409.
Samuel, 1 : 2, 25, p. 226.
Isaiah, 1 : 11, p. 284. 7 : 9, p. 530. 7 : 14, p. 348. 8 : 23. 9 : 1, p. 349. 21 : 7, 8, p. 350. 43 : 19, p. 531. 53 : 2, p. 271, 291, 633. 53 : 4, 5, p. 643.
Jeremiah, 31 : 33, p. 308.
Joel, chap. 3 : p. 518.
Zechariah, 3 : p. 609.
Malachi, 3 : 15, p. 451.
Psalm, 15 : 7, p. 620. 19 : 4, p. 568. 42 : 5, p. 706. 44 : 1, p. 588. 45 : 5, p. 636. 51 : 5, p. 620. 62, p. 466. 90 : 4, p. 399, 650. 95 : 2, p. 563. 97 : 7, p. 409, n. Ps. 110, p. 574. 111 : 10, p. 411. 145 : 3, p. 563.
Job, 14 : 4, p. 412, 620.
Proverbs, 22 : 28, p. 710.
Maccabees II., 6, p. 151.
Matthew, 3 : 10. 5 : 16, p. 253. 5 : 17, p. 359. 5 : 28, p. 654. 7 : 22, p. 253. 9 : 17, p. 464. 19 : 14, p. 312. 10 : 23, p. 695. 11 : 13, p. 525. 11 : 27, p. 357, 574. 12 : 6, 42, p. 574. 13 : 16, p. 675. 13 : 43, p. 623. 13 : 52, p. 360. 14 : 13, p. 695. 16 : 16, p. 574. 17 : 1, p. 553. 18 : 20, p 211. 19 : 6, p. 439. 19 : 12, p. 697. 19 : 14, p. 312, 552. 21 : 16, p. 705. 22 : 19, 20, p. 699. 22 : 21, p. 259. 25, p. 715. 26 : 52, p. 373.
Mark, 6 : 13, p. 119. 10 : 46, p. 364. 15 : 21, p. 447.
Luke, 1 : 31, p. 580. 2 : 40, p. 639. 7, p. 273. 9 : 50, p. 313. 12 : 8, p. 434–436. 12 : 49, p. 707. 12 : 50, p. 707. 13 : 2, p. 412. 13 : 21, p. 606. 15 : 8, p. 420. 22 : 24, p. 212.
John, 1 : 27, p. 430. 3 : 5, p. 648. 3 : 29, p. 434. 4 : 34, p. 436. 4 : 35, p. 436. 4 : 48, p. 432. 5 : 14, p. 253. 6 : 53, p. 648. 6 : 54, p. 324. 7 : 49, p. 346. 8 : 24, p. 544. 8 : 44, p. 590. 8 : 43, 45, p. 545. 9 : 3, p. 412. 10 : 3, p. 719. 10 : 30, p. 584. 13 : 8, p. 699. 13 : 21, p. 636, n. 14 : 9, p. 584. 15, p. 176. 15 : 1, p. 171. 17 : 3, p. 572.
Acts, 1 : 17, p. 196. 2 : 46, p. 325. 8 : 27, —40, p. 83. 10 : 46, p. 186. 13 : 23, p. 427. 14 : 23, p. 189. 15, p. 159. chap. 19, p. 316. 20 : 7, p. 295. 20 : 17, p. 192. 20 : 17, 28, p. 184. 23 : 8, p. 42. 23 : 9, p. 41. 24 : 5, p. 349. 27, p. 290.
Romans, 8 : 3, p. 641. 8 : 19, p. 625. 8 : 20, 21, p. 411. 8 : 26, p. 716. 9 : 5, p. 584. 12 : 1, p. 180. 12 : 7, 8, p. 187. 15 : 24, p. 85. 16, p. 289, 660. 16 : 5,— 14, 15, p. 185, 290. 16 : 14, p. 660.
1 Corinthians, 1 : 21, p. 621. 1 : 25, p. 705, 2 : 6, p. 388. 2 : 9, p. 531, 675. 2 : 14, 16, p. 628. 3 : 17, p. 253. 14 : 23,—25, p. 327. 5 : 4, p. 190. 5 : 7, p. 207. 6 : 12, p. 385. 6 : 15, p. 189. chap. 7, p. 680. 7 : 5, p. 457. 7 : 21, p. 269. 8 : 6, p. 574. 8 : 9, p. 385. 8 : 19, p. 189. 9 : 9, p. 555. 9 : 22,—12 : 26,— 10 : 33, p. 245. 9 : 24, p. 253. 11 : 4, 5, p. 679. 11 : 5, p. 182. 11 : 19, p. 341. 12, p. 180. 13 : 10, p. 487. 14 : 23–25, p. 327. 14 : 30, p. 320. 14 : 34, p. 182. chap. 15, p. 655. 15 : 28, p. 600. 15 : 29, p. 478. 16 : 19, p. 185. 16 : 19, 20, p. 290.
2 Corinthians, chap. 5, p. 546. 15 : 2, p. 253.
Galatians, chap. 2, p. 171, 319. chap. 4, p. 548. 5 : 19, p. 499. 6 : 6, p. 478.
Philippians, 1 : 1, p. 184. 1 : 16, p. 323. 2 : 10, p. 288. 2 : 15, p. 253. 4 : 3, p. 658.
Ephesians, 3 : 10, p. 382. 4 : 5, 6, p. 318. 4 : 6, p. 572. 4 : 9, p. 471. 5 : 4, p. 262. 5 : 5, p. 245. 5 : 16, p. 262. 6 : 11, p. 133.
Colossians, 2 : 16, p. 13. 21, 22, p. 700. 4 : 15, p. 185, 290.
1 Timothy, 3 : 1, 184. 3 : 2, p. 197. 3 : 8, p. 184. 5 : 17, p. 188, 326. 6 : 12, p. 306.
2 Timothy, 2 : 14, p. 199. 3 : 7, p. 506.
Titus, 1 : 5, p. 184, 189. 1 : 7, p. 184.
Philemon, v. 2, p. 185.
Hebrews, chap. 2, p. 382. 2 : 13, p. 563. 4 : 12, p. 707. 11 : 3, p. 372, 565. 12 : 14, p. 715.
1 Peter, 2 : 9, p. 180. 3 : 21, p. 306, 308. 5 : 13, p. 79.
1 John, 2 : 1, 2, p. 246. 1 : 7, p. 523. 2 : 19, p. 341. 5, p. 572.
James, 5 : 14, p. 119.
Revelation, 1 : 6, p. 197. 1 : 10, p. 295.

II. CITATIONS FROM WRITERS ON CHURCH HISTORY.

Acta concilii Carthagin. p. 308, 309.
—— concilii Nicæni II., actio V., edid. Mansi, t. 13, f. 167, p. 500.
—— martyrum (edid. Ruinart) Scillitanorum. Perpetuæ et Felicitatis, p. 122. Perpetuæ et Felicit. præfatio, p. 516, 518.
—— Feliciss. p. 151.
—— Justini, p. 270.
—— Procopii, p. 303.
—— martyrum coptiaca edid. Georgi, Romæ, 1793, præfatio pag. 109, p. 149.
—— Saturnini, Dativi, et aliorum in Africa, (Baluz, Miscellanea, t. 2,) p. 152.
—— Martyrii Justini, (Symeon Metaphrastes,) p. 670.
—— cum Felice Manichæo, l. 1, c. 9. (Augustin. opera, edid. Benedict, t. 8,) p. 487.
—— Thomæ, edid. Thilo; codex apocr. f. 10, p. 499. f. 17, p. 492.
Alexander Alexandrinus, apud Theodoret. histor. ecclesiast. l. 1, c. 4, p. 723.
Alexander Lycopolitanus, c. Manichæos, (Combefisii græcor. patrum auctarium novissimum, Paris, 1672, t. 2, f. 4,) p. 482. c. 3, p. 494, 500. c. 5, p. 494, 500. c. 24, p. 499.
Apollinaris Hierapolitanus. Chronicon paschale Alexandr. p. 298.
Apollonius, (ap. Euseb. hist. eccles. 5, 18,) p. 513.
Arius ad Alexandrinos, (ap. Epiphanium hæres. 69, § 7,) p. 716.
Arnobius, disputatio, c. gentes, l. 1, c. 13, p. 689. 1, 39, p. 688. 2, 71, p. 689. 3, 7, p. 150. 4, 36, p. 689. Arnobii conflictus cum Serapione, (Bibliothec. patr. Lugdunensis, t. 8,) p. 599.
Athanasius, c. Apollinarem, l. 2, § 3, p. 602, 603. historia Arianorum ad Monachos, § 64, p. 154. § 71, p. 603. Oratio IV. c. Arianos, § 8, p. 598. § 11, p. 597. § 12, p. 598, 600. § 13, p. 595. § 20, 21, 22, p. 598. § 23, p. 599. § 25, p. 595, 597, 598, 599, 600. § 26, p. 596. de sententia Dionysii, § 14, p. 606, 608. de synodis, c. 4, p. 602. c. 43, p. 606. de decretis synodi Nicænæ, t. 1. P. 2, pag. 68, p. 716. § 26, p. 607.
Athenagoras, legatio pro Christianis, f. 37, ed. Coloniensis, p. 328, 522.
Augustinus, c. Faustum Manichæum, l. 11, p. 502. l. 11, c. 3, p. 491. l. 18, p. 502. l. 18, c. 5, p. 505. l. 20, p. 494. l. 32, p. 502. c. Fortunatum, l 1, (appendix,) p. 505. c. Julian, opus imperf. l. 3. c. 172, p. 494, 498. c. 174, p 496. c. 177, p. 499. c. 186, p. 499, 497. c. 187, p. 498. c. epist. fundamenti. c. 5, p. 487. c. 8, p. 505. c. 13, p. 490. de Genesi, c. Manichæos, l. 2, c. 39, p. 497. de moribus Manich. c. 10, seqq. p. 503. de morib. eccles. cathol. c. 35, p. 504. de natura boni c. 46, p. 495. breviculum collationis cum Donatistis, d. 3, c. 13, p. 150' 151. de hæresibus, h. 32, p. 504. h. 68, p. 685. sermo 202, § 2, p. 302. sermo 212, p. 307, 308. de civitat. Dei, l. 5, c. 31, p. 9. l. 6, c. 5, seqq. p. 7. l. 19, c. 23, p. 172. de doctrina Christ. l. 2, c. 11, p. 303.
Barnabas epistola, c. 9, 12, p. 658. c. 15, p. 650.
Basilides tractatus (ἐξηγητικά) in disputatione Archelai cum Mani, c. 55, p. 401. apud Clementem Alexandr. Stromata, l. 6. f. 508, p. 405. f. 509, p. 403.
Basilius Cæsar, epistol. 188, (ep. canon. 1,) p. 320. ep. 210. ep. 214, § 3. ep. 235, § 6. p. 596.
Canon, de canone novi testamenti fragm. (antiquit, italic. ævi Jud. ed. Muratori, t. 3,) p. 660.
Celsus, λόγος ἀληθής, (ap. Originem, c. Celsum,) l. 1, c. 9, p. 164. c. 17, p. 171. c. 28, p. 161, 162. c. 67, p. 169, 250. l. 2, c. 10, p. 169. c. 13, p. 169. c. 23, p. 170. c. 27, p. 165. c. 34, p. 169. c. 41, 42, p. 169. c. 55, 63, 67, p. 169. l. 3, c. 10, seqq. p. 164. c. 44, p. 164. c. 51, p. 219. c. 59, p. 166. c. 65, p. 166. l. 4, c. 28, p. 171. c. 62, seqq. p. 166, 168. c. 69, p. 167. c. 73, p. 169. c. 75, p. 167, 169. c. 76, p. 167. c. 81, p. 168. c. 99, p. 168. l. 5, c. 63, p. 164. c. 61, p. 177. l. 6, c. 15, p. 167. c. 41, p. 161. l. 7, c. 35, p. 169. c. 36, p. 165. c. 62, p. 165. c. 56. p. 177. l. 8, c. 17, p. 289. c. 21, p. 265. κατὰ μάγων, p. 161.
Chronica Edessena, (Assemani bibl. orient. t. 1, f. 391,) p. 291.
Claudius Apollinaris, ap. Euseb. l. 5, p. 117.
Clemens Alexandrin. ed. Paris, 1641, προτρεπτικός, f. 45, p. 558. f. 69, p. 620. παιδαγωγός, l. 1, c. 1, p. 692. l. 1, c. 6, p. 531. l. 1, f. 103, p. 317. f. 118, p. 564. l. 2, c. 8, f. 176, p. 691. l. 2, c. 12, p. 282. f. 142, p. 326. f. 194, d. p. 286. l. 3, c. 1, p. 278, 292. f. 246, p. 293. f. 247, p. 293, 312. f. 250, p. 281. f. 255, p. 278, 279. f. 256, p. 317. f. 257, p. 290. Stromata, l. 1, f. 272, p. 251. f. 273, a. p. 530. f. 274, p. 691. f. 278, p. 534, 535. f. 382, p. 537. f. 291, p. 533. f. 292, p. 533, 540. f. 298, p. 539. f. 304, p. 452. f. 309, p. 537. f. 310, p. 536. f. 311, p. 520. f. 313, p. 621. f. 318, p. 533. f. 319, p. 308, 537. f. 320, p. 458. f. 340, p. 302. f. 360, p. 534. l. 2, f. 362, a. p. 530. f. 363, p. 414, 415. f. 364, p. 558. f. 365, b. p. 531. f. 371, p. 414, 531. f. 372, p. 530. f. 373, p. 530. f. 375, p. 411, 425. f. 379, p. 646. f. 381, p. 532. f. 384, p. 531. f. 407, p. 419. f. 408, p. 402. f. 409, p. 432. f. 411, p. 385, 453. f. 414, p. 119. l. 3, f. 257, p. 262. f. 427, p.

415, 416. f. 428, p. 451. f. 431, p. 466. f. 436, p. 452. f. 438, p. 452. f. 441, p. 451. f. 444, p. 531. f. 446, p. 278, 457. f. 448, p. 188. f. 449, p. 280. f. 451, p. 429. f. 453, p. 620. f. 457, p. 262. f. 460, d. p. 458, 632. f. 465, p. 456, 458. f. 466, p. 620. f. 469, p. 620. f. 470, p. 620, 633. l. 4, f. 490, p. 532. f. 503, p. 434. f. 506, p. 407, 412. f. 507, p. 403. f. 508, p. 405. f. 509, A. p. 403, 406. f. 509, B. p. 433. f. 509, C. et D. p. 424. f. 511, p. 520, 610. f. 518, 519, p. 540. f. 528, b. p. 530. f. 533, p. 280. f. 536, p. 413. f. 537, p. 586. f. 539, p. 400. l. 5, f. 546, p. 468. f. 549, p. 654. f. 554, p. 535. f. 560, p. 538. f. 565, p. 586. f. 582, p. 307, 588. f. 583, d. p. 407. f. 587, p. 533. f. 588, p. 558, 620. f. 591, p. 610. l. 6, f. 621, p. 402. f. 636, seqq. p. 538. f. 638, 639, p. 656. f. 641, p. 406, 408, 409, 427. f. 644, p. 537, 538. f. 645, p. 540. f. 647, p. 520, 536. f. 649, p. 632. f. 652, p. 540. f. 655, p. 535. f. 659, b. p. 528, 535. f. 660, p. 528. f. 662, p. 620. f. 663, p. 541. f. 667, p. 622. f. 669, p. 540. f. 672, p. 176, 538. f. 675, p. 539. f. 677, p. 553. f. 680, p. 364. f. 688, p. 538. f. 690, p. 633. f. 691, p. 541. f. 693, p. 536, 537. f. 694, p. 537. l. 7, f. 700, p. 586. f. 702, p. 541. f. 708, p. 586. f. 715, b. p. 289. f. 722, p. 286, 452, f. 728, p. 286. f. 730, p. 551. f. 732, b. p. 308. f. 732, p. 532. f. 741, p. 281. f. 753, p. 164. f. 754, p. 307. f. 755, p. 208, 307. f. 756, p. 533. f. 757, p. 532. f. 759, p. 326. f. 762, 763, p. 533. f. 764, p. 417. *τίς πλούσιος σωζόμενος*, c. 11, p. 279. c. 21, p. 621. c. 42, p. 196. *Ὑποτυπώσεις*, apud Euseb. præp. evang. l. 2, c. 2, p. 691. Euseb. l. 6, c. 3, p. 691. Didascal. anatol (*Θεοδότου ἐπιτομαί*) f. 794, p. 404. f. 796, p. 711. f. 797, p. 424, 425.

Clemens Romanus, epistola I. ad Cor. c. 5, p. 85. c. 32, 33, p. 644. c. 40, p. 196, 659. c. 42, p. 79, 185, 189. c. 44, p. 189. Clementinæ homiliæ, h. 2, c. 6, p. 354. c. 9, p. 354. c. 17, p. 362. c. 38, p. 358. h. 3, c. 19, p. 360. c. 20, p. 354, 355, 357. c. 22, 23, seqq. p. 357. c. 26, p. 355. c. 42, p. 354. c. 51, p. 359. h. 8, c. 5, p. 355. c. 7, p. 360. c. 10, p. 354. c. 11, 12, p. 356. c. 22, 23, p. 356. h. 16, c. 10, p. 358. c. 12, p. 601. h. 17, c. 18, p. 359. c. 19, p. 372. h. 18, c. 13, p. 357. Clementinæ Recognitiones, p. 32. l. 8, c. 53, p. 359.

Commodianus, instructiones, p. 68. i. 6, p. 687. i. 26, p. 687. i. 47, p. 229. i. 48, p. 280. i. 49, p. 637. i. 57, p. 687. i. 59, p. 281. i. 61, p. 687. i. 62, p. 280. i. 66, p. 237. i. 69, p. 198. i. 76, p. 303, 329. i. 79, p. 288. i. 80, p. 687.

Commonitorium, quomodo sit agendum cum Manichæis, (August. ed. Bened. t. 8, append,) p. 504.

Concilium Illiberitanum, c. 13, p. 278. c. 18, p. 198. c. 25, p. 229. c. 26, p. 296. c. 33, p. 277. c. 36, p. 293. c. 43, p. 301. c. 56, p. 271. c. 62, p. 262. c. 77, p. 233.

Concilium Neocæsariense, c. 12, p. 238.

Constitutiones apostolicæ, l. 2, c. 28, p. 326. l. 8, c. 17, p. 703. c. 26, p. 201. c. 31, p. 262. c. 32, p. 197.

Cornelius, ep. R. Epistola ad Fabium episc. Antiochenum, ap. Euseb. h. eccles. 643, p. 201, 238, 690.

Cyprianus, ed. Baluz., ep. 1, ad Donatum, p. 249, 263. ep. 2, p. 134, 231. ep. 3, p. 206, 226. ep. 4, p. 134. ep. 5, p. 192, 200, 224. ep. 6, p. 229, 230. ep. 7, p. 135. ep. 9, p. 227. ep. 11, p. 227. ep. 12, p. 231. ep. 13, p. 200, 231. ep. 14, p. 134, 226, 229, 231. ep. 18, p. 133. ep. 21, p. 133. ep. 22, p. 229. ep. 26, p. 133, 220. ep. 31, p. 132, 239. ep. 33, p. 199. ep. 38, p. 233. ep. 40, p. 131, 207, 223. ep. 42, p. 241. ep. 49, p. 224, 225. ep. 52 ad Antonianum, p. 220, 234, 235, 239, 240, 242, 243, 244, 245, 654. ep. 54, p. 234. ep. 55, ad Cornelium, p. 136, 214, 225, 233, 235. ep. 56, p. 136. ep. 59, p. 313. ep. 60, p. 256. ep. 61, ad Euchratem, p. 267. ep. 62, ad Pomponium, p. 277. ep. 63, p. 332. ep. 66, ad Fernenesium, p. 198, 199. ep. 68, p. 200, 217, 604. ep. 69 ad Pupianum, p. 236, 248. ep. 70, p. 315, 322, 323. ep. 71 ad Quintum, p. 318, 319, 320. ep. 72 ad Stephanum, p. 316, 319. ep. 72 ad Jubajanum, p. 316. ep. 73, p. 320, 323. ep. 74 ad Pompeiium, p. 214, 216, 322. ep. 75, p. 126, 201, 207, 214, 216, 220, 318, 320, 322, 329. ep. 76, ad Magnum, p. 307, 309, 310, 322. ep. 77, p. 138. ep. 82 ad Successum, p. 139. ep. 83, p. 139. ep. ad Demetrianum, p. 258. de lapsis, p. 134, 230, 332, 333. (edid. Baluz. f. 189,) p. 648. de habitu virginum, p. 277. de spectaculis, p. 265, 332. c. 29, p. 266. de mortalitate, p. 258, 334. de opere et eleemosynis, p. 330, 647. de unitate ecclesiæ, p. 210. de oratione dominica, p. 329. apologia, p. 136. de testimoniis, initio, p. 686. l. III. c. 25, p. 253, 648. c. 26, p. 253. c. 28, p. 227. c. 54, p. 620. finis, p. 686. de rebaptismate, p. 322, 323.

Diognetus, epistola ad p. 69. § 11, p. 644.

Dionysius Alexandrinus, apud Euseb. h. eccles. 5. 5, (epist. ad Stephanum,) p. 320. 6. 41, (ep. ad Fabium Antiochenum,) p. 130. 6. 46, (ad Novatianum,) p. 241. 7. 7, (ad Sixtum Secundum,) p. 320. 7. 5, p. 318. 7. 6, p. 599. 7. 7, (ad Philemonem,) p. 712. 7. 8, p. 243. 7. 9, p. 321. 7. 10, p. 137. 7. 22, p. 258. 7. 24, (*περὶ ἐπαγγελιῶν*,) p. 653. Præparatio evangel. l. 14, (*περὶ φύσεως*,) p. 713. apud Athanasium, de sententia Dionysii, (*ἔλεγχος καὶ ἀπολογία*, ad Dionysium Rom.,) p. 608. § 14, (ep. ad Ammonium et Euphranor.)

p. 606. apud Routh, reliquiæ sacræ, vol. 2, (ad Basilidem,) p. 712.
Dionysius Rom. apud Athanasium. De decretis synodi Nicænæ, § 25, (ἀνατροπή,) p. 610.
Disputatio Archelai cum Mani. Opera Hippolyti ed. Fabricius, f. 193, p. 505.
Ebed Jesu, catalogus scriptorum. Assemani biblioth. orient. p. 682.
Ephraem Syrus. opera syriace et latine, t. 2, sermo 1, f. 438, seqq. p. 462. sermo 14, f. 468, d. p. 466. sermo 102, § 6, f. 551, 552, p. 471. f. 553, 555, p. 442. ap. Wegener de Manichæorum indulgentiis, Lips. 1827, pag. 69, seqq. p. 503.
Epiphanius, hæres h. 26, § 3, 9, p. 446. h. 30, p. 345, 351, 352, 353. § 13, p. 348. § 15, p. 358. § 16, p. 331. § 18, p. 358. § 25, p. 346. h. 33, § 3, p. 437. h. 30, § 16, p. 331. h. 44, § 2, p. 475. h. 48, p. 515. h. 51, p. 526. h. 57, p. 580. h. 64, p. 696. h. 62, p. 596, 597, 601. h. 67, p. 602, 713. expositio fidei catholicæ, c. 21, p. 303. de mensur. et pond. c. 15, p. 343.
Epistolæ, Ecclesiæ Romanæ ad ecclesiam Carthageniensem, (Cypr. ep. 2,) p. 132, 231. confessorum ad Cypr. (Cypr. ep. 26,) p. 220. ecclesiæ Smyrnens. (Euseb. l. 4, c. 15,) p. 109, 335. ecclesiarum Lugd. et Vienn. (Euseb. l. 5, c. 1, seqq.,) p. 112, 276. Petri ad Jacobum (præfatio Clementinarum,) p. 361. Synodi ad Paulum Samosatenum, (Mansi conc. 1, f. 1034,) p. 603.
Ἡσαΐου ἀναβατικόν, ed. Lawrence, Oxon. 1819, p. 716. f. 38, 59, v. 32–36, p. 716.
Euodius Uzal. de fide contra Manichæos, c. 4, p. 501. c. 10, p. 494. c. 11, p. 490. c. 28, p. 500.
Eusebius. Historia eccles. l. 1, c. 7, p. 709. c. 10, p. 82. c. 10, § 2, p. 85. l. 2, c. 2, p. 684. c. 13, p. 665. c. 23, p. 675. l. 3, c. 1, p. 80. c. 5, p. 343. c. 19, 20, p. 96. c. 28, p. 399. l. 4, c. 3, p. 661. c. 6, p. 344. c. 13, p. 720. c. 15, p. 109, 335, 472. c. 16, 17, p. 665. c. 22, p. 676. c. 23, p. 204, 206. c. 26, p. 101, 102, 104, 299, 676. c. 29, p. 458. c. 30, p. 718. c. 37, p. 661. l. 5, c. 1, p. 112. c. 3, p. 276, 524. c. 5, p. 116, 117, 320, 321. c. 12, p. 721. c. 13, p. 467, 474. c. 16, p. 514, 515. c. 17, p. 661. c. 18, p. 513. c. 20, p. 677. c. 21, p. 118. c. 24, p. 194, 215, 298, 300, 332. c. 26, p. 680. c. 27, p. 721. c. 28, p. 575, 580, 581, 582. l. 6, c. 1, p. 83, 691. c. 3, p. 691. c. 6, p. 528, 694. c. 7, p. 121. c. 8, p. 697. c. 9, p. 101. c. 10, p. 527. c. 11, p. 692. c. 13, p. 691. c. 14, p. 693, 694. c. 15, p. 700. c. 17, p. 708. c. 19, p. 81, 171, 197, 699, 703. c. 20, p. 593, 681. c. 27, p. 707. c. 28, p. 126. c. 30, p. 659. c. 31, p. 709. c. 32, p. 710, 721. c. 33, p. 593. c. 36, p. 704. c. 37, p. 710. c. 39, p. 711. c. 41, p. 130, 132. c. 43, p. 201, 238, 316, 690. c. 46, p. 241, 243. l. 7, c. 2, p. 711. c. 6, p. 599. c. 7, p. 320, 712. c. 8, p. 243. c. 9, p. 309, 321, 323. c. 10, p. 127, 137. c. 11, p. 138. c. 12, p. 472. c. 13, 15, p. 140. c. 18, p. 292. c. 22, p. 258. c. 24, p. 653. c. 30, p. 602, 603, 659. c. 32, p. 721. l. 8, c. 2, p. 148. c. 4, p. 147. c. 32, p. 736. præparatio evangelica, l. 2, c. 2, p. 691. l. 3, c. 7, p. 27. l. 4, c. 2, p. 145. c. 7, p. 31. c. 13, p. 26. c. 21, 22, p. 28. l. 5, c. 1, p. 146. l. 6, c. 10, p. 80. fin. p. 442. l. 7, c. 8, p. 44. demonstratio evangelica, l. 3, pag. 134, p. 172. vita Constantini, l. 2, c. 32, seqq. p. 148. c. 50, p. 145. de martyribus Palæst. c. 1, 3, 9, p. 154. c. 4, p. 721. c. 10, p. 472. c. 11, f. 388, p. 722. adversus Hieroclem, p. 174.
Εὐαγγέλιον κατ' Αἰγυπτίους, abud. Epiph. h. 62, p. 601.
Evangelium ad Hebræos, apud Epiph. h. 30, § 13, p. 348. apud Hieron. in Micham. l. 2, c. 7, (t. 6, f. 520,) apud Orig. in Joann. t. 2, § 6, p. 350.
Faustus Manichæus, apud Agust., c. Faustum, l. 11, 18, p. 502. l. 20, p. 494. l. 32, p. 500, 502.
Felix Manichæus, apud Agust., c. Felicem, l. 1, c. 19, p. 504.
Firmilianus, episc. Cæsar. epistola ad Cypr. (Cypr. ep. 75,) p. 126, 201, 207, 216, 220, 318, 320, 322.
Gennadius, c. 15, p. 686.
Gobarus, apud Photium, cod. 235, p. 675.
Gregorius Naz. orat. 25, p. 82.
Gregorius Nyss. vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi, c. 27, p. 720.
Hegesippus, apud Euseb., l. 2, c. 23, p. 675. l. 4, c. 22, p. 676.
Heracleon in evang. Joann. apud Orig. in Joann. t. 2, § 15, p. 423. t. 6, § 23, p. 430. t. 9, § 12, p. 441. t. 10, § 14, p. 431. § 19, p. 431. t. 13, § 10, p. 432. § 11, p. 373, 432. § 16, p. 422. § 20, p. 432. § 25, 30, p. 422. § 48, p. 423. § 51, p 422. § 59, p. 422. t. 20, § 20, p. 422. in evangel. Lucæ, apud Clement. Strom. l. 4, f. 503, p. 434.
Heraclianus, episc. Chalcedon., ap. Phot. cod. 95, p. 485.
Hermas, Pastor, Fabr. cod. apocr. cod. 3, l. 2, (p. 1009,) p. 646. l. 3, p. 278, 296.
Hieronymus, (ed. Martianay.) Epist. 1 ad Donat. p. 222. ep. 5 ad Ctesiphont. p. 697. ep. 27 ad Marcellum, p. 521. ep. 29 ad Paulum, p. 705. ep. 41 ad Pamach. et Ocean. p. 608, 702. ep. 71 ad Lucin. p. 333. ep. 72 ad Vitalem, p. 297. ep. 83 ad Magnum. p. 661. ep. 146 ad Evangel. p. 190. ep. 148, p. 82. ep. ad Algasia, tom. IV. f. 197, p. 674. de viribus illustribus, c. 1, p. 227. c. 3, p. 349. c. 20, p. 661. c. 25, p, 674. c. 36, p. 527. c. 42, p. 118. c. 47, p. 721. c. 53, p. 685. c. 60, p. 222. c. 63, p. 709. c. 72, p. 485. c. 77, p. 723. c. 79, p. 688. ad versus Rufinum, vol. II. p. 1, p. 589.

vol. 4, l. 1, f. 358, p. 721. l. 1, f. 359, p. 720, 721. l. 2, f. 411, p. 704. f. 413, p. 589. f. 414, p. 704. f. 425, p. 722, 723. commentar. in Isaiam, l. 1, c. 1, t. 3, f. 71, (ed. Vallarsi, Venet. 1767, t. 4, p. 21,) p. 349. l. 2, c. 5, ad Isai. 5, 18, f. 83, (ed. Vallarsi, p. 130,) p. 349. l. 9, c. 29, v. 18, f. 250, (ed. Vallarsi, p. 398,) p. 349. (ed. Vallarsi, p. 130,) p. 349. ad Isai. 31 : 7, 8, f. 261, (ed. Vallarsi, p. 425, ed. Martianay, T. III. p. 79, 83, 250, 261,) p. 350. in Isai. l. IV. c. 11, T. IV. (p. 156,) p. 350. commentar. in Micham. l. 2, c. 7, t. 6, f. 520, p. 350.

Hilarius in epist. ad Ephes. c. 4, v. 12, p. 182. in epist. ad Tim. I. c. 3, p. 190. II. c. 3, 7, p. 506. de synodis, § 86, p. 606.

Hippolytus contra Noetum, § 1, p. 584. apud Phot. cod. 121, 202, p. 682.

Ignatius, epistola ad Ephes. c. 11, 42, p. 196. c. 20, p. 647. ep. II. ad Polycarp, § 5, p. 284. c. 4, p. 269. ad Magnes. c. 9, p. 295, 296. ad Smyrn. § 2, p. 631.

Irenæus, (ed. Massuet.) Hæres. l. 1, c. 1, § 3, p. 418. c. 3, p. 439. c. 3, § 5, p. 420. c. 5, § 2, p. 424. c. 6, p. 263. c. 7, § 3, 4, p. 426. c. 8, § 4, p. 423. c. 10, p. 84. c. 11, § 2, p. 438. c. 12, § 3, p. 424. c. 21, p. 477. c. 21, § 4, p. 476. c. 24, p. 400, 448, 471. c. 25, p. 450. c. 26, p. 348, 452. § 2, p. 348, 397, 452. c. 27, § 2, p. 471. c. 29, p. 456. c. 31, p. 448. l. 2, c. 4, p. 375. c. 10, § 1, p. 613. c. 16, p. 400. c. 22, § 4, p. 311. c. 28, § 3, p. 613. c. 32, § 4, p. 74. l. 3, c. 2, p. 389. c. 3, p. 196, 204. § 4, p. 465. c. 4, p. 85. c. 5, p. 389. c. 7, p. 679. c. 11, p. 452. § 9, p. 527. c. 13, § 4, p. 560. c. 14, p. 192. c. 15, p. 390. 393. c. 17, p. 646. c. 18, 20, (alias 22,) p. 642. c. 22, p. 634. c. 24, § 1, p. 209. c. 31, p. 642. l. 4, c. 13, 14, p. 645. c. 18, p. 330. § 4, p. 331. c. 26, p. 192. c. 30, p. 119, 274. c. 33, § 6, p. 678. § 7, p. 209. § 9, p. 119. l. 5, c. 1, § 1, p. 635, 641. c. 31, p. 654. c. 32, p. 651. c. 35, p. 651. epistola ad Victorem, ap. Euseb. 5. 24, p. 215, 300. 332. epistola ad Florinum, ap. Euseb. 5. 20, p. 677.

Isidorus, comment. in prophet. Parchor. ap. Clem. Strom. l. 6, f. 641, p. 406.

Julius Africanus, epistola ad Aristidem, ap. Euseb. 6. 31, (Routh, reliq. sacr. vol. 2, p. 115.) p. 709.

Justinus Martyr, (ed. Colon. 1686,) apologia I. f. 45, p. 74. § 66, p. 648. f. 48, p. 586. f. 50, 51, p. 662. apologia II. p. 250, 259, 275, 283, 303, 662. f. 56, p. 609. c. 58, p. 96. f. 68, p. 76. f. 74, p. 670. f. 75, p. 580. f. 81, p. 667. f. 88, p. 63. f. 98, p. 79. § 10, p. 635. § 61, p. 305. dialogus, c. Tryphone Judæo, f. 218, p. 9, 275. f. 247, p. 669. f. 259, p. 298. f. 264, p. 669. f. 266, p. 342, 362. f. 267, p. 342, 363, 585. f. 273, p. 670. f. 291, p. 347. f. 315, p. 348. f. 317, p. 642. f. 320, p. 669. f. 322, p. 642. f. 327 331, p. 585. f. 338, p. 298. f. 344, p. 609. f. 345, p. 129, 330. f. 349, p. 668. f. 350, p. 68. f. 358, p. 42, 130. f. 370, p. 62. cohortatio, p. 15, p. 666. Δόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας, p. 666. editio Benedict. apol. I. § 4, 6, 8, p. 665.

Lactantius, institutiones, l. 4, c. 27, p. 145. l. 5, c. 11, p. 126. l. 6, c. 13, p. 172. de mortib. persecutorum, c. 10, p. 145, 153. c. 16, p. 155, 174.

Leontius Byzantinus contra Nestorium et Eutychen, (translation,) Greek fragments in Erlich dissertatio de erroribus Pauli Samosateni, Lips. 1745, (p. 23,) p. 602, 603.

Mani, epistola fundamenti, ap. August. de epist. fund. c. 13, p. 490. de fide contra Manichæos, (Euod. Uzal.,) c. 4, p. 501. c. 11, p. 490. thesaurus, ap. August. de natura boni, c. 46, p. 495. epistola ad Scythianum Fabricius bilioth. græca, vol. 7, f. 316, p. 486. epistola ad virginem Menoch, ap. August. opus imperfect. c. Julian. l. 3, c. 174, p. 496. c. 172, 187, p. 498. ad Patricium, ap. August. op. imp. c. Julian. c. 186, p. 497. ad Addam, Fabr. biblioth. græca, (edit. nova,) vol. 7, f. 316, p. 499, 500. epistolæ Fabr. biblioth. græca, vol. 7, f. 316, p. 502.

Melito Sard. apud Euseb. l. 4, c. 26, p. 101, 102.

Methodius, Combefis. biblioth. græc. patr. auctar. noviss. P. 1. f. 113, p. 358. περὶ κτισμάτων, ap. Phot. cod. 235, p. 569. de libero arbitrio, Galland. biblioth. patr. t. 3, f. 762, p. 422. Symposium Orat. II. Theophil. § 5, p. 721. Orat. IX. § 5, p. 721.

Militiades περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν προφήτην ἐν ἐκστάσει λαλεῖν, p. 519.

Minucius Felix, Octavius, p. 88, 92. c. 8, p. 78, 271. c. 9, p. 76.

Montanus, apud Epiphan. hæres. 48. Euseb. l. 5, c. 16, p. 515.

Novatianus de trinitate, c. 6, 8, p. 560. epist. ad Dionys. Alexandr. ap. Euseb. l. 6, c. 46, p. 241.

Optatus Milevensis de schismate Donatistarum, ed. Du Pin, (p. 174,) p. 150. l. 1, c. 22, p. 155.

Origenes, c. Celsum, l. 1, c. 1, p. 74, 88, 108. c. 2, p. 4, 74, 76. c. 4, p. 160, 559. c. 9, p. 164, 544. c. 17, p. 171. c. 28, p. 161, 162. c. 32, p. 639. c. 46, p. 75. c. 57, p. 454. c. 67, p. 169, 250. l. 2, c. 1, p. 345. c. 9, p. 636. c. 10, p. 169. c. 16, p. 627. c. 23, p. 639. c. 27, p. 165. c. 13, 34, 41, 42, p. 169. c. 55, 63, 67, p. 169. l. 3, f. 55, p 70. c. 7, p. 89. c. 8, p. 127. c. 9, p. 79, 128. c. 10, p. 164. c. 14, p. 89. c. 15, p. 128. c. 24, p. 75. c. 27, p. 474. c. 29, p. 250. c. 41, p. 636. c. 42, p. 639. c 44, p. 164. c. 46, p. 544. c. 50, p. 305. c. 51, p. 219, 305. c. 59, p. 166. c. 62, p. 166. c. 65, p. 166. c. 70, p. 570. c. 76, p. 627. l. 4, c. 15, p. 639. c. 16, p. 633. c. 36

p. 160. c. 40, p. 627. c. 48, p. 171. c. 57, p. 655. c. 62, 69, p. 168. c. 69, p. 656. c. 69, 75, 76, 81, p. 167, 168. c. 73, 75, p. 169. c. 99, p. 168. l. 5, c. 14, p. 570. c. 23, p. 570, 571. c. 25, p. 87. c. 54, p. 475. c. 61, p. 177, 348. c. 63, p. 164. l. 6, c. 12, seqq. p. 544. c. 13, p. 544. c. 15, p. 167. c. 24, p. 699. c. 25, p. 91. c. 28, p. 128, 447. c. 41, p. 161. c. 42, p. 402. c. 44, p. 623. c. 75, p. 639. c. 77, p. 634. l. 7, c. 26, p. 128. c. 36, 42, p. 164. c. 56, p. 177. l. 8, c. 12, p. 577, 588. c. 17, p. 90, 284. c. 21, p. 265. c. 22, p. 300. c. 35, p. 169. c. 41, p. 108. c. 63, 67, p. 91. c. 68, p. 91, 129. c. 69, p. 108. c. 70, p. 129. c. 72, p. 90. fin. p. 272. In Joannem, t. 1, § 9, p. 548, 552. 11, p. 550. 16, p. 623. 17, p. 625. 22, p. 548, 627. 24, p. 411. 30, p. 636. 32, p. 588. 40, p. 564. 42, p. 593. t. 2, § 1, p. 583. 2, p. 576, 577, 587, 590. 3, p. 578. 4, p. 552. 6, p. 350. 7, p. 623, 624. 15, p. 433, 628. 18, p. 577. 21, p. 643. 25, p. 67, (ed. Lommatzsch, p. 146,) p. 591. t. 5, § 4, p. 367. (edit. Lommatzsch, vol. 1, p. 172,) p. 473. t. 6, § 1, p. 704. 2, p. 520. 12, p. 441. 17, p. 253, 648. 23, p. 430. 24, p. 703. 34, p. 643. t. 10, p. 590. § 4, p. 556. 13, p. 702. 14, p. 399. 19, p. 431. 21, p. 577. 27, p. 547. t. 12, § 3, p. 587. t. 13, § 5, p. 551. 10, p. 432. 11, p. 373, 432. 16, p. 421, 422, 427. 20, p. 432. 21, p. 560. 25, p. 422, 568, 590, 591. 30, p. 422. 34, p. 627. 38, 41, p. 436. 48, p. 423. 51, 52, p. 307, 546. 58, p. 543. 59, p. 422, 432, 624. t. 19, § 1, p. 545, 591. § 3, p. 251. § 4, p. 644. § 5, p. 624, 625, 636, 638. t. 20, § 16, p. 568, 590. § 17, p. 636. § 18, p. 637. 20, p. 421, 422. 25, p. 638. 28, p. 549, 633. t. 22, § 18, p. 571. t. 28, § 14, p. 643. t. 32, § 5, p. 700. 11, p. 627, 628, 636. 16, p. 649. 18, p. 568, 569, 587, 622. In Math. ed. Huet. t. 2, § 10, p. 624. t. 3, (p. 857. ed. de la Rue,) p. 126. t. 4, (Lat. ed. Lomm. p. 73, et. seqq.) p. 644. t. 10, § 2, p. 623. 9, § 23, p. 695. (ed. Lomm. vol. 3, p. 26,) p. 546. t. 11, § 12, p. 346. 14, p. 649. 17, p. 694. t. 12, § 6, p. 547. 37, p. 633. t. 13, § 1, (ed. Lomm. vol. 3, p. 210,) p. 571. 2, p. 629. 7, p. 201. 22, p. 630. 26, p. 622, 636, 639. t. 14, § 16, p. 528. t. 15, § 3, p. 697. 7, (ed. Lomm. vol. 3, p. 340,) p. 552. t. 15, § 1, p. 563, 695. 3, p. 694, 698. 23, p. 648. t. 16, § 1, p. 695. 8, p. 594, 603, 636, 640, 644. 9, p. 530. 12, p. 345, 364. 22, p. 233. 25, p. 705. t. 17, § 14, p. 578. 26, p. 699. 30, p. 625. t. 20, § 20, p. 421. f. 213, p. 548. f. 268, p. 550. f. 290, p. 550. f. 334, p. 636. f. 363, p. 522. f. 367, (t. 15,) p. 698. f. 374, 375, p. 552. f. 378, p. 563. f. 381, (t. 15,) p. 708. f. 402, p. 656. f. 420, p. 603. f. 423, p. 636. f. 445, (t. 16,) p. 705. opera de la Rue, vol. 3, f. 887, p. 639. f. 898, p. 649. Commentar. series in Matth. § 62, (ed. Lomm. t. 4, p. 352,) p. 629. § 100, (ed. Lomm. t. 4, p. 446,) p. 634. Homiliæ in Jeremiam, h. 2. 16, p. 627. h. 8. 8, p. 705. h. 9. 3, p. 569. h. 9. 4, p. 589. h. 14, p. 627. h. 15. 6, p. 636. h. 18. 6, p. 563. h. 18. 12, p. 346. h. 19. 4, p. 277. *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, præf. f. 4, p. 568. l. 1, c. 2, § 6, p. 568. (ed. de la Rue, t. 1, f. 76,) p. 627. c. 8. 3, p. 638. l. 2, c. 1, p. 624. c. 1. 4, p. 568. c. 2. 2, p. 624. c. 4, p 656. c. 5. 3, p. 638. c. 5. 5, p. 638. c. 6, p. 636. c. 8, p. 626. c. 8. 3, p. 637. c. 9, p. 570, 571. l. 3, c. 4, p. 629. c. 5, p. 568. l. 4, c. 8, p. 463. de oratione dominica, c. 7, p. 625. c. 12, p. 285. c. 13, p. 285. c. 15, p. 590. c. 22, p. 285. c. 29, p. 629, 630. c. 31, p. 288, 289. Commentar. in epist. ad Rom. l. 1, (ed. Lomm. vol. 5, p. 250,) p. 636. l. 1, (ed. Lomm. vol. 5, p. 251,) p. 571. l. 2, (ed. Lomm. vol. 6, p. 107,), p. 628. c. 9, (ed. Lomm. vol. 6, p. 108,) p. 629. l. 4, (ed. de la Rue, t. 4, f. 549,) p. 404. l. 5, p. 314. commentar. in Genesin, init. p. 568. ed. de la Rue, t. 2, f. 25, p. 676. Selecta in Psalmos, 44. 1, p. 588. ed. de la Rue, t. 2, f. 570, p. 651. ed. Lomm. t. 11, p. 388, p. 655. commentar. in Exod. 10 : 27, p. 629. ed. Lomm. t. 8, p. 299, p. 613. ed. Lomm. t. 8, p. 300, p. 564. commentar. in Titum fragm. p. 578, 593. homilia in Isaiam, 4, 1, p. 626. homilia in Jerem. 14, p. 627. homilia in Lucam, 14, p. 314. de martyribus, § 4, p. 706. 7, p. 625. 12, p. 637. epistola ad Greg. Thaumaturg. p. 287. epistola ad Jul. African. § 4, p. 710. 5, p. 708. epist. ad Demetrium, (apud Hieron. adv. Rufinum, 2, f. 411, ed. Mart.,) p. 704. epist. ad synodum, (Hieron. adv. Ruf. 2, f. 411, ed. Mart.,) p. 705. epist. t. 1, f. 3, (ed. de la Rue,) p. 701. dialogus de recta in Deum fide, (opp. de la Rue, t. 1, f. 807,) p. 473, 474. Philocalia, c. 1, p. 17, p. 557, 681. p. 28, p. 554. p. 51, p. 554. c. 2, p. 10, 61. p. 553. c. 13, p. 718. c. 14, p. 387. c. 15, p. 544, 553. p. 139 p. 556. c. 24, (ed. Lomm. t. 11, p. 450,) p. 630. c. 26, (de la Rue, t. 2, f. 111 ; Lomm. t. 8, p. 305,) p. 629.

Pacianus Barcelonensis, epist. 3, contra Novat., (Galland. biblioth. patr. t. 7,) p. 246.

Palladius, Lausiaca, c. 147, p. 708.

Pamphilus, apologia Origenis, (ed. de la Rue, t. 4, f. 35,) p. 640.

Papias, *λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξηγήσεις*, fragm. J. A. Cramer Catena in acta apost. Oxon. 1838, p. 12, p. 650.

Paulus Samosatenus, ap. Epiphan. hæres. h. 67, p. 602. ap. Leont. Byzant. contra Nest. et Eutych. p. 602.

Περίοδοι ἀποστόλων, act. conc. Nic. 2, actio 5, (ed. Mansi, t. 13, f. 167,) p. 500.

Philostorgius, hist. eccles. l. 3, c. 4, 5, p. 83.
Photius, cod. 95, p. 485. cod. 111, p. 692. cod. 118, p. 693, 704, 710. cod. 121, p. 681 cod. 202, p. 682. cod. 255, p. 675.
Polycrates, ap. Euseb. h. eccles. 5. 24, p. 194, 298.
Pontius diaconus, vita Cypriani, p. 139, 222, A. 1, p. 223.
Prædestinatus, h. 26, 86, p. 685.
Ptolemæus, ep. ad Floram, p. 437, 438.
Rhodon, ap. Euseb. h. eccl. 5. 13, p. 467.
Rufinus, expositio symboli apostolici, p. 306, 307. de adulteratione librorum Origenis, (opp. Hieron. t. 5, f. 251, ed. Martianay,) p. 705.
Sabellius, ap. Athan. c. Arian. or. 4, § 8, p. 598. § 11, p. 597. § 12, p. 598, 600. § 13, p. 595. § 20, 21, 22, p. 598. § 23, p. 599. § 25, p. 595, 597, 598, 599. ap. Basilium, ep. 210, 214. § 3, ep. 235, § 6, p. 596. ap. Epiphan. hæres. 62, p. 596. ap. Justin. Mart. dial. c. Tryph. Jud. f. 358, (ed. Colon.,) p. 597. ap. Theodoret. hæret. fab. 2. 9, p. 600.
Severus Asmonin. (Renaudot, hist. patriarch. Alexandr. p. 40,) p. 485.
Socrates, h. eccles. l. 3, c. 7, p. 593. c. 23, p. 170. l. 4, c. 13, p. 720. c. 28, p. 244.
Sozomenus, h. eccl. l. 7, c. 19, p. 303.
Sulpicius Severus, hist. sacr. l. II. c. 31, p. 344.
Tabenistanensis, annales regnum atque legatorum Dei, vol. 2, p. 1, Gryph. 1835, p. 103, p. 350.
Tatianus, oratio contra Græcos, § 19, p. 671.
Tertullianus, Apologeticus, f. 98, p. 79. c. 1, p. 84. c. 3, p. 269. c. 5, p. 93, 96, 116. c. 7, p. 327. c. 17, p. 177. c. 21, p. 93, 272, 685. c. 34, p. 90. c. 39, p. 76, 192, 325. c. 42, p. 259, 273. c. 46, p. 78. ad Nationes, l. 1, c. 5, p. 218, 254. c. 18, p. 77. ad Scapulam, c. 2, p. 175. c. 4, p. 84, 116, 119, 122. c. 5, p. 102, 119. ad Martyres, c. 1, p. 229. de idololatria, c. 6, p. 262. c. 11, p. 262. c. 14, p. 277, 301. c. 15, p. 91, 259. c. 18, p. 271, 272. c. 19, p. 273. de spectaculis, c. 1, p. 265. c. 2, p. 72. c. 15, p. 264. 19, p. 263. c. 24, p. 265. 26, p. 265. de corona militis, c. 2, p. 273. c. 3, p. 293, 308, 309, 317, 334, 517. c. 4, p. 269. c. 11, p. 270. c. 13, p. 269. de fuga in persecutione, c. 12, p. 121, 122, 521. c. 13, p. 121. c. 14, p. 121. de pudicitia, c. 1, p. 214. c. 4, p. 522. c. 7, 10, p. 292. c. 12, p. 517. c. 19, p. 221, 318, 523. c. 21, p. 517, 518. c. 22, p. 229, 523. de pœnitentia, c. 5, p. 220. c. 6, p. 252, 306. c. 9, p. 219. 220. c. 10, p. 219. de jejuniis, c. 11, p. 525. c. 13, p. 206, 256, 280, 521. c. 14, p. 294, 296. c. 17, p. 326. de exhortatione castitatis, c. 5, p. 680. c. 11, p. 334, 522. de baptismo. c. 7, p. 315. c. 8, p. 316. c. 15, p. 318. c. 17, 195, 196. c. 18, p. 312, 315, 615. de virginibus velandis, c. 1, p. 214, 516, 517. c. 9, p. 188, 214. de pallio, p. 275. de monogamia, p. 519, c. 1, p. 522. c. 12, p. 197. c. 20, p. 522. ad uxorem, l. 2, c. 4, p. 255, 325. c. 5, p. 332. c. 8, p. 255, 281, 284. de cultu fœminarum, l. 2, c. 9, p. 275. c. 11, p. 282. de patientia, c. 1, p. 616, 619. de oratione, c. 6, p. 648. c. 19, p. 332. c. 23, p. 296, 297, 301. c. 24, p. 289. c. 25, 26, p. 286, seqq. c. 28, (Muratori Anecdota bibl. Ambros. t. 3,) p. 284. De anima, c. 9, p. 520. c. 10, p. 615. c. 11, p. 617. c. 12, p. 635. c. 16, p. 618. c. 19, p. 615. c. 21, p. 617, 619. c. 22, p. 616, 618. c. 41, p. 616, 646. c. 47, p. 75. c. 55, p. 654. c. 56, p. 523. c. 58, p. 654. de testimonio animæ, p. 177, c. 1, p. 559. de carne Christi, c. 5, p. 631. c. 6, p. 642. c. 9, p. 631. c. 11, seqq. p. 560, 635. c. 14, p. 631. de resurrectione carnis, c. 2, p. 474. c. 8, p. 315, 316, 648. c. 48, p. 308, 478. adv. Judæos, c. 7, p. 85. adv. Valentinianos, c. 4, p. 437. c. 5, 678. adv. Praxeam. p. 605. c. 1, p. 583. c. 3, p. 576. c. 7, p. 560. c. 10, p. 584. c. 12, p. 642. c. 14, 26, 27, p. 584. contra Marcionem, l. 1, c. 2, p. 684. c. 5, p. 467. c. 7, p. 466. c. 10, p. 559. c. 11, p. 468. c. 14, p. 315, 317. c. 15, p. 466. c. 18, p. 559. c. 19, p. 469, 559. c. 20, p. 680. c. 28, p. 472. c. 34, p. 473. l. 2, c. 12, 13, p. 561. c. 16, 27, p. 562. c. 29, p. 562. l. 3, c. 3, p. 470. c. 3, 4, p. 471. c. 15, p. 470. c. 24, p. 468, 471. l. 4, p. 462. c. 2, 3, p. 473. c. 5, p. 474. c. 9, p. 465, 470. c. 10, p. 561. c. 17, p. 469. c. 22, p. 519. c. 29, p. 471. c. 35, p. 470. c. 36, p. 465. c. 40, p. 648. l. 5, c. 1, p. 306. c. 1, 10, p. 478. adv. Hermogenem, c. 15, p. 566. c. 36, p. 617. Præscriptio hæreticorum, c. 13, p. 684. c. 19, p. 582. c. 22, p. 213. c. 30, p. 462, 463, 465, 474. c. 39, p. 463. c. 41, p. 201, 328, 478. addit. p. 463. addit. c. 53, p. 580.
Testamentum XII. patriarcharum. Test. III. c. 8, p. 194. t. IV. (Jud.) c. 21, p. 365. t. IV. c. 23, p. 348. t. VII. (Dan.) c. 5, p. 348, 352.
Theodoretus, hæret. fab. I. 14, p. 444. 19, p. 567, 618. 20, p. 458. 21, p. 458. f. II. 3, p. 396. 9, p. 600. f. III. 3, p. 584.
Theodoretus, h. eccl. l. 1, c. 4, p. 723.
Theodorus, Panegyricus in Originem, c. 15, p. 717.
Theodotus, didasc. Anatol., 429, (opp. Clem. ed. Par. 1641,) f. 794, p. 404. f. 796, D. p. 411. f. 797, B. p. 425, 433. f. 800, col. 2, D. p, 477. f. 806, p. 457.
Theonas Alexandr. epist. ad Lucianum, (d'Achery Spicilegium, f. 297. Galland. bibl. patr. t. 4,) p. 143.
Theophilus ad Autolycum, p. 71. l. 1, c. 2, p. 559. or. 2, § 5, p. 721. or. 9, § 5, p. 721.

Titus Bostrensis, c. Manichæos, l. 1, c. 12, p. 492. c. 30, p. 500. præf ad lib. 3, (Can. lect. ant. ed. Basn. Antv. 1725, t. 1, f. 137,) p. 496. l. 3, initio, p. 501.

Victorianus, episc. Patab. (in Pannonia,) hist. creationis (ed. Cave, hist. ap. Galland. bibl. patr. t. 4; Routh, rel. sacr. vol. 3, p. 273, Oxon. 1815,) p. 296.

III. CITATIONS FROM PROFANE WRITERS.

Ælius Lampridius, vita Alexandri Severi, c. 1, p. 120. c. 24, p. 103. c. 45, p. 199. vita Commodi, c. 6, 7, p. 119. vita Heliogabali, c. 3, 6, 7, p. 125.

Ælius Spartianus, vita Hadriani, c. 22, p. 102. vita Caracallæ, l. 6, c. 6, p. 703. vita Septimii Severi, c. 17, p. 120.

Ammianus Marcellinus, l. 25, c. 4, p. 107.

Apollonius Tyanensis, apud Euseb. præparat. evangel. l. 4, c. 13, (Porphyr. de abstin. carn. l. 2, § 34,) p. 26. epistolæ, (Philostratus opp. ed. Olearius ep. 58, f. 401,) p. 31.

Arrhianus, diatribæ, l. 4, c. 7, p, 159.

Aristides, encomium Romæ, p. 88. orationes. p. 73.

Aristoteles, ethica Nicomach. l. 3, c. 7, p. 611. 9. 13, p. 267, 268. 10. 7, p. 628. ethica magna, l, (ed. Bekker, p. 1197,) p. 558. l. 34, p. 281. ethica Eudem. 3. 3, p. 19. Metaphysica. 10. 8, (ed. Bekker, t. 2, p. 1074,) p. 7. Politica, l. 2, p. 46. 3. 5, p. 29. de anima, 3. 5, p. 426.

Artemidorus, Oneirocrit. l. 4, 5, c. 18, p. 275.

Athenæus, Deipnosoph. l. 1, § 36, p. 205.

Aulus Gellius, noctes atticæ, l. 12, c. 11, p. 158.

Cicero de legibus, l. 2, c. 8, p. 86.

Digesta, t. 12, l. 12, c. 1, § 14, p. 120. t. 14, l. 1, c. 4, p. 126.

Dio Cassius, p. 96, 97. l. 55, c. 23, p. 116. l. 71, § 8, p. 116 72. 4, p. 118.

Dio Chrysostomus, (orat. II. ed. Reiske, vol. 1, pag. 405,) orat. 12, p. 27, 86.

Diocletianus, edictum contra Manich. (Hilarius in epist. sec. ad Timoth. 3, 7,) p. 144. edictum, c. Christian. (Euseb. h. eccl. l. 8, c. 2; vita Constant. l. 2, c. 32; Lactant. de mort. persecut. c. 10,) p. 148.

Dionysius Halicarn. antiquitt. Rom. l. 2, c. 18, p. 6. 19, p. 88. 20, p. 29. 68, p. 12. 4. 62; p. 177.

Domitius Ulpianus de officiis Proconsulum Fragm. Digest. t. 14, l. 1, c. 4, seqq. p. 126.

Flavius Vopiscus, Saturninus, c. 8, p. 102. vita Aureliani, c. 20, p. 142.

Galenus de differentia pulsuum, l. 2, c. 4, p. 164, (ed. Charter,) l. 3, c. 3, (t. 8, f. 68,) p. 164, 172.

Galerius, edictum. p. 144, 156.

Hadrianus, ep. ad Cons. Servianum, ap. Flav Vopisc. in Saturnino, c. 8, p. 102.

Hierocles, *λόγοι φιλαλήθεις πρὸς τοὺς Χριστιανούς*, (ap. Lact. institut. l. 5, c. 2; de mort. persecut. c. 16,) p. 173.

Historia Edessena e nummis illustrata, (auct. Bayer,) l. 3, pag. 173, p. 80.

History of the East Moguls, (in German: Schmidt, p. 271,) p. 482.

Homerus, Ilias, l. 2, v. 204, p. 154.

Josephus Archæol. l. 16, c. 2, § 4, p. 88. l. 18, c. 1, p. 38, 41. § 4, p. 48. de bello Judaico, l. 2, c. 8, § 1, p. 38. § 4, p. 44. § 6, 12, 13, p. 45. § 8, 9, p. 47. § 10, p. 43. § 13, p. 45. contra Apionem, l. 1, § 8, p. 41.

Julius Capitolinus, vita Antonini Pii, c. 9, p. 103. c. 11, 24, p. 105. c. 13, 21, p. 107. c. 24, p. 105.

Julius Paulus, sententiæ receptæ, p. 109, t. 21, l. 5, p. 87.

Juvenalis, Sat. 2, p. 16. Sat. 3. v. 75, p. 103.

Lucianus. *Ἁλιεύς*, p. 9. Demonax. Cypr. p. 10. Hermotimos, § 81, p. 16. *Ζεὺς ἐλεγχόμενος*, p. 24. Jupiter Tragœdus, p. 93. Peregrinus Proteus, p. 158, seqq. *Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ Ψευδομάντις*, § 12, p. 161.

Marc. Aurelius, *εἰς ἑαυτόν*. l. 1, c. 6, p. 73. c. 17, p. 106, 107. l. 1, fin. p. 116. l. 10, c. 14, p. 17. l. 11, c. 3, p. 105. c. 18, p. 106. l. 12, c. 28, p. 106. edict. in Pandect. p. 107.

Malalas, Johannes, ed. Niebuhr, l. 11, p. 273, p. 100.

Mihr Nersch. Proclamation, (St. Martin, memoires hist. et geograph. sur l'Armenie, t. 2, p. 472. Paris, 1819. Elisæus, history of the religious wars between the Armenians and the Persians, transl. into English by Prof. Newman, p. 1099, Lond. 1830,) p. 489.

Notitia dignitatum imperii Romani, sec. 27, p. 116.

Pausanias, l. 8, c. 2, § 2, p. 12.

Pherecides, fragm. (ed. Sturz. p. 46,) p. 402.

Philo. Quod omnis probus liber, § 12, p. 44, 47, 48. Oratio in Flaccum, § 6, p. 50. de sacrif. Abel et Caini, § 17, p. 61. Legi allegor. I. § 12, p. 66. de vita Mosis, l. 1, f. 607, p. 51. § 27, f. 625, p. 52. l. 2, § 3, p. 65. § 38. p. 55. l. 3, § 17, p. 66. l. 3, f. 681, p. 61. de confusione ling. § 5, f. 320, p. 51. de nominibus mutatis, § 8, p. 1053, p. 51. de caritate, § 2, f. 699, p. 52. de Abrahamo, § 19, f. 364, p. 52. f. 367, p. 601. de victimis, f. 238, § 3, p. 52. de vic-

timas offerent. f. 854, p. 61. § 12, f. 856, p. 52. de plantat. Noæ, § 17, p 53. l. 2, § 8, f. 219, p. 54. Quæstiones in Genesin, l. 1, § 55, p. 57. l. 3, § 3, (ed. Lips. opp. Philonis, t. 7, p. 5,) p 53. Quis rerum divinarum hæres. § 16, f. 492, p. 55. Legis allegoria, l. 1, § 12, p. 66. l. 2, § 7, p. 56. § 21, p. 59. l. 3, § 33, p. 57. § 73, p. 397. Quod deterior potiori insidiatur, § 6, p. 56. § 7, p. 60. Quod Deus immutab. § 11, p. 57. § 14, p. 58. § 16, p. 66. de præmio et pœna, § 7, p. 57. § 18, 19, p. 65. de Cherubim, § 5, p. 58. de migratione Abrahami, § 16, p. 58. f. 402, p. 59. de decalogo, § 22, p. 59, 60. f. 760, p. 61. de profugis, § 1, p. 59. § 6, p. 60. § 6. f. 455, p. 60. § 7, p. 60. § 15, 18, p. 66. de monarchia, l. 2, p. 407. l. 2, § 3, p. 65. f. 816, p. 61. de vita contemplativa, § 3, p. 62. de execrationibus, § 9, p. 65. de mundi opificio, § 24, p. 396. opp. f. 186, p. 697. de somniis, l. 1, § 41, p. 397. f. 580, p. 54.

Philostratus, l. 4, (f. 200, ed. Morelli, Paris, 1608; c. 40, f. 181, ed. Olearius,) p. 31. ep. 58, (ed. Olear. f. 401,) p. 31. vita Apollonii Tyanensis, l. 6, c. 29, p. 174.

Plato, Phædrus, (ed. Bip. vol. 10, p. 285,) p. 5. de legib. l. 4, (ed. Bip. vol. 8, p. 185,) p. 19, 572. l. 10, p. 87–91, (ed. Bip. vol. 9,) p. 375. Timæus, p. 25, 26. Tim. p. 569, (t. 9, p. 326, ed. Bip.) p. 396. de republic. p. 26. l. 2, (p. 257); l. 3, (vol. 6, p. 266, ed. Bip.) p. 58. Philebus, p. 26.

Plinius, hist. nat. l. 2, c. 4, seqq.; l. 7, c. 1, p. 10.

Plinius, sec. epist. l. 1, ep. 12, 22; l. 3, ep. 7; l. 6, ep. 24, p. 16. l. 10, ep. 97, p. 97, 99.

Plotinus, (anecdota græca, t. 2, p. 237, ed. Villoison, Venet. 1781,) p 26. Ennead, I. l. 8, c. 14, p. 376. II. l. 9, p. 369, 390. l. 10. c. 9, p. 29. III. l. 2, p. 406. l. 7, p. 569, 586.

Plutarchus de superstitione, c. 33, p. 13. *περὶ δεισιδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθεότητος*, p. 13, 14. de Iside et Osiride, c. 1, p. 34. c. 20, p. 23. c. 23, p. 21. c. 37, p. 20. c. 71, p. 14. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 20, p. 15. c. 22, p. 21. de Stoicorum repugnantiis, c. 6, p. 18. c. 13, p. 16. c. 15, p. 22. c. 35, p. 16. c. 38, p. 22. c. 39, p. 16. de sera numinis vindicta, c. 3, p. 19. defectu oraculorum, l. 1, c. 2, p. 20. c. 9, p. 21. c. 12, p. 28. c. 24, p. 571. c. 47, p. 23. adversus Stoicos, c. 31, p. 20. Pericles, c. 6, p. 23. de Pythiæ oraculis, c. 6, p. 177. c. 7, 21, p. 24. c. 9, p. 176. c. 24, p. 514. de *εἰ* apud Delphos, c. 20, p. 25. Life of Alexander, c. 27. Oratio 1, de Alexandri virtute sive fortuna, § 6, 10, p. 50. Quæstiones Platonicæ, qu. IV. p. 375. de anima procreatrice in Timæo, c. 9, (opp. ed. Hutten. t. 12, p. 296,) p. 376.

Polybius, l. 3. 6, c. 6, p. 3. l. 6, c. 56, p. 6.

Porphyrius de abstinentia carnis, l. 1, c. 40, seqq. p. 385. l. 2, c. 34, p. 26. vita Plotini, p. 27. c. 2, p. 31. c. 16, p. 390. *περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας*, Euseb. præpar. evang. l. 4, c. 7, p. 31. l. 5, c. 1, p. 171. ap. Augustin. de civitate Dei, l. 19, c. 23, p. 171. ap. Euseb. demonstrat. evang. l. 3, p. 134, p. 171. ep. ad Marcellam uxorem, p. 172. c. 18, p. 170. c. 24, (ed. Maji, Mil. 1816), p. 170. *κατὰ Χριστιανῶν* Euseb. l. 6, c. 19, p. 699. Euseb, h. eccl. l. 6, c. 19, p. 171.

Pseudosibyllinæ, p. 96.

Seneca, ep. 41 ad Lucil. p. 18.

Septimius Severus in Digestis, l. 12, tit. 12, § 14, p. 120.

Sextus, Gnomæ, 12, p. 697.

Simplicius, (in Epictet. f. 187, ed. Salmas,) p. 491.

זכות אדם in Eisenmenger, Part I. c. 8, pag. 336, p. 354.

Stobæus, Eclogæ, l. 2, c. 1. 11, (ed. Heeren, P. II. p. 10,) p. 10.

Strabo, l. 1, c. 2, p. 7. l. 16, c. 2, p. 9.

Suetonius, vita Claudii, c. 24, p. 604.

Tacitus, Annal. l. 2, c. 4, p. 108. c. 30, p. 112. c. 85, p. 89. l. 11. c. 15; l. 13, c. 32, p. 89. l. 14, c. 42, p. 268. l. 15, c. 42, p. 95. c. 44, p. 94. Hist. l. 2, c. 8, p. 96.

Themistius, or. 15. *τίς ἡ βασιλικωτάτη τῶν ἀρετῶν*, p. 116.

Varro, 177, pag. 15, p. 86.

Virgilius, IV. Eclog. p. 177.

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